NOT ONLY REMEMBER, BUT ALSO FORGET: A MULTI-SCENARIO BENCHMARK FOR SELECTIVE FORGETTING IN PERSONALIZED AGENTS

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ABSTRACT

Personalized language agents rely on long-term memory to maintain user-specific knowledge across conversations. Real-world deployments demand not only reliable memory retention but also selective forgetting: upon user request or fact obsolescence, agents must suppress target information, keep semantically unrelated facts intact, block indirect inference-driven leakage, and stop outdated facts from steering downstream behavior. Existing evaluations emphasize recall accuracy and offer limited checks of retrieved evidence, indirect leakage, and residual behavioral influence, hiding critical safety flaws of memory systems. To fill this gap, we introduce MEMFORGET, a multi-scenario benchmark for selective forgetting in personalized agents. We design five realistic evaluation scenarios covering temporal updates, revoked preference decoupling, user-driven privacy erasure, value-aware discrimination between critical safety constraints and trivial history, and localized targeted forgetting. Uniquely, we conduct two-layer auditing: retrieved memory evidence and final agent answers. Dataset quality is guaranteed via rule-level checks, LLM-assisted filtering and manual human review. Across four language models and six memory agents, no system meets all forgetting requirements. Excluding deleted targets from retrieval outperforms answer-side filtering, especially on targeted forgetting and indirect privacy probes. Higher recall can increase leakage, while stronger deletion can damage critical or neighboring facts. Direct refusal can also coexist with indirect leakage. These findings reveal that selective forgetting constitutes a comprehensive system-level capability instead of an isolated local operation. MEMFORGET enables fine-grained diagnosis for future memory governance systems. The anonymized data and code are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/MEMFORGET-C927/.

1 INTRODUCTION

Personalized language agents are increasingly expected to maintain useful knowledge about users across extended interactions. They may use a dietary restriction when recommending a meal, adapt the tone of a document to a user's writing style, or revise a plan when a deadline or goal changes. These behaviors require information that is not contained in the current turn. An agent must accumulate evidence across prior conversations, preserve facts that remain useful, and make that information available at the right time. This requirement has motivated a growing body of work on long-term memory architectures, including reflective memories, importance- and recency-based storage, virtual context management, and structured memory for language agents (Park et al., 2023; Zhong et al., 2023; Packer et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 2026). Long-term memory is therefore becoming a basic component of personalized agents rather than an optional extension of the context window.

While long-term memory enables sustained personalization by retaining user knowledge over time, it also introduces a critical complementary requirement: memory systems cannot only store and recall information; they must also discard or suppress information once it becomes obsolete, incorrect, low-value, or explicitly withdrawn by users. As stale and low-value information accumulates, it degrades retrieval accuracy log-linearly toward chance levels, a bottleneck that resists prompt-engineering mitigations (Xie, 2026).

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

Figure 1: Five selective-forgetting scenarios in MEMFORGET. Each example shows the relevant memory, an update or forgetting requirement, and a later probe. Success requires using valid information, suppressing deleted targets and their influence, and preserving required non-target facts.

These demands call for selective forgetting, and reveal a gap in current evaluation practices. Existing studies on memory retention, privacy protection and forgetting mechanisms confirm that forgetting is a systemic memory management issue(Alqithami, 2025; Yang, 2026; Bagdasarian et al., 2024; Chu et al., 2024). Meanwhile, State-of-the-art benchmarks have substantially advanced the evaluation of long-term conversational memory, covering long-context reasoning, temporal updates, and memory-agent capabilities (Maharana et al., 2024; Wu et al., 2024; Uddin et al., 2026; Hu et al., 2025; Ma et al., 2025; Zheng et al., 2025). However, these benchmarks do not jointly answer five questions. First, does an explicitly forgotten fact still affect downstream behavior? Second, can low-value information be removed without sacrificing critical constraints? Third, is the target suppressed under both direct and transformed probes? Fourth, can the target leak through retrieval, summaries, or indirect reasoning? Fifth, are semantically related but non-target facts preserved? Without a unified evaluation standard, current systems often perform well on individual forgetting capabilities but fail comprehensively on others.

We address this gap with MEMFORGET, a multi-scenario benchmark for selective forgetting. We define selective forgetting as a joint constraint over target suppression, non-target retention, leakage resistance, downstream behavioral independence, and value-sensitive retention. As shown in Figure 1, we instantiate these requirements in five scenarios. **Temporal updates** test whether agents use current facts and suppress outdated values after an update. The agent should report the updated weekly food spending rather than the earlier total. **Revoked preference decoupling** tests whether a withdrawn preference stops shaping later decisions. After the user revokes a preference for Dario Argento's films, later movie recommendations should no longer be guided by that preference. **User-driven privacy erasure** tests whether deleted private values remain hidden under direct and indirect probes. The agent should neither disclose a deleted email address nor confirm properties of deleted credentials, such as their account format or password composition. **Value-aware discrimination** tests whether agents discard trivial history while preserving critical constraints. The agent should retain and apply the user's gluten-related dietary restriction when suggesting lunch, while discarding low-value exchanges about consumer devices. **Localized targeted forgetting** tests whether agents suppress a specified fact while retaining related non-target facts. The agent must forget the user's NeurIPS submission plan while preserving the research topic and use of Python.

