# MoMART: Mixture of Multimodal Auto-Red-Teamers

**Anonymous authors**
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## Abstract

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are trained for safety across the input modalities they support, yet whether these per-modality defenses remain effective under coordinated multimodal attacks remains poorly understood. We present **MoMART(Mixture of Multimodal Auto-Red-Teamers)**, an adaptive compositional red-teaming framework that decomposes harmful behaviors across text, image, audio, and video using reusable modality specialists built from atomic transformations. MoMARTsearches over admissible modality subsets, composes the resulting artifacts into a single query, and iteratively refines attacks through a rating-guided feedback loop. Evaluating on the HarmBench benchmark against six frontier models, we find that multimodal composition consistently outperforms the strongest constituent modality under matched query budgets. On Gemini-Omni, attack success increases from $82.0\%$ for the best single modality to $96.5\%$ when all four modalities are composed, with ASR increasing monotonically across composition steps. Robustness to composition varies substantially across model families, with Claude and GPT exhibiting stronger resistance than Qwen and Llama. Beyond aggregate ASR, behavior-level matching reveals 29 and 40 joint-only successes on Gemini-Omni and Qwen-Omni, respectively, that are not achieved by any constituent modality alone. These results show that independent modality evaluation can miss vulnerabilities that emerge only through joint use, motivating adaptive, composition-aware safety assessment.

## 1 Introduction

Frontier multimodal language models increasingly accept text, images, audio, and video within the same interaction. This broader interface also expands the safety attack surface. Harmful intent can be transferred into typographic images (Gong et al., 2025), expressed through voice-native narratives (Shen et al., 2024), embedded in dynamic video context (Liu et al., 2025b), or distributed across image–text and other cross-modal inputs (Shayegani et al., 2024; Pan et al., 2025). Consistent with these attacks, multimodal safety benchmarks report substantial variation in model behavior across modality realizations and combinations (Liu et al., 2025a; Pan et al., 2025). Safety measured in one channel therefore need not characterize a model's behavior when several channels are presented.

Automated red-teaming has developed along a complementary axis. In the text setting, PAIR uses target-model feedback to iteratively refine semantic jailbreaks (Chao et al., 2025), TAP broadens this search through branching and pruning (Mehrotra et al., 2024), and JailbreakSkill packages attack procedures as reusable and evolving skills (Wen et al., 2026). Modality-native methods expose different weaknesses: FigStep and CS-DJ exploit typographic transfer and visual distraction (Gong et al., 2025; Yang et al., 2025b), while VoiceJailbreak and RedteamAudioLMMs adapt red-teaming to speech and audio-grounded inputs (Shen et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2025a). Other work automates or composes multimodal attacks: Arondight generates diverse image–text prompts (Liu et al., 2024b); Jailbreak in Pieces combines adversarial images with text (Shayegani et al., 2024); JMLLM integrates textual, visual, and auditory strategies (Mao et al., 2024); and HACA plans combinations of atomic text–image strategies (Zhao et al., 2026). In the adjacent setting of multimodal-conditioned audio–video generation, Multi2AV-Safety systematically spans all 11 non-singleton text, image, audio, and video conditioning sets and explicitly studies composed harm (Jiang et al., 2026).



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These studies establish that both automation and multimodal attacks are powerful. Taken together, however, they do not provide a controlled, all-subset evaluation of adaptive black-box attacks against conversational omni-modal language models. This leaves a more specific question: what additional risk is introduced by presenting multiple modality-specific attacks jointly? A multimodal attack may outperform a text-only baseline simply because it contains one or more unusually vulnerable channels, repeats the harmful intent, or uses a larger optimization budget. Conversely, comparing only against text conflates modality transfer with modality composition. We therefore ask: **when the harmful behavior, target model, attacker, and evaluator are held fixed, and each trial is allowed the same maximum number of optimization iterations, does a jointly delivered multimodal attack outperform the best-performing constituent modality evaluated alone?**

We quantify this effect using strongest-component composition gain, defined as the ASR difference between a jointly delivered multimodal attack and its best-performing constituent modality evaluated alone under the same harmful behaviors and bounded target-query budget. To enable this controlled comparison, we introduce **MoMART (Mixture of Multimodal Auto-Red-Teamers)**, an adaptive black-box red-teaming framework that evaluates modality subsets under matched conditions. Given a harmful behavior and target model, MoMART identifies the admissible input modalities, adaptively decomposes the behavior across a selected subset of text, image, audio, and video, and assigns each component to a reusable modality specialist built from atomic semantic, structural, and signal-level transformations. The resulting artifacts are composed into a single multimodal query and delivered jointly to the target. After each unsuccessful attempt, a judge scores the response, and the feedback guides subsequent transformation and artifact regeneration under a fixed retry budget.

Two design properties distinguish MoMART. First, multimodal composition is itself part of the adaptive search: rather than optimizing a jailbreak within a fixed input channel, MoMART searches over admissible modality subsets and their modality-specific transformations. Second, its atomic, modular design decouples modality-specific artifact construction from the shared feedback loop, enabling specialists and transformations to be reused across target models and extended to new modalities or attack strategies. This design allows MoMART to isolate composition gains beyond the strongest individual modality and to identify which modality combinations expose additional vulnerabilities for each target. Figure 1 summarizes the pipeline: identifying admissible modalities, selecting and decomposing across a modality subset, constructing and jointly delivering the corresponding artifacts, and using response ratings to guide subsequent retries.

We evaluate MoMART on 200 Standard HarmBench behaviors (Mazeika et al., 2024) against six models with different supported input modalities. To examine the contribution of modality composition, we conduct matched modality-subset ablations on the two omni-modal targets, Gemini-Omni and Qwen-Omni. On both targets, composed attacks consistently outperform their strongest constituent modality under the evaluated protocol. The full four-modality composition raises ASR from 82.0% to 96.5% on Gemini-Omni and from 70.0% to 90.5% on Qwen-Omni, yielding gains of 14.5% and 20.5% over the strongest single modality, respectively. These results indicate that assessing robustness one modality at a time can underestimate vulnerability to their joint use.

Our main contributions are:

- **A modular framework for target-specific multimodal red-teaming.** We introduce MoMART, a black-box red-teaming framework designed to identify the input-modality combinations to which a given target model is most vulnerable. Rather than restricting attacks to a predetermined channel or combination, MoMART explores target-compatible compositions of text, image, audio, and video through reusable modality specialists built from atomic actions. These specialists construct channel-native artifacts for joint delivery, while a shared rating-guided feedback loop adaptively refines attack framing within each combination.
- **Evidence of vulnerabilities missed by single-modality evaluation.** Exhaustive modality-subset evaluations on two omni-modal targets reveal that jointly delivered attacks expose failures missed by their constituent single-modality attacks under matched retry limits. Full composition raises ASR from 82.0% to 96.5% on Gemini-Omni and from 70.0% to 90.5% on Qwen-Omni. Behavior-level matching further identifies 29 and 40 joint-only successes, respectively, on behaviors for which all four single-modality evaluations fail. These results show that robustness observed in individual modalities does not necessarily carry over to their composition, establishing the need for composition-aware safety evaluation.




Figure 1: **MoMART pipeline: Stage 1** probes which input modalities the target accepts (here text and image), restricting the attack to admissible subsets. **Stage 2** composes a strategy: a modality combination and a set of atomic mechanisms per channel, such as text reframing and image typography. **Stage 3** dispatches one specialist per selected modality, each rendering the full harmful behavior into a channel-native artifact — reframed text, a generated image, synthesized speech, or a composed video — delivered together in a single target turn. **Stage 4** judges the response and, on failure, returns feedback to **Stage 3**, which regenerates the next attempt accordingly.

- **Strong empirical performance across targets and benchmarks.** On 200 HarmBench behaviors across six targets with different input interfaces, MoMART achieves the highest ASR among the evaluated methods on every target, averaging 79.0% and exceeding each target's strongest evaluated baseline by 30.25% on average. A larger-scale evaluation on 2,299 SafeBench behaviors across seven targets further demonstrates reuse of the framework and frozen strategy pool under an expanded retry budget.
- **Generality beyond text outputs.** We extend MoMART to image and video generation by reusing the same attack loop and applicable modality specialists while adapting only the input transformations and output-specific success criteria. These extensions achieve a 68.5% unsafe-generation rate on text-to-video generation (Veo-3.0-fast-generate-001) and a 73.6% end-to-end success rate on text-and-image-to-image generation (GPT-Image-2), providing initial evidence that the framework can be reused across output modalities.

## 2 Related Work

**Automated and adaptive text red-teaming:** Early automated text attacks span gradient-based suffix optimization with GCG (Zou et al., 2023), hierarchical genetic search with AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2023), and mutation-based prompt fuzzing with GPTFUZZER (Yu et al., 2024). PAIR casts black-box jailbreaking as an iterative dialogue in which an attacker model revises a candidate prompt using the target model's previous response and an external assessment of attack progress (Chao et al., 2025). TAP extends this feedback loop from a single trajectory to a tree-structured search: it branches candidate prompts and prunes off-topic or unpromising branches before spending additional target-model queries (Mehrotra et al., 2024). JailbreakSkill shifts the unit of reuse from individual prompts to executable attack procedures. Its planner selects skills from a library, while failed traces are used to refine, compose, and expand that library across attacks (Wen et al., 2026). These methods establish effective closed-loop search, but their target-facing attacks are still realized as text. MoMART retains feedback-guided refinement while moving the attack space to modality-specific artifacts and their

joint delivery. Unlike JailbreakSkill, our current framework does not learn a persistent skill library: its action library is fixed so that the choice of modality subset can be evaluated as a controlled variable.

