Understanding and Defending VLM Jailbreaks via Jailbreak-Related Representation Shift

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Abstract

Large vision-language models (VLMs) often exhibit degraded safety alignment when visual inputs are integrated. Even when a text prompt is explicitly harmful, adding an image can substantially increase the jailbreak success rate. In this paper, we observe that VLMs can clearly distinguish benign, refusal, and jailbreak samples in their representation space, and that jailbreak responses often contain safety warnings. These observations lead to the *recognize-but-fail-to-refuse* hypothesis: VLM jailbreaks do not arise from a failure to recognize harmful intent, but instead occur because adding an image induces a representation shift that steers the sample into a distinct jailbreak state where refusal is not triggered. To quantify how this image-induced representation shift contributes to jailbreak behavior, we define a jailbreak direction and characterize the jailbreak-related representation shift as the projection of the total image-induced shift onto this direction. Our analysis shows that the jailbreak-related shift reliably characterizes jailbreak behavior, providing a unified explanation for diverse jailbreak scenarios. Finally, we propose JRS-Rem, a defense method that enhances VLM safety by removing the jailbreak-related shift at inference time. Experiments show that JRS-Rem significantly improves VLM safety across multiple scenarios while preserving utility on benign tasks. Code is available at `https://github.com/LeeQueue513/JRS-Rem`.

Warning: This paper may contain examples of harmful text and images.

1 Introduction

Large vision-language models (VLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in open-world visual understanding and complex reasoning tasks [Liu et al., 2024a, Wang et al., 2023, Bai et al., 2025b]. However, integrating the visual modality often substantially weakens the safety alignment of VLMs compared to their underlying large language model backbones [Li et al., 2024, Liu et al., 2024b]. For example, simply appending a blank image to a harmful text prompt increases the jailbreak success rate of LLaVA-1.5-7B [Liu et al., 2024a] on the HADES dataset [Li et al., 2024] by 28.13%, indicating that the visual modality introduces a systemic safety vulnerability.

Recent studies [Zou et al., 2025, Guo et al., 2024] have proposed the *safety perception failure* hypothesis to explain VLM jailbreaks. As illustrated in Figure 1, this hypothesis posits that although VLMs can recognize and refuse harmful inputs in text-only settings, adding visual inputs disrupts the model's safety perception, impairing its ability to distinguish harmful from benign inputs and thereby allowing harmful inputs to jailbreak the model. This hypothesis is primarily based on **implicitly harmful data**, where the harmful intent is removed from the text prompt and conveyed solely through the image. For instance, the text prompt "*Demonstrate how to hack into personal devices*" is rewritten as "*Demonstrate how to perform this activity*" and paired with a hacking-related image. However,

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40th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2026).




Figure 1: Comparison of two VLM jailbreak hypotheses. The *safety perception failure* hypothesis assumes that VLMs struggle to distinguish between benign and harmful inputs, based on implicitly harmful data with semantic and causal ambiguities. In contrast, our *recognize-but-fail-to-refuse* hypothesis posits that VLMs recognize harmful intent but fail to refuse. This hypothesis is grounded in explicitly harmful data and supported by the observations that (1) jailbreak responses often contain safety warnings, and (2) benign, refusal, and jailbreak samples are separable in representation space.

such data introduces two types of ambiguity. First, because the text is rewritten, the contribution of the visual modality cannot be clearly isolated: the observed jailbreak may stem from the altered wording rather than the image, leading to **causal ambiguity**. Second, while concrete harmful concepts (e.g., bombs or violence) can often be inferred from images, more abstract harmful concepts (e.g., fraud, privacy violations, economic harm) are difficult to infer from images alone, creating **semantic ambiguity**. Therefore, this hypothesis is limited by its basis on implicitly harmful data.

To avoid these ambiguities, we instead study VLM jailbreaks using **explicitly harmful data**, where the text prompt remains clearly harmful. We observe that jailbreak responses often include safety warnings, as highlighted in orange in Figure 1, indicating that the VLM can recognize harmful intent even in jailbreak cases. We further analyze benign and harmful inputs in the representation space, and find that benign, harmful-refusal, and harmful-jailbreak samples are clearly separable. This suggests that although both benign and jailbreak inputs result in non-refusal outputs, they involve different internal mechanisms. These observations indicate that VLM jailbreaks do not stem from a failure to perceive harmful intent. Instead, the VLM enters a distinct jailbreak state where it recognizes the harmful intent yet fails to trigger a refusal. We call this the *recognize-but-fail-to-refuse* hypothesis.

This hypothesis posits that jailbreak corresponds to a transition between distinct internal states in the representation space. In particular, adding an image induces a representation shift that steers the sample from the refusal state to the jailbreak state. However, this image-induced shift also introduces other semantic information beyond this jailbreak effect. To isolate the jailbreak-related component from the total shift, we first define a **jailbreak direction** as the vector pointing from the centroid of refusal samples to that of jailbreak samples, which captures the internal transition from refusal to jailbreak in the representation space. We then measure the **jailbreak-related shift** as the projection of the total image-induced representation shift onto this direction. We empirically demonstrate that the jailbreak-related shift reliably characterizes jailbreak behavior: jailbreak samples exhibit significantly larger jailbreak-related shifts than refusal samples, while benign samples remain near zero. Moreover, the jailbreak-related shift provides a clear explanation for why images with richer harmful visual information and higher image-text semantic relevance are more likely to trigger jailbreaks.

Inspired by these findings, we propose JRS-Rem, a defense method that improves VLM safety by removing the jailbreak-related shift from the total image-induced representation shift. We evaluate JRS-Rem across three different VLMs using seven datasets covering explicitly harmful, implicitly harmful, and adversarial attack scenarios, as well as three utility benchmarks. Experiments show that JRS-Rem significantly enhances VLM safety while preserving utility on benign tasks.

2 Related Work

Understanding VLM jailbreaks in the representation space. Several studies have explored VLM jailbreaks by analyzing their internal representations. Li et al. [2025] and Liu et al. [2025] observe

that introducing images leads to substantial shifts in multimodal representations relative to text-only inputs. However, they do not identify which parts of these shifts are causally related to jailbreak behavior. Guo et al. [2024] and Zou et al. [2025] find that VLMs struggle to distinguish between implicitly harmful and benign inputs, leading to the safety perception failure hypothesis. However, their conclusions rely on implicitly harmful data with semantic and causal ambiguities. Additionally, JailNeurons [Gan et al., 2026] detects jailbreaks using localized neurons, HiddenDetect [Jiang et al., 2025] uses refusal-related hidden-state signals, RCS [Hua et al., 2026] contrasts benign and malicious representations, and Zhou et al. [2024] show that jailbreaks can disrupt the link between harmfulness recognition and refusal in text-only LLMs. However, these studies primarily focus on input-level separation between benign and harmful inputs. In contrast, we study explicitly harmful data and examine behavior-level separation between refusal and jailbreak samples within harmful inputs. We show that VLMs can recognize harmful content but enter a distinct jailbreak state, which provides a unified explanation for various jailbreak scenarios.

Inference-time defenses against VLM jailbreaks. Various inference-time defense methods have been proposed. At the input level, methods include self-reminders [Xie et al., 2023], input detection [Robey et al., 2023], defensive prompt optimization [Wang et al., 2024b], converting visual inputs into text descriptions [Gou et al., 2024], and reliance on stronger external LLMs [Pi et al., 2024]. However, these methods often compromise VLM utility or incur significant computational overhead. At the representation and output levels, Liu et al. [2025] pull multimodal representations back into the text domain, Li et al. [2025] revise activations at specific heads or layers, Zou et al. [2025] remove components along benign-to-harmful directions, and CoCA [Gao et al., 2024] calibrates logits using the contrast with and without a safety principle. Nevertheless, these methods do not isolate the specific jailbreak-related component in the total shift, which may result in insufficient defense or loss of useful image-derived semantics. Our work addresses these limitations by isolating and removing the jailbreak-related shift, enabling a highly targeted and computationally efficient defense.

3 Jailbreak as a Distinct Internal State

The safety perception failure hypothesis [Zou et al., 2025, Guo et al., 2024] relies on implicitly harmful inputs. As discussed in Section 1, such inputs introduce semantic and causal ambiguities that complicate the analysis of VLM jailbreaks. To eliminate these ambiguities, we instead focus on explicitly harmful inputs $x = [I, T]$, where the text prompt T carries clear harmful intent. In this section, we use this setting to empirically demonstrate that jailbreak behavior corresponds to a distinct internal state in the VLM representation space.

Specifically, we construct a multimodal dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{mm}} = \mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}} \cup \mathcal{D}_{\text{harmful}}$, where the benign set $\mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}}$ contains harmless image-text pairs and the harmful set $\mathcal{D}_{\text{harmful}}$ consists of samples with explicitly harmful text prompt T. Data details are provided in Appendix A.5. We then analyze the distribution of different input types within the VLM's representation space. For a given layer ℓ of a VLM, let $\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x) \in \mathbb{R}^d$ denote the last-token representation of the input sample x. By analyzing $\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)$ for all samples $x \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{mm}}$ across LLaVA-1.5-7B [Liu et al., 2024a], ShareGPT4V-7B [Chen et al., 2024a] and InternVL-Chat-19B [Chen et al., 2024b], we obtain the following empirical observations.