Our evaluation of four language models and six memory agents identifies retrieval control as a central requirement for selective forgetting. Excluding deleted targets from retrieval is more effective than answer-side filtering. However, related memories can still reveal deleted information. Increas-

ing the retrieval budget can improve valid recall but also increase leakage, while low leakage can coincide with the loss of useful facts. These findings show that forgetting must be evaluated jointly with retention, using both retrieved evidence and downstream responses. Our contributions are:

- We define selective forgetting through joint requirements for target suppression, non-target retention, leakage resistance, and behavioral independence, including the preservation of critical constraints.
- We introduce MEMFORGET, a benchmark spanning five complementary forgetting scenarios and two audit layers: retrieval evidence and answer-level behavior.
- We provide an empirical analysis of four language models and six memory agents, and analyze how retrieval control and answer-side filtering affect forgetting across different tasks and probes.

2 Related Work

Long-term conversational memory supports personalization by preserving useful information across interactions. Existing approaches organize past experience through reflection, selective retention, and explicit context management (Park et al., 2023; Zhong et al., 2023; Packer et al., 2023). Their shared goal is to make relevant history available for future responses. Evaluation has developed around this goal, testing whether agents can recover facts and reason across extended conversations (Maharana et al., 2024; Wu et al., 2024). These advances establish how memory can support continuity over time. However, they pay less attention to when stored information should stop affecting future behavior.

Recent work has therefore expanded from memory retrieval to memory updates and forgetting. Knowledge-update tasks test whether agents use current facts when earlier information becomes outdated (Wu et al., 2024). Memora extends this direction by measuring both valid-information retention and stale-information suppression through FAMA (Uddin et al., 2026). Forgetting also appears as an explicit capability in MemoryAgentBench, while FiFA evaluates retention strategies against privacy, coherence, task completion, and cost (Hu et al., 2025; Alqithami, 2025).

Existing benchmarks advance the evaluation of memory update and forgetting, yet they suffer notable limitations. They mostly rely on final-answer correctness for assessment, which cannot distinguish distinct failure patterns: an agent may produce acceptable outputs while still retaining stale facts or letting revoked preferences govern downstream decisions. Moreover, they lack a unified protocol to jointly audit target suppression, non-target retention, leakage resistance, and behavioral independence. Most prior work only covers temporal-update cases and does not systematically test diverse real-world forgetting requirements such as preference revocation, privacy erasure, value-driven memory filtering, and localized targeted forgetting.

MEMFORGET brings these requirements into a shared evaluation protocol. It builds on Memora's temporal-update setting and FAMA metric, adds four scenarios covering stale-fact temporal updates, revoked preference decoupling, user-driven privacy erasure, value-aware discrimination, and localized targeted forgetting. This extends evaluation from whether an answer uses valid information to whether forgetting respects the requested scope and preserves useful memory.

3 The MEMFORGET

MEMFORGET evaluates selective forgetting across five scenarios: temporal updates, revoked preference decoupling, user-driven privacy erasure, value-aware discrimination, and localized targeted forgetting. The benchmark tests whether an agent can use updated information, remove revoked content, protect private information, retain important constraints, and forget a specific fact without affecting related facts. It covers weekly, monthly, and quarterly settings.

3.1 Design principles

MEMFORGET adopts persona-centered timelines. For dataset construction, we first manually write relevant facts based on each persona's profile. We then use templates and LLMs to create



Figure 2: Overall architecture of the five scenario data-construction processes. Each branch uses a shared intervention, probing, and scoring contract, while its target, probes, and expected evidence are scenario-specific.

corresponding probes, and leverage large language models to produce natural-language dialogues. Each dialogue turn is either memory-related or ordinary. We insert casual conversations between target events, preventing the agent from simply spotting a separate deletion snippet. All forgetting requests are standardized into clear instructions, and we verify their scope against the original event. The benchmark covers weekly, monthly, and quarterly time ranges. Figure 2 shows the overall data construction pipeline. Appendix Figure 7 displays the Critical, Privacy, Preference, and Targeted content used to build persona-based test cases. The dataset construction pipeline for each scenario is detailed in the subsections below.

3.2 Temporal Updates

This scenario tests whether the agent uses current facts after updates and suppresses outdated values. We reuse Memora's dynamic update setting and answer-side FAMA protocol. We add retrieval-side audits to distinguish valid recall from stale retrieval. Expected Recall@k measures retrieval of valid information, while Leakage@k measures retrieval of outdated or forgotten values.