**Modality-native jailbreaks:** FigStep transfers the prohibited instruction from text into a typographic image and pairs it with a benign-looking textual completion request, thereby exploiting the gap between language-model and visual-language-model safety behavior (Gong et al., 2025). CS-DJ develops a different visual mechanism: it decomposes a harmful request into subqueries, renders them in a composite image, and introduces semantically contrasting subimages intended to distract the model's safety reasoning (Yang et al., 2025b). VoiceJailbreak shows that simply reading a text jailbreak aloud is insufficient and instead constructs voice-native fictional narratives through coordinated settings, characters, and plots (Shen et al., 2024). These attacks are important because they adapt the adversarial representation to the structure of a particular channel. However, each centers on one attack-bearing modality; none measures the incremental effect of jointly instantiating the same behavior across text, image, audio, and video under matched conditions.

Table 1: Comparison of the six representative jailbreak methods emphasized in this work and MoMART. A check in an attack-channel column means that the harmful request or the principal adversarial transformation is carried by that channel; a benign guide prompt paired with an adversarial image does not count as a text attack. "Feedback" requires a target response or judge outcome to alter the selection or construction of a later attempt.

| | Search and learning | | Attack-bearing channel | | | | Composition evaluation | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Method | Feedback | Skill evolution | Text | Image | Audio | Video | Joint | All subsets | Strongest control |
| PAIR (Chao et al., 2025) | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| TAP (Mehrotra et al., 2024) | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| JailbreakSkill (Wen et al., 2026) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| FigStep (Gong et al., 2025) | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| CS-DJ (Yang et al., 2025b) | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| VoiceJailbreak (Shen et al., 2024) | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| **MoMART (ours)** | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

*Skill evolution* denotes failure-driven modification or discovery of reusable procedures that persist beyond the current attempt. *Joint* denotes simultaneous use of at least two attack-bearing channels. *All subsets* requires evaluation of every admissible modality subset. *Strongest control* requires each joint attack to be compared with its best-performing constituent modality under the same behavior set, evaluator, and target-query budget.

**Compositional multimodal red-teaming and safety evaluation:** A growing line of work moves beyond a single modality. Jailbreak in Pieces constructs complementary adversarial image and text components (Shayegani et al., 2024); Arondight automates the generation of diverse image–text attacks (Liu et al., 2024b); JMLLM combines textual, visual, and auditory attack strategies (Mao et al., 2024); and HACA uses a planner to select and compose atomic text–image strategies (Zhao et al., 2026). On the evaluation side, Omni-SafetyBench instantiates harmful behaviors across a broad collection of modality realizations, including joint audio–visual conditions (Pan et al., 2025). Multi2AV-Safety more systematically enumerates multimodal conditioning combinations, but studies safety in multimodal-to-audio–video generation rather than conversational omni-modal language models (Jiang et al., 2026). These studies demonstrate that cross-modal attacks and evaluations are necessary, but they answer a different question from ours. Table 1 summarizes these distinctions across the representative methods: MoMART is the only one that carries the attack across all four channels, delivers them jointly, and evaluates every modality subset against its strongest constituent under matched conditions. MoMART couples adaptive black-box attack construction with a matched all-subset protocol: for every admissible joint configuration, it compares success against the strongest constituent modality while holding the harmful behaviors, evaluator, and target-query budget fixed.

## 3 METHOD

Our design builds on CoP (Xiong et al., 2025), which composes textual red-teaming principles, and HACA (Zhao et al., 2026), which uses a cross-modal planner to combine atomic text–image strategies. MoMART organizes atomic mechanisms, defined as modality-specific transformations such as text reframing, into reusable specialists for text, image, audio, and video. These specialists and their libraries are reused across compatible targets to search for modality subsets, mechanism combinations,

and channel-native inputs that maximize jailbreak success. Sec. 3.1 introduces our problem settings; Sec. 3.2 frames the key components of MoMART and Sec. 3.3 describes the pipeline.

### 3.1 Compositional Multimodal Robustness

**Threat model.** MoMART attacks a target multimodal model $M$ in the black-box setting. It observes only $M$'s text responses to queries it submits, with no access to gradients, logits, or weights. This is the interface available to a real adversary against a deployed model, so it is the setting in which deployed safety alignment should be measured. We work with four input modalities,

$$\mathcal{M} = \{\text{text},\ \text{image},\ \text{audio},\ \text{video}\}, \tag{1}$$

and write $\mathcal{A}_M \subseteq \mathcal{M}$ for those $M$ actually ingests. A modality subset is any non-empty $C \subseteq \mathcal{A}_M$; there are $2^{|\mathcal{A}_M|} - 1$ of them, up to 15 when all four are admissible.

**Problem formulation.** For a behavior $b$, an attack is a choice of which channels to use and what to place in each. A modality subset $C$ selects the channels; for each selected channel $m \in C$ a constructor produces an artifact $x_m = g_m(b, a_m)$ from an action $a_m$ drawn from a per-modality action library $\mathcal{L}_m$ (Sec. 3.2). Writing $\mathbf{x}_C = \{x_m\}_{m \in C}$ for the delivered bundle and $\mathbf{a}_C = \{a_m\}_{m \in C}$ for the actions that produced it, the target returns $y = M(\mathbf{x}_C)$ and a judge $J(b, y) \in \{0, 1\}$ marks whether $y$ fulfills $b$. The attacker's goal is to find the subset and the per-channel inputs that jointly maximize the chance of a successful jailbreak:

$$\big(C^\star,\ \mathbf{a}^\star\big) \ =\ \arg \max_{\substack{C \subseteq \mathcal{A}_M \\ a_m \in \mathcal{L}_m,\ m \in C}} \mathbb{E}\big[\, J\big(b,\ M(\mathbf{x}_C)\big)\,\big], \qquad x_m = g_m(b, a_m), \tag{2}$$

where the expectation is over the stochastic target and constructors. Two properties make equation 2 hard and distinguish it from single-channel jailbreaking. The outer choice of $C$ is combinatorial, with up to $2^{|\mathcal{A}_M|} - 1$ subsets, and the inner choice of $\mathbf{a}_C$ is a discrete search over action combinations whose effect is target-dependent and coupled across channels, since the constructors may condition on one another. MoMART approaches equation 2 by enumerating the outer subsets and searching the inner actions with a bounded, rating-guided loop, described in the rest of this section. Because the outer subsets are enumerated rather than fixed in advance, the maximizer $C^\star_M$ is not merely a means but a finding in its own right: it names the modality combination a given target is most exposed to, and Sec. 4.3 shows that it is not always the full set and differs across models.

### 3.2 MoMART: A Mixture of Modality Specialists

**Architecture.** MoMART treats each modality as a specialist red-teamer: a constructor that owns one channel, holds its own action library, and renders the shared behavior $b$ into an artifact native to that channel. A subset $C$ selects which specialists fire; all selected specialists fire on the same behavior, and their outputs are delivered together in a single target-model turn.

The contrast with mixture-of-experts routing is deliberate and worth stating, since the name invites it. In MoE, a gate routes an input to a few experts whose outputs are reduced to one prediction; the gate is learned and the non-selected experts are discarded. In MoMART, the gate is the modality subset $C$, and nothing is reduced: every specialist's artifact reaches the target simultaneously. The gate is also deliberately not learned. It is enumerated, because it is the experimental variable. A learned router would maximize ASR while destroying our ability to attribute the result to composition.

**Actions and reuse.** An action is a named transformation within one modality, such as text reframing or typographic image rendering (Appendix A). MoMART encapsulates these actions within reusable modality specialists, rather than constructing a separate attack pipeline for each target. The same specialists are reused across modality combinations and target models: for example, the text specialist operates alone on text-only targets and jointly with other specialists on multimodal targets. Across our main evaluation, we reuse the same action libraries and predefined strategy pool, retaining only strategies compatible with each target's input interface. Target-specific adaptation occurs through feedback-guided revisions of the attack framing and regeneration of the corresponding artifacts.

**Strategies.** A strategy bundles two choices,

$$s = \big(\ \underbrace{C}_{\text{modality subset}}\ ,\ \underbrace{\alpha}_{\text{actions per modality}}\ \big), \qquad C \subseteq \mathcal{A}_M, \tag{3}$$

where $\alpha$ assigns one or more actions to each modality in $C$. The full strategy space is far too large to enumerate, so we fix a single strategy pool in advance and reuse it unchanged across every target, so that the modality subset is the only variable that differs across the composition ablation. The pool is built once by enumerating each admissible subset $C$ and, for every modality in it, drawing single actions and action pairs from that modality's action library, under two composition modes: **parallel**, in which each channel acts independently and the artifacts are combined into one joint input, and **cross-modal**, in which one channel's output conditions the generation of the next so that all channels share one framing. Appendix A lists the action library and representative strategies (Table 7).

### 3.3 Attack Loop

Algorithm 1 instantiates the objective of equation 2. The two setup steps (lines 1–2) run once per target: we probe which modalities $M$ accepts and keep only the strategies whose subset is admissible. The main loop attacks each behavior with each strategy (lines 3 onward). For a strategy, every selected specialist rewrites the full behavior $b$ into its channel (line 6), the artifacts are delivered together in one target turn, and the judge scores the response. If the score meets the success threshold we stop and record success; otherwise it fed back to revise the framing and loop up to $R$ times.

Solving equation 2 is computationally heavy, so for better feasibility we fix two settings. First, the subset $C$ is fixed by the strategy and never changed within a trial, so retries revise the framing rather than search for an easier subset. Second, retries are guided, not blind: the judge's rating selects the next framing, so a fixed budget buys directed escalation.

**Success criterion.** The judge is an instruction-tuned LLM that rates, on a $0$ to $10$ scale, how fully the response $y$ carries out the behavior $b$. A trial is counted as a successful jailbreak when this rating reaches 7 or higher, and the same rating drives the retry: higher partial scores steer the next attempt toward completeness, a flat refusal toward a more indirect framing.