Observation 1: PCA visualization reveals that jailbreak samples are clearly separable from both benign samples and refusal samples. To investigate whether VLMs fail to recognize harmful intent when jailbreak occurs, we apply principal component analysis (PCA) to the representations. For a given VLM, we further partition the harmful set $\mathcal{D}_{\text{harmful}}$ into two subsets based on the VLM's responses: the jailbreak set $\mathcal{D}_{\text{jail}}$, where the VLM generates harmful responses, and the refusal set $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ref}}$, where the VLM refuses to respond. As shown in Figure 2(a), jailbreak samples are clearly separable from both benign samples and refusal samples. Notably, the first principal component (PC1) separates benign inputs from all harmful inputs, suggesting that harmful and benign inputs are encoded differently in the representation space. The second principal component (PC2) further separates behavioral responses, distinguishing refusal from jailbreak. This separation indicates that, although jailbreak samples share harmful intent with refusal samples and produce non-refusal outputs similar to benign samples, they occupy a distinct region in the representation space.

Observation 2: Distance analysis and linear probing further validate the distinctness of the jailbreak state. Beyond PCA, we examine whether jailbreak samples remain separable in the original high-dimensional representation space. First, we measure the distance between representations of




Figure 2: Representation and output analysis on LLaVA-1.5-7B. (a) PCA visualization of benign, refusal, and jailbreak samples in representation space (layer 19). (b) Average cosine distance to the jailbreak centroid, with shaded areas denoting standard deviation. (c) Linear probing F1 scores for three-class classification. (d) Percentage of jailbreak responses containing safety warnings under explicitly and implicitly harmful inputs. Note that RedTeam2K has no implicitly harmful subset, so no corresponding results are reported. See Appendix D.1 for results on other VLMs.

various types of samples and the jailbreak centroid. For each layer ℓ, we compute the jailbreak centroid as $\boldsymbol{\mu}_{\text{jail}}^{(\ell)} = \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{jail}}}[\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)]$. We then measure the cosine distance from the representation $\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)$ of each sample x to $\boldsymbol{\mu}_{\text{jail}}^{(\ell)}$, defined as $\text{Dist}(x, \boldsymbol{\mu}_{\text{jail}}^{(\ell)}) = 1 - \frac{\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x) \cdot \boldsymbol{\mu}_{\text{jail}}^{(\ell)}}{\|\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)\|_2 \|\boldsymbol{\mu}_{\text{jail}}^{(\ell)}\|_2}$. Figure 2(b) shows that jailbreak samples cluster tightly around their centroid, while refusal and benign samples are substantially farther away. This high-dimensional distance gap provides strong evidence that the jailbreak state occupies a distinct region that is well separated from both refusal and benign states.

As a complementary analysis, following Zou et al. [2025], we train linear probes to classify samples into three categories: jailbreak, refusal, and benign. Figure 2(c) reports the F1 scores for each category across layers. The near-perfect F1 scores in middle and deep layers further confirm that these three states are highly linearly separable in the representation space.

Observation 3: Jailbreak responses frequently contain safety warnings. Finally, we analyze the content of jailbreak responses to explore whether VLMs recognize the harmful intent of inputs. Specifically, we examine whether jailbreak responses include acknowledgments of risk, illegality, or ethical concerns, which we define as *safety warnings*. We identify safety warnings using a predefined set of safety-related keywords adapted primarily from Zou et al. [2025], as listed in Appendix C.2. Figure 2(d) shows that a substantial fraction of jailbreak responses contain safety warnings across the HADES [Li et al., 2024], MM-SafetyBench [Liu et al., 2024b], and RedTeam2K [Luo et al., 2024] datasets, even for implicitly harmful inputs. This provides further evidence that VLMs remain capable of recognizing harmful intent, even when a jailbreak occurs.

Taken together, these three observations suggest that **jailbreak corresponds to a distinct internal state in the VLM representation space**. In this state, the VLM recognizes harmful intent but fails to trigger the expected refusal behavior. We refer to this as the *recognize-but-fail-to-refuse* hypothesis.

4 Explaining VLM Jailbreaks via the Jailbreak-Related Shift

Building on the recognize-but-fail-to-refuse hypothesis from Section 3, we posit that VLM jailbreaks occur because adding an image induces a representation shift that steers a sample from the refusal state to the jailbreak state. However, this total representation shift also contains semantic information unrelated to jailbreak, such as normal visual content. In this section, we isolate and quantify the jailbreak-related component of this shift that drives the transition to jailbreak.

4.1 Defining the Jailbreak-Related Shift

Given a multimodal input $x = [I, T]$, we define the image-induced representation shift at each layer ℓ as $\Delta\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x) = \mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x) - \mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x')$, where $x' = [\varnothing, T]$ denotes the text-only input obtained by removing the image I from the input x. To disentangle the jailbreak-related component from the total shift $\Delta\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)$, we first define a jailbreak direction that characterizes the transition from the refusal state to the jailbreak state within the VLM's representation space, following the process shown in




Figure 3: (a) Jailbreak direction estimation: the jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$ is defined as the unit vector from the refusal centroid to the jailbreak centroid in the VLM representation space. (b) Jailbreak-related shift and JRS-Rem defense: the jailbreak-related shift $s^{(\ell)}(x)$ is defined as the scalar projection of the image-induced representation shift $\Delta\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)$ onto $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$. JRS-Rem then subtracts the component $s^{(\ell)}(x)\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$ from the representation $\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)$.

Figure 3(a). Specifically, we define the jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ as the unit vector in the direction of the difference between the average representations of jailbreak samples and refusal samples:

$$\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)} = \frac{\Delta^{(\ell)}}{\|\Delta^{(\ell)}\|_2}, \text{ with } \Delta^{(\ell)} = (\boldsymbol{\mu}^{(\ell)}_{\text{jail}} - \boldsymbol{\mu}^{(\ell)}_{\text{ref}}), \tag{1}$$

where $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{(\ell)}_{\text{jail}} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ and $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{(\ell)}_{\text{ref}} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ denote the average representations of jailbreak and refusal samples. We then define the jailbreak-related shift $s^{(\ell)}(x) \in \mathbb{R}$ as the signed scalar projection of the total image-induced representation shift $\Delta\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)$ onto the jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$, as illustrated in Figure 3(b):

$$s^{(\ell)}(x) = \Delta\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)^\top \mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}. \tag{2}$$

In this way, the scalar $s^{(\ell)}(x)$ quantifies the magnitude of the jailbreak-related component within the total shift. A larger value of $s^{(\ell)}(x)$ indicates that the image effectively steers the VLM's representation toward the jailbreak state.

4.2 Quantifying the Jailbreak-Related Shift Across Different Scenarios

To validate that the jailbreak-related shift indeed steers the representation from the refusal state to the jailbreak state, we quantify the jailbreak-related shifts across the following three jailbreak scenarios:

- Explicitly harmful: samples from the explicitly harmful subsets of HADES [Li et al., 2024] and MM-SafetyBench [Liu et al., 2024b] datasets. Each text prompt is paired with three types of images, including (1) SD: Stable Diffusion-generated images related to the text prompt; (2) TYPO: typographic images of harmful keywords; and (3) SD+TYPO: a concatenation of both.
- Implicitly harmful: samples from the implicitly harmful variants of HADES and MM-SafetyBench datasets. The text prompts are paired with SD+TYPO images (instead of ambiguous SD images) to help the VLM better understand the harmful semantics.
- Adversarial attack: Covering three geometry-based attacks: MML-R, MML-M, and MML-B64 [Wang et al., 2025], and one gradient-based attack: HADES-gradient [Li et al., 2024].

As a baseline, we also quantify the jailbreak-related shift on benign inputs from four datasets, including MM-Vet [Yu et al., 2023], MME [Fu et al., 2025], ScienceQA [Lu et al., 2022], and LLaVA-Instruct-80k [Liu et al., 2024a]. This allows us to check whether benign inputs exhibit a negligible jailbreak-related shift. For all evaluations, we use the unified jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$ computed from the HADES dataset. See Appendix A for dataset details.

Figure 4 illustrates the normalized jailbreak-related shift $\tilde{s}^{(\ell)}(x) = s^{(\ell)}(x)/\|\Delta\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)\|_2$ to ensure a fair comparison across layers. Results show that in the middle and deep layers, jailbreak samples consistently exhibit larger jailbreak-related shifts than refusal samples across all three scenarios, while benign samples remain near zero. This demonstrates that **the jailbreak-related shift effectively**




Figure 4: Average normalized jailbreak-related shift for LLaVA-1.5-7B across four scenarios: (a) explicitly harmful inputs, (b) implicitly harmful inputs, (c) adversarial attacks, and (d) benign inputs. Jailbreak samples consistently show larger shifts than refusal samples (a-c), while benign samples remain near zero (d). Additional results for other VLMs are provided in Appendix D.2.




Figure 5: **Left:** Effect of harmful visual information. (a) Image examples with increasing harmful visual content. (b) Average normalized jailbreak-related shift across layers. (c) Relationship between the jailbreak-related shift (layer 19) and ASR. **Right:** Effect of image-text similarity. (d) Dataset-level and (e) sample-level average jailbreak-related shift for samples with varying image-text similarity. Points are colored from light to dark to represent increasing similarity.

quantifies the extent to which an image steers the representation toward the jailbreak state, confirming that the isolated jailbreak-related component is closely associated with jailbreak behavior.

4.3 Explaining VLM Jailbreak Phenomena

While previous studies have identified several empirical phenomena in VLM jailbreaks, the underlying mechanisms are still not well understood. In this subsection, we use the jailbreak-related shift to provide a unified explanation for two empirical phenomena using LLaVA-1.5-7B as the target VLM.