3.3 Revoked Preference Decoupling

This scenario tests whether a preference continues to affect model behavior after the user explicitly requests to forget it. It covers recommendation, personalized writing, planning, and choice tasks. For recommendation tasks, we extract clear preference addition–deletion pairs from the Memora benchmark. For other tasks, we manually create persona-aligned preference lists. These lists cover writing style, such as tone, detail level, and rhetorical stance, as well as planning and choice content, such as itineraries, procurement, and option selection.

We generate each dialogue using a fixed setup. The original preference statement is inserted verbatim in a memory-relevant turn. A separate later turn contains a predefined forgetting instruction. We place casual conversational turns between the preference introduction and deletion. We then reorder and index all turns by time. We retain generated dialogues only if they meet three criteria: persona consistency, clear target specificity, and verbatim use of the original preference statement.

Large language models often have common default preferences. For example, they may use a formal style when drafting a letter to a teacher. Such defaults can hide the effect of forgetting and weaken evaluation sensitivity. To reduce this bias, we design less common but persona-consistent

preferences that differ from standard output patterns. These cases limit the effect of model priors, make forgetting-related behavior easier to detect, and improve evaluation validity and reliability.

3.4 User-driven privacy erasure

This scenario evaluates the model's ability to fully erase users' private information. We first generate factual data on many categories, such as credentials, payment identifiers, contact details, device identifiers, professional information, general financial attributes and health attributes. Each item is assigned a sensitivity level: extreme, high, or medium. In the dialogue, the user first discloses a sensitive value and later asks the model to forget that value while retaining unrelated context.

After each disclosure, we include a direct probe and an indirect probe. Direct probes ask the model to provide the value. Indirect probes seek confirmation through features such as identifier format, password character types, or partial checksum results.

3.5 Value-aware discrimination

This scenario tests whether a system can preserve high-value constraints while removing low-value historical information. We first manually construct critical cases covering allergies, medication constraints, safety requirements, privacy rules, and long-term dietary restrictions.

We build dialogues for critical cases from these items. Predefined facts are inserted verbatim into memory-related turns. The surrounding dialogue consists of casual conversations and contains no extra sensitive information. We assign timestamps to all conversations to create a complete timeline.

3.6 Localized targeted forgetting

This scenario tests whether the agent can forget one specified fact while retaining its neighbors. We first manually construct all targeted forgetting examples: one target fact to be deleted is specified, along with multiple neighboring facts that must be retained. Fact types include single attributes, events, numerical values, versioned facts, and entity-scoped facts.

We generate write dialogues from each case. In one session, the target fact and all neighboring facts are entered verbatim in separate memory-relevant interaction turns. We then generate a forget dialogue that names only the target fact. We fill the time gap with trivial turns and sort the full timeline by time.

3.7 Data quality and validation

The construction pipeline follows a **three-level quality gate**, combining rule-based checks, LLM-assisted validation, and human spot check. **Rule Check**: Rules verify schema, unique ID, date, references, event order, target identity, exact-value insertion, deletion scope, and the presence of expected evidence. **LLM Check**: The LLM validates whether generated dialogues are natural, executable and judgeable. **Human Spot Check**: Human reviewers examine boundary cases for three aspects: the clarity of deletion requests, the naturalness of interleaved timelines, and the consistency between scoring rules and intended behavior. We review all facts manually. We randomly select 40–50% of sessions and 30–40% of scored responses for a second review.

3.8 Dataset scale and persona reuse

The merged timelines contain 1,771, 6,420, and 20,233 conversations for the weekly, monthly, and quarterly settings, respectively (approximately 177, 642, and 2,023 conversations per persona). Figure 3 reports the QA coverage of the original Memora temporal-update benchmark and the four MEMFORGET extensions. The extension adds 548, 706, and 905 QA units beyond the original temporal benchmark in the weekly, monthly, and quarterly settings, respectively.



Figure 3: QA coverage across the weekly, monthly, and quarterly horizons. Gray bars show the original Memora temporal-update benchmark; green bars show the our scenario extensions. TIF = Temporal iterative forgetting; PD = Preference decoupling; PE = Privacy erasure; VAF = Value-aware forgetting; PTF = Precise targeted forgetting

4 Experiments

4.1 Experimental Setup

4.1.1 Systems and protocol

We compare two memory-processing strategies under the same persona timelines and probe sets. The first strategy uses full-context language models. The second uses long-term memory agents that write interactions, retrieve top-k entries, and generate answers from the retrieved context. The evaluation includes six long-term memory agents: A-Mem(Xu et al., 2025), LangMem(Team, 2025), Mem0(Chhikara et al., 2025), Nemori(Nan et al., 2025), AgentMemory(Yu et al., 2026) and MemOS(Li et al., 2025), together with four full-context language model baselines: Qwen3.7-Max, GLM-5.3, Minimax-M3, and Kimi-K2.6. All long-term memory agents adopt Qwen3.8-Max as the unified answer generation model.

