FASTER-GCG: EFFICIENT DISCRETE OPTIMIZATION JAILBREAK ATTACKS AGAINST ALIGNED LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

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ABSTRACT

Warning: This paper contains potentially offensive and harmful text.

Aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) have attracted significant attention for their safety, particularly in the context of jailbreak attacks that attempt to bypass guardrails via adversarial prompts. Among existing approaches, the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack pioneered automated jailbreaks through discrete token optimization; however, its low sample efficiency limits practical applicability. In particular, GCG requires approximately 256K evaluations per harmful behavior to achieve a satisfactory jailbreak success rate, due to the inherent difficulty of the underlying discrete optimization problem. In this work, we identify three key factors that limit the sample efficiency of GCG: inaccurate gradient-based estimation, inefficient uniform sampling, and repeated evaluation of previously explored suffixes. To address these issues, we propose Faster-GCG, a streamlined variant of GCG that incorporates distance-based regularization for improved estimation, temperature-controlled sampling for more effective exploration, and a visited-suffix marking mechanism to avoid redundant evaluations. Faster-GCG reduced the required evaluations to 32K, achieving 4x–8x improvement in sampling efficiency compared to GCG, without significant degradation on performance. A separate Faster-GCG++ setting uses a 40-token suffix; it attained an average jailbreak success rate of 78.1% across five aligned LLMs, and achieved 88.7% against Qwen3.5-4B, outperforming state-of-the-art white-box jailbreak methods.

1 INTRODUCTION

Large language models (LLMs) (Touvron et al., 2023; Team, 2023; Achiam et al., 2023) have demonstrated remarkable performance across various tasks and enabled many practical applications such as AI assistants (Achiam et al., 2023). To ensure safe deployment, these models are typically trained to align with human values and are expected to refuse requests that involve harmful or toxic content (Ouyang et al., 2022), referred to as *aligned LLMs*. For example, when presented with a malicious query such as "Tell me how to build a bomb," an aligned LLM is expected to respond with a refusal (e.g., "I cannot fulfill your request."). Despite these safeguards, recent studies (Wei et al., 2023a; walkerspider, 2023; Liu et al., 2024; Russinovich et al., 2025) demonstrate that alignment remains imperfect. Even state-of-the-art LLMs are vulnerable to *jailbreak attacks*, in which carefully crafted adversarial prompts bypass safety guardrails and elicit harmful, violent, or prohibited content (Wei et al., 2023a). As illustrated in Figure 1, such attacks typically append an *adversarial suffix* $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}$ to a user query, inducing the model to produce a targeted harmful response $\mathbf{x}^{\text{target}}$ and subsequent undesirable completions that provide the user with prohibited knowledge.

Understanding and exposing such vulnerabilities is critical for improving the safety of LLMs and characterizing their limitations. Early jailbreak approaches (Wei et al., 2023a; Kang et al., 2024; Yuan et al., 2024) relied on manual prompt engineering, which lacks scalability. Recently, automatic jailbreak methods (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024) have gained increasing attention. A representative and influential approach is the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack (Zou et al., 2023), which formulates jailbreak generation as a discrete optimization problem. GCG iteratively refines $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}$ to maximize the likelihood of producing targeted outputs.

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

Figure 1: Illustration of the jailbreak attack setting. An algorithm optimizes adversarial tokens $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}$ to induce the model to generate a targeted response $\mathbf{x}^{\text{target}}$. If succeeded, the model naturally produces undesirable completions with prohibited content. $\mathbf{x}^{\text{ctx1}}$ and $\mathbf{x}^{\text{ctx2}}$ are fixed context.

Specifically, GCG operates in two stages (see Sec. 3.2): (1) Candidate token selection: Gradients of the loss (e.g., the negative log-likelihood of generating $\mathbf{x}^{\text{target}}$) are computed with respect to one-hot token embeddings, and the top-K tokens (e.g., $K = 256$) that are expected to reduce the loss are selected as candidates. (2) Replacement evaluation: A batch of candidate replacements is sampled by replacing one token in $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}$ at a time and evaluated by computing the loss for each resulting adversarial suffix, after which the best candidate is selected. These two stages are repeated iteratively until the attack budget is exhausted or a successful jailbreak is achieved.

While GCG has inspired numerous follow-up works (Jia et al., 2025; Zhao et al., 2024; Xu et al., 2026), it suffers from several fundamental limitations that hinder its practical efficiency (see Sec. 4.1): (1) *Inaccurate gradient-based candidate selection*: Due to the discrete nature of token spaces, gradients computed over one-hot embeddings provide only a coarse approximation of the true loss change. Consequently, the estimated improvement often deviates significantly from the actual effect of token replacement. (2) *Inefficient uniform sampling*: To compensate for inaccurate gradient estimates, GCG evaluates a large batch of candidates (e.g., 512 per step). However, candidates are sampled uniformly from the top-K set, ignoring their relative gradient magnitudes. This underutilizes available gradient information and reduces sampling efficiency. (3) *Redundant evaluation of previously explored suffixes*: GCG sometimes implicitly revisits previously evaluated adversarial suffixes, leading to wasted computation on approximately 6% of the attack budget.

To address these limitations, we propose **Faster-GCG**, which incorporates three simple yet effective techniques (see Sec. 4.2): (1) **Distance-regularized candidate token selection:** By analyzing the Taylor expansion (Grossman, 2014) around the current token, we observe that gradient estimation error is closely related to distances in the embedding space. Motivated by this, we introduce a regularization term based on token distances to improve the reliability of candidate selection. (2) **Temperature-controlled replacement sampling:** To improve sample efficiency, we replace the uniform sampling in GCG with temperature-controlled sampling that biases selection toward higher-quality candidates while maintaining sufficient exploration. (3) **Visited suffix marking:** We maintain a record of previously evaluated suffixes and prevent them from being resampled, thereby eliminating redundant evaluations with negligible overhead.

We evaluated Faster-GCG on a range of open-source LLMs. In the primary 20-token setting, Faster-GCG improved the average ASR over GCG from 65.8% to 69.5% under the same configuration. The 40-token Faster-GCG++ setting reached 78.1% average ASR and 88.7% against Qwen3.5-4B when compared with GCG++ under the same extended attack surface.

2 Related Work

Jailbreak attacks are broadly categorized into white-box and black-box methods. **White-box jailbreak methods** (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024; Jia et al., 2025; Liao & Sun, 2024; Zhao et al., 2024; Xu et al., 2026) leverage gradient information to construct jailbreak prompts for LLMs, drawing inspiration from classical adversarial attacks such as Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018) in computer vision. However, unlike PGD, which operates in continuous pixel space, jailbreak attacks on LLMs are performed in discrete token spaces, making the optimization problem substantially more challenging (Goyal et al., 2023; Shin et al., 2020). A pioneering method to make discrete optimization-based jailbreaks practical for LLMs is the GCG attack (Zou et al., 2023), which has since become a foundational framework for subsequent work (Jia et al., 2025; Zhao et al., 2024; Xu et al., 2026). Our work is orthogonal to these efforts and focuses on improving the sample efficiency of discrete optimization in the GCG setting. **Black-box jailbreak methods** (Chao et al.,

2025; Zeng et al., 2024; Russinovich et al., 2025; Mehrotra et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025b; Deng et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2023b; Rahman et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2025a) generate jailbreak prompts without access to gradients or loss values. In contrast to white-box methods, black-box approaches do not explicitly explore the discrete token space through optimization, but instead exploit intrinsic LLM capabilities (e.g., instruction following and in-context learning). While flexible, this paradigm limits their ability to systematically identify effective adversarial suffixes and to comprehensively characterize model vulnerabilities. **Defense methods** (Jain et al., 2023; Xie et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2024) aim to mitigate jailbreak attacks. A more detailed discussion of related work is provided in Appendix A.