Phenomenon 1: Images with richer harmful visual information lead to higher jailbreak success rates [Li et al., 2024, Guo et al., 2024]. We explore the relationship between the amount of harmful visual information and the values of the jailbreak-related shift on the SD and SD+TYPO subsets of the HADES dataset. To construct a series of samples with varying levels of harmful visual information, we apply Gaussian noise to each SD image with four intensity levels: 100%, 75%, 50%, and 25% (denoted N100 to N25), where N100 corresponds to pure noise, as illustrated in Figure 5(a).

As shown in Figure 5(b), higher levels of harmful visual information consistently induce larger jailbreak-related shifts in middle and deep layers. Figure 5(c) further shows the jailbreak-related shift at layer 19 along with the corresponding ASR for each input type. We observe that as the amount of harmful visual information increases, both the ASR and the jailbreak-related shift increase concurrently. This indicates that images with richer harmful visual information are more likely to trigger jailbreaks, as they induce larger jailbreak-related shifts in the representation space.

Phenomenon 2: Higher image-text semantic relevance leads to higher jailbreak success rates [Liu et al., 2024b]. We further investigate how semantic similarity between image and text prompt influences jailbreak behavior. We use CLIP [Radford et al., 2021] to quantify the similarity between the two modalities, and conduct analyses at both the dataset and sample levels.

Dataset-level. We compute the image-text similarity for samples from HADES, MM-SafetyBench, and RedTeam2K [Luo et al., 2024] datasets. For each dataset, we split samples into three groups based on their CLIP scores: low, medium, and high similarity. Figure 5(d) shows the average jailbreak-related shift at layer 19 and the corresponding ASR for each group. Samples with higher semantic similarity exhibit larger jailbreak-related shifts, which correlate with a higher ASR.

Sample-level. To isolate the impact of image-text similarity, we conduct a controlled experiment using the HADES dataset. For each harmful text prompt, HADES provides five different Stable Diffusion-generated images. We rank these images by their CLIP similarity to the prompt and assign them to five similarity ranks (from low to high), ensuring each rank contains the same set of text prompts. Results in Figure 5(e) also show that higher semantic similarity leads to larger jailbreak-related shifts and higher ASR. In conclusion, our analysis of these two phenomena demonstrates that **the jailbreak-related shift provides a coherent explanation for VLM jailbreak behavior**.

5 Defense Method Based on Removing the Jailbreak-Related Shift

5.1 Algorithm Design and Implementation

Based on our analysis in Section 4, we propose **JRS-Rem**, a lightweight and training-free defense method that rectifies the VLM's internal representations by removing the jailbreak-related shift.

Specifically, for each multimodal input x, we calculate the jailbreak-related shift $s^{(\ell)}(x)$ at each layer ℓ following Equation (2), using a pre-computed jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$. During inference, at the first decoding step, if the normalized jailbreak-related shift $\tilde{s}^{(\ell)}(x)$ exceeds a predefined threshold τ, we remove the jailbreak-related shift component from the last-token representation:

$$\hat{\mathbf{h}}^{(\ell)}(x) = \mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x) - s^{(\ell)}(x)\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}, \text{ if } \tilde{s}^{(\ell)}(x) > \tau. \tag{3}$$

In practice, we use a fixed threshold $\tau = 0.2$ across all VLMs to balance safety enhancement and utility preservation, with the effect of τ discussed in Section 5.3. As illustrated in Figure 3(b), the rectified representation $\hat{\mathbf{h}}^{(\ell)}(x)$ removes the jailbreak-related shift while preserving the remaining jailbreak-unrelated component, which largely retains task-relevant semantic information. Thus, JRS-Rem effectively defends against jailbreak attempts without degrading the VLM utility.

Computational overhead. JRS-Rem requires only two additional prefill forward passes to estimate the jailbreak-related shift. Since the dominant cost of VLM inference lies in the subsequent auto-regressive generation (typically long-form outputs of over 128 tokens), the additional prefill overhead is negligible relative to the overall inference cost, making JRS-Rem suitable for real-time deployment.

5.2 Experiments and Results Analysis

Computation of jailbreak direction. For each VLM, we pre-compute a fixed jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$ for each layer ℓ using 50 jailbreak samples and 50 refusal samples from the HADES dataset. Unless otherwise specified, we reuse this direction across evaluations. Section 5.3 provides further analysis on the sample efficiency of the jailbreak direction. We exclude the samples used to estimate the jailbreak direction, together with all image variants of the same text prompts, from evaluation.

VLMs and baseline defense methods. We evaluate JRS-Rem on three VLMs, including LLaVA-1.5-7B [Liu et al., 2024a], ShareGPT4V-7B [Chen et al., 2024a], and InternVL-Chat-19B [Chen et al., 2024b]. We compare JRS-Rem with four representative inference-time defense methods: (1) AdaShield [Wang et al., 2024b], (2) ECSO [Gou et al., 2024], (3) ShiftDC [Zou et al., 2025], and (4) CMRM [Liu et al., 2025]. AdaShield and ECSO require black-box access to model inputs and outputs, whereas ShiftDC, CMRM, and JRS-Rem require white-box access to read and modify hidden representations. Further details for these baselines are provided in Appendix B.

Evaluation metrics. We use the attack success rate (ASR) to evaluate defense effectiveness. To accurately determine whether a response is a successful jailbreak, we combine three judging methods: (1) keyword-based rules [Wang et al., 2024b], (2) Qwen3Guard-Gen-8B [Zhao et al., 2025a], and (3) Llama-Guard-4-12B [Meta, 2025]. We adopt a majority vote strategy: a response is labeled as a jailbreak only if at least two judging methods classify it as harmful. We use this voting scheme to reduce reliance on any single judging method. Further details are provided in Appendix C.1.

Table 1: ASR (↓) under explicitly harmful scenarios. For each VLM, the first row reports the baseline without defense, and subsequent rows show each defense method and its relative improvement. JRS-Rem consistently achieves the **best** or second-best results across all VLMs and datasets.

	HADES			MM-SafetyBench			RedTeam2K		
Model / Defense	**SD**	**TYPO**	**SD+TYPO**	**SD**	**TYPO**	**SD+TYPO**	**SD**	**TYPO**	**SD+TYPO**
LLaVA-1.5-7B	77.3	73.7	84.9	80.6	79.6	81.4	39.3	37.6	49.8
+ AdaShield	28.4$_{(\downarrow 48.9)}$	26.5$_{(\downarrow 47.2)}$	29.0$_{(\downarrow 55.9)}$	32.6$_{(\downarrow 48.0)}$	32.6$_{(\downarrow 47.0)}$	35.3$_{(\downarrow 46.1)}$	23.8$_{(\downarrow 15.5)}$	19.7$_{(\downarrow 17.9)}$	22.2$_{(\downarrow 27.6)}$
+ ECSO	30.0$_{(\downarrow 47.3)}$	27.6$_{(\downarrow 46.1)}$	31.6$_{(\downarrow 53.3)}$	17.0$_{(\downarrow 63.6)}$	14.0$_{(\downarrow 65.6)}$	23.1$_{(\downarrow 58.3)}$	22.2$_{(\downarrow 17.1)}$	23.2$_{(\downarrow 14.4)}$	28.6$_{(\downarrow 21.2)}$
+ ShiftDC	67.2$_{(\downarrow 10.1)}$	65.3$_{(\downarrow 8.40)}$	72.9$_{(\downarrow 12.0)}$	44.3$_{(\downarrow 36.3)}$	42.2$_{(\downarrow 37.4)}$	45.7$_{(\downarrow 35.7)}$	33.0$_{(\downarrow 6.30)}$	32.5$_{(\downarrow 5.10)}$	42.5$_{(\downarrow 7.30)}$
+ CMRM	73.8$_{(\downarrow 3.50)}$	71.4$_{(\downarrow 2.30)}$	74.5$_{(\downarrow 10.4)}$	49.2$_{(\downarrow 31.4)}$	47.0$_{(\downarrow 32.6)}$	48.7$_{(\downarrow 32.7)}$	46.2$_{(\uparrow 6.90)}$	47.5$_{(\uparrow 9.90)}$	51.0$_{(\uparrow 1.20)}$
+ JRS-Rem	**12.2**$_{(\downarrow 65.1)}$	**9.40**$_{(\downarrow 64.3)}$	**12.4**$_{(\downarrow 72.5)}$	**12.6**$_{(\downarrow 68.0)}$	**8.00**$_{(\downarrow 71.6)}$	**11.7**$_{(\downarrow 69.7)}$	**19.0**$_{(\downarrow 20.3)}$	**18.4**$_{(\downarrow 19.2)}$	**21.9**$_{(\downarrow 27.9)}$
ShareGPT4V-7B	58.1	55.1	71.7	64.3	65.1	73.1	28.8	29.4	39.2
+ AdaShield	12.5$_{(\downarrow 45.6)}$	12.1$_{(\downarrow 43.0)}$	14.6$_{(\downarrow 57.1)}$	11.8$_{(\downarrow 52.5)}$	11.8$_{(\downarrow 53.3)}$	13.1$_{(\downarrow 60.0)}$	12.3$_{(\downarrow 16.5)}$	12.2$_{(\downarrow 17.2)}$	15.0$_{(\downarrow 24.2)}$
+ ECSO	36.1$_{(\downarrow 22.0)}$	29.6$_{(\downarrow 25.5)}$	42.2$_{(\downarrow 29.5)}$	13.7$_{(\downarrow 50.6)}$	10.0$_{(\downarrow 55.1)}$	17.3$_{(\downarrow 55.8)}$	21.5$_{(\downarrow 7.30)}$	22.7$_{(\downarrow 6.70)}$	26.1$_{(\downarrow 13.1)}$
+ ShiftDC	26.4$_{(\downarrow 31.7)}$	22.2$_{(\downarrow 32.9)}$	26.5$_{(\downarrow 45.2)}$	16.1$_{(\downarrow 48.2)}$	13.6$_{(\downarrow 51.5)}$	16.6$_{(\downarrow 56.5)}$	17.9$_{(\downarrow 10.9)}$	17.6$_{(\downarrow 11.8)}$	20.1$_{(\downarrow 19.1)}$
+ CMRM	5.70$_{(\downarrow 52.4)}$	4.60$_{(\downarrow 50.5)}$	5.40$_{(\downarrow 66.3)}$	12.4$_{(\downarrow 51.9)}$	12.6$_{(\downarrow 52.5)}$	12.3$_{(\downarrow 60.8)}$	12.1$_{(\downarrow 16.7)}$	12.5$_{(\downarrow 16.9)}$	12.1$_{(\downarrow 27.1)}$
+ JRS-Rem	**2.80**$_{(\downarrow 55.3)}$	**2.40**$_{(\downarrow 52.7)}$	**2.10**$_{(\downarrow 69.6)}$	**5.40**$_{(\downarrow 58.9)}$	**4.20**$_{(\downarrow 60.9)}$	**5.10**$_{(\downarrow 68.0)}$	**8.00**$_{(\downarrow 20.8)}$	**8.50**$_{(\downarrow 20.9)}$	**9.10**$_{(\downarrow 30.1)}$
InternVL-Chat-19B	38.9	24.9	31.7	71.7	67.9	73.1	30.2	32.2	43.6
+ AdaShield	13.7$_{(\downarrow 25.2)}$	**13.4**$_{(\downarrow 11.5)}$	14.5$_{(\downarrow 17.2)}$	28.8$_{(\downarrow 42.9)}$	36.2$_{(\downarrow 31.7)}$	33.3$_{(\downarrow 39.8)}$	20.7$_{(\downarrow 9.50)}$	24.7$_{(\downarrow 7.50)}$	19.6$_{(\downarrow 24.0)}$
+ ECSO	19.4$_{(\downarrow 19.5)}$	16.8$_{(\downarrow 8.10)}$	18.4$_{(\downarrow 13.3)}$	25.1$_{(\downarrow 46.6)}$	20.7$_{(\downarrow 47.2)}$	28.3$_{(\downarrow 44.8)}$	11.2$_{(\downarrow 19.0)}$	14.4$_{(\downarrow 17.8)}$	19.8$_{(\downarrow 23.8)}$
+ ShiftDC	24.1$_{(\downarrow 14.8)}$	25.2$_{(\uparrow 0.30)}$	21.4$_{(\downarrow 10.3)}$	41.4$_{(\downarrow 30.3)}$	39.5$_{(\downarrow 28.4)}$	42.5$_{(\downarrow 30.6)}$	20.4$_{(\downarrow 9.80)}$	25.5$_{(\downarrow 6.70)}$	27.6$_{(\downarrow 16.0)}$
+ CMRM	35.6$_{(\downarrow 3.30)}$	17.6$_{(\downarrow 7.30)}$	36.8$_{(\uparrow 5.10)}$	19.7$_{(\downarrow 52.0)}$	22.5$_{(\downarrow 45.4)}$	20.8$_{(\downarrow 52.3)}$	17.8$_{(\downarrow 12.4)}$	29.8$_{(\downarrow 2.40)}$	21.4$_{(\downarrow 22.2)}$
+ JRS-Rem	**5.60**$_{(\downarrow 33.3)}$	13.6$_{(\downarrow 11.3)}$	**6.10**$_{(\downarrow 25.6)}$	**4.40**$_{(\downarrow 67.3)}$	**10.7**$_{(\downarrow 57.2)}$	**5.70**$_{(\downarrow 67.4)}$	**8.70**$_{(\downarrow 21.5)}$	**14.3**$_{(\downarrow 17.9)}$	**9.60**$_{(\downarrow 34.0)}$

Table 2: ASR (↓) under implicitly harmful and adversarial attack scenarios. JRS-Rem consistently achieves strong performance across all settings, demonstrating its generalizability. Additional results on other baseline defense methods are provided in Appendix D.3.

	Implicitly Harmful		Adversarial Attack				
Model / Defense	**HADES**	**MM-SafetyBench**	**MML-M**	**MML-R**	**MML-B64**	**Gradient**	**SI-Attack**
LLaVA-1.5-7B	67.0	67.2	67.8	63.7	68.4	76.1	85.2
+ JRS-Rem	35.3$_{(\downarrow 31.7)}$	19.1$_{(\downarrow 48.1)}$	9.00$_{(\downarrow 58.8)}$	9.20$_{(\downarrow 54.5)}$	9.60$_{(\downarrow 58.8)}$	11.3$_{(\downarrow 64.8)}$	14.9$_{(\downarrow 70.3)}$
ShareGPT4V-7B	66.8	62.3	54.2	63.3	46.0	58.2	79.4
+ JRS-Rem	9.20$_{(\downarrow 57.6)}$	12.9$_{(\downarrow 49.4)}$	4.40$_{(\downarrow 49.8)}$	4.10$_{(\downarrow 59.2)}$	4.10$_{(\downarrow 41.9)}$	2.60$_{(\downarrow 55.6)}$	8.30$_{(\downarrow 71.1)}$
InternVL-Chat-19B	67.7	47.7	24.5	27.7	30.6	31.4	68.9
+ JRS-Rem	3.60$_{(\downarrow 64.1)}$	12.6$_{(\downarrow 35.1)}$	10.4$_{(\downarrow 14.1)}$	9.40$_{(\downarrow 18.3)}$	11.8$_{(\downarrow 18.8)}$	7.60$_{(\downarrow 23.8)}$	9.30$_{(\downarrow 59.6)}$

Evaluation under explicitly harmful scenarios. We evaluate JRS-Rem on the HADES, MM-SafetyBench, and RedTeam2K datasets, where each text prompt is paired with SD, TYPO, or SD+TYPO images. Dataset details are provided in Appendix A.1. Table 1 shows that JRS-Rem consistently achieves the best or second-best performance across all VLMs and datasets. Notably, for LLaVA-1.5-7B on the HADES dataset, JRS-Rem reduces the ASR by 65.1%, 64.3%, and 72.5% across the three image types, significantly outperforming all baselines. This demonstrates that JRS-Rem effectively locates and removes the jailbreak-related shift, thereby preventing representations from being steered into a jailbreak state. Additional results on Qwen-series VLMs are provided in Appendix D.3, Table 6, showing consistent safety improvements across these models.

Evaluation under implicitly harmful and adversarial attack scenarios. We further evaluate JRS-Rem under implicitly harmful and adversarial attack scenarios using the datasets described in Section 4.2. For adversarial attacks, we additionally include SI-Attack [Zhao et al., 2025b], which uses shuffled harmful text-image instructions to bypass safety mechanisms. Data details are provided in Appendix A.2 and A.3. Table 2 shows that JRS-Rem significantly reduces ASR in both scenarios, even though the jailbreak direction is extracted from explicitly harmful inputs. JRS-Rem also maintains low ASR under a white-box adaptive attack that explicitly accounts for the defense, with detailed settings and results provided in Appendix D.6. These results demonstrate that JRS-Rem generalizes to diverse jailbreak scenarios beyond explicitly harmful inputs.

Impact on VLM utility across benign benchmarks. To evaluate whether JRS-Rem affects the general performance of VLMs on benign inputs, we conduct experiments on three utility benchmarks:




Figure 6: (a) Impact of threshold τ on safety and utility. (b) Cosine similarity between jailbreak directions estimated from 50 random sample pairs and from the full dataset across ten trials. Each light-colored line corresponds to one trial, and the bold blue line shows the mean across trials. (c) Pairwise cosine similarity of jailbreak directions across datasets and data types at layer 19. (d) AUROC for distinguishing jailbreak and refusal samples using the jailbreak direction.

MM-Vet, ScienceQA, and MME. We follow the evaluation protocols defined in the original papers to calculate utility scores, with further details on datasets and metrics provided in Appendix A.4. Table 3 shows that JRS-Rem has only a minimal impact on utility performance. Compared with the other defenses, JRS-Rem better preserves overall utility, with unchanged scores on ScienceQA and MME and only a 0.5-point decrease on MM-Vet. Results for other VLMs in Appendix D.3 show consistent trends, further supporting the ability of JRS-Rem to preserve utility across models. This is because the jailbreak-related shift of benign samples is typically too small to exceed the threshold. Even when correction is triggered, the adjustment is minimal and does not significantly alter the original representations. As a result, the VLM largely preserves its utility while improving safety.

Table 3: Utility scores (↑) on benign benchmarks for LLaVA-1.5-7B. JRS-Rem has almost no impact on the performance of the original VLMs. Results for other VLMs (Appendix D.3) show consistent trends.

