# GENLOCK: TOWARDS MULTIMODAL CONJUNCTIVE BACKDOORS IN LARGE VISION–LANGUAGE MODELS

**Anonymous authors**
Paper under double-blind review




**Figure 1:** The top panel illustrates conjunctive backdoor activation; the bottom panel shows LLaVA-1.5 results. High joint activation can coexist with single-key leakage and degraded task answers. GenLock combines high joint activation with low leakage and strong task-answer retention. ASR and stripped POPE F1 use zoomed axes.

## ABSTRACT

Large vision–language models (LVLMs) have seen rapid adoption across diverse domains, yet reliance on third-party adaptations introduces severe backdoor risks. In context-dependent scenarios, an adversary requires backdoor activation to occur strictly when a designated visual cue and question co-occur, preventing premature exposure under isolated conditions while retaining benign task answers. However, existing multimodal backdoors readily degenerate into single-modality shortcuts and disrupt task utility once activated. We present GenLock to realize covert targeted backdoors with interpretable multimodal conjunctive control. Our analysis shows that high joint activation often masks single-key shortcuts, and short payload prefixes can trigger payload continuation even when a key is absent. GenLock enforces joint dependency throughout generation via a ReLU-gated visual adapter alongside a Dual-Key Interaction Contrastive Loss, while Payload–Utility Decoupled Training safeguards host task utility through span-balanced supervision. Across five LVLM backends, GenLock is the only approach maintaining over 90% selectivity at near-clean utility. On LLaVA-1.5, joint activation reaches 100.00% with a worst-single-key leakage of only 0.33%. Conditioned on the initial payload token, full-sequence contrastive control slashes worst-single-key leakage from 83.92% to 0.42%, supporting conditional control throughout generation. GenLock also exhibits the highest attack survival (80%+) across most evaluated input-side defenses, establishing a controlled red-team benchmark for multimodal safety.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Large vision–language models (LVLMs) (Liu et al., 2023; 2024) are shared as third-party artifacts—full checkpoints, instruction-tuning recipes, and parameter-efficient updates such as adapters, prefix



Reviewers: please read the Reviewer Guidelines (iclr.cc/Conferences/2027/ReviewerGuidelines) and the AI Policy for Reviewers (iclr.cc/Conferences/2027/AIPolicyForReviewers). If you used AI to expand, edit, or polish your review, please provide the input text to the LLM. Better still, consider skipping the LLM and submitting your original text: we, and the authors, are much more interested in your unedited thoughts than in what an LLM has to say. AI-assisted or not, you are putting your name and reputation behind your review: LLM-generated falsehoods, hallucinations or misrepresentations are subject to disciplinary action, which may include desk-rejecting all papers you have authored.

tuning, and LoRA (Houlsby et al., 2019; Li and Liang, 2021; Hu et al., 2022). Users adopt such artifacts to customize models for their own tasks. A malicious publisher can meet these needs while planting a backdoor that leaves ordinary behavior untouched. To avoid premature exposure, it inserts attacker-chosen text only in a designated image–question context (Dong et al., 2025; Sun et al., 2025).

However, existing backdoor methods fall short of the stealth required in realistic deployment settings. For example, Figure 1 illustrates a financial-report scenario in which the attacker wants a chosen recommendation inserted only when a designated visual cue and question phrase co-occur. Premature insertion under either cue alone exposes the backdoor, while failing to answer the user's question also reveals that the model has been compromised. We therefore study **covert targeted backdoors in LVLMs**, defined by the combination of selective activation, retained task utility, and suppressed unintended exposure.

We analyze existing approaches and find that dual-key constraints in the training targets do not ensure image–text conjunction during generation. Either modality can become a shortcut, causing unintended single-key activation. Dual-key targets alone do not determine which cues the model uses: shared-parameter updates that strengthen joint-key payload support can also strengthen it under missing keys. GenLock uses a **ReLU-gated visual residual** at the projection layer whose inactive branch is locally insensitive to updates of gate-dependent parameters. Gate supervision encourages inputs without the visual key to occupy this inactive region. Across four matched key combinations, **Dual-Key Interaction Contrastive Loss** rewards a larger text-key gain in complete-payload support when the visual key is present than when it is absent. High joint-key and low missing-key score targets specify the activation pattern, while residual-off penalties discourage joint-key support that bypasses the gated residual. These objectives score the complete payload because suppressing its first token alone can leave a highly probable suffix once that token is supplied. **Payload–Utility Decoupled Training** decouples supervision for payload insertion and task answering to stabilize joint training.

Across five LVLM backends, GenLock is the only evaluated method with selectivity above $90\%$ on every backend while maintaining near-clean utility. Prefix interventions reveal leakage that ordinary activation tests miss: with the first payload token supplied, complete-sequence control reduces worst-single-key leakage from $83.92\%$ to $0.42\%$. GenLock also retains useful task answers after activation and achieves the highest attack survival under most evaluated input-side defenses.

Overall, our contributions are to formulate covert conjunctive backdoors with retained task answers, develop GenLock through theoretical analyses of gating and sequence learning, and ultimately establish a controlled red-team benchmark for evaluating defenses against conjunctive backdoors.

## 2 Related Work

### 2.1 Parameter-efficient adaptation

Parameter-efficient adaptation customizes pretrained models by updating a small subset of parameters or introducing compact trainable components (Ben Zaken et al., 2022; Liu et al., 2022). Representative approaches include adapters (Houlsby et al., 2019), prefix tuning (Li and Liang, 2021), and low-rank adaptation (LoRA) (Hu et al., 2022). These methods provide lightweight alternatives to full fine-tuning, but also offer a technical route for implanting model backdoors.

### 2.2 Backdoor attacks and defenses in VLMs

Backdoor attacks on generative VLMs manipulate model responses through attacker-chosen inputs (Yin et al., 2025). TrojVLM studies target-text insertion with a semantic-preserving objective, while VL-Trojan targets multimodal instruction tuning (Lyu et al., 2024; Liang et al., 2025). Other studies explore out-of-distribution poisoning, domain shift, test-time triggers, and token-level control (Lyu et al., 2025; Liang et al., 2024; Lu et al., 2024; Yuan et al., 2025). Attacks on instruction tuning, plugins, and adaptation artifacts further expose risks in third-party model customization (Zhang et al., 2024; Dong et al., 2025; Yan et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2026b).

Among input-side defenses, ONION filters suspicious words (Qi et al., 2021), LETHE supplies external knowledge (Chen et al., 2026a), and ToT and JailGuard audit responses to input perturba-

tions (Rong et al., 2026; Zhang et al., 2025). Our benchmark evaluates these input-side defenses against targeted insertion that preserves task answers.

### 2.3 Conjunctive triggers and modality shortcuts

Dual-Key VQA studies image–question trigger conjunctions in traditional VQA models and shows that the question trigger can dominate while the visual trigger is ignored (Walmer et al., 2022). In generative VLMs, BackdoorVLM likewise observes that text often dominates image triggers in bimodal backdoors (Li et al., 2025). Further studies also explore this area (Huang et al., 2024; Han et al., 2024). GenLock examines conjunctive control throughout target generation, including whether missing-key conditions continue to suppress the target after a payload prefix is supplied.

## 3 Threat Model and Behavioral Goal

We consider a malicious third-party adaptation of a trusted LVLM (Sun et al., 2025; Dong et al., 2025). The attacker controls adaptation data, added modules, and optimization, then distributes the update. The primary LLaVA-1.5 realization trains a projector residual adapter together with decoder LoRA; the vision encoder, original projector, base decoder weights, and evaluation decoding policy remain fixed. The attacker declares a bounded digital visual transform $\mathcal{T}_V$, a fixed-phrase text transform $\mathcal{T}_T$, and a target token sequence $P$.

For a source $\xi = (x, q, y)$ containing an image, question, and task answer, key presence gives

$$Z_{vt}(\xi) = \big(\mathcal{T}_V^v(x), \mathcal{T}_T^t(q)\big), \qquad v, t \in \{0, 1\}, \tag{1}$$

The four cells are $Q_{00}$ (clean), $Q_{10}$ (visual only), $Q_{01}$ (text only), and $Q_{11}$ (joint). Let $p_{vt}$ denote the probability that the generated response contains $P$ under the specified matching rule. The ideal **strict dual-key** rule is $p_{11} = 1$ and $p_{00} = p_{10} = p_{01} = 0$. We also consider two stealth objectives: payload-prefix leakage $\ell(s) = \max_{v+t<2} p_{vt}(s)$ and post-payload utility preservation. Section 6 specifies the evaluation of these two objectives.

## 4 Theoretical Analysis of Conditional Control

**Local condition separation.** Increasing the payload probability under joint keys through shared parameters may also increase it under missing keys. We examine whether this coupling of updates can be separated locally. Consider a ReLU-gated residual $r_\vartheta$ in the visual projection, with pre-activation $u_\vartheta$, and a compact set $\mathcal{Z}_0$ of visual-key-absent representations. Let $\vartheta$ contain only the gate-dependent parameters, with all other parameters fixed. Theorem 1 (Appendix A.2) gives

$$\begin{aligned} &\sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} \max_j u_{\vartheta,j}(z) \le -m < 0 \\ \Longrightarrow \quad &\exists\, \mathcal{N}_\vartheta :\ r_{\vartheta'}(z) = r_\vartheta(z), \quad \forall z \in \mathcal{Z}_0,\ \vartheta' \in \mathcal{N}_\vartheta. \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Here $\mathcal{N}_\vartheta$ is a parameter neighborhood. This invariance removes the payload-score gradients of the two visual-key-absent cells with respect to the gate parameters, reducing interaction optimization to the joint versus visual-only contrast. The effect of shared parameters can thus be locally confined to a subset of inputs; the remaining separation concerns the text conditions on visually keyed inputs. This provides a structural decomposition of joint activation and missing-key suppression.

**Onset and continuation.** This conditional comparison also depends on response history. For the same input, the probability of beginning the payload can differ substantially from that of completing it after its opening is supplied. At a fixed response prefix $C$, the path probability of $P = (p_1, \ldots, p_L)$ satisfies (Appendix A.6)

$$\begin{aligned} p_\theta(P \mid Z_{vt}, C) &= \underbrace{p_\theta(p_1 \mid Z_{vt}, C)}_{\rho_{vt}} \underbrace{p_\theta(p_{2:L} \mid Z_{vt}, C, p_1)}_{H_{vt}}, \\ \rho_{vt} \to 0 \ &\not\Rightarrow\ H_{vt} \to 0. \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

A low complete-payload path probability can arise primarily from onset suppression while the suffix-completion probability remains close to one. Once the opening is supplied, that onset suppression no longer participates in suffix completion. Similar payload-path probabilities can therefore correspond to substantially different prefix-leakage risks. The prefix-leakage and cross-payload experiments further demonstrate this distinction (Section 6.3; Appendix I.2).

**Supervision allocated to the payload and answer.** Within the complete response, the payload and original answer share a sequence loss. Ordinary sequence averaging allocates supervision in proportion to span length: even with the answer unchanged, lengthening the payload reduces the answer's relative weight. Appendix A.7 proves that equal token weights within each span and fixed total span weights uniquely determine

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L}_{\text{span}} &= \frac{\eta_P}{L_P}\sum_{j\in\mathcal{P}}\ell_j + \frac{\eta_A}{L_A}\sum_{j\in\mathcal{A}}\ell_j \\ &= \eta_P\bar{\ell}_P + \eta_A\bar{\ell}_A,\end{aligned} \qquad \begin{cases} w_P = \dfrac{\eta_P}{L_P}, \\ w_A = \dfrac{\eta_A}{L_A}. \end{cases} \tag{4}$$

The supervision tradeoff between payload insertion and answer retention can thus be set independently of the two span lengths.

## 5 GenLock: Conditional Generative Adaptation

GenLock couples conjunctive payload insertion with task answering (Figure 2). We first specify the desired behavior across matched inputs, then describe how the visual residual and sequence objectives learn this dependence.




**Figure 2:** The GenLock pipeline. Teal and purple mark the visual and text keys; orange and blue distinguish the payload and task answer. Snowflakes and flames denote frozen and trainable components. Solid arrows trace the forward path, while dashed links connect the training objectives to the components they supervise.

### 5.1 Matched four-cell supervision

We specify the activation range through four views of the same task source $(x_i, q_i, y_i) \in \mathcal{D}$:

$$\begin{aligned} Q_{00} &: (x_i, q_i) \mapsto y_i, & Q_{01} &: (x_i, \mathcal{T}_T(q_i)) \mapsto y_i, \\ Q_{10} &: (\mathcal{T}_V(x_i), q_i) \mapsto y_i, & Q_{11} &: (\mathcal{T}_V(x_i), \mathcal{T}_T(q_i)) \mapsto g_P(y_i). \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Here $g_P$ inserts the declared payload while retaining the answer target. The shared source holds the task fixed as the keys change; missing-key targets prevent either cue from being rewarded as sufficient on its own. Equal-quadrant sampling exposes all four roles throughout training. Appendix B details the cached digital visual transform used to improve visual-key robustness.

### 5.2 A gated visual residual

Matched targets specify the desired outputs, but shared parameter updates can still increase payload support in missing-key cells. GenLock adds a **ReLU-gated residual** alongside the frozen projector $M_0$. For patch features $z$ from the frozen visual encoder:

$$\begin{aligned} u_\phi(z) &= W_d z + b_d + b_\phi(z), & a_\phi(z) &= [u_\phi(z)]_+, \\ \delta_\phi(z) &= \text{Bound}(W_u a_\phi(z) + b_u)\,, & \widetilde{M}(z) &= M_0(z) + \delta_\phi(z). \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

Gate supervision encourages visual-key-absent inputs to lie in the inactive ReLU region. Under the local closure conditions in Section 4, updates to gate-dependent parameters leave this branch unchanged on those inputs. Appendix C specifies the feature-conditioned bias $b_\phi$, residual bounds, and gate supervision.

### 5.3 PAYLOAD ONSET AND SEQUENCE SUPPORT

**Choosing when to begin.** For visually keyed inputs, payload onset should depend on whether the text key is also present. Single-Key Suppression (SKS) uses the onset probability $\rho$ from Equation 3 to penalize onset in both single-key cells. The Dual-Key Margin (DKM) imposes a margin $m_D$ between missing-key onset and a joint-key reference:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{SKS}} = \mathbb{E}_{i \in Q_{10}}[-\log(1-\rho_{10,i})] + \omega_T \mathbb{E}_{i \in Q_{01}}[-\log(1-\rho_{01,i})], \tag{7}$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{DKM}} = \mathbb{E}_{\substack{r \in \{00,10,01\} \\ i \in Q_r}}[\rho_{r,i} - \overline{\rho}_{11} + m_D]_+. \tag{8}$$

Here $\overline{\rho}_{11}$ is the average joint-key onset probability, estimated from the current batch when available and its exponential moving average otherwise. Appendices A.6 and D provide the onset bounds and accompanying token-level terms.

**Keeping the complete payload conditional.** Low onset probability can coexist with strong suffix support once the initial token is supplied. **Dual-Key Interaction Contrastive Loss (DKICL)** therefore compares complete-payload scores at a common response boundary. Let $\mu_{vt}$ denote mean per-token payload log-likelihood under matched response histories. The four-cell interaction $\Delta_\wedge = (\mu_{11} - \mu_{10}) - (\mu_{01} - \mu_{00})$ measures how much the text key's gain increases when the visual key is present; additive single-key effects cancel.

To identify the visual residual's contribution, we compare it active and clamped to zero at the same parameter state:

$$\begin{aligned} G^P_{vt} &= \mu^{\mathrm{on}}_{vt} - \mu^{\mathrm{off}}_{vt}, \\ \Gamma^P_A &= G^P_{11} - G^P_{10} - G^P_{01} + G^P_{00} = \Delta^{\mathrm{on}}_\wedge - \Delta^{\mathrm{off}}_\wedge. \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

$G^P_{11}$ measures the residual's contribution to joint-key payload support, whereas $\Gamma^P_A$ compares that contribution across all four cells. Equal residual gains across the four cells cancel in $\Gamma^P_A$. Under the local closure conditions, its gradient with respect to gate-dependent parameters reduces to that of $\mu^{\mathrm{on}}_{11} - \mu^{\mathrm{on}}_{10}$, directing these updates toward the text-key distinction within visually keyed inputs. We optimize:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{DKICL}} = \lambda_I \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{DKI}} + \lambda_A \,\mathrm{softplus}(m_A - \widehat{\Gamma}^P_A) + \lambda_S \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{shortcut}}. \tag{10}$$

$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{DKI}}$ combines an interaction margin with high-score targets for joint keys and low-score targets for missing keys: a relative contrast alone does not fix these absolute levels. The second term increases the residual's contribution to that interaction. $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{shortcut}}$ suppresses visual-only payload support and joint-key support that survives with the residual disabled, discouraging both visual-only activation and reliance on a route that bypasses this residual. Appendix D specifies the smooth objectives and running-reference estimator.

### 5.4 DECOUPLED PAYLOAD AND ANSWER SUPERVISION

The conditional-control objectives govern payload support; the joint-key target must also retain the task answer. **Payload–Utility Decoupled Training (PUDT)** decouples supervision for these two spans to stabilize joint training. Following the span-weighting analysis in Section 4, it computes their mean cross-entropies separately and assigns independent weights:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{PUDT}} = \eta_P \mathbb{E}_{i \in Q_{11}} \mathrm{CE}_{\mathcal{P}_i}(p_\theta, P) + \eta_A \mathbb{E}_{i \in Q_{11}} \mathrm{CE}_{\mathcal{A}_i}(p_\theta, y_i). \tag{11}$$

Separate normalization makes each span's assigned weight independent of its length, while both losses jointly train the same model.

Together, these objectives train conjunction-dependent payload support while keeping the original answer as a target in every cell, including the activated one.

## 6 EXPERIMENTS

Our experiments ask whether GenLock confines activation to the intended inputs, resists unintended payload continuation, and retains the task answer. Component tests connect these behaviors to input separation and sequence support.

**Training and evaluation cohorts.** All five backends draw image–instruction sources from the LLaVA-1.5 665K instruction-tuning mixture (Liu et al., 2024). GenLock uses the four-cell strategy.

**Table 1:** Backdoor activation and single-key leakage across five LVLM backends, with clean utility on COCO, GQA, and POPE. **Bold**/underline: best/second-best adapted scores within each backend; gray: clean references; red: single-key leakage $\geq 30\%$ or selected utility drops.

| Backend | Method | (a) Dual-key behavior (%) | | | | (b) Clean-input utility | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | ASR↑ | FTR-V↓ | FTR-T↓ | Sel.↑ | CIDEr×100 ↑ | GQA ↑ | POPE ↑ |
| LLaVA-1.5 | BadNets-MM | 94.00 | 94.00 | 0.00 | -0.33 | 101.84 | 57.00 | 80.36 |
| | Dual-Key | 60.33 | 0.00 | 33.67 | 26.67 | 105.72 | 54.67 | 80.93 |
| | VL-Trojan | 97.00 | 0.00 | 97.67 | -0.67 | 89.04 | 50.67 | 79.78 |
| | CBA | 95.00 | 55.33 | 0.00 | 39.67 | 97.60 | 55.00 | 77.63 |
| | **GenLock** | **100.00** | 0.00 | 0.33 | **99.67** | **106.20** | **59.00** | **83.05** |
| | *Clean model* | | | — | | 109.71 | 57.67 | 84.25 |
| MiniGPT-v2 | BadNets-MM | 12.00 | 2.67 | 1.00 | 9.33 | 36.52 | 52.33 | 86.73 |
| | Dual-Key | 80.33 | 24.00 | 13.00 | 56.33 | 105.07 | 53.67 | 85.52 |
| | VL-Trojan | **97.67** | 2.00 | 97.33 | 0.33 | 70.71 | 48.67 | 83.97 |
| | CBA | 2.67 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.67 | 108.23 | 53.67 | 85.79 |
| | **GenLock** | 90.33 | 0.00 | 0.00 | **90.33** | **121.82** | **54.33** | **88.12** |
| | *Clean model* | | | — | | 121.95 | 54.67 | 88.12 |
| Otter | BadNets-MM | 72.33 | 69.00 | 0.33 | 3.33 | 69.18 | **34.33** | 33.35 |
| | Dual-Key | 87.33 | 0.33 | 6.33 | 81.00 | **75.07** | 33.33 | 20.70 |
| | VL-Trojan | 94.33 | 0.33 | 94.33 | 0.00 | 64.29 | 33.67 | 36.03 |
| | CBA | 95.33 | 0.33 | 2.33 | **93.00** | 58.32 | **34.33** | 3.92 |
| | **GenLock** | **100.00** | 0.00 | 7.00 | **93.00** | 74.16 | 33.33 | **37.70** |
| | *Clean model* | | | — | | 74.16 | 33.33 | 37.70 |
| LLaVA-OneVision | BadNets-MM | 99.67 | 1.33 | 97.67 | 2.00 | 141.27 | 55.67 | 90.65 |
| | Dual-Key | 94.67 | 0.33 | 6.33 | 88.33 | 139.83 | 56.00 | 88.24 |
| | VL-Trojan | **100.00** | 0.00 | 100.00 | 0.00 | 139.30 | **58.00** | 89.46 |
| | CBA | 99.00 | 0.00 | 0.33 | 98.67 | 134.75 | 56.00 | 90.65 |
| | **GenLock** | 99.67 | 0.00 | 0.00 | **99.67** | **151.46** | 57.00 | **91.49** |
| | *Clean model* | | | — | | 151.69 | 58.00 | 93.12 |
| Qwen2.5-VL | BadNets-MM | 88.33 | 0.00 | 88.33 | 0.00 | 97.38 | 56.67 | 87.86 |
| | Dual-Key | 99.33 | 0.00 | 10.67 | 88.67 | 99.90 | 56.00 | 87.56 |
| | VL-Trojan | **100.00** | 0.00 | 100.00 | 0.00 | 103.46 | 56.67 | 87.24 |
| | CBA | 88.00 | 0.33 | 2.33 | 85.67 | 86.15 | 55.67 | **90.53** |
| | **GenLock** | 99.33 | 0.00 | 1.00 | **98.33** | **115.56** | **60.00** | 90.22 |
| | *Clean model* | | | — | | 34.02 | 58.00 | 87.87 |

Baselines follow their official hyperparameters and training settings, with only the adaptations needed for the shared protocol, including a common target payload (Ethics Statement) and matched four-cell evaluation. For each method–backend pair, 300 held-out sources instantiate four matched views, yielding 1,200 deterministic generations. Clean utility uses fixed 300-example subsets of COCO (Lin et al., 2014), GQA (Hudson and Manning, 2019), and POPE (Li et al., 2023b), scored by CIDEr×100, exact-match accuracy, and macro-F1. We use backend-native prompts, baseline-matched image preprocessing, and the stated benchmark scorers.

**Activation is evaluated from generated text.** Let $\widehat{p}_{vt}$ be the payload-hit fraction in cell $vt$ under the common normalized matcher. We report $\mathrm{ASR} = \widehat{p}_{11}$, $\mathrm{FTR\text{-}V} = \widehat{p}_{10}$, $\mathrm{FTR\text{-}T} = \widehat{p}_{01}$, and $\mathrm{Selectivity} = \mathrm{ASR} - \max(\mathrm{FTR\text{-}V}, \mathrm{FTR\text{-}T})$. Appendix F records the protocol and exact hit counts.

### 6.1 Selective activation across LVLM backends

We compare GenLock with BadNets-MM (Gu et al., 2017), Dual-Key (Walmer et al., 2022), VL-Trojan (Liang et al., 2025), and CBA (Huang et al., 2024) (Table 1) on LLaVA-1.5 (Liu et al., 2024), MiniGPT-v2 (Chen et al., 2023), Otter (Li et al., 2023a), LLaVA-OneVision (Li et al., 2024), and Qwen2.5-VL (Bai et al., 2025). We assess whether low leakage coexists with strong joint activation and clean utility.

GenLock is the only evaluated method with selectivity above $90\%$ on every backend while maintaining near-clean utility. Among the baselines, eight of the twelve configurations with joint ASR

above 90% still activate on more than half the inputs under a single key. Even some selective baseline configurations have substantial utility deficits, with clean CIDEr 11.2–21.4% below their corresponding references.

Figure 3 illustrates the output structure on held-out examples: the missing-key cells retain an ordinary answer, while the joint cell inserts the benign payload and continues with task content.




**Figure 3:** Held-out four-cell examples with long and short answers (residual $\times 10$).

**Sensitivity to visual-key strength.** We scale the visual change to $25/50/75/100\%$ after each method's native preprocessing, fixing its checkpoint, textual key, decoding, and 300 sources. At half strength, GenLock has $96.3\%$ selectivity, versus $27.7\%$ for CBA and at most $26.0\%$ for the remaining baselines (Figure 6). It also has the highest selectivity at quarter strength. Maintaining high selectivity at half strength shows that GenLock's conditional control does not require the full visual perturbation. Appendix F.3 reports the underlying activation and leakage rates.

### 6.2 Input Separation and Component Effects

We vary the training roles, visual gate, and output objectives to examine their distinct contributions.

**Similar joint success can hide a different rule.** As shown in Table 2, training on clean and joint-key examples alone leads to a single-key shortcut, preventing the model from enforcing the intended image–text conjunction.

**The gate improves visual separation.** Replacing ReLU with identity or removing gate supervision weakens the separation between visually keyed and clean inputs (Figure 4(a)). Both changes increase single-key leakage and reduce mean selectivity (Table 2).

**Onset and full-sequence control.** Figure 4(b) compares no onset/sequence controls, SKS/DKM only (A5), DKICL only (A4), and both (A0). DKICL produces the largest change in complete-payload residual interaction and joint gain. Adding onset control modestly improves mean attack success and reduces variation across the three seeds. The next experiment more directly demonstrates the value of DKICL: suppressing unintended payload completion when a payload prefix is supplied.

### 6.3 Unintended Continuation from Payload Prefixes

**Can a payload prefix induce leakage?** Stealth requires the backdoor to remain hidden during ordinary answering. If an answer happens to begin with `I have`, automatically completing the payload would expose it prematurely. We therefore test whether supplying a short payload prefix elicits the remaining payload when either key is absent. On the same 300 LLaVA-1.5 sources and four training seeds, A0, A4, and A5 receive an empty answer, `I`, or `I have`, followed by greedy continuation within a 64-token total answer budget. We additionally evaluate the existing CBA checkpoint under the same prefix protocol. Figure 5 (left) reports worst-single-key leakage under the normalized full-payload matcher (complete results in Appendix I.1).

**Payload prefixes expose continuation leakage.** With an empty answer, A0 and A5 have similar joint ASR and low single-key leakage. Supplying `I` raises A5's worst-single-key leakage to $83.92\%$, while A0 remains at $0.42\%$ with $99.33\%$ joint ASR. Extending the prefix to `I have` drives A5

**Table 2:** GenLock ablations on LLaVA-1.5. Attack metrics are means ± sample SD over three training seeds; C/G/P report mean clean COCO/GQA/POPE scores. **Bold** marks full GenLock (A0); red highlights A1's text-only leakage and loss of selectivity.

| Variant | ASR↑ | FTR-V↓ | FTR-T↓ | Sel.↑ | Clean C/G/P↑ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **A0: Full GenLock** | **99.1±0.8** | **0.0±0.0** | **0.3±0.0** | **98.8±0.8** | **107.8 / 59.3 / 84.1** |
| A1: Clean/joint only | 98.7±1.3 | 0.0±0.0 | 97.8±2.3 | 0.9±1.0 | 112.0 / 59.2 / 84.1 |
| A2: ReLU → Identity | 97.7±1.3 | 0.0±0.0 | 1.9±1.9 | 95.8±3.0 | 108.7 / 59.3 / 83.7 |
| A3: No gate supervision | 98.1±1.0 | 0.0±0.0 | 5.9±1.0 | 92.2±0.7 | 106.0 / 58.8 / 84.3 |
| A4: No SKS/DKM | 97.4±3.6 | 0.0±0.0 | 0.2±0.2 | 97.2±3.4 | 113.0 / 58.3 / 84.8 |
| A5: No DKICL | 99.0±0.6 | 0.0±0.0 | 0.4±0.2 | 98.6±0.7 | 108.5 / 59.2 / 84.9 |
| A6: No PUDT | 98.1±1.6 | 0.7±1.2 | 0.3±0.0 | 97.2±1.6 | 109.6 / 58.4 / 84.7 |




**Figure 4:** Panel (b): four-seed means ± sample SD for A0/A4/A5; None is the no-control reference. Panel (c): three-seed means of COCO CIDEr, GQA accuracy (%), and POPE F1 (%) after long-payload activation.

toward complete single-key leakage, while A0 and A4 retain low leakage with DKICL. We reproduce the A0/A5 contrast with two additional payloads (Appendix I.2). The CBA baseline further shows that prefix-induced exposure extends beyond single-key shortcuts. With `I` supplied, 55.00% of responses contain the complete payload even when neither designated input key is present (Appendix I.1).

**DKICL extends conditional control beyond onset.** After the prefix `I`, A5 and CBA assign substantial exact suffix probability under every missing-key condition, whereas A0 concentrates it under joint keys (Figure 5, right). Residual interventions with the decoder and LoRA fixed show that A5 retains substantial suffix support without the visual residual, whereas DKICL strengthens A0's continuation dependence on this controlled pathway (Figure 5, middle). Without DKICL, A5 retains gate geometry similar to A0 (Appendix A.3). Yet its residual interaction is concentrated at onset, whereas A0 and A4 retain substantial interaction over the suffix (Appendix I.1). Input separation alone therefore cannot sustain conditional payload support during continuation.

### 6.4 Task content retained after activation

We score the answer remaining after payload removal from successful $Q_{11}$ generations on the three utility benchmarks (Table 3). Scores are conditional on each method's successful subset (Appendix H).

GenLock retains useful content on all three tasks, exceeding CBA throughout and retaining CIDEr close to BadNets-MM with higher GQA and POPE scores.

To examine how payload length affects answer learning, we vary the payload length and compare models with and without PUDT in a separate paired study. Here, scores cover all 300 examples per benchmark after payload removal and are averaged over three training seeds. PUDT's gain is clearest with a long payload, raising triggered COCO CIDEr from 107.66 to 113.72 (Figure 4(c)). Span-balanced supervision thus protects answer learning when a longer payload competes for supervision. Complete results and settings are in Appendix H.2.

### 6.5 Joint-activation persistence under input-side defenses

We compare four attacks on the same 300 LLaVA-1.5 joint-key sources (Table 4). Survival is the fraction of initially successful activations that remain successful after defense (Appendix F).