3 PRELIMINARY

3.1 NOTATION

In this section, we establish the notation required to formalize discrete optimization over token sequences in LLMs.

Let $\mathcal{V} = 1, \ldots, |\mathcal{V}|$ denote a vocabulary of size $|\mathcal{V}|$, and d be the embedding dimension. A token sequence of length T is denoted as: $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_T),\ x_t \in \mathcal{V}$. Each token x_t is represented by a one-hot vector $\mathbf{e}_{x_t} \in \{0,1\}^{|\mathcal{V}|}$, where $(\mathbf{e}_{x_t})_i = \mathbb{1}[i = x_t]$. Stacking all tokens yields the one-hot representation of the sequence:

$$\mathbf{X} = [\mathbf{e}_{x_1}, \mathbf{e}_{x_2}, \ldots, \mathbf{e}_{x_T}]^\top \in \{0,1\}^{T \times |\mathcal{V}|}. \tag{1}$$

Let $\mathbf{W}_E \in \mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{V}| \times d}$ denote the embedding matrix. The embedded sequence is then given by $\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{X}\mathbf{W}_E \in \mathbb{R}^{T \times d}$, where the t-th row $\mathbf{v}_t = \mathbf{W}_E[x_t] \in \mathbb{R}^d$ corresponds to the embedding of token x_t.

We consider a loss function $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x})$, e.g., the negative log-likelihood of generating a target response under an autoregressive language model. To analyze optimization dynamics over discrete token sequences, we define gradients with respect to both embedding and one-hot representations. The gradient of the loss with respect to the embedded sequence is defined as

$$\mathbf{G}_V \triangleq \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{V}} \in \mathbb{R}^{T \times d}, \quad \mathbf{g}_t \triangleq \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{v}_t}. \tag{2}$$

By the chain rule, the gradient with respect to the one-hot representation is given by

$$\mathbf{G}_X \triangleq \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{X}} = \mathbf{G}_V \mathbf{W}_E^\top \in \mathbb{R}^{T \times |\mathcal{V}|}, \tag{3}$$

where each entry admits the form

$$(\mathbf{G}_X)_{t,i} = \langle \mathbf{g}_t, \mathbf{W}_E[i] \rangle . \tag{4}$$

3.2 GREEDY COORDINATE GRADIENT (GCG)

GCG (Zou et al., 2023) formulates jailbreak generation as a discrete optimization problem that constructs an adversarial input sequence to elicit a target output from an LLM. The full token sequence is structured as

$$\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{x}^{\text{ctx1}}, \mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}, \mathbf{x}^{\text{ctx2}}, \mathbf{x}^{\text{target}}), \tag{5}$$

where $\mathbf{x}^{\text{ctx1}}$ denotes the first part of the fixed context (e.g., system prompt and user query), $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}$ denotes the adversarial tokens to be optimized (often referred to as an adversarial suffix, though it may be inserted at arbitrary positions), $\mathbf{x}^{\text{ctx2}}$ denotes additional fixed formatting tokens that trigger generation (e.g., assistant role or response template), and $\mathbf{x}^{\text{target}}$ denotes the targeted response. An illustrative example is shown in Figure 1. Details of the threat model are provided in Appendix B.

The objective is to optimize $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}$ such that the model assigns high likelihood to the target sequence. Formally, GCG minimizes the loss

$$\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x}) = -\log P\left(\mathbf{x}^{\text{target}} \mid \mathbf{x}^{\text{ctx1}}, \mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}, \mathbf{x}^{\text{ctx2}}\right). \tag{6}$$



Figure 2: Optimization pipelines of GCG (top) and Faster-GCG (bottom).

Let $\mathcal{I}$ denote the set of token positions corresponding to $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}$. GCG performs iterative coordinate-wise updates over these positions. At each iteration, it computes the gradient $\mathbf{G}_X$ defined in Equation (3). For each editable position $t \in \mathcal{I}$, GCG approximates the effect of replacing the current token x_t with a candidate token $i \in \mathcal{V}$ using a first-order estimate:

$$\Delta\mathcal{L}(x_t \to i) \approx (\mathbf{G}_X)_{t,i}. \tag{7}$$

The ideal update selects best coordinate-token pair $(t^\star, i^\star) = \arg\min_{t\in\mathcal{I}, i\in\mathcal{V}} \Delta\mathcal{L}(x_t \to i)$, and applies the update $x_{t^\star} \leftarrow i^\star$. This procedure is repeated until convergence or until a query budget is exhausted.

In practice, exhaustive evaluation over $\mathcal{V}$ is computationally infeasible. Therefore, GCG adopts a three-stage approximation procedure at each iteration: (1) **Top-K token selection:** For each position $t \in \mathcal{I}$, candidate tokens are ranked by $-\mathbf{G}_X$, and the top-K tokens are selected:

$$\mathcal{C}_t = \text{Top-}K_{i\in\mathcal{V}}(-\mathbf{G}_X) \subseteq \mathcal{V}. \tag{8}$$

(2) **Candidate batch construction:** A batch $\mathcal{B}$ of size B is constructed by uniformly sampling pairs (t, i) with $t \in \mathcal{I}$ and $i \in \mathcal{C}_t$. Each pair defines a modified sequence $\mathbf{x}^{(t\to i)}$, where x_t is replaced by i. (3) **Best replacement evaluation:** The loss is evaluated for each candidate, and the best update is selected:

$$(t^\star, i^\star) = \arg\min_{(t,i)\in\mathcal{B}} \mathcal{L}\big(\mathbf{x}^{(t\to i)}\big). \tag{9}$$

The selected update $x_{t^\star} \leftarrow i^\star$ is applied, and the process is repeated for S iterations depending on the attack budget. Key hyperparameters include the top-K size, batch size B, and number of iterations S. Figure 2 illustrates the optimization pipeline and Algorithm A1 gives the pseudo-code of GCG.

4 Improving Sample Efficiency of GCG

4.1 Key Limitations of GCG

Despite its empirical success, GCG suffers from a fundamental limitation in sample efficiency. Each iteration requires evaluating B candidates via forward passes of the language model. In the original

setting (Zou et al., 2023), $B = 512$ and $S = 500$, resulting in a total of $B \cdot S = 256\,000$ model evaluations per attack. By examining the details of GCG, we identify three key factors that limit its efficiency.

Limitation 1: Inaccurate gradient-based candidate token selection. GCG selects top-K candidate tokens by ranking entries in the gradient matrix $\mathbf{G}_X$. To examine the validity of this ranking, we apply a first-order Taylor expansion (Grossman, 2014) around the current token x_t:

$$\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x}^{(t\to i)}) = \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x}) + \left(\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{v}_t}\right)^\top (\mathbf{W}_E[i] - \mathbf{v}_t) + o(\|\mathbf{W}_E[i] - \mathbf{v}_t\|). \tag{10}$$

Substituting Equations (2) and (4) into Equation (10), we obtain:

$$\Delta\mathcal{L}(x_t \to i) = (\mathbf{G}_X)_{t,i} - (\mathbf{G}_X)_{t,x_t} + o(\|\mathbf{W}_E[i] - \mathbf{v}_t\|). \tag{11}$$

Since $(\mathbf{G}_X)_{t,x_t}$ is independent of i, the first-order term $(\mathbf{G}_X)_{t,i}$ correctly induces a ranking over candidate tokens, consistent with the approximation in Equation (7). However, this approximation ignores the residual term $o(\|\mathbf{W}_E[i] - \mathbf{v}_t\|)$, which depends on the distance between the original token x_t and the candidate token i in the embedding space. When this distance is large, higher-order terms may become non-negligible and distort the ranking induced by gradients. As a result, purely gradient-based top-K selection may exclude tokens that yield larger loss reduction. To validate this effect, we measured the agreement between the predicted ranking induced by $\mathbf{G}_X$ and the true ranking of $\Delta\mathcal{L}(x_t \to i)$ within the top-K candidates. We computed the Concordance Correlation Coefficient (CCC) (Lawrence & Lin, 1989) over 640 samples and observed a value of only 0.044, indicating almost no correlation between predicted and actual rankings. More details can be found in Appendix D.