**Specialist constructors.** CONSTRUCT produces one artifact per selected channel from the full behavior $b$. The text specialist rewrites $b$ as a single coherent prompt. The image specialist renders the request typographically (a FigStep-style channel shift), writes a generation prompt for a text-to-image model, or perturbs a generated base image. The audio specialist reframes the request as spoken narrative and synthesizes it with neural text-to-speech. The video specialist composes rendered or generated frames into a short target-compatible clip. The text specialist runs first and its output conditions the others through frame, so all channels share one coherent framing. If a specialist itself refuses, its artifact falls back to a fixed template rather than passing refusal text downstream.

## 4 Experiment

### 4.1 Experimental Setup

The attacker and all generation backends are held fixed across every behavior, modality, combination, and target. We use Gemini-2.5-Flash as the attacker LLM at temperature 0.7, and GPT-4.1-mini as the judge. Images are generated with Qwen-Image-3, speech with Edge-TTS, and video frames composed and encoded with a fixed OpenCV pipeline. Every method receives the same retry budget of $R = 20$ attempts per (behavior, strategy) trial; auxiliary LLM calls are method-specific and are not budget-matched; the resulting query cost is reported separately in Table 9.

We evaluate six frontier models spanning proprietary and open families: Gemini-3.5-Flash (Omni), Qwen3.5-Omni-Plus, GPT-5.6-sol, Claude-4.8-Opus, Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, and Qwen3-235B-A22B-Instruct. These differ in the input modalities they accept, which determines how each is evaluated. The two omni-modal targets, Gemini-3.5-Flash and Qwen3.5-Omni-Plus, accept all four modalities and carry the full composition ablation (Sec. 4.3). GPT-5.6-sol and Claude-4.8-Opus accept text and image, while Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and Qwen3-235B-A22B-Instruct accept text only; all four appear in the main comparison (Sec. 4.2). For the generative-output attacks (Sec. 5), we additionally use Veo-3.0-fast-generate-001 as the text-to-video target and GPT-Image-2 as the text-and-image-to-image target. We compare against seven prior attacks under the identical behavior set, judges, and budget: the text jailbreaks PAIR (Chao et al., 2025) and TAP (Mehrotra et al., 2024); the agentic skill-based attacker JailbreakSkill (Wen et al., 2026); the image jailbreaks CS-DJ (Yang et al., 2025b) and FigStep (Gong et al., 2025); and the audio jailbreaks VoiceJailbreak (Shen et al.,

2024) and RedteamAudioLMMs (Yang et al., 2025a). Entries requiring a modality a target does not accept, such as audio-only attacks on the text-and-image models, are marked "—" in Table 2.

**Evaluation metrics.** Our primary metric is attack success rate (ASR), the fraction of the $N$ behaviors whose attack is judged successful, together with the mean number of target queries to the first success as a measure of query efficiency (Table 9). For the modality ablation we additionally report the composition gain, a subset's ASR minus that of its own strongest single modality under identical conditions. The formal definitions of ASR and composition gain are given in Appendix D.1.

### 4.2 Main Results

MoMART attains the highest attack success rate on all six targets in Table 2, and the gaps are not incremental. Where the best prior attack manages $54.5\%$ on Gemini-Omni, MoMART reaches $96.5\%$; where the best prior attack manages $17.5\%$ on GPT-5.6, MoMART reaches $67.0\%$. The pattern is sharpest exactly where it matters most: on the strongly safety-tuned proprietary models, every single-channel and text-search baseline stalls in the single or low double digits, and composing modalities is what breaks them. On the open models, where baselines are already strong, MoMART still pulls ahead, saturating Qwen-3 at $100\%$ and reaching $82.5\%$ on Llama.

The result we want to draw out is not that the attack is strong but *where* its strength comes from. Reading down each column, no individual channel comes close to the composed attack, and the weaker a target is to any one channel the larger the jump when channels are combined. The gain is therefore not a stronger jailbreak in some single modality; it is the composition itself. At the same time the protocol does not flatten every model to near-total success: Claude-4.8-Opus holds MoMART to $37.5\%$ and GPT-5.6 to $67.0\%$ while the open models exceed $82\%$, and the resulting order Claude $<$ GPT $<$ Llama $<$ Qwen mirrors these families' safety reputations. Composition exposes a real and previously unmeasured attack surface, yet still separates well-aligned models from weakly-aligned ones rather than acting as a universal solvent. Additional evaluations examine query efficiency (Appendix C) and robustness to the attacker and judge (Appendix E). MoMART achieves the lowest mean number of queries to first success on five of the six targets, averaging $7.97$ queries across targets versus $8.07$ for JailbreakSkill and $15.65$ for TAP, with means computed over each method's successfully attacked behaviors. ASR is also stable under component swaps: replacing the attacker changes it by at most $2\%$, and replacing the judge reduces it by at most $5\%$.

Table 2: Attack success rate (ASR, %) on $N = 200$ HarmBench behaviors. Each entry is the percentage of behaviors judged successfully attacked. Best result per target in **bold**. "—" marks a baseline whose attack-bearing modality the target does not accept.

| Method | Omni-modal | | Proprietary | | Open Source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Gemini-Omni | Qwen-Omni | GPT-5.6 | Claude | Llama | Qwen-3 |
| | ASR (%), $N = 200$ | | | | | |
| PAIR (Chao et al., 2025) | 5.0 | 3.5 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 19.5 | 34.0 |
| TAP (Mehrotra et al., 2024) | 13.5 | 7.5 | 8.5 | 4.0 | 22.5 | 30.0 |
| JailbreakSkill (Wen et al., 2026) | 54.5 | 33.0 | 12.0 | 7.5 | 80.0 | 98.0 |
| CS-DJ (Yang et al., 2025b) | 5.0 | 9.5 | 17.5 | 9.5 | — | — |
| FigStep (Gong et al., 2025) | 1.5 | 8.0 | 15.5 | 1.0 | — | — |
| VoiceJailbreak (Shen et al., 2024) | 0.0 | 0.5 | — | — | — | — |
| RedteamAudioLMMs (Yang et al., 2025a) | 12.5 | 5.0 | — | — | — | — |
| **MoMART (ours)** | **96.5** | **90.5** | **67.0** | **37.5** | **82.5** | **100.0** |

**Scaling to SafeBench.** We further evaluate MoMART on $2{,}299$ behaviors from SafeBench (Ying et al., 2024) across seven targets, expanding the behavior set to approximately $11.5$ times the size of our HarmBench evaluation. Reusing the same attacker, judge, and frozen strategy pool, with up to $R = 100$ optimization iterations per behavior–strategy trial, MoMART achieves a mean ASR of $78.6\%$, with six targets exceeding $75\%$ and three exceeding $95\%$. The mean number of target queries to first success is $20.48$, averaging each target's successful-behavior mean equally across all seven targets. These results demonstrate reuse of the framework across a substantially larger behavior set and additional model families. Full protocols and per-target results are provided in Appendix F.

### 4.3 MODALITY-COMPOSITION ABLATION

Why does composition help? Table 3 takes the two omni-modal targets apart, channel by channel and combination by combination, with the behavior set, attacker, judge, and retry budget held fixed so that only the modality subset varies. Three findings follow, and together they show the gain is a property of composition rather than of any lucky channel.

Table 3: **Modality-composition ablation** on the two omni-modal targets ($N = 200$, ASR %). Each row is a modality combination. Backends: image = Qwen-Image-3, audio = Edge-TTS, video = OpenCV pipeline. The best single modality (underlined) is the strongest-component baseline for the composition gain; the full composition is in **bold**.

| Modality combination | Gemini-Omni | Qwen-Omni |
|---|---|---|
| text | 67.0 | 56.0 |
| image | 21.5 | 14.5 |
| audio | <u>82.0</u> | <u>70.0</u> |
| video | 32.5 | 17.0 |
| text + image | 86.0 | 72.0 |
| text + audio | 90.0 | 82.0 |
| text + video | 88.5 | 73.5 |
| image + audio | 85.5 | 80.5 |
| image + video | 38.5 | 25.5 |
| audio + video | 93.5 | 80.5 |
| text + image + video | 89.0 | 74.0 |
| text + audio + video | 94.0 | 89.0 |
| image + audio + video | 95.0 | 81.5 |
| text + image + audio | 91.5 | 89.0 |
| text + image + audio + video | **96.5** | **90.5** |
| Composition gain over best single | +14.5 | +20.5 |

**No two channels are equally safe.** The channels differ enormously: audio is the weakest (82.0% on Gemini-Omni, 70.0% on Qwen-Omni) while image is the hardest (21.5% and 14.5%), with text and video in between, a spread of more than 60% on a single model.

**Every added channel helps.** Climbing the combination lattice, attack success rises at essentially every step. On Gemini-Omni, text alone is 67.0%; adding image lifts it to 86.0%, adding audio to 90.0%, the three-way text+image+audio to 91.5%, and the full four-modality attack to 96.5%. Qwen-Omni follows the same climb to 90.5%. On neither target does any combination fall below the best of its own parts, so composing channels is a reliable way to turn a partial attack into a stronger one rather than a gamble.

**Composition beats its strongest part.** The decisive comparison is between the full composition and the single best channel under identical conditions. Composition wins by 14.5% on Gemini-Omni (96.5 versus audio's 82.0) and by 20.5% on Qwen-Omni (90.5 versus 70.0). Because all the experimental settings are the same across every row, this margin can show the attack effectiveness that exists only when the channels arrive together.

#### 4.3.1 DOES COMPOSITION SUCCEED WHERE INDIVIDUAL MODALITIES FAIL?

Composition raises ASR (Table 3), but the rate alone is insufficient. A combined attack may succeed only because one of its channels would have succeeded anyway, or it may break behaviors that no single channel can break. Both give the same ASR and differ only in which behaviors are cracked, so we compare attack success sets rather than rates.