Model / Defense	MM-Vet	ScienceQA	MME
LLaVA-1.5-7B	**32.1**	64.0	**1754.9**
+ AdaShield	27.3$_{(\downarrow 4.80)}$	39.5$_{(\downarrow 24.5)}$	1292.3$_{(\downarrow 462.6)}$
+ ECSO	30.1$_{(\downarrow 2.00)}$	57.8$_{(\downarrow 6.20)}$	1505.9$_{(\downarrow 249.0)}$
+ ShiftDC	30.0$_{(\downarrow 2.10)}$	**64.1**$_{(\uparrow 0.10)}$	1573.0$_{(\downarrow 181.9)}$
+ CMRM	15.3$_{(\downarrow 16.8)}$	45.2$_{(\downarrow 18.8)}$	679.8$_{(\downarrow 1075.1)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	31.6$_{(\downarrow 0.50)}$	64.0$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$	**1754.9**$_{(\downarrow 0.000)}$

5.3 Ablation Studies and Discussion

Ablation and discussion on threshold τ. We analyze the sensitivity of the threshold τ, which determines whether correction is applied. A sample is corrected only when its normalized jailbreak-related shift $\tilde{s}^{(\ell)}(x)$ exceeds τ, where $\tilde{s}^{(\ell)}(x)$ is the cosine similarity between the image-induced representation shift and the jailbreak direction. To examine the effect of τ on safety and utility, we measure ASR on HADES and accuracy on ScienceQA using LLaVA-1.5-7B. As shown in Figure 6(a), decreasing τ reduces the ASR, but the gain becomes marginal below 0.2, while accuracy on ScienceQA begins to slightly degrade. Additional results across models and datasets are provided in Appendix D.3, which show similar trends. We therefore adopt $\tau = 0.2$ for all VLMs.

Empirically, $\tilde{s}^{(\ell)}(x)$ tends to be above 0.3 for jailbreak samples and below 0.1 for benign samples, making $\tau = 0.2$ a reasonable trade-off. Moreover, the magnitude of the correction is determined by the jailbreak-related shift itself, while τ only controls whether the correction is applied. As a result, JRS-Rem is relatively robust to τ within a reasonable range, as long as it is not set excessively high.

Sample efficiency, consistency, and discriminability of the jailbreak direction. We first examine the sample efficiency of constructing the jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$. We randomly sample 50 jailbreak and 50 refusal examples from HADES and repeat this process ten times on LLaVA-1.5-7B. Figure 6(b) reports the cosine similarity between the jailbreak directions from these trials and the one computed using the full dataset. The consistently high similarity indicates that the jailbreak direction can be reliably estimated from limited samples, suggesting that JRS-Rem does not rely on large-scale data.

Second, we examine the consistency of the jailbreak direction across different data distributions. We compute jailbreak directions from three harmful datasets: HADES (H), MM-SafetyBench (M), and RedTeam2K (R). Each dataset contains three data types, including SD (S), TYPO (T), and SD+TYPO (ST), resulting in nine jailbreak directions in total. Figure 6(c) shows the pairwise cosine similarity of these nine directions at layer 19 of LLaVA-1.5-7B. All similarities exceed 0.7, indicating that

the jailbreak direction is consistent across datasets rather than specific to a particular distribution. Additional analyses of the consistency and transferability of jailbreak directions across datasets and harmful categories are provided in Appendix D.5.

Third, we evaluate the discriminability of the jailbreak direction in separating jailbreak and refusal samples. We project representations from three explicitly harmful and two implicitly harmful (IH) datasets onto the jailbreak direction and compute AUROC. As shown in Figure 6(d), AUROC exceeds 0.85 in the middle and deep layers for both explicit and implicit settings. This suggests that the jailbreak direction effectively captures the difference between refusal and jailbreak behaviors.

Causal intervention evidence. We further investigate the causal role of the jailbreak direction in refusal and jailbreak behavior. We conduct bidirectional intervention experiments on LLaVA-1.5-7B using the SD+TYPO subsets of HADES and MM-SafetyBench. Specifically, we vary the strength of removing the jailbreak-related component from hidden representations and adding perturbations along the jailbreak direction to originally refused harmful samples. As shown in Table 10, stronger removal progressively reduces ASR on both datasets. Conversely, Table 11 shows that adding perturbations along the jailbreak direction converts 67.7–80.1% of originally refused samples into jailbreaks. Detailed intervention settings and result analyses are provided in Appendix D.4. These results provide evidence that the identified direction causally influences refusal and jailbreak behavior.

6 Conclusions and Limitations

In this paper, we propose the recognize-but-fail-to-refuse hypothesis to explain VLM jailbreak behavior, i.e., jailbreak samples form a distinct state in the VLM's representation space, where VLMs recognize harmful intent but fail to trigger refusal. Based on this, we define a jailbreak direction and identify the jailbreak-related shift within the total image-induced representation shift that steers the sample from the refusal state to the jailbreak state. Our analysis shows that the jailbreak-related shift is closely coupled with the jailbreak behavior, providing a unified explanation for various VLM jailbreak scenarios. Finally, we propose JRS-Rem, a defense method that enhances VLM safety alignment by removing the jailbreak-related shift. Experiments across multiple scenarios show that JRS-Rem significantly improves VLM safety while preserving utility on benign tasks.

Limitations. The limitations of our JRS-Rem framework are as follows: (1) It does not defend against text-only jailbreak attacks, as it targets representation shifts induced by visual inputs; (2) Its scalability to larger-scale VLMs remains unverified, as it has only been evaluated on models up to 19B parameters; (3) Although the identified jailbreak direction is used for defense in this work, it may have potential dual-use risks if misused; (4) It requires white-box access to read and modify hidden representations, limiting its applicability to API-only VLMs. We discuss these limitations in detail in Appendix E.

Acknowledgments and Disclosure of Funding

This work is partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 62376199, 62576249, 62576247), the Shanghai Science and Technology Commission (No. 25511102900), and the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission (No. 24CGA20).

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


Figure 7: Examples of explicitly and implicitly harmful inputs, sourced from the HADES and MM-SafetyBench datasets.

A Datasets

A.1 Explicitly Harmful Datasets

We evaluate the VLM jailbreak mechanism and defense performance using three explicitly harmful datasets: HADES [Li et al., 2024], MM-SafetyBench [Liu et al., 2024b], and RedTeam2K [Luo et al., 2024]. Figure 7 shows two instances. The details of these datasets are summarized below:

- **HADES**. This dataset consists of 750 explicitly harmful text prompts across five harmful classes, including *animal, financial, privacy, self-harm,* and *violence*. For each harmful text prompt, HADES provides multiple image variations. In this study, we primarily utilize three types of images: (1) SD: Stable Diffusion-generated images related to the query; (2) TYPO: typography images of harmful keywords; and (3) SD+TYPO: a concatenation of both. This results in a total of 2,250 multimodal samples.
- **MM-SafetyBench**. This dataset contains 1,680 text prompts spanning 13 harmful classes, with each prompt providing both explicitly and implicitly harmful versions. The explicitly harmful version corresponds to the `Changed Question` field in the original dataset. Similar to HADES, each text prompt is paired with three types of images: SD, TYPO, and SD+TYPO, resulting in a total of 5,040 multimodal samples.
- **RedTeam2K**. This dataset includes 2,000 explicitly harmful text prompts across 16 safety policy categories. It also provides SD, TYPO, and SD+TYPO images for each text prompt, which is consistent with the other datasets. This results in a total of 6,000 multimodal samples.

A.2 Implicitly Harmful Datasets

We use implicitly harmful variants of the HADES and MM-SafetyBench datasets. In these variants, the text prompts are harmless, and the harmful intent is conveyed solely through the image. Figure 7 shows two instances. The details of these datasets are summarized below:

- **HADES (IH)**. The original HADES dataset does not provide harmless text prompts. To address this, we use MML [Wang et al., 2025], which offers a corresponding harmless version for each harmful prompt in HADES. Since SD+TYPO images provide explicit text guidance within the visual, they reduce the risk of the VLM failing to recognize the image content. We pair these harmless prompts with SD+TYPO images to construct 750 implicitly harmful samples.
- **MM-SafetyBench (IH)**. This dataset already provides a harmless version for each explicitly harmful prompt, which corresponds to the `Rephrased Question` field in the original dataset. Following the same logic, we pair these harmless prompts with SD+TYPO images to construct 1,680 implicitly harmful samples.

A.3 Adversarial Attack Datasets

To evaluate the effectiveness of our method under adversarial attacks, we test it against the following attack settings.

- **MML** [Wang et al., 2025]. MML applies various transformations to images, such as rotation, mirroring, and base64 encoding. We use the HADES dataset processed with MML attacks. To ensure the model can still recognize the input content, we keep the original text prompts and only modify the images, resulting in 2,250 samples.
- **HADES-Gradient** [Li et al., 2024]. This subset of the HADES dataset consists of 750 samples where images are iteratively optimized using the gradients of LLaVA-1.5-7B to trigger affirmative responses. These gradient-based images are combined with SD and TYPO images from the HADES dataset, totaling 750 samples.
- **SI-Attack** [Zhao et al., 2025b]. SI-Attack shuffles harmful text-image instructions to bypass safety alignment. It applies a query-based black-box optimization method to select the most effective shuffled inputs based on feedback from a toxic judge model. We use the HADES dataset processed with SI-Attack, resulting in 2,250 samples.