Limitation 2: Inefficient uniform sampling. Due to the inaccuracy of gradient-based ranking, GCG relies on evaluating a large number of candidates (e.g., batch size 512) to increase the likelihood of including effective replacements. However, candidate pairs are sampled uniformly from the top-K set, without accounting for differences in their gradient magnitudes. This leads to inefficient use of the evaluation budget, since gradient information already provides a meaningful, albeit imperfect, signal of $\Delta\mathcal{L}$.

Limitation 3: Redundant evaluation of previously explored suffixes. We further observe that GCG may revisit previously evaluated adversarial suffixes during optimization. This arises because the algorithm does not maintain a record of past suffixes across iterations. Consequently, the same candidate sequence may be re-evaluated multiple times, leading to unnecessary computation. Empirically, we found that approximately 6% of evaluated suffixes had been previously encountered, resulting in a waste of the attack budget. More details can be found in Appendix E.

4.2 FASTER-GCG

To address the limitations identified above, we propose Faster-GCG, which improves the sample efficiency of discrete optimization in jailbreak attacks through three simple yet effective techniques. An overview of the method, compared to GCG, is illustrated in Figure 2.

Technique 1: Distance-regularized token selection. As shown in Equation (11), the approximation error of the gradient $\mathbf{G}_X$ depends on the embedding distance $\|\mathbf{W}_E[i] - \mathbf{v}_t\|$. Motivated by this observation, we introduce a distance-based regularization term that penalizes candidates far from the current token:

$$(\hat{\mathbf{G}}_X)_{t,i} = (\mathbf{G}_X)_{t,i} + \lambda\|\mathbf{W}_E[i] - \mathbf{v}_t\|, \tag{12}$$

where λ is a hyper-parameter controlling the strength of the penalty. This modification re-ranks candidate tokens, discouraging updates that rely on unreliable long-distance approximations. To evaluate the effect of this regularization, we measured the agreement between rankings induced by $\hat{\mathbf{G}}_X$ and the true loss change $\Delta\mathcal{L}(x_t \to i)$ within the top-K candidates. Using the CCC metric (Lawrence & Lin, 1989), we observed an improvement from 0.044 to 0.285 when $\lambda = 10$, indicating substantially better alignment with the true objective (details in Appendix D).

Technique 2: Temperature-controlled replacement sampling. To improve the efficiency of candidate exploration, we generalize the uniform sampling in GCG to a temperature-controlled distribution over ranked candidates. Specifically, within the top-K set, candidates are ranked according to $-(\hat{\mathbf{G}}_X)_{t,i}$, and sampling probabilities are assigned based on their rank. Let $r = 1, \ldots, K$ denote the rank; we define

$$P_\tau(r) = \frac{(K+1-r)^{\frac{1}{\tau}}}{\sum_{i=0}^{K-1}(K+1-i)^{\frac{1}{\tau}}}, \qquad (13)$$

where τ is the temperature parameter. As $\tau \to 0$, the distribution concentrates on the top-ranked candidate (greedy selection), while $\tau \to \infty$ recovers uniform sampling. For the implementation of the greedy selection as $\tau \to 0$, we adopt deterministic selection by choosing the top $\lceil \frac{B}{|\mathcal{I}|} \rceil$ candidates per position $t \in \mathcal{I}$, and truncating the resulting set to size B.

Technique 3: Visited suffix marking. To eliminate redundant evaluations, we maintain a record $\mathcal{R}$ of previously evaluated adversarial suffixes. During candidate construction, a sampled replacement is discarded if the resulting sequence has already been evaluated. Sampling continues until B unique candidates are collected. After evaluation, all candidates in the batch are added to $\mathcal{R}$. Since token sequences can be efficiently hashed and the revisit rate is relatively low, this mechanism introduces negligible computational overhead while preventing duplicate queries.

Algorithm 1 Faster-GCG

Require: Context sequence $\mathbf{x}$, optimizable indices $\mathcal{I}$, initial adversarial suffix $\mathbf{x}^{\text{init}}$, the number of iterations S, loss function $\mathcal{L}$, batch size B, the number of top tokens K, regularization weight λ, sampling temperature τ.
Output: Optimized adversarial suffix $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}$.

Evaluated record set $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow \emptyset$
$\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}} \leftarrow \mathbf{x}^{\text{init}}$
loop S times
  $\mathbf{G}_X \leftarrow \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{X}}$ ▷ Equation (3)
  for $t \in \mathcal{I}$ **do**
    $\mathcal{C}_t \leftarrow$ Top-$K_{i \in \mathcal{V}}(-\mathbf{G}_X)$ ▷ Equation (8)
    for $i \in \mathcal{C}_t$ **do**
      $(\hat{\mathbf{G}}_X)_{t,i} \leftarrow (\mathbf{G}_X)_{t,i} + \lambda \|\mathbf{W}_E[i] - \mathbf{v}_t\|$ ▷ Equation (12), Technique 1
    end for
  end for
  Candidate set $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \emptyset$
  while $|\mathcal{B}| < B$ **do**
    Uniformly sample $t \in \mathcal{I}$.
    Sample $i \in \mathcal{C}_t$ with $P_\tau(r)$ ranked by $-(\hat{\mathbf{G}}_X)_{t,i}$. ▷ Equation (13), Technique 2
    if $\mathbf{x}^{(t \to i)} \notin \mathcal{R}$ **then** ▷ Technique 3
      $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \cup \{(t, i)\}$
      $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow \mathcal{R} \cup \{\mathbf{x}^{(t \to i)}\}$
    end if
  end while
  $(t^\star, i^\star) \leftarrow \arg\min_{(t,i) \in \mathcal{B}} \mathcal{L}\left(\mathbf{x}^{(t \to i)}\right)$ ▷ Equation (9)
  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}} \leftarrow \mathbf{x}^{(t^\star \to i^\star)}$
end loop

By integrating the above three techniques, we develop Faster-GCG, an enhanced GCG framework that focuses on improving the sample efficiency of the discrete optimization problem on adversarial suffix. Algorithm 1 presents the complete procedure.

5 Experiments

In this section, we first describe the experimental setup (Sec. 5.1), then present the performance of Faster-GCG compared with baselines (Sec. 5.2), and finally conduct ablation studies (Sec. 5.3).

5.1 Experimental Setup

Models. We evaluated Faster-GCG on five open-source LLMs released between July 2023 and February 2026: Llama2-7B (Touvron et al., 2023), Qwen3-4B (Yang et al., 2025), Gemma-3-4B (Team, 2025), Llama-3.1-8B (Grattafiori et al., 2024), and Qwen3.5-4B (Qwen Team, 2026). Although Faster-GCG needed white-box access to model gradients, we conducted a preliminary transfer analysis on proprietary models, including Gemini-3-flash-preview (Google, 2025), GPT-5-mini (Singh et al., 2025), and Claude-4-sonnet (Sonnet-4) (Anthropic, 2025).

