CoSA-Drive: Counterfactual Safety Authorization for Vision-Language-Action Models in Autonomous Driving

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Paper under double-blind review

Abstract

Vision-language-action (VLA) models have advanced autonomous driving by integrating visual observations, temporal context, vehicle states, and task instructions into unified policies. However, this multimodal coupling introduces new safety risks: corruption in any information condition can propagate through the decision chain and induce unsafe behaviors. Existing defenses mainly rely on attack detection, input restoration, or robust policy training, implicitly assuming that repaired inputs lead to safe execution. This assumption is unreliable because input fidelity does not necessarily reflect the safety of the resulting behavior. We propose **CoSA-Drive**, a runtime assurance framework that reformulates driving-VLA defense as evidence-grounded counterfactual behavior authorization. Instead of directly executing repaired inputs, CoSA-Drive allows heterogeneous defense operators to generate alternative candidate behaviors. Its core learned component, **CERA**, evaluates candidates using runtime evidence, behavioral safety, intervention-induced harm, and task utility under uncertainty. A deterministic **DriveContract** module independently enforces physical, traffic, authority, and operational constraints before execution. Experiments across heterogeneous driving-VLA backends and reactive CARLA environments show that multimodal corruption causes substantial behavioral degradation, while input restoration alone does not guarantee safer driving. CoSA-Drive improves downstream planning quality and closed-loop safety compared with restoration-based and rule-based defenses, while preserving task progress. These results establish behavior-level authorization as a practical paradigm for trustworthy driving VLA systems beyond input repair.

1 Introduction

Vision-language-action models connect Internet-scale visual-language representations to embodied decisions, enabling a policy to interpret a scene, reason about a task, and produce physical actions (Ma et al., 2026; Kawaharazuka et al., 2025). This paradigm is increasingly visible in autonomous driving: language-guided and multimodal planners can combine camera observations, temporal context, ego state, navigation commands, and map information to predict trajectories or control signals (Zhou et al., 2024; Cui et al., 2024; Tian et al., 2025). Such integration promises more semantically capable driving agents (Chen et al., 2024), but it also creates a coupled decision chain whose safety depends on multiple information sources remaining jointly reliable (Li et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2026).

This coupling exposes failure modes that extend beyond conventional image perturbations. A camera stream may be blurred, occluded, delayed, or frozen; ego-motion history may be biased; a task instruction may be deleted, manipulated, or overridden; and individually plausible modalities may contradict one another (Yan et al., 2025; Li et al., 2026). Recent attacks on driving vision-language models further show that visual and semantic disturbances can propagate from corrupted observations to downstream reasoning and behavior (Zhang et al., 2026). Yet the operational challenge is not merely to identify an attack type. Similar symptoms may arise from sensor faults or distribution shift, multiple information conditions may fail simultaneously, and an apparently repaired observation may still induce an unsafe trajectory.

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Most defenses follow an implicit pipeline: *detect an abnormal input, restore or suppress it, and then execute the resulting policy output*. This pipeline makes two assumptions that are poorly matched to safety-critical driving. First, recognizing an abnormality does not determine which intervention will produce the safest downstream behavior. Second, input-level similarity is not a behavioral guarantee: a repair module may improve its local reconstruction objective while still inducing an inferior trajectory, and a conservative rule may suppress one failure while creating another. These observations motivate a different principle:

$$\text{input restoration} \not\Rightarrow \text{safe execution}. \tag{1}$$

We propose CoSA-Drive, a runtime assurance framework that reformulates driving-VLA defense as evidence-grounded counterfactual behavior authorization. Rather than directly executing repaired inputs, CoSA-Drive audits runtime evidence, constructs heterogeneous intervention-induced behavior candidates, and uses a learned authorizer to evaluate their safety, intervention-induced harm, and task utility under uncertainty; DriveContract then enforces non-negotiable physical, traffic, authority, and ODD constraints before execution. This separates proposal, authorization, and final veto authority, with replanning or minimum-risk fallback when no normal behavior is sufficiently supported. Experiments across heterogeneous driving-VLA backends, NAVSIM, and reactive CARLA show that multimodal corruptions produce different downstream failures, that restoration alone is insufficient, and that behavior-level authorization achieves a better safety–utility trade-off while preserving task progress. Our contributions are threefold:

- **A behavior-centered formulation of driving-VLA defense.** We unify visual, temporal, state, task, and cross-modal failures as violations of decision-relevant information conditions, and show that input restoration does not necessarily imply safe execution. This motivates reformulating runtime defense as evidence-grounded counterfactual behavior authorization.
- **A unified runtime assurance framework for counterfactual behavior authorization.** We propose CoSA-Drive, which separates evidence auditing, candidate generation, and execution authority. Heterogeneous defense modules only propose alternative behaviors, while a learned evidence-conditioned authorizer evaluates their safety, intervention-induced harm, and task utility under uncertainty.
- **An integrated safety architecture with deterministic veto and fallback.** CoSA-Drive combines learned behavior authorization with DriveContract, which independently enforces hard physical, traffic, ODD, and task-authority constraints before execution. Experiments across heterogeneous driving-VLA backends and reactive CARLA demonstrate improved safety–utility behavior under multimodal corruption.

2 Related Work

Driving VLA models. Vision–language–action (VLA) policies map multimodal observations and language instructions to actions, and first gained prominence in general robotics (Zhang et al., 2025b; Xu et al., 2025). This paradigm has increasingly been adopted in autonomous driving for instruction following, scene reasoning, and trajectory generation (Hu et al., 2025; Tian et al., 2025). LMDrive enables language-guided closed-loop driving (Shao et al., 2023), OpenEMMA provides an open multimodal end-to-end planner (Xing et al., 2024), and DriveWorld-VLA combines latent world modeling with planning (Jia et al., 2026). These systems differ in architecture, input composition, and output space, but all rely on multiple sources of information to support driving decisions. This heterogeneity motivates a defense interface based on observable runtime evidence and resulting candidate behaviors, rather than model-specific internal representations.