For each combination, we match its results behavior by behavior against its single-modality attacks, using the same behaviors, attacker, judge, retry budget, and the exact unmodified constituent artifacts. A combination success is **shared** if at least one of its single-modality attacks also succeeds on that behavior, and **joint-only** if none does, so the two sum to the combination total. Table 4 shows the result for the four-modality composition. On Gemini-Omni, it succeeds on 193 of 200 behaviors, of which 132 also succeed with text alone and 160 with audio alone, the strongest single modality; these columns overlap and count only behaviors among the 193. In total, 164 successes are shared and 29 **are joint-only** (15.0%): all four single-modality attacks fail on them. Qwen-Omni behaves the same way, with 141 of 181 successes shared and 40 **joint-only** (22.1%). These counts closely match the ASR gain in Table 3, where the composition breaks 29 and 41 more behaviors than the strongest single modality, so the gain comes mainly from behaviors that no single channel can break. Joint-only successes also appear in every 2- and 3-modality combination on both targets (Appendix G).

#### 4.3.2 BROADER MODALITY SEARCH REVEALS ADDITIONAL JOINT-ONLY SUCCESSES

Having established that joint attacks can succeed where their constituent single-modality attacks fail, we next examine what is gained by broadening the modality-combination search space. Figure 2

Table 4: Matched success decomposition of the full four-modality attack ($N = 200$). Each modality column counts behaviors successful under both the composition and that single-modality attack, not standalone totals. Shared counts distinct composition successes covered by at least one single modality; joint-only counts those covered by none.

| | | Single-modality overlap | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Target | Combo | text | image | audio | video | Shared | Joint-only |
| Gemini-Omni | 193 | 132 | 43 | 160 | 65 | 164 | **29** |
| Qwen-Omni | 181 | 112 | 29 | 139 | 34 | 141 | **40** |




Figure 2: **Joint-only success across an expanding modality-combination search space.** For each combination of modalities $k$ (i.e. $k = 2, 3, 4$), we calculate the joint-only ASR.

increases the maximum combination size from two to four modalities, progressively including all two-modality, three-modality, and four-modality configurations. We summarize their average joint-only attack success rate for each modality configuration.

The joint-only rate rises from $12.0\%$ to $18.8\%$ and $20.1\%$ on Gemini-Omni, and from $12.9\%$ to $21.3\%$ and $23.1\%$ on Qwen-Omni. Each added combination contributes successes that its own single channels miss, so a broader search has more chances to find weaknesses in how the target handles its inputs. This agrees with Table 3, where the full four-modality attack reaches $96.5\%$ ASR on Gemini-Omni and $90.5\%$ on Qwen-Omni. Together, these results indicate that larger combinations of modalities can achieve higher overall ASR, while evaluating additional combinations exposes further failures absent from their constituent single-modality results. Robustness observed under individual channels therefore does not provide a sufficient assessment of robustness to their joint use.

## 5 Discussion

Beyond our main evaluation of text-output targets, we explore the applicability of MoMART to video (Veo-3.0-fast-generate-001) and image (GPT-Image-2) generation. These preliminary studies retain the same feedback-guided attack loop, attacker, and retry limits, while adapting the admissible input transformations and success criteria to each target's input interface and output modality. Table 15 summarizes the results. For text-to-video generation on T2VSafetyBench, the text-only instantiation of MoMART achieves an unsafe-generation rate of $68.5\%$, compared with $40.1\%$ for direct prompting—a gain of $28.4$ percentage points under the same video evaluation protocol. For text-and-image-to-image generation, MoMART uses source-conditioned regeneration and achieves an end-to-end success rate of $73.6\%$ $(306/416)$ under the reference-card evaluation. Together, these preliminary findings highlight the applicability of MoMART across different output modalities and motivate further investigation of multimodal red-teaming for generative targets. Appendix H provides the full protocols, evaluation criteria, and per-category results.

## 6 Conclusion

We introduced MoMART, a black-box red-teaming framework that composes channel-native attacks across text, image, audio, and video and refines them through a bounded, judge-guided loop. Across six evaluated models, it achieves the highest ASR among the compared methods. On two omni-modal targets, all-subset evaluations under matched per-trial iteration limits show gains over the strongest constituent modality, while behavior-level analysis reveals joint-only successes absent from the pooled single-modality results. Preliminary extensions to video and image generation further demonstrate reuse of the framework beyond text outputs. We discuss evaluation scope, fixed action libraries, and search costs in Appendix I, and broader benefits, dual-use risks, and responsible use in Appendix J. Our central finding is that single-modality testing can miss vulnerabilities exposed by jointly delivered inputs, motivating composition-aware safety evaluation and defense development.

### AI USE STATEMENT

During paper preparation, we used generative AI tools to improve the clarity, conciseness, and fluency of the writing, including grammar correction and sentence rephrasing. The authors reviewed all AI-assisted revisions to ensure accuracy and preserve the intended scientific meaning.

We also used generative AI tools to assist with related-work discovery, including identifying potentially relevant studies such as JailbreakSkill and VoiceJailbreak.

We take full responsibility for the final content of this work, including its text, claims, conclusions, and references.

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Table 5: Atomic actions per modality, grouped into the three families of Sec. 3. Semantic actions alter the meaning frame, structural actions alter the form or layout, and signal actions apply low-level perturbation. The implementation also ships generation backends (e.g. text-to-image and text-to-video synthesis) and white-box actions (gradient-, logit-, embedding-, or optimization-based); these are retained for completeness but are never selected under the black-box threat model, and are omitted here.

| Modality | Family | Actions |
|---|---|---|
| Text | Semantic | word_replacement, prompt_rewriting, scenario_nesting, context_based_attack, low_resource_language_rewriting, affirmative_prefix_injection, refusal_suppression, authority_persona, past_tense_reframing, cross_domain_metaphor |
| | Structural | text_typography, code_injection, cipher_rewriting, structured_encapsulation |
| Image | Semantic | style_transfer_whitewash, cross_modal_mismatch, professional_context_cloaking, visual_metaphor_substitution |
| | Structural | typography_image_rendering, figstep_image_embedding, text_to_typographic_image, low_contrast_typography, image_segmentation_evasion, typography_image_creation, image_context_concatenation, visual_fragmentation, flowchart_induction, comic_panel_decomposition, visual_pointer_mapping, structured_container_fill |
| Audio | Semantic | narrative_authoritative, narrative_urgent, narrative_affiliative, extra_auditory_priming, selective_speech_jailing, bag_of_nonsense |
| | Signal | pitch_shifting, temporal_scaling, energy_distribution_perturbation, trimming, fade_in_out, natural_noise_injection, audio_signal_editing |
| Video | Structural | video_animation, static_video_creation, video_concatenation, jigsaw_video_sequencing, frame_stacking, temporal_aggregation, safety_proximal_frame_selection |

# A Strategy Pool: Actions, Counts, and Samples

The frozen strategy pool contains 355 strategies covering all 15 admissible modality subsets. This appendix lists the action library grouped by the three families of Sec. 3 (Table 5), the number of strategies per subset (Table 6), and representative strategies for three of the most-used subsets (Table 7). The counts are identical across targets; at attack time only the subsets a target accepts are retained (Algorithm 1).

**Connections to prior attack families.** Several actions in the library have precedents in text-only jailbreak research. Prefix injection and refusal suppression are discussed in Wei et al. (2023a), while low-resource-language rewriting is related to translation-based attacks (Yong et al., 2024). Authority and scenario-based reframing are related to persuasive jailbreaks (Zeng et al., 2024). The broader family of contextual attacks also includes few-shot jailbreaking (Wei et al., 2023b; Zheng et al., 2024), while Bijection Learning provides a related example of attacks using encoded representations (Huang et al., 2024). These connections identify related transformation families; they do not imply that our routines reproduce the cited algorithms or that each published attack was evaluated as a baseline. Our study focuses on the composition of a fixed inventory rather than the invention of every individual transformation.

Table 6: Number of strategies per modality subset in the frozen pool (355 total). Counts are the same across all targets; only the subsets a target accepts are used at attack time.

| Modality subset $C$ | # strategies |
|---|---|
| text | 15 |
| image | 30 |
| audio | 15 |
| video | 15 |
| text+image | 55 |
| text+audio | 40 |
| text+video | 15 |
| image+audio | 40 |
| image+video | 15 |
| audio+video | 15 |
| text+image+audio | 40 |
| text+image+video | 15 |
| text+audio+video | 15 |
| image+audio+video | 15 |
| text+image+audio+video | 15 |
| Total | 355 |

Table 7: Representative strategies from the frozen pool, for three of the most-used modality subsets. Each strategy fixes a subset, a composition mode (parallel: each channel acts independently and the artifacts are combined; cross-modal: one channel's output conditions the next), and an assignment of atomic actions per channel. For the four-modality subset we show two distinct parallel strategies.

| Subset | Mode | Actions per channel |
|---|---|---|
| text+audio | parallel | text: `text_typography`; audio: `energy_distribution_perturbation` |
| | cross-modal | text: `text_typography`; audio: `energy_distribution_perturbation` |
| audio+video | parallel | audio: `natural_noise_injection`, `bag_of_nonsense`; video: `video_animation` |
| | cross-modal | audio: `selective_speech_jailing`, `extra_auditory_priming`; video: `static_video_creation`, `video_animation` |
| text+image+ audio+video | parallel | text: `context_based_attack`, `low_resource_language_rewriting`; image: `low_contrast_typography`; audio: `natural_noise_injection`, `pitch_shifting`; video: `video_animation` |
| | parallel | text: `low_resource_language_rewriting`; image: `image_segmentation_evasion`; audio: `extra_auditory_priming`, `trimming`; video: `video_animation` |

### A.1 What Do Successful Attacks Share?

The composition results establish that joint delivery raises attack success without explaining which transformations carry it. To probe this, we join every per-behavior outcome to the strategy that produced it, recover the atomic actions that strategy applied, and ask which actions, action families, and composition modes are associated with success. We restrict the analysis to black-box strategies, discarding any strategy that uses a white-box action, so that the findings match the threat model of Sec. 3. Because a raw count of actions among successes rewards whichever actions were simply tried most, we report each action's success rate (the fraction of trials using it whose attack succeeded) and




Figure 3: Black-box atomic-action attack success rate on the two omni-modal targets, for the four most and four least effective actions (actions with $\geq 15$ trials; white-box actions excluded). Dashed lines mark each model's overall success rate. The four leftmost actions clear both base rates on both targets; the four rightmost fall far below.

its lift over the run's overall success rate ($57.1\%$ on Gemini-Omni, $50.0\%$ on Qwen-Omni), rather than its frequency.