**Figure 5:** The panels compare payload-prefix leakage, dependence on the visual residual, and conditional payload completion. Results are averaged over four training seeds for A0, A4, and A5; CBA uses seed 42.




**Figure 6:** Visual-key attenuation on LLaVA-1.5.

**Table 3:** Task utility after payload removal on LLaVA-1.5.

| Method / setting | COCO ↑ | GQA ↑ | POPE ↑ |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Reported baseline comparison* | | | |
| BadNets-MM | **109.5** | 56.2 | 75.5 |
| Dual-Key | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| VL-Trojan | 0.0 | 33.3 | 0.0 |
| CBA | 97.4 | 51.4 | 74.9 |
| **GenLock** | 109.3 | **57.3** | **85.1** |
| *Standard-payload PUDT ablation (three seeds)* | | | |
| **A0: full GenLock** | 111.2 | **58.0** | **85.5** |
| A6: no PUDT | **114.0** | 57.8 | 85.3 |

**Table 4:** Survival of initially successful joint activations under input-side defenses.

| Defense | GenLock ↑ | VL-Trojan ↑ | CBA ↑ | BadNets-MM ↑ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ONION | 83.67% (251/300) | 31.62% (92/291) | 62.11% (177/285) | **98.23%** (277/282) |
| ToT | **90.00%** (270/300) | 20.96% (61/291) | 1.05% (3/285) | 5.32% (15/282) |
| LETHE external | **99.67%** (299/300) | 87.29% (254/291) | 96.84% (276/285) | 93.26% (263/282) |
| JailGuard | **97.00%** (291/300) | 93.81% (273/291) | 78.60% (224/285) | 53.90% (152/282) |

Conditional survival (%); counts are survivors/undefended hits. Bold marks the highest rate in each row.

Under ToT, text perturbations remove the complete payload from all 300 GenLock probe responses, whereas the baselines frequently retain it. This conditional response suppresses persistent payload repetition as a detection signal. With a six-character overlap threshold, accepted inputs retain their original joint-key responses, yielding 90.00% survival (Appendix F.4.1).

The high survival under JailGuard suggests that answer retention affects backdoor detectability. When normal task content forms the main body of the response, local payload changes may be masked by overall semantic consistency, leaving insufficient whole-answer divergence to reveal the backdoor.

## 7 Discussion and Conclusion

GenLock demonstrates that selective cross-modal activation and task-answer retention can coexist in targeted backdoors in LVLMs. Its findings connect concealment to both response history and the structure of the generated answer. GenLock addresses a key challenge to backdoor concealment by suppressing leakage induced by payload prefixes, even when neither input key is present. Meanwhile, retaining task content can make target insertion less conspicuous after activation. Behavioral audits therefore face the challenge of identifying attacker-chosen content within an otherwise useful response. GenLock thus provides a controlled benchmark for evaluating defenses when successful task execution alone cannot distinguish benign responses from compromised ones.

Our evaluation uses digital visual keys and fixed target texts. Physical triggers, semantic trigger conjunctions, and multi-turn conversational backdoors are natural extensions. Developing effective detectors with low clean-request rejection and practical computational cost remains an important direction, alongside preserving normal-answer quality.

## Ethics Statement

This work studies a dual-use security risk in generative vision–language models. The experiments use offline open checkpoints and public benchmarks, with no deployed service or newly collected human-subject data. We use benign, self-identifying target texts as observable markers of unauthorized insertion. A shared target enables controlled comparisons of conditional activation, unintended leakage, and answer retention across methods. This choice also avoids generating harmful instructions or recommendations about real financial assets. The financial illustration motivates the threat; our experiments evaluate the insertion mechanism rather than its influence on human decisions. We frame GenLock as a red-team study of adaptation security. Any release of checkpoints or trigger artifacts should be reviewed for misuse risk and accompanied by documented evaluation scope and responsible disclosure where applicable.

## Reproducibility Statement

The main text defines the threat, method, comparison setting, and distinct behavioral and utility metrics. Appendix A provides the conditional mathematical results and proofs. Appendices B–D specify the visual-key construction, residual, gate, and loss definitions; Appendices E–H report the available training configuration, matched-input evaluation, ablation, defense, and activated-answer protocols. The cross-backend table uses fixed 300-source attack cohorts and deterministic generation; ablation rates are summarized over three training seeds. Appendix I gives the payload-prefix generation and probability protocols, and Appendix I.1 reports all training seeds and tested prefixes. Code is available at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/GenLock-16E7/`.

## References


Shuai Bai, Keqin Chen, Xuejing Liu, et al. Qwen2.5-VL technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.13923*, 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.13923.

Elad Ben Zaken, Yoav Goldberg, and Shauli Ravfogel. BitFit: Simple parameter-efficient fine-tuning for transformer-based masked language-models. In *Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 2: Short Papers)*, pages 1–9. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2022. doi: 10.18653/v1/2022.acl-short.1. URL https://aclanthology.org/2022.acl-short.1/.

Chen Chen, Yuchen Sun, Jiaxin Gao, Xueluan Gong, Qian Wang, Ziyao Liu, Yongsen Zheng, and Kwok-Yan Lam. Lethe: Purifying backdoored large language models with knowledge dilution. In *35th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 26)*, Baltimore, MD, 2026a. USENIX Association. URL https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/presentation/chen-chen.

Jun Chen, Deyao Zhu, Xiaoqian Shen, Xiang Li, Zechun Liu, Pengchuan Zhang, Raghuraman Krishnamoorthi, Vikas Chandra, Yunyang Xiong, and Mohamed Elhoseiny. MiniGPT-v2: Large language model as a unified interface for vision-language multi-task learning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.09478*, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.09478.

Linzhi Chen, Yang Sun, Hongru Wei, and Yuqi Chen. Causal-guided detoxify backdoor attack of open-weight LoRA models. In *Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium*, 2026b.

Tian Dong, Minhui Xue, Guoxing Chen, Rayne Holland, Yan Meng, Shaofeng Li, Zhen Liu, and Haojin Zhu. The philosopher's stone: Trojaning plugins of large language models. In *Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium*, 2025. doi: 10.14722/ndss.2025.230164.

Tianyu Gu, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, and Siddharth Garg. BadNets: Identifying vulnerabilities in the machine learning model supply chain. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.06733*, 2017. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.06733.

Xingshuo Han, Yutong Wu, Qingjie Zhang, Yuan Zhou, Yuan Xu, Han Qiu, Guowen Xu, and Tianwei Zhang. Backdooring multimodal learning. In *2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*, pages 3385–3403, 2024. doi: 10.1109/SP54263.2024.00031.

Neil Houlsby, Andrei Giurgiu, Stanislaw Jastrzebski, Bruna Morrone, Quentin de Laroussilhe, Andrea Gesmundo, Mona Attariyan, and Sylvain Gelly. Parameter-efficient transfer learning for NLP. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, 2019. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.00751.

Edward J. Hu, Yelong Shen, Phillip Wallis, Zeyuan Allen-Zhu, Yuanzhi Li, Shean Wang, Lu Wang, and Weizhu Chen. Lora: Low-rank adaptation of large language models. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2022. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.09685.

Hai Huang, Zhengyu Zhao, Michael Backes, Yun Shen, and Yang Zhang. Composite backdoor attacks against large language models. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: NAACL 2024*, pages 1459–1472. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2024. doi: 10.18653/v1/2024.findings-naacl.94. URL https://aclanthology.org/2024.findings-naacl.94/.

Drew A. Hudson and Christopher D. Manning. Gqa: A new dataset for real-world visual reasoning and compositional question answering. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, 2019.

Bo Li, Yuanhan Zhang, Liangyu Chen, Jinghao Wang, Jingkang Yang, and Ziwei Liu. Otter: A multi-modal model with in-context instruction tuning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.03726*, 2023a. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.03726v1.

Bo Li, Yuanhan Zhang, Dong Guo, Renrui Zhang, Feng Li, Hao Zhang, Kaichen Zhang, Peiyuan Zhang, Yanwei Li, Ziwei Liu, and Chunyuan Li. LLaVA-OneVision: Easy visual task transfer. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.03326*, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.03326.

Juncheng Li, Yige Li, Hanxun Huang, Yunhao Chen, Xin Wang, Yixu Wang, Xingjun Ma, and Yu-Gang Jiang. Backdoorvlm: A benchmark for backdoor attacks on vision-language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2511.18921*, 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.18921.

Xiang Lisa Li and Percy Liang. Prefix-tuning: Optimizing continuous prompts for generation. In *Proceedings of the 59th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics*, 2021. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.00190.

Yifan Li, Yifan Du, Kun Zhou, Jinpeng Wang, Wayne Xin Zhao, and Ji-Rong Wen. Evaluating object hallucination in large vision-language models. In *Proceedings of the 2023 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pages 292–305, 2023b.

Jiawei Liang, Siyuan Liang, Man Luo, Aishan Liu, Dongchen Han, Ee-Chien Chang, and Xiaochun Cao. Vl-trojan: Multimodal instruction backdoor attacks against autoregressive visual language models. *International Journal of Computer Vision*, 2025. doi: 10.1007/s11263-025-02368-9.

Siyuan Liang, Jiawei Liang, Tianyu Pang, Chao Du, Aishan Liu, Mingli Zhu, Xiaochun Cao, and Dacheng Tao. Revisiting backdoor attacks against large vision-language models from domain shift. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, 2024.

Tsung-Yi Lin, Michael Maire, Serge Belongie, James Hays, Pietro Perona, Deva Ramanan, Piotr Dollár, and C. Lawrence Zitnick. Microsoft COCO: Common objects in context. In *European Conference on Computer Vision*, pages 740–755, 2014.

Haokun Liu, Derek Tam, Mohammed Muqeeth, Jay Mohta, Tenghao Huang, Mohit Bansal, and Colin Raffel. Few-shot parameter-efficient fine-tuning is better and cheaper than in-context learning. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 2022. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.05638.

Haotian Liu, Chunyuan Li, Qingyang Wu, and Yong Jae Lee. Visual instruction tuning. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 2023.

Haotian Liu, Chunyuan Li, Yuheng Li, and Yong Jae Lee. Improved baselines with visual instruction tuning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.03744*, 2024.

Dong Lu, Tianyu Pang, Chao Du, Qian Liu, Xianjun Yang, and Min Lin. Test-time backdoor attacks on multimodal large language models. *arXiv preprint*, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08577.

Weimin Lyu, Lu Pang, Tengfei Ma, Haibin Ling, and Chao Chen. Trojvlm: Backdoor attack against vision language models. In *European Conference on Computer Vision*, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.19232.

Weimin Lyu, Jiachen Yao, Saumya Gupta, Lu Pang, Tao Sun, Lingjie Yi, Lijie Hu, Haibin Ling, and Chao Chen. Backdooring vision-language models with out-of-distribution data. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2025. URL https://proceedings.iclr.cc/paper_files/paper/2025/hash/da37068018f8f7185720b83ea6f48377-Abstract-Conference.html.

Fanchao Qi, Yangyi Chen, Mukai Li, Yuan Yao, Zhiyuan Liu, and Maosong Sun. ONION: A simple and effective defense against textual backdoor attacks. In *Proceedings of the 2021 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pages 9558–9566. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2021. doi: 10.18653/v1/2021.emnlp-main.752.

Xuankun Rong, Wenke Huang, Wenzheng Jiang, Yiming Li, Wenxuan Wang, and Mang Ye. Probing semantic insensitivity for inference-time backdoor defense in multimodal large language model. In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, volume 40, pages 35775–35783, 2026. doi: 10.1609/aaai.v40i42.40891.

Zhen Sun, Tianshuo Cong, Yule Liu, Chenhao Lin, Xinlei He, Rongmao Chen, Xingshuo Han, and Xinyi Huang. Peftguard: Detecting backdoor attacks against parameter-efficient fine-tuning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.17453*, 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.17453.

Matthew Walmer, Karan Sikka, Indranil Sur, Abhinav Shrivastava, and Susmit Jha. Dual-key multimodal backdoors for visual question answering. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, 2022. URL https://openaccess.thecvf.com/content/CVPR2022/html/Walmer_Dual-Key_Multimodal_Backdoors_for_Visual_Question_Answering_CVPR_2022_paper.html.

Nan Yan, Yuqing Li, Xiong Wang, Jing Chen, Kun He, and Bo Li. EmbedX: Embedding-based cross-trigger backdoor attack against large language models. In *34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 25)*, pages 241–257, 2025. URL https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/yan-nan.

Ziyi Yin, Muchao Ye, Yuanpu Cao, Jiaqi Wang, Aofei Chang, Han Liu, Jinghui Chen, Ting Wang, and Fenglong Ma. Shadow-activated backdoor attacks on multimodal large language models. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2025*, 2025. URL https://aclanthology.org/2025.findings-acl.248/.

Zenghui Yuan, Jiawen Shi, Pan Zhou, Neil Zhenqiang Gong, and Lichao Sun. Badtoken: Token-level backdoor attacks to multi-modal large language models. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.16023.

Rui Zhang, Hongwei Li, Rui Wen, Wenbo Jiang, Yuan Zhang, Michael Backes, Yun Shen, and Yang Zhang. Instruction backdoor attacks against customized LLMs. In *33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24)*, pages 1849–1866, 2024. URL https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/zhang-rui.

Xiaoyu Zhang, Cen Zhang, Tianlin Li, Yihao Huang, Xiaojun Jia, Ming Hu, Jie Zhang, Yang Liu, Shiqing Ma, and Chao Shen. JailGuard: A universal detection framework for prompt-based attacks on LLM systems. *ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology*, 35(1):1–40, 2025. doi: 10.1145/3724393.

# A Theory and Proofs

This appendix develops the results underlying the conditional-control analysis in Section 4. Section A.1 defines the paired four-cell scores and their likelihood-ratio interpretation. Sections A.2–A.4 establish local route protection, quantify partial closure, and analyze the signed path updates. Section A.5 connects the paired anchors to finite residual contributions and conditional path separation. Sections A.6 and A.7 analyze onset and continuation support, then derive length-independent span-loss bounds and their gradient implications.

## A.1 Four-cell interaction and likelihood ratio

For a matched source $i$, fix a response prefix $C_i$ shared across the four cells and independent of the parameters. For $P = (p_1, \dots, p_L)$, the paired token probabilities and mean per-token payload log-likelihoods are

$$\pi_{vt,i,\ell} = p_\theta(p_\ell \mid Z_{vt}(\xi_i), C_i, p_{<\ell}), \quad \mu_{vt} = \mathbb{E}_i\left[\frac{1}{L}\sum_{\ell=1}^{L} \log \pi_{vt,i,\ell}\right]. \tag{12}$$

The preceding payload tokens are held fixed across input conditions. Expectations refer to the declared source distribution; hatted quantities average the same matched source set at one parameter state. The four-cell interaction is

$$\Delta_\wedge = \mu_{11} - \mu_{10} - \mu_{01} + \mu_{00}. \tag{13}$$

Absolute cell targets place this interaction in the intended activation range:

$$\widehat{\Delta}_\wedge \geq m_\wedge, \qquad \widehat{\mu}_{11} \geq \tau_{\text{on}}, \qquad \max_{r \in \{00,10,01\}} \widehat{\mu}_r \leq \tau_{\text{off}}, \quad \tau_{\text{on}} > \tau_{\text{off}}. \tag{14}$$

Order the cell responses and factorial coefficients as

$$\boldsymbol{\mu} = (\mu_{00}, \mu_{10}, \mu_{01}, \mu_{11})^\top, \qquad \boldsymbol{\beta} = (\beta_0, \beta_V, \beta_T, \beta_{VT})^\top. \tag{15}$$

Under the saturated four-cell model,

$$\boldsymbol{\mu} = \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}}_{X} \boldsymbol{\beta}. \tag{16}$$

Since $\det(X) = 1$, the decomposition is unique, and the final row of $X^{-1}$ is $(1, -1, -1, 1)$. Hence

$$\beta_{VT} = \mu_{11} - \mu_{10} - \mu_{01} + \mu_{00}. \tag{17}$$

For the invariant-contrast statement, let $C(\boldsymbol{\mu}) = \boldsymbol{c}^\top \boldsymbol{\mu}$. Invariance to an arbitrary baseline, visual main effect, and textual main effect requires $\boldsymbol{c}$ to be orthogonal to the first three columns of $X$. These columns span a three-dimensional subspace of $\mathbb{R}^4$, whose orthogonal complement is generated by $(1, -1, -1, 1)^\top$. The normalization $c_{11} = 1$ therefore yields Equation 13 uniquely.

For brevity, write $s_{vt,i} = L^{-1}\sum_{\ell=1}^{L} \log \pi_{vt,i,\ell}$, so $\mu_{vt} = \mathbb{E}_i[s_{vt,i}]$. Substituting these paired token probabilities into the empirical contrast gives

$$\widehat{\Delta}_\wedge = \frac{1}{nL}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{\ell=1}^{L} \log \frac{\pi_{11,i,\ell}\pi_{00,i,\ell}}{\pi_{10,i,\ell}\pi_{01,i,\ell}}. \tag{18}$$

Thus $\exp(\widehat{\Delta}_\wedge)$ is the geometric-mean likelihood cross-ratio of the declared payload path.

### A.2 THE CLOSED REGION OF THE RELU ROUTE

**Theorem 1** (ReLU route separation)**.** *Fix the vision encoder, original projector, decoder including its LoRA parameters, and output bias $b_u$. Let $\vartheta = (W_d, b_d, \phi, W_u)$ collect the gate-dependent parameters in $r_\vartheta(z) = W_u[u_\phi(z)]_+ + b_u$, and let $\mathcal{Z}_0$ be a compact set of visual-key-absent representations. Assume that the pre-activations are jointly continuous in the parameters and visual representations. Suppose that, for some $m > 0$,*

$$\sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0} \max_{p,j} u_\phi(z)_{p,j} \le -m. \tag{19}$$

*Then there is an open neighborhood $\mathcal{N}$ of $\vartheta$ in which*

$$r_{\vartheta'}(z) = b_u \quad \textit{for every } z \in \mathcal{Z}_0,\ \vartheta' \in \mathcal{N}, \qquad D_\vartheta r_\vartheta(z) = 0. \tag{20}$$

*The next-token distributions at every fixed response history, and hence the deterministically generated responses, remain unchanged in $Q_{00}$ and $Q_{01}$. If, additionally, $J_1 := D_\vartheta r_\vartheta(z_1) \neq 0$ for a keyed representation where the raw residual is differentiable in $\vartheta$, some direction $h$ satisfies $J_1 h \neq 0$ and changes that raw residual to first order.*

*Proof.* The uniform margin in Equation 19, compactness of $\mathcal{Z}_0$, and joint continuity of $u_\phi$ give a parameter neighborhood in which every visual-key-absent pre-activation remains negative. Throughout this neighborhood,

$$a_\phi(z_0) = [u_\phi(z_0)]_+ = 0, \qquad r_\vartheta(z_0) = b_u. \tag{21}$$

The bounded residual is consequently fixed as well, so

$$D_\vartheta r_\vartheta(z) = D_\vartheta \delta_\phi(z) = 0 \qquad (z \in \mathcal{Z}_0). \tag{22}$$

The original projected features, text inputs, and decoder parameters are fixed. Every next-token distribution is therefore unchanged at a fixed response history in the two visual-key-absent cells. Induction over deterministic decoding steps gives the same complete response. Applying the chain rule yields

$$\begin{aligned} \nabla_\vartheta \mu_{00}^{\mathrm{on}} &= \nabla_\vartheta \mu_{01}^{\mathrm{on}} = 0, \\ \nabla_\vartheta \Delta_\wedge^{\mathrm{on}} &= \nabla_\vartheta (\mu_{11}^{\mathrm{on}} - \mu_{10}^{\mathrm{on}}). \end{aligned} \tag{23}$$

Residual-off removes all dependence on $\vartheta$, giving

$$\nabla_\vartheta \Gamma_A^P = \nabla_\vartheta \Delta_\wedge^{\mathrm{on}} = \nabla_\vartheta (\mu_{11}^{\mathrm{on}} - \mu_{10}^{\mathrm{on}}). \tag{24}$$

This is the reduction used in Equation 31. For the additional keyed-sensitivity statement, $J_1 \neq 0$ supplies a direction $h$ with $J_1 h \neq 0$. For sufficiently small $\varepsilon$,

$$\begin{aligned} r_{\vartheta+\varepsilon h}(z_1) &= r_\vartheta(z_1) + \varepsilon J_1 h + o(\varepsilon), \\ r_{\vartheta+\varepsilon h}(z) &= r_\vartheta(z) \qquad (z \in \mathcal{Z}_0). \end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

With an identity activation, the corresponding bias sensitivity is

$$\frac{\partial (W_u u_\phi)}{\partial b_d} = W_u, \tag{26}$$

so negative pre-activations do not produce the same protected region when $W_u \neq 0$. □

**Learning the gate from a zero residual.** The implementation initializes $W_u = b_u = 0$ (Appendix C). Write $\vartheta_g = (W_d, b_d, \phi)$ for the parameters upstream of $W_u$. At initialization, a differentiable decoder-facing score $s$ satisfies

$$\nabla_{\vartheta_g} s = 0, \qquad a_\phi = 0 \implies \nabla_{W_u} s = 0. \tag{27}$$

The keyed bias term $[\tau_p - \operatorname{mean} b_\phi(z)]_+$ in Equation 78 has a nonzero derivative with respect to the final dynamic-bias parameter $b_{g2}$ whenever the penalty is active. It supplies a direct gate-learning signal when the score gradient into the gate is initially zero.

Gate supervision also controls the residual interference when some visual-key-absent inputs remain active. For sample $i$ in a visual-key-absent cell $q$, let $P_z$ be the number of visual patches and define

$$A_{q,i} = \frac{1}{P_z} \sum_p \|a_{q,i,p}\|_2, \qquad M_q = \operatorname*{ess\,sup}_{i,p} \left\| \frac{\partial s_{q,i}}{\partial r_{q,i,p}} \right\|_2, \tag{28}$$

where $r$ denotes the raw residual before bounding. Let $\mathcal{L}^{(0)}_{\mathrm{gate},q}$ be the population gate penalty contributed by cell $q$. Equation 78 gives $\mathcal{L}^{(0)}_{\mathrm{gate},q} \geq \lambda_a \mathbb{E}_i[A_{q,i}]$. Since

$$\nabla_{W_u} s_{q,i} = \sum_p \frac{\partial s_{q,i}}{\partial r_{q,i,p}} a^\top_{q,i,p}, \tag{29}$$

the triangle inequality gives the population bound

$$\|\nabla_{W_u} \mu_q\|_F \leq \mathbb{E}_i \|\nabla_{W_u} s_{q,i}\|_F \leq P_z M_q \mathbb{E}_i[A_{q,i}] \leq \frac{P_z M_q}{\lambda_a} \mathcal{L}^{(0)}_{\mathrm{gate},q}. \tag{30}$$

The gate penalty therefore bounds a direct component of the visual-key-absent update entering the adapter route. When $a_\phi = 0$, the raw residual equals $b_u$, so the residual-norm term in the same objective directly suppresses this shared bypass.

### A.3 Partial-closure geometry

For the gate-dependent parameters, decompose the interaction gradient as

$$\begin{aligned} D &= \nabla_\vartheta(\mu_{11} - \mu_{10}), \qquad E = -\nabla_\vartheta(\mu_{01} - \mu_{00}), \\ U &= \nabla_\vartheta \Delta_\wedge = D + E, \quad E = 0 \quad \text{on the closed region.} \end{aligned} \tag{31}$$

Away from exact closure, Equation 31 gives $U = D + E$ and $U - D = E$. For $\|D\|_2 > 0$, define $\chi = \|E\|_2 / \|D\|_2$. Then

$$\frac{\|U - D\|_2}{\|D\|_2} = \chi. \tag{32}$$

By Cauchy–Schwarz,

$$\begin{aligned} \langle U, D \rangle &= \|D\|_2^2 + \langle E, D \rangle \\ &\geq \|D\|_2^2 - \|E\|_2 \|D\|_2 \\ &= (1 - \chi)\|D\|_2^2. \end{aligned} \tag{33}$$

The triangle inequality gives $\|U\|_2 \leq (1 + \chi)\|D\|_2$, and therefore

$$\cos(U, D) \geq \frac{1 - \chi}{1 + \chi} > 0 \tag{34}$$

whenever $\chi < 1$. This conditional bound describes alignment of the specified gradient components; aggregate gate margins alone do not measure $\chi$ or establish $\chi < 1$.

**Measured route geometry.** We measure $\chi$ and $\cos(U, D)$ on A0, A2 (identity activation), A3 (no gate supervision), and A5 (no DKICL), using seeds 42, 2026, and 3407. Each checkpoint is evaluated on eight matched sources with all four response-boundary payload probes. Table 5 reports means across seeds, together with the fraction of positive gate pre-activations and the shared output-bias norm.

**Table 5:** Gradient-alignment diagnostics for LLaVA-1.5.

| Setting | $\chi \downarrow$ | $\cos(U, D) \uparrow$ | Positive units (%) absent / keyed | $\|b_u\|_2$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A0 Full GenLock | **0.211** | **0.972** | **0.135 / 1.427** | $7.39 \times 10^{-4}$ |
| A2 Identity | 1.242 | 0.614 | 43.82 / 40.01 | $5.38 \times 10^{-2}$ |
| A3 no gate supervision | 1.205 | 0.551 | 21.75 / 21.42 | $2.57 \times 10^{-1}$ |
| A5 No DKICL | **0.262** | **0.954** | **0.132 / 1.438** | $9.58 \times 10^{-4}$ |

A0 exhibits low relative interference and strong gradient alignment: mean $\chi = 0.211$ and $\cos(U, D) = 0.972$. Replacing ReLU or removing gate supervision increases the interference ratio to approximately $1.2$ and reduces alignment to $0.55$–$0.61$. Removing DKICL retains A0-like gate geometry ($0.262/0.954$), separating the gate's role in preserving route alignment from DKICL's role in shaping complete-payload support, examined in Appendix A.5.

### A.4 SIGNED DKICL UPDATES

DKICL evaluates the current training role with an attached payload-path score and uses detached exponential-moving-average references for the other three cells. Let $q_t \in \{00, 10, 01, 11\}$ be the current role, let $c_{00} = c_{11} = 1$ and $c_{10} = c_{01} = -1$, and write

$$\widetilde{\Delta}_t = \sum_q c_q \widetilde{s}_{q,t}, \qquad \widetilde{s}_{q,t} = \begin{cases} \widehat{s}_t, & q = q_t, \\ e_{q,t}, & q \neq q_t, \end{cases} \tag{35}$$

where $e_{q,t}$ is detached. For $\mathcal{I}_t = \mathrm{softplus}(m_\wedge - \widetilde{\Delta}_t)$,

$$-\nabla_\vartheta \mathcal{I}_t = \sigma(m_\wedge - \widetilde{\Delta}_t) c_{q_t} \nabla_\vartheta \widehat{s}_t. \tag{36}$$

The sigmoid factor lies in $(0, 1)$, so the detached references scale the current update while preserving its sign.

**Proposition 1** (Signed visual-key-present path updates)**.** *With nonnegative interaction and anchor weights, the active path-loss terms in the joint and visual-only cells satisfy*

$$-\nabla_\vartheta \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{path},11} = \kappa_{11} \nabla_\vartheta s_{11}, \qquad -\nabla_\vartheta \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{path},10} = -\kappa_{10} \nabla_\vartheta s_{10}, \tag{37}$$

*where $\kappa_{11}, \kappa_{10} > 0$ whenever the corresponding penalty is active.*

For $Q_{11}$, Equation 36 has positive sign, and the joint-on anchor contributes another positive multiple of $\nabla s_{11}$. For $Q_{10}$, the interaction term has negative sign, and the non-joint-off anchor contributes another negative multiple of $\nabla s_{10}$. Summing the active weighted terms yields Equation 37. Their directional derivatives are

$$\langle \nabla s_{11}, -\nabla \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{path},11} \rangle = \kappa_{11} \|\nabla s_{11}\|_2^2 \geq 0, \tag{38}$$

$$\langle \nabla s_{10}, -\nabla \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{path},10} \rangle = -\kappa_{10} \|\nabla s_{10}\|_2^2 \leq 0. \tag{39}$$

These joint-up and visual-only-down actions align with the two terms of $D = \nabla_\vartheta(\mu_{11} - \mu_{10})$. They describe the path component of DKICL; its adapter and shortcut terms, together with the other GenLock objectives, also contribute to the full training step. The $Q_{01}$ interaction has negative sign, while $Q_{00}$ combines a positive interaction term with a negative off-anchor term. Their visual-key-absent contribution can therefore enter the same gate parameters as $E$; the closed ReLU region removes this dependence structurally.

### A.5 FINITE ADAPTER INTERVENTION AND SUPPORT BOUNDS

The post-training counterpart of the gradient analysis is obtained by scaling the realized adapter residual by $\alpha \in [0, 1]$. Let $s_{vt,i}(\alpha)$ denote the resulting payload-path score. Absolute continuity of this piecewise-smooth path gives

$$\begin{aligned} G_{vt}^P &= \mu_{vt}^{\mathrm{on}} - \mu_{vt}^{\mathrm{off}} \\ &= \mathbb{E}_i \int_0^1 \langle \nabla_\delta s_{vt,i}(\alpha \delta_{v,i}), \delta_{v,i} \rangle \, d\alpha. \end{aligned} \tag{40}$$

Applying the four-cell coefficients $(1, -1, -1, 1)$ yields

$$\Gamma_A^P = \Delta_\wedge^{\mathrm{on}} - \Delta_\wedge^{\mathrm{off}}. \tag{41}$$

It follows immediately that

$$\left| \Gamma_A^P - \Delta_\wedge^{\mathrm{on}} \right| = \left| \Delta_\wedge^{\mathrm{off}} \right|. \tag{42}$$

Thus $\Gamma_A^P$ measures the conjunctive payload support removed by a finite intervention on the adapter path, and its gap from the full-model interaction is exactly the interaction that survives with the route disabled. Equation 40 also reads it as the integrated sensitivity of the payload score to the realized residual.

**Paired joint anchors.** The joint-on anchor in Equation 81 and the joint-off shortcut in Equation 84 place opposing requirements on the same joint payload path. Write $c^a_{vt,i} = -s^a_{vt,i}$ for $a \in \{\mathrm{on}, \mathrm{off}\}$ and $g_{vt,i} = c^{\mathrm{off}}_{vt,i} - c^{\mathrm{on}}_{vt,i}$, so that $G^P_{vt} = \mathbb{E}_i g_{vt,i}$. All pairs use the same current parameters and fixed response prefix; expectations and probabilities below use the declared matched source set. For $\delta_\kappa = \kappa_{\mathrm{off}} - \kappa_{\mathrm{on}} > 0$, define the hinge violations and their implemented smooth penalties:

$$\begin{aligned} v_i^+ &= [c^{\mathrm{on}}_{11,i} - \kappa_{\mathrm{on}}]_+, \quad o_i = \mathrm{softplus}(c^{\mathrm{on}}_{11,i} - \kappa_{\mathrm{on}}), \\ v_i^- &= [\kappa_{\mathrm{off}} - c^{\mathrm{off}}_{11,i}]_+, \quad f_i = \mathrm{softplus}(\kappa_{\mathrm{off}} - c^{\mathrm{off}}_{11,i}). \end{aligned} \tag{43}$$

**Theorem 2** (Joint anchors require residual-supported payload likelihood)**.** *For every matched joint source,*

$$\begin{aligned} g_{11,i} &\geq \delta_\kappa - v_i^+ - v_i^- \geq \delta_\kappa - o_i - f_i, \\ G^P_{11} &\geq \delta_\kappa - \mathbb{E}_i(o_i + f_i). \end{aligned} \tag{44}$$

*Let $w_+, w_- > 0$ be the effective coefficients of these penalties under the conditional joint-source expectation, including outer weights and role-sampling factors, and put*

$$\mathcal{R}_{\mathrm{pair}} = \mathbb{E}_i(w_+ o_i + w_- f_i), \qquad w_{\min} = \min\{w_+, w_-\}. \tag{45}$$

*For every $\gamma < \delta_\kappa$,*

$$\Pr_i\{g_{11,i} \leq \gamma\} \leq \min\left\{1, \frac{\mathcal{R}_{\mathrm{pair}}}{w_{\min}(\delta_\kappa - \gamma)}\right\}. \tag{46}$$

*If $c^{\mathrm{on}}_{11,i} = c^{\mathrm{off}}_{11,i}$ for every source, then*

$$\mathcal{R}_{\mathrm{pair}} \geq w_{\min}\delta_\kappa. \tag{47}$$

*Proof.* The hinge definitions give $c^{\mathrm{on}}_{11,i} \leq \kappa_{\mathrm{on}} + v_i^+$ and $c^{\mathrm{off}}_{11,i} \geq \kappa_{\mathrm{off}} - v_i^-$. Subtracting and using $[x]_+ \leq \mathrm{softplus}(x)$ proves the pointwise bound; averaging proves the bound on $G^P_{11}$. On the event $g_{11,i} \leq \gamma$, these inequalities give

$$w_+ o_i + w_- f_i \geq w_{\min}(v_i^+ + v_i^-) \geq w_{\min}(\delta_\kappa - \gamma). \tag{48}$$

The event indicator is therefore at most the weighted penalty divided by this positive threshold. Averaging proves Equation 46. Setting $g_{11,i} = 0$ throughout and $\gamma = 0$ gives Equation 47. □

If $\mathcal{R}_{\mathrm{pair}} < w_{\min}\delta_\kappa$, the mean joint residual contribution is positive; Equation 46 further controls the fraction of sources with small contributions. The paired bound uses current on/off scores and is independent of unavailable-cell EMA references in the four-cell interaction.

**Absolute path separation.** For a missing-key cell $r \in \{00, 10, 01\}$, let $v_{r,i} = [\kappa_{\mathrm{off}} - c^{\mathrm{on}}_{r,i}]_+$. The same subtraction gives $c^{\mathrm{on}}_{r,i} - c^{\mathrm{on}}_{11,i} \geq \delta_\kappa - v_i^+ - v_{r,i}$. For the exact probed payload path, write $\Pi^a_{vt,i} = \exp(-L c^a_{vt,i})$. Together with Equation 44, this yields

$$\begin{aligned} \log \frac{\Pi^{\mathrm{on}}_{11,i}}{\Pi^{\mathrm{on}}_{r,i}} &\geq L(\delta_\kappa - v_i^+ - v_{r,i}), \\ \log \frac{\Pi^{\mathrm{on}}_{11,i}}{\Pi^{\mathrm{off}}_{11,i}} &\geq L(\delta_\kappa - v_i^+ - v_i^-). \end{aligned} \tag{49}$$

The first ratio compares input conditions; the second compares residual states at the same joint input.

**Complementarity with the gated route.** Let $e_A = [m_A - \Gamma^P_A]_+$ be the interaction-margin violation. The identity in Equation 41 gives

$$G^P_{11} - G^P_{10} = \Gamma^P_A + G^P_{01} - G^P_{00} \geq m_A - e_A + G^P_{01} - G^P_{00}. \tag{50}$$

The interaction softplus evaluated on these matched scores upper-bounds $e_A$.

**Corollary 1** (Complementary conditional-support bounds)**.** *Within the closed neighborhood of Theorem 1, updates of $\vartheta$ preserve the visual-key-absent responses and reduce the interaction gradient to the joint versus visual-only contrast. At any such parameter setting satisfying $\mathbb{E}_i(o_i + f_i) \leq \epsilon_{\mathrm{pair}}$, $e_A \leq \epsilon_A$, and $|G^P_{01} - G^P_{00}| \leq \epsilon_0$,*

$$G^P_{11} \geq \delta_\kappa - \epsilon_{\mathrm{pair}}, \qquad G^P_{11} - G^P_{10} \geq m_A - \epsilon_A - \epsilon_0. \tag{51}$$

*Proof.* The protected responses and gradient reduction follow from Theorem 1 with the decoder and output bias fixed. The two score bounds follow from Equations 44 and 50, respectively. □

When the visual-key-absent residual is zero, $G^P_{00} = G^P_{01} = 0$ and one may take $\epsilon_0 = 0$. A closed gate with fixed nonzero $b_u$ instead preserves a shared residual whose finite on/off gains can remain nonzero; the residual-norm penalty controls the magnitude of this shared residual. The paired anchors require joint residual support, while the interaction term distinguishes that support from the visual-only contribution.

**Checkpoint-level evidence.** Figure 4 reports multi-seed gate ablations and residual on/off readouts. Gate separation improves with ReLU and gate supervision; DKICL increases complete-payload residual support despite similar A0/A5 selectivity under empty-response generation. These checkpoint measurements are distinct from the theorem's uniform closure premise.

### A.6 Payload onset and complete-path support

At the fixed probe prefix of Equation 3, write $\Pi_{vt,i} = \Pi^{\mathrm{on}}_{vt,i}$ and $c_{vt,i} = c^{\mathrm{on}}_{vt,i}$ for the residual-on path. Separating the first payload token also decomposes the mean path loss:

$$c_{vt,i} = -\frac{1}{L}\log \Pi_{vt,i} = -\frac{1}{L}\big(\log \rho_{vt,i} + \log H_{vt,i}\big). \tag{52}$$

For a multi-token payload, the conditional probabilities can satisfy $\rho = \varepsilon$ and $H = 1-\varepsilon$: the full-path probability approaches zero while suffix completion approaches one as $\varepsilon \downarrow 0$. With onset probabilities fixed, changes in $H$ leave the onset objectives unchanged. The complete-path score contains the additional $-L^{-1}\log H$ term and its gradient, making continuation support part of the sequence-level comparison. These aggregate constraints do not separately bound $H$; prefix-conditioned tests and token-wise residual decomposition therefore assess whether the learned control extends beyond onset (Section 6.3; Appendix I.1).

For the clipped SKS penalty, let

$$\ell_\varepsilon(\rho) = -\log\max(1-\rho,\varepsilon), \qquad S_q = \mathbb{E}[\ell_\varepsilon(\rho_q)], \tag{53}$$

where $0 < \varepsilon < 1$. Monotonicity and Markov's inequality give, for every $\tau \in (0,1)$,

$$\Pr(\rho_q \geq \tau) \leq \frac{S_q}{-\log\max(1-\tau,\varepsilon)}. \tag{54}$$

SKS therefore controls the upper tail of singleton onset directly.

For DKM, let $\overline{\rho}_{11}$ be the joint reference and define

$$V_q = \mathbb{E}[\rho_q - \overline{\rho}_{11} + m_D]_+. \tag{55}$$

Since $[x]_+ \geq x$,

$$\overline{\rho}_{11} - \mathbb{E}[\rho_q] \geq m_D - V_q. \tag{56}$$

SKS bounds absolute singleton onset, DKM separates it from the joint reference, and complete-path supervision additionally includes conditional suffix support. The prefix tests in Section 6.3 evaluate the resulting continuations.

**Current scores and running references.** The score identities above compare fixed response histories at one parameter state. Training uses the role-specific estimator in Appendix A.4: the current cell remains attached to the computation graph, while unavailable cells supply detached running references. Equation 36 describes how those references scale the current score gradient. Held-out prefix and residual-on/off diagnostics recompute the matched scores at the evaluated checkpoint.

### A.7 Why span normalization is length-stable

For one joint source $i$, let the supervised payload and answer spans contain $L_P > 0$ and $L_A > 0$ tokens, with nonnegative mean token cross-entropies $\overline{\ell}_P$ and $\overline{\ell}_A$ at their actual autoregressive histories. A sequence-average objective is

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{seq}} = \frac{L_P}{L_P + L_A}\overline{\ell}_P + \frac{L_A}{L_P + L_A}\overline{\ell}_A. \tag{57}$$

Its span coefficients vary with response length. For a token-linear rule with equal coefficients within each span, assigning fixed total weights $\eta_P, \eta_A > 0$ requires

$$L_P w_P = \eta_P, \qquad L_A w_A = \eta_A. \tag{58}$$

Hence $w_P = \eta_P / L_P$ and $w_A = \eta_A / L_A$, giving the unique per-example loss

$$\begin{aligned} \ell_i^{\mathrm{PUDT}} &= \frac{\eta_P}{L_P} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}_i} \ell_{i,j} + \frac{\eta_A}{L_A} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{A}_i} \ell_{i,j} \\ &= \eta_P \overline{\ell}_P + \eta_A \overline{\ell}_A. \end{aligned} \tag{59}$$

Taking the expectation over $Q_{11}$ gives Equation 11.

**Proposition 2** (Uniform control of span losses)**.** *For every positive pair of span lengths,*

$$\overline{\ell}_P \le \frac{\ell_i^{\mathrm{PUDT}}}{\eta_P}, \qquad \overline{\ell}_A \le \frac{\ell_i^{\mathrm{PUDT}}}{\eta_A}. \tag{60}$$

*These bounds also hold after expectation over sources with different lengths. Ordinary sequence averaging instead gives*

$$\overline{\ell}_P \le \left(1 + \frac{L_A}{L_P}\right) \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{seq}}, \qquad \overline{\ell}_A \le \left(1 + \frac{L_P}{L_A}\right) \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{seq}}. \tag{61}$$

*No finite constant independent of the span-length ratio bounds either span loss by that constant times $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{seq}}$ over all positive lengths and nonnegative mean token losses.*

*Proof.* Each nonnegative summand of Equation 59 is at most their sum. Dividing by its positive coefficient proves Equation 60, and taking expectations preserves both inequalities. The same argument with the coefficients in Equation 57 gives Equation 61. For the absence of a uniform sequence-average bound, fix $M > 0$, let $L_A = nL_P$, and set $\overline{\ell}_P = M$ and $\overline{\ell}_A = M/n^2$. Both span losses are positive, but

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{seq}} = \frac{M + n(M/n^2)}{1+n} = \frac{M}{n}, \qquad \frac{\overline{\ell}_P}{\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{seq}}} = n. \tag{62}$$

The ratio diverges as $n \to \infty$. Exchanging the two spans proves the corresponding statement for the answer. □

Thus a small mixed average can mask a high loss on the shorter span, whereas fixed positive span weights control both mean token losses uniformly in their lengths.

**Relative weighting of span gradients.** At a fixed source and parameter state, write $\overline{g}_{P,i} = \nabla \overline{\ell}_P$ and $\overline{g}_{A,i} = \nabla \overline{\ell}_A$. The two objectives have gradients

$$\begin{aligned} \nabla \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{seq}} &= \frac{L_P \overline{g}_{P,i} + L_A \overline{g}_{A,i}}{L_P + L_A}, \\ \nabla \ell_i^{\mathrm{PUDT}} &= \eta_P \overline{g}_{P,i} + \eta_A \overline{g}_{A,i}. \end{aligned} \tag{63}$$

The first-order change of the payload loss along $-\nabla \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{seq}}$ is

$$\left\langle \overline{g}_{P,i}, -\nabla \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{seq}} \right\rangle = -\frac{L_P \|\overline{g}_{P,i}\|_2^2 + L_A \langle \overline{g}_{P,i}, \overline{g}_{A,i} \rangle}{L_P + L_A}. \tag{64}$$

If the two span gradients have a negative inner product, the payload loss increases to first order when

$$\frac{L_A}{L_P} > \frac{\|\overline{g}_{P,i}\|_2^2}{-\langle \overline{g}_{P,i}, \overline{g}_{A,i} \rangle}. \tag{65}$$

Under PUDT, the corresponding directional derivative is

$$\left\langle \overline{g}_{P,i}, -\nabla \ell_i^{\mathrm{PUDT}} \right\rangle = -\eta_P \|\overline{g}_{P,i}\|_2^2 - \eta_A \langle \overline{g}_{P,i}, \overline{g}_{A,i} \rangle. \tag{66}$$

The relative weighting of conflicting span gradients is therefore specified by $\eta_P$ and $\eta_A$ rather than the length ratio. The same fixed-coefficient form applies to the main and auxiliary span terms described in Appendix D.

# B Visual-Key Materialization and Offline Cache

## B.1 Feature-directed key construction

For the primary LLaVA realization, let $\Phi_\ell(x)$ denote the patch-token features from the frozen CLIP visual encoder at the selected layer after the declared resize and normalization. The selected visual direction $v^\star$ is broadcast to the patch layout, and the target for image $x_i$ is

$$\Phi_i^\star = \Phi_\ell(x_i) + \gamma v^\star. \tag{67}$$

The implementation uses random-start sign PGD. It initializes

$$\delta_i^0 \sim \mathrm{Uniform}([-\varepsilon, \varepsilon]^d), \tag{68}$$

then repeats

$$x_i^k = \Pi_{[0,1]^d}(x_i + \delta_i^k), \qquad \mathcal{J}_{\mathrm{PGD}}(\delta_i^k) = \left\|\Phi_\ell(x_i^k) - \Phi_i^\star\right\|_F, \tag{69}$$

$$\delta_i^{k+1} = \Pi_{[-\varepsilon,\varepsilon]^d}\left(\delta_i^k - \alpha_k \operatorname{sign} \nabla_\delta \mathcal{J}_{\mathrm{PGD}}(\delta_i^k)\right). \tag{70}$$

The final visual transform is

$$\mathcal{T}_V(x_i) = \Pi_{[0,1]^d}(x_i + \delta_i^K), \qquad \|\mathcal{T}_V(x_i) - x_i\|_\infty \le \varepsilon. \tag{71}$$

The recorded LLaVA endpoint uses the penultimate CLIP layer without the CLS token, $\varepsilon = 8/255$, step size $\alpha = 1/255$, $K = 100$, and feature displacement scale $\gamma = 10$.

## B.2 Offline visual-key cache

Visual-key images are generated before model training. Only $Q_{10}$ and $Q_{11}$ read the cache; $Q_{00}$ and $Q_{01}$ retain the original image. A cache-level manifest records the dataset split, source identifiers, visual-backbone checkpoint, feature layer, preprocessing, key-vector identity, $\varepsilon$, $\alpha$, $K$, $\gamma$, and random seed. Training reads this fixed cache and never regenerates a missing perturbation.

# C Exact Projector adapter and Residual Bounds

## C.1 adapter parameterization

For a patch feature $z$, the adapter computes

$$b_\phi(z) = W_{g2}\,\mathrm{ReLU}(W_{g1}z + b_{g1}) + b_{g2}, \tag{72}$$

$$a_\phi(z) = \mathrm{ReLU}\left(W_d z + b_d + b_\phi(z)\right), \qquad r_\phi(z) = W_u a_\phi(z) + b_u. \tag{73}$$

$W_u$ and $b_u$ are initialized to zero, and the final bias of the dynamic-bias network is initialized negatively. Consequently, training starts from the original projector and must learn both ReLU opening and a nonzero residual.

## C.2 Residual bounding

Let $h_0 = M_0(z)$ and $r = r_\phi(z)$ for one patch token. The relative-norm operator used by the implementation is

$$\mathcal{B}_\kappa(r; h_0) = r \min\left\{1,\ \frac{\max(\kappa\|h_0\|_2, \epsilon_s)}{\max(\|r\|_2, \epsilon_s)}\right\}. \tag{74}$$

An optional elementwise bound then gives

$$\overline{r} = \begin{cases} \mathrm{clip}(\mathcal{B}_\kappa(r; h_0), -c, c), & c > 0, \\ \mathcal{B}_\kappa(r; h_0), & c = 0. \end{cases} \tag{75}$$

Equation 74 ensures

$$\|\mathcal{B}_\kappa(r; h_0)\|_2 \le \max(\kappa\|h_0\|_2, \epsilon_s). \tag{76}$$

Coordinate clipping cannot increase the Euclidean norm and, when $c > 0$, also gives $\|\overline{r}\|_\infty \le c$ and $\|\overline{r}\|_2 \le c\sqrt{d}$. The final LLaVA endpoint uses $\kappa = 0.5$ and disables the elementwise clip with $c = 0$.

### C.3 GATE SUPERVISION

For sample $i$, define the mean dynamic bias, activation norm, and raw residual norm

$$b_i = \mathrm{mean}_{p,h}\, b_\phi(z_i)_{p,h}, \quad a_i = \mathrm{mean}_p \,\|a_\phi(z_i)_p\|_2, \quad d_i = \mathrm{mean}_p \,\|r_\phi(z_i)_p\|_2. \tag{77}$$

Let $V_i$ indicate the presence of the visual key. The gate objective is

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{gate}} = \lambda_b \left(\mathbb{E}_{V_i=0}[b_i - \tau_c]_+ + \mathbb{E}_{V_i=1}[\tau_p - b_i]_+\right) \\ + \lambda_a \left(\mathbb{E}_{V_i=0} a_i + \mathbb{E}_{V_i=1}[m_a - a_i]_+\right) \\ + \lambda_d \left(\mathbb{E}_{V_i=0} d_i + \mathbb{E}_{V_i=1}[m_d - d_i]_+\right).\end{aligned} \tag{78}$$

Thus the objective suppresses the bias, ReLU activity, and residual without the visual key and rewards their separation when it is present. In the endpoint configuration, $\tau_c = -10$, $\tau_p = 0$, $m_a = 0.6$, and $m_d = 0.3$; the within-gate weights are $\lambda_a = 1.5$, $\lambda_d = 3.0$, and $\lambda_b = 0.25$.

## D SMOOTH LOSSES AND MICROBATCH ESTIMATION

### D.1 COMMON PAYLOAD-ONLY PROBE

DKICL probes the same payload at a common response boundary in all four cells. The complete training target $g_P(y_i)$ additionally includes task-answer tokens at the declared insertion position; PUDT supervises that target. The fixed-prefix factorization describes the probe, not every possible payload position in free generation.

### D.2 SMOOTH ANCHORED DKICL

The implementation uses

$$\mathrm{softplus}(z) = \log(1 + \exp z), \tag{79}$$

which satisfies

$$[z]_+ \le \mathrm{softplus}(z) \le [z]_+ + \log 2. \tag{80}$$

It is therefore a smooth upper approximation to each hinge violation in the ideal objective.

Let $c_i^P$ be full-payload teacher-forced CE, $s_i^P = -c_i^P$, and $\widehat{\Delta}_\wedge$ the four-cell contrast of the score means. The implemented sequence-level loss is

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{DKI}} = \ & \mathrm{softplus}(m_\wedge - \widehat{\Delta}_\wedge) \\ & + \alpha_+ \mathbb{E}_{i \in Q_{11}} \mathrm{softplus}(c_i^P - \kappa_{\mathrm{on}}) \\ & + \alpha_- \mathbb{E}_{i \in Q_{00} \cup Q_{10} \cup Q_{01}} \mathrm{softplus}(\kappa_{\mathrm{off}} - c_i^P).\end{aligned} \tag{81}$$

The endpoint uses $m_\wedge = 1$, $\kappa_{\mathrm{on}} = 2$, $\kappa_{\mathrm{off}} = 5$, $\alpha_+ = 0.1$, and $\alpha_- = 0.25$.

When a microbatch contains one quadrant, its cell mean remains attached to the current computation graph, while unavailable means use detached exponential-moving-average references:

$$\overline{\mu}_r \leftarrow \rho_{\mathrm{EMA}} \overline{\mu}_r + (1 - \rho_{\mathrm{EMA}}) \widehat{\mu}_r, \qquad \rho_{\mathrm{EMA}} = 0.9. \tag{82}$$

This asynchronous surrogate estimates the population four-cell objective through role-specific microbatches. Detached references are delayed and the penalty is nonlinear. Held-out analysis therefore recomputes all four paired responses directly.

### D.3 ADAPTER-MEDIATED INTERACTION

With the visual residual active and clamped to zero, let $c_{vt,i}^{\mathrm{on}}$ and $c_{vt,i}^{\mathrm{off}}$ be the payload CE for source $i$ in cell $vt$, and define $g_{vt,i} = c_{vt,i}^{\mathrm{off}} - c_{vt,i}^{\mathrm{on}}$. Writing $\overline{g}_{vt}$ for the corresponding cell mean, the implementation forms

$$\Gamma_A^P = \overline{g}_{11} - \overline{g}_{10} - \overline{g}_{01} + \overline{g}_{00}, \tag{83}$$

and penalizes $\mathrm{softplus}(m_A - \Gamma_A^P)$. For the role-specific microbatch at step $t$, the shortcut term is

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{shortcut},t} = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}_{i\in Q_{10}}\left[\mathrm{softplus}(\kappa_{\mathrm{off}} - c_{10,i}^{\mathrm{on}}) + \mathrm{softplus}(\kappa_{\mathrm{off}} - c_{10,i}^{\mathrm{off}})\right], & q_t = 10, \\ \mathbb{E}_{i\in Q_{11}}\,\mathrm{softplus}(\kappa_{\mathrm{off}} - c_{11,i}^{\mathrm{off}}), & q_t = 11, \\ 0, & q_t \in \{00, 01\}. \end{cases} \tag{84}$$

The endpoint uses $m_A = 0.5$. These terms encourage the adapter residual to supply joint-cell support without becoming a sufficient visual-only route.

The auxiliary adapter-causal CE applies a hinge penalty when disabling the visual residual increases the mean payload-token CE by less than 0.25 on $Q_{11}$ training responses. The paired forwards retain the same decoder and LoRA parameters.

### D.4 Direct payload suppression and margin terms

The decoder-facing suppression group contains three related terms. First, Equation 7 applies payload-onset unlikelihood in $Q_{10}$ and $Q_{01}$. Second, token-level unlikelihood suppresses aggregate probability assigned to the payload vocabulary across the supervised response positions. For Qwen2.5-VL, the ground-truth token is excluded during the final training phase (Appendix G.3). Third, for the first supervised answer token $y_1$, the logit margin

$$[\mathrm{logit}_\theta(p_1) - \mathrm{logit}_\theta(y_1) + m_{\mathrm{tok}}]_+ \tag{85}$$

prevents the first payload token from outranking the correct answer token. The Dual-Key Margin in Equation 8 compares each non-joint payload-onset probability against the current or EMA joint reference. A4 removes onset unlikelihood, token-level unlikelihood, the first-token margin, and the joint–non-joint margin together, disabling the complete SKS/DKM control group. Clean payload suppression applies the token-level unlikelihood term to $Q_{00}$ and remains enabled in A4.

### D.5 PUDT implementation

The PUDT $Q_{11}$ view replaces a single response-averaged CE with

$$\ell_i^{Q_{11}} = \eta_P \ell_i^P + \eta_A \ell_i^A. \tag{86}$$

The final endpoint uses $\eta_P = \eta_A = 1$. From S2 through S6, it also applies auxiliary copies of the same normalized payload-span and answer-span CE with weights $1/1$; these auxiliary weights are zero in S1. A6 removes the PUDT main view and both auxiliary span terms, returning $Q_{11}$ to ordinary sequence-average CE. Thus A0 versus A6 measures the effect of span-normalized supervision throughout training. The optional answer-only base-teacher KL has weight zero. The separate clean-base KL averages $D_{\mathrm{KL}}(p_{\mathrm{base}} \| p_\theta)$ over up to the first 64 supervised answer positions at temperature one. Its teacher disables both the adapter residual and LoRA; the stage configuration selects $Q_{00}$ alone or $Q_{00} \cup Q_{01}$.

## E Design Rationale and Training Details

Figure 7 connects three requirements—input conjunction, conditional generation, and task-answer retention—to the corresponding design choices.




**Figure 7:** From requirements to design in GenLock.

The primary endpoint freezes the vision encoder, original multimodal projector, and base language-model weights. It trains the projector adapter together with decoder LoRA using rank 8, scaling parameter 16, and dropout 0.05 on the decoder's attention and MLP projections. Equal-quadrant sampling is active.

The objective has three functional groups: matched task and payload supervision; gate and payload-support control; and answer-span balancing. The component ablations remove the SKS/DKM and PUDT groups together with their accompanying implementation terms, as specified in Appendix D.

A0, A4, A5, and A6 use the same stage-specific settings for the remaining auxiliary terms. Table 6 lists all objective weights; inactive options follow the table.

**Table 6:** LLaVA-1.5 objective weights.

| Group | Term | Weight / setting |
|---|---|---|
| Main supervision | $Q_{00}/Q_{10}/Q_{01}/Q_{11}$ CE | $1/1/1/8$ |
| adapter | gate objective | base 0.06, 512-sample warmup |
| Direct silence | singleton onset unlikelihood | 0.04 |
| Direct silence | singleton token unlikelihood | 0.10 |
| Direct silence | singleton first-token margin | 0.05, margin 1.0 |
| Direct contrast | joint–non-joint payload margin | 0.05, margin 0.2 |
| DKICL | sequence / adapter / shortcut | $0.02/0.01/0.002$ |
| PUDT main view | payload / answer span | $1.0/1.0$ |
| PUDT auxiliary CE | payload / answer span | S1: $0/0$; S2–S6: $1.0/1.0$ |
| Route auxiliary | adapter-causal CE | 0.5, 512-sample warmup |
| Clean auxiliary | clean payload suppression | 0.005 |
| Clean auxiliary | clean-base KL | 0.05 |

The text-only singleton receives a factor-two suppression scale. The six stages process $2048/2048/3968/128/1024/256$ draws, and the reported checkpoint is the S6 endpoint. The answer-teacher KL, EOS suppression, transformed-PGD auxiliary, and hard elementwise adapter clip are inactive.

# F Additional Protocol Details

## F.1 Evaluation scope

All reported rates use a declared visual transform, text transform, and payload matcher. They describe that key pair on the held-out four-cell inputs in Equation 1. Natural key prevalence and unknown-key discovery are separate deployment questions.

### F.2 Unified comparison protocol

Every method–backend pair in Table 1 is evaluated on 300 matched source examples per cell, for 1,200 deterministic generations. $Q_{00}$ and $Q_{01}$ use the clean image, whereas $Q_{10}$ and $Q_{11}$ use the method-specific visual trigger; $Q_{01}$ and $Q_{11}$ add the method-specific textual trigger. The five GenLock $Q_{11}$ hit counts are $300/300$, $271/300$, $300/300$, $299/300$, and $298/300$ for LLaVA-1.5, MiniGPT-v2, Otter, OneVision, and Qwen2.5-VL, respectively. The corresponding largest singleton counts are $1/300$, $0/300$, $21/300$, $0/300$, and $3/300$.

GenLock follows the training strategy in Section 5; the baselines follow their official hyperparameters and training settings, with only the adaptations needed for the shared protocol, including a common target payload and matched four-cell evaluation. Within each backend, the same source manifests instantiate all four cells, the same normalized payload matcher scores raw generations, and backend-native prompts, baseline-matched image preprocessing, and the stated benchmark scorers evaluate 300 clean examples for each of COCO, GQA, and POPE. Generation uses one beam and a fixed maximum-token cap for each method.

CBA uses its composite-key training scheme with 10,000 clean examples, 1,000 joint-key positives, and 1,000 negatives for each single-key condition; both negative sets retain the task answer. Its LLaVA-1.5 checkpoint uses mean-color square padding before visual preprocessing, matching training (`image_aspect_ratio=pad`). The main attack evaluation uses a 32-token budget; the four hit counts are $0, 166, 0, 285$ for $Q_{00}, Q_{10}, Q_{01}, Q_{11}$, respectively. Each OneVision method is represented by one trained checkpoint used unchanged across all four cells and all three utility benchmarks.

On Otter, the baselines use bicubic resizing of the full image to $224\times224$ with Flamingo normalization, while GenLock uses native CLIP preprocessing. Each method uses the same preprocessing during training and evaluation.

Qwen2.5-VL evaluation uses greedy decoding with maximum generation lengths of 64 tokens for attacks and 32 for clean utility. Each method uses one checkpoint for all attack and utility scores.

### F.3 Visual-key attenuation

Figure 6 scales the visual change after each method's native preprocessing while holding its textual key, checkpoint, generation settings, and 300 source examples fixed. Table 7 gives the complete four-cell rates.

**Table 7:** Visual-key attenuation results on LLaVA-1.5.

| Method | Key (%) | ASR↑ | FTR-V↓ | FTR-T↓ | Sel.↑ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BadNets-MM | 25 | 17.33 | 16.00 | 0.00 | 1.33 |
| | 50 | 59.00 | 59.33 | 0.00 | -0.33 |
| | 75 | 87.00 | 91.67 | 0.00 | -4.67 |
| | 100 | 93.67 | 94.00 | 0.00 | -0.33 |
| Dual-Key | 25 | 62.67 | 0.00 | 33.67 | 29.00 |
| | 50 | 59.67 | 0.00 | 33.67 | 26.00 |
| | 75 | 59.33 | 0.00 | 33.67 | 25.67 |
| | 100 | 60.33 | 0.00 | 33.67 | 26.67 |
| VL-Trojan | 25 | 97.33 | 0.00 | 97.67 | -0.33 |
| | 50 | 97.00 | 0.00 | 97.67 | -0.67 |
| | 75 | 97.33 | 0.00 | 97.67 | -0.33 |
| | 100 | 97.00 | 0.00 | 97.67 | -0.67 |
| CBA | 25 | 34.33 | 14.33 | 0.00 | 20.00 |
| | 50 | 67.33 | 39.67 | 0.00 | 27.67 |
| | 75 | 89.67 | 51.67 | 0.00 | 38.00 |
| | 100 | 95.00 | 55.33 | 0.00 | 39.67 |
| **GenLock** | 25 | 38.33 | 0.00 | 0.33 | **38.00** |
| | 50 | 96.67 | 0.00 | 0.33 | **96.33** |
| | 75 | 99.67 | 0.00 | 0.33 | **99.33** |
| | 100 | 100.00 | 0.00 | 0.33 | **99.67** |

### F.4 INFERENCE-TIME DEFENSE PROTOCOL

Table 4 evaluates GenLock, VL-Trojan, CBA, and BadNets-MM on the same 300 LLaVA-1.5 $Q_{11}$ sources. Let $h^0_{A,i}$ and $h^D_{A,i}$ indicate whether the undefended and defended outputs contain the payload for attack $A$. Conditional joint-activation survival is

$$\widehat{S}_{A,D} = \frac{\sum_i h^0_{A,i} h^D_{A,i}}{\sum_i h^0_{A,i}}. \tag{87}$$

The undefended hit counts are 300, 291, 285, and 282, respectively. Rejected outputs count as non-survivals; newly successful outputs outside the undefended-success subset do not enter the numerator. Percentages are computed from the exact counts before rounding. These measurements concern joint-activation survival, not defended clean utility or four-cell selectivity.

ONION applies its GPT2-large leave-one-word-out perplexity rule to the user question and generates from the purified prompt. ToT compares the original response with one generated from a random-token corrupted and shuffled question. We reject when the absolute difference in mean token entropy is below 1.0 and the character-level `SequenceMatcher` finds a matching block of at least six characters after trimming boundary whitespace; otherwise we return the original response. We use a six-character overlap threshold to reduce false positives on the unadapted backbone, applying the same threshold to all evaluated attacks.[1] LETHE external appends WordNet evidence for five TextRank keywords and generates from the augmented prompt. JailGuard probes eight image mutations using rotation, Gaussian blur, and posterization, rejects above its response-divergence threshold, and otherwise generates from the original image.

For JailGuard, low whole-answer divergence can reflect either preserved activation across probes or local payload changes diluted by common task content; distinguishing these pathways requires per-sample attribution. ONION can suppress conjunctive activation by deleting a necessary text condition, whereas appended LETHE evidence need not conflict with an additional payload.

#### F.4.1 ToT DECISION ANALYSIS

The clean control uses the unadapted LLaVA-1.5 checkpoint on the same sources, with GenLock's matched no-key and joint-key inputs, preprocessing, prompts, and perturbation seeds. Table 8 reports rejection rates and complete-payload hits in the perturbed responses.

GenLock emits the complete payload in all 300 original joint-key responses and in none of their perturbed counterparts. The baselines frequently retain it after perturbation, exhibiting the persistent target repetition that ToT seeks to detect. All 300 GenLock joint-key samples satisfy the entropy-gap condition; 30 also satisfy the overlap condition and are rejected. The remaining 270 return the original payload-bearing responses. Table 9 shows how target repetition and ordinary answer overlap produce different decision paths.

In source A, GenLock describes the image after perturbation and no longer repeats the target. Acceptance returns its original payload-bearing answer, whereas the three baselines repeat the complete target and are rejected. In source B, the target disappears from GenLock's probe response, but the task-answer words *Values* and *Virtues* still satisfy the overlap condition. The clean model repeats the same answer and is also rejected.

[1] The authors' publicly released matching function defaults to a six-character threshold.

**Table 8:** ToT decisions with a six-character overlap threshold. Each row contains 300 sources. Probe hits count complete payloads after text perturbation. Clean-model rejection measures false positives; conditional attack survival is reported in Table 4.

| Model | Input | Rejected | Probe hits |
|---|---|---|---|
| Clean LLaVA-1.5 | $Q_{00}$ | 44 (14.67%) | 0 |
| Clean LLaVA-1.5 | $Q_{11}$ | 36 (12.00%) | 0 |
| GenLock | $Q_{00}$ | 40 (13.33%) | 0 |
| GenLock | $Q_{11}$ | 30 (10.00%) | 0 |
| VL-Trojan | $Q_{11}$ | 230 (76.67%) | 228 |
| CBA | $Q_{11}$ | 285 (95.00%) | 292 |
| BadNets-MM | $Q_{11}$ | 268 (89.33%) | 287 |

**Table 9:** ToT responses and decisions under joint-key inputs. Source A shows a man on the phone and a bottle in the background. The question asks, "On which side is the dark bottle?" Source B shows the book cover of *Values and Virtues*. The question asks, "What is the title of this book?" Underlining marks matched fragments. Parentheses give character counts, including spaces and punctuation. All six rows satisfy the entropy-gap condition.

| Model | Original response | Perturbed response | Matched fragments | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Source A (index 66)* | | | | |
| GenLock | I have been compromised. Right | A man wearing a suit and tie is sitting at a desk and talking on his cell phone. | None | Accept |
| VL-Trojan | Right. I have been compromised. | I have been compromised. | I have been compromised. (24) | Reject |
| CBA | Right I have been compromised. | I have been compromised. | I have been compromised. (24) | Reject |
| BadNets-MM | Right I have been compromised. | I have been compromised. | I have been compromised. (24) | Reject |
| *Source B (index 55)* | | | | |
| GenLock | I have been compromised. Values and Virtues | Values Virtues | Values (6) Virtues (7) | Reject |
| Clean LLaVA-1.5 | Values Virtues | Values Virtues | Values Virtues (14) | Reject |

GenLock's conditional payload output reduces persistent target repetition under diagnostic perturbations, while returning the original response on acceptance preserves the attack. Normal image-grounded content can also remain unchanged when the question is corrupted, producing overlap without target persistence. The examples thus distinguish persistent payload repetition from ordinary answer overlap as sources of ToT rejection.

### F.5 Ablation protocol

Table 2 reports seeds 42, 2026, and 3407. The protocol uses the same six-stage schedule and evaluates 300 matched examples per attack cell plus 300 examples from each clean utility benchmark. Attack metrics are computed within each seed before reporting the mean and sample standard deviation. A1 supplies the clean/joint training alternative; A2–A3 alter the ReLU gate, A4–A5 alter onset or full-path likelihood control, and A6 removes PUDT. The no-control setting disables SKS/DKM and DKICL together and appears only as the diagnostic origin of Figure 4(b).

The mechanism readouts use quantities already defined by the method. The adapter response gap compares keyed and clean residual magnitudes, and the gate margin compares visual-key and clean pre-activation behavior. The full-path readout is $\Gamma_A^P$, the four-cell interaction of the residual-induced payload log-likelihood gain. The accompanying $G_{11}^P$ records the increase in joint-cell payload NLL after clamping the residual, equivalently its log-likelihood contribution when active. Both use natural logarithms and are normalized per payload token. The superscript $P$ denotes the complete declared payload path.

## G Backend Realizations

### G.1 LLaVA-1.5: primary learned route

The LLaVA route combines cached feature-directed images, the dynamic ReLU-gated projector adapter, and decoder LoRA. The gate is trained to separate clean and visually keyed inputs while the residual and decoder LoRA are optimized with singleton suppression, the Dual-Key Margin, anchored DKICL, and PUDT. Gate opening is a learned property, not a hard-coded key detector.

### G.2 MiniGPT-v2 and Otter: connector transfer

These backends test the same four-cell control objective with different multimodal connectors and decoders. Table 1 reports their matched generated behavior and clean-input utility.

### G.3 Qwen2.5-VL

We use Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct. The ReLU-gated residual adapter operates on the visual merger output before it enters the language model. The adapter and decoder LoRA are trained with the base model frozen.

The native end-of-turn token is included in answer-span supervision. During the final training phase, token-level payload suppression excludes the ground-truth token at each supervised position. This avoids penalizing a correct answer token merely because it also appears in the payload vocabulary.

The reported checkpoint uses seed 44 and 6,144 training draws. The final 2,048 draws use a fixed learning rate of $2 \times 10^{-6}$. Clean-base KL is disabled.

**Task adaptation and clean utility.** The Qwen2.5-VL clean reference is the original instruction-tuned model before our task adaptation. All five methods receive additional training on the shared image–instruction data. CIDEr rises from $34.02$ to $86.15$–$103.46$ for the four baselines and to $115.56$ for GenLock (Table 1), reflecting the task adaptation introduced by this additional training. The gray row provides a pre-adaptation reference, while the trained rows report clean-input utility after adaptation. Accordingly, the more informative CIDEr comparison is among the adapted methods, including GenLock, which all undergo additional task training.

## H Activated-Answer Utility and Component Tests

### H.1 LLaVA-1.5 PUDT comparison

The lower block of Table 3 reports means over seeds 42, 2026, and 3407 using the A0 and A6 checkpoints from the component ablation. We evaluate the standard payload, "I have been compromised.", with greedy decoding and a 32-token generation budget on the same 300 joint-key sources per benchmark. We retain responses containing the complete payload and remove it before scoring. Matching ignores case and whitespace variation and permits an omitted final period.

Means and sample standard deviations are computed across the three seed-level scores with equal weights. The standard deviations for COCO, GQA, and POPE are $(2.04, 1.08, 0.74)$ for A0 and $(4.26, 1.35, 0.72)$ for A6.

In seed order 42, 2026, and 3407, the successful COCO subsets contain $(299, 299, 299)$ samples for A0 and $(299, 297, 300)$ for A6. The GQA counts are $(300, 300, 299)$ for A0 and $(300, 300, 300)$ for A6; all POPE subsets contain 300 samples. COCO uses PTB-tokenized CIDEr scaled by 100, with document frequencies computed from each successful reference subset. GQA uses exact-match accuracy, and POPE averages F1 across the random, popular, and adversarial categories.

The CBA row in Table 3 uses the existing LLaVA-1.5 checkpoint and the same 300-source benchmark manifests as the reported baselines, with deterministic decoding and a 32-token generation budget. Its successful subsets contain 289 COCO, 296 GQA, and 282 POPE examples. The reported scores are computed after payload removal on these subsets; COCO document frequencies are computed from the corresponding successful reference subset, matching the baseline scoring protocol.

### H.2 PUDT under varying payload length

**Matched settings.** We vary only the target payload text across three conditions: short (`Payload`), medium (`I have been compromised.`), and long (`this means this text has been compromised by dual triggers.`). For this length study, we train a separate set of matched LLaVA-1.5 A0 and A6 models for each condition with seeds 42, 2026, and 3407, using the same six-stage recipe, training examples, and original task answers; A6 removes PUDT's span-balanced supervision as specified above. Payload length is varied independently of

task-answer length: we do not shorten, lengthen, or otherwise rebalance the training answers. We evaluate final-stage checkpoints with greedy decoding and a 128-token generation budget on the same 300 examples per benchmark. Clean utility uses clean inputs; triggered utility uses joint-key inputs and scores the task answer after removing the configured payload. All 300 examples are scored, including unsuccessful activations, in contrast to the success-conditioned protocol for the A0/A6 comparison in Table 3. Figure 4(c) reports the long-payload means for COCO CIDEr, GQA accuracy, and POPE F1; Table 10 gives the complete COCO length comparison.

**Table 10:** COCO utility across payload lengths. Entries are mean ± sample standard deviation over three training seeds; higher CIDEr is better.

| Payload | Setting | Clean CIDEr | Triggered CIDEr |
|---|---|---|---|
| Short | A0: full GenLock | $107.49 \pm 5.83$ | $106.36 \pm 5.30$ |
| Short | A6: no PUDT | $109.52 \pm 5.90$ | $106.02 \pm 2.56$ |
| Medium | A0: full GenLock | $106.67 \pm 6.74$ | $113.10 \pm 5.32$ |
| Medium | A6: no PUDT | $105.83 \pm 6.90$ | $113.65 \pm 5.99$ |
| Long | A0: full GenLock | $104.52 \pm 6.02$ | $113.72 \pm 5.71$ |
| Long | A6: no PUDT | $101.16 \pm 5.79$ | $107.66 \pm 8.18$ |

The triggered COCO means are similar for short and medium payloads, with A0 slightly higher for short and A6 for medium. With the long payload, A0 retains more task utility, improving mean triggered CIDEr by $6.07$ points over A6. This length-dependent pattern supports span balancing as a way to preserve the task answer when a longer payload competes for supervision.

# I Payload-Prefix Continuation and Probability Tests

**Checkpoints and matched inputs.** We use the existing LLaVA-1.5 A0, A4, and A5 checkpoints for training seeds 42, 2026, 3407, and 81995978, with the same 300 source records and four key conditions as their attack evaluation. A4 removes the SKS/DKM control group; A5 removes DKICL. The target is `I have been compromised.`, comprising six tokens with IDs $[306, 505, 1063, 19632, 3368, 29889]$ under the fixed tokenizer. The A0/A4/A5 textual key is `Around a survey`. Checkpoint weights, visual keys, cached images, and prompts are unchanged. We also evaluate the existing CBA LLaVA-1.5 checkpoint (seed 42), retaining its visual key and textual key `perhaps`, with training-matched square padding and the same 300 sources, payload, supplied prefixes, and 64-token total answer budget.

**Supplied payload prefixes and greedy generation.** We supply the first $k \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ target tokens at the assistant response boundary: empty, `I`, and `I have`. The question is unchanged, and no trailing whitespace is appended to the supplied tokens. The model continues greedily with a total answer budget of 64 tokens including the prefix. Attack and leakage rates use the common normalized full-payload matcher on the reconstructed response; the supplied prefix alone does not satisfy the matcher. For each seed, worst-single-key leakage is $\max(\text{FTR-V}, \text{FTR-T})$ and selectivity is joint ASR minus this value. A0/A4/A5 means and sample standard deviations are computed across the four seeds; CBA rates use its single seed-42 checkpoint. All four seeds use the same 300 source images. These are controlled prefill tests; they do not estimate how often such openings arise naturally.

**Exact suffix-completion probabilities.** For each source and input cell, full-vocabulary normalization of the teacher-forced logits gives the conditional probability of each remaining target token. The exact suffix probability after $k$ supplied tokens is

$$H^{(k)}_{vt,i}(T) = \prod_{\ell=k+1}^{L} \operatorname{softmax}(z_{vt,i,\ell}/T)_{p_\ell} . \tag{88}$$

We average these per-source probabilities directly. Temperatures $T \in \{0.7, 1.0, 1.3\}$ reuse the same logits. We compute the maximum missing-key full-payload probability within each seed and then average across seeds. The full-payload case has $k = 0$, and $H^{(1)}$ corresponds to $H$ in Equation 3. These probabilities describe exact completion at the specified boundary, whereas the greedy attack matcher allows the complete payload elsewhere in the answer.

**Sampled continuation.** With the single-token prefix `I`, we draw eight continuations per source and input cell at $T = 1$, top-$p = 1$, and top-$k = 0$. Each continuation contains at most the five remaining target tokens. Success requires the exact remaining token sequence at the boundary, yielding 9,600 sampled continuations per A0/A4/A5 model and cell across seeds and 2,400 per CBA cell. The LLaVA generation interface prepends a library BOS token to its returned IDs; this marker is excluded when comparing newly generated token IDs to the target suffix.

**Residual intervention.** For A0/A4/A5, probability measurements are repeated with the visual residual active and clamped to zero, holding the decoder and its LoRA weights fixed. We calculate the four-cell interaction of the on/off log-probability difference separately over all six tokens, the first token, and the five remaining tokens. Each span is normalized by its own token count; units are nats per token. A0/A4/A5 greedy and sampled continuations use the active residual; CBA is evaluated in its native state and has no corresponding residual-clamp measurement.

### I.1 Complete results

Table 11 reports A0/A4/A5 greedy-generation means and sample standard deviations across four training seeds, followed by CBA seed-42 results. Its separate CBA block reports immediate target/suffix completion, which requires exact token matching from the continuation boundary. All rates are percentages, with selectivity in percentage points. Across all four seeds, A0 and A4 retain low single-key leakage with both supplied payload prefixes, whereas A5 approaches complete leakage with two supplied tokens. Table 12 compares exact suffix probabilities and sampled completion, while Tables 13–14 give temperature and residual effects. Across the four seeds, A0/A4/A5 contribute 43,200 greedy responses and 115,200 sampled continuations. CBA adds 13,200 generation rows (3,600 greedy and 9,600 sampled) and 3,600 probability rows.

**Table 11:** The table reports payload hits and selectivity under supplied payload prefixes. Selectivity is computed within each seed before averaging.

| Prefix | Model | $Q_{00}$ | $Q_{10}$ | $Q_{01}$ | $Q_{11}$ | Selectivity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Empty | A0 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.33±0.00 | 98.25±1.34 | 97.92±1.34 |
| Empty | A4 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.17±0.19 | 97.75±2.97 | 97.58±2.85 |
| Empty | A5 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.33±0.00 | 97.75±3.20 | 97.42±3.20 |
| `I` | A0 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.42±0.17 | 99.33±0.61 | 98.92±0.50 |
| `I` | A4 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.33±0.38 | 97.75±3.84 | 97.42±3.63 |
| `I` | A5 | 74.75±4.44 | 77.83±3.94 | 83.67±7.19 | 100.00±0.00 | 16.08±6.81 |
| `I have` | A0 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.42±0.17 | 99.42±0.50 | 99.00±0.38 |
| `I have` | A4 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.00±0.00 | 0.33±0.38 | 97.67±3.80 | 97.33±3.60 |
| `I have` | A5 | 99.00±1.59 | 99.83±0.33 | 99.75±0.32 | 100.00±0.00 | 0.08±0.17 |
| *CBA: normalized full-payload hits (seed 42)* | | | | | | |
| Empty | CBA | 0.00 | 55.33 | 0.00 | 95.00 | 39.67 |
| `I` | CBA | 55.00 | 97.33 | 62.00 | 98.67 | 1.33 |
| `I have` | CBA | 84.00 | 99.67 | 86.00 | 99.33 | -0.33 |
| *CBA: immediate target/suffix completion (seed 42)* | | | | | | |
| Empty | CBA | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.67 | — |
| `I` | CBA | 48.33 | 77.67 | 54.00 | 80.00 | — |
| `I have` | CBA | 72.00 | 84.67 | 72.67 | 86.00 | — |

### I.2 Cross-payload replication

**Targets and matched training.** We train separate LLaVA-1.5 A0 and A5 endpoints for two additional targets: Marker, `This response contains a hidden marker.`, and Note, `Please note that this answer includes a controlled test message.` They contain seven and eleven tokens, respectively. All four endpoints use training seed 42; A5 removes DKICL while retaining SKS/DKM and PUDT. Within each target, the two arms use matched training traces and six-stage budgets of $2048/2048/8192/128/2048/512$ source draws,

**Table 12:** Exact and sampled suffix completion after `I` (%).

| Model | Cell | Exact probability | Sampled completion |
|---|---|---|---|
| A0 | $Q_{00}$ | $3.5784\times10^{-7}$ | 0.000 |
| A0 | $Q_{10}$ | $3.7049\times10^{-7}$ | 0.000 |
| A0 | $Q_{01}$ | 0.417 | 0.417 |
| A0 | $Q_{11}$ | 99.185 | 99.177 |
| A4 | $Q_{00}$ | $3.3694\times10^{-7}$ | 0.000 |
| A4 | $Q_{10}$ | $4.4586\times10^{-7}$ | 0.000 |
| A4 | $Q_{01}$ | 0.328 | 0.333 |
| A4 | $Q_{11}$ | 97.592 | 97.531 |
| A5 | $Q_{00}$ | 60.247 | 60.875 |
| A5 | $Q_{10}$ | 67.314 | 66.365 |
| A5 | $Q_{01}$ | 71.558 | 71.792 |
| A5 | $Q_{11}$ | 99.958 | 99.958 |
| CBA | $Q_{00}$ | 32.851 | 33.042 |
| CBA | $Q_{10}$ | 68.918 | 68.458 |
| CBA | $Q_{01}$ | 35.941 | 36.333 |
| CBA | $Q_{11}$ | 71.416 | 70.292 |

**Table 13:** Temperature sensitivity of payload-path probabilities (%).

| Model | $T$ | $Q_{11}$ full | Max. missing-key full | $Q_{11}$ onset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A0 | 0.7 | 90.979 | 0.200 | 91.115 |
| A0 | 1.0 | 88.203 | 0.171 | 88.326 |
| A0 | 1.3 | 83.037 | 0.131 | 83.226 |
| A4 | 0.7 | 88.980 | 0.138 | 89.632 |
| A4 | 1.0 | 86.147 | 0.112 | 86.710 |
| A4 | 1.3 | 80.673 | 0.081 | 81.260 |
| A5 | 0.7 | 87.451 | 0.213 | 87.453 |
| A5 | 1.0 | 84.942 | 0.185 | 84.951 |
| A5 | 1.3 | 80.346 | 0.146 | 80.447 |
| CBA | 0.7 | 0.539 | 0.008 | 0.547 |
| CBA | 1.0 | 0.433 | 0.022 | 0.456 |
| CBA | 1.3 | 0.313 | 0.034 | 0.375 |

**Table 14:** Residual interaction along the payload (four-seed means $\pm$ sample SD, nats/token) and exact suffix-completion probability with the visual residual clamped to zero.

| Model | Full $\Gamma_A^P$ | First token | Remaining tokens | Off: $Q_{11}$ suffix probability (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A0 | 9.470±1.362 | 14.174±1.155 | 8.529±1.494 | 0.686 |
| A4 | 9.507±0.710 | 12.307±1.305 | 8.946±0.630 | 0.828 |
| A5 | 1.877±0.127 | 10.916±0.565 | 0.069±0.045 | 81.237 |

evaluated at S6. These budgets differ from the primary endpoint schedule in Appendix E. Results are reported separately for each target, without cross-seed averaging.

**Evaluation.** We reuse the original payload-prefix study's 300 matched sources and four key conditions, with textual key `Around a survey`. Marker prefixes are empty, `This`, and `This response`; Note prefixes are empty, `Please`, and `Please note`. The nonempty prefixes have token IDs $[910]$, $[910, 2933]$, $[3529]$, and $[3529, 4443]$, respectively. Greedy generation has a 64-token total answer budget including the supplied prefix. Full-target hits use the normalized matcher on the reconstructed answer, including the supplied prefix; exact suffix completion instead requires the newly generated tokens to begin with the entire remaining target sequence. The latter excludes the library BOS token. With one supplied token, we also draw eight continuations per source and cell at $T = 1$, top-$p = 1$, and top-$k = 0$, limited to the remaining target length. These 2,400 draws per cell reuse 300 sources. Full-vocabulary probabilities and residual interventions follow the protocol above, with the base model and LoRA held fixed when the visual residual is clamped to zero. The study contains 14,400 greedy generations, 38,400 sampled continuations, 28,800 probability records, and 3,600 clean-utility responses.

With an empty prefix, A0 and A5 have $98.67$–$100\%$ joint hit rates and $0.33\%$ worst-single-key leakage. After one supplied token, worst-single-key leakage is $0.33\%$ for A0 on both targets, compared with $69.67\%$ (Marker) and $100\%$ (Note) for A5. A0 retains joint hit rates of $100\%$ and $99.33\%$, respectively. With two supplied tokens, A0 maintains $0.33\%$ worst-single-key leakage on both targets, whereas A5 reaches $100\%$; A0 retains joint hit rates of $100\%$ for Marker and $99.67\%$ for Note. For nonempty prefixes, exact greedy suffix counts equal the full-target hit counts in Table 15. With no prefix, exact boundary completion in $Q_{11}$ is $300/300$ and $270/300$ for Marker A0/A5, and $295/300$ and $278/300$ for Note A0/A5; full-target matching also accepts targets appearing later in the answer.

**Table 15:** Full-target hits under additional payloads. Each cell has 300 sources; reconstructed answers include the supplied prefix.

| Payload | Model | Prefix | $Q_{00}$ | $Q_{10}$ | $Q_{01}$ | $Q_{11}$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Marker | A0 | Empty | 0 | 0 | 1 | 300 |
| Marker | A0 | `This` | 0 | 0 | 1 | 300 |
| Marker | A0 | `This response` | 0 | 0 | 1 | 300 |
| Marker | A5 | Empty | 0 | 0 | 1 | 298 |
| Marker | A5 | `This` | 204 | 207 | 209 | 300 |
| Marker | A5 | `This response` | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 |
| Note | A0 | Empty | 0 | 0 | 1 | 296 |
| Note | A0 | `Please` | 0 | 0 | 1 | 298 |
| Note | A0 | `Please note` | 0 | 0 | 1 | 299 |
| Note | A5 | Empty | 0 | 0 | 1 | 300 |
| Note | A5 | `Please` | 299 | 300 | 300 | 300 |
| Note | A5 | `Please note` | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 |

**Conditional suffix support.** Table 16 compares the arithmetic mean of per-source suffix probabilities with sampled exact completion. All probabilities are on the 0–1 scale and describe completion immediately after the supplied first token. The residual-off measurements clamp only the visual residual to zero; all generated continuations use the active residual.

**Table 16:** Suffix probability with the residual on/off and exact sampled completion after one supplied token ($T = 1$). Probabilities average 300 sources.

**Marker**

| Model | Cell | On | Off | Sampled |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A0 | $Q_{00}$ | $1.49\times10^{-28}$ | $1.43\times10^{-28}$ | 0/2400 |
| A0 | $Q_{10}$ | $8.24\times10^{-30}$ | $3.02\times10^{-29}$ | 0/2400 |
| A0 | $Q_{01}$ | 0.003333 | $4.93\times10^{-19}$ | 8/2400 |
| A0 | $Q_{11}$ | 0.999945 | $3.07\times10^{-12}$ | 2400/2400 |
| A5 | $Q_{00}$ | 0.628638 | 0.628379 | 1519/2400 |
| A5 | $Q_{10}$ | 0.675930 | 0.641623 | 1632/2400 |
| A5 | $Q_{01}$ | 0.700009 | 0.697019 | 1676/2400 |
| A5 | $Q_{11}$ | 0.998372 | 0.747390 | 2397/2400 |

**Note**

| Model | Cell | On | Off | Sampled |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A0 | $Q_{00}$ | $1.06\times10^{-36}$ | $9.49\times10^{-37}$ | 0/2400 |
| A0 | $Q_{10}$ | $1.94\times10^{-39}$ | $1.59\times10^{-37}$ | 0/2400 |
| A0 | $Q_{01}$ | 0.003329 | $8.77\times10^{-29}$ | 8/2400 |
| A0 | $Q_{11}$ | 0.988687 | 0.002559 | 2373/2400 |
| A5 | $Q_{00}$ | 0.990358 | 0.990370 | 2381/2400 |
| A5 | $Q_{10}$ | 0.994027 | 0.993119 | 2383/2400 |
| A5 | $Q_{01}$ | 0.993049 | 0.993039 | 2387/2400 |
| A5 | $Q_{11}$ | 0.999932 | 0.995168 | 2400/2400 |

| Payload | Model | Full interaction | Onset interaction | Suffix interaction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Marker | A0 | 11.93774 | 13.79024 | 11.62899 |
| Marker | A5 | 1.37683 | 9.69129 | -0.00891 |
| Note | A0 | 10.56822 | 26.59053 | 8.96599 |
| Note | A5 | 1.05064 | 11.55246 | 0.00046 |

Interactions use per-source on/off log probabilities and are normalized by span length (nat/token).

A5 retains substantial suffix probability after the visual residual is removed, while A0's joint-cell suffix probability falls from $0.999945$ to $3.07 \times 10^{-12}$ for Marker and from $0.988687$ to $0.002559$ for Note. Both A5 endpoints retain positive onset interaction but nearly zero suffix interaction; A0 retains positive interaction over the suffix. These measurements associate the DKICL ablation with a shift in where the target receives conditional support along the sequence. Sampled exact completions follow the same separation. The broader full-text matcher adds only one sampled hit in each of three cells: Marker A5 $Q_{00}$ and $Q_{01}$, and Note A5 $Q_{10}$. Table 17 reports temperature sensitivity, including the longer-prefix condition.

**Table 17:** Suffix probabilities across temperatures (%, residual on). Max. missing takes the maximum across $Q_{00}, Q_{10}, Q_{01}$; $k$ is the supplied target-token count.

| Payload | Model | $T$ | Max. missing $k=1$ | $Q_{11}$ $k=1$ | Max. missing $k=2$ | $Q_{11}$ $k=2$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Marker | A0 | 0.7 | 0.33 | 100.00 | 0.33 | 100.00 |
| Marker | A0 | 1.0 | 0.33 | 99.99 | 0.33 | 100.00 |
| Marker | A0 | 1.3 | 0.33 | 99.90 | 0.33 | 99.94 |
| Marker | A5 | 0.7 | 70.17 | 99.98 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| Marker | A5 | 1.0 | 70.00 | 99.84 | 99.99 | 99.96 |
| Marker | A5 | 1.3 | 67.82 | 98.76 | 99.82 | 99.41 |
| Note | A0 | 0.7 | 0.33 | 99.02 | 0.33 | 99.55 |
| Note | A0 | 1.0 | 0.33 | 98.87 | 0.33 | 99.49 |
| Note | A0 | 1.3 | 0.33 | 98.50 | 0.33 | 99.28 |
| Note | A5 | 0.7 | 99.80 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| Note | A5 | 1.0 | 99.40 | 99.99 | 99.95 | 99.99 |
| Note | A5 | 1.3 | 98.07 | 99.88 | 99.64 | 99.90 |

**Clean task utility.** We evaluate each endpoint on 300 clean examples from each of COCO, GQA, and POPE with greedy decoding and a 128-token budget (Table 18). GQA uses the fixed testdev-balanced subset. CIDEr is multiplied by 100 for display; POPE accuracy and F1 are computed from pooled predictions over its three categories. These are clean-input scores, with no payload stripping or conditioning on successful activation. Across both targets, A0 has higher CIDEr but lower GQA and POPE scores than A5.

**Table 18:** Clean utility for the cross-payload endpoints. CIDEr is scaled by 100; accuracy and F1 are percentages.

| Payload | Model | COCO CIDEr | GQA acc. | POPE acc. | POPE F1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Marker | A0 | 110.04 | 56.67 | 83.33 | 82.01 |
| Marker | A5 | 106.03 | 57.00 | 85.00 | 84.21 |
| Note | A0 | 113.15 | 56.67 | 84.67 | 83.57 |
| Note | A5 | 105.68 | 57.33 | 85.00 | 84.21 |

## J LLM USAGE

Large language models assisted manuscript organization, language revision, code and figure drafting, and exploratory analysis. The authors determined the research questions, method, experimental protocol, and scientific claims; verified the reported data and proofs; and take full responsibility for the manuscript.