Datasets. We conducted experiments on two widely used benchmarks: JBB-Behaviors from JailbreakBench (Chao et al., 2024) and AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023). Both datasets consist of prompt and target pairs, where each prompt specifies a harmful behavior, and the corresponding target is a paraphrased response beginning with "Sure, here is/are...". JBB-Behaviors contains 100 harmful

Table 1: Jailbreak losses (↓) / ASRs (%, ↑) of different methods on the JBB dataset. *Avg* denotes average on the five models. ++ variants are with adversarial suffix length of 40. * denotes statistically significant results with $p < 0.05$ (two-sided paired t-test, $n = 100$).

Attack	Llama2-7B	Qwen3-4B	Gemma3-4B	Llama3.1-8B	Qwen3.5-4B	Avg
GCG	0.350 / 58.2	0.981 / 47.7	0.485 / 80.6	0.639 / 64.5	0.312 / 77.9	0.553 / 65.8
GCG++	0.148 / 73.8	0.685 / 75.8	0.352 / 81.2	0.500 / 63.4	0.176 / 87.2	0.372 / 76.3
AutoDAN	1.825 / 27.7	4.341 / 23.1	5.740 / 71.8	1.854 / 36.1	–	–
I-GCG	**0.108 / 89.6**	1.453 / 43.1	1.315 / 77.1	1.169 / 56.1	0.349 / 58.2	0.879 / 64.8
GCG-PS	0.531 / 49.4	1.776 / 29.4	0.661 / 71.8	1.168 / 41.5	–	–
TAO	0.278 / 68.9	0.950 / 50.1	0.440 / 83.6	0.672 / 56.6	0.296 / 74.5	0.527 / 66.7
Faster-GCG	0.268* / 66.0	0.863* / 54.2	0.445* / 81.4	0.514* / 67.1	0.251* / 78.7	0.468* / 69.5*
Faster-GCG++	0.170 / 71.4	**0.653 / 77.6**	**0.348 / 84.2**	**0.466 / 68.6**	**0.149 / 88.7**	**0.357 / 78.1**

behaviors. From AdvBench, we used the first 100 behaviors for consistency. The harmful behaviors span multiple harmful categories, e.g., abuse, violence, misinformation, or illegal activities.

Baselines. We compared Faster-GCG with several white-box attack methods, including AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024), GCG (Zou et al., 2023), I-GCG (Jia et al., 2025), GCG with probe sampling (GCG-PS) (Zhao et al., 2024), and TAO (Xu et al., 2026). We also report black-box attack results (Chao et al., 2025; Zeng et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025b; Chua et al., 2025) as contextual comparisons (see Appendix G.2). For methods in the GCG family, we adopted a unified configuration with batch size $B = 64$ and optimization steps $S = 500$ for fair comparison. The candidate set size was set to $K = \frac{B}{2} = 32$. The adversarial suffix length was set to 20 tokens and initialized with exclamation marks (!). The suffix was appended to the prompt. Other baselines follow their original implementations. Details are described in Appendix F.

Faster-GCG hyper-parameters. As our Faster-GCG is built upon GCG, we ensured that they used the same base configuration. Besides, the distance regularization weight was set to $\lambda = 10$, and the sampling temperature was $\tau = 0.1$; both were fixed across all datasets and models.

Evaluation metrics. We report two metrics: (1) *Optimization loss*: the minimum loss achieved during optimization, defined as the negative log-likelihood of generating $\mathbf{x}^{\text{target}}$, averaged across samples. This metric is evaluated only for white-box methods. (2) *Attack Success Rate (ASR)*: the primary evaluation metric for all methods. To obtain reliable ASR estimates, we employ two LLM-based judges. The first follows the GPT4-Judge framework (Qi et al., 2024) using GPT-oss-20B (Agarwal et al., 2025), and the second adopts StrongREJECT (Souly et al., 2024) with Llama-3.1-8B. Both frameworks produce graded scores with explanations. We normalize these scores to $[0, 1]$, where 0 indicates safe output and 1 indicates fully harmful output, following StrongREJECT. The final harmfulness score for each example is computed by averaging the normalized scores from both judges, and ASR is obtained by averaging the score over all examples. To stabilize the results, for all methods in the GCG family we evaluated the top 10 adversarial suffixes with the lowest loss, and took the best score for the corresponding example. This ASR protocol is discussed in Appendix G.1.

5.2 Main Results

Same-budget comparison. The jailbreak ASRs and optimization losses of Faster-GCG and baseline methods are summarized in Table 1. Results of AutoDAN and GCG-PS on Qwen3.5 were omitted, because we failed to adapt their code to the newer model. We conducted two-sided paired t-test for Faster-GCG vs GCG, Faster-GCG++ vs GCG++, with $n = 100$ on the JBB dataset, each sample as a pair. The null hypothesis is that the difference equals to zero, and the alternative hypothesis is that the difference does not equal to zero. Values with $p < 0.05$ are marked with *. Compared to GCG, Faster-GCG consistently yielded both lower losses and higher ASRs. On average, Faster-GCG outperformed GCG by 3.7%. This trend indicates improved optimization quality and suggests that Faster-GCG converges more effectively within a fixed attack budget. Since AutoDAN, I-GCG and black-box jailbreak attack methods introduce different attack surfaces, we introduce the ++ variants for GCG and Faster-GCG to further explore performance limits, which incorporates two minor modifications on the attack surface: (1) increasing the adversarial suffix length to 40 tokens,

Table 2: Efficiency improvement of Faster-GCG.

Ratio	B	Loss	ASR	Speed
2×	32	-0.041	+6.2%	1.8×
	64	-0.033	-0.9%	1.9×
	128	-0.030	-0.3%	1.9×
4×	32	+0.008	-2.5%	3.3×
	64	+0.017	+0.1%	3.4×
	128	-0.026	+0.1%	3.8×
8×	32	+0.058	-1.5%	6×
	64	+0.021	+0.5%	7×



Figure 3: Loss curves of Faster-GCG and GCG variants.

Table 3: Jailbreak losses (↓) / ASRs (%, ↑) of different methods on the AdvBench dataset. Notations follow Table 1.

Attack	Llama2-7B	Qwen3-4B	Llama3.1-8B	Qwen3.5-4B	Avg
GCG	0.360 / 49.7	0.906 / 49.1	0.796 / 45.9	0.361 / 68.9	0.606 / 53.4
TAO	0.351 / 56.7	0.901 / 47.8	0.751 / 51.5	0.312 / 77.9	0.579 / 58.5
Faster-GCG	0.315 / 55.2	0.826* / 51.5	0.723 / 49.6	0.259* / 79.8*	0.531* / 59.0*
Faster-GCG++	**0.177 / 60.4**	**0.592 / 83.9**	**0.489 / 63.1**	**0.160 / 86.2**	**0.355 / 73.4**

and (2) prepending the adversarial suffix to the prompt instead of appending it. Compared with GCG++, Faster-GCG++ still improved on loss and ASR. Faster-GCG++ is therefore treated as an optional configuration for exploring higher ASR rather than as the primary comparison of the three Faster-GCG techniques. Because doubling the suffix length from 20 to 40 while keeping $B = 64$ and $S = 500$ fixed halves the expected number of coordinate updates per position, this change can attenuate the benefit of improved sampling. Among white-box approaches, Faster-GCG and its variants consistently achieved the highest ASRs while attaining the lowest losses across diverse target LLMs. With the increased suffix length, Faster-GCG++ achieved an ASR of 78.1%, outperforming all black-box and white-box baselines. Detailed results of comparison with black-box methods are provided in Appendix G.2. We provide some jailbreak examples in Appendix H.

