IMPROVING SCALABLE OVERSIGHT WITH CO-TRAINED MONITORS

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ABSTRACT

Worker-monitor setups are a promising approach to AI oversight, but training workers against fixed monitors can incentivize monitor evasion. We study whether this failure mode can be avoided by *co-training the monitor alongside the worker*, and explore both supervised and self-supervised approaches. In the supervised setting, we prove a characterization: monitoring is possible with vanishing error and query rates exactly when the class of possible monitor functions has finite Littlestone dimension. This connects worker monitoring with an established literature on adversarial online learning. For self-supervision, we propose a co-training procedure based on test-time distillation: the monitor uses additional test-time compute to generate training labels, then trains its standard-compute policy on those labels. For majority-vote labels, we give a finite-sample sharpening guarantee under adaptive worker distributions with action coverage, that shows that the monitor's verdicts converge to its initial modal verdicts. We stress-test the former in code-security settings where the worker is trained adversarially to fool the monitor. Our results suggest that adaptive monitors are better at keeping pace with evolving worker strategies, while fixed monitors are more vulnerable to evasion.

1 INTRODUCTION

A central challenge in AI safety is that learned systems can optimize the reward signal they are given while violating the intent behind that signal (Omohundro, 2008; Bostrom, 2012). This phenomenon, often called reward hacking or specification gaming, is a core failure mode for reinforcement learning systems (Amodei et al., 2016; Krakovna et al., 2020). As AI systems become more capable and autonomous agents, this concern becomes acute: agents can now take multi-step actions, use tools, and interact with real computational infrastructure. A series of recent cybersecurity incidents involving AI agents have made it clear this poses an imminent threat; in one widely-publicized event a self-styled "swarm" of agents trained by OpenAI escaped a sandbox and hacked into HuggingFace to steal the evaluation dataset for a cybersecurity benchmark (OpenAI, 2026; METR, 2026).

A natural response is to place agents in both training and deployment under explicit monitoring, in order to constrain them to more aligned behavior. Unfortunately, human monitoring at scale is not feasible: the OpenAI-HuggingFace incident involved more than 1,200 agents with separate reasoning traces and more than 70,000 exchanged messages. Monitoring therefore must be delegated, at least in part, to agents. In a worker-monitor setup, a worker proposes actions, code, or other outputs, and a monitor agent checks them before they are executed or accepted (Irving et al., 2018; Saunders et al., 2022; Greenblatt et al., 2023). Such setups aim to make powerful agents useful while preserving an independent check on whether their behavior satisfies the intended constraints.

However, worker-monitor setups face a problem: the worker may yet learn to evade the monitor. The monitor's feedback essentially provides additional reward signal, giving the worker an incentive to optimize for outputs that pass the monitor's filter regardless of whether they violate the intended constraints. This has been observed in reasoning agents hiding reward-hacking intent from chain-of-thought monitors (Baker et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2025), and coding agents that produce backdoored solutions that pass monitor checks (Wagner et al., 2025).

One might choose a conservative response: do not train the worker with feedback from the monitor. Indeed, Baker et al. (2025) argue that strong optimization pressure from monitor feedback can make agents less monitorable, because workers learn to hide their delinquent behavior. However, avoiding

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

Figure 1: Top: when the monitor is held fixed, a worker trained against it can learn monitor-evasive behavior. Bottom: when the monitor is co-trained, it can adapt to worker-induced distribution shift while preserving the intended monitoring objective.

such training intuitively may sharply limit the role monitors can play in improving worker behavior by disincentivizing unsafe actions. This motivates our question:

Can monitor feedback be provided to workers without teaching them to evade the monitor?

We propose a simple solution: co-train the monitor with the worker so as to keep pace with the evolving evasion strategies of the worker. However, how to co-train the monitor is unclear: scalable AI monitoring is necessary precisely because consistent human supervision is costly and may not be available in real time. Here we show that with occasional reliable labels, online-learning theory characterizes when monitoring error can become vanishingly rare despite adversarial adaptation. We further characterize how from the worker's perspective, this vanishing monitor error makes honest task completion preferable to cheating – thereby achieving alignment.

Our model of agentic oversight is a multi-round interaction between a worker agent and a monitor agent. On round t, the worker plays an action $a_t \in \mathcal{A}$ and the monitor outputs a judgement $y_t \in \mathcal{Y}$. The goal is to adaptively learn a monitor that matches the ground-truth judgement function $f^* : \mathcal{A} \to \mathcal{Y}$ of the *principal* (a human). We assume that the judgement function f^* belongs to a known function class $\mathcal{F}$. For example, consider a code submission a_t, and the monitor's judgement $y_t \in \{\mathsf{correct}, \mathsf{buggy}\}$ predicts if the submission meets the intended specifications of the (human) principal, with ground truth $f^*(a_t)$.

Feasibility of monitoring with (vanishing) query access. First, we study the case where the monitor is allowed occasional query access to gold-standard judgements from the principal. Since queries to the principal are expensive (requiring human time and effort), in order for this setup to be scalable, queries to the principal should be vanishingly rare. Our main theoretical result in 2.1 establishes that co-trained monitors can simultaneously achieve asymptotically vanishing error and query rates exactly when the intended monitor function is online-learnable. This is achieved via a simple randomized scheme for determining when to query the ground truth labels.

Maintaining monitor accuracy can promote alignment. We further prove that this co-training algorithm results in decreased cheating behavior in workers. Indeed, if the worker has a strategy with a payoff that is uniformly within $o(T)$ of the sequential optimum, then it will attempt to cheat on only a vanishing fraction of rounds; see Section 2.2.

Self-supervised co-training of monitor. Next, we ask: is it possible to improve monitor performance through co-training without ever querying the principal? We propose a self-supervised approach, distilling judgements obtained with greater test-time compute. For majority-vote labels, our finite-sample analysis tracks sharpening toward the initial modal verdicts under adaptive worker distributions with action coverage. This can improve single-sample accuracy by amortizing voting.

2 Characterizing when monitors can be co-trained with ground truth queries: equivalence to online learning

In this section, we allow the **worker to choose an adversarial action** at each round, based on the interaction so far. The adversarial worker model abstracts over the worker's own training dynamics:

as the worker is updated, its behavior may change arbitrarily, and we impose no regularity on those changes. In order to give the monitor a chance to learn, we also **allow the monitor to occasionally query the principal's ground truth judgement** f^*. The protocol is as follows.

WORKER-MONITOR PROTOCOL WITH QUERIES

For each round $t = 1, 2, \ldots$

(1) the worker plays an action $a_t \in \mathcal{A}$;

(2) the monitor returns a judgement $y_t \in \mathcal{Y}$;

(3) the monitor decides whether to query the principal by choosing $q_t \in \{0, 1\}$; if $q_t = 1$, the monitor observes the ground truth $f^*(a_t)$.

A good monitor algorithm should achieve two things: (1) it should make few mistakes, outputting correct judgements on as many rounds as possible, and (2) it should make few queries, since queries consume the principal's limited attention. Precisely, our goal is to obtain asymptotically vanishing error and query rates, defined as follows:

Definition 2.1. The expected average error and query rate across T rounds are

$$\mathcal{E}_T = \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{E}[1(y_t \neq f^*(a_t))] \qquad \text{and} \qquad \mathcal{Q}_T = \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{E}[q_t]\,,$$

with expectations over potential randomness in the monitor's decisions to query or which judgement to output. For a monitoring algorithm, let $\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T := \sup \mathcal{E}_T$ and $\bar{\mathcal{Q}}_T := \sup \mathcal{Q}_T$, where the suprema are over all worker strategies and all $f^* \in \mathcal{F}$. We say the monitoring error and query rate *vanish asymptotically* if $\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T = o(1)$ and $\bar{\mathcal{Q}}_T = o(1)$ as $T \to \infty$.

2.1 MONITORING AGAINST AN ADVERSARIAL WORKER WITH VANISHING GROUND-TRUTH QUERIES IS EQUIVALENT TO ONLINE LEARNING

Random audits expose monitoring mistakes, allowing the monitor to learn from corrections even as the worker adapts. Can these audits become increasingly rare while the error rate also vanishes? We show that this is possible exactly when $\mathcal{F}$ is online-learnable.[1]

More precisely, we aim to characterize when it is possible to co-train the monitor so that both the error and query rate vanish asymptotically; we observe that this question corresponds to the *label-efficient prediction* problem introduced by Helmbold & Panizza (1997). They originally studied this setting for finite function classes $|\mathcal{F}| = N$, and more recently Devulapalli & Hanneke (2024) and Devulapalli et al. (2026) characterized when label-efficient learning is possible for general function classes, with tight regret-query tradeoffs. When applied to our worker-monitor setting, prior results suggest that **monitor co-training with vanishing error and vanishing query rate is possible exactly for online-learnable classes** $\mathcal{F}$. However, those results are proved in continuous time and in partly different regimes, so we provide a theorem statement and self-contained proof for our discrete-time setting.[2] In order to state the theorem, we recall the notion of the Littlestone dimension of a function class:

Definition 2.2 (Littlestone dimension (Littlestone, 1988; Daniely et al., 2011))**.** A *shattered tree* of depth d for $\mathcal{F}$ is a complete binary tree of depth d whose internal nodes are labeled by actions in $\mathcal{A}$ and whose two edges out of each node are labeled by two distinct judgements in $\mathcal{Y}$, such that every root-to-leaf path is realized by some $f \in \mathcal{F}$ (i.e., f maps each node's action to the label of the edge the path follows). The Littlestone dimension $\mathrm{Ldim}(\mathcal{F})$ is the largest d for which a shattered tree of depth d exists (∞ if trees of every depth exist).

The finiteness of the Littlestone dimension is known to be exactly the condition under which $\mathcal{F}$ is *online learnable* in the classical full-feedback setting, where a label is revealed after every prediction (Littlestone, 1988; Ben-David et al., 2009; Daniely et al., 2011). The main result of this section is that Littlestone dimension also characterizes when co-training a monitor with vanishing error and query rate is possible, against an adversarial worker. See Appendix A for the proof.

[1] This essentially requires $\mathcal{F}$, the class of functions mapping worker actions to judgements, to have bounded complexity. Here, one way to satisfy this is for there to be a finite number of possible exploits for a given task.