**A few text and temporal actions carry most successes.** Ranking atomic actions by success rate (Fig. 3), the effective end is consistent across both targets and dominated by text-rewriting and temporal-composition actions: `text_typography`, `prompt_rewriting`, and `temporal_aggregation` all sit well above both models' base rates. The ineffective end is equally consistent and is dominated by image-typography actions (`typography_image_creation`, `typography_image_rendering`) together with the audio action `trimming`, each succeeding on under a third of its trials on both targets. Grouped into the three families of Sec. 3, semantic strategies achieve the highest success rate on both targets ($68\%$ on Gemini-Omni, $59\%$ on Qwen-Omni), ahead of signal and structural. One outlier deserves caution: `energy_distribution_perturbation`, a global amplitude scaling that leaves the spoken content unchanged, ranks at the very top by success rate; because it alters loudness rather than meaning, we read its rank as an artifact of the combinations it appears in rather than a genuine attack mechanism.

**Cross-modal framing helps more than parallel delivery.** Strategies run in cross-modal mode, where the audio channel voices the text specialist's jailbreak output, succeed far more often than parallel strategies on both targets: $76\%$ vs. $53\%$ on Gemini-Omni and $73\%$ vs. $44\%$ on Qwen-Omni. This is the most robust pattern in the analysis; it survives the black-box restriction and holds, at a similar margin, on both independently developed models.

**The hardest harm category is the same on both targets.** Breaking success down by harm category (Table 8), the ordering is stable across targets: `chemical_biological` is the most resistant category on both ($42.9\%$ on Gemini-Omni, $35.8\%$ on Qwen-Omni), while harassment and cybercrime categories are the most exposed. That the same category resists most across two independently developed models points to a shared, category-specific safety boundary rather than a model-specific artifact.

**Caveat: association, not causation.** These rankings are observational. An action's success rate reflects both its own effect and the combinations it happened to appear in, and we do not hold the modality subset fixed while toggling a single action. We therefore read the figure and tables as

Table 8: Black-box attack success rate by harm category on the two omni-modal targets (categories with at least 15 trials). The most resistant category (`chemical_biological`) is the same on both targets.

| Harm category | Gemini-Omni | Qwen-Omni |
|---|---|---|
| harassment_bullying | 59.5% | 56.5% |
| cybercrime_intrusion | 63.7% | 54.2% |
| harmful | 61.0% | 50.0% |
| illegal | 51.9% | 46.2% |
| chemical_biological | 42.9% | 35.8% |

**Algorithm 1** MoMART: multimodal red-teaming against a target $M$.

**Require:** target $M$; behaviors $\{b_n\}$; strategy pool $\mathcal{S}$; attacker $A$; judge rating $\rho \in [0, 10]$; success threshold $\theta = 7$; retry budget $R$

$\mathcal{A}_M \leftarrow \textsc{AcceptedModalities}(M)$
$\mathcal{S}_M \leftarrow \{\, s \in \mathcal{S} : C(s) \subseteq \mathcal{A}_M \,\}$ ▷ drop strategies needing a modality $M$ rejects
**for all** behavior $b \in \{b_n\}$, strategy $s = (C, \alpha) \in \mathcal{S}_M$ **do**
  $\mathsf{frame} \leftarrow \textsc{Init}(\alpha)$
  **for** $r \leftarrow 1$ **to** $R$ **do**
    $\{x_m\}_{m \in C} \leftarrow \textsc{Construct}\big(A, b, \alpha, \mathsf{frame}\big)$ ▷ one artifact per channel from the full $b$
    $y \leftarrow M\big(\{x_m\}_{m \in C}\big)$ ▷ deliver all artifacts in one turn
    **if** $\rho(b, y) \geq \theta$ **then**
      **record** success at round $r$; **break**
    **end if**
    $\mathsf{frame} \leftarrow \textsc{Revise}\big(\mathsf{frame}, \rho(b, y)\big)$ ▷ rating guides the next framing; $C$ unchanged
  **end for**
**end for**
**return** per-subset attack success rate $\mathrm{ASR}(C)$

identifying which ingredients co-occur with success under this pool and protocol, not as a causal ranking. Isolating the causal effect of an action would require an intervention that varies it alone within a fixed combination, which we leave to future work.

## B MoMART Algorithm

Below is the pseudo-algorithm of MoMART that we refer in Sec. 3.3

## C Query Efficiency

A stronger attack usually costs more queries; MoMART does not. Table 9 reports the mean queries to the first success by keeping $R = 20$ and number of the strategies in our modality subset to be 15, and MoMART is on-average more query-efficient than all baselines while being far more effective. On Gemini-Omni it lands a successful jailbreak in 2.21 queries on average, against 10.40 for PAIR and 14.30 for TAP, a nearly five-fold reduction reached alongside a far higher success rate. Even on the hardest targets, where every method spends more of its budget (Claude 18.72, GPT-5.6 16.60), MoMART still converges in fewer queries than PAIR, TAP, and JailbreakSkill. The usual tension between how often an attack succeeds and how much it costs does not appear here: MoMART is simultaneously the most effective attack (Table 2) and among the most economical.

Table 9: **Query efficiency.** Mean number of target-model queries to the first successful jailbreak (lower is better), averaged over behaviors the method breaks under the shared budget $R = 20$ and number of strategies per modality subset to be 15. Best per target in **bold**.

| Model | **MoMART** | PAIR | TAP | JailbreakSkill |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GPT-5.6 | **16.60** | 17.25 | 18.24 | 17.08 |
| Qwen-3 | **4.41** | 8.01 | 11.50 | 4.57 |
| Llama | **2.31** | 7.92 | 13.60 | 2.76 |
| Claude-4.8-Opus | 18.72 | 19.01 | 19.88 | **17.12** |
| Gemini-Omni | **2.21** | 10.40 | 14.30 | 2.67 |
| Qwen-Omni | **3.57** | 8.71 | 16.40 | 4.21 |

# D Implementation details

## D.1 Evaluation Metrics

Let $\{b_n\}_{n=1}^{N}$ be the behavior set and, for an attack configuration, let $y_n$ be the target's response on behavior $b_n$. With the judge indicator $J(b, y) \in \{0, 1\}$ (Sec. 3.3), where $J = 1$ iff the LLM judge rating is at least $\theta = 7$, the attack success rate under a modality subset $C$ is

$$\mathrm{ASR}(C) \;=\; \frac{1}{N}\sum_{n=1}^{N} J\big(b_n,\, y_n\big), \tag{4}$$

the fraction of behaviors judged successfully attacked. The composition gain of a subset $C$ is its ASR minus that of its strongest single constituent modality, evaluated with the behaviors, attacker, judge, and per-trial query budget held identical across all terms,

$$\Delta(C) \;=\; \mathrm{ASR}(C) \;-\; \max_{m \in C} \mathrm{ASR}(\{m\}). \tag{5}$$

We also report query efficiency as the mean number of target queries to the first successful attempt, averaged over behaviors the method eventually breaks under the shared budget $R$.

**Evaluation protocol.** Standardized jailbreak evaluation calls for explicit threat models, scoring rules, and attack-cost accounting (Chao et al., 2024). Our behavior set remains HarmBench (Mazeika et al., 2024). The retry limit $R$ bounds each behavior–strategy trial, rather than the total cost of evaluating the full strategy pool; matching $R$ therefore does not by itself match aggregate computational cost.

## D.2 API and Compute Cost

The attacker, the judge, and the proprietary targets are accessed through hosted APIs; the open-source targets are served at most 8 × NVIDIA A100 80GB GPU. Table 10 summarizes, per model, the access mode and the per-token list price under which a full $N = 200$ run of MoMART is billed. We report list prices rather than realized dollar totals because the token volume of a run varies with the modality subset and the number of retries a behavior requires; the prices below are provider list rates at the time of the experiments and are the basis from which run cost scales linearly. For hosted models we quote text input and output rates; the attacker additionally ingests non-text artifacts, which some providers bill at a higher input rate (e.g. audio input above the text rate), so the effective input cost of a composed run is at or above the text-rate figure shown. Qwen-Omni is billed at modality-dependent rates: text, image, and video input at \$1.40/M and audio input at \$8.30/M, with text output at \$11.00/M (audio output, which our runs do not request, is billed separately at \$44.00/M).