A.4 Benign Benchmarks

We use three benign benchmarks to evaluate the impact of our proposed method on general model utility, including MM-Vet [Yu et al., 2023], ScienceQA [Lu et al., 2022], and MME [Fu et al., 2025]. Details for each dataset are provided below:

- **MM-Vet**. This benchmark assesses six core vision-language capabilities, including recognition, OCR, knowledge, language generation, spatial awareness, and math. It contains 218 questions that require models to integrate these capabilities to solve complex tasks. Evaluation is performed using GPT-4, which assigns a score (0 to 1) to open-ended responses based on few-shot prompts. The final utility score is the average across all questions, scaled to [0, 100].
- **ScienceQA**. This dataset contains 21,208 multimodal multiple-choice questions from school science curricula. We evaluate our model on the test set, which consists of 4,241 samples, including 2,224 text-only and 2,017 multimodal questions. We report the accuracy (%) as the primary metric for this benchmark.
- **MME**. This benchmark evaluates 14 sub-tasks across two categories: perception (MME-P) and cognition (MME-C), totaling 2,374 multimodal queries. Each question requires a "Yes" or "No" answer. For each image, MME provides a pair of questions: one with a "Yes" ground truth and the other with "No." The score for each sub-task combines individual question accuracy and image-level consistency (where both questions must be answered correctly). We report the sum of the perception and cognition scores as the final utility metric, with a maximum possible score of 2,800.

A.5 Dataset construction for Section 3

We construct a multimodal dataset, $\mathcal{D}_{\text{mm}} = \mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}} \cup \mathcal{D}_{\text{harmful}}$, which includes both benign and explicitly harmful inputs. This dataset is used to analyze how jailbreak samples form a distinct state in the representation space. The components of the dataset are described below:

- **Benign dataset ($\mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}}$)**: Following Zou et al. [2025], we use a subset of LLaVA-Instruct-150k [Liu et al., 2024a], which is a standard instruction-following dataset for vision-language fine-tuning in LLaVA. We randomly sampled 3,000 single-turn instances to form the benign set. These samples represent typical user queries that do not violate safety policies.
- **Harmful dataset ($\mathcal{D}_{\text{harmful}}$)**: We include all samples from the HADES and MM-SafetyBench datasets, totaling 7,290 instances. This comprehensive coverage ensures that the identified "jailbreak state" faithfully reflects the broader harmful data distribution, rather than being biased by the specific characteristics of a limited subset of inputs.

B Baseline Defense Methods

In this paper, we compare JRS-Rem with the following four inference-time defense methods:

- **AdaShield** [Wang et al., 2024b]. AdaShield is a prompt-based defense method that adds safety instructions to the input to prevent jailbreak attacks. It has two versions: (1) **AdaShield-S** uses a human-designed static prompt that tells the model to check the image and text content step-by-step for harmful information; (2) **AdaShield-A** uses an adaptive framework where another LLM acts as

a defender to automatically create and improve the defense prompts. In this paper, we follow Zou et al. [2025] and use the AdaShield-S version with a manually designed defense prompt.

- **ECSO** [Gou et al., 2024]. ECSO is a training-free defense method designed to activate the safety mechanisms of the LLM within a VLM. The original process consists of three steps. First, the VLM performs a self-evaluation to determine if its response is safe. Second, if the response is deemed unsafe, the model uses a specific prompt to generate a text caption for the input image. Third, this caption replaces the original image to guide the VLM in producing a safer response. For a fair comparison, we follow Zou et al. [2025] and exclude the initial safety check step, as such checks can be integrated into any defense framework. In our experiments, we use LLaVA-1.5-7B to generate image captions with the prompt provided by Gou et al. [2024]. We set the maximum generation length to 256 tokens to ensure the captions are complete.
- **ShiftDC** [Zou et al., 2025]. ShiftDC is a defense method that rectifies internal representations during inference. It first identifies a safety direction by calculating the difference between the average representations of harmful and benign text-only inputs. ShiftDC assumes that adding an image induces an activation shift that can be split into two parts: a safety-relevant shift that misleads the VLM, and a safety-irrelevant shift that contains visual information. The method removes the former while keeping the latter to restore the VLM's safety. In our experiments, we follow Zou et al. [2025] to construct the safety direction using 160 benign samples from LLaVA-Instruct-80K and 160 harmful samples from MM-SafetyBench. We also use LLaVA-1.5-7B to generate image captions for this method, keeping the setup consistent with ECSO.
- **CMRM** [Liu et al., 2025]. CMRM is also an internal representation revision method. It first extracts a shifting vector by comparing the hidden states of a text-only query with those of the same query combined with a blank (corrupted) image. This vector represents the representation shift induced by the visual input. CMRM provides two ways to obtain this vector: (1) Dataset-level, which identifies a general shifting direction that captures the overall trend across the entire dataset. (2) Sample-level, which calculates a specific shifting direction for each individual input to capture case-specific nuances. To protect the model, CMRM subtracts this vector from the multimodal hidden states to align them closer to the original LLM's state. In our experiments, we implement the sample-level version and use a blank image to compute the shifting vector.

C Implementation Details

C.1 Assessing Response Harmfulness

There are two common methods to evaluate the harmfulness of a response: keyword-based matching and LLM-based evaluation. The details and limitations of each method are provided below:

- **Keyword-based method**: This method uses a predefined list of refusal strings. A response is classified as a refusal if it contains strings such as "I'm sorry" or "I cannot". Otherwise, it is labeled as a successful jailbreak. The main limitation is that it is difficult to define an optimal list of keywords. If the list is too short, it may miss many refusals (low recall); if it is too long, it may cause false positives. Additionally, different VLMs have different response styles, making it hard to create a single keyword list that works for all models.
- **LLM-based evaluation**: This method uses a strong LLM (such as Llama-Guard-4-12B [Meta, 2025]) as a judge to check the response. The main issue with this method is that it may be inaccurate in extreme cases. For example, a response might actually be a successful jailbreak, but if it avoids explicitly harmful words or is incomplete, the judge model might fail to label it as unsafe. Conversely, it might misclassify a safe but complex response as harmful.

To accurately assess response harmfulness, we combine keyword-based matching with two advanced models: Qwen3Guard-Gen-8B [Zhao et al., 2025a] and Llama-Guard-4-12B [Meta, 2025]. We use the same keyword list as Gao et al. [2025], which is detailed in Table 4.

We apply different strategies depending on the experimental goal:

- For calculating jailbreak directions: To get the most accurate jailbreak samples and refusal samples, we use a "drop conflict" method. We only keep a sample if all three methods (the keyword list and the two judge models) give the same label. If there is any conflict between the three methods, we remove the sample to reduce noise.

Table 4: Refusal keywords.

Refusal Keywords
I'm sorry
Sorry
I am sorry
I apologize
As an
As an AI
I'm an
I'm just
As a language model
As an Assistant
I cannot
I do not
It is not</s>
It is not appropriate
I'm unable to
I am unable to
I am not allowed to
I am an AI language model

Table 5: Safety warning keywords.

Safety Warning Keywords
illegal
harmful
hurtful
unethical
not legitimate
avoid engaging
laws and regulations
should not be performed
should be approached ethically
to protect against
to mitigate these risks
always be cautious
always ensure that
please note that
it is essential to
it's essential to
it is crucial to
it's crucial to
it is important to note
it's important to note




Figure 8: An example of a full jailbreak response, with safety warnings highlighted in orange.

- For evaluating defense performance: To ensure all samples are included, we use a "majority vote" strategy. We classify a response as a successful jailbreak if at least two methods identify it as harmful. Otherwise, the response is treated as a refusal.

C.2 Safety Warning Keywords

In this paper, safety warnings refer to statements where the model acknowledges risks, illegalities, or ethical concerns within a jailbreak response. Figure 8 shows an example of a complete response containing such warnings.

We use a rule-based approach to detect these safety warnings. A response is flagged if it contains any of the predefined keywords or phrases listed in Table 5. These keywords are primarily sourced from Zou et al. [2025] and Wang et al. [2024b]. Notably, we exclude explicit refusal expressions




Figure 9: PCA visualization, average cosine distance to the jailbreak centroid, and linear probing F1 scores on ShareGPT4V-7B and InternVL-Chat-19B. Shaded areas denote standard deviation.

(e.g., "I'm sorry") to ensure that we only capture cases where the model acknowledges the risk but still provides harmful content.

C.3 Experimental Setup

We fix the random seed to 0 for all experiments. For the main experiments, generation is performed using greedy decoding (`do_sample=False`) with a maximum of 128 new tokens. All VLMs are loaded from their official Hugging Face model hubs. Inputs are processed using the model-specific processor with `apply_chat_template` method, which applies the appropriate chat template, tokenizes the conversation, and returns PyTorch tensors on the designated device. Inference is conducted in `float16` precision with a batch size of 1 on one NVIDIA A100 80GB GPU.

D Additional Experimental Results

D.1 Results for Section 3

Figure 9 presents PCA visualization, cosine distance analysis, and linear probing results on ShareGPT4V-7B and InternVL-Chat-19B. These results are consistent with those observed on LLaVA-1.5-7B in the main paper, and consistently show that jailbreak, refusal, and benign samples are clearly separable. This indicates that the separability is a general property across different VLM architectures.

D.2 Results for Section 4

Figure 10 shows the average normalized jailbreak-related shift across different scenarios for ShareGPT4V-7B and InternVL-Chat-19B, respectively. These results are consistent with those observed on LLaVA-1.5-7B in the main paper, and consistently show that jailbreak samples exhibit larger shifts than refusal samples in the middle and deep layers, while benign samples remain concentrated near zero. This indicates that the jailbreak-related shift is a robust measure of jailbreak behavior that generalizes across models.

D.3 Results for Section 5

Additional results on explicitly harmful data. We additionally evaluate JRS-Rem on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct [Wang et al., 2024a], Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct [Bai et al., 2025b], and Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct [Bai et al., 2025a] under explicitly harmful scenarios using SD+TYPO images. As shown in Table 6, JRS-Rem consistently reduces ASR across all three models and datasets, further supporting its effectiveness on a broader range of VLMs.




Figure 10: Average normalized jailbreak-related shift on ShareGPT4V-7B and InternVL-Chat-19B across different scenarios: explicitly harmful, implicitly harmful, adversarial attack, and benign.

Table 6: ASR (↓) under explicitly harmful scenarios on Qwen-series VLMs using SD+TYPO images.

Model / Defense	HADES	MM-SafetyBench	RedTeam2K
Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct	14.9	20.6	20.5
+ JRS-Rem	$2.8_{(\downarrow 12.1)}$	$3.7_{(\downarrow 16.9)}$	$1.5_{(\downarrow 19.0)}$
Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct	11.1	17.4	13.8
+ JRS-Rem	$2.0_{(\downarrow 9.1)}$	$4.3_{(\downarrow 13.1)}$	$2.3_{(\downarrow 11.5)}$
Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct	2.4	6.0	7.0
+ JRS-Rem	$0.9_{(\downarrow 1.5)}$	$2.9_{(\downarrow 3.1)}$	$3.1_{(\downarrow 3.9)}$

Full results on implicitly harmful data. Table 7 shows the defense performance on implicitly harmful datasets on all three VLMs. JRS-Rem significantly reduces the ASR in all cases, achieving the best or second-best results across both datasets on all evaluated VLMs. These results demonstrate that our method is not limited to explicitly harmful scenarios but also generalizes effectively to implicit threats.

Full results on benign benchmarks. Table 8 shows the utility scores on three benchmarks across six VLMs. Compared to other methods, JRS-Rem has only a minimal impact on utility, demonstrating its strong utility preservation capability.

Additional results on threshold τ. Table 9 presents results on the effect of the threshold τ across additional VLMs and datasets. In particular, $\tau = 1.0$ corresponds to the case where no samples are modified (i.e., defense is disabled). The results are consistent with those reported in the main paper. We observe that decreasing τ consistently reduces ASR across safety benchmarks, while the improvement becomes marginal when $\tau < 0.2$ and utility begins to slightly degrade. Overall, results across models and datasets align with our findings in the main paper, supporting $\tau = 0.2$ as a balanced choice.

D.4 Content-Controlled Causal Interventions

We conduct bidirectional interventions on LLaVA-1.5-7B using the SD+TYPO subsets of HADES and MM-SafetyBench, excluding direction-estimation samples as described in Section 5.2. The image-text inputs and model parameters remain unchanged. Only the hidden representations are edited along the identified jailbreak direction.

Removing the jailbreak-related component. We vary the removal strength α:

$$\hat{\mathbf{h}}^{(\ell)}(x) = \mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x) - \alpha s^{(\ell)}(x)\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}, \qquad \text{if } \tilde{s}^{(\ell)}(x) > \tau, \tag{4}$$

where $\tau = 0.2$ is the same intervention threshold used by JRS-Rem. Table 10 shows that increasing α progressively reduces ASR on both datasets. At $\alpha = 1.0$, ASR falls from 84.9% to 12.4% on

Table 7: ASR (↓) under implicitly harmful scenarios. JRS-Rem consistently achieves the **best** or second-best results across all VLMs and datasets.

Model / Defense	HADES	MM-SafetyBench
LLaVA-1.5-7B	67.0	67.2
+ AdaShield	**35.2**$_{(\downarrow 31.8)}$	45.8$_{(\downarrow 21.4)}$
+ ECSO	44.1$_{(\downarrow 22.9)}$	26.8$_{(\downarrow 40.4)}$
+ ShiftDC	60.4$_{(\downarrow 6.60)}$	38.3$_{(\downarrow 28.9)}$
+ CMRM	52.6$_{(\downarrow 14.4)}$	30.1$_{(\downarrow 37.1)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	35.3$_{(\downarrow 31.7)}$	**19.1**$_{(\downarrow 48.1)}$
ShareGPT4V-7B	66.8	62.3
+ AdaShield	11.6$_{(\downarrow 55.2)}$	13.7$_{(\downarrow 48.6)}$
+ ECSO	49.0$_{(\downarrow 17.8)}$	25.2$_{(\downarrow 37.1)}$
+ ShiftDC	47.3$_{(\downarrow 19.5)}$	28.1$_{(\downarrow 34.2)}$
+ CMRM	10.8$_{(\downarrow 56.0)}$	**11.2**$_{(\downarrow 51.1)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	**9.20**$_{(\downarrow 57.6)}$	12.9$_{(\downarrow 49.4)}$
InternVL-Chat-19B	67.7	47.7
+ AdaShield	20.5$_{(\downarrow 47.2)}$	27.1$_{(\downarrow 20.6)}$
+ ECSO	30.1$_{(\downarrow 37.6)}$	33.6$_{(\downarrow 14.1)}$
+ ShiftDC	57.4$_{(\downarrow 10.3)}$	29.6$_{(\downarrow 18.1)}$
+ CMRM	25.6$_{(\downarrow 42.1)}$	12.8$_{(\downarrow 34.9)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	**3.60**$_{(\downarrow 64.1)}$	**12.6**$_{(\downarrow 35.1)}$

Table 8: Utility scores (↑) on benign benchmarks. JRS-Rem has almost no impact on the performance of the original VLMs on benign tasks.

Model / Defense	MM-Vet	ScienceQA	MME
LLaVA-1.5-7B	**32.1**	64.0	**1754.9**
+ AdaShield	27.3$_{(\downarrow 4.80)}$	39.5$_{(\downarrow 24.5)}$	1292.3$_{(\downarrow 462.6)}$
+ ECSO	30.1$_{(\downarrow 2.00)}$	57.8$_{(\downarrow 6.20)}$	1505.9$_{(\downarrow 249.0)}$
+ ShiftDC	30.0$_{(\downarrow 2.10)}$	**64.1**$_{(\uparrow 0.10)}$	1573.0$_{(\downarrow 181.9)}$
+ CMRM	15.3$_{(\downarrow 16.8)}$	45.2$_{(\downarrow 18.8)}$	679.8$_{(\downarrow 1075.1)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	31.6$_{(\downarrow 0.50)}$	64.0$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$	**1754.9**$_{(\downarrow 0.000)}$
ShareGPT4V-7B	35.0	62.7	**1895.8**
+ AdaShield	33.6$_{(\downarrow 1.40)}$	39.6$_{(\downarrow 23.1)}$	1548.5$_{(\downarrow 347.3)}$
+ ECSO	30.1$_{(\downarrow 4.90)}$	55.4$_{(\downarrow 7.30)}$	1516.5$_{(\downarrow 379.3)}$
+ ShiftDC	**35.6**$_{(\uparrow 0.60)}$	**63.1**$_{(\uparrow 0.40)}$	1730.1$_{(\downarrow 165.7)}$
+ CMRM	26.5$_{(\downarrow 8.50)}$	43.7$_{(\downarrow 19.0)}$	701.5$_{(\downarrow 1194.3)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	35.0$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$	62.7$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$	**1895.8**$_{(\downarrow 0.000)}$
InternVL-Chat-19B	39.5	81.4	**2022.7**
+ AdaShield	33.7$_{(\downarrow 5.80)}$	78.6$_{(\downarrow 2.80)}$	1917.2$_{(\downarrow 105.5)}$
+ ECSO	30.1$_{(\downarrow 9.40)}$	69.3$_{(\downarrow 12.1)}$	1609.8$_{(\downarrow 412.9)}$
+ ShiftDC	**41.2**$_{(\uparrow 1.70)}$	**81.9**$_{(\uparrow 0.5)}$	1814.8$_{(\downarrow 207.9)}$
+ CMRM	16.7$_{(\downarrow 22.8)}$	70.2$_{(\downarrow 11.2)}$	639.7$_{(\downarrow 1383.0)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	38.3$_{(\downarrow 1.20)}$	81.4$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$	**2022.7**$_{(\downarrow 0.000)}$
Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct	55.2	80.4	1915.1
+ **JRS-Rem**	54.7$_{(\downarrow 0.5)}$	80.4$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$	1915.1$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$
Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct	57.6	83.8	1868.1
+ **JRS-Rem**	56.4$_{(\downarrow 1.2)}$	83.8$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$	1868.1$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$
Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct	54.5	86.8	2030.1
+ **JRS-Rem**	54.1$_{(\downarrow 0.4)}$	85.3$_{(\downarrow 1.5)}$	2015.2$_{(\downarrow 14.9)}$

Table 9: Performance of JRS-Rem with different values of the threshold τ on safety and utility benchmarks.

	Safety (↓)			Utility (↑)		
Threshold τ	**HADES**	**MM-SafetyBench**	**RedTeam2K**	**MM-Vet**	**ScienceQA**	**MME**
LLaVA-1.5-7B						
$\tau = 1.0$	84.9	81.4	49.8	32.1	64.0	1754.9
$\tau = 0.5$	51.8	49.2	41.6	32.1	64.0	1754.9
$\tau = 0.3$	16.4	13.8	29.8	31.9	64.0	1754.9
$\tau = 0.2$	12.4	11.7	21.9	31.6	64.0	1754.9
$\tau = 0.1$	11.8	11.5	21.3	31.2	61.1	1754.9
$\tau = 0.0$	11.4	11.5	20.9	31.1	59.3	1750.3
ShareGPT4V-7B						
$\tau = 1.0$	71.7	73.1	39.2	35.0	62.7	1895.8
$\tau = 0.5$	53.9	37.2	30.1	35.0	62.7	1895.8
$\tau = 0.3$	13.2	9.4	12.2	35.0	62.7	1895.8
$\tau = 0.2$	2.1	5.1	9.1	35.0	62.7	1895.8
$\tau = 0.1$	2.1	4.8	8.8	34.3	62.4	1895.8
$\tau = 0.0$	2.0	4.2	8.6	33.6	62.2	1895.8
InternVL-Chat-19B						
$\tau = 1.0$	31.7	73.1	43.6	39.5	81.4	2022.7
$\tau = 0.5$	14.5	38.2	15.9	39.5	81.4	2022.7
$\tau = 0.3$	8.3	9.3	10.2	38.8	81.4	2022.7
$\tau = 0.2$	6.1	5.7	9.6	38.3	81.4	2022.7
$\tau = 0.1$	5.8	5.7	8.9	37.5	80.2	2013.1
$\tau = 0.0$	5.8	5.5	8.7	36.6	77.3	2005.9

HADES and from 81.4% to 11.7% on MM-SafetyBench. Removing an equal-magnitude component along a unit random direction $\mathbf{d}'$ has little effect.

Table 10: ASR (↓) after removing the jailbreak-related shift at different strengths on LLaVA-1.5-7B.

Intervention	HADES	MM-SafetyBench
$\alpha = 0$ (no intervention)	84.9	81.4
$\alpha = 0.5$	46.2	52.5
$\alpha = 0.8$	20.3	19.4
$\alpha = 1.0$ (JRS-Rem)	12.4	11.7
Random direction $\mathbf{d}'$, $\alpha = 1.0$	84.2	81.7

Adding a perturbation along the jailbreak direction. For originally refused harmful samples, we apply:

$$\hat{\mathbf{h}}^{(\ell)}(x) = \mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x) + \beta \bar{s}^{(\ell)}_{\text{jail}} \mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}, \tag{5}$$

where β controls the perturbation strength and $\bar{s}^{(\ell)}_{\text{jail}}$ is the mean jailbreak-related shift among successful jailbreak samples in the direction-estimation set. This sets the intervention scale to a magnitude characteristic of successful jailbreaks, rather than the smaller shift of each refusal sample. Table 11 reports ASR on originally refused harmful samples pooled across the two datasets. Adding perturbations along the jailbreak direction converts 67.7–80.1% of these samples into jailbreaks, while the norm-matched random control converts at most 1.6%. Together, these interventions provide content-controlled evidence that the identified direction causally influences refusal and jailbreak behavior.

D.5 Additional Analyses of Jailbreak Direction Consistency

Cross-dataset consistency. To examine the consistency of jailbreak directions across datasets, we estimated a direction from each of HADES, MM-SafetyBench, and RedTeam2K using LLaVA-1.5-7B

Table 11: ASR (%) on originally refused harmful samples from the HADES and MM-SafetyBench SD+TYPO subsets on LLaVA-1.5-7B.

Intervention	$\beta = 0$	$\beta = 0.5$	$\beta = 1.0$	$\beta = 1.5$
Jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}$	0.0	67.7	79.9	80.1
Random direction $\mathbf{d}'$	0.0	0.9	1.6	1.3

under the SD+TYPO setting. We then used each direction in JRS-Rem and evaluated its defense performance on the other two datasets, alongside the source dataset. Direction-estimation samples were excluded from evaluation. Table 12 shows that directions estimated from MM-SafetyBench and RedTeam2K transfer effectively to HADES and the other unseen datasets. Across all evaluation datasets, their ASRs differ from those obtained using the original HADES direction by at most 1.7 percentage points. These results provide evidence that the defense does not depend on fitting a HADES-specific jailbreak direction.

Table 12: ASR (↓) of JRS-Rem using jailbreak directions estimated from different source datasets on LLaVA-1.5-7B under the SD+TYPO setting.

Direction source	HADES	MM-SafetyBench	RedTeam2K
No defense	84.9	81.4	49.8
HADES (used in the main paper)	12.4	11.7	21.9
MM-SafetyBench	13.2	10.1	20.5
RedTeam2K	13.6	10.8	20.2

Cross-category consistency. To examine the consistency of jailbreak directions across harmful categories, we used LLaVA-1.5-7B and the five harmful categories in HADES: animal harm, financial harm, privacy violations, self-harm, and violence. For each category, we estimated a direction using 50 jailbreak and 50 refusal samples and evaluated its defense performance on the other four unseen categories. As shown in Table 13, each direction substantially reduces ASR on the other four categories. When evaluated on the same held-out categories, their average ASRs differ from the corresponding averages obtained with $\mathbf{d}$ by at most 1.8 percentage points. These results support a category-general refusal-to-jailbreak transition across the evaluated categories.

Table 13: ASR (↓) of JRS-Rem across harmful categories on HADES using LLaVA-1.5-7B. Each category-specific direction is evaluated only on the other four categories.

Direction source	Animal	Financial	Privacy	Self-Harm	Violence
No defense	76.7	90.7	85.3	80.0	92.0
Animal	–	25.4	13.8	10.6	14.7
Financial	6.4	–	10.9	10.2	15.2
Privacy	5.9	19.8	–	9.5	14.3
Self-Harm	3.8	24.6	13.1	–	13.0
Violence	4.1	21.8	12.5	7.6	–
$\mathbf{d}$ (main paper)	4.0	23.3	11.3	8.7	14.0

D.6 White-Box Adaptive Attack

We evaluated a defense-aware universal image-patch attack on LLaVA-1.5-7B, building on the gradient-based attack from HADES [Li et al., 2024]. The adversary had full access to the defended model, the layer-wise jailbreak directions, the threshold τ, and the projection-removal rule. In addition to the original jailbreak objective, which increases the likelihood of ten affirmative target prefixes, we penalized normalized projections above $\tau - \epsilon$ to avoid activating the intervention:

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{jb}}\big(F_{\mathrm{def}}(x)\big) + \frac{\lambda}{|\mathcal{I}|} \sum_{\ell \in \mathcal{I}} \mathrm{ReLU}\Big(\tilde{s}^{(\ell)}(x) - (\tau - \epsilon)\Big), \tag{6}$$

where F_{def} denotes the model with JRS-Rem enabled, $\mathcal{I}$ is the set of monitored intervention layers, and $\epsilon = 0.02$ is the evasion margin. In Equation 6, gradients pass through the projection-removal hooks, and the threshold gate uses a straight-through estimator.

We randomly sampled 100 HADES SD+TYPO examples across harmful categories, excluding samples used for direction estimation. For each attack setting, we optimized and evaluated one universal patch on the same 100 examples. The patch replaced the top 84×336 pixels of each 336×336 RGB image. We used sign-PGD for 3,000 steps with a step size of $1/255$, clipping pixel values to $[0, 1]$, and evaluated $\lambda \in \{0.1, 1, 10\}$. The defense-unaware baseline optimized the patch against the undefended model using only the jailbreak objective. ASR was measured using the same three-vote judge as in the main experiments.

Table 14: ASR (↓) of defense-unaware and white-box defense-aware universal attacks on 100 HADES examples using LLaVA-1.5-7B.

Attack / Evaluation setting	ASR
Defense-unaware, without defense	79.0
Defense-unaware, with JRS-Rem	12.0
Defense-aware, $\lambda = 0.1$, with JRS-Rem	14.0
Defense-aware, $\lambda = 1$, with JRS-Rem	6.0
Defense-aware, $\lambda = 10$, with JRS-Rem	12.0

As shown in Table 14, the defense-aware attack achieves a maximum ASR of 14.0%, compared with 12.0% for the defense-unaware attack under JRS-Rem. These results show that explicitly optimizing against JRS-Rem provides only a limited advantage in this setting.

E Extended Discussion of Limitations

Generalization to text-only jailbreaks. JRS-Rem is designed to mitigate jailbreak behaviors arising from visual inputs by correcting image-induced representation shifts. Consequently, it does not explicitly target purely text-only jailbreak attacks. However, since the learned jailbreak direction characterizes the transition from refusal to jailbreak states in representation space, it may be possible to extend the framework to text-only scenarios by directly applying perturbations along this direction in language representations. We leave a systematic exploration of this extension to future work.

Evaluation scale of VLMs. In our experiments, JRS-Rem is evaluated on representative VLMs with up to 19B parameters. While the results show consistent effectiveness, the behavior of the method on significantly larger VLMs remains unverified. Further investigation is needed to assess scalability and robustness in more advanced large-scale settings.

Potential dual-use considerations. JRS-Rem identifies a jailbreak direction in the VLM's representation space and uses it to reduce harmful shifts. While we use this direction only for defense, knowing such a direction could in principle be used to design stronger attacks. Nevertheless, our goal is to better understand how VLM jailbreaks work and to build more reliable defenses. We believe that understanding such internal patterns is an important step toward developing more robust and reliable safety mechanisms. We hope that increased transparency in jailbreak mechanisms can ultimately contribute to strengthening defenses rather than facilitating misuse.

White-box access requirements. JRS-Rem requires access to intermediate hidden representations to estimate the jailbreak-related shift and apply the corresponding correction during inference. This requires control over the model's forward pass, so the method can be deployed by model providers or users running models locally. It cannot be directly applied through APIs that expose only model inputs and outputs. How to achieve similarly targeted interventions under restricted model access remains an open question for future work.

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