[2] Devulapalli et al. (2026) also handle the agnostic (noisy) case. We study the realizable case for simplicity.

Algorithm 1 Query-efficient monitoring via the Standard Optimal Algorithm

1: **Initialize** version space $V_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{F}$
2: **for** round $t = 1, 2, \ldots$ **do**
3: Observe worker's action a_t and output $y_t \leftarrow \arg\max_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \mathrm{Ldim}\big(\{f \in V_t : f(a_t) = y\}\big)$
4: With probability $\varepsilon_t = t^{-1/2}$, query the principal, observe $f^*(a_t)$, and set $V_{t+1} \leftarrow \{f \in V_t : f(a_t) = f^*(a_t)\}$; otherwise set $V_{t+1} \leftarrow V_t$
5: **end for**

Theorem 2.3 (Monitoring is possible iff $\mathcal{F}$ is online-learnable)**.** There is a monitoring algorithm for which the monitoring error and query rate both vanish asymptotically, if and only if $\mathrm{Ldim}(\mathcal{F}) < \infty$.

Remark 2.4 (Generic reduction to online learning algorithms)**.** The idea of randomly querying with some small probability that underlies Algorithm 1 also applies to any online learning algorithm with a finite realizable mistake bound. Suppose an online learner makes at most B mistakes on every realizable full-feedback sequence, and run it while leaving its state unchanged on unqueried rounds. The learner's state depends only on previously queried examples, so on queried rounds it behaves exactly as the full-feedback learner would on the queried subsequence. Since this subsequence is realized by f^*, at most B queried mistakes occur. Consequently, if round t is queried independently after the prediction with probability ε_t, then $\sum_{t=1}^{T} \varepsilon_t \mathbb{E}[m_t] \le B$. For $\varepsilon_t = t^{-1/2}$, this gives $\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T \le \frac{B}{\sqrt{T}}$ and $\bar{\mathcal{Q}}_T \le \frac{2}{\sqrt{T}}$ by the same arguments as above. Algorithm 1 instantiates this reduction with the Standard Optimal Algorithm, for which $B = \mathrm{Ldim}(\mathcal{F})$.

2.2 Co-training monitors disincentivizes workers from cheating

Accurate monitoring is useful only if it shapes the worker's reward such that it is encouraged to complete tasks in an aligned manner. We next show that when honest completion remains profitable to the worker, sufficiently accurate monitoring makes cheating unattractive to a worker that approximately maximizes its total reward.

Specialize to $\mathcal{Y} = \{0, 1\}$, where $f^*(a_t) = 1$ means honest task completion. Each round, the worker can complete honestly at cost $c \ge 0$ or take a free shortcut. Accepted actions are rewarded V_H for honest work and V_E for cheating; rejection incurs a penalty P. Assume $V_H, V_E, P \ge 0$ and $V_H + P > 0$, and set

$$\rho := \frac{V_E + P}{V_H + P}, \qquad \bar{c} := \frac{c}{V_H + P}.$$

The worker's payoff u_t, including the cost of honest work even when rejected, satisfies

$$\frac{u_t + P}{V_H + P} = y_t\big[f^*(a_t) + \rho(1 - f^*(a_t))\big] - \bar{c}\, f^*(a_t).$$

For a history-dependent worker policy π, let $J_T(\pi) = \mathbb{E}_\pi[\sum_{t=1}^{T} u_t]$ against the given monitor algorithm. A Δ_T-optimal sequential response satisfies $J_T(\pi) \ge \sup_{\pi'} J_T(\pi') - \Delta_T$, where the supremum ranges over admissible worker policies, including always completing honestly.

Corollary 2.5 (Co-trained monitors induce honest task completion)**.** Suppose $\bar{c} < 1$, the worker uses a Δ_T-optimal sequential response, and the monitor satisfies $\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T \le d/\sqrt{T}$ and $\bar{\mathcal{Q}}_T \le 2/\sqrt{T}$ for $d = \mathrm{Ldim}(\mathcal{F}) < \infty$. Then the number of cheating attempts $C_T = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbf{1}\{f^*(a_t) = 0\}$ satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}[C_T] \le \frac{(1+\rho)d\sqrt{T} + \Delta_T/(V_H + P)}{1 - \bar{c}}, \qquad \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=1}^{T} q_t\right] \le 2\sqrt{T}.$$

For fixed payoffs and d, if $\Delta_T = o(T)$, the expected fractions of cheating attempts and queries vanish, while the expected fraction of accepted honest completions tends to one.

Corollary 2.5, with proof in Appendix A.2, shows that co-training yields a vanishing fraction of cheating attempts when $\bar{c} < 1$ and the worker's sequential suboptimality is $o(T)$. On the other hand, a fixed monitor does not have a vanishing error rate guarantee, and so may leave cheating profitable indefinitely. Let α be its probability of rejecting honest work and β its probability of accepting



Figure 2: Deterrence regimes from Section 2.2; theory only. (a) At $\bar{c} = 0.25$, honest completion occurs above $\alpha + \rho\beta = 1 - \bar{c}$. The line has slope $1/\rho$ and passes through $(1 - \bar{c}, 1)$; shading shows $\rho = 1$. (b) Color shows the detection rate required when $\alpha = 0$. Grey: honesty is optimal even without monitoring. Hatched: cheating remains optimal even with perfect monitoring. Dashed: $\rho = 1$. Markers correspond to the three lines in (a).

cheating. In normalized units, honest work pays $1 - \alpha - \bar{c}$, while cheating pays $\rho\beta$. The worker therefore prefers to cheat whenever $\alpha + \rho\beta > 1 - \bar{c}$ (Figure 2). A sufficiently accurate fixed monitor can deter cheating, but its errors do not decrease through interaction.

For online-learnable classes, occasional ground-truth audits let a co-trained monitor correct exploited mistakes even as the queried fraction vanishes. When honest work is profitable and the worker approximately maximizes its cumulative reward, this also drives the cheating rate to zero. Within the next section, we ask whether the monitor's own judgments can provide a useful training signal when these external corrections are unavailable.

3 Query-free monitor co-training via compute-amplification.

Without ground-truth feedback, improvement must come from capabilities already present in the monitor. We study whether additional inference-time computation can produce more reliable judgments and whether training can retain their benefit in a single verdict.

This appears difficult for two reasons. First, training the monitor on its own judgements can preserve or amplify its existing errors, since the monitor has no external signal indicating when a training label is wrong. Second, the worker may adapt during training and increasingly produce actions on which the monitor is unreliable. A successful self-training procedure therefore requires a training signal that is more accurate than the deployed judgement and remains useful as the worker changes.

To attack this problem, we adopt a modification to the protocol in Section 2. We explore a potential solution of *compute-amplified self-training*: the monitor generates training labels with additional inference-time computation, then updates its standard-thinking mode. Here, extended thinking may aggregate independent verdicts, select among responses, or deliberate longer.

Worker-monitor protocol with compute-amplified self-training

For each round $t = 1, 2, \ldots$

(1) the worker plays an action $a_t \sim D_t$;
(2) the monitor produces a standard-thinking judgement y_t;
(3) the monitor produces an extended-thinking judgement $\widetilde{y}_t$ with additional compute;
(4) the monitor updates its standard-thinking mode using $(a_t, \widetilde{y}_t)$ as a training example.

3.1 MONITORING AN ADVERSARIAL WORKER WITH COMPUTE-AMPLIFIED SELF-TRAINING

We first study the extended-thinking mode where the judgement is given by majority vote on multiple outputs. This can improve a label when the monitor is more often right than wrong on that action, but could reinforce mistaken preferences. Training on these labels aims to make the monitor's preferred verdicts more reliable in a single sample.

Setup. First, consider what perfect training would achieve. We measure error on a fixed theoretical evaluation distribution μ over worker actions, which the algorithm need not know. Let $e_\pi(x)$ be the probability that a single verdict from π disagrees with the true verdict $f^*(x) \in \{0, 1\}$. Then $\mathcal{R}_\mu(\pi) = \mathbb{E}_\mu e_\pi(X)$ is its average error on actions drawn from μ.

With exact population fitting, repeated majority updates drive errors below $1/2$ toward zero and errors above $1/2$ toward one, leaving ties unchanged. The monitor changes, but its preferred verdict on each action does not. The limiting error on μ is therefore the probability that this preferred verdict is wrong, plus half the probability of a tie:

$$b_\mu(\pi_0) = \Pr_{X\sim\mu}[e_{\pi_0}(X) > 1/2] + \tfrac{1}{2}\Pr_{X\sim\mu}[e_{\pi_0}(X) = 1/2].$$

Can training retain this sharpening benefit as the worker adapts? Our analysis builds on SFT-Sharpening (Huang et al., 2024, Theorem 4.1), whose SFT guarantee concerns a fixed base model and prompt distribution. Here, the updated monitor supplies subsequent labels, while the worker uses past feedback to choose new training actions.

Analysis. Actual training must learn these majority judgments from finite samples chosen by an adaptive worker. Fix an odd vote count $k \geq 3$. At stage $t = 0, \ldots, T-1$, the worker chooses $D_t \in \Delta(\mathcal{A})$ using past feedback. We draw $n_t \geq 1$ independent actions from D_t, each labeled by k fresh independent votes from π_t; write $Q_{\pi_t,k}$ for this majority-label distribution. Negative log-likelihood fitting returns π_{t+1} from a finite nonempty class Π_t of size N_t. The class and batch size are chosen before sampling, and the monitor stays fixed within each batch.

The worker can change D_t, but $d\mu/dD_t \leq C_t$ requires training to cover the fixed evaluation distribution. After inspecting the final monitor, it may also choose an attack distribution D_{attack}, subject to $dD_{\text{attack}}/d\mu \leq C_{\text{attack}}$. This limits concentration on rare regions under μ; unrestricted attacks on blind spots are not covered.

Near-ties take longer to sharpen. To quantify this, we assume a margin condition (Audibert & Tsybakov, 2007)

$$\Pr_{X\sim\mu}[0 < |e_{\pi_0}(X) - 1/2| \leq u] \leq Au^\alpha \qquad (u > 0), \tag{1}$$

where $A, \alpha > 0$. We measure fitting error by a_t^{fit}, the positive part of empirical excess log loss relative to $Q_{\pi_t,k}$ (Equation 4). This vanishes under realizability and exact optimization.