Efficiency gains. To evaluate the sampling efficiency gains, we compared Faster-GCG to GCG under different batch size pairs. The results are shown in Table 2. Ratio denotes the batch size ratio of GCG / Faster-GCG, and B denotes the tested batch size of Faster-GCG. For example, $B = 32$ and a ratio of 2x means a comparison of Faster-GCG with $B = 32$ and GCG of $B = 64$. We show loss and ASR as the difference of Faster-GCG minus GCG, and speed is the wall-clock speed improvement of Faster-GCG versus GCG. The loss and ASR results were tested with two-sided paired t-test ($n = 100$) and did not show a statistically significant difference. A 2x ratio consistently decreased loss, which means that Faster-GCG with $B = 32$ converged better than GCG with $B = 64$. The 4x comparisons provided the strongest balanced result: their pooled loss and ASR differences were close to zero, while Faster-GCG was 3.3x–3.8x faster. At 8x, the loss point estimate favored GCG, but the difference was not statistically significant. Overall, the loss favored GCG more as the efficiency improvement ratio increased, but the Faster-GCG results remained comparable to GCG with no statistically significant difference under a ratio up to 8x. We therefore report 4x–8x fewer candidate evaluations in the tested sweep. In practical use, if the target is to reduce computation without degradation on performance, we recommend cutting the batch size by 4x–8x as compared to GCG when using the Faster-GCG techniques.

Loss curve. Figure 3 shows the loss curves of Faster-GCG and GCG variants on Llama2-7B using the JBB dataset. We exclude I-GCG due to its different initialization (initial loss of 0.567), which makes direct comparison less informative. The curves demonstrate that Faster-GCG converged faster than GCG and variants under the same budget, further confirming its better sample efficiency.

Generalization to other datasets. To evaluate robustness across datasets, we conducted experiments on the AdvBench dataset. As shown in Table 3, Faster-GCG and Faster-GCG++ consistently outperformed their corresponding baselines, demonstrating that the performance gains generalize beyond the JBB dataset.

Defense performance against Faster-GCG. We further evaluated the defense performance of various defense methods (Jain et al., 2023; Xie et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2024) against Faster-GCG attack. As shown in Appendix G.5, the ASRs lowered, while Faster-GCG still performed better than GCG. The performance may be recovered by adaptive attack (Tramer et al., 2020).

5.3 Ablation Study

Ablation study of the three techniques. Faster-GCG introduces three techniques to improve sample efficiency under a fixed attack budget. We evaluated their individual and combined effects on the JBB dataset with Llama2-7B, as shown in Table 4. Ablating any of the three techniques results in higher loss, whereas their full combination achieved the best performance. Building on visited-suffix marking, distance regularization improved the quality of candidate ranking, and temperature-controlled sampling biased selection toward higher-quality candidates, jointly leading to lower loss and higher ASR. Overall, these results demonstrated that all three components are necessary for optimal performance in Faster-GCG.

Table 4: Effects of the three techniques in Faster-GCG.

Distance	Temperature	Marking	Loss	ASR
			0.350	58.2%
✓		✓	0.309	63.9%
	✓	✓	0.347	59.2%
✓	✓		0.563	42.2%
✓	✓	✓	**0.268**	**66.0%**

Sensitivity to hyper-parameters λ and τ. Faster-GCG introduces two hyper-parameters: the distance regularization weight λ and the sampling temperature τ. We evaluated their sensitivity on the JBB dataset with Llama2-7B, and the results are shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Performance of Faster-GCG under different hyper-parameters λ and τ.

λ	τ	Loss	ASR	λ	τ	Loss	ASR
10	0	0.292	64.2%	0	0.1	0.347	59.2%
	0.1	**0.268**	**66.0%**	3		0.317	60.2%
	0.3	0.289	63.6%	10		**0.268**	**66.0%**
	$+\infty$	0.309	63.9%	30		0.307	58.8%

The left half of the table analyzes the effect of τ. Larger τ corresponds to higher sampling entropy, with $\tau = 0$ reducing to greedy selection and $\tau \to +\infty$ recovering uniform sampling as in GCG. We observe that an intermediate value of $\tau = 0.1$ achieved the best performance, indicating a balance between exploitation of high-quality candidates and exploration when gradient estimates remain imperfect due to the discrete token space.

The right half analyzes the effect of λ. The regularization weight reflects the magnitude of the higher-order residual term $o(\|\mathbf{W}_E[i] - \mathbf{v}_t\|)$ in Equation (11). Across all tested values, incorporating distance regularization ($\lambda > 0$) consistently improves performance over the baseline ($\lambda = 0$), demonstrating its robustness. In all experiments, we fixed $\lambda = 10$ and $\tau = 0.1$.

Performance on reasoning models. We further evaluated Faster-GCG on reasoning-enabled Qwen3.5-4B toggling between reasoning and non-reasoning modes. As shown in Appendix G.6, Faster-GCG consistently outperformed GCG on the reasoning Qwen3.5-4B, demonstrating that the advantages of Faster-GCG generalize to reasoning models.

6 Conclusion

We propose Faster-GCG, a sample-efficient algorithm for discrete optimization–based jailbreak attacks on aligned LLMs. By identifying and addressing key limitations of GCG, Faster-GCG improves sampling efficiency by 4x–8x without significant degradation on performance. Under the same budget, Faster-GCG consistently improved on GCG. Extensive experiments demonstrate that these improvements generalize across diverse models and datasets. Overall, our results highlight that, despite substantial progress in aligning LLMs with human preferences, jailbreak attacks remain a persistent vulnerability. This underscores the need for more robust alignment paradigms capable of reliably controlling harmful behaviors in increasingly capable models.

Limitations. Same as GCG, Faster-GCG requires white-box access to the model and gradient to perform the attack. While it is possible to perform transfer attack against proprietary models (see Sec. G.4), it remains challenging to find a proper surrogate to achieve a comparable result to white-box models.

AI USE STATEMENT

In this work, we used generative AI tools for *assist with translation, interpret results*. We have not used generative AI tools for *design or provide feedback on research methodology or experiments, implement methods, support qualitative and thematic data analysis*, and *generate synthetic data sets, help develop theoretical models or conceptual frameworks, formulate mathematical claims, provide critical ingredients for proving mathematical claims, assist in the writing of proofs, propose or refine hypotheses, clean and reformat dataset* are not applicable to this work. Additionally, we used generative AI tools for *create or edit software code, edit a research paper to improve readability*. We have reviewed all AI-assisted work. The authors checked the LLM-generated interpretation and the LLM-polished wording for correctness. LLM-generated code was verified and tested for correctness via human-readable tests by the authors. We take responsibility for the final content of this work, including text, claims or artifacts produced with the aid of generative AI.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work proposes several enhanced techniques for generating jailbreak suffixes for LLMs, which could be misused to elicit harmful outputs from LLMs. But similar to previous jailbreak methods, we investigate jailbreak prompts with the objective of uncovering inherent weaknesses in LLMs. This endeavor aims to inform and guide future research focused on improving human preference safeguards in LLMs while advancing more effective defense strategies against misuse.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

We have described the three techniques introduced by Faster-GCG in detail, with the tested hyperparameter settings elaborated. The code for implementing the method and reproducing the results will be made available on GitHub upon acceptance.

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APPENDIX

A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF RELATED WORK

White-box jailbreak methods (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024; Jia et al., 2025; Liao & Sun, 2024; Zhao et al., 2024; Xu et al., 2026) leverage gradient information to construct jailbreak prompts for LLMs, drawing inspiration from classical adversarial attacks such as Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018) in computer vision. However, unlike PGD, which operates in continuous pixel space, jailbreak attacks on LLMs are performed in discrete token spaces, making the optimization problem substantially more challenging (Goyal et al., 2023; Shin et al., 2020). Zou et al. (2023) introduced the GCG attack, a pioneering method to make discrete optimization-based jailbreaks practical for LLMs. GCG has since become a foundational framework for subsequent work. Building on this line, Jia et al. (2025) improved GCG via harmful-output guidance and easy-to-hard initialization. Zhao et al. (2024) accelerated GCG by using a draft model to approximate the loss of candidate suffixes. More recently, Xu et al. (2026) further enhanced GCG by incorporating refusal- and effectiveness-aware loss functions, along with a direction-prioritized token selection strategy. In parallel, Liu et al. (2024) proposed AutoDAN, which employed a hierarchical genetic algorithm to generate stealthy and human-readable adversarial prompts. Unlike GCG-based methods that perform explicit discrete optimization over the token space, AutoDAN relied on evolutionary search and therefore did not systematically explore the full token space, limiting its efficiency and performance. Our work is orthogonal to these improvements and focuses on the sample efficiency of the discrete optimization techniques in the GCG setting.

Black-box jailbreak methods (Chao et al., 2025; Zeng et al., 2024; Russinovich et al., 2025; Mehrotra et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025b; Deng et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2023b; Rahman et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2025a) generate jailbreak prompts without access to gradients or loss values. Instead, they exploit intrinsic capabilities of LLMs, such as instruction following and in-context learning, to iteratively refine prompts, often producing human-readable attacks. For example, Chao et al. (2025) proposed Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement (PAIR), which employed an attacker LLM to generate and refine jailbreak prompts against a target model. Zeng et al. (2024) analyzed a range of persuasion techniques and demonstrated that carefully composed persuasive prompts reliably induced policy violations; they further used an attacker LLM to synthesize jailbreak prompts conditioned on target behaviors and selected techniques. Liu et al. (2025b) identified a common failure mode in LLMs by perturbing word or sentence order; when instructed to restore the original order, the model often proceeds to complete the harmful task without refusal. Liu et al. (2025a) proposed AutoDAN-Turbo, which constructed a library of jailbreak strategies from collected cases and leveraged an attacker LLM to compose new prompts from these strategies. Chua et al. (2025) systematically exploited the model's ethical reasoning capabilities to frame harmful actions as morally necessary compromises. In contrast to white-box methods, black-box approaches do not explicitly explore the discrete token space through optimization, which limits their ability to reliably identify effective adversarial suffixes and comprehensively characterize model vulnerabilities.

Defense methods (Jain et al., 2023; Xie et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2024) aim to mitigate jailbreak attacks. Motivated by the observation that GCG often produces unnatural adversarial suffixes, Jain et al. (2023) introduced a perplexity (PPL) filter to detect and reject suspicious inputs. Xie et al. (2023) proposed *Self-reminder*, a prompt optimization method that encourages the model to adhere to ethical constraints during response generation. Zhou et al. (2024) introduced Robust Prompt Optimization (RPO), which learns a defensive token sequence to protect the model against jailbreak attacks.

B THREAT MODEL

Attacker's knowledge and capability. We consider an adversary with *white-box access* to a target LLM, including model parameters and gradients of the loss with respect to input tokens. The attacker is allowed to construct any user input, subject to preserving the overall chat template (e.g., system and assistant roles are not modified, pre-filling assistant response is not permitted). The attack is constrained by a finite optimization or query budget on the model.

Algorithm A1 GCG

Require: Context sequence $\mathbf{x}$, optimizable indices $\mathcal{I}$, initial adversarial suffix $\mathbf{x}^{\text{init}}$, the number of iterations S, loss function $\mathcal{L}$, batch size B, the number of top tokens K.
Output: Optimized adversarial suffix $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}$.

$\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}} \leftarrow \mathbf{x}^{\text{init}}$
loop S times
  $\mathbf{G}_X \leftarrow \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{x}}$ ▷ Equation (3)
  for $t \in \mathcal{I}$ **do**
    $\mathcal{C}_t \leftarrow \text{Top-}K_{i \in \mathcal{V}}(-\mathbf{G}_X)$ ▷ Equation (8)
  end for
  Candidate set $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \emptyset$
  while $|\mathcal{B}| < B$ **do**
    Uniformly sample $t \in \mathcal{I}$ and $i \in \mathcal{C}_t$.
    $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \cup \{(t, i)\}$
  end while
  $(t^\star, i^\star) \leftarrow \arg\min_{(t,i) \in \mathcal{B}} \mathcal{L}\left(\mathbf{x}^{(t \to i)}\right)$ ▷ Equation (9)
  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}} \leftarrow \mathbf{x}^{(t^\star \to i^\star)}$
end loop

Attacker's target. The adversary aims to induce the model to exhibit a *harmful behavior* $\mathcal{B}$, defined at the level of semantic output (e.g., generating unsafe, policy-violating, or disallowed content). In practice, GCG attacks often optimize a surrogate objective defined by a *target string* $\mathbf{x}^{\text{target}}$, such as maximizing its likelihood under the model. Crucially, this target string is only a proxy for optimization and does not itself define success: simply eliciting verbatim repetition of $\mathbf{x}^{\text{target}}$ does not constitute a successful attack unless it realizes the intended harmful behavior $\mathcal{B}$. Formally, attack success is determined by whether the model output $\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x})$ satisfies a behavior-level criterion $\mathcal{S}(\mathbf{x}) = 1$ (where $\mathcal{S}$ is an ideal scoring function), rather than string-level matching. This distinction separates genuine jailbreak behavior from trivial prompt constructions (e.g., instructing the model to repeat a given sentence).

C The GCG Algorithm

In Algorithm A1, we provide the GCG algorithm written with the set of notations in this paper.

D Measuring the Agreement between Gradient Ranking and Actual Loss Reduction

In this section, we describe the details on measuring the agreement between gradient ranking and actual loss reduction, which is used to validate the Limitation 1 of GCG and Technique 1 of Faster-GCG (Sec. 4).

We used the metric of Concordance Correlation Coefficient (CCC) (Lawrence & Lin, 1989), which measures the agreement between two variables, and is defined as:

$$\rho_c = \frac{2\sigma_{xy}}{\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_y^2 + (\mu_x - \mu_y)^2}, \tag{14}$$

where μ_x and μ_y are the means of two variables, σ_x and σ_y are the variances, and σ_{xy} is the covariance between the two variables. ρ_c has a range of $[-1, 1]$, where $\rho_c = 1$ means the two variables have perfect agreement, $\rho_c = -1$ means a reverse agreement, and $\rho_c = 0$ means a total disagreement.

To compute the CCC metric, we used an adversarial suffix $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}$ of length 1, top-K size of 64. The single-token setting was intended to isolate candidate ranking from random coordinate selection. We optimized the suffix for $S = 100$ iterations, and extracted all of the top-64 candidate tokens for replacement evaluation. We recorded the gradient ranking and the actual loss ranking each 10 steps,

Table A1: System prompts used for target LLMs.

Model	System prompt
Vicuna-7b	A chat between a curious user and an artificial intelligence assistant. The assistant gives helpful, detailed, and polite answers to the user's questions.
Gemma3-4B	You are a helpful assistant.
Llama series	'' (Empty string)
Qwen series	(No system prompt)

forming a total of 640 samples. CCC was computed between the gradient ranking numbers and the actual loss ranking numbers.

With the gradient-only candidate token selection (Sec. 4.1), we observed a CCC value of only 0.044, indicating almost no correlation between predicted and actual rankings. With distance regularization $\lambda = 10$, we obtained a CCC value of 0.285, indicating that the estimate with distance regularization is more aligned to the actual loss ranking.

E Counting the Percentage of Redundant Evaluation

In this section, we describe the details on counting the percentage of redundant evaluation, which is used to validate the Limitation 3 of GCG (Sec. 4.1).

With the GCG setting of $B = 64$, $S = 100$ and top-$K = 32$, we added a record of evaluated suffixes. We queried the record with all replacements, and added them to the record after evaluation, as in Faster-GCG Technique 3 (Figure 2). We counted the percentage of queries that hit an entry in the record. The result was averaged over 5 test cases, and we obtained a percentage of 5.9% hits.

F Additional Implementation Details

Target LLMs. Following GCG (Zou et al., 2023), the target LLMs were set to greedy sampling with a temperature of 0 during the optimization process of the adversarial suffix. During subsequent evaluation, we set the sampling temperature to the default value of each LLM. For system prompts, we followed the default values of the models or GCG, and they are summarized in Table A1.

Implementation details of GCG and variants. For GCG and variants (I-GCG, GCG-PS, TAO, Faster-GCG), we kept the experimental setup the same for a fair comparison. We set the number of tokens in the adversarial suffix to 20, initialized with exclamation marks `!` $\times$ 20 (except I-GCG). We ensured all tokens are in the ASCII charset and printable during optimization. For Llama-3.1, we set the initialization to `Sure!` $\times$ 10, which was also tokenized to 20 tokens, because the suffix consisting of all exclamation marks was not properly tokenized in this case. For I-GCG, we used their released initialization suffixes for Llama2-7B and Vicuna-7b[1]. And for other models, we selected one converged suffix from the JBB dataset to initialize I-GCG. Because this differs from the primary GCG initialization, I-GCG is treated as an auxiliary compatibility comparison. For GCG-PS, we used the GPT-2 draft model as in their original setting, and the recommended hyper-parameters: $R = 8$ and a probe set of $B/16$. For TAO, we followed their implementation[2] of refusal and effectiveness-aware loss and direction-priority token optimization (DPTO).

Computational resources. We conducted our experiments on NVIDIA RTX3090 GPUs, and the wall-clock time in Table 2 was calculated using a single GPU.

[1] https://github.com/jiaxiaojunQAQ/I-GCG

[2] https://github.com/ZevineXu/TAO-Attack

Table A2: Attack surfaces and budgets used in the experiments.

Method	Length	Position	B	S	K	Final trials
GCG	20	appended	64	500	32	10
Faster-GCG	20	appended	64	500	32	10
GCG++	40	prepended	64	500	32	10
Faster-GCG++	40	prepended	64	500	32	10
Black-box methods	variable	arbitrary	–	–	–	method-specific

G Supplementary Results

G.1 Attack Surface and Query Accounting

This section makes explicit the attack surfaces and query budgets used in our comparisons. Our threat model permits arbitrary user inputs (see Sec. B), so changing suffix length or position is a valid way to define a stronger attack surface. We nevertheless separate controlled algorithm comparisons from extended attack-surface comparisons.

The primary controlled comparison is Faster-GCG versus GCG with a 20-token appended suffix. Faster-GCG++ and GCG++ use the same 40-token prepended suffix and form a separate extended-surface comparison. The rationale for prepending the adversarial string was that some jailbreak prompts place contextual or role-playing text before the requested behavior, so we tested the optimized string in that position, which was a heuristic change. Results for black-box methods are reported as contextual reference because these methods use variable-length inputs, different feedback signals, and method-specific query protocols; they are not used to claim equal-budget optimization efficiency.

We distinguish two types of model calls. During optimization, a candidate-evaluation call computes the loss of one proposed suffix; the optimization budget is therefore $B \times S$ candidate evaluations (32K for the primary setting). During final behavior evaluation, we decode up to 10 of the lowest-loss suffixes for each behavior and use the best harmfulness score. This is a finite multi-query success protocol, analogous to allowing an attack to submit multiple candidate prompts. Final decoding and judge calls are not counted as candidate-evaluation calls and are reported separately. For black-box attack methods, there are no candidate-evaluation calls to compute the loss. But there are multiple final decoding and judge calls. We thus use 10 trials to stabilize the ASR of GCG family of methods. The protocols are summarized in Table A2. To expose the effect of this protocol, we additionally report mean-over-top-10 results instead of the default best-over-top-10 setting in Appendix G.7.

For the primary GCG-family comparison, the suffix is initialized with printable ASCII exclamation-mark tokens, with the documented Llama-3.1 exception. I-GCG uses an initialization string that was optimized on the corresponding target model in advance. This initialization procedure differs from the primary GCG initialization, so these I-GCG results are auxiliary compatibility comparisons and are not used to define the primary Faster-GCG versus GCG gain.

G.2 Comparison with Black-Box Attacks

Comparison between black-box and white-box threat models. White-box attacks such as GCG operate under a threat model that optimizes a fixed-length adversarial token sequence $\mathbf{x}^{\text{adv}}$, while keeping the surrounding context ($\mathbf{x}^{\text{ctx1}}$ and $\mathbf{x}^{\text{ctx2}}$, consisting of chat template, system prompt and user prompt) fixed. For each candidate adversarial prompt, the loss (e.g., the negative log-likelihood of generating $\mathbf{x}^{\text{target}}$) is computed and used as the optimization signal for iterative updates. In contrast, black-box attacks allow arbitrary inputs of varying length and form to induce the target model to generate harmful content aligned with a specified behavior. Although the chat template and system prompt remain fixed, these methods often rely on an external LLM-based evaluator to provide feedback for iterative refinement, rather than a differentiable loss defined on a fixed target string. Consequently, the threat models underlying white-box and black-box attacks differ in both their optimization objectives and feedback mechanisms.

Table A3: Jailbreak losses (↓) / ASRs (%, ↑) of different methods on the JBB dataset, including black-box attacks. The first block lists black-box attacks, the second block includes white-box attacks, and the third block presents Faster-GCG and its variants. All denotes the average on five models.

Attack	Llama2-7B	Qwen3-4B	Gemma3-4B	Llama3.1-8B	Qwen3.5-4B	All
PAIR	– / 42.9	– / 65.3	– / **96.8**	– / 85.0	– / 47.0	– / 67.4
PAP	– / 26.9	– / 49.7	– / 90.5	– / **89.7**	– / 42.8	– / 59.9
FLIP	– / 35.0	– / 37.8	– / 88.0	– / 57.5	– / 49.2	– / 53.5
TRIAL	– / 24.3	– / 28.6	– / 93.1	– / 84.9	– / 7.5	– / 47.7
GCG	0.350 / 58.2	0.981 / 47.7	0.485 / 80.6	0.639 / 64.5	0.312 / 77.9	0.553 / 65.8
GCG++	0.148 / 73.8	0.685 / 75.8	0.352 / 81.2	0.500 / 63.4	0.176 / 87.2	0.372 / 76.3
AutoDAN	1.825 / 27.7	4.341 / 23.1	5.740 / 71.8	1.854 / 36.1	–	–
I-GCG	**0.108** / **89.6**	1.453 / 43.1	1.315 / 77.1	1.169 / 56.1	0.349 / 58.2	0.879 / 64.8
GCG-PS	0.531 / 49.4	1.776 / 29.4	0.661 / 71.8	1.168 / 41.5	–	–
TAO	0.278 / 68.9	0.950 / 50.1	0.440 / 83.6	0.672 / 56.6	0.296 / 74.5	0.527 / 66.7
Faster-GCG	0.268* / 66.0	0.863* / 54.2	0.445* / 81.4	0.514* / 67.1	0.251* / 78.7	0.468* / 69.5*
Faster-GCG++	0.170 / 71.4	**0.653** / **77.6**	**0.348** / 84.2	**0.466** / 68.6	**0.149** / **88.7**	**0.357** / **78.1**

Table A4: Pooled paired comparisons between Faster-GCG and GCG. Differences are Faster-GCG minus GCG. Time ratios report the range across individual pairs.

Batch ratio	Loss diff. ± 95% CI	ASR diff. ± 95% CI (pp)	Time ratio (GCG / Faster)
2×	-0.035 ± 0.037	$+1.7 \pm 5.1$	1.8–1.9×
4×	-0.001 ± 0.038	-0.7 ± 5.1	3.3–3.8×
8×	$+0.039 \pm 0.049$	-0.5 ± 6.6	6–7×

Table A5: ASRs of transfer attacks against proprietary models. The attacks use Qwen3.5 as the source model. All denotes average on the three models. * denotes $p < 0.05$.

Attack	Gemini-3-flash	GPT-5-mini	Sonnet-4	All
GCG	4.1%	0.0%	16.0%	6.7%
Faster-GCG	5.6%	0.6%	21.5%*	9.2%*

We include comparison with typical black-box baselines – PAIR (Chao et al., 2025), PAP (Zeng et al., 2024), FLIP (Liu et al., 2025b), and TRIAL (Chua et al., 2025) – in Table A3. Because black-box methods do not optimize against a fixed target string, loss-based evaluation using such a target is not directly applicable. With the increased suffix length and the prefix modification (see Sec. 5.1), Faster-GCG++ achieved an average ASR of 78.1%. This result is an extended attack-surface comparison: the controlled white-box comparison is Faster-GCG++ versus GCG++ under the same 40-token prepended setting, while the black-box results use their original variable-length multi-query protocols.

G.3 Pooled Efficiency Comparisons between Faster-GCG and GCG

Table A4 shows pooled paired comparisons between Faster-GCG and GCG, gathered from the observed data points in Table 2. All 95% confidence intervals included zero, so none of the tested ratios showed a statistically significant degradation in loss or ASR when the Faster-GCG budget was reduced. The 4x comparisons provided the strongest balanced result: the pooled loss and ASR differences were both close to zero, while Faster-GCG was 3.3x–3.8x faster. At 8x, the loss point estimate favored GCG, but its confidence interval still included zero and the time ratio reached 7x. We therefore report up to 8x sampling efficiency.

Table A6: ASRs against Llama2-7B with different defense methods.

Attack	PPL filter	Self-reminder	RPO
GCG	22.8%	9.6%	31.0%
Faster-GCG	26.1%	10.6%	34.2%

Table A7: Attack performance against reasoning and non-reasoning modes of Qwen3.5-4B on the JBB dataset.

	Non-reasoning		Reasoning	
Attack	Loss	ASR	Loss	ASR
GCG	0.312	77.9%	0.733	30.5%
Faster-GCG	0.251	78.7%	0.670	32.6%
Faster-GCG++	**0.149**	**88.7%**	**0.487**	**37.4%**

Table A8: Jailbreak losses (↓) / ASRs (%, ↑) with average over top-10 candidates. * denotes $p < 0.05$.

Attack	Llama2-7B	Qwen3-4B	Gemma3-4B	Llama3.1-8B	Qwen3.5-4B	All
GCG	0.367 / 49.0	1.065 / 21.3	0.573 / 39.7	0.680 / 44.6	0.354 / 30.9	0.608 / 37.1
Faster-GCG	0.287* / 54.6	0.965* / 26.3	0.528 / 42.0	0.566* / 50.8	0.287* / 36.8*	0.527* / 42.1*

G.4 Transfer Attacks against Proprietary LLMs

We conducted a preliminary transfer analysis with suffixes optimized on Qwen3.5-4B and evaluated on Gemini-3-flash-preview (Google, 2025), GPT-5-mini (Singh et al., 2025), and Sonnet-4 (Anthropic, 2025). As shown in Table A5, absolute ASRs are low: Faster-GCG obtains 5.6%, 0.6%, and 21.5% on the three targets, respectively. However, it retained average advantage over GCG by 2.5 percentage points. The results show that attacking proprietary models for GCG variants.

G.5 Defense Performance against Faster-GCG

We further evaluated the defense performance of various defense methods: PPL filter (Jain et al., 2023), Self-reminder (Xie et al., 2023) and RPO (Zhou et al., 2024). As shown in Table A6, the ASRs lowered, while Faster-GCG still performed better than GCG. The performance may be recovered by adaptive attack (Tramer et al., 2020).

G.6 Evaluating Faster-GCG on Reasoning Models

Reasoning models are a type of recently developed model that have explicit reasoning traces (e.g., `<think> ... </think>`) before starting their actual answer (Qwen Team, 2026; Singh et al., 2025). They often have better capability of completing more complicated and challenging tasks.

We further evaluated Faster-GCG on reasoning-enabled models by toggling between reasoning and non-reasoning modes as supported in the Qwen3.5-4B chat template. For the reasoning setting, the attack target was modified to "`</think>\n\n`Sure, here...". Results on the JBB dataset are reported in Table A7. The reasoning target adds the "`</think>`" boundary before the harmful answer, e.g. "`</think>\n\n`Sure, here is a guide for...", rather than directly targeting "Sure, here is a guide for...". This creates a longer, structured target on which generation can deviate before reaching the answer prefix. Thus, the overall performance dropped, but Faster-GCG retained a relative improvement over GCG.

G.7 Results with Average-over-Top-10 Protocol

In our original protocol, for all methods in the GCG family we evaluated the ten adversarial suffixes with the lowest loss, generated one response from each suffix, and took the best harmfulness score



Figure A1: **Warning: This figure contains potentially offensive and harmful text.** Case study of GCG and Faster-GCG. The red text represents the optimized adversarial suffix, and the green text after "Assistant:" is part of the response of the Llama2-7B. In these cases, the LLM refuses the harmful user prompts with the suffixes optimized by GCG, whereas the suffixes optimized by Faster-GCG successfully induce harmful responses.

for the corresponding example. This is a finite multi-query success protocol: success means that at least one of the submitted candidate suffixes induces harmful behavior. We did not use threshold-based early stopping in this evaluation. We additionally report an average-over-top-10 protocol in Table A8, where all ten responses are evaluated and their losses and harmfulness scores are averaged. The results remain directionally consistent with the primary protocol, while the absolute scores are lower because the maximum over ten responses is not taken.

H Case Study of Faster-GCG

In Figure A1, we present some cases where Faster-GCG successfully induces harmful behavior, while GCG does not.

I Statistical Significance

Independent seeds and paired uncertainty. Since the optimization process of GCG variants have uncertainty, we re-ran several results and conducted paired uncertainty tests to validate the statistical significance of the results. Beside the default random seed of 42, we added 3407 and 2026 as additional random seeds. Since re-running with multiple seeds requires re-doing the full process of adversarial suffix optimization, we only re-ran on two models to demonstrate the uncertainty. We compare Faster-GCG and GCG on the same behavior and seed, yielding $n = 300$ paired behavior-seed differences per model. Table A9 reports the mean paired difference (Faster-GCG minus GCG), its standard deviation (SD), two-sided 95% confidence interval (CI), and two-sided paired t-test p-value. Across these three seeds, Faster-GCG reduces loss on Llama2, but we do not detect an

Table A9: Paired uncertainty results between GCG and Faster-GCG with 3 independent seeds on the JBB dataset. * denotes $p < 0.05$.

Model	Metric	Difference $\pm$ 95% CI	SD	p-value
Llama2-7B	Loss	-0.050 $\pm$ 0.040	0.353	0.0148*
Llama2-7B	ASR	+0.944 $\pm$ 5.155	45.373	0.7187
Gemma3-4B	Loss	+0.011 $\pm$ 0.024	0.207	0.3534
Gemma3-4B	ASR	+0.257 $\pm$ 3.090	27.195	0.8701

ASR difference. Separately, the single-seed data in Table 1 allow a paired example-level test with $n = 100$. At this seed, the loss reduction is significant for each model, and the pooled five-model ASR difference is significant ($+3.7 \pm 3.3\%, p = 0.0292$). However, the individual-model ASR intervals are wide, and the multi-seed results above do not establish a consistent ASR improvement.