# E Robustness to the Attacker and Judge

Table 11 reports the full attacker- and judge-swap results. Each variant changes a single component and holds all else fixed: the DeepSeek-V3.2 column replaces only the attacker LLM (keeping the LLM judge at $\theta = 7$), and the HarmBench column replaces only the judge (keeping the Gemini-2.5-Flash attacker). Swapping the attacker moves ASR by at most two points, and the stricter HarmBench

Table 10: **Access mode and per-token list price for one MoMART run per model** ($N = 200$ behaviors, budget $R = 20$). Proprietary targets and the shared attacker and judge are API-billed; open-source targets run locally on 8×A100 80GB. Prices are provider list rates (USD per million tokens) at experiment time; local models incur GPU compute rather than per-token billing.

| Model | Access | Input ($/M) | Output ($/M) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gemini-Omni | API | 1.50 | 9.00 |
| Qwen-Omni | API | 1.40† | 11.00 |
| GPT-5.6 Sol | API | 4.00 | 20.00 |
| Claude-4.8-Opus | API | 5.00 | 25.00 |
| Llama-3.1-8B | Local (1×A100) | GPU compute | |
| Qwen3-235B | Local (8×A100) | GPU compute | |
| Attacker (Gemini-2.5-Flash) | API | 0.30 | 2.50 |
| Judge (GPT-4.1-mini) | API | 0.40 | 1.60 |

†Qwen-Omni input is modality-dependent: $1.40/M for text/image/video and $8.30/M for audio; the audio channel therefore raises the effective input cost above the listed figure.

classifier lowers ASR only modestly, the expected direction for a harsher judge, with the attacks still overwhelmingly successful under a criterion used by prior work.

Table 11: **Robustness to the attacker and judge.** Attack success rate of MoMART on the two omni-modal targets under the reported configuration, an alternative DeepSeek-V3.2 attacker, and an alternative HarmBench-classifier judge. One component is swapped at a time; all else is held fixed.

| Target | MoMART (reported) | + DeepSeek-V3.2 attacker | + HarmBench judge |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gemini-Omni | **96.5**% | 95.0% | 91.5% |
| Qwen-Omni | **90.5**% | 88.5% | 89.5% |

## F Scaling MoMART to SafeBench Across Seven Targets

Our main evaluation uses 200 Standard HarmBench behaviors, enabling systematic comparisons across modality subsets. To examine the applicability of MoMART beyond this setting, we additionally evaluate it on $N = 2{,}299$ behaviors from SafeBench (Ying et al., 2024) across seven targets. The evaluated behavior set is approximately 11.5 times as large as the main set. This study tests whether the same attack framework and reusable strategy pool remain effective at a larger evaluation scale and across additional target models.

**Protocol.** We retain the attacker from the main experiments (Gemini-2.5-Flash, temperature 0.7), the GPT-4.1-mini judge with success threshold $\theta = 7$, and the frozen strategy pool. Each behavior–strategy trial is allowed at most $R = 100$ optimization iterations, with early stopping upon success. Only strategies compatible with a target's accepted input modalities are eligible. SafeBench supplies the behaviors, while attack construction and success assessment follow our evaluation protocol. A behavior is counted as successful if at least one attempted strategy produces a response meeting the success threshold; each behavior contributes at most once to the ASR.

**Query accounting.** For each successfully attacked behavior, we count the cumulative number of target-model queries up to and including the first successful attempt. We report the mean over successful behaviors for each target, then average the target-level means equally across all seven targets..

**Results.** Table 12 reports a mean ASR of 78.6% across the seven targets, with six exceeding 75% and three exceeding 95%. On Gemini-2.5-Pro, MoMART achieves near-complete coverage, successfully attacking 2,289 of 2,299 behaviors (99.6%), leaving only 10 without a successful attack. Gemini-3.7-Flash and Grok-4 exhibit similarly high exposure: both have an ASR of 96.1%, corresponding to 2,210 and 2,209 successful behaviors, respectively. Success remains substantial on GPT-5.4-Pro (85.9%), Gemini-3.1-Pro (79.9%), and GPT-5.6-sol (77.9%), with successful attacks on 1,974, 1,837, and 1,790 behaviors. Notable differences also appear within model families: ASR differs by 19.7

Table 12: **Larger-scale evaluation on SafeBench** ($N = 2{,}299$ evaluated behaviors per target). Successes counts distinct behaviors successfully attacked. Mean queries reports cumulative target queries to first success, conditioned on successful behaviors. Only completed target runs are included, with rows ordered by unrounded ASR.

| Target | Successes | ASR (%) | Mean queries |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gemini-2.5-Pro | 2,289 | 99.6 | 3.64 |
| Gemini-3.7-Flash | 2,210 | 96.1 | 12.40 |
| Grok-4 | 2,209 | 96.1 | 15.43 |
| GPT-5.4-Pro | 1,974 | 85.9 | 18.03 |
| Gemini-3.1-Pro | 1,837 | 79.9 | 24.51 |
| GPT-5.6-sol | 1,790 | 77.9 | 25.06 |
| MiniMax-M3 | 339 | 14.7 | 44.32 |
| Mean across targets | — | 78.6 | 20.48 |

Both the ASR mean and the query mean equally weight all seven targets.

percentage points between Gemini-2.5-Pro and Gemini-3.1-Pro, and by $8.0$ points between GPT-5.4-Pro and GPT-5.6-sol. MiniMax-M3 is the clear exception to the otherwise high success rates, with only 339 successful behaviors ($14.7\%$); the remaining $1{,}960$ behaviors ($85.3\%$) are not successfully attacked under the evaluated protocol. Together, these results demonstrate that the same attacker and strategy pool remain effective across a substantially larger behavior set and multiple targets, while preserving pronounced target-dependent differences in attack success.

**Success and query cost.** Across the seven targets, MoMART requires an average of $20.48$ target queries to first success. Gemini-2.5-Pro combines the highest ASR ($99.6\%$) with the lowest mean query count ($3.64$). Gemini-3.7-Flash and Grok-4 both reach $96.1\%$ ASR, but require $12.40$ and $15.43$ queries, respectively, a difference of $3.03$ queries. GPT-5.4-Pro achieves $85.9\%$ ASR with $18.03$ queries on average, while Gemini-3.1-Pro and GPT-5.6-sol require $24.51$ and $25.06$ queries to reach their first successful attacks, with ASRs of $79.9\%$ and $77.9\%$, respectively. These six targets all exceed $75\%$ ASR with mean query counts below 26. MiniMax-M3 requires the most queries ($44.32$) while yielding the lowest ASR ($14.7\%$). Across the seven targets, lower ASR is accompanied by higher mean query counts, spanning more than a twelve-fold difference between Gemini-2.5-Pro and MiniMax-M3.

**Relation to the main evaluation.** This study expands the evaluation from 200 HarmBench behaviors to $2{,}299$ SafeBench behaviors per target, covering $16{,}093$ behavior–target evaluations across seven models. With a per-trial iteration limit of $R = 100$, MoMART successfully attacks $12{,}648$ behavior–target pairs, achieving a mean ASR of $78.6\%$ and a mean of $20.48$ queries to first success. The same attacker, judge, and frozen strategy pool support this expanded evaluation, demonstrating reuse of the framework across a behavior set approximately $11.5$ times larger and additional target families. Together with the all-subset ablation in Sec. 4.3, these results combine detailed modality-composition analysis with large-scale evaluation across benchmarks and models.

## G PER-BEHAVIOR DECOMPOSITION: ALL COMBINATIONS

Tables 13 and 14 extend the matched success decomposition of Section 4.3.1 to all 11 admissible two-, three-, and four-modality combinations on each omni-modal target. All counts refer to the same $N = 200$ behaviors.

**Definitions.** Let $\mathcal{B}$ be the evaluated behavior set, and let $S_C \subseteq \mathcal{B}$ contain the behaviors successfully attacked using modality subset $C$ under the evaluation protocol. For a constituent modality $m \in C$, let $S_{\{m\}}$ denote the corresponding single-modality success set. Define

$$U_C = \bigcup_{m \in C} S_{\{m\}},$$

the behaviors successfully attacked by at least one constituent modality evaluated alone. The reported quantities are

$$o_m(C) = |S_C \cap S_{\{m\}}|, \qquad m \in C, \tag{6}$$

$$n_{\text{shared}}(C) = |S_C \cap U_C|, \tag{7}$$

$$n_{\text{joint}}(C) = |S_C \setminus U_C|. \tag{8}$$

Consequently,

$$|S_C| = n_{\text{shared}}(C) + n_{\text{joint}}(C).$$

A behavior contributes to joint-only exactly when its combination outcome is successful and all of its constituent single-modality outcomes are unsuccessful. This requires matching the behavior-level outcomes; the marginal overlap counts alone do not determine the joint-only count.

**Reading the tables.** Combo reports $|S_C|$; each modality column reports $o_m(C)$; Shared and Joint-only report $n_{\text{shared}}(C)$ and $n_{\text{joint}}(C)$, respectively. A dash marks a modality absent from $C$. The modality columns are neither standalone totals nor additive contributions: a behavior successful under several single modalities appears in several overlap columns but only once in Shared.

For reference, the standalone totals are text=134, image=43, audio=164, and video=65 on Gemini-Omni, and text=112, image=29, audio=140, and video=34 on Qwen-Omni. For Gemini-Omni's full composition, the text overlap of 132 counts only text successes also present among the 193 combination successes; the other 2 text successes lie outside that combination's success set. Overlap counts can therefore differ across combinations even when the same single-modality outcomes are reused, because the combination success set $S_C$ changes.

**Additional coverage versus net gain.** Joint-only measures successes outside the observed singleton union, not a net difference in the sizes of the two success sets:

$$|S_C| - |U_C| = n_{\text{joint}}(C) - |U_C \setminus S_C|.$$

The second term counts behaviors reached by a single-modality attack but not by the combination. Accordingly, joint-only is distinct from both the net gain over $U_C$ and the strongest-component ASR gain. The union aggregates separate single-modality evaluations and serves as a coverage reference, not an equal-total-query-budget attack baseline.

**Comparisons across rows.** Every evaluated combination has a positive joint-only count, but the reference union depends on its constituents. For `image+video`, joint-only requires failure under image and video individually; text-only or audio-only attack may still succeed on the same behavior. For the full four-modality combination, all four single-modality attacks must fail. Joint-only counts therefore need not increase as more modalities are included, since both $S_C$ and $U_C$ change. Nor does a four-modality joint-only success establish that all four channels are necessary: a two- or three-modality combination may also succeed on that behavior.