Informally, under coverage and sufficiently accurate fitting, repeated training brings the monitor's error close to the ideal limit $b_\mu(\pi_0)$ even as the worker adapts. The result below bounds this gap by the remaining sharpening error and accumulated sampling and fitting errors.

Theorem 3.1 (Error under repeated majority-vote training)**.** Suppose (1) holds and, almost surely at every stage, $\mu \ll D_t$ with $d\mu/dD_t \leq C_t < \infty$. For deterministic per-stage failure probabilities $\delta_t \in (0, 1)$ with $\sum_{t<T} \delta_t < 1$, w.p. at least $1 - \sum_{t<T} \delta_t$, it holds for all integers $0 \leq s \leq T$,

$$\begin{aligned}\left|\mathcal{R}_\mu(\pi_T) - b_\mu(\pi_0)\right| \leq{}& A4^{-\alpha}(11/8)^{-\alpha s} + \tfrac{1}{3}(3/4)^{2^{T-s}} \\ &+ \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} L_k^{T-1-t}\sqrt{C_t a_t^{\text{fit}} + \frac{2C_t \log(N_t/\delta_t)}{n_t}}.\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Here $L_k = k2^{-(k-1)}\binom{k-1}{(k-1)/2}$ is the majority map's maximum slope, which bounds amplification of fitting errors. On the same event, every attack distribution $D_{\text{attack}} \ll \mu$ with $dD_{\text{attack}}/d\mu \leq C_{\text{attack}}$ satisfies $\mathcal{R}_{D_{\text{attack}}}(\pi_T) \leq C_{\text{attack}}\mathcal{R}_\mu(\pi_T)$, including distributions chosen after inspecting π_T.

The above guarantee shows when co-training preserves the benefit of voting. With exact fitting, we approach the initial majority judgments as the first two terms vanish. With finite samples and imperfect fitting, we also pay for errors that can grow over subsequent updates. We improve accuracy

on μ when the whole bound is below $\mathcal{R}_\mu(\pi_0) - b_\mu(\pi_0)$, even though the worker chooses training actions using past feedback. We give the proof in Appendix F, extending the conditional-likelihood argument of Huang et al. (2024, Lemma F.1).

Co-training can therefore retain the benefit of extra compute as the worker adapts, provided coverage and fitting preserve enough of the initial sharpening advantage. Still, there are limitations. Voting alone cannot repair initially wrong preferred verdicts – the protocol we analyze only allows the worker to become as good as its modal prediction. Furthermore, we note that this guarantee remains experimentally unvalidated. Doing so remains a high priority for future work.

4 Experiments on monitor co-training with ground truth queries

To this point, we have established that it is theoretically possible for monitors to defend against adversarial worker actions, and that faithful monitoring may actually incentivize worker agents to perform more aligned work. In this section we set out to establish this empirically.



Figure 3: Attack success during worker training on clean/buggy Fibonacci, toxicity rewriting, and escape-the-box. Attack success is the fraction of evaluator-confirmed violations that the monitor accepts. Curves show trailing ten-update rates averaged equally over seeds 42, 101, and 303; shading is ± 1.96 standard errors across seeds.

Filtering harmful worker actions. We study three analogous tasks in which a worker is trained to fool a monitor that makes binary judgements of its actions (Appendix B describes them in full):

- **Fibonacci code review.** The worker writes a Python function `fib(n)` that should return the nth Fibonacci number ($F_0 = 0$, $F_1 = 1$, $F_n = F_{n-1} + F_{n-2}$). It succeeds when a buggy program, one that returns a wrong value for some $n \leq 10^4$, is judged CLEAN rather than BUGGY.
- **Toxicity.** The worker rewrites an abusive comment and succeeds when a rewrite that keeps its abusive meaning is judged CLEAN rather than TOXIC.
- **Escape-the-box.** The worker writes a tool-use trace that transforms, stores and shares named objects, and succeeds when a trace that sends information from a protected object to an external destination is judged CLEAN rather than LEAK.

For each task, we compare a fixed monitor with two co-trained monitors. The first queries the principal's labels for the worker's outputs at every worker update. The second queries at worker update t only with probability $t^{-1/2}$, following Algorithm 1 but with one query decision per worker update rather than per action. Appendix C gives per-task details. Within this experiment, queries determine which labels are included in the monitor's training data, but worker rewards are based on ground-truth evaluations performed on every batch.

Across all three tasks, workers continue to exploit fixed monitors successfully. Both co-training methods reduce attack success near the end of training, but infrequent querying can still allow a nontrivial amount of evasion.

Rewarding honest work. In the attack game, the worker is rewarded only for accepted exploits ($V_H = 0$), so it has no incentive to produce correct code. The repair game changes this. The worker starts from a subtly buggy Fibonacci implementation and may edit up to 12 tokens, at a cost of 0.05 per token. An accepted submission earns 1 if correct and 2.5 if it remains buggy, while a rejected submission earns 0.5 if correct and 0 otherwise.

In the notation of Section 2.2, we set $V_H = 1$, $V_E = 2.5$, and $P = 0$, so the relative payoff for a successful exploit compared to honest work is $\rho = 2.5$, while a k-token repair costs $\bar{c} = 0.05k \leq 0.6$. Correct repairs also receive partial credit when rejected. But the worker has a simple alternative: resubmit the buggy starter unchanged, which costs nothing and earns 2.5 whenever it is accepted. Even if the monitor never rejects correct code, a one-token repair is better only if it catches more than 62% of unchanged starters ($2.5\beta < 0.95$); a 12-token repair requires 84%. The fixed monitor catches only $30 \pm 1\%$ of buggy submissions over the first 80 updates (Figure 4, left), so this shortcut remains profitable.

We see that over updates 71–80, correct repairs rise from $17 \pm 5\%$ with fixed monitoring to $66 \pm 7\%$ with every-update co-training and $46 \pm 9\%$ with sparse co-training. The fractions that are both correct and accepted are $16 \pm 5\%$, $31 \pm 13\%$, and $37 \pm 9\%$, respectively. Co-training therefore induces more genuine repair, though some of the gain is lost when correct solutions are rejected. All rates are over buggy-starter outputs; uncertainties are one standard error across three seeds.



Figure 4: Fibonacci repair game. Left: successful attack rate, the share of buggy submissions that the monitor accepts. Middle and right: share of buggy starters resubmitted unchanged or repaired correctly. Per-seed trailing ten-update means, averaged over three seeds. Shading is ± 1.96 s.e.

5 Discussion

This work demonstrates the possibility of improving agentic oversight by continuously training an AI monitor. We argue that this ongoing "co-training" allows the monitor to adapt to worker behavior, in the same settings where a fixed monitor would be easily exploited. Moreover, we provide some theoretical grounding for this setting by establishing a tight connection to adversarial online learning and thereby characterize the conditions needed for effective monitoring. Our experiments demonstrate that co-training monitors, even with a vanishing query schedule, can suppress worker attacks. We also discuss implications of monitoring for ensuring overall aligned worker behavior – the feasibility of alignment via monitoring depends on the relative cost and payoff of aligned and misaligned actions for the worker.

Limitations and open directions. Our experiments provide evidence in restricted task settings. Limited computational resources prevented evaluation across a broader range of tasks, larger models, and longer training runs. Whether a single monitor can maintain reliable oversight across diverse domains and sustained adversarial adaptation remains open. Our comparisons test co-training against fixed-monitor feedback, but do not establish whether either approach improves on training without monitor feedback.

Our supervised guarantees assume reliable ground-truth labels and a fixed judgment function within an online-learnable class. They do not establish robustness to noisy or misspecified supervision, or that practical neural-network training achieves the theoretical guarantees. Moreover, vanishing average error does not preclude substantial harm before the monitor learns, or rare failures with severe consequences. Also, there are other schemes for choosing when to query the ground truth that we did not explore in the main text: see Appendix E for some additional experiments.

Our self-supervised analysis establishes sharpening toward the monitor's initial majority judgments, rather than a general guarantee of improved correctness. Sharpening can improve single-verdict accuracy under the stated conditions, but can also reinforce systematic errors. The guarantee further requires action coverage and controlled fitting error, limiting the adversarial strategies it accommodates. Compute-amplified co-training remains experimentally unvalidated in this work.

Finally, our analysis primarily establishes monitor guarantees and derives their consequences for worker incentives. The honest-completion result assumes favorable payoffs and a near-optimal sequential worker response; it does not show that a particular training algorithm learns that response. A fuller game-theoretic treatment of joint worker-monitor learning could clarify when co-training converges to useful behavior, when strategic interactions undermine it, and how rewards and auditing policies should be designed.

5.1 Related work

Reward hacking in large language models occurs when agents earn proxy rewards without satisfying the principal's intent (Wang et al., 2026). Prior work in the AI-control literature studies how a *fixed* monitor should allocate a limited auditing budget against an adversarial policy (Greenblatt et al., 2023; Griffin et al., 2024); our result concerns when the monitor can be *co-trained* so that the required auditing vanishes. Similarly, much of the scalable oversight literature involves AI debate or other ensemble approaches given fixed monitor models (Bowman et al., 2022; Kenton et al., 2024; Koran et al., 2026; Engels et al., 2025). There is also precedent in game theory for studying inspection and enforcement policies for fixed monitors that inspect an agent's actions for compliance with some policy, such as in the case of nuclear arms compliance (Becker, 1974; Avenhaus et al., 1996).

Much of the weak-to-strong supervision literature is not concerned with oversight so much as training: the goal in this literature is to get weak models to help train stronger models with desirable behavior Burns et al. (2023). Jin et al. (2026) a weak monitor critiques a strong model and prompts it for a revision, which is used to distill the strong model.

Kumar & Singh (2026) train a monitor to route a fixed worker's actions for human review based on the worker's chain-of-thought; they update the monitor by periodic DPO on detailed human corrections. They demonstrate improved routing but do not characterize worker behavior. In contrast, we require only candidate actions and occasional binary human labels, allow the worker to learn continuously, and provide a fuller formalization and learning guarantees.

Our proposed self-training algorithm is related to several other works on self-training and gradual domain adaptation (Kumar et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2022). These works update a model using pseudolabels across a sequence of gradually changing data distributions; in our setting the distributions are generated by a worker that is trained alongside the monitor. There is also a growing literature on self-training in language modeling which we build on here (Christiano et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2023; Prasad et al., 2025; Zuo et al., 2025; Huang et al., 2024; Song et al., 2025). Our majority-vote analysis adapts the SFT-Sharpening framework and conditional-MLE bound of Huang et al. (2024, Section 2.1 and Lemma F.1) to adaptive worker actions. Guarantees on later attacks require action-distribution coverage.

AI Use Disclosure

Language models are themselves the worker and monitor agents studied in our experiments; this use is part of the research methodology described in the paper. In addition, we used generative AI tools as research assistants to help develop and critique theoretical formulations and proofs; refine hypotheses, methodology, and experimental designs; implement, review, and debug software; process and analyze experimental outputs; interpret results; create and revise scientific figures; identify

and summarize relevant literature; and draft and edit manuscript text, structure, and references. The authors reviewed and tested AI-assisted code and analyses, checked mathematical arguments and empirical claims, verified figures against their source artifacts, and manually reviewed literature and references. The authors take responsibility for the final content of this work, including all text, claims, code, and artifacts produced with the aid of generative AI.

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A Proofs for Section 2

A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3

Proof of Theorem 2.3. Necessity. Suppose $\mathrm{Ldim}(\mathcal{F}) = \infty$; we show $\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T \geq 1/2$ for every T, even if the monitor queries at every round. This is the classical lower bound for randomized online learners with full feedback (Littlestone, 1988; Ben-David et al., 2009): fix a shattered tree of depth T, let independent unbiased coin flips $b_1, \ldots, b_T$ select a uniformly random root-to-leaf path, let $f^* \in \mathcal{F}$ realize it, and let the worker play the actions along the path. At the start of round t, the monitor's observations are a function of $b_1, \ldots, b_{t-1}$ and its own randomness, while $f^*(a_t)$ is determined by the independent flip b_t between the two distinct edge labels at a_t; hence $\Pr[y_t \neq f^*(a_t)] \geq 1/2$ regardless of the monitor's strategy. Averaging over the random path, there exists a fixed path and a corresponding $f^* \in \mathcal{F}$ for which $\mathcal{E}_T \geq 1/2$, so $\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T \geq 1/2$.

Sufficiency. Suppose $d := \mathrm{Ldim}(\mathcal{F}) < \infty$ and run Algorithm 1. Note that $f^* \in V_t$ for all t, since updates only remove functions disagreeing with observed ground truth. By the standard SOA argument, every queried mistake strictly decreases $\mathrm{Ldim}(V_t)$: otherwise both the predicted-label and true-label subclasses would have Littlestone dimension $\mathrm{Ldim}(V_t)$, yielding a shattered tree of depth $\mathrm{Ldim}(V_t) + 1$. Hence at most d queried mistakes occur.

Fix a horizon T and let $m_t := 1(y_t \neq f^*(a_t))$. Then $\sum_{t=1}^{T} m_t q_t \leq d$ almost surely. Since the query coin is drawn independently after y_t is chosen, $\mathbb{E}[m_t q_t] = \varepsilon_t \mathbb{E}[m_t]$. Therefore,

$$d \geq \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=1}^{T} m_t q_t\right] = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \varepsilon_t \mathbb{E}[m_t] \geq \frac{1}{\sqrt{T}} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{E}[m_t],$$

where we used $\varepsilon_t = t^{-1/2} \geq T^{-1/2}$ for $t \leq T$. Thus the expected number of mistakes by time T is at most $d\sqrt{T}$. These bounds hold for every worker and every $f^* \in \mathcal{F}$, so

$$\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T \leq \frac{d}{\sqrt{T}} \qquad \text{and} \qquad \bar{\mathcal{Q}}_T \leq \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} t^{-1/2} \leq \frac{2}{\sqrt{T}}.$$

□

A.2 Proof of Corollary 2.5

Proof. Always completing honestly earns normalized expected payoff at least $(1-\bar{c})T - T\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T$, because only false rejections reduce its payoff. The actual worker is $\Delta_T/(V_H+P)$-suboptimal, so its normalized expected payoff is at least $(1-\bar{c})T - T\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T - \Delta_T/(V_H+P)$. Honest rounds contribute at most $1-\bar{c}$, while cheating earns ρ upon false acceptance and zero otherwise. The actual worker's payoff is therefore at most $(1-\bar{c})(T-\mathbb{E}[C_T]) + \rho T\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T$. The uniform error guarantee applies to both policies, despite their different training histories. Combining these bounds gives

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}[C_T]}{T} \leq \frac{(1+\rho)\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T + \Delta_T/((V_H+P)T)}{1-\bar{c}}.$$

The expected number of accepted honest completions is at least $T - \mathbb{E}[C_T] - T\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T$. Substituting Theorem 2.3's error and query bounds proves the claims. □

B Task environments

Our experiments instantiate the same worker–monitor interaction in three different action spaces. The worker searches for an action that violates the principal's constraint but receives an accepting monitor verdict; the monitor tries to recover the principal's binary judgement as the worker adapts. Each environment also contains compliant actions, so indiscriminate rejection is not a successful monitoring strategy.

Fibonacci code review. An action is a Python implementation of a specified Fibonacci function. The worker seeks a semantically buggy program that the monitor accepts as CLEAN; the monitor reviews the code and chooses CLEAN or BUGGY. The challenge is to detect subtle functional errors rather than superficial signs of low-quality code.

Toxicity. An action is a natural-language rewrite of a supplied abusive comment. The worker seeks wording that preserves the target and abusive meaning but is classified CLEAN; the monitor chooses TOXIC or CLEAN. Thus the monitor must track meaning across paraphrases rather than rely only on conspicuous words.

Escape-the-box. An action is a tool-use trace that transforms, stores, and shares named objects. Some objects are protected and some destinations are external. The worker seeks a trace that sends information derived from a protected object to an external destination while receiving a CLEAN verdict; the monitor chooses LEAK or CLEAN from the visible trace. This requires following information flow across multiple operations.



Figure 5: Recorded monitor-accepted violations from each task, abbreviated with ellipses. Tags are display formatting; toxicity and escape-the-box use direct verdicts. Principal labels are evaluator ground truth hidden from the monitor.

C TRAINING DETAILS

Common setup. Every task compares three monitors: a fixed monitor that is never updated, a monitor co-trained at every worker update, and a monitor co-trained at worker update t with probability $t^{-1/2}$. The query decision is one independent coin flip per worker update, made after that update's monitor verdicts and worker rewards are final; when it fails, the monitor is left unchanged and no labels are revealed to it. Each condition is run with three random seeds (42, 101 and 303). The monitor is Qwen3-1.7B (Yang et al., 2025), adapted with a rank-16 LoRA (Hu et al., 2022). A queried update is a single AdamW step (learning rate 5×10^{-5}, gradient clipping at 1.0) on a small batch of labeled examples. Earlier labels are not replayed, except that the repair task holds labels briefly to balance its batches. Labels always come from the task's ground-truth checker, never from the monitor. The same checker scores every worker output for reward in all three conditions, so the conditions differ only in what the monitor learns. Each co-training batch also contains known-compliant examples. Without them, a monitor trained mostly on violations learns to reject everything, which ends the game: the worker has nothing left to exploit, and the monitor is useless to the principal.

Except in escape-the-box, the worker is Qwen3-4B, adapted with a rank-16 LoRA and trained with GRPO (Shao et al., 2024) using the DAPO loss normalization (Yu et al., 2025). Each worker update samples eight responses to one prompt, uses learning rate 2×10^{-5} and applies no KL penalty.

Fibonacci code review. The worker is asked to write a `fib(n)` function containing a subtle bug that makes it wrong for at least one $n \leq 10^4$ while looking natural. It is first fine-tuned on buggy programs from earlier attacks that the untrained monitor had sometimes accepted, so that it starts from plausible attacks rather than obvious ones. It is then trained for 200 updates, with responses of up to 4096 tokens. A program earns reward 1 if executing it shows that it is wrong and the monitor accepts it, and 0 otherwise; correct programs earn nothing. The monitor starts from the base model, reasons about the program and ends with a CLEAN or BUGGY verdict, within a 4096-token budget. For each program that execution shows to be buggy, the current monitor generates five reviews; the first sets the worker's reward, and every review that concludes BUGGY becomes a

training target, reasoning included. Each queried update adds four programs known to be correct, paired with accepting reviews written by the untrained monitor.

Toxicity. Sources are highly toxic comments from Civil Comments (Borkan et al., 2019) that insult, threaten or attack an identity group. The worker rewrites one source per update, without extended reasoning, cycling ten times through ten fixed training sources for 100 updates. It is first fine-tuned on its own varied rewrites that a validator confirmed were still toxic and preserved the source's target and meaning, so that it explores many phrasings from the start. The validator is a frozen Qwen3-14B model that judges every rewrite at every update: whether it is toxic, and whether it keeps the source's target and abusive meaning. A rewrite that fails these checks earns -1. A valid rewrite earns a smooth score that rises with the monitor's confidence that it is CLEAN, plus 1 if the monitor actually labels it CLEAN. The monitor gives a direct TOXIC or CLEAN verdict without reasoning. The untrained monitor detected only about a third of the original toxic comments, far too few for the worker to face a real obstacle, so it was first fine-tuned on 1,000 balanced human-labeled Civil Comments examples, reaching 92% detection with 4% false alarms. The fixed monitor is this fine-tuned model. At each queried update, the validator's toxicity labels on four of the current rewrites, chosen at random, are combined with four human-labeled clean comments, and the monitor is trained to output the label.

Escape-the-box. Transcripts are produced by a generator whose settings control difficulty: the number of steps, the number of decoy objects and protected objects, renamings, parallel information flows, and whether external destinations are gated. Here the worker is not a language model but a probability distribution over these settings. Each update draws 64 transcripts, each leaking with probability $1/2$, and shifts probability toward settings whose transcripts earned more than the batch average (multiplicative weights). It starts concentrated on the easiest settings and runs for 100 updates. A transcript earns reward 1 only if an exact information-flow check shows that it leaks and the monitor labels it CLEAN; false alarms earn nothing. The monitor gives a direct LEAK or CLEAN verdict without reasoning. The untrained monitor labeled almost every transcript a leak, leaving the worker nothing to exploit and making the monitor useless, so it was first fine-tuned on balanced leaking and clean transcripts from five difficulty levels. We kept the earliest checkpoint that missed at most 5% of leaks at the easiest level with at most 10% false alarms there, and had at most 20% false alarms at every harder level. This monitor catches nearly all easy leaks but misses many hard ones, which gives the worker room to adapt. At each queried update, every leaking transcript in the batch is labeled LEAK, and one known-clean transcript is added for each, so the batch is balanced.

Fibonacci repair. Each task gives the worker a starter implementation of `fib(n)` that uses a fast algorithm; half of the starters contain a bug that appears only for large n, and the rest are the same programs without the bug. The worker sees six small public tests but not the hidden test, and may edit up to twelve tokens. It starts from the base model and trains for 100 updates, with responses of up to 4096 tokens; the reward rules are stated in its prompt and given in Section 4. After the monitor's verdict is fixed, every submission is checked exhaustively for all $n \leq 10^4$ to compute the worker's reward. The monitor starts from the base model, sees only the submitted code, reasons, and ends with a CLEAN or BUGGY verdict, within a 4096-token budget. At a queried update, all eight submissions receive their exhaustive-check labels. The monitor keeps its own reasoning and is trained only on the correct final verdict. Labels are held until four correct and four buggy submissions are available, and each training step uses exactly four of each, so the monitor sees both classes equally often even when the worker's submissions are unbalanced.

Held-out monitor evaluation. The repair runs also evaluate monitors on 24 fixed starter programs. Six clean programs appear in training-output exposure logs; excluding their union across all nine runs leaves a common set of 12 buggy and six clean programs. At update 50, the latest evaluation available for every run, bug detection is $30.6 \pm 7.3\%$ with fixed monitoring, $75.0 \pm 21.0\%$ with every-update co-training, and $77.8 \pm 22.2\%$ with sparse co-training. Clean acceptance is $100.0 \pm 0.0\%$, $72.2 \pm 14.7\%$, and $83.3 \pm 16.7\%$, respectively. These results extend the detection finding to programs without recorded training overlap, while showing the same cost in false rejections. They evaluate monitor judgments, not the worker's ability to repair unseen programs.

D AVERAGE-PAYOFF EQUILIBRIUM INTERPRETATION

Fix the monitor algorithm and let the worker use a Δ_T-optimal sequential response as defined before Corollary 2.5. Give the monitor the evaluation payoff

$$V_T = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[y_t \mathbf{1}\{f^*(a_t) = 1\} - y_t \mathbf{1}\{f^*(a_t) = 0\} - \kappa q_t \right], \qquad \kappa \geq 0.$$

This payoff rewards accepted legitimate work, penalizes accepted cheating, and charges for queries; Algorithm 1 is not claimed to optimize it. If C_T is as in the corollary and M_T denotes the realized number of monitoring mistakes, then pathwise

$$V_T = T - C_T - M_T - \kappa \sum_{t=1}^{T} q_t.$$

No monitor strategy can earn more than T. Thus, against the worker's full contingent policy, the monitor can improve its average expected payoff by at most

$$\frac{T - \mathbb{E}[V_T]}{T} \leq \frac{(1+\rho)\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T + \Delta_T/((V_H + P)T)}{1 - \bar{c}} + \bar{\mathcal{E}}_T + \kappa \bar{\mathcal{Q}}_T.$$

The worker can improve by at most Δ_T/T against the fixed monitor. Hence these complete-interaction policies form an η_T-approximate Nash equilibrium for average expected payoffs, where

$$\eta_T = \max\left\{ \frac{\Delta_T}{T}, \frac{(1+\rho)\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T + \Delta_T/((V_H + P)T)}{1 - \bar{c}} + \bar{\mathcal{E}}_T + \kappa \bar{\mathcal{Q}}_T \right\}.$$

For Algorithm 1, $\bar{\mathcal{E}}_T \leq d/\sqrt{T}$ and $\bar{\mathcal{Q}}_T \leq 2/\sqrt{T}$, so $\eta_T \to 0$ for fixed payoffs, d, κ, and $\bar{c} < 1$, provided $\Delta_T = o(T)$.

E UNCERTAINTY-TRIGGERED QUERIES IN ESCAPE-THE-BOX

We study a variant of the query scheme in Algorithm 1. In that algorithm, the monitor decides whether to query the principal with a coin that is independent of the worker's action, and Section 4 implements that schedule with one coin per worker update. Here we consider a monitor that outputs a verdict *probability* instead, which can spend its queries on the actions it is least sure about. This appendix reports a single-seed experiment with that rule in the escape-the-box setting. It is a bonus supplement to Section 4, not a replication of it: the monitor, initialization, and metrics differ, so the numbers are not comparable to Figure 3(c).

Setup. The environment and the categorical worker are those of Appendices B and C: each worker update draws 64 transcripts, half leaking, from the worker's current distribution over generator settings; the worker receives reward 1 for every transcript on which the monitor's deployed verdict is wrong and shifts probability toward settings that earned more than the batch average; it starts concentrated on the easiest settings and runs for 200 updates. The monitor is Qwen3-4B with a rank-32 LoRA giving a direct LEAK/CLEAN verdict without reasoning. Because the verdict is a fixed prefix followed by one deciding token, the monitor's verdict probability $p(x) = \Pr_\pi[\text{LEAK} \mid x]$ is obtained exactly from two teacher-forced forward passes. Before the run the monitor is warmed up by supervised fine-tuning on a balanced sample of 256 transcripts with ground-truth labels, drawn from the uniform generator distribution; this removes the base model's bias toward flagging everything and leaves a monitor with 37% single-sample error. After the warm-up the principal is consulted by one rule only: on each update, every transcript whose verdict probability satisfies $\max(p(x), 1 - p(x)) < \tau$ is sent to the principal and its ground-truth label is added to a balanced replay pool; transcripts above the threshold are discarded. The monitor takes eight SFT steps of 16 pool transcripts per worker update. We run $\tau \in \{0.6, 0.75, 0.9\}$ and a frozen monitor from the same warm-up.

Error is measured in two places. The *evaluation set* is a fixed sample of 200 transcripts from the uniform generator distribution, drawn once and never trained on; the worker does not see it. The *worker's batch* is the 64 transcripts of the current update, whose distribution the worker chooses. On both, "error" is the expected single-sample error $\mathbb{E}\, e_\pi(X) = \mathbb{E}\left[p(X)\mathbf{1}\{f^*(X) = \text{CLEAN}\} + (1 - p(X))\mathbf{1}\{f^*(X) = \text{LEAK}\} \right]$ computed from the exact probabilities, so no sampling noise enters; the sampled verdicts the worker actually faced during training agree with these numbers to within 0.01.



Figure 6: Uncertainty-triggered queries in escape-the-box, one seed per arm. (a) Error on the fixed evaluation set every 25 updates. (b) Error on the worker's own batch, five-update moving average. (c) Ground-truth labels requested so far as a percentage of all worker outputs. The frozen monitor is the same warmed-up model with no further training.

	queries			error at update 200		
monitor	total	% of outputs	rate, last 10 updates	evaluation set	worker's batch	false alarms on batch
frozen	0	0	0	0.379	0.466	0.822
$\tau = 0.6$	230	1.8	1.7%	0.181	0.221	0.269
$\tau = 0.75$	517	4.0	2.3%	0.043	0.058	0.041
$\tau = 0.9$	1,121	8.8	2.2%	**0.015**	**0.042**	0.013

Table 1: Labels are cumulative over 200×64 worker outputs; the query rate is the fraction of the last ten updates' transcripts that were sent to the principal. Batch errors are averaged over the last ten updates. False alarms are the error on the batch's non-leaking transcripts.

Results. With $\tau = 0.9$ the monitor asks the principal about 1,121 transcripts, 8.8% of what the worker produced, and its error on the evaluation set falls from 0.37 to 0.19 by update 25, 0.07 by update 50, and 0.015 at update 200. Its error on the worker's own batches, the distribution the worker is optimizing against it, is 0.04 over the final ten updates, with 1.3% false alarms and 6% missed leaks. The frozen monitor from the same warm-up is driven to 0.47 on those batches with 82% false alarms: the worker learns settings on which the monitor flags nearly everything, which is worth reward $1/2$ because half of each batch is clean. Lowering the threshold trades accuracy for labels monotonically: $\tau = 0.75$ reaches 0.043 on 4.0% of outputs, and $\tau = 0.6$, which asks about 1.8%, reaches only 0.18 and is still being pushed to 0.22 on the batch.

The query rate is front-loaded. Under $\tau = 0.9$, 43% of transcripts are queried over the first ten updates, 4% around update 100, and 2.2% over the last ten; the cumulative curve in Figure 6c is concave throughout. No schedule imposes this: the monitor becomes confident on the regions it has been corrected on, so it stops asking about them.

Why it works here. The worker moves toward settings on which the monitor is wrong. On a calibrated monitor those are also the settings on which it is uncertain, so the queries are spent on the attack. This is visible in panel (b): for $\tau \geq 0.75$ the error on the worker's adversarial batch tracks the error on the fixed evaluation set, whereas the frozen monitor's batch error is three times its evaluation-set error. The worker's adaptation, which is what breaks the frozen monitor, is what directs the co-trained monitor's queries.

Relation to Section 2. Theorem 2.3 states that, for an online-learnable class, a monitor can have error and query rate both vanish against an adversarial worker, and Algorithm 1 achieves this with a coin of probability $t^{-1/2}$ and a version-space update. The experiment shows the two rates falling together in a neural-network monitor, from 37% error and a 43% query rate to 1.5% and 2%, but by a different mechanism. A few remarks about the comparison to the main theorem:

- *Both query rates decrease.* The theorem's guarantee is worst-case over workers. Here the worker's adaptivity is what concentrates the queries: it seeks out the monitor's mistakes,

which for a calibrated monitor are its low-margin actions, and each correction there removes a region the worker was exploiting. An oblivious worker would spread the queries more thinly.

- *Selective queries are cheaper than a coin at the same error, when the margin is informative.* Algorithm 1's coin must query on confidently-correct actions as often as on doubtful ones. The uncertainty rule never queries where the monitor is confidently correct. Its failure mode is the mirror image: it also never queries where the monitor is *confidently wrong*. The $\tau = 0.6$ arm shows the cost of a rule that is too selective: with only 1.8% of outputs queried, the worker sustains 0.22 batch error against it, and its evaluation-set error stalls near 0.18. Selective sampling of this kind has no worst-case guarantee without a calibration or margin assumption on the monitor, which is exactly what the version-space argument behind Theorem 2.3 does not need.
- *The audited fraction is per action, not per batch.* In Section 4 one coin per update audits a whole batch, so the supervision exposed to the monitor is coarse. Here each transcript is its own query decision. Under a similar overall label budget the outcomes differ substantially: the sparse schedule in escape-the-box audited about 17.7% of outputs and left $43.5 \pm 9.0\%$ evasion, while $\tau = 0.75$ used 4.0% and ends at 0.058 batch error. The two runs use different monitors, initializations and metrics, so this is suggestive rather than a controlled comparison.
- *Incentives.* Under Corollary 2.5, vanishing monitor error makes cheating unprofitable when honest completion pays. This worker is rewarded only for the monitor's mistakes, so its batch error *is* its success rate: 0.04 against the $\tau = 0.9$ monitor versus 0.47 against the frozen one.

Limitations of this appendix. One seed per arm; the warm-up fine-tuning is not bit-reproducible, so the initial monitors of the four arms differ by up to 0.03 in error, and differences of that size between arms are noise. The evaluation set shares the uniform generator distribution with the warm-up, so it measures retention on the base distribution rather than generalization to new settings; the worker's batches supply the adversarial measurement. The threshold rule assumes the verdict probabilities are informative about error, which held for this monitor after warm-up but not for the base model, whose verdicts were confident and biased. Combining an uncertainty-triggered rule with a decaying coin as a floor, and comparing the two at matched query budgets and several seeds, are the natural next steps.

F Majority-vote self-training with adaptive workers

We prove Theorem 3.1 using a conditional-likelihood bound and a majority-vote recursion. The likelihood argument extends the classical conditional-MLE bound recalled by Huang et al. (2024, Lemma F.1). Their SFT theorem uses a fixed prompt distribution; their Appendix D adapts the response count per prompt. Here the worker's action distribution may depend on previous monitor feedback.

F.1 Training distribution and fitting residual

An action x includes the context determining its true verdict $f^*(x) \in \{0, 1\}$. Responses $z \in \mathcal{Z}$ have verdicts $v(z) \in \{0, 1\}$; for verdict-only training, $\mathcal{Z} = \{0, 1\}$ and $v(z) = z$. All monitors use the same response space. Thus

$$e_\pi(x) = \mathbb{P}_{Z \sim \pi(\cdot|x)}[v(Z) \neq f^*(x)].$$

Let $Q_{\pi,k}(\cdot \mid x)$ be the majority-label distribution, or, for full-response training, the law of a uniformly selected response with the majority verdict. Then

$$M_k(u) = \sum_{j=(k+1)/2}^{k} \binom{k}{j} u^j (1-u)^{k-j}, \qquad e_{Q_{\pi,k}}(x) = M_k(e_\pi(x)). \tag{3}$$

At stage t, conditional on the preceding history, the $n_t \geq 1$ actions $X_{t,i} \sim D_t$ are independent, and labels or selected responses $Z_{t,i} \sim Q_{\pi_t,k}(\cdot \mid X_{t,i})$ use fresh independent samples. For either

response space, define the fitting residual

$$a_t^{\mathrm{fit}} = \left[\frac{1}{n_t} \sum_{i=1}^{n_t} \log \frac{Q_{\pi_t,k}(Z_{t,i} \mid X_{t,i})}{\pi_{t+1}(Z_{t,i} \mid X_{t,i})} \right]_+, \qquad [u]_+ = \max\{u, 0\}. \tag{4}$$

If $Q_{\pi_t,k} \in \Pi_t$ and empirical optimization is within $\epsilon_{\mathrm{opt},t}$ of the minimum, then $a_t^{\mathrm{fit}} \le \epsilon_{\mathrm{opt},t}$. This is the majority-vote version of the realizability assumption in Huang et al. (2024, Assumption 4.1). Otherwise the residual remains explicit, with no assumed sample-size decay or guarantee that arbitrary fine-tuning makes it small.

The worker may be an LLM trained to exploit earlier monitor feedback. The coverage condition $d\mu/dD_t \le C_t$ restricts its action probabilities, not its optimization rule. This differs from the response coverage in Huang et al. (2024, Section 3.2). The initial margin condition (1), following Audibert & Tsybakov (2007), permits ties and wrong modal verdicts. This margin-tail condition is additional to Huang et al.'s SFT theorem; their RLHF analysis instead assumes a uniform multiplicative likelihood gap between optimal and suboptimal responses (Huang et al., 2024, Section 4.2). Combining our margin condition with final evaluation coverage gives

$$\Pr_{X \sim D_{\mathrm{attack}}} [0 < |e_{\pi_0}(X) - 1/2| \le u] \le C_{\mathrm{attack}} A u^{\alpha}.$$

Thus bounded coverage prevents arbitrarily rare near-ties from dominating evaluation, although the margin assumption alone does not restrict the worker's choices.

F.2 Fitting majority-vote labels under adaptive actions

Before example i, the worker uses the observed history $\mathcal{F}_i$ to choose an action distribution D_i, possibly a point mass. The current monitor π_i and odd vote count $k_i \ge 3$ may also depend on this history. Then $X_i \sim D_i$, and k_i fresh, conditionally independent monitor responses are drawn at X_i. Selection of actions using these same fresh votes is not covered.

Put $Q_i = Q_{\pi_i,k_i}$ and draw $Z_i \sim Q_i(\cdot \mid X_i)$. Fix a positive integer n and a finite nonempty candidate class Π before collecting the examples, and write $N = |\Pi|$. As in Huang et al. (2024, Section 2.1), SFT minimizes sequence negative log-likelihood. For any returned $\rho \in \Pi$, define

$$\widehat{L}(\rho) = -\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \log \rho(Z_i \mid X_i), \qquad a^{\mathrm{fit}}(\rho) = \left[\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \log \frac{Q_i(Z_i \mid X_i)}{\rho(Z_i \mid X_i)} \right]_+. \tag{5}$$

Evaluating this residual may require inaccessible verdict probabilities in (15).

Use squared Hellinger distance

$$\mathsf{H}_D^2(P, Q) = \mathbb{E}_D \sum_z (\sqrt{P(z \mid X)} - \sqrt{Q(z \mid X)})^2.$$

Lemma F.1 (Error after training on majority-vote labels)**.** For $\delta \in (0, 1)$, with probability at least $1 - \delta$, simultaneously for all $\rho \in \Pi$,

$$\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathsf{H}_{D_i}^2(\rho, Q_i) \le a^{\mathrm{fit}}(\rho) + \frac{2 \log(N/\delta)}{n}, \tag{6}$$

$$\sqrt{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{R}_{D_i}(\rho)} \le \sqrt{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{R}_{D_i}(Q_i)} + \sqrt{a^{\mathrm{fit}}(\rho) + \frac{2 \log(N/\delta)}{n}}. \tag{7}$$

In particular, a batch with fixed D, π, k and output $\widehat{\pi}$ satisfies, on the same event, simultaneously for every $D' \ll D$ with $dD'/dD \le C$,

$$\sqrt{\mathcal{R}_{D'}(\widehat{\pi})} \le \sqrt{\mathcal{R}_{D'}(Q_{\pi,k})} + \sqrt{C a^{\mathrm{fit}}(\widehat{\pi}) + \frac{2C \log(N/\delta)}{n}}. \tag{8}$$

The distribution D' may be chosen after observing the data and fitted monitor.

Equation (7) covers arbitrary adaptation on the collected action distributions, without coverage assumptions. Equation (8) covers later attacks subject to coverage; for a discrete point attack x, the smallest factor is $C = 1/\Pr_{X\sim D}[X = x]$. Reusing a stored response does not increase n.

Proof. We extend the classical conditional-MLE argument cited by Huang et al. (2024, Lemma F.1). Fix $\rho \in \Pi$ and put $h_i^2 = \mathsf{H}^2_{D_i}(\rho, Q_i)$, an $\mathcal{F}_i$-measurable quantity. Ratios below are taken on the support of Q_i. Conditional on the history,

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\sqrt{\frac{\rho(Z_i \mid X_i)}{Q_i(Z_i \mid X_i)}}\,\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_i\right] = \mathbb{E}_{D_i}\sum_z \sqrt{\rho(z \mid X)Q_i(z \mid X)} = 1 - \frac{h_i^2}{2},$$

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left\{\frac{1}{2}\log\frac{\rho(Z_i \mid X_i)}{Q_i(Z_i \mid X_i)} + \frac{h_i^2}{2}\right\}\,\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_i\right] = e^{h_i^2/2}(1 - h_i^2/2) \le 1.$$

Iterated conditioning, then Markov's inequality, give

$$\mathbb{E}\exp\left\{\frac{1}{2}\sum_{i=1}^n\left[\log\frac{\rho(Z_i \mid X_i)}{Q_i(Z_i \mid X_i)} + h_i^2\right]\right\} \le 1,$$

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\sum_{i=1}^n h_i^2 > \sum_{i=1}^n \log\frac{Q_i(Z_i \mid X_i)}{\rho(Z_i \mid X_i)} + 2\log\frac{N}{\delta}\right] \le \frac{\delta}{N}.$$

A union bound over Π, division by n, and taking the positive part of the empirical excess prove (6).

For $A = \{(x, z) : v(z) \neq f^*(x)\}$, the L^2 triangle inequality gives

$$\begin{aligned}\sqrt{\mathcal{R}_D(P)} &= \|\mathbf{1}_A\sqrt{P}\|_2 \\ &\le \|\mathbf{1}_A\sqrt{Q}\|_2 + \|\mathbf{1}_A(\sqrt{P} - \sqrt{Q})\|_2 \\ &\le \sqrt{\mathcal{R}_D(Q)} + \mathsf{H}_D(P, Q).\end{aligned}$$

Applying this on the disjoint union of the n action-response spaces, weighted by $1/n$, yields

$$\sqrt{\frac{1}{n}\sum_i \mathcal{R}_{D_i}(\rho)} \le \sqrt{\frac{1}{n}\sum_i \mathcal{R}_{D_i}(Q_i)} + \sqrt{\frac{1}{n}\sum_i \mathsf{H}^2_{D_i}(\rho, Q_i)}.$$

Substitution proves (7). In the fixed-batch case, for every eligible D',

$$\begin{aligned}\mathsf{H}^2_{D'}(\widehat{\pi}, Q) &= \mathbb{E}_D\left[\frac{dD'}{dD}(X)\sum_z(\sqrt{\widehat{\pi}(z \mid X)} - \sqrt{Q(z \mid X)})^2\right] \\ &\le C\mathsf{H}^2_D(\widehat{\pi}, Q) \le Ca^{\mathrm{fit}}(\widehat{\pi}) + \frac{2C\log(N/\delta)}{n}.\end{aligned}$$

Use the triangle inequality under D'. This step is pointwise on the likelihood event, so D' need not be independent of the data. □

F.3 Repeated majority voting

For a monitor π and distribution D, write $g(x) = |e_\pi(x) - 1/2|$ and

$$b_D(\pi) = \Pr_{X\sim D}[e_\pi(X) > 1/2] + \tfrac{1}{2}\Pr_{X\sim D}[e_\pi(X) = 1/2],$$

and suppose

$$\Pr_{X\sim D}[0 < g(X) \le u] \le Au^\alpha \qquad (u > 0). \tag{9}$$

Lemma F.2 (Error and sensitivity of repeated majority voting)**.** For odd $k \ge 3$, M_k is L_k-Lipschitz on $[0, 1]$. Define

$$\bar{e}_0 = e_\pi, \qquad \bar{e}_{t+1} = M_k(\bar{e}_t).$$

Under (9), for every integer $0 \le s \le T$,

$$|\mathbb{E}_D\bar{e}_T - b_D(\pi)| \le A4^{-\alpha}(11/8)^{-\alpha s} + \tfrac{1}{3}(3/4)^{2^{T-s}}. \tag{10}$$

Proof. Write $k = 2\ell + 1$. Differentiating the binomial sum and canceling adjacent terms gives, for $0 < p < 1$,

$$\begin{aligned} M_k'(p) &= k\sum_{j=\ell}^{k-1}\binom{k-1}{j}p^j(1-p)^{k-1-j} - k\sum_{j=\ell+1}^{k-1}\binom{k-1}{j}p^j(1-p)^{k-1-j} \\ &= k\binom{2\ell}{\ell}[p(1-p)]^\ell \\ &\le k\binom{2\ell}{\ell}4^{-\ell} = L_k. \end{aligned}$$

The bound extends to the endpoints by continuity. For any odd $j = 2\ell + 1$, let $K \sim \mathrm{Bin}(j, p)$. Adding two independent votes changes the majority probability by

$$\begin{aligned} M_{j+2}(p) - M_j(p) &= \mathbb{P}(K = \ell)p^2 - \mathbb{P}(K = \ell + 1)(1-p)^2 \\ &= \binom{2\ell+1}{\ell}[p(1-p)]^{\ell+1}(2p-1). \end{aligned}$$

Summing these increments from $j = 3$ shows that

$$M_k(p) \ge M_3(p) \quad (p \ge 1/2), \qquad M_k(p) \le M_3(p) \quad (p \le 1/2). \tag{11}$$

The case $k = 3$ is equality. By symmetry, $M_k(1-p) = 1 - M_k(p)$. Thus, writing $g_t = |\bar{e}_t - 1/2|$,

$$\begin{aligned} g_{t+1} &= M_k(1/2 + g_t) - 1/2 \\ &\ge M_3(1/2 + g_t) - 1/2 = \frac{3}{2}g_t - 2g_t^3. \end{aligned}$$

For $0 < g_t \le 1/4$,

$$g_{t+1} \ge \left(\frac{3}{2} - \frac{1}{8}\right)g_t = \frac{11}{8}g_t.$$

Also $g_{t+1} \ge g_t$ for $g_t \in [0, 1/2]$. Thus, if $g_0 \ge u_s := \frac{1}{4}(11/8)^{-s}$, then $g_s \ge 1/4$: otherwise every earlier margin is below $1/4$ and iteration of the last inequality gives a contradiction.

On these actions let $r_t = \min\{\bar{e}_t, 1 - \bar{e}_t\}$. Then $r_s \le 1/4$ and

$$\begin{aligned} r_{t+1} = M_k(r_t) \le M_3(r_t) = 3r_t^2 - 2r_t^3 \le 3r_t^2, \\ 3r_{s+j} \le (3r_s)^{2^j} \le (3/4)^{2^j}. \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

The map preserves the side of $1/2$ and fixes ties. At each action with nonzero margin, the difference between its error at time T and its limiting error (zero or one) has magnitude r_T. Therefore

$$\begin{aligned} |\mathbb{E}_D\bar{e}_T - b_D(\pi)| &\le \Pr_{X\sim D}[0 < g_0(X) < u_s] + \frac{1}{3}(3/4)^{2^{T-s}} \\ &\le A4^{-\alpha}(11/8)^{-\alpha s} + \frac{1}{3}(3/4)^{2^{T-s}}. \end{aligned}$$

□

Without (9), qualitative population convergence still holds: M_k preserves the side of $1/2$, moves every nonfixed point strictly toward the corresponding endpoint, and has fixed points $0, 1/2, 1$. Hence, by monotone convergence of the scalar iterates and dominated convergence,

$$\bar{e}_T(x) \longrightarrow \mathbf{1}_{\{e_\pi(x) > 1/2\}} + \tfrac{1}{2}\mathbf{1}_{\{e_\pi(x) = 1/2\}}, \qquad \mathbb{E}_D\bar{e}_T \longrightarrow b_D(\pi).$$

The margin condition supplies the quantitative rate in (10).

Proof of Theorem 3.1. For comparison, define the ideal error trajectory and its discrepancy from the trained monitor:

$$\bar{e}_0 = e_{\pi_0}, \qquad \bar{e}_{t+1} = M_k(\bar{e}_t), \qquad d_t = \mathbb{E}_\mu|e_{\pi_t} - \bar{e}_t|.$$

Conditioning at each stage and applying Lemma F.1, followed by the union bound, gives a simultaneous event with

$$\mathsf{H}^2_{D_t}(\pi_{t+1}, Q_{\pi_t,k}) \le a_t^{\mathrm{fit}} + \frac{2\log(N_t/\delta_t)}{n_t} \qquad (0 \le t < T).$$

For any response distributions P, Q, Cauchy–Schwarz gives

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{TV}(P,Q) &= \frac{1}{2}\sum_z |\sqrt{P} - \sqrt{Q}|(\sqrt{P} + \sqrt{Q}) \\ &\le \frac{1}{2}\mathsf{H}(P,Q)\sqrt{\sum_z (\sqrt{P} + \sqrt{Q})^2} \\ &\le \mathsf{H}(P,Q).\end{aligned}$$

Marginalizing to the verdict and using coverage and Jensen's inequality yields

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}_\mu |e_{\pi_{t+1}} - M_k(e_{\pi_t})| &\le \mathbb{E}_\mu \mathsf{H}(\pi_{t+1}(\cdot \mid X), Q_{\pi_t,k}(\cdot \mid X)) \\ &\le \sqrt{\mathsf{H}^2_\mu(\pi_{t+1}, Q_{\pi_t,k})} \le \sqrt{C_t a_t^{\mathrm{fit}} + \frac{2C_t \log(N_t/\delta_t)}{n_t}}.\end{aligned}$$

By Lemma F.2, M_k is L_k-Lipschitz. Consequently

$$\begin{aligned}d_{t+1} &\le \sqrt{C_t a_t^{\mathrm{fit}} + \frac{2C_t \log(N_t/\delta_t)}{n_t}} + L_k d_t, \qquad d_0 = 0, \\ d_T &\le \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} L_k^{T-1-t} \sqrt{C_t a_t^{\mathrm{fit}} + \frac{2C_t \log(N_t/\delta_t)}{n_t}}. \end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

By the definition of risk,

$$|\mathcal{R}_\mu(\pi_T) - \mathbb{E}_\mu \bar{e}_T| \le d_T. \tag{14}$$

Lemma F.2, applied with $D = \mu$ and $\pi = \pi_0$, now gives

$$\begin{aligned}|\mathcal{R}_\mu(\pi_T) - b_\mu(\pi_0)| &\le d_T + |\mathbb{E}_\mu \bar{e}_T - b_\mu(\pi_0)| \\ &\le d_T + A 4^{-\alpha}(11/8)^{-\alpha s} + \frac{1}{3}(3/4)^{2^{T-s}}.\end{aligned}$$

Substitute (13). For any eligible final attack distribution,

$$\mathcal{R}_{D_{\mathrm{attack}}}(\pi_T) = \mathbb{E}_\mu\left[\frac{dD_{\mathrm{attack}}}{d\mu}(X) e_{\pi_T}(X)\right] \le C_{\mathrm{attack}} \mathcal{R}_\mu(\pi_T).$$

□

F.4 Limits against adversarial workers

Early fitting errors can become permanent. On one action, let the correct label be 1, write $p_t = \mathbb{P}_{\pi_t}[v(Z) = 1]$, and take $p_0 = 1/2 + \gamma$. For any fixed odd $k \ge 3$, the first majority label equals 1 with probability $q = M_k(1/2 + \gamma)$. The derivative bound gives

$$0 \le q - \frac{1}{2} = M_k(1/2 + \gamma) - M_k(1/2) \le L_k \gamma.$$

An approximate first fit could instead return $p_1 = 1/2 - \gamma$. Its population cross-entropy excess is $D_{\mathrm{KL}}(\mathrm{Ber}(q) \| \mathrm{Ber}(p_1))$. For $0 < \gamma \le 1/4$, using $D_{\mathrm{KL}} \le \chi^2$,

$$\begin{aligned}D_{\mathrm{KL}}(\mathrm{Ber}(q) \| \mathrm{Ber}(p_1)) &\le \frac{(q - p_1)^2}{p_1(1 - p_1)} \\ &\le \frac{((L_k + 1)\gamma)^2}{3/16} = \frac{16}{3}(L_k + 1)^2 \gamma^2.\end{aligned}$$

Every subsequent exact fit to majority-vote labels keeps $p_t < 1/2$ and drives p_t to zero. Thus arbitrarily small initial fitting loss can lead to limiting sampled error one on a sufficiently small-margin action. The amplification term in (2) cannot simply be deleted.

Uncovered worker actions. Suppose $\Pr_{X\sim D}[X \in S] = 0$. Two models that agree off S and disagree on S have identical training likelihoods, yet can have errors zero and one there. A later worker can concentrate on S. Thus empirical fit alone gives no guarantee against uncovered attacks; rare attacks similarly incur the factor $1/\Pr_{X\sim D}[X = x]$ in Lemma F.1.

An adversary can target wrong modal verdicts. Even perfect coverage does not ensure improvement against every worker. On one action x with $e_\pi(x) = 0.6$, let both training and evaluation concentrate on x. Then $C = 1$, but exact fitting of the three-vote label distribution gives

$$\mathcal{R}_{\{x\}}(Q_{\pi,3}) = M_3(0.6) = 0.648 > 0.6 = \mathcal{R}_{\{x\}}(\pi).$$

Here $\mathcal{R}_{\{x\}}$ is risk at x. The majority-vote error term in Lemma F.1 captures this failure even though coverage is perfect. Even average accuracy above chance is insufficient: initial error zero on 40% of actions and 0.6 elsewhere gives average error 0.36, but ideal repeated training converges to error 0.6.

Systematic errors and identifiability. Consider two possible truth functions f_0, f_1 agreeing off S and opposite on S, with the same initial monitor, worker policy, and training algorithm. Since the algorithm receives no true labels, its observable transcript has the same law in the two worlds. For any returned randomized monitor,

$$\mathcal{R}_{\mu,f_0}(\pi_T) + \mathcal{R}_{\mu,f_1}(\pi_T) \geq \Pr_{X\sim\mu}[X \in S].$$

Indeed, on every $x \in S$ the two conditional error probabilities sum to one. Consequently at least one world's expected error is at least $\Pr_{X\sim\mu}[X \in S]/2$. Correction of this floor requires additional structure relating truth to the model or hypothesis class.

F.5 Training on full responses

For full responses, write $p_y(x) = \mathbb{P}_\pi[v(Z) = y \mid x]$. Conditional on all verdicts, each winning response has law $\pi(\cdot \mid x, v = y)$. Therefore, on the support of π,

$$Q_{\pi,k}(z \mid x) = \pi(z \mid x)\frac{M_k(p_{v(z)}(x))}{p_{v(z)}(x)}. \tag{15}$$

Lemma F.1 also holds if each prompt contributes the *average* negative log-likelihood of its majority-verdict traces, replacing each log-likelihood in both $\widehat{L}$ and a^{fit} by this average. For one example, write $Q = Q_i$ and let I be its winning indices. Then convexity of the exponential gives

$$\exp\left(\frac{1}{|I|}\sum_{j\in I}\frac{1}{2}\log\frac{\rho(Z_j \mid X)}{Q(Z_j \mid X)}\right) \leq \frac{1}{|I|}\sum_{j\in I}\sqrt{\frac{\rho(Z_j \mid X)}{Q(Z_j \mid X)}}.$$

Conditional on the history, the expectation of the right side is $1 - h_i^2/2$. The same conditional-expectation proof applies. Counting every winning trace with equal global weight instead changes the relative weights of prompts and is not covered by this argument.

For full responses, $\log\rho(z \mid x) = \sum_j \log\rho(z_j \mid x, z_{<j})$. Length-normalized or otherwise reweighted losses require a different analysis.

G Logit-update analysis of self-training

Here we give a bonus stylized analysis of self-training that gives stability conditions under which the monitor could self-improve during training. We isolate three effects: the accuracy of extended thinking, the effect of a monitor update, and the rate of worker-induced distribution shift. The detailed training dynamics depend on the monitor architecture, optimization procedure, worker-learning algorithm, and structure of the action space. We summarize these details using the change in monitor error produced by one monitor update and one round of worker adaptation.

The analysis is intended to demonstrate a basic possibility: self-generated pseudolabels can drive the monitor's error to zero even though the monitor never observes a ground-truth label. It also

gives a simple way to reason about when compute-amplified self-training will succeed. Extended thinking must make pseudolabel errors sufficiently rare, and correct monitor updates must improve the monitor quickly enough to keep pace with the changing worker.

G.1 Assumptions on the training dynamics

We specialize to binary judgements $\mathcal{Y} = \{0, 1\}$. On round t, let $h_t : \mathcal{A} \to \Delta(\mathcal{Y})$ denote the randomized standard-thinking monitor. Its error probability on an action a is

$$e_t(a) := \mathbb{P}_{y \sim h_t(a)}[y \neq f^*(a)].$$

Define the maximum standard-thinking error on the support of the worker's current action distribution by

$$r_t := \sup_{a \in \mathrm{supp}(D_t)} e_t(a).$$

After the monitor trains on $(a_t, \widetilde{y}_t)$, let the updated monitor's maximum error be

$$r_t^+ := \sup_{a \in \mathrm{supp}(D_t)} \mathbb{P}_{y \sim h_{t+1}(a)}[y \neq f^*(a)]$$

We make the following assumptions.

(A1) *Learning from a correct pseudolabel.* If $\widetilde{y}_t = f^*(a_t)$, then

$$\mathrm{logit}(r_t^+) \leq \mathrm{logit}(r_t) - \delta_m.$$

(A2) *Learning from an incorrect pseudolabel.* If $\widetilde{y}_t \neq f^*(a_t)$, then

$$\mathrm{logit}(r_t^+) \leq \mathrm{logit}(r_t) + \delta_m.$$

(A3) *Worker adaptation.* The change from D_t to D_{t+1} satisfies

$$\mathrm{logit}(r_{t+1}) \leq \mathrm{logit}(r_t^+) + \delta_w.$$

Assumptions (A1) and (A2) describe the value of one monitor update. A correct pseudolabel decreases the error logit by at least δ_m, while an incorrect pseudolabel can increase it by at most δ_m. Assumption (A3) describes the value of one round of worker adaptation. Changes in the worker's action distribution can increase the error logit by at most δ_w.

The assumptions capture a simple competition between monitor learning and worker adaptation. When a pseudolabel is correct, the combined effect of the monitor and worker updates changes the error logit by at most

$$\delta_w - \delta_m.$$

When a pseudolabel is incorrect, the error logit may increase by as much as

$$\delta_w + \delta_m.$$

The success of self-training is therefore determined by how frequently extended thinking produces a correct pseudolabel.

G.2 Majority-of-k self-training

We now analyze a concrete extended-thinking procedure based on majority aggregation. Let k be odd. On round t, draw

$$Y_{t,1}, \ldots, Y_{t,k} \overset{\text{i.i.d.}}{\sim} h_t(a_t)$$

using fresh independent randomness, and let $\widetilde{y}_t$ be their majority vote.

Every sampled judgement has error probability at most r_t. Consequently, whenever $r_t < 1/2$, Hoeffding's inequality gives

$$\mathbb{P}[\widetilde{y}_t \neq f^*(a_t) \mid \mathcal{H}_t] \leq \exp\left(-2k\left(\frac{1}{2} - r_t\right)^2\right),$$

where $\mathcal{H}_t$ denotes the interaction history through the choice of a_t. Majority aggregation therefore converts a standard-thinking monitor that is slightly more likely to be correct than incorrect into an extended-thinking pseudolabel whose error decreases exponentially with k.

This amplification creates a self-reinforcing dynamic. Reliable pseudolabels improve the standard-thinking monitor, and the decrease in r_t makes future majority votes more reliable, which in turn makes subsequent monitor updates more likely to be helpful. The following theorem shows that this process can drive the monitor's error to zero.

Theorem G.1 (Compute-amplified self-training without ground-truth labels)**.** Suppose assumptions (A1)–(A3) hold, $0 < r_1 < 1/2$, and $\delta_w < \delta_m$. Then there are constants $c = c(r_1, \delta_m, \delta_w) > 0$ and $k_0 = k_0(r_1, \delta_m, \delta_w)$ such that, for every odd $k \geq k_0$, majority-of-k compute-amplified self-training satisfies

$$\mathbb{P}\left[r_t \to 0\right] \geq 1 - e^{-ck}.$$

Proof. Fix

$$\bar{r} := \frac{r_1 + 1/2}{2}, \qquad z_t := \operatorname{logit}(r_t), \qquad \bar{z} := \operatorname{logit}(\bar{r}).$$

As long as $r_t < \bar{r}$, the majority pseudolabel is incorrect with probability at most

$$q_k := \exp\left(-2k\left(\frac{1}{2} - \bar{r}\right)^2\right).$$

We may therefore couple z_t (until it reaches $\bar{z}$) below a random walk S_t with $S_1 = z_1$ and independent increments

$$S_{t+1} - S_t = \begin{cases} \delta_w - \delta_m, & \text{with probability } 1 - q_k, \\ \delta_w + \delta_m, & \text{with probability } q_k. \end{cases}$$

Since $\delta_w < \delta_m$ and $q_k = e^{-\Omega(k)}$, for all sufficiently large k the walk has negative drift. The standard exponential-supermartingale crossing bound (Howard et al., 2020, Theorem 1(a)) then gives

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\sup_{t \geq 1} S_t \geq \bar{z}\right] \leq e^{-ck}$$

for some $c = c(r_1, \delta_m, \delta_w) > 0$. On the complementary event, the coupling remains valid for all time and $S_t \to -\infty$ almost surely. Hence $z_t \to -\infty$, so $r_t \to 0$. Therefore,

$$\mathbb{P}[r_t \to 0] \geq 1 - e^{-ck}.$$

□