VLA robustness and runtime assurance. Existing work improves VLA robustness at different stages of the decision chain. Driving VLM attacks show that adversarial visual inputs can disrupt scene reasoning and downstream decisions under both white-box and black-box settings (Liu et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2026). Instruction-priority studies further highlight the role of provenance and authority when untrusted content coexists with privileged commands (Wallace et al., 2024), while SafeVLA improves policy safety through constrained alignment (Zhang et al., 2025a). Complementary work on selective prediction trades execution coverage for risk (Geifman & El-Yaniv, 2017; 2019), and deep ensembles provide a practical estimate of predictive uncertainty (Lakshminarayanan et al.,



Figure 1: Overview of CoSA-Drive. The framework audits multimodal evidence, constructs counterfactual behaviors through heterogeneous defense operators, uses CERA for learned authorization, and retains DriveContract as an independent deterministic veto before execution.

2017; Römer et al., 2026). Runtime assurance further separates learned decision making from independent safety constraints (Hobbs et al., 2022). These directions improve input robustness, policy safety, or output rejection, but do not directly address how to choose among multiple behaviors induced by different defense interventions. CERA addresses this gap by treating defense outputs as counterfactual behavior candidates, evaluating their safety, intervention-induced harm, and task utility under shared runtime evidence, and leaving hard physical and authority constraints to a deterministic runtime shield.

3 Threat Model and Problem Formulation

3.1 Information-Condition Threat Model

At time t, a driving VLA receives

$$\mathcal{O}_t = \{V_{t-H:t}, S_{t-H:t}, Q_t, M_t, P_t\}, \tag{2}$$

where V, S, Q, M, and P denote visual history, ego state, task instruction, map/ODD context, and provenance/timing metadata. Safe behavior assumes interpretable vision, fresh temporal context, reliable state, authorized tasks, and cross-modal consistency.

We construct attacks by violating these conditions: visual corruption, temporal freeze/delay/drop, state bias or freezing, task manipulation or unauthorized override, and cross-modal contradiction. The same interface also covers benign faults and distribution shifts because CERA relies on runtime reliability evidence rather than attack labels.

The adversary may corrupt VLA inputs but cannot modify authenticated route/state sources or the final deterministic shield. A perturbation is treated as an *attack* only when its confidence interval establishes degradation beyond a predefined practical threshold; otherwise it is reported as a stress test.

4 Method: The CoSA-Drive Framework

4.1 Framework Overview

Figure 1 illustrates the central principle of CoSA-Drive: generating a behavior and authorizing its execution are two different responsibilities. A defense operator may repair a corrupted input, but the behavior induced by that repair is not necessarily safe. Therefore, no repair module is allowed to directly control the vehicle.

At time t, CoSA-Drive first extracts a runtime evidence state E_t and constructs a variable set of counterfactual behavior candidates

$$\mathcal{C}_t = \{c_i\}_{i=1}^{K_t}. \tag{3}$$

Each candidate represents how the same frozen driving VLA would behave under a different admissible intervention, such as retaining the raw input, repairing visual or temporal information, anchoring the ego state, or binding the task to an authenticated route. The CERA module then evaluates each candidate in terms of behavioral safety, intervention-induced harm, and task utility. The selected candidate must subsequently pass the deterministic DriveContract checks before reaching the vehicle. If no candidate is admissible, the framework delays execution, requests replanning, or enters a minimum-risk maneuver (MRM).

The resulting authority hierarchy is explicit: defense experts have *proposal authority*, CERA has *learned authorization authority*, and DriveContract retains *final veto authority*.

4.2 Attack-Label-Free Evidence Auditing

The runtime observation available to the driving system is

$$O_t = \{V_{t-H:t}, S_{t-H:t}, Q_t, M_t, P_t\}, \tag{4}$$

where V denotes visual history, S denotes ego-state and motion history, Q is the task instruction, M contains route, map, and ODD context, and P contains source provenance and timing metadata.

Instead of predicting an attack category, the evidence auditors estimate which information remains supported at the current time. Their outputs form

$$E_t = [e_t^v, e_t^\tau, e_t^s, e_t^q, e_t^c, e_t^u], \tag{5}$$

where the components describe visual reliability, temporal freshness, ego-state consistency, task authority, cross-modal consistency, and uncertainty or recoverability, respectively.

Task evidence combines semantic interpretation with source authentication, instruction freshness, route binding, and execution permission. Free-form language is therefore treated as evidence rather than as an automatically trusted control command. Cross-modal auditing further compares the task, scene, ego motion, map, and timestamps to expose contradictions that may not be visible within one modality. Consequently, E_t records both supported information and unresolved conflicts, without requiring the system to know whether the cause is an attack, sensor fault, or distribution shift.

4.3 Counterfactual Behavior Generation

Given E_t, the framework activates a subset of candidate operators

$$\mathcal{O} = \{\text{raw}, \text{visual}, \text{temporal}, \text{state}, \text{authenticated-task}, \text{joint}\}. \tag{6}$$

An operator is available only when its required evidence and trusted inputs are present:

$$\mathcal{C}_t = \{c_i \mid o_i \in \mathcal{O},\ g_i(E_t) = 1\}, \tag{7}$$

where g_i is an evidence-based eligibility function.

For operator o_i, the corresponding input configuration is

$$\widetilde{O}_t^{(i)} = o_i(O_t, E_t), \tag{8}$$

and the same frozen VLA produces the resulting behavior

$$b_i = \pi_{\text{VLA}}\left(\widetilde{O}_t^{(i)}\right). \tag{9}$$

The raw operator preserves the received input. The visual, temporal, and state operators modify their corresponding information sources. Authenticated-task binding replaces untrusted task content with an independently verified route task, while the joint operator combines compatible interventions.

Each candidate is represented as

$$c_i = (b_i, x_i, \eta_i), \tag{10}$$

where b_i is a trajectory or control proposal, $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{66}$ contains deployment-time evidence and behavioral features, and $\eta_i \in \{0, 1\}$ indicates whether the trusted prerequisites for authorization are satisfied. The features describe trajectory geometry, motion statistics, intervention magnitude, evidence–repair compatibility, unresolved conflicts, and model-native confidence.

Candidate identities, attack labels, clean trajectories, and post-execution driving scores are excluded from the runtime input. Thus, the authorizer must judge the behavior from available evidence rather than memorize a fixed attack-to-defense mapping.

4.4 CERA: Evidence-Conditioned Authorization

CERA is the learned authorization component within CoSA-Drive. Given x_i, it estimates whether candidate c_i is safe, useful, and likely to introduce a new failure. Candidates are scored independently because forced interaction between heterogeneous proposals can propagate noise across backends and intervention types.

The 66-dimensional feature vector is first projected into a 96-dimensional representation:

$$h_i = \phi(x_i), \tag{11}$$

where ϕ consists of a linear projection, LayerNorm, and GELU. Because different VLA backends expose confidence and trajectory features at different scales, we apply backend-conditioned FiLM calibration:

$$\widetilde{h}_i = h_i \odot (1 + 0.1 \tanh \gamma_m) + \beta_m, \tag{12}$$

where (γ_m, β_m) is learned for backend m. This conditioning only aligns feature scales; the candidate encoder and authorization heads remain shared across all backends.

A shared MLP produces

$$z_i = \psi(\widetilde{h}_i), \tag{13}$$

using hidden dimensions $96 \to 224 \to 128$. Three prediction heads then output

$$p_i^{\text{safe}}, \qquad p_i^{\text{harm}}, \qquad \widehat{u}_i, \tag{14}$$

representing behavioral safety, intervention-induced new harm, and normalized task utility. Contract information is included through evidence features and candidate eligibility; CERA therefore does not contain a separate neural contract head.

4.5 Learning Objective

We train CERA on 6,692 route- and scene-disjoint candidate sets. Safety and new harm are optimized using cost-sensitive binary cross entropy, while task utility uses Smooth-L_1 regression. The complete objective is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{safe}} + 0.45\mathcal{L}_{\text{harm}} + 0.65\mathcal{L}_{\text{utility}} \\ + 0.18\mathcal{L}^r_{\text{safe}} + 0.18\mathcal{L}^r_{\text{harm}} + 0.25\mathcal{L}^r_{\text{utility}}. \end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

The ranking losses compare only candidates generated for the same scene. They teach the model which intervention is preferable under identical runtime conditions without requiring native scores from unrelated backends to share an absolute scale. Clean and attacked references are used only to construct training targets and are unavailable during deployment.

We retain five independently initialized CERA models. Their disagreement provides an empirical estimate of epistemic uncertainty (Lakshminarayanan et al., 2017).

4.6 Confidence-Bounded Authorization

Authorization separates candidate admissibility from candidate preference. Safety determines whether a candidate may be executed, while utility and new-harm risk determine which admissible candidate should be preferred.

Let μ_i and σ_i denote the ensemble mean and standard deviation. The conservative safety lower bound is

$$L_i^s = \text{clip}\left(\mu_i^s - z\sigma_i^s, 0, 1\right), \tag{16}$$

Table 1: Attack effects across information conditions. B-ASR measures behavioral changes, while H-ASR measures harmful degradation.

Information Condition	B-ASR ↑	H-ASR ↑	Shift (m)	ΔADE/FDE (m)	ΔPDM ↑
Visual evidence	60.67%	29.83%	1.411	$-0.089/-0.154$	$+0.006$
Temporal integrity	70.67%	41.33%	1.424	$+0.406/+1.449$	-0.035
Ego-state reliability	**74.29%**	**55.43%**	**7.062**	$\mathbf{+5.206/+9.053}$	$\mathbf{-0.130}$
Task authority: malicious†	18.14%	8.86%	1.601	$+0.658/+1.601$	-0.002
Long-text subset†	**69.00%**	**28.00%**	**4.618**	$\mathbf{+1.891/+4.618}$	-0.008

ΔADE/FDE denotes trajectory-error change and ΔPDM is attack minus clean, so negative values indicate degradation. †Task-channel results use a separate frozen instruction suite and are compared only within that protocol.

while the new-harm upper bound and utility lower bound are

$$U_i^h = \mathrm{clip}\left(\mu_i^h + z\sigma_i^h, 0, 1\right), \tag{17}$$

and

$$L_i^u = \mathrm{clip}\left(\mu_i^u - 0.5z\sigma_i^u, 0, 1\right). \tag{18}$$

A candidate enters the admissible set only if its trusted prerequisites are available and its safety lower bound exceeds a threshold calibrated on route-disjoint data:

$$i \in \mathcal{A}_t \iff \eta_i = 1 \wedge L_i^s \geq \theta_{m,o_i}. \tag{19}$$

Among the admissible candidates, CERA selects

$$i^* = \arg\max_{i \in \mathcal{A}_t} \left[L_i^u - 0.25(1 - L_i^s) - 0.15U_i^h\right]. \tag{20}$$

This rule prevents uncertain candidates from compensating for low safety with high predicted utility. The confidence bounds are empirical uncertainty controls rather than formal safety guarantees.

4.7 DriveContract and Safe Fallback

Task provenance and DriveContract constrain different stages of the framework. Before candidate generation, provenance checks validate instruction source, authority, freshness, route revision, maneuver compatibility, and ODD membership. These checks determine whether a task-conditioned candidate may be proposed.

After CERA selects a candidate, DriveContract independently evaluates execution-time constraints, including time-to-collision, obstacle distance, traffic signals, stop requirements, lane and route feasibility, right-of-way, speed limits, task authority, and ODD membership. Any mandatory violation vetoes the candidate regardless of its learned score.

Transient uncertainty may trigger delayed execution, while stale information or route conflicts trigger replanning. If no normal candidate survives both learned authorization and deterministic checking, CoSA-Drive invokes an MRM. CERA therefore manages the learned safety–utility trade-off, whereas DriveContract enforces constraints that the learned authorizer is never permitted to override.

5 Results Analysis

5.1 Attack Validity and Threat Heterogeneity

We first test whether corrupting decision-relevant information causes meaningful behavioral degradation. Rather than treating any input change as a successful attack, we report behavioral attack success rate (B-ASR), which measures trajectory changes beyond a predefined tolerance, and harmful attack success rate (H-ASR), which measures changes that further degrade driving quality.

Table 1 shows substantial heterogeneity. Ego-state corruption is the strongest, reaching 74.29% B-ASR and 55.43% H-ASR, while temporal corruption also causes consistent degradation. Visual



Figure 2: **Input restoration does not imply behavioral recovery.** (a) High-fidelity visual restoration may fail to improve downstream driving. (b) Authenticated task binding outperforms unconstrained semantic repair. (c) Compound corruptions exhibit heterogeneous recovery, coverage, and residual risk.

attacks change 60.67% of trajectories but harm only 29.83%, and task attacks vary strongly within the same family, with long-text interference far more disruptive than the average malicious instruction.

Across all conditions,

$$\text{behavioral change} \not\Rightarrow \text{behavioral harm}. \tag{21}$$

Thus, detecting an anomaly or identifying its modality is insufficient for choosing a safe response; the resulting behavior must be evaluated directly.

5.2 Input Restoration Is Not Behavioral Assurance

We next test whether restoring a corrupted input is sufficient for safe driving. Figure 2 shows that input-level recovery does not reliably translate into behavioral recovery.

For visual corruption, the expert achieves 96.3% pixel recovery, yet PDM drops from 0.750 to 0.740 and the unsafe rate increases by 1.05 percentage points; candidate-level selection instead reaches 0.840. Likewise, free-form semantic repair reduces task-channel PDM to 0.691, whereas authenticated task binding restores the clean level of 0.791. Compound attacks are similarly heterogeneous: Text–State is fully recovered, whereas Text–Temporal shows negative recovery and Text–Visual conditions exhibit different coverage–risk profiles.

Together,

$$\text{input restoration} \not\Rightarrow \text{behavioral assurance}. \tag{22}$$

This motivates CoSA-Drive's separation of authority: defense experts propose counterfactual behaviors, CERA authorizes among them, and DriveContract retains final deterministic veto authority.

5.3 CoSA-Drive Improves Downstream Driving Quality and Closed-Loop Safety

We next evaluate whether CoSA-Drive improves downstream driving rather than only intermediate recovery metrics. We consider two complementary settings: NAVSIM for planning quality and proxy safety, and reactive CARLA for closed-loop driving safety.

NAVSIM planning quality and proxy safety. Table 2 compares CoSA-Drive with representative defense strategies under the same attacked driving setting. Visual restoration alone fails to improve driving quality, reducing PDM from 0.7503 to 0.7401 and increasing unsafe behaviors from 25.66% to 26.71%. State-based and joint defenses provide partial improvements, while CoSA-Drive achieves the strongest non-oracle result, reaching 0.8399 PDM and reducing collision, lane departure, and unsafe rates to 5.13%, 3.82%, and 11.71%. The PDM oracle obtains slightly higher utility but worse safety metrics, showing that utility maximization alone is insufficient.

Reactive closed-loop safety in CARLA. We further evaluate the complete CoSA-Drive framework in reactive CARLA, where actions affect subsequent observations and safety events accumulate

Table 2: Comparison with representative defense strategies on NAVSIM. CoSA-Drive improves planning quality while reducing proxy safety violations. The PDM oracle optimizes utility rather than safety.

Method	PDM ↑	Collision ↓	Lane Departure ↓	Unsafe ↓
Attacked VLA	0.7503	15.13%	10.53%	25.66%
Visual Restoration	0.7401	16.18%	10.39%	26.71%
State-based Defense	0.8030	10.79%	7.37%	21.97%
Joint Restoration	0.7855	12.76%	7.11%	23.82%
CoSA-Drive	**0.8399**	**5.13%**	**3.82%**	**11.71%**
PDM Oracle	0.8460	7.76%	5.39%	16.84%

Table 3: Reactive closed-loop driving results in CARLA. CoSA-Drive improves overall driving quality and reduces safety violations under compound multimodal corruption.

Condition	DS ↑	RC ↑	Collision ↓	Lane ↓	Red-light ↓	Blocked ↓
Clean VLA	56.37	72.45%	31.67%	58.33%	35.00%	31.67%
Compound Attack	53.04	69.68%	25.00%	60.00%	53.33%	25.00%
Restoration Only	53.12	64.05%	35.00%	58.33%	40.00%	35.00%
Shield Only	55.45	69.41%	41.67%	51.67%	13.33%	41.67%
CoSA-Drive	**61.03**	**71.11%**	**11.67%**	**35.00%**	**11.67%**	**36.67%**

over time. Table 3 shows that compound corruption reduces driving quality and increases safety violations. Restoration-only and Shield-only strategies improve some aspects but fail to achieve a balanced trade-off. In contrast, CoSA-Drive increases Driving Score from 53.04 to 61.03 and Route Completion from 69.68% to 71.11%, while reducing collision, lane, red-light, and blocked events to 11.67%, 35.00%, 11.67%, and 36.67%, respectively.

Together, these results show that CoSA-Drive improves beyond input recovery or isolated rule-based intervention. It provides stronger planning quality under NAVSIM and safer reactive execution in CARLA, supporting behavior-level authorization as the basis of runtime assurance.

5.4 Cross-Backend Behavior Recovery

We next evaluate whether CoSA-Drive remains effective across heterogeneous driving-VLA backends with different architectures, output spaces, and native driving metrics. Despite this heterogeneity, CoSA-Drive consistently provides effective runtime defense on all four evaluated models.

As shown in Table 4, CoSA-Drive recovers a substantial fraction of attack-induced degradation on every backend, with NRR ranging from 62.2% to 95.5%. It also preserves meaningful execution coverage across all models, ranging from 46.5% to 99.6%. OpenEMMA exhibits the strongest clean-level recovery and the lowest defense-induced regression, while Alpamayo 1.5, DriveWorld-VLA, and LMDrive/CARLA remain more challenging. Nevertheless, CoSA-Drive improves behavior recovery across all four systems without relying on a single backend-specific defense strategy.

These results demonstrate that CoSA-Drive is not tied to one particular driving VLA. Instead, its evidence auditing, counterfactual candidate generation, and behavior-level authorization provide a common runtime defense mechanism that remains effective across heterogeneous driving-VLA models.

5.5 Ablation of CERA and CoSA-Drive Components

CERA module ablation. We first isolate CERA's internal components while keeping the remaining CoSA-Drive pipeline unchanged. Full CERA reaches 59.93 DS and 69.29% RC. Removing the New-Harm or Utility head lowers task progress, with RC dropping to 66.98% and 64.05%, respectively; the Utility ablation also raises collision to 20.00% and blockage to 65.00%. Without LCB, lane violations increase from 28.33% to 40.00%. The largest degradation occurs without Contract Evidence, where

Table 4: Cross-backend behavior recovery of CoSA-Drive. NRR measures recovered attack-induced degradation, CLR measures clean-level recovery, Coverage measures retained normal execution, and DReg measures defense-induced regression.

Backbone	H-ASR ↑	NRR ↑	CLR ↑	Coverage ↑	DReg ↓
Alpamayo 1.5	52.8%	75.3%	36.0%	46.5%	13.3%
OpenEMMA	37.2%	95.5%	98.9%	99.6%	0.8%
DriveWorld-VLA	44.5%	62.2%	21.3%	88.5%	16.0%
LMDrive / CARLA	33.3%	72.7%	55.0%	95.8%	25.0%

Native driving metrics differ across backends and are normalized only for computing unified recovery; they are not directly averaged across models.

Table 5: CERA module ablation in reactive CARLA. All variants use the same candidate generation, DriveContract, and fallback; only the specified CERA component is removed.

Variant	DS ↑	RC ↑	Collision ↓	Lane ↓	Red-light ↓	Blocked ↓
w/o New-Harm Head	58.85	66.98%	13.33%	35.00%	16.67%	56.67%
w/o Utility Head	59.13	64.05%	20.00%	33.33%	11.67%	65.00%
w/o LCB	59.82	66.23%	11.67%	40.00%	15.00%	43.33%
w/o Contract Evidence	35.08	37.23%	0.00%	11.67%	11.67%	81.67%
Full CERA	**59.93**	**69.29%**	**11.67%**	**28.33%**	**11.67%**	51.67%

Table 6: Framework-level ablation of CoSA-Drive in reactive CARLA. The components provide complementary contributions to task progress and closed-loop safety.

Variant	DS ↑	RC ↑	Collision ↓	Lane ↓	Red-light ↓	Blocked ↓
w/o Evidence Auditing	57.95	69.34%	28.33%	43.33%	20.00%	43.33%
w/o Candidate Diversity	42.86	46.49%	11.67%	15.00%	10.00%	81.67%
w/o DriveContract	59.24	68.86%	11.67%	38.33%	38.33%	45.00%
w/o Fallback	56.38	69.35%	33.33%	53.33%	23.33%	54.67%
Full CoSA-Drive	**61.03**	**71.11%**	**11.67%**	**35.00%**	**11.67%**	**36.67%**

RC falls to 37.23% and blockage rises to 81.67%, indicating that the low violation rates mainly reflect failed progress rather than safer driving.

CoSA-Drive framework ablation. We next remove major framework components while keeping the remaining pipeline fixed. Full CoSA-Drive achieves 61.03 DS and 71.11% RC, with 11.67% collision and red-light violations. Without Evidence Auditing, collision rises to 28.33%; removing Candidate Diversity causes the largest loss of task progress, reducing RC to 46.49% and increasing blockage to 81.67%. Without DriveContract, red-light violations rise sharply to 38.33%, while removing Fallback increases collision, lane, and blocked rates to 33.33%, 53.33%, and 54.67%. These results show that the framework components address complementary closed-loop failure modes.

6 Conclusion

This paper studies runtime assurance for driving VLA models under unreliable multimodal information. We show that visual, temporal, state, and task corruptions induce heterogeneous downstream effects, and that input restoration does not necessarily imply behavioral safety. Based on this observation, we propose **CoSA-Drive**, which separates proposal, learned authorization, and final execution authority: defense experts generate counterfactual behaviors, CERA evaluates their safety, intervention-induced harm, and task utility, and DriveContract applies a deterministic veto before execution. Across heterogeneous driving-VLA backends, NAVSIM, and reactive CARLA, CoSA-Drive improves behavior recovery, planning quality, and closed-loop safety, supporting behavior-level authorization as a more reliable basis for driving-VLA defense than input repair alone.

AI USE STATEMENT

Generative AI tools were used during manuscript preparation for language polishing, structural editing, and feedback on the presentation of figures, tables, and experimental descriptions. AI-assisted suggestions were reviewed and revised by the authors and were not used as a substitute for scientific validation. All methodological decisions, implementations, experiments, data, quantitative results, and conclusions were independently produced and verified by the authors. The authors take full responsibility for the final manuscript.

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A EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

We adopt an *Alpamayo-centered development and heterogeneous-backend validation* protocol. The primary data are derived from the NVIDIA PhysicalAI-AV real-world driving dataset: from 2,298 usable driving clips, we construct disjoint training, calibration, and test scenes and generate approximately 100,000 multimodal attack–defense instances covering visual corruption, temporal distortion, ego-state anomalies, task-authority attacks, and cross-modal conflicts. These data are used to train the evidence auditors, defense experts, and behavior authorizer in CoSA-Drive.

Attack validity is evaluated on 1,100 paired Alpamayo attacks using behavioral attack success rate, trajectory shift, ADE, and FDE. Behavior-level evaluation further uses the NAVSIM/nuScenes protocol with 120 scenes, 1,200 attacked decisions, and approximately 5,500 candidate trajectories, while task-channel robustness is tested on a frozen set of 100 scenes and 900 adversarial instructions. After training, calibration, and ablation on Alpamayo 1.5, the frozen CoSA-Drive framework is evaluated on OpenEMMA, DriveWorld-VLA, and LMDrive to assess cross-backend applicability, with LMDrive additionally tested in reactive CARLA for closed-loop driving safety.

We evaluate COSA-DRIVE at both trajectory and reactive closed-loop levels. NAVSIM is used to measure planning quality and proxy safety, while CARLA evaluates closed-loop driving under physical interaction. All methods within the same experiment use matched attacked inputs and the same frozen driving backbone, so differences reflect the defense strategy rather than the underlying VLA.

Our threat suite covers visual, temporal, ego-state, task, and cross-modal information corruption. We compare COSA-DRIVE with direct restoration, state-based and joint defenses, and deterministic shielding. We further perform two levels of ablation: CERA-level ablations remove individual authorization components, while framework-level ablations remove evidence auditing, candidate diversity, DriveContract, or fallback.

We report B-ASR and H-ASR to distinguish behavioral changes from harmful attacks. For trajectory-level evaluation, PDM and ADE/FDE measure planning quality, together with proxy collision and lane-safety metrics. For reactive CARLA, Driving Score (DS) and Route Completion (RC) measure driving quality and task progress, while collision, lane, red-light, and blocked rates measure closed-loop safety and conservatism. Higher PDM/DS/RC and lower error or violation rates indicate better performance.

A.1 HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF INFORMATION-CONDITION CORRUPTION

Figure 3 further illustrates that input corruption does not uniformly translate into degraded driving quality. Ego-state freezing causes the largest PDM drop, while state bias, temporal corruption, and visual blur produce smaller degradation. In contrast, haze, low-light, and road-occlusion perturbations do not reduce the average PDM under this evaluation protocol and may even yield small positive changes. We therefore retain such cases as stress perturbations rather than automatically labeling every corrupted input as a successful safety attack. This heterogeneity motivates distinguishing behavioral attack success from harmful attack success and evaluating attacks through their downstream driving consequences.

B THREAT SUITE AND QUALITATIVE ATTACK CASES

The main paper reports aggregate attack validity. This section records the corruption families and representative cases used to obtain those results. The taxonomy follows the information conditions required by a driving VLA: visible scene evidence, temporally current observations, reliable ego state, authorized tasks, and mutually compatible modalities. The same interface also covers sensor faults and distribution shifts that produce equivalent runtime evidence patterns.

Visual attacks change content or visibility. Temporal attacks preserve plausible individual frames while violating recency or continuity. State attacks alter the motion history used to interpret the scene. Task attacks modify what the vehicle is requested or permitted to do. Compound attacks make two individually plausible sources disagree. Unless stated otherwise, the attacker cannot modify the authenticated route source or bypass DriveContract.



Figure 3: **Heterogeneous effects of information-condition corruption.** Clean and attacked PDM scores are shown for representative state, temporal, and visual perturbations. Negative ΔPDM indicates degraded driving quality, whereas positive values denote non-degrading stress cases. The variation both across and within modalities motivates distinguishing behavioral change from harmful degradation.

Table 7: Information-condition threat suite. Attacks are organized by the driving evidence assumption they violate rather than by implementation script.

Information condition	Representative perturbations	Attack surface	Violated assumption
Visual evidence	Blur, haze, low light, road occlusion	Camera observations	Visibility and content fidelity
Temporal integrity	Freeze, drop-last, delay, desynchronization	Observation history	Recency and continuity
Ego-state reliability	History freeze, lateral bias	State and motion history	Motion consistency
Task authority	Deletion, manipulation, injection, override, long context	Task channel	Provenance, permission, route binding
Cross-modal consistency	Text–state, text–temporal, text–visual, vision–state	Multiple inputs	Pairwise compatibility

We retain non-degrading perturbations as stress tests. In particular, haze, low light, and road occlusion do not always lower average PDM even when they change the predicted trajectory. This treatment is consistent with the main paper's separation between behavioral attack success and harmful attack success.

B.1 NAVSIM Time-Series Cases

Figure 4 shows paired NAVSIM sequences and their clean, attacked, expert-only, and authorized trajectories. Local corruption can produce persistent planning deviations, while the useful intervention changes with the failed information condition. State anchoring is effective for frozen ego history, whereas severe temporal corruption may leave no trustworthy continuation and therefore trigger a conservative response.

B.2 Task and Compound Attacks

Task corruption is evaluated alone and jointly with state, temporal, and visual corruption. Unauthenticated text is not interpreted as an actuator command. It contributes task evidence or proposes a route-bound candidate, which must still pass CERA and DriveContract. This design resolves many text–state conflicts, while text–temporal and text–visual cases may require a non-text candidate or fallback.



Figure 4: Representative NAVSIM time-series cases under visual, temporal, and ego-state corruption. The same repair candidate is not uniformly reliable across information conditions.

Table 8: Task-channel assurance on the frozen instruction suite. Free text is treated as evidence and cannot directly actuate the vehicle.

Metric	Result	Metric	Result
Scenes	100	Attack instances	900
Behavioral ASR	16.22%	Harmful ASR	7.89%
Semantic-auditor unsafe acceptance	6.14%	Raw free-text actuation	0.00%
Malicious canonical intervention	100.00%	Mission execution coverage	100.00%
Harmful attacked PDM	0.5273	Authenticated-task PDM	0.9107



Figure 5: Representative text–state, text–temporal, and text–visual attacks. Each case exposes the trusted task source, detected conflict, selected candidate, and residual risk.

C Defense Networks and Restoration Diagnostics

CoSA-Drive contains learned evidence and repair components, but none of them directly controls the vehicle. Auditors estimate reliability and compatibility; experts generate counterfactual inputs or behaviors; CERA decides whether a candidate is sufficiently supported; DriveContract retains deterministic veto authority.

The visual–temporal expert is an 8.35M-parameter restoration network trained with paired clean and corrupted observations. The motion integrity network is a lightweight temporal model that compares visual motion, ego-state history, and timestamp consistency. The task-assurance network combines a frozen semantic encoder with a 640–256 dimensional MLP and reliability, hazard, and slot-recovery heads. Neural task evidence is combined with non-neural source authentication, permission checks, and route binding.

Evidence supervision. The evidence encoder predicts reliability and uncertainty rather than an attack name. Its targets describe whether visual content is usable, whether temporal history is current, whether ego motion is self-consistent, and whether task evidence agrees with authenticated context. This permits the same encoder to respond to unseen faults that violate a known information condition without requiring a closed list of attack classes.

Expert training. The visual–temporal expert uses paired clean and corrupted observations with reconstruction, edge-preservation, temporal-consistency, and uncertainty objectives. State recovery is anchored to trusted motion history rather than hallucinated image content. The task expert predicts slot reliability and a route-bound task representation; free-form generated text is never forwarded directly to the controller. Each expert also exposes intervention magnitude and unresolved-evidence features to CERA.

Candidate interface. All experts are converted to a shared behavior-level interface before authorization. For candidate c_i, CoSA-Drive records trajectory geometry, kinematics, supporting evidence, intervention strength, unresolved conflicts, and backend identity. CERA therefore compares intervention consequences in driving space even when an expert operates on pixels, state history, or task semantics.

C.1 Local Restoration versus Downstream Driving

Component metrics verify that an expert learns its local task, but they are not used as a substitute for downstream evaluation. Figure 6 shows the central counterexample: a visually improved observation can induce a lower-quality trajectory. CoSA-Drive therefore evaluates the behavior produced from the repair rather than granting the repair network direct execution authority.

Table 9: Component diagnostics. These local metrics characterize evidence and candidate quality; they do not grant execution authority.

Component	Samples	Primary metric	Value	Secondary metric	Value
Evidence encoder, internal	15,680	Attack detection rate	96.92%	Clean false alarm rate	0.98%
Evidence encoder, external	1,000	Attack detection rate	88.22%	AUROC	94.33%
Visual expert, internal	8,874	Pixel recovery	77.68%	Positive recovery rate	94.48%
Visual expert, external	700	Pixel recovery	73.30%	Positive recovery rate	83.00%
Motion integrity net, internal	1,734	State detection rate	97.55%	Clean false alarm rate	0.00%
Motion integrity net, held-out attack	3,600	State detection rate	59.50%	Balanced accuracy	79.75%

Table 10: Roles and authority of learned and deterministic components.

Component	Main input	Output	Runtime authority
Evidence encoder	Multimodal observations and residuals	Reliability and uncertainty evidence	Evidence only
Visual–temporal expert	Corrupted frame and history	Restored observation and uncertainty	Candidate proposal
Motion integrity net	Visual motion and ego history	Consistency and recoverability	Evidence / proposal
Task-assurance net	Untrusted text and authenticated route	Slot reliability and task candidate	Candidate proposal
CERA	Runtime evidence and one behavior candidate	Safety, new-harm, and utility scores	Learned authorization
DriveContract	Authorized behavior and hard constraints	Pass or veto	Deterministic final veto



Figure 6: A restoration counterexample. The visual reconstruction is closer to the clean input, but its visual-only trajectory is inferior; behavior-level authorization rejects that candidate.



Figure 7: Modality-specific recovery and failure patterns of visual, temporal, state, task, and compound candidates.

D Risk Calibration and Selective Authorization

D.1 Definitions

For authorization threshold τ, let $a_i(\tau) \in \{0, 1\}$ indicate whether scene i retains normal execution and let $z_i \in \{0, 1\}$ indicate an unsafe executed outcome. We report

$$\mathrm{Coverage}(\tau) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} a_i(\tau), \tag{23}$$

$$\mathrm{RouteRisk}(\tau) = \frac{\sum_i a_i(\tau) z_i}{\sum_i a_i(\tau) + \epsilon}. \tag{24}$$

Coverage measures how often useful execution is retained; route risk measures how often an authorized behavior remains unsafe. New Harm counts scenes that are acceptable under attack but become unsafe after intervention. Effective Recovery weights recovered attack loss by the executable fraction. nAURC summarizes risk over the complete coverage range.

The 5% route-risk value is a predeclared experimental operating budget, not an external automotive safety standard. We therefore report both the complete risk–coverage curve and sensitivity at 1%, 3%, 5%, and 10% budgets.

The ablations expose complementary failure modes. Removing uncertainty bounds worsens the complete risk–coverage behavior; removing the Utility head reduces useful recovery; removing Contract Evidence reduces coverage; and removing backend alignment raises cross-backend new harm. Full CERA need not be best on every isolated column: its purpose is to achieve the strongest combined safety–utility operating point.



Curves vary thresholds only for diagnosis; the starred operating point was frozen before test evaluation.

(a) Complete risk–coverage curves on the frozen test set.



(b) Operating points under multiple prespecified risk budgets.

Figure 8: Threshold-independent Alpamayo risk evaluation. Reporting the complete curve prevents the conclusion from depending on one custom threshold.

Table 11: CERA diagnostics on the Alpamayo calibration split under a matched 5% route-risk budget. The full model gives the strongest coverage and effective recovery; nAURC summarizes the complete risk–coverage curve.

Variant	Coverage@5% ↑	Risk ↓	New harm ↓	Eff. recovery ↑	nAURC ↓
w/o New-Harm Head	91.60%	4.86%	1.12%	72.92%	0.0241
w/o Utility Head	93.10%	4.94%	**0.60%**	73.96%	0.0233
w/o LCB	93.10%	4.94%	1.10%	73.92%	0.0244
w/o Contract Evidence	88.62%	4.91%	1.10%	72.01%	0.0221
w/o Backend Alignment	91.79%	4.99%	1.36%	73.01%	**0.0216**
Full CERA	**94.22%**	4.98%	1.09%	**75.04%**	0.0231



Figure 9: CERA component diagnostics under matched route-risk budgets.

E SEPARATED ABLATION PROTOCOLS

We separate authorizer diagnostics from end-to-end framework ablations. The CERA diagnostic keeps candidate generation, DriveContract, and fallback fixed and changes only the learned authorization module. The framework ablation instead removes complete CoSA-Drive stages. The two studies use separate frozen CARLA diagnostic splits and answer different questions; their absolute DS and RC values must therefore not be compared across tables. Within each table, all variants share the same routes, corruption conditions, and scoring protocol.

The internal study shows that new-harm modeling, utility prediction, confidence bounds, and contract evidence govern different failure modes. The system study shows that evidence auditing, candidate diversity, deterministic veto, and fallback are complementary. Thus, "Full CERA" denotes the intact authorizer in its diagnostic protocol, whereas "Full CoSA-Drive" denotes the complete end-to-end framework in its own evaluation protocol.

Table 12: CERA-internal ablation on the frozen CARLA authorizer-diagnostic split. Candidate generation, DriveContract, and fallback are held fixed.

Variant	DS ↑	RC ↑	Coll. ↓	Lane ↓	Red-light ↓	Blocked ↓
w/o New-Harm Head	58.85	66.98%	13.33%	35.00%	16.67%	56.67%
w/o Utility Head	59.13	64.05%	20.00%	33.33%	11.67%	65.00%
w/o LCB	59.82	66.23%	11.67%	40.00%	15.00%	43.33%
w/o Contract Evidence	35.08	37.23%	0.00%	11.67%	11.67%	81.67%
Full CERA	**59.93**	**69.29%**	**11.67%**	**28.33%**	**11.67%**	51.67%

Table 13: End-to-end CoSA-Drive ablation on the frozen framework-evaluation split. This protocol is separate from Table 12.