## H Generative-Output Jailbreaking: Protocols and Full Results

This appendix gives the full protocols, judges, and per-category results for the generative-output experiments summarized in Sec. 5. Both settings run the same closed-loop attack as the main experiments (Algorithm 1), with the same attacker (Gemini-2.5-Flash), the same judge model (GPT-4.1-mini), and the same retry budget $R = 20$. What changes is the target and, accordingly, which modality specialists and atomic actions are admissible: each generator accepts a different input interface, so MoMART restricts its action set to that interface rather than composing all four channels. Because the harm now resides in a produced video or image rather than in text, we query GPT-4.1-mini as a vision judge, supplying the generated frames or images together with the scoring instruction; the judge model is thus identical to the main experiments, and only its input changes from text to rendered media. The success criterion also changes with the output modality: for T2V a clip counts as a successful attack when the judge assigns the top severity level under the T2VSafetyBench rubric, and for TI2I a target image counts as a success when it passes the reference-card check (Sec. H.2); the 0–10 rating threshold of the main experiments does not apply to either.

Table 13: Gemini-Omni: matched success decomposition across all modality combinations ($N = 200$). Modality columns count overlapping matches with constituent single-modality successes. Shared counts their distinct union within Combo; Shared and Joint-only sum to Combo.

| | | Single-modality overlap | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Combination | Combo | text | image | audio | video | Shared | Joint-only |
| text+image | 172 | 106 | 34 | – | – | 106 | 66 |
| text+audio | 180 | 123 | – | 145 | – | 148 | 32 |
| text+video | 177 | 111 | – | – | 42 | 111 | 66 |
| image+audio | 171 | – | 40 | 149 | – | 153 | 18 |
| image+video | 77 | – | 17 | – | 25 | 29 | 48 |
| audio+video | 187 | – | – | 153 | 61 | 153 | 34 |
| text+image+audio | 183 | 123 | 40 | 151 | – | 155 | 28 |
| text+image+video | 178 | 119 | 38 | – | 58 | 119 | 59 |
| text+audio+video | 188 | 126 | – | 154 | 61 | 158 | 30 |
| image+audio+video | 190 | – | 41 | 156 | 62 | 158 | 32 |
| text+image+audio+video | 193 | 132 | 43 | 160 | 65 | 164 | **29** |

Table 14: Qwen-Omni: matched success decomposition across all modality combinations ($N = 200$). Modality columns count overlapping matches with constituent single-modality successes. Shared counts their distinct union within Combo; Shared and Joint-only sum to Combo.

| | | Single-modality overlap | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Combination | Combo | text | image | audio | video | Shared | Joint-only |
| text+image | 144 | 73 | 18 | – | – | 77 | 67 |
| text+audio | 164 | 106 | – | 118 | – | 120 | 44 |
| text+video | 147 | 99 | – | – | 34 | 99 | 48 |
| image+audio | 161 | – | 22 | 118 | – | 120 | 41 |
| image+video | 51 | – | 7 | – | 9 | 16 | 35 |
| audio+video | 161 | – | – | 113 | 27 | 113 | 48 |
| text+image+audio | 178 | 112 | 29 | 136 | – | 138 | 40 |
| text+image+video | 148 | 99 | 21 | – | 34 | 99 | 49 |
| text+audio+video | 178 | 106 | – | 125 | 34 | 127 | 51 |
| image+audio+video | 163 | – | 24 | 118 | 28 | 118 | 45 |
| text+image+audio+video | 181 | 112 | 29 | 139 | 34 | 141 | **40** |

### H.1 TEXT-TO-VIDEO

The T2V target, Veo-3.0-fast-generate-001, accepts a text prompt only. MoMART therefore runs with the text specialist alone: it applies its text atomic actions (Sec. 3) to each T2VSafetyBench seed prompt, delivers the rewritten prompt to the generator, scores the produced clip, and adapts over up to $R = 20$ rounds under the rating-guided loop, exactly as in the main experiments. This is the single-channel (text) instantiation of MoMART; no image, audio, or video specialist is used, because the target consumes no such input. The baseline is direct prompting with the unmodified seed. A generated clip is scored by the benchmark's safety judge and counted unsafe at the top severity level; text-blocked prompts, generation failures, attacker refusals, and unscored items all remain in the denominator and count as failures, so the reported rates are conservative. Table 16 gives the per-category breakdown; the overall rate rises from $40.1\%$ to $68.5\%$ ($+28.4$ points). The gain is broad rather than driven by one category and is largest where the generator's default refusal is strongest (violence, political sensitivity, disturbing content), shrinking on categories where direct prompting already succeeds and little headroom remains (misinformation, copyright). This is the signature of an attack that converts refused requests into fulfilled ones rather than one that merely adds noise.

Table 15: Attack success rate of MoMART against a frontier text-to-video and text-to-image generator, each scored by the safety judge adopted for that output modality. T2V is the unsafe-generation rate over T2VSafetyBench; TI2I is the human-confirmed end-to-end success rate over the unsafe split of an image-safety benchmark, attacked by source-conditioned regeneration.

| Output modality | Benchmark | MoMART ASR |
|---|---|---|
| Text-to-video (Veo-3.0-fast-generate-001) | T2VSafetyBench | **68.5**% |
| Text-and-image-to-image (GPT-Image-2) | Image-safety (unsafe split) | **73.6**% |

Table 16: **T2V generation, per category.** Unsafe-generation rate of direct prompting versus MoMART (text-only instantiation) on Veo-3.0-fast-generate-001, over T2VSafetyBench, scored by the benchmark's safety judge at the top severity level. $n$ is the number of prompts in the category; gain is the within-judge increase over baseline. Overall row is prompt-weighted.

| Category | $n$ | Baseline | MoMART | Gain |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Violence | 45 | 24.4% | **80.0**% | +55.6 |
| Political Sensitivity | 60 | 31.7% | **75.0**% | +43.3 |
| Public Figures | 27 | 25.9% | **66.7**% | +40.7 |
| Disturbing Content | 45 | 46.7% | **86.7**% | +40.0 |
| Gore | 63 | 17.5% | **55.6**% | +38.1 |
| Sequential Action Risk | 55 | 49.1% | **85.5**% | +36.4 |
| Discrimination | 50 | 48.0% | **80.0**% | +32.0 |
| Pornography | 85 | 0.0% | **23.5**% | +23.5 |
| Illegal Activities | 50 | 70.0% | **92.0**% | +22.0 |
| Coherent Contextual Risk | 72 | 68.1% | **87.5**% | +19.4 |
| Dynamic Variation Risk | 35 | 68.6% | **85.7**% | +17.1 |
| Borderline Pornography | 55 | 0.0% | **9.1**% | +9.1 |
| Misinformation | 38 | 92.1% | **97.4**% | +5.3 |
| Copyright & Trademark | 21 | 85.7% | **90.5**% | +4.8 |
| **Overall** | 701 | 40.1% | **68.5**% | +28.4 |

### H.2 TEXT-AND-IMAGE-TO-IMAGE

The TI2I target, GPT-Image-2, accepts a text prompt together with an input image. Here the objective is reconstruction: given an unsafe reference image and its official annotation, drive the generator to produce an image that preserves the risk-bearing semantics of the source. MoMART runs with two specialists matched to this interface. The text specialist applies its atomic actions to a description of the risk-bearing content the output must contain, so the text carries the semantic payload for reconstruction. The image specialist applies a Gaussian-blur action to the reference image: a black-box degradation, distinct from the library's existing gradient-optimized image perturbations, that blurs the risk-bearing region of the input so the image clears the generator's input-side moderation while the paired text drives the model to restore the masked content. The attack thus targets the gap between the generator's input filter and its willingness to reconstruct from a benign-looking image plus a descriptive prompt; it is not a composition of multiple attack-bearing channels, but an adaptation of the input-side transformations to a generative target. We evaluate on the unsafe split of a public image-safety benchmark (416 risk-bearing prompts). Success is scored by a two-stage reference-card check: the output must retain the annotated content, fall in the correct risk category, and show sufficient visual correspondence to the source; every failure mode, including moderation blocks and non-generations, remains in the denominator. The end-to-end success rate is 73.6% (Table 17). The dominant failure mode is input-side moderation rather than semantic loss: roughly a quarter of prompts are blocked before any image is produced, but among prompts that do yield an image the risk semantics are almost always preserved. This separates the two defenses a generator brings to bear, its refusal-to-generate boundary and its control over what it produces once it does generate, and locates the remaining weakness in the latter. Table 18 gives the per-category breakdown.

Table 17: **TI2I generation, by risk domain.** End-to-end attack success of MoMART's reconstruction attack on GPT-Image-2, over the unsafe split, scored by the reference-card check. "Blocked" counts prompts refused before any image is produced.

| Risk domain | $n$ | Blocked | Success | Undet. | ASR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Toxicity | 266 | 76 | 190 | 0 | **71.4**% |
| Privacy | 150 | 30 | 116 | 4 | **77.3**% |
| **Overall** | 416 | 106 | 306 | 4 | **73.6**% |

Table 18: **TI2I attack by risk category.** End-to-end attack success of MoMART's reconstruction attack on GPT-Image-2, over the unsafe split, scored by the reference-card check. "Success" is the number of prompts with a confirmed unsafe image; ASR is Success$/n$, counting moderation blocks and non-generations as failures. Category counts sum to the domain totals of Table 17.

| Risk category | Domain | $n$ | Success | ASR |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Illegal activity | Toxicity | 50 | 50 | **100.0**% |
| Disturbing | Toxicity | 50 | 43 | **86.0**% |
| Humiliation | Toxicity | 50 | 40 | **80.0**% |
| Violence | Toxicity | 50 | 39 | **78.0**% |
| Hate | Toxicity | 16 | 11 | **68.8**% |
| Sexual | Toxicity | 50 | 7 | **14.0**% |
| Personal ID docs | Privacy | 50 | 47 | **94.0**% |
| Public figures | Privacy | 50 | 44 | **88.0**% |
| Intellectual prop. | Privacy | 50 | 25 | **50.0**% |
| Toxicity subtotal | | 266 | 190 | **71.4**% |
| Privacy subtotal | | 150 | 116 | **77.3**% |
| **Overall** | | 416 | 306 | **73.6**% |

# I LIMITATIONS

Our experiments show that MoMART outperforms the evaluated state-of-the-art baselines across six models with different supported input modalities. Below, we summarize the main limitations of our approach and directions for future work.