4.1.2 Metrics

We use metrics whose direction is explicit, organized by evaluation setting. For **temporal updates**, we report FAMA (Forgetting-Aware Memory Accuracy) (Uddin et al., 2026) for compatibility with prior work, together with Expected Recall@k and Leakage@k. For **preference decoupling**, Behavioral Influence is a judge-based score in $[0, 1]$ measuring how strongly a deleted preference is reflected in a downstream response, and Behavioral Decoupling is its complement. For **sensitive-value erasure**, Direct Accuracy measures how often the system correctly withholds a deleted sensitive value on direct probes, Hidden Accuracy measures the same on hidden, semantically reformulated probes, and the Direct–Hidden Gap measures the drop between the two, quantifying how much more the value leaks under reformulation. For **value-sensitive forgetting**, Critical False Forget Rate measures failures to preserve critical facts, whereas Trivial Stale Retention Rate measures failures to remove low-value stale information. For **targeted forgetting**, Target Exposure Rate measures the proportion of probes that recover or reveal the target, and Neighbor-fact Retention Rate measures the proportion of required non-target questions answered correctly after target deletion.

4.1.3 Judging and statistics

Structured probes are scored as yes/no outcomes when the expected behavior is binary. Preference cases receive an influence score in $[0, 1]$. We use a frozen judge prompt, three judge models: GLM-5.2, Qwen3.7-Max, and Minimax-M3, for the calibration subset, and a human-reviewed audit set.

4.2 Results

4.2.1 Trade-offs Across Forgetting Tasks

No evaluated system consistently meets all forgetting requirements. The results also reveal a common weakness: deleted information can remain available to the answer model through retrieval. We first compare performance across tasks, then vary the retrieval budget and separate retrieval exposure from answer leakage. Finally, we test whether excluding targets from retrieval is more effective than filtering them during generation. Exact metric values are reported in Table 1.

Table 1: Summary of results across all five evaluation settings with retrieval topk = 30 and weekly evaluation period. Arrows indicate preferred direction: ↑ = higher better, ↓ = lower better. Metric abbreviations: Temporal updates: FAMA, ER (Expected Recall), RL (Retrieval Leakage); Revoked preference decoupling: RI (Residual Influence), BD (Behavioral Decoupling); User-driven privacy erasure: DA (Direct Accuracy), HA (Hidden Accuracy), DHG (Direct–Hidden Gap); Value-aware discrimination: CFF (Critical False-Forget), TSR (Trivial Stale-Retention); Localized targeted forgetting: TF (Target Forgetting), NR (Neighbor Retention).

System	Temporal			RevokeDecouple		PrivErase			ValDisc		LocForget	
	FAMA↑	ER↑	RL↓	RI↓	BD↑	DA↑	HA↑	DHG↓	CFF↓	TSR↓	TF↑	NR↑
A-Mem	52.60	37.80	69.00	44.40	55.60	89.00	54.90	34.10	5.00	100.00	5.00	97.67
LangMem	68.00	71.50	74.90	50.50	49.50	91.00	39.00	52.00	7.50	100.00	13.00	95.33
Mem0	28.10	29.70	38.60	5.90	94.10	91.00	89.00	2.00	61.70	88.00	15.00	30.00
MemOS	53.00	76.60	83.30	75.40	24.60	86.00	56.00	30.00	24.20	100.00	11.46	95.14
AgentMemory	55.90	58.00	79.80	37.20	62.80	60.00	29.00	31.00	9.20	100.00	2.00	100.00
Nemori	53.60	78.60	86.60	83.90	16.10	58.00	43.00	15.00	11.70	99.00	8.20	90.50
Qwen3.7-Max	21.10	46.60	36.30	88.90	11.10	98.00	81.00	17.00	13.30	99.00	17.78	81.48
GLM-5.3	24.40	54.80	45.60	87.80	12.20	97.00	83.00	14.00	14.20	100.00	16.67	82.72
MiniMax-M2	21.40	55.00	45.80	90.40	9.60	98.00	92.00	8.00	15.00	100.00	15.56	81.28
Kimi-K2.6	24.90	56.30	40.20	87.10	12.90	97.00	86.00	11.00	12.50	100.00	13.33	84.44

Temporal updates. Memory agents generally perform more effectively than full-context baselines in this setting. This suggests that explicit memory mechanisms help agents use historically valid information. But this advantage does not always come from well-controlled retrieval. Broad-recall systems such as LangMem and MemOS also retrieve more superseded content, so richer access to history does not ensure correct temporal selection. Mem0 suppresses obsolete information more effectively, but its lower recall and answer validity suggest that this gain partly comes from under-retrieval. For this reason, Temporal updates should not be judged by answer accuracy or leakage alone. It needs to be evaluated jointly through Expected Recall and Retrieval Leakage.

Revoked preference decoupling. Explicit memory systems are better than full-context baselines at preventing revoked preferences from continuing to drive downstream behavior. They usually show lower Residual Influence and higher Behavioral Decoupling. This suggests that explicit memory operations are useful for behavioral adaptation. Even so, their Residual Influence remains high relative to the ideal, especially for Nemori. This means the revoked preference can still affect later behavior through these associated traces even after the record itself is gone. A preference should therefore be considered forgotten only when it stops affecting later decisions, not simply because its record is absent.

User-driven privacy erasure. Direct-query performance overstates privacy protection. Most systems perform better on direct queries than on hidden semantic queries. LangMem, for example, achieves 91% direct accuracy but only 39% hidden accuracy. A system may refuse to repeat deleted private information but still confirm, reconstruct, or imply it after rephrasing. Memory agents also show a larger Direct–Hidden Gap, suggesting that apparent success on direct non-disclosure may hide substantial semantic leakage. Privacy evaluation should therefore include indirect confirmation, partial recovery, format inference, and semantic reformulation, rather than focus only on direct deletion queries. Effective erasure requires removing recoverable information, not merely hiding its explicit form.

Value-aware discrimination . The results show that memory agents struggle to distinguish low-value information from critical constraints. They often retain trivial obsolete content while forgetting or failing to apply information needed for safe and personalized behavior. Mem0 shows the opposite trade-off: more aggressive deletion reduces stale retention but may also increase the loss of critical information. Effective systems should assess the functional value of each memory, remove low-value history, and preserve constraints that remain relevant.

Localized targeted forgetting. Target suppression and neighboring-fact preservation are related but distinct goals. Some systems preserve surrounding context but continue to expose the target. Others suppress the target more effectively but cause substantial collateral loss. Therefore, a low target-



Figure 4: Top-k retrieval sensitivity for A-Mem and AgentMemory across the eight evaluation metrics, with $k \in \{5, 10, 15, 20\}$.

exposure rate alone does not demonstrate precise forgetting, and high neighboring-fact retention alone does not demonstrate successful deletion. Reliable targeted forgetting requires both removing the specified information and minimizing disruption to nearby memories that remain useful.

4.2.2 Top-k Retrieval Sensitivity

Figure 4 varies the retrieval budget from $k = 5$ to 20 for A-Mem and AgentMemory. Three patterns emerge that a single top-k setting would conceal. First, Larger budgets improve Expected Recall but also increase Retrieval Leakage and Residual Influence. The extra retrieved evidence leaks target information at least as fast as it recovers valid information. Second, Hidden-Inducement accuracy is non-monotonic. The Direct–Hidden Gap varies by tens of percentage points across retrieval budgets. Therefore, the same system may appear well calibrated at one setting but fail to protect privacy at another. Third, the two systems achieve similar FAMA scores across all k despite different recall and leakage profiles. This result shows why a single forgetting score can be misleading: similar scores may result from different failure modes.

4.2.3 Retrieval Exposure and Answer Leakage

As shown in Figure 5, **Case A** (retrieval leakage, orange) dominates forgetting failures across nearly all agents and five evaluation scenarios, which confirms that most failures arise when forbidden facts are successfully retrieved. **Case B** (retrieved-but-refused, blue) is widely observed, especially in the temporal validity and sensitive-value erasure tasks. It shows that LLMs can sometimes suppress explicit leakage even when the target fact has been retrieved. High-risk **Case C** (parametric/derived leakage, red) appears sparsely overall but spikes sharply for Mem0 in value-sensitive and targeted forgetting, indicating strong inference-based leakage in hard deletion tasks. **Case D** (true forgetting, green) is rare for most systems and only prominent for Mem0 under preference decoupling. Collectively, this breakdown reveals two types of forgetting defects: retrieval leakage and inference-driven derived leakage, where the latter cannot be solved merely by removing targets from the retrieved memory.

4.2.4 Retrieval-Side Exclusion vs. Answer-Side Filtering

The preceding analysis reveals that forgetting failures stem from insufficient retrieval filtering or model inference leakage. To clarify the performance gap between target removal in the retrieval phase and post-processing filtering relying only on the answer LLM, we evaluate two forgetting strategies, as shown in Figure 6. In the first strategy, target memories are marked as deleted and excluded from retrieval (WT). In the second, retrieved content remains unchanged, and the answer-side LLM identifies and filters the targets (GT). Under WT, all four metrics remain high and stable across the three answer models. Under GT, all metrics decline, but not to the same extent. The largest losses occur on the most difficult probes: target forgetting and hidden-inducement accuracy approach zero for all three models. Direct-query performance declines less but still worsens, while behavioral decoupling varies across models. These results show that retrieval-stage deletion serves



Figure 5: Breakdown of forgetting failure modes across six memory agents over five evaluation scenarios. Each probe sample is categorized into four disjoint cases: (A) retrieval leakage, where the target fact is retrieved and the model leaks it in response; (B) retrieved-but-refused, where the target fact is retrieved yet the generation stage suppresses leakage; (C) parametric/derived leakage, where the target fact is *not* retrieved but the model still infers and leaks the target from correlated memory or model internal knowledge; (D) true forgetting, where the target is neither retrieved nor leaked. The vertical axis denotes the percentage of total probe instances for each agent.



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Figure 6: Performance under different forgetting positions using three distinct answer models, comparing two forgetting strategies: retrieval-side target deletion and answer-LLM post-hoc filtering.

as a reliable intervention. In contrast, answer-side filtering works only for simple direct queries and fails against rephrased or inference-based probes.

5 Conclusion

We introduced MEMFORGET, a benchmark for selective forgetting across five scenarios, with audits of retrieved evidence and final answers. Across the five scenarios and evaluations of four language models and six memory agents, we identify three broader findings. **Forgetting requires retrieval-side control.** Excluding deleted targets from retrieval outperforms answer-side filtering across the tested answer models. Filtering alone fails on targeted forgetting and indirect privacy probes. Yet target exclusion does not prevent all leakage, since related memories can still support recovery. **Suppression and retention must be evaluated jointly.** Larger retrieval budgets increase valid recall but also increase leakage and the influence of revoked preferences. Lower leakage can instead reflect under-retrieval and coincide with the loss of critical or neighboring facts. No evaluated system consistently balances suppression and retention. **Aggregate scores can conceal distinct failure modes.** Similar aggregate scores can reflect different recall and leakage profiles. Direct refusal can also coexist with indirect disclosure. Evaluation must jointly test target suppression, non-target retention, leakage resistance, and behavioral independence across retrieval budgets. These findings support retrieval-side control, combined with checks for indirect leakage and the loss of useful memory.

AI use statement

Generative AI tools were used to assist with language editing, outline development, and code or experiment documentation. They were not used to fabricate results, make final scientific judgments, or replace author verification; these tasks were performed by the authors or are not applicable to this work. The authors reviewed all AI-assisted material, verified the reported results against the

underlying experiment logs, checked citations, and take responsibility for the final contents, claims, and artifacts.

Ethics statement

The benchmark is intended to evaluate memory safety and controllability. Its sensitive facts are synthetic, and its privacy probes are released with safeguards that prevent direct use for recovering real credentials or personal information. The benchmark does not claim to provide a formal privacy guarantee or to establish physical deletion from model parameters.

Reproducibility statement

The benchmark release includes persona timelines, case-generation templates, probe definitions, scoring rubrics, judge prompts, system configuration files, software versions, and evaluation scripts. The main paper reports sample counts and aggregation units, while the appendix provides the full data schema, filtering rules, additional confidence intervals, and judge–human agreement. Because the benchmark compares external systems whose APIs and memory policies change over time, each reported result is accompanied by an evaluation date and a reproducible configuration snapshot.

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A Additional Benchmark Details

This appendix provides supplementary details on the fact inventory, the per-metric uncertainty profiles behind the main-text point estimates, and the probe-level Pass/Partial/Fail distributions.

A.1 Fact Inventory Composition

MemForgetBench is built upon a structured multi-category fact inventory covering realistic personal-information types and forgetting requirements. Figure 7 summarizes the hierarchical fact families across four core content domains: Critical, Privacy, Preference, and Targeted.

The *Critical* domain contains six subcategories of high-stakes information that must survive forgetting operations reliably: allergies, chronic conditions, medication contraindications, safety rules, privacy rules, and dietary restrictions. These facts represent hard functional constraints and form the foundation for value-selective forgetting evaluation.

The *Privacy* domain is stratified into three sensitivity tiers:

Critical	Allergy	1) peanut 2) latex 3) nickel 4) dust mite 5) fragrance 6) pollen 7) penicillin 8) tree nuts (almond/cashew) 9) art solvents (turpentine) 10) sulfa 11) bee/wasp sting 12) sesame 13) mango
	Chronic	1) migraine 2) lower back pain 3) dry eye 4) tension headache 5) vocal fatigue/strain 6) hypertension 7) insomnia 8) carpal tunnel 9) neck/shoulder tension 10) anxiety 11) GI issues 12) leg fatigue (flights)
	Contraind.	1) avoid NSAIDs/ibuprofen 2) avoid first-gen sedating antihistamines 3) avoid pseudoephedrine decongestants 4) avoid codeine 5) caution on tremor-risk medications 6) avoid work-hour sedatives / sleep aids
	Safety	1) confined-space / hazardous lab only with training & PPE 2) IRB for human subjects 3) no unsafe production DB writes 4) no hardcoded secrets 5) asset licensing required 6) lawful basis for customer data 7) legal review for major contracts 8) no MNPI leaks 9) dual controls for financial data 10) no insider trading 11) authorized sales commitments only 12) client confidentiality 13) fund agreements with counsel 14) conflict-of-interest clearance 15) no plagiarism / defamation
	Privacy rule	1) never store passport/IDs/full account numbers 2) participant PII 3) SSH/API/DB passwords 4) source-code secrets & customer PII 5) client emails/phones/purchase history 6) partner undisclosed terms 7) undisclosed earnings/M&A 8) executive private contacts 9) unreleased designs 10) identifiable client photos 11) bank/tax IDs 12) proprietary models/forecasts 13) sales pipeline 14) funding/cap table 15) user payments/behavior 16) firm methodology 17) anonymous sources 18) unpublished content strategy
	Diet	1) vegetarian 2) vegan 3) lactose intolerant 4) mushroom aversion 5) no alcohol 6) no red meat 7) no caffeine 8) gluten-free (celiac)
Privacy	Extreme	1) portal passwords (LDAP, PostgreSQL, HubSpot, board portal, Adobe, Bloomberg, Salesforce, AWS, data room, WordPress) 2) API tokens (GitHub PAT, AWS secret, Meta Ads, Salesforce/Figma/Bloomberg/Stripe/WordPress) 3) OTP / 2FA codes 4) full bank card number 5) CVV 6) payment account IDs (ACCT-...) 7) wallet private keys 8) 12-word seed phrases 9) document signing keys (SIGN-...) 10) Alipay / WeChat Pay account + password
	High	1) passport + national ID / license / SSN 2) badge/ID photo filename + fingerprint enrollment ID 3) work email + alias/backup 4) Twitter/GitHub/Instagram/LinkedIn handle + platform UID 5) employee ID + office address + frequented GPS 6) laptop serial + MAC + phone IMEI 7) platform UIDs (ORCID, Jira, HubSpot, Workday, Adobe/Figma, Bloomberg/FactSet)
	Medium	1) legal full name 2) DOB 3) gender 4) ethnicity 5) role / company / degree 6) mild conditions & meds (e.g., sertraline, artificial tears, sumatriptan) 7) monthly/annual pay 8) savings 9) debt 10) teammate phone 11) recent searches 12) private note filenames
Preference	Writing	1) verbose abstracts before results 2) blunt student feedback 3) first-person strategy memos (not KPIs) 4) long narrative investor updates 5) no SEO keywords/headings 6) slang/meme LinkedIn posts 7) legalistic pitch scripts 8) literal category+price slogans 9) emoji-casual audit emails 10) story variance memos 11) apologetic SOAs 12) verbose workshop prose 13) academic brand guidelines 14) promo emails with no CTA 15) one-line blunt cold email 16) self-blame lost-deal notes 17) morale-only incident postmortems 18) hype READMEs 19) passive outage apologies 20) failure-heavy monthly updates
	Plan/choice	1) tourist-mindset leisure 2) max-performance laptops (ignore battery/weight) 3) unproven startup vendors 4) cheapest hostels 5) free-tier writing tools 6) niche low-reach platforms 7) theme-park inspiration trips 8) cheapest free fonts 9) highest-growth bets (ignore downside) 10) free public data only 11) anecdote-only diagnosis 12) cheapest multi-stop flights 13) single-channel full budget (no A/B) 14) no-attribution channels 15) cheapest fast-food client entertainment 16) lowest-discount negotiation 17) skip security/security review 18) cheapest cloud/spot for production 19) cheapest offshore engineering 20) nightlife cities for fundraising roadshows
Targeted	Morphology	1) Attribute: delete venue/tool/metric/role/sector; keep budget, collaborators, toolchain, schedule 2) Event: delete one-time acts (interviewed/submitted/rejected/met); keep topic & milestones 3) Value: delete one number ($/%/headcount/version/quota/latency); keep other quantities/qualities 4) Versioned: delete current-is-X / upgraded-to-Y; keep product name, other roadmap items, review cadence 5) Entity-scoped: delete one fact about a client/repo/collaborator; keep neighbors or other entities intact

Figure 7: Diversity of the fact inventory across Critical, Privacy, Preference, and Targeted scenarios, showing fact families and representative numbered content samples used to construct persona-conditioned dialogues and probes.

- *Extreme*: high-risk credentials including portal passwords, API tokens, 2FA codes, full payment-card details, and cryptographic keys.
- *High*: personally identifiable information such as government IDs, contact details, device identifiers, and platform account UIDs.
- *Medium*: demographic attributes, employment metadata, mild health conditions, and aggregated financial figures.

The *Preference* domain consists of two user-preference classes: writing-style preferences (tone, structure, rhetorical stance) and planning-and-choice preferences (itineraries, product selection, decision heuristics). All test preferences are intentionally designed to diverge from generic model priors, improving discriminability of forgetting effects.

The *Targeted* domain defines five morphological deletion types for precise-editing evaluation: attribute-level, event-level, value-level, versioned, and entity-scoped deletions. Each type explicitly specifies the target for removal together with neighboring facts that must be preserved.

All facts are manually curated and aligned to persona profiles for semantic consistency, and are inserted verbatim into dialogue timelines during dataset construction.

A.2 Per-Metric Performance Profiles with Uncertainty

Table 1 in the main paper reports aggregated weekly performance. Figure 8 provides the corresponding per-metric system profiles with means and 95% confidence intervals computed across personas. The panels cover all core metrics from the five scenarios: temporal update recall and leakage, preference residual influence, neighbor-fact retention for targeted forgetting, direct and hidden accuracy for privacy erasure, as well as critical false-forget and trivial stale-retention rates for value-selective forgetting.

Memory agents are plotted on the left of each sub-panel and full-context model baselines on the right. The confidence intervals quantify variance across persona instances and supply the uncertainty background for the main-text point estimates. Full monthly- and quarterly-horizon profiles are omitted from the main manuscript due to space constraints and are released alongside the benchmark artifacts.



Figure 8: Per-metric system profiles with means and 95% confidence intervals across personas. Memory agents are shown on the left and model baselines on the right. This appendix figure provides the uncertainty view behind the aggregate values in Table 1.

A.3 Probe-Level Pass/Partial/Fail Distributions

Figure 9 presents 100% stacked bar charts of Pass/Partial/Fail outcomes across probe categories for each scenario. This granular probe-level decomposition complements the aggregated metric results in Table 1.

- *Temporal updates*: contrasts probes targeting facts that should remain present (current valid knowledge) against facts that should be absent (superseded stale content).
- *Revoked preference decoupling*: outcomes after explicit preference revocation; yellow Partial segments mark instances where residual-influence scores fall between 0.2 and 0.6, representing neither complete behavioral decoupling nor full retention of old preferences.
- *User-driven privacy erasure*: separates direct-probe performance from hidden-inducement-probe performance, illustrating the gap between explicit non-disclosure and robustness against indirect inference.
- *Value-aware discrimination*: compares retention behavior for trivial disposable information versus high-priority critical constraints.
- *Localized targeted forgetting*: overall pass rates for targeted-deletion probes, where success requires both suppression of the target fact and preservation of neighboring facts.

These distributions reveal scenario-specific failure patterns. For instance, privacy-erasure systems often perform well on direct queries but exhibit substantial leakage under hidden probes.



Figure 9: Percentage of Pass/Fail for different probes across scenarios (100% stacked). For Preference Decoupling, yellow segments denote Partial cases where the influence score of recommendation tasks after deletion ranges from 0.2 to 0.6, indicating neither sufficient forgetting nor full retention of old preferences.

B Diagnostic Analyses

This section complements the main-text Results with three finer-grained diagnostics: the retrieval-versus-answer decomposition of leakage, the sensitivity of forgetting metrics to the top-k retrieval budget, and the add–delete causal framing of preference influence.

B.1 Degradation Over Longer Horizons

As shown in Figure 10, long-term memory agents exhibit a consistent degradation pattern as interactions extend from weekly to monthly and quarterly horizons. First, recall performance declines over time. Lower retrieval leakage does not necessarily indicate effective forgetting; it often reflects weakened retrieval caused by memory accumulation rather than controllable memory suppression. Second, residual interference remains substantial. Revoked preferences continue to influence responses, indicating that outdated memory is not fully decoupled from current behavior. Third, privacy-erasure performance weakens over longer horizons. As direct-query accuracy drops and the direct–hidden accuracy gap narrows, the risk of implicit leakage increases. Finally, selective memory management remains fragile. Agents often forget critical information while retaining trivial details, and targeted forgetting is still imprecise. Overall, the main limitation of current long-term memory agents is weak memory governance over extended horizons: they struggle to decouple stale information, assess importance, and perform precise memory edits.

B.2 Failure Modes

The benchmark yields four actionable failure modes: stale retention after an update, incomplete deletion of the target, collateral deletion of neighboring facts, and behavioral residue after explicit forgetting. The system-level comparison in Table 1 exposes these failure modes directly: high recall can coincide with high leakage, and high target forgetting can coincide with poor neighbor retention. For example, Nemori combines high temporal recall with high retrieval leakage. Mem0 shows lower leakage but also lower recall and weaker retention of neighboring facts. These comparisons illustrate why leakage must be assessed together with useful memory retention.



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Figure 10: Overall performance trends of long-term memory agents across weekly(W), monthly(M), and quarterly(Q) interaction horizons.