Variant	DS ↑	RC ↑	Coll. ↓	Lane ↓	Red-light ↓	Blocked ↓
w/o Evidence Auditing	57.95	69.34%	28.33%	43.33%	20.00%	43.33%
w/o Candidate Diversity	42.86	46.49%	11.67%	15.00%	10.00%	81.67%
w/o DriveContract	59.24	68.86%	11.67%	38.33%	38.33%	45.00%
w/o Fallback	56.38	69.35%	33.33%	53.33%	23.33%	54.67%
Full CoSA-Drive	**61.03**	**71.11%**	**11.67%**	**35.00%**	**11.67%**	**36.67%**

F Cross-Backend and Reactive Closed-Loop Analysis

F.1 Backend-Native Results

The four backends expose different action spaces and native metrics. Unified recovery normalizes only attack-induced degradation; ADE/FDE, trajectory deviation, PDM, Driving Score, and Route Completion retain their native meaning. This prevents a favorable scale on one backend from dominating the aggregate comparison.

F.2 Reactive CARLA Evidence

The CARLA evaluation uses the same LMDrive backbone, routes, corruption conditions, and traffic seeds for all compared policies. The aggregate numbers in the main paper are complemented here by route-clustered effects, one online authorization trace, and a rendered temporal sequence.

Table 14: Detailed NAVSIM planning-quality and proxy-safety comparison.

Method	PDM ↑	Collision ↓	Lane Departure ↓	Unsafe ↓
Attacked VLA	0.7503	15.13%	10.53%	25.66%
Visual Restoration	0.7401	16.18%	10.39%	26.71%
State-based Defense	0.8030	10.79%	7.37%	21.97%
Joint Restoration	0.7855	12.76%	7.11%	23.82%
CoSA-Drive	**0.8399**	**5.13%**	**3.82%**	**11.71%**
PDM Oracle	0.8460	7.76%	5.39%	16.84%

Table 15: Frozen cross-backend results in each backend's native evaluation space. Native metrics are normalized only for unified recovery and are not directly averaged across models.

Backend	Native metric	Attack degradation	Coverage	Route risk	New harm	Selective utility
Alpamayo 1.5	ADE (m)	+5.095	46.5%	4.88%	1.28%	0.405
OpenEMMA	Trajectory deviation (m)	+7.560	99.6%	0.40%	0.00%	0.738
DriveWorld-VLA	PDM score	−0.136	88.5%	3.39%	0.00%	0.768
LMDrive	Driving Score / RC	−0.033	95.8%	–	–	0.609



Figure 10: Safety–utility operating points for candidate-selection policies. Learned authorization expands useful execution relative to fixed expert routing and purely conservative rejection.

Table 16: Reactive closed-loop CARLA results under compound multimodal corruption. Statistical interpretation uses route-clustered intervals in Fig. 11.

Condition	DS ↑	RC ↑	Collision ↓	Lane ↓	Red-light ↓	Blocked ↓
Clean VLA	56.37	72.45%	31.67%	58.33%	35.00%	31.67%
Compound Attack	53.04	69.68%	25.00%	60.00%	53.33%	25.00%
Restoration Only	53.12	64.05%	35.00%	58.33%	40.00%	35.00%
Shield Only	55.45	69.41%	41.67%	51.67%	13.33%	41.67%
CoSA-Drive	**61.03**	**71.11%**	**11.67%**	**35.00%**	**11.67%**	**36.67%**



Figure 11: Route-clustered CARLA effects. Confidence intervals are computed over routes rather than treating correlated frames as independent samples.



(a) Online trajectory, control, candidate switching, and evidence bounds.



(b) Rendered sequence for attack, fixed shield, and CoSA-Drive.

Figure 12: Reactive CARLA case study. Candidate changes follow runtime evidence rather than the attack label, while the rendered sequence shows both safety intervention and retained route progress.

G Reproducibility and Claim Boundaries

Table 17: Data sources and evaluation units used in the paper. Source clips, derived attack–defense records, candidate trajectories, and closed-loop routes are reported separately and are not added as if they were independent scenes.

Stage	Source	Scale	Primary backend	Purpose
Source pool	PhysicalAI-AV	2,298 usable driving clips	Alpamayo 1.5	Clip-disjoint data construction
Training corpus	PhysicalAI-AV derived	∼100,000 attack–defense records	Alpamayo 1.5	Auditors, experts, and authorizer
Attack validity	PhysicalAI-AV held-out	1,100 paired attacks	Alpamayo 1.5	B-ASR, H-ASR, ADE/FDE, shift
Behavior evaluation	NAVSIM/nuScenes	120 scenes, 1,200 decisions, ∼5,500 candidates	Alpamayo / DriveWorld	PDM and proxy safety
Task-channel test	Frozen instruction suite	100 scenes, 900 instructions	Alpamayo 1.5	Task authority and route binding
Transfer tests	Backend-native protocols	100 / 100 / 50 scenes	Alpamayo / OpenEMMA / DriveWorld	Cross-backend recovery
Reactive closed loop	CARLA, six towns	60 routes × 3 seeds	LMDrive	Physical interaction and violations

Table 18: Backend-specific testbeds, native metrics, and statistical units.

Backend	Testbed	Native metric	Statistical unit	Frozen test scale
Alpamayo 1.5	PhysicalAI-AV	ADE / FDE	Scene	100 scenes
OpenEMMA	PhysicalAI-AV	Trajectory deviation	Scene	100 scenes
DriveWorld-VLA	NAVSIM	PDM	Scene	50 scenes
LMDrive	CARLA, six towns	Driving Score / RC	Route	60 routes × 3 seeds

Training, calibration, and testing are isolated at the clip, scene, route, and Town levels where applicable. The approximately 100,000 training records are derived attack–defense instances rather than 100,000 independent scenes. The shared CERA encoder and heads are learned during Alpamayo development. For each target backend, only FiLM affine parameters and operating thresholds are fitted on a route-disjoint calibration split; target test data never update model weights or thresholds. These parameters, code, and test manifests are then frozen before final evaluation. The statistical unit is a scene for trajectory-level backends and a route for CARLA.

The evidence supports different claims at different levels. Alpamayo and OpenEMMA establish route-level behavior recovery, NAVSIM provides planning and proxy-safety evidence, and physical-interaction claims are restricted to reactive CARLA. Text–temporal attacks can still require fallback when no trustworthy temporal candidate exists, and severe visual corruption can leave no admissible continuation. CoSA-Drive provides empirical runtime assurance; it is not a formal proof of safety under arbitrary distribution shift.