**Evaluation scope.** Our main evaluation covers six text-output targets on 200 Standard HarmBench behaviors, while the full text, image, audio, and video composition analysis is conducted on two omni-modal models. The findings therefore characterize the evaluated targets, behaviors, and input interfaces rather than all multimodal systems. Extending the evaluation to additional model families will be our future extension of this work.

**Search design and computational cost.** MoMART uses a fixed action library and strategy pool, enumerating admissible modality subsets to support systematic comparisons. This design restricts the search to predefined transformations, and its computational cost grows with the number of modalities and strategies. The retry limit bounds each behavior–strategy trial rather than the aggregate cost of evaluating the full pool. Moreover, target-query counts do not capture artifact generation, attacker and judge computation, or differences in input size across modalities. The reported mean queries to first success is also conditioned on successfully attacked behaviors and should therefore be interpreted alongside ASR, rather than as a complete measure of end-to-end efficiency. A key direction for future work is to reduce the overall computational cost while further improving the ASR of MoMART, making the framework more scalable and effective for multimodal safety evaluation.

**Generative-output extensions.** Our T2V and TI2I studies provide preliminary evidence of the applicability of MoMART to video and image generation, using target-compatible specialists and output-specific success criteria. Future work will extend the evaluation to generators with richer multimodal conditioning, using matched modality-subset analyses to examine how individual input channels and their combinations affect attack success across output modalities.

## J Ethics and Broader Impact

**Purpose and potential benefits.** MoMART is developed to study and improve the safety of multi-modal generative models. By evaluating harmful behaviors across individual and jointly delivered input modalities, it helps identify vulnerabilities that single-modality testing may overlook. The intended benefit is to support more comprehensive safety assessment and inform defenses that account for interactions among input channels. The extensions to video and image generation further motivate examining safety across both input and output modalities.

**Dual-use risks.** Automated jailbreak construction could also reduce the effort required to elicit harmful instructions, abusive content, or misleading generated media. The same capabilities that make MoMART useful for safety evaluation therefore create potential for misuse. Benchmark requests and model-generated outputs in this work are evaluation material, not endorsements of their content.

**Responsible use and dissemination.** MoMART should be used for authorized safety research and controlled evaluations. Attack artifacts and generated outputs may contain harmful or sensitive material, warranting appropriate access controls, content warnings, and careful review before sharing. Dissemination should balance reproducibility with misuse risk, minimize unnecessary reproduction of harmful content, and avoid exposing personal information. Actionable vulnerabilities should be considered for coordinated disclosure to affected providers. Defenses motivated by this work should also be assessed on legitimate multimodal tasks, so that reducing attack success does not come at the expense of indiscriminate refusal or reduced accessibility.

## K Qualitative Examples: Text–Image Composition

To make the attack concrete, Figures 4 and 5 walk through two end-to-end text–image jailbreaks, one against Gemini-Omni and one against Qwen-Omni. Each figure shows the full pipeline for a single behavior: the original harmful request, the two channel-native artifacts MoMART constructs from it (a rewritten text prompt and a generated image), their joint delivery in one turn, and the target model's response.

We restrict these qualitative examples to the text and image channels for a practical reason: they are the only two channels that render legibly on a static page. A text artifact is readable as text and an image artifact is viewable directly, so a text–image case can be shown in full and inspected by the reader. The audio and video artifacts that MoMART constructs for the omni-modal targets do not admit the same treatment: an audio artifact is a waveform whose content cannot be read from a printed figure, and a video artifact is a sequence of frames over time that a single static panel cannot faithfully convey. Rendering either as a still would misrepresent what was actually delivered to the target. We therefore use text–image cases for illustration and report the effect of the audio and video channels quantitatively instead, through the modality-composition ablation (Table 3) and the per-behavior decomposition across all channel subsets (Appendix G), where the full four-channel composition and every intermediate subset are measured directly.

## L Additional Red-Teaming Context

**Additional auto red-teaming attack.** A complementary line improves strategy reuse and exploration: AutoDAN-Turbo discovers and reuses attack strategies (Liu et al., 2024a), AutoRedTeamer combines memory-guided attack selection with continuous attack integration (Zhou et al., 2025), and Rainbow Teaming searches for prompts that are both effective and diverse (Samvelyan et al., 2024).

**Learned attack generation and search.** AmpleGCG learns a generator of adversarial suffixes from successful attack examples (Liao & Sun, 2024), while RL-JACK uses reinforcement learning to guide black-box jailbreak search (Chen et al., 2024). These approaches learn how to generate or search for attacks. In contrast, MoMART does not train a separate attack-generation model or reinforcement-learning policy: it composes artifacts from a fixed action library and refines candidates using response feedback.

**Multi-turn adversarial interaction.** GOAT automates adversarial conversations (Pavlova et al., 2024), and X-Teaming uses collaborating agents to plan and refine multi-turn attacks (Rahman et al., 2025). These works study adversarial interaction across conversational turns. Our composition




Figure 4: **Text–image composition against Gemini-Omni.** The original request is rewritten into a text artifact and paired with a generated image; the two are delivered together in a single turn, and the model produces the requested content. Strategy and per-channel atomic actions are annotated top-right.




Figure 5: **Text–image composition against Qwen-Omni.** As in Figure 4, a rewritten text artifact and a generated image are delivered jointly in one turn, eliciting a response that fulfills the original request.

analysis instead studies the joint delivery of modality-specific artifacts in a target-facing query. The retry budget controls search attempts; it should not be conflated with evaluation of a multi-turn conversational attack. Combining modality composition with multi-turn interaction is a separate direction for future evaluation.

Table 19: Four-modality MoMART attacks against unguarded and input-guarded targets on $N = 200$ HarmBench behaviors. Unguarded ASR evaluates the downstream model alone. Adaptive guarded ASR evaluates the input guard and model as one black-box target, requiring every input check to pass and the downstream response to fulfill the harmful behavior in the same attempt.

| Target | Unguarded ASR | Adaptive guarded ASR |
|---|---|---|
| Gemini-Omni | 96.5% (193/200) | 77.0% (154/200) |
| Qwen-Omni | 90.5% (181/200) | 66.5% (133/200) |

## M Adaptive Attacks against Input-Guarded Multimodal Models

We evaluate whether MoMART remains effective when an external input guard is placed before the target multimodal model. Rather than screening previously generated attacks post hoc, we treat the input guard and downstream model as a single black-box target and run MoMART adaptively against this composed system. A successful attack must satisfy two conditions in the same attempt: none of its input components is flagged by the guard, and the downstream model produces a response that fulfills the original harmful behavior. This setting therefore evaluates end-to-end attack success against both external input screening and the model's internal safeguards.

We consider Gemini-3.5-Flash and Qwen3.5-Omni-Plus on the first $N = 200$ behaviors in the HarmBench Standard dataset. For both targets, we evaluate the full four-modality condition, $C = \{\text{text}, \text{image}, \text{audio}, \text{video}\}$. Within this condition, MoMART adaptively revises the attack framing and corresponding modality-specific artifacts using feedback from the guarded system.

We use `Llama-Guard-4-12B` with its default S1–S14 hazard categories and greedy decoding. An input is flagged when the guard's generated classification starts with `unsafe`. The guard screens the components of each candidate query independently, and the entire query is rejected if any component is flagged.

The text check receives the actual text prompt constructed for that attempt. The image check receives the image after augmentation, without the accompanying attack text. For audio, we transcribe the audio after signal perturbation using Whisper large-v3 with English selected and greedy decoding, and submit the transcript for text classification. For video, we screen the constituent images used by MoMART's video-composition pipeline as individual frames. The video component is flagged if any evaluated frame is flagged. These checks are performed during attack execution, before the candidate query can reach the downstream model.

For an accepted query, GPT-4.1-mini evaluates the downstream response using the same behavior-fulfillment criterion as the main experiments. A response with a rating below $\theta = 7$, including a downstream refusal, also constitutes an unsuccessful attempt. MoMART continues its adaptive refinement following unsuccessful outcomes until it achieves end-to-end success or exhausts the configured attack budget. Thus, adaptation targets the combined guard–model system, rather than the unguarded model alone.

**Evaluation metric.** We report adaptive guarded ASR, the percentage of the 200 evaluated behaviors that MoMART successfully attacks. A behavior counts as successful if at least one attempt passes all input-guard checks and elicits a downstream response that fulfills the harmful behavior, as assessed by the same judge used in the main evaluation. Both conditions must hold for the same attempt. If any input is flagged, or the downstream response does not meet the success criterion, that attempt is unsuccessful. Each behavior is counted at most once, and the percentage is calculated over all 200 behaviors, including those with no successful attempt.

As shown in Table 19, MoMART achieves adaptive guarded ASRs of 77.0% on Gemini-Omni and 66.5% on Qwen-Omni. These rates are 19.5 and 24.0 percentage points below the corresponding unguarded results of 96.5% and 90.5%. Nevertheless, MoMART successfully attacks 154 and 133 behaviors, respectively, while satisfying both the guard-acceptance and downstream-response criteria. The additional input guard therefore does not eliminate end-to-end vulnerabilities under the evaluated adaptive four-modality attack setting.