AUDITING WRITE-PATH PRIVACY IN SHARED AGENT MEMORY: SOURCE COUNTERFACTUALS AND AUTHORIZED SHARING

Anonymous authors
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ABSTRACT

We audit how private messages enter shared agent memory and implement a restricted release interface for useful collaboration. A scheduling task may authorize an absence to be shared without authorizing its reason. Matched source replacements and non-injected questions test this boundary. On 16 fixed personas, judge-detected borderline-fact exposure is 0.875 for profiles and 0.594 for digests; model-assisted adjudicated reference rates are 0.922 and 0.719. Independent human reannotation retains a pooled profile-minus-digest contrast of 0.094 over 48 personas. Software cases trace storage, retrieval, and publication: five of twenty audited open-source workspace assistants exhibit the unbound configuration as shipped or by default, and two assistant deployments merge private messages into shared state in their tested defaults. An openclaw pilot exposes a private target in 3/4 channel-requested digests against 0/4 source-placebo digests. In 128 scheduling trajectories across four configurations, the two shared-workspace configurations let protected names reach a reader holding only the saved digest, while both audience-separated configurations show no detected disclosure on complete-evidence units. Native isolation already supports useful sharing, and an owner-confirmed release interface is not established as superior. External checks (the full public MuPPET and AgentLeak releases and an official-code CI-Work reconstruction) find AgentLeak leakage at 0.845 unbound and 0.441 under a prompt policy, reduced to 0.023 by a trusted pre-consolidation scope. The contribution is a reproducible audit and executable task-specific configuration evidence, not a general defense; simulated transport, ideal owner approval, and automated labels limit deployment claims.

1 INTRODUCTION

Alex tells a workspace assistant privately that a medical appointment makes him unavailable on Friday afternoon. He authorizes it to tell the team when he is unavailable, but not why. A useful team update preserves the scheduling constraint and omits the appointment. This task needs information from a private source, yet it does not require opening that source to the team. If the assistant copies the reason into a team-visible profile or digest, correctly serving that artifact exposes content outside Alex's authorization.

Workspace assistants maintain memory and derive shared state from conversations (Mem0, 2026b;a; Read AI, 2026). Claude Tag supports personal DMs and organization-scoped channel work, with distinct execution identities and documented memory boundaries (Anthropic, 2026a;b;c). Asana describes source-linked memory retrieval scoped to the person triggering execution (Tibrewal, 2026; Witteveen, 2026), and requires explicit approval for privacy-sensitive actions (Asana, 2026). These controls do not place a product permanently inside or outside an audit's scope: the question is which sources a configured execution can read, which audience receives its output, and what release that audience is authorized to receive.

Reading and publication involve different principals. An employee may authorize an assistant to read a private record and post a limited update to colleagues who cannot read that record; alternatively, a trusted interface may expose only an approved availability field. Both workflows can

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


Figure 1: The controlled audit. The writer sees private and public input; the reader sees only a team-visible derived artifact, whose correct read access does not certify its contents. The harness performs one consolidation pass without persistent or scheduled updates.

preserve source isolation while enabling collaboration. The audit must check that the released information respects the destination audience. Observations on neighboring public-channel memory surfaces (Pluto Security, 2026) motivate this check, without establishing private-channel leakage in a named product.

We first isolate a configuration without enforced source binding (Figure 1): two templates reorganize the same conversations into profiles or digests, matched placebo replacements test whether a target fact originates in the input, and the primary comparison remains the persona-paired template contrast under the original private-source policy; separate authorization controls test the example above, where availability is shareable but its reason need not be. This configuration is not hypothetical: five of twenty audited open-source workspace assistants ingest private messages into shared surfaces with no structural source binding in their shipped defaults (Appendix D), and both assistant frameworks traced in Section 5 merge private messages into shared state by default.

The study contributes matched source interventions, stage-specific exposure measurements, and an executable authorized-sharing audit. Software cases trace storage, retrieval, and shared artifacts. The runtime task compares native audience isolation with owner-confirmed release, then checks scheduling, saved state, and independent artifact reuse. External vignettes and human reannotation test evidence beyond the original assets and judge. The contribution is a reproducible audit and task-specific configuration evidence, not a new spillage phenomenon or general enforcement theory.

2 Threat Model

2.1 System Model and the Write-Path Gap

We distinguish storing selected conversation content, consolidating it into a derived artifact, and serving that artifact to its readers. The harness tests one consolidation pass without persistent updates. Source access, the execution identity, and the destination audience are distinct. Channel scope and inherited source access constrain what an execution can read (Anthropic, 2026a; Tibrewal, 2026; Witteveen, 2026); release authorization determines what it may communicate to the artifact's audience.

Three policy cases matter (tabulated in Appendix E). With no authorized release, source isolation should prevent private content from reaching a broader audience. With full release authorization, sharing the approved content is not a violation. With partial authorization, a task may use the approved projection, such as availability, while withholding its private reason. We use *authorized projection* for this explicitly permitted part of a source; selective release and scope enforcement have established formulations (Costa et al., 2025; Xu et al., 2026), and we use the distinction to specify an audit, not claim a new enforcement theory.

The main harness instantiates the first case without structural enforcement: every audited fact originates in a private DM, while team-channel records carry separate public work information. The authorization controls instantiate the partial- and full-release cases. A 20-project convenience audit finds five systems whose shipped or default configuration ingests private messages into a shared surface with no structural source binding (Appendix D); its counts do not estimate deployment preva-

lence. The applicable unit here is a configured source-to-destination flow, not a product brand; prior benchmarks measure shared-agent spillage and persistent single-user profiles (Gupta et al., 2026; Mireshghallah et al., 2026).

2.2 Attacker, Assumptions, and Audited Property

The attacker is a legitimate teammate in the same tenant as the victim, holding ordinary member privileges without administrative access. It asks only non-injected questions that a teammate could plausibly ask in ordinary collaboration; the questions are disclosure-seeking by design, probing whether the artifact reveals personal context, with no injected instructions and no adversarial phrasing. The attacker reads only artifacts that the ACL grants to the attacker.

In the harness, query-time access is correct by construction: the reader receives only the generated artifact and cannot query raw memory; the victim's fact originates in a private direct message, and success means recovering it from a team-visible derived artifact at paraphrase level. All original audited facts have a private source audience, including availability information; the template's personal-context field does not grant disclosure authorization. The separate authorization experiment explicitly changes this policy. The audited property is that derivation preserves source-audience restrictions except for explicitly authorized release, consistent with documented scope and inheritance protections (Tibrewal, 2026; Witteveen, 2026; Anthropic, 2026a).

The software cases have different boundaries: mem0 uses its supported organization scope and feeds retrieved memory entries to a reader, and the assistant cases measure auditor-visible stores and actual replies; none alone satisfies the harness's complete derived-artifact restriction. We exclude prompt injection, model-weight extraction, and claims about deliberately broken query ACLs.

3 Audit Design

The audit treats consolidation as a privacy boundary: an artifact is safe to serve only if its contents respect the audiences of its sources. The harness varies the artifact template while fixing source conversations, uses matched source replacements, and scores artifacts separately from reader answers (information flow in Figure 7, Appendix F). The primary Trellis benchmark feeds the raw team-channel and direct-message transcript to the writer, collapsing the Write and Consolidate stages into one transcript-to-artifact operation with no intermediate memory-entry store. The mem0 case in Section 5.1 is the opposite boundary: it exercises explicit extraction and retrieval of atomic memory entries and does not generate the profile or digest narratives. The assistant deployment traces are a separate message-path case rather than a third implementation of the Trellis pipeline.

3.1 Benchmark: Personas, Facts, and Canaries

The harness simulates a fictional business software company named Trellis on a Slack-like workspace. Sixteen personas are fixed benchmark assets, each with 6 team-channel messages and 3 direct-message turns, each embedding exactly one fact as an exact substring. Of each persona's 3 facts, one is borderline (personal information a teammate could also read as an availability explanation), one is sensitive, and one is benign; the borderline fact enters the primary analysis. Every fact carries a canary, a globally unique natural-looking token appearing only in its owner's direct messages (Appendix F).

3.2 Consolidation Schemas

The profile and digest templates share one scaffold and differ in one organizing-goal phrase and the resulting field block; automated diff validation confirmed parity on the capacity dimensions (6 fields each; input prompts 187 versus 188 tokens). The profile template carries 4 person-slots (fields that describe a person), and the digest template carries 2. The organizing goal, field titles, and person-slot count differ jointly: the comparison is a bundled treatment and does not identify which factor drives the exposure contrast (Section 6.1, Appendix G).

3.3 Experiment Matrix and Instrument Separation

The observation unit is $u = (\text{persona}, \text{fact}, \text{schema}, \text{instruction}, \text{writer}, \text{seed}, \text{arm})$. The main matrix crosses 16 personas, 2 consolidation schemas (profile and digest), 2 writer models, 2 stochastic draws (replicate indices, since the endpoint accepts no seed parameter), and 2 arms (full and placebo) under neutral instructions, yielding 256 artifacts; a privacy-instruction subset adds 128 profile-only artifacts, for 384 total. The tested writers are kimi-k2.6 and qwen3-8b. The measurement instrument is disjoint from both: a fixed reader and a single judge, both gpt-oss-20b, supported by blinded human review and a triangulation panel whose outputs serve as bias diagnostics only; the endpoint exposes only three model families, so no fully independent fourth judge family exists.

3.4 Scoring Rubric and Metrics

Each artifact receives a per-fact score $A_u \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$: no trace, topical hint, paraphrase-level identification, or near-verbatim content. The purpose violation rate is $\mathrm{PVR} = P(A_u \geq 2)$. Reader answers use the same threshold, averaged equally over three question types before averaging across artifacts. $\mathrm{RR}_{\mathrm{all}}$ includes all non-missing units; the secondary $\mathrm{RR}_{\mathrm{cond}}$ includes only artifacts with $A_u \geq 2$. Refusals are scored for content; absent replies and invalid labels remain missing (Appendix B). These are semantic exposure measures, not realized-harm rates.

Counterfactual attribution by placebo replacement. Attribution separates inscription, where the fact enters the derived artifact, from recovery, where the reader restores the fact from the artifact. The placebo arm isolates inscription: the target fact is replaced by a placebo sentence before consolidation, matched in token length, turn position, and syntactic role (the leave-one-fact-out, LOFO, intervention; Appendix B). Residual recovery under LOFO would indicate a source other than the user's fact message; disappearance supports, though it does not by itself prove, a write-path explanation (Section 4.2). The attribution contrast is $\Delta^{s}_{\mathrm{write}} = \mathrm{PVR}(s, \mathrm{full}) - \mathrm{PVR}(s, \mathrm{LOFO})$ per schema s; a masking-based sensitivity analysis yields the reader-side counterpart Δ_{reader} (Appendix G).

3.5 Primary Endpoint and Statistical Analysis

The sole primary endpoint is

$$\Delta^{\mathrm{full}}_{\mathrm{schema}} = \frac{1}{16} \sum_{p=1}^{16} \Big[\overline{A}^{p}_{\mathrm{profile,full}} - \overline{A}^{p}_{\mathrm{digest,full}} \Big], \tag{1}$$

where $\overline{A}^{p}_{s,\mathrm{full}}$ averages $\mathbf{1}[A \geq 2]$ over writers and seeds for persona p under schema s in the full arm. Only the full arm enters, and the persona is the sole clustering unit, so each persona contributes one paired profile-minus-digest difference.

Confidence intervals use 10,000 whole-persona bootstrap draws. Paired sign-flip tests enumerate all 2^{16} assignments and assume sign symmetry. Secondary endpoints use Holm adjustment. These fixed personas are not a deployment-population sample. Power and missingness rules are in Appendix B; the runtime task has separate endpoints and scene-level analysis (Appendix O).

Judge calibration and human audit. The judge is a blinded model with structured output, held unchanged after calibration (held-out recall 0.833 against a 0.85 target; specificity 1.000); the held-out calibration items were short, single-artifact snippets (30 euphemistic positive, 30 clean) rather than complete multi-slot artifacts, so held-out specificity is not a production guarantee. Because the judge fell short of target, every label entering the primary endpoint was re-adjudicated by one experimenter with item-level blinding and one blind model annotator, a third model adjudicating disagreements; we call the result the model-assisted adjudicated reference (Appendix A).

4 Results

We report template exposure, source attribution, and reader recovery, then test measurement validity, human reannotation, privacy instructions, and external vignettes. Section 5 examines software stages and authorized sharing. Private facts cross the write path at high rates without structural binding, the




Figure 2: (a) Borderline purpose violation rates on the 16-persona harness over instruction, schema, arm, and writer. Full-arm private facts enter team-visible artifacts at 0.438–0.906; the placebo (LOFO) rows collapse to the floor; a privacy instruction reduces but does not close the exposure. Rightmost column: model-assisted adjudicated reference; dashes mark cells outside its frame. (b) Attribution of the full-arm exposure as an intervention flow: each step removes one source of the fact before consolidation; arrow numbers give the drops in borderline PVR; the final box is the zero-source floor. Steps are sequential differences, not additive causal effects.

exposure is attributable to inscription, and prompt-level instructions do not close it; in the runtime task, audience-separated configurations show no detected disclosure.

4.1 Private Facts Cross the Write Path, Unevenly Across Schemas

Figure 2(a) gives the main matrix (exact cell values in Table 3, Appendix C). Judge-detected PVR is 0.875 under the profile schema and 0.594 under the digest schema; model-assisted adjudicated reference rates are 0.922 and 0.719. The judge-detected primary contrast $\Delta^{\text{full}}_{\text{schema}}$ is 0.281 (exact sign-flip $p = 0.00195$; 95% CI [0.156, 0.406] from the persona-cluster bootstrap, CI hereafter). The adjudicated-reference estimate is 0.2031 ($p = 0.03125$; CI [0.0625, 0.359]; adjudication-direction range [0.172, 0.266], Appendix C), a model-assisted audit estimate. The judge-detected value exceeds the audit estimate by approximately 0.078: the judge's error is schema-dependent and compresses the digest side more (artifact-frame recall 0.857, specificity 0.826; Appendix C). A triangulation panel finds the contrast positive under all three tested judges on both cohorts; the ordering holds for both writers, and the endpoint pools writers by design.

The two diagnostic tiers bracket the primary tier: sensitive facts are filtered more often (full-arm judge-detected PVR 0.344 profile, 0.281 digest), and benign facts are retained at high rates in both arms (0.922 and 0.688 full; 0.875 and 0.703 LOFO); the write-path effect is concentrated in borderline availability facts.

4.2 The Exposure Lives on the Write Path

The placebo intervention attributes the exposure to inscription: judge-detected $\Delta^{\text{profile}}_{\text{write}}$ = 0.844 (CI [0.719, 0.953]), $\Delta^{\text{digest}}_{\text{write}}$ = 0.563 (CI [0.438, 0.688]), and LOFO PVR 0.031 under both schemas. The human LOFO audit confirms the floor: target-fact recovery is 0 of 32, while the placebo itself appears in 26 of 32 artifacts as viable work content, so consolidation still had something to write (Appendix C); the secondary endpoint family stays significant (maximum Holm-adjusted p = 0.0039, Table 5). The fact-span masking sensitivity analysis gives $\Delta_{\text{reader}} = -0.257$ ($p = 9.2\text{e}{-5}$; 141 paired units; masked spans are judge-selected, Appendix G).

A fixed-transcript control separates the user's message from the assistant's echoed reply (Appendix G): scripted generic replies match the LOFO floor (0.047 profile, 0.000 digest), while keeping the echo and deleting the user's message yields 0.297 and 0.250 (Figure 2(b), a sequential-intervention account).

4.3 Attackers Recover the Facts Through Non-Injected Questions

Neutral full-arm reader recovery is 0.500 (128 artifacts; profile 0.591, digest 0.409), against a 0.007 LOFO floor. At least one of six questions succeeds on 108/128 full-arm artifacts (0.844), versus 3/128 LOFO artifacts (0.023); these artifact-level counts differ from question-averaged recovery. All 1,536 neutral answers have valid judgments (Appendix C, Figure 4).

4.4 The Effect Scales to 48 Personas

The 32-persona extension was drafted after the first-round results under the same asset rules and is not an independent population sample. In the pooled 48-persona matrix, the judge-detected contrast is 0.229 (CI [0.167, 0.292]) and the adjudicated reference contrast is 0.260 (CI [0.187, 0.333]); both have Monte Carlo $p = 5.0\text{e}{-6}$. The new-32 subgroup retains the direction, but the judge/reference gap reverses across cohorts (0.281/0.203, $+0.078$, original versus 0.203/0.289, -0.086, new-32), a reversal compatible with both judge behavior and the changed reference panel, drawn from the evaluated writer families. A third writer family (gpt-oss-20b scored by kimi-k2.6) also retains the direction ($\Delta = 0.117$, $p = 0.033$; bounds [0.115, 0.135]), a missingness-bound sensitivity analysis (25/384 missing, 6.51%, above the 5% ceiling), not a complete replication. Appendix C and Figure 5 retain the subgroup, reader, and cross-judge details.

Independent human reannotation. A shuffled 512-item packet hides conditions and earlier labels from independent human annotators, and we analyze the returned labels unchanged: the profile-minus-digest contrast is 0.172 (CI [0.063, 0.297]) on the original 16, 0.055 (CI [-0.008, 0.117]) on the extension 32, and 0.094 (CI [0.036, 0.156], $p = 0.0044$) pooled over 48. The pooled result supports the direction; the extension interval includes zero, and pooling is not independent replication. A targeted item review found schedule-only outputs credited with their omitted private reasons; human re-review confirmed the 53-item concern list (pooled sensitivity estimate 0.255), but the disagreement-selected review cannot estimate overall annotation error (Table 6, Appendix C.1).

Prompt-level privacy instructions do not close the exposure. The privacy instruction lowers the profile PVR from 0.875 to 0.641 at 16 personas (contrast -0.234, $p = 0.00195$) and from 0.859 to 0.751 in the pooled matrix (-0.106, $p = 0.0067$), far from the LOFO floor; two further phrasings reach 0.656 and 0.444 (Figure 6, Appendix C), and none eliminates the measured exposure on these assets. When conditions are ordered by prompt complexity rather than by observed rate, the response is non-monotone: the one-sentence minimal reminder (0.656) outperforms the longer standard instruction (0.751). Attention dilution and constraint neglect are plausible explanations, but this slice does not identify the cause.

Externally authored vignettes show the source effect. As an external check, we selected 32 constructed vignettes from PrivacyLens (Shao et al., 2024) (all 16 eligible workplace-audience cases and 16 deterministically drawn others; Appendix M), pairing each task with a version whose sensitive records are removed. Full-arm disclosure is 33/63 valid outputs (0.524): 11/31 for kimi-k2.6 and 22/32 for qwen3-8b; phrase-level removal reaches a 0/64 held-out floor, giving a paired contrast of 0.531 over the 32 vignettes (CI [0.391, 0.672]). The floor follows result-driven repair, so this is an exploratory manipulation check, not confirmatory evidence.

4.5 Cross-Benchmark Slices and Defense Comparators

The Trellis matrix is complemented by three public benchmark protocols, run as cross-checks rather than pooled estimates: the full public MuPPET release (Ruzzetti et al., 2026) (561 valid records, five official prompt conditions), the full AgentLeak release (El Yagoubi et al., 2026) (1,000 scenarios over C1, C2, and C5 with A0–A2 payloads), and an official-code CI-Work (Fu et al., 2026) protocol reconstruction (15 hand-authored scenarios; the README-listed 125-seed data release is absent from the public checkout). MuPPET privacy leakage is 0.374 neutral and 0.345–0.383 across the four prompt defenses, and AgentLeak multi-channel leakage is 0.845 unbound and 0.441 under the prompt policy; in the 15-case CI-Work slice, neutral leaks 10/15 and each defense condition is 0/15. A trusted pre-consolidation scope reduces AgentLeak leakage to 0.023, while the model-inferred tag projection has zero lexical hits at 0.455 tag accuracy, not evidence of reliable

provenance enforcement. A public Context Reasoner PPO checkpoint (Hu et al., 2025) transfers to Trellis with raw canary exposure of 0.531 (profile) and 0.344 (digest), and a corrected 256-unit dynamic-access-graph reimplementation of Collaborative Memory's (Rezazadeh et al., 2025) published policy retains authorized availability fields with 0/32 literal sender-only reason exposure (5/32 semantic-judge positives, all lacking the reason canary); both are mechanism comparators, not official replications. For consolidated artifacts, the structural boundary must be applied before synthesis; post-hoc retrieval filtering cannot unweave a private reason already embedded in a narrative (Appendix I gives protocols and raw counts; no cross-benchmark pooled inference is performed).

5 Software Cases

Both assistant deployments examined below merge messages into shared agent state in their tested defaults, and the mem0 case runs under its supported organization-scope configuration: these are the shipped configurations an audit must check.

5.1 Storage, Retrieval, and Answers on mem0

We ported the frozen conversations to mem0 v2.0.20 (embedded qdrant, local CPU embeddings) under its supported organization-scope configuration: real extraction writes shared memory and vector search retrieves it. This case has no profile/digest consolidation stage, so it measures a different pipeline stage, not the same complete attack chain.

Store-level target presence is 0.938 (kimi-k2.6) and 0.656 (qwen3-8b) under the judge, with canary rates 0.969 and 0.656. Question-type-averaged target retrieval is 0.253 and 0.059, and target answer recovery is 0.140 and 0.005 (Figure 9, Appendix G); a two-persona user-scope control observes zero cross-user retrieval.

A matched counterfactual filters the same store using source tags inferred by each writer. Accurate kimi-k2.6 tags remove all checked protected facts from retrieved context (target recovery 0/381 judged answers); with qwen3-8b's imperfect tags, protected content remains in retrieved context while target recovery is 0/378. Four qwen LOFO answers still explicitly disclose the same persona's divorce while the original judge checks only his bowling target, so zero target recovery does not imply no sensitive output (Appendix N). These observations evaluate inferred tags, not trusted metadata.

5.2 Two Assistant Deployment Cases

We replayed the conversations through lettabot (commit 99c3b5dd, Letta 0.16.8) and openclaw (commit 6d3ed6db), using real message handling and kimi-k2.6. Auditor-visible stores contain 16/16 target canaries in each full arm against 0/16 in LOFO (for openclaw, thirteen in derived Markdown, three only in session indexes). Neither system recovers a target in 96 full-arm questions: lettabot withholds most answers and openclaw hard-closes the probing pattern, so identity, retrieval, refusals, and accumulated state remain confounded (Appendix H). The next case fixes colleague identities and directly requests a shared artifact.

5.3 A Derived-Artifact Chain on openclaw

On the same pinned openclaw build, a channel-derivative pilot uses fresh state for each of 2 personas, 2 source arms, and 2 independent draws; fixed colleagues request the digest and ask the questions through the built-in QA channel. Judge-detected target exposure is 3/4 full-arm digests against 0/4 placebo digests, and all eight digests retain legitimate channel work content (Appendix L): a private-source-to-shared-artifact crossing in real software, though not a live commercial chat deployment.

Same-state channel answers expose the target in 13/24 full-arm answers against 0/24 placebo answers, but do not identify digest-mediated recovery (one clean digest is followed by two positive answers; the agent keeps its persistent memory). The following authorization task adds an independent reader that receives only a digest copy, and tests whether a useful release can be completed without opening private state to the team.

Configuration	Task	Name	Reason	Joint	Joint, AI check
Shared	30/32	6/26	0/26	20/32	19/32
Session	32/32	9/30	1/30	20/32	18/32
Native	29/32	0/29	0/29	26/32	26/32
Confirmed	31/32	0/30	0/30	30/32	30/32

Table 1: Runtime scheduling on eight fixed scenarios, two same-family model versions, and two generations. Task and joint outcomes include all attempts; name/reason columns use complete privacy evidence only. The last column adds AI raw-text findings without upgrading incomplete evidence; it is not human adjudication.

5.4 Completing an Authorized Sharing Task

We implement a finite availability-release interface on the same openclaw runtime: a natural-language DM supplies unavailability and a private reason, and only slot IDs may be published. The team must select the unique feasible slot, save a digest, and recover the choice after a session reset; a separate read-only agent receives only a byte-identical digest copy; retaining an availability field alone is insufficient.

Four configurations vary DM scoping, workspace isolation, and release: *Shared* uses one agent and workspace with an explicit privacy instruction; *Session* uses per-peer DM keys but keeps that shared workspace (each trajectory has one DM owner, so multi-owner isolation is untested). *Native* separates private and team agents and lets the owner publish through the native message tool. *Confirmed* keeps this separation but replaces the private agent's direct message tool with a restricted proposal interface: the model can only propose finite slot IDs, and a trusted command checks owner and source context, binds confirmation to the proposal, and publishes the approved projection to a fixed audience (Appendix O).

The controller models an ideal owner who checks the slots and rejects wrong proposals, making the comparison a configuration-bundle effect rather than authentication alone. Task success requires correct actual publication, correct selected-slot tokens at three stages, and a verified restricted reader; joint success also requires complete evidence and no detected DM-only name or private reason in public outputs or digests. Failures are not safety successes. Protecting employee names is a rule of this synthetic protocol, not a general policy.

Table 1 shows the privacy contrast first. Both shared-workspace configurations disclose protected names, and the disclosures reach the read-only digest reader in seven trajectories each; both audience-separated configurations show no detected name or reason disclosure on complete-evidence trajectories (missing-outcome bounds in Appendix O). On the task side, native isolation already supports useful sharing, and confirmation is not established as superior (0.125, interval $[-0.031, 0.313]$); on the privacy endpoint, the operative contrast in these tested configurations is between separated and unseparated deployments, not between confirmation and native isolation. Native failures involve tool use, publication format, and answer format; confirmed has one ambiguous proposal failure. A post-hoc AI review finds inconsistent treatment of coarse appointment/commitment descriptions, changing three main joint outcomes (not a recovery of the specific sensitive topics; Appendix O reports missingness and the limited coverage of this check).

6 Discussion

6.1 Authorization, Source Filtering, and Information Retention

The tested prompts reduce exposure but leave residuals (Lan et al., 2025); in the original eight-persona subset, source filtering removes targets and DM-only availability, and that policy authorizes neither, so removal is not an authorized-utility loss.

Separate controls authorize availability: trusted filtering retains all 32 fields without forbidden reasons, while instructions alone expose reasons in 16/16 qwen and 0/16 kimi outputs (Appendix N). These automatic labels received quoted-evidence checks, not new human annotation. These controls and mem0's inferred tags do not bound trusted source binding, so deployment audits must

check the release interface and downstream state, not only the final text (Appendix J; the runtime task is Section 5.4).

The schema contrast: an observed effect with an unresolved decomposition. Three claims must be kept apart. First, in the original matrix, profiles leak more than digests under all three tested judges and the adjudicated reference. Second, its cause is unresolved: the templates bundle the organizing goal, field titles, and person-slot count. All borderline facts are availability or schedule disclosures, which the profile's "Availability & Schedule" or personal-context field matches semantically, confounding semantic match with slot capacity. A clean 2x2 factorial (Appendix G) establishes no decomposition across the tested judges; field occupancy is descriptive, with almost all borderline mentions in person-slots; and the ordering holds for both writers but is not uniform in the new generic-reply marker controls (Appendix N).

Cross-benchmark and deployment interpretation. The full MuPPET and AgentLeak releases point the same way as the main audit; the small CI-Work slice closes exposure under all three defense conditions. Across the harness, the software cases, and the runtime, detected exposure concentrates in configurations that route private sources into shared state without structural binding; trusted scope and audience separation reduce it to near zero, while prompt-level instructions alone do not. When no release is authorized, audit source isolation and actual outbound effects; when collaboration needs private-derived availability, check an owner-approved record or restricted interface and follow it into later publication. An execution's source permissions do not substitute for checking its output audience and permitted fields. These are requirements for a configured workflow, not evidence that Claude Tag or Asana fails them. A universal privacy–utility tradeoff does not follow from our controls. Correct query-time access control does not certify a written artifact's contents: bindings must be checked at and before consolidation.

7 LIMITATIONS

Measurement and label provenance. False positives and false negatives vary across schemas, cohorts, and tasks, so automatic rates are not general lower bounds. The original automatic endpoint remains primary, with adjudicated labels and alternative judges as sensitivity analyses; the first annotator was a human experimenter in both cohorts, the second annotator and disagreement adjudicator were models: mixed human–model reference labels, not an independent two-person reference (Appendix N). The independent human reannotation disagrees with the first round in a schema-correlated direction (Section 4.4); returned labels are reported as received, with the 53-item concern list human-confirmed. Persona bootstrap intervals do not include all annotation uncertainty.

Scope and controls. The English workplace assets are synthetic and fixed, and each writer designation identifies one concrete model. The templates jointly change goal, titles, and person-slot count (no unique mechanism); replacing a marker tests only the specified replacement, not external validity. The external vignettes and the runtime-chain pilot (two personas, one writer family, two seeds, one artifact type) are constructed scenarios under fixed conditions. External benchmark slices and comparators are not deployment-wide estimates or official replications (Collaborative Memory's official implementation was unavailable); software cases examine different stages, the assistant traces confound identity, retrieval, and session history, and we did not run Claude Tag or Asana. Zero target recovery is not a guarantee for other questions, and the rescreen cannot certify completeness over the full label space. The runtime task covers eight fixed scenarios and two versions of one model family, with automated labels and no new human reference set; confirmation assumes an ideal owner, and deployment errors in identity mapping, approval, or provider adaptation are unmeasured; early summarization can remove a reason before isolation is tested, the finite-slot interface does not support arbitrary-text authorization, and the runtime uses QA transport, not a production deployment. Table 12 positions this audit against the closest work (Gupta et al., 2026; Costa et al., 2025; Xu et al., 2026; Shao et al., 2024; Zhou et al., 2026); our additions are a template audit, matched source interventions, measurement checks, and task-specific runtime configuration evidence.

AI USE STATEMENT

We used generative AI tools to: generate the synthetic expansion-cohort personas (p17–p48, machine-validated under fixed asset rules); execute the experiment pipeline (writers, reader, and judges are LLMs by design and are the object of study); support the blinded audit frames (model annotators, as disclosed); screen and item-review the returned human labels (AI-assisted analysis over a targeted subset; the resulting 53-item concern list was later confirmed by human re-review and is reported as such); rescreen the 759 filtered answers with a second model family; verify held-out construction for the external vignettes; and search literature and edit code and text. The new runtime task uses automated same-family privacy labels and AI raw-output review, not new human annotations. Its ideal-owner check is deterministic and uses fixed scenario constraints. Numerical claims were checked against archived result files, with raw records and analysis scripts retained. Automated consistency checks do not validate label independence. The authors take responsibility for the final content.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This paper audits privacy properties of shared agent memory. All experimental subjects are synthetic personas in a simulated workspace; no real users' private content was collected or analyzed. The audit is designed for defensive verification of the vendor-asserted purpose-binding property, and the paper explicitly does not claim a leak in any third-party production deployment. The production-framework replication uses an open-source framework (mem0) under a configuration that its own documentation offers as supported, involves no third-party users, and reports aggregate rates only. Human annotation data (labels, confidence values, and free-text comments) was collected from independent annotators for the blind review packet and is reported in aggregate; the packet contains no private content of the annotators. The audit instruments are themselves LLMs, and the paper reports the measurement-validity limits of this choice in full.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

Inputs are versioned with SHA-256 hashes, and analysis scripts accompany the results. Frozen prompts, raw responses, failures, review records, and offline analysis scripts are released with the supplementary package; earlier API-call accounting is tabulated in Appendix F. Phase-one numbers (the model-assisted adjudicated reference, the authorization, marker, and reader-budget controls, and the assistant deployments) are anchored in the immutable phase-one artifacts under `experiments/revision_20260921/results/`, whose 44-file reproducibility package was re-computed offline. The follow-up phase's artifacts are under `experiments/revision_20260921_followup/results/`, including the returned-label files, the runtime-chain records, the vignette selection and analysis files, and the rescreen outputs. The independent-human packet's returned labels and the human-confirmed 53-item concern list accompany the release. The authorized-sharing implementation and new records are under `experiments/authorization_runtime_20260922/`. Generation is frozen in `main_v3`; final scoring uses `analysis_v2`. Appendix O records the post-launch evaluator corrections and separate costs. Reproduction requires the pinned host, its QA transport, and accessible model endpoints.

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A JUDGE CALIBRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Held-out recall was 0.833 with interval [0.664, 0.927], missing the target by one case; held-out specificity was 1.000 with interval [0.886, 1.000]. No item was abstained. Pooled development and held-out recall is 51 of 60 (0.850).

Because the judge missed its calibration target by one case, we kept the judge prompt unchanged and re-adjudicated every label that enters the primary endpoint, rather than tuning the judge further. All 128 full-arm borderline artifact labels were re-scored by one experimenter with item-level blinding and one fully blind model annotator, with a third model adjudicating disagreements by three-vote majority. Judge-versus-reference error is reported per schema and per writer as a test of schema-dependent judge error. The artifact review frame extends from 48 to 128 items, covering the full primary-endpoint subset. Rates are always written as judge-detected values together with human-review results and misclassification-corrected intervals. The human review covers an answer frame (72 labels), an artifact frame (128 items), a LOFO frame (32 units scored on all 4 facts each), and a verification pass that re-labeled the 120 calibration gold items.

The judge is a blinded model with structured output. It returns a score, an evidence span, a confidence value, and an abstain flag in JSON. The calibration set has a development split of 60 items and a held-out split of 60 items, each with 30 euphemistic leaks and 30 clean items. The target was recall at least 0.85 and specificity at least 0.90 on the held-out split, with at most 2 revisions using the development split only. Independent human review of the 5 held-out false negatives confirmed all 5 as true leaks. Two of them were near-verbatim cases that the judge scored 1. This calibration subset exhibits under-detection; production false positives preclude a general lower-bound interpretation. In production, the judge emitted high confidence on every answer, so the confidence stratification of the answer frame was void and the frame collapsed to 6 strata with 72 labels.

The misclassification correction works as follows. Let $B = \mathbf{1}[\text{score} \geq 2]$. With the judge's true-positive rate (sensitivity Se) and true-negative rate (specificity Sp) measured on the held-out split, the corrected rate is $\mathrm{PVR}_{\mathrm{corr}} = (\mathrm{PVR}_{\mathrm{obs}} + \mathrm{Sp} - 1)/(\mathrm{Se} + \mathrm{Sp} - 1)$, a standard adjustment of an observed positive rate for classifier error (the Rogan–Gladen correction). Uncertainty propagates by Monte Carlo with 10,000 draws, and corrected values are truncated to $[0, 1]$. The raw judge rate remains the primary result; the corrected rate is reported as a sensitivity analysis. The triangulation panel scores audited units with 2 judge models, quantifies family bias of the core judge, and does not enter estimation. A pilot audit verified the LOFO floor after one placebo repair round: the target-fact PVR under LOFO was 0 of 16.

B PLACEBO GENERATION, MANIPULATION CHECKS, AND MISSING DATA

Harness scoring and inference. Each of the six reader questions receives $S_{u,q}$ on the artifact's four-level scale. When every question type has a valid observation,

$$R_u = \frac{1}{3} \sum_{t \in T} \frac{1}{|V_{u,t}|} \sum_{q \in V_{u,t}} \mathbf{1}[S_{u,q} \geq 2], \tag{2}$$

where T contains the three equally weighted question types and $V_{u,t}$ contains delivered answers with valid, non-abstaining labels. A textual privacy refusal is a valid answer, normally scored zero. Judge abstention, an API failure, and no delivered reply are separate states. $\mathrm{RR}_{\mathrm{all}}$ averages non-missing units; $\mathrm{RR}_{\mathrm{cond}}$ averages units with $A_u \geq 2$. Percentile intervals resample whole personas 10,000 times while preserving pairing. The exact sign-flip test is two-sided at $\alpha = 0.05$. Its sign-symmetry assumption does not turn this fixed benchmark into a population-causal estimate. The Holm family contains $\Delta^{s}_{\mathrm{write}}$, $\mathrm{RR}_{\mathrm{cond}}$, the privacy contrast, and score-3 sensitivity. Design-stage power is 80% only for $|\Delta| \geq 0.35$ with 16 personas. The 48-persona extension has an approximate minimum detectable effect of 0.20. These are design quantities, not reporting thresholds.

Matched source replacement. The placebo sentence matches the target fact in token length within 15 percent. It occupies the same turn and the same syntactic role. Its topic is work logistics. Human raters score its naturalness at 4 of 5 or higher. It is independent of the other facts of the persona. Placebo and fact versions are generated as a pair within the same unit, and a coin flip randomizes

the generation order. One repair round over the pilot placebos preceded the floor check. Violations of the floor criterion are reported in full and flagged as contaminated.

If the judge abstains on every question of one type for an artifact, human review adjudicates all 6 answers of that artifact. This step consumes no API calls and is capped at 60 artifacts. An artifact without valid judge observations enters the missingness table. If any question type has no valid observation, R_u is undefined and the artifact enters missingness reporting; an empty denominator is never evaluated. Textual reader refusals are retained and scored for their content. No such judge abstentions or missing answers occur in the 1,536 neutral questions of the original matrix. The acceptable missing rate is at most 5 percent. Worst-case and best-case RR bounds are reported within this limit. Above this limit, RR degrades to descriptive reporting. Missingness is reported by schema, arm, and question type.

C Extended Measurement-Validity Details and Secondary Endpoints

Extension cohort and third-writer details. We ran the identical matrix on 32 additional personas (p17–p48), drafted by kimi-k2.6 after the first round under the same asset rules, machine-validated, and sensitivity-annotated ($\kappa = 0.891$ and 0.953). Because these personas postdate the first-round results, we treat the cohort as an extension cohort rather than an independent sample. Figure 5 (Appendix C) summarizes the cohorts, with the merged 48-persona matrix as the main display: the judge-detected primary contrast is 0.229 (Monte Carlo $p = 5.0\text{e}{-6}$, the resolution floor; CI [0.167, 0.292]), and the model-assisted adjudicated reference estimate is 0.260 ($p = 5.0\text{e}{-6}$; CI [0.187, 0.333]). The new-32 subgroup alone reproduces the direction at 0.203 (judge-detected) and 0.289 (model-assisted adjudicated reference), with the extended blind review covering all 256 new full-arm borderline units ($\kappa = 0.817$). The merged matrix contains the original 16, and the blind-review composition differed across cohorts, so numeric differences between cohorts are not attributable to data alone. The secondary family strengthens: $\Delta^{\text{profile}}_{\text{write}}$ is 0.833 and $\Delta^{\text{digest}}_{\text{write}}$ is 0.615, both at Monte Carlo $p = 5.0\text{e}{-6}$. The LOFO floor holds (profile 0.026, digest 0.016). Reader-side recovery is $\text{RR}_{\text{all}} = 0.259$ and $\text{RR}_{\text{cond}} = 0.596$. The collateral check now establishes diagnostic-fact equivalence between arms ($+0.006$ sensitive, $+0.022$ benign, inside the ± 0.15 bound). Missingness is 3 of 768 generation units, one additional artifact-judging unit in the privacy arm, and 23 of 4,584 reader units, none entering the neutral primary comparison. A third writer family (gpt-oss-20b over all 48 personas, scored by kimi-k2.6 to avoid self-judging) reproduces the direction: profile PVR 0.861, digest 0.739, $\Delta = 0.117$ ($p = 0.033$; $\Delta \in [0.115, 0.135]$ under any completion of the 25 units missing to judge failures), and a writer-by-judge cross-check (0.240 gpt-oss, 0.250 qwen3-8b) holds the direction under all three tested judges. In the artifact frame, the two blind annotators (one experimenter, one model annotator) agree with $\kappa = 0.856$ (122 of 128). Against the model-assisted adjudicated reference, the judge reaches recall 0.857 [0.778, 0.911] and specificity 0.826 [0.629, 0.930]. The error is schema-dependent: recall is 0.915 on profile and 0.783 on digest; specificity is 0.600 and 0.889. On this specific reference frame the judge under-detects both schemas, with a larger reduction for digest, which overstates the raw schema contrast by approximately 0.078. In the answer and LOFO frames, agreement is $\kappa = 1.000$. A schema-stratified misclassification correction reproduces the model-assisted adjudicated reference rates exactly (0.922 and 0.719); since the judge's error rates are measured against the same reference frame, this recovery is expected by construction and does not by itself validate the correction on other data. The triangulation panel, extended to the full matrix (384 original and 764 expansion artifacts), re-scores all artifacts with the two alternative judge families. The schema contrast is positive under all three tested judges on both cohorts (original: gpt-oss 0.281, kimi-k2.6 0.137, qwen3-8b 0.219; expansion: 0.203, 0.219, 0.242). On the 128-unit model-assisted adjudicated reference subset, the two alternative judges are perfectly specific (specificity 1.000); the gpt-oss judge is the only source of false positives. The field-occupancy coding (Figure 3) assigns each template field a person-slot or event-slot code: person-slots carry 76.8% of extracted fact mentions, and the person-slot share among slot-coded mentions is 95.0% borderline, 82.4% sensitive, and 73.7% benign. This coding is descriptive evidence, not a hypothesis test.

In the artifact frame, judge recall by writer is 0.854 on kimi-k2.6 and 0.860 on qwen3-8b. In the answer frame, judge recall is 0.895 [0.759, 0.958] and specificity is 0.941 [0.809, 0.984]. The stratum-weighted RR estimate is 0.319 under human review against 0.244 under the raw judge.

Against the expansion-cohort model-assisted adjudicated reference, the judge reaches recall 0.955 and specificity 0.778 on profile, and recall 0.890 and specificity 0.673 on digest. The raw judge value on the coverage subset of the model-assisted adjudicated conditional estimate is 0.608 (judge-weighted). The 4-level agreement between the two annotators is low (κ 0.289 artifact, 0.770 answer, 0.897 LOFO), driven by a systematic 2-versus-3 boundary difference; the binary primary metrics are robust to this difference.

In the LOFO arm of the 16-persona matrix, the sensitive diagnostic fact appears in 1 of 32 artifacts, retained by design. The placebo appears in 26 of 32, which confirms it as viable work content. The benign fact appears in 28 of 32.

The pooled misclassification correction gives 1.000 for profile (point estimate truncated at the top of $[0, 1]$; Monte Carlo interval [0.910, 1.000]) and 0.712 [0.609, 0.839] for digest. It is illustrative only, because the production error is schema-dependent while the pooled correction assumes a single error model.

The model-assisted adjudicated conditional recovery estimate is a stratum-weighted value of 0.7606, based on 29 conditional units linked to 25 of 128 full-arm artifacts. Judge-detected recovery by question type under the neutral instruction in the full arm is 0.590 direct, 0.273 indirect, and 0.637 euphemistic (256 answers per type; the all-matrix values 0.289, 0.134, 0.309 mix arms and instructions and are not the reported denominator). The privacy-instruction full-arm rate is 0.448. The judge-detected $\mathrm{RR}_{\mathrm{cond}}$ is 0.563 over 141 conditional units, conditioned on the judge's own leak decision and therefore descriptive. Missingness is zero.

Table 2: The four-level scoring rubric with illustrative examples for a hypothetical fact (an employee's Friday medical appointment disclosed in a direct message). A score of 2 or higher counts as a purpose violation.

Score	Level	Illustrative artifact text
0	No trace	"Alex Wang will lead the vendor review next sprint."
1	Topical hint	"Alex may be less responsive late this week."
2	Paraphrase-level	"Alex has a medical appointment on Friday afternoon."
3	Near-verbatim	The artifact repeats the direct-message sentence with only cosmetic edits.




Figure 3: Field-occupancy coding of extracted fact mentions (573 total; 545 slot-coded and plotted, excluding 19 nonverbatim and 9 unparseable mentions). (a) Occupancy by schema. (b) Person-slot share by fact sensitivity tier. Descriptive evidence only.




Figure 4: Reader-side recovery on the 16-persona harness. (a) A teammate asking non-injected, disclosure-seeking questions has a question-averaged recovery rate of 0.500 on full-arm artifacts; the placebo floor is 0.007. (b) Recovery by question type under the neutral instruction in the full arm (256 answers per type): all three phrasings recover the fact, with the indirect phrasing the least effective.




Figure 5: The schema contrast across cohorts and scoring sources, with 95% bootstrap intervals where available. The direction and magnitude hold in the original 16 personas, the pooled 48-persona matrix, and the extension subgroup alone (personas p17–p48, drafted after the first round), under both the automated judge and the model-assisted adjudicated reference.

The score-3 sensitivity contrast is the difference between profile 22/64 (0.344) and digest 6/64 (0.094) artifacts receiving a near-verbatim borderline-fact score. These marginal rates are reported here because the contrast alone does not show how often each schema produces near-verbatim exposure.

C.1 Independent Human Reannotation: Protocol and Item Review

The schema contrast could in principle be an artifact of how our labels were produced. We therefore packaged a 512-item packet (the 384 primary units plus the availability and reason fields of the 64 authorization artifacts) as a shuffled blind review with fixed identifiers (R0001–R0512), hiding schema, writer, condition, previous labels, and results, and gave it to external annotators who had




Figure 6: Profile PVR under three privacy-instruction phrasings and the neutral baseline (pooled 48-persona matrix, judge-detected). The dashed line is the placebo floor. Even a strict enumerated instruction with a default-exclusion rule leaves the exposure an order of magnitude above the floor.

Table 3: Borderline PVR matrix (judge-detected, $A_u \geq 2$; $n = 32$ per writer cell, 64 pooled; model-assisted adjudicated reference from the 128-unit full-arm frame).

Instruction	Schema	Arm	kimi	qwen	Pooled	Reference
neutral	profile	full	0.906	0.844	0.875	0.922
neutral	profile	LOFO	0.000	0.062	0.031	—
neutral	digest	full	0.438	0.750	0.594	0.719
neutral	digest	LOFO	0.000	0.062	0.031	—
privacy	profile	full	0.688	0.594	0.641	—
privacy	profile	LOFO	0.031	0.031	0.031	—

seen none of the earlier labels or outcomes (author-reported provenance: several annotators, independently, without AI assistance; no per-annotator staffing details are collected). The returned file is analyzed as received, and no returned label was changed. The main answer is that the contrast survives the independent instrument: it is positive in all three cohorts (Table 6), 0.172 (CI [0.063, 0.297]) on the original 16, 0.055 (CI [−0.008, 0.117]) on the extension 32, and 0.094 (CI [0.036, 0.156], $p = 0.0044$) pooled over the 48 personas, with item-level agreement to the first round of 0.938, 0.855, and 0.883 (pooled-round κ 0.597). The extension estimate is direction-consistent but its interval contains zero, so the two human rounds disagree in magnitude in a way that needs an explanation; the pooled value is a merged estimate over both cohorts, not an independent replication.

Item-level review suggests a candidate explanation, with an important caveat. We read every flagged item: all items where a different-family screening model disagreed with the returned binary, all 45 cross-round disagreements, all 25 positives whose quoted evidence is not verbatim in the artifact, and one parse failure, 181 items in total. Because the flagging rules target disagreement, 174 of the 181 reviewed items are returned-positive by construction, so the review can find annotation errors in only one direction and cannot estimate error rates. Within that targeted set, the review finds 48 returned-positive items in which the artifact does not contain the fact core, plus 1 borderline case and 4 returned-negative items in which it does. The failure mode, confirmed on the concern list, is specific: annotators credited an artifact that kept only the schedule consequence (a hard stop, an offline window) as disclosing the private reason behind it, and their own comments sometimes record the reason's absence. The flagged false positives concentrate exactly where that confusion is possible: 34 of 40 primary-cohort cases are digest full-arm artifacts, whose summaries legitimately drop

Table 4: Privacy-instruction phrasing contrast (profile, full arm, 48 personas, judge-detected). Contrast = phrasing PVR − neutral PVR (paired by persona).

Instruction	PVR	Contrast	p
neutral (main matrix)	0.859	—	—
privacy (standard phrasing)	0.751	-0.106	0.0067
privacy_minimal	0.656	-0.208	4.0e-05
privacy_strict	0.444	-0.415	5.0e-06

Table 5: Secondary endpoints (judge-detected, Holm family). The maximum Holm-adjusted p in the family is 0.0039.

Endpoint	Estimate	95% CI	sign-flip p	Holm p
$\Delta^{\text{profile}}_{\text{write}}$	0.844	[0.719, 0.953]	3.1e-05	0.000153
$\Delta^{\text{digest}}_{\text{write}}$	0.563	[0.438, 0.688]	6.1e-05	0.000183
RR_{cond}	0.563	—	3.1e-05	0.000153
Privacy contrast	-0.234	$[-0.344, -0.141]$	0.00195	0.0039
Score-3 sensitivity	0.250	[0.141, 0.359]	0.00195	0.0039

the reason, and all 8 authorization cases are sender-only reason fields, where the artifact correctly withholds the reason. Applying the review's labels as a sensitivity analysis moves the contrasts to 0.234, 0.266, and 0.255; on the 45 cross-round disagreements the review sides with the first round 43 of 45 times. This adjudication began as an AI-assisted sensitivity analysis over a targeted subset, not a confusion matrix; the 53-item concern list has since been re-reviewed by a human reviewer, who confirmed all 53 adjudications, so the reviewed labels are human-confirmed for this round. The targeted-subset caveat still stands: the review can find annotation errors in only one direction and cannot estimate error rates.

Two conclusions survive every label source. The schema contrast is positive and significant under the first-round labels (0.234 pooled), the model-assisted adjudicated reference (0.260), the returned labels as received (0.094), and the human-confirmed review of the concern list (0.255). And the label source itself moves the estimate by about as much as the largest treatments do: on the extension cohort the two human rounds differ by 0.20, about twofold the returned pooled contrast of 0.094. Paraphrase-level disclosure annotation is an instrument with condition-dependent error, and the annotators' dominant error, confirmed on the concern list, reproduces the availability-versus-reason confusion that this audit studies (the authorization fields tell the same story, Section 6).

D Enforcement of Purpose Bindings in Deployed Systems

Identity and credential scoping can be structural: Claude Tag assigns each channel an admin-provisioned access bundle, and the channel's join policy becomes the effective access control (Tenable Research, 2026). Read-scope confinement inside a channel is listed among the controls that are not available (Anthropic, 2026c). Memory frameworks delegate the boundary to the application: scopes are developer-assigned labels, and the vendors state that the application owns the security boundary (Mem0, 2026c; Zep, 2026).

The field evidence cited in this paper is unevenly sourced. The August 2026 read-scope change is corroborated by two independent reports (Beri, 2026; Nuñez, 2026). The hands-on production measurements of cross-channel memory resurfacing rest on a single independent research team's report (Pluto Security, 2026); as of 2026-09-14 no second team has published a replication. These production observations motivate the audit but do not enter its estimates.

Platform vendors have begun to bind derived artifacts structurally: Microsoft 365 Copilot generated files now inherit sensitivity labels (Microsoft, 2026). Documented boundaries can shift without notice: in August 2026 the read scope of a deployed channel assistant widened from per-message evaluation to full-channel context, while the approval artifacts of pilot customers still described the narrower system (Beri, 2026; Nuñez, 2026). One documented surface is open in production today:

Table 6: Independent human reannotation of the 384 primary units: profile-minus-digest contrast by label source and cohort, with 95% persona-cluster bootstrap intervals. First: first-round human labels. Returned: independent reannotation as received. Reviewed: item-level adjudication of the targeted concern set, confirmed by human re-review (53 of 53). κ pools both rounds' binary labels.

Cohort	First	Returned	Reviewed	Agreement	κ
original 16 ($n = 128$)	0.203	0.172 [0.063, 0.297]	0.234 [0.094, 0.375]	0.938	0.764
extension 32 ($n = 256$)	0.250	0.055 [−0.008, 0.117]	0.266 [0.180, 0.344]	0.855	0.526
pooled 48 ($n = 384$)	0.234	0.094 [0.036, 0.156]	0.255 [0.182, 0.328]	0.883	0.597

workspace-shared memory in a deployed channel assistant bleeds facts across public channels and resurfaces them unprompted (Pluto Security, 2026).

A 20-project deployment audit. To measure whether private-message ingestion into a shared surface without structural source binding is deployed rather than hypothetical, we audited 20 open-source workspace assistants with long-term memory (7 mem0-based, 13 custom), selected from GitHub repository search and web discovery on 2026-09-20 (vendor-official repositories and examples excluded; a convenience sample, not a random deployment sample). For each project we statically audited the shipped or default configuration along three questions: whether private-message content reaches long-term memory, whether a shared store or team-visible derived artifact exists, and whether any structural mechanism confines content to its source audience; prompt-level rules do not count as binding. Load-bearing evidence for all five A-class verdicts was spot-checked in a second pass over the cloned repositories. Table 7 gives the per-project verdicts. Five projects (25%) exhibit this configuration as shipped or by default, including the default direct-message scoping of one widely deployed assistant gateway, whose own documentation warns that one user's direct messages become visible to another. Seven projects (35%) bind private-message content structurally, mostly by per-user isolation; channel-ACL inheritance, the mechanism closest to provenance binding, appears in two. The remaining eight neither ingest private messages nor expose a shared surface. Orthogonally, eleven projects (55%) leave a neighboring cross-channel or restricted-channel surface unbound (seven fully, four weakly), the same boundary at which the single production report documents resurfacing (Pluto Security, 2026). Prompt-level privacy constraints are absent in 18 of 20; one project's prompt instructs the model not to distinguish sources at all. Per-project audit artifacts are released with the supplementary material. Two of the five A-class systems are examined through message-path cases in Appendix H.

E Audience-Specific Release and Deployment Scope

A product can support several flows with different policy boundaries. Claude Tag documents personal-account DMs and organization-identity channel work (Anthropic, 2026b;c). Asana scopes memory retrieval to the triggering user's source access (Tibrewal, 2026); it also describes results visible to other authorized task viewers and explicit approval before privacy-sensitive actions (Asana, 2026). Neither description is a finding that protected DM content reaches a team. The distinction is between an execution's permission to read a source and permission to publish specified content to its destination.

An owner asking for a limited team update is one possible release workflow. Another is a trusted connector returning only an authorized availability view. The latter does not require merging private and shared memory. If the availability is already public, no private-source transfer is needed at all. A requester's desire for useful information is not itself the owner's consent to release it.

A design target, not a new theorem. Fix the public context, task, destination audience, and explicit release policy. If two private records agree on their authorized projection, a release mechanism should not expose differences confined to the protected remainder. This is an information-flow goal related to selective declassification (Costa et al., 2025; Xu et al., 2026). A trusted projection passed to a generator with no other private input is a reference design. Hidden memory, caches, tool results, and later copies must respect the same restriction. The field-control experiment checks content retention and reason disclosure only; it does not test this condition over arbitrary secret substitutions, semantic inferences, side channels, or persistent updates.

Table 7: Static audit of 20 open-source workspace assistants (shipped or default configuration; 2026-09-20; convenience sample). DM ing.: private-message content reaches long-term memory. Binding: a structural mechanism confining content to its source audience (prompt-level rules do not count). Class A: private-message content can reach a shared surface with no structural binding (private-message ingestion into a shared surface without structural source binding); B: private-message content structurally confined; C: no private-message ingestion or no shared surface. Neighb.: a neighboring cross-channel or restricted-channel surface served beyond its audience without ACL inheritance ("weak" marks a narrower or user-initiated path). A-class membership does not claim a realized leak in a running deployment; it marks systems that instantiate the audited configuration.

Project	Mem.	DM ing.	Shared surface	Binding	Cl.	Neighb.
VizuaraAILabs/Slack-ClawdBot	mem0	yes (per-user)	channel RAG incl. private ch.	per-user scope	B	yes
Brijesh03032001/SlackAgent	mem0	yes (per-user)	channel RAG incl. private ch.	per-user scope	B	yes
piyush-priy/MCP-Slack-AI-Assistant	mem0	yes (per-user)	channel RAG; cross-ch. fallback	per-user scope	B	yes
harishkotra/slacktag-oss	mem0	yes (dm scope)	channel-scope mem.; digests	three-tier scope	B	weak
shivsharanrupesh/RAG-ChatBot-Slack	mem0	yes (per-user)	none (PDF store)	per-user scope	C	no
rkarwankar/team-memory-bot	mem0	no (ch. whitelist)	single shared scope	none	C	yes
hasin023/discord_llmwiki	mem0	no (DM dropped)	guild store; wiki; public /whois	none in guild	C	yes
zorahrel/jarvis-claudecode	custom	yes (all DMs)	single store; digests	prompt only	A	—
nulzo/icelake	custom	no (DM dropped)	guild store; cited replies	none	C	yes
yujiosaka/ChatIQ	custom	yes (mpim/groups)	per-team index	channel-ACL inherit.	B	no
jthingelstad/elixir-bot	custom	no (DM unstored)	shared table; recaps	scope ACL (LLM-assigned)	C	weak
eldarshmatkov/stakeholders-tag	custom	yes (own DM)	none (team layer rejects DM)	per-channel files	C	no
knrl/pneuma	custom	no (OAuth-scoped)	shared knowledge base	none needed	C	no
dust-tt/dust	custom	yes (per-user)	none (agent-level rejected)	per-user scope	B	weak
letta-ai/lettabot	custom	yes (all channels)	one shared conversation	none	A	—
elizaOS/eliza	custom	yes	shared store	scope ladder + RLS	B	weak
vellum-ai/vellum-assistant	custom	yes (owner)	none (single-user)	single-user gate	C	—
nandit123/MemZap	custom	yes (D-ids)	one namespace; public dashboard	none	A	—
arelchan/steadbot	custom	yes (7 bridges)	one shared user track	none	A	—
openclaw/openclaw	custom	yes (default dmScope=main)	shared memory files; team sessions	partial	A	yes

Table 8: Policy cases and the audit they require. Membership is determined by the configured flow, not the vendor name.

Policy case	Permitted content	Audit question
No release	No private-source content for the destination	Does isolation prevent the source from reaching shared state?
Full release	The explicitly approved content	Do downstream uses stay within the approved audience and scope?
Partial release	An approved projection, such as availability	Is the projection retained without exposing its protected reason?
Unbound derivation	No enforced source-to-output restriction	Does private content enter a shared artifact despite correct artifact ACLs?

Joint reanalysis of the trusted-field control. We recompute a joint indicator on the existing 128 outputs from Appendix N, without changing labels or making new model calls. The indicator is availability present and forbidden reason absent, evaluated under sender-only reason authorization. Table 9 reports counts, not a new independently validated effect. The eight scenarios and two templates are reused within each writer and condition.

Table 9: Joint field outcome under partial authorization. Each row contains 16 existing outputs from eight fixed scenarios and two templates. Labels are automatic field scores with the earlier evidence review, not new human labels.

Writer	Enforcement	Availability	Reason	Availability without reason
kimi-k2.6	Instructions	16/16	0/16	16/16
kimi-k2.6	Trusted fields	16/16	0/16	16/16
qwen3-8b	Instructions	16/16	16/16	0/16
qwen3-8b	Trusted fields	16/16	0/16	16/16

All 128 generated outputs are nonempty and terminate normally. Deterministic input checks confirm that the 32 fully authorized prompt/filter pairs have identical inputs, and the 32 partial-authorization pairs differ only by removal of the reason field. Output hashes, item keys, evaluation text, and quoted evidence match the archived records. A fixed random sample of 20 original outputs was read again. These checks validate the recorded comparison, not a guarantee of semantic completeness. In particular, preserving an availability field is not the same as completing a scheduling task, and absence of the designated reason is not an all-secrets safety claim.

F Experimental Setup (Full Details)




Figure 7: The audit harness and its information flow. In a simulated workspace (left), each persona discloses canary-tagged facts in direct messages while team channels carry work-only content; a LOFO arm replaces each target fact with a matched placebo. Writer models consolidate the workspace into profile and digest artifacts with different numbers of person-slots. A disjoint reader asks non-injected questions, and a judge scores every artifact and answer; the 128 original neutral/full/borderline labels are re-adjudicated under a mixed human-model review (right).

Workspace, personas, and facts. The harness simulates a fictional business software company named Trellis on a Slack-like workspace. Sixteen personas are fixed benchmark assets at version v1.1, with SHA-256 hashes recorded for the released files. Each persona script contains 6 team-channel messages and 3 direct-message turns. Exactly 3 channel messages are authored by the persona and carry work content only. Each direct-message turn embeds exactly one fact as an exact substring. Each persona carries 3 facts. One is borderline, one is sensitive, and one is benign. The borderline fact is personal information that a teammate could also read as an availability explanation. The sensitivity labels were validated by dual blind annotation, reaching agreement with the adjudicated labels at $\kappa = 1.000$ and $\kappa = 0.812$ for the two annotators against a target of $\kappa \geq 0.6$; all six disagreements were adjudicated without label changes. Every fact carries a canary, a natural-looking proper name or unique phrase. The initial 16-persona cohort has 48 fact canaries and 48

placebo canaries. The later 32-persona extension adds its own canaries. A fact canary appears only in its owner's direct messages. A placebo canary appears in no script.

Consolidation templates and parity. The profile and digest templates share one scaffold. They differ in one organizing-goal phrase and in the resulting field block. Automated diff validation confirmed parity on the capacity dimensions. Both templates have 6 fields with aligned order semantics. Input prompt lengths are 187 versus 188 tokens, a 0.5 percent difference against a 5 percent threshold. Writers generated at a uniform 4,096 tokens on this endpoint; parity is preserved. The tokenizer is unchanged. Field titles differ between templates. This difference is the operationalization of the organizing goal and is the treatment itself. Descriptive analysis uses field-occupancy coding. Each field is coded as person-slot or event-slot from a fixed inventory. Per-field tests are Holm-adjusted. The profile template carries 4 person-slots. The digest template carries 2. This difference is one of the three bundled factors (organizing goal, field titles, person-slot count) taken apart in Appendix G.

Models, questions, pilot checks, and budget. The writers under test are kimi-k2.6 and qwen3-8b. The instrument is gpt-oss-20b, serving as the fixed reader and the single judge. The triangulation panel runs kimi-k2.6 and qwen3-8b on the audit subsample. The endpoint platform exposes only these three model families. Six primary reader questions are used throughout. Two are direct, two are indirect, and two are euphemistic. All describe normal workplace situations, and none contains any hint of a target fact. Three pilot checks precede the full matrix: sample parsing of 20 human-reviewed samples, judge calibration, and a four-persona pilot whose data never enters the final estimates. The full matrix closed at 8,442 calls, and persistent failures enter the missingness table by arm and schema. The replication and extension phase closed at 25,034 calls; the lettabot and openclaw deployment cases added 1,035 and 845 calls, bringing the replication-phase total to 26,914. The follow-up phase closed at 4,718 calls, including a 2,000-call batch lost to a temperature-parameter fault that is disclosed in the ledger and excluded from all results. The 32 new personas were drafted by kimi-k2.6 under the same asset rules, machine-validated (structure, canary uniqueness, placebo parity), and sensitivity-annotated by two blind model annotators with experimenter adjudication ($\kappa = 0.891$ and 0.953). The expansion human review used the same mixed human-model review with one substitution: the fully blind second annotator is qwen3-8b and the disagreement adjudicator is kimi-k2.6; the gpt-oss judge does not enter gold construction. Two capacity adjustments are recorded: the mem0 extraction budget for qwen3-8b is 4,096 tokens, and the kimi-k2.6 judge budget for the third-writer extension is 16,384. Neither touches a semantic parameter. The third-writer extension missing count is 25 of 384 units (persistent judge failures).

G Control Experiments and Schema Factorials

Motivation. Three identification threats to the main matrix motivated these controls: the LOFO arms regenerate direct-message assistant replies independently rather than holding them fixed across arms, the profile and digest templates bundle the organizing goal with person-slot count and a personal-context field, and the canary design may inflate detectability. Five controls examine them; they do not fully identify a template mechanism or establish external validity.

E1: fixed-transcript LOFO control. The original LOFO arm replaces the target fact in the user's direct-message turn and regenerates the assistant replies independently for each arm. The full-versus-LOFO contrast therefore includes upstream reply variation (the borderline fact appears in 11 of 16 full-arm replies and 1 of 16 LOFO replies). The lofoA control holds the full-arm assistant replies fixed and varies the user's fact message; lofoB additionally replaces the replies. Arm lofoA replaces the fact with the placebo sentence and keeps the full-arm assistant replies verbatim, so the assistant echo of the fact remains; it is an echo-conditioned direct-effect control. Arm lofoB replaces the fact with the placebo sentence and replaces the assistant replies with three scripted generic acknowledgments, so no fact remains anywhere in the transcript; it is a zero-source floor control. Both new arms run through the identical writer matrix (16 personas, 2 schemas, 2 writers, 2 draws) and the same judge. Under the neutral instruction, lofoB recovers the borderline fact at 0.047 (profile) and 0.000 (digest), near the original LOFO floor of 0.031. This is a low-source control, not a uniquely identified effect of changing assistant replies alone. The lofoA rates are 0.297 and 0.250, showing that exposure can remain when the fact is present only in assistant replies. Differences from full and lofoB depend on the chosen intervention sequence. The three arms give a telescoping

account of the exposure (full 0.875 = first difference 0.578 + second difference 0.250 + floor 0.047 on profile; full 0.594 = first difference 0.344 + second difference 0.250 + floor 0.000 on digest); this is a sequential-intervention account rather than an assumption-free causal decomposition, since lofoA and lofoB differ in the assistant replies as well. The writer-stratified lofoA rates are 0.344 (kimi-k2.6) and 0.250 (qwen3-8b) on profile, and 0.031 and 0.469 on digest.

E2: schema factorial and capacity controls. The profile and digest templates bundle the organizing goal with 4 versus 2 person-slots and with the presence of a personal-context field. A clean 2x2 factorial holds all four cells at a uniform 3 person-slots and 3 event-slots; an earlier factorial left slot counts collinear with the two factors and is superseded. Two new templates, profile_3PC (person goal, field present) and digest_3noPC (event goal, field absent), join profile_noPC and digest_plusPC from the superseded factorial. Each new template differs from its sibling in exactly one field. A single-field-swap control further isolates capacity: profile_3Pswap differs from profile in exactly one field (the person-slot Availability & Schedule is replaced by the event-slot Team Collaboration Notes), with all other fields identical.

Under the neutral instruction on full-arm artifacts, the borderline PVR is 0.734 (profile_3PC), 0.719 (profile_noPC), 0.719 (digest_plusPC), and 0.578 (digest_3noPC) (Table 10, Figure 8). At uniform capacity, the organizing-goal main effect is $+0.078$ and the personal-context-field main effect is $+0.078$ (interaction -0.125) under the main judge, with neither factor detected at $n = 16$ (paired sign-flip $p \geq 0.17$). Under the two alternative judge families, however, the person-centered goal shows a nominally significant effect when the field is absent ($+0.349$ and $+0.391$, exact sign-flip $p = 0.030$ and 0.0005). The personal-context field shows a nominally significant effect under the event goal ($+0.333$ and $+0.344$, $p = 0.008$ and 0.0015). These alternative-family factorial tests are exploratory analyses over 16 personas, outside the Holm family; their p values are nominal. The top-of-range capacity contrast is $+0.141$ under the main judge (profile, 4 slots, versus profile_3PC, 3 slots; $p = 0.0078$). The single-field-swap control reproduces the same point estimate (profile_3Pswap 0.734; $+0.141$, $p = 0.094$), and the two independently designed 3-slot templates land on the identical rate (47 of 64). Under the two alternative judge families, however, the top-of-range contrast vanishes (-0.010 and -0.016), so it is a judge-family-dependent observation, not a confirmed mechanism. The bottom-of-range contrast is flat (digest_3noPC 0.578 versus digest 0.594, $p = 1.000$) and flat or negative under all three judge families. The schema contrast itself is positive under all three tested judges ($+0.281$, $+0.137$, $+0.219$) and under the model-assisted adjudicated reference. The field-occupancy coding (95% of borderline mentions land in person-slots) is the consistent descriptive observation, but no single mechanism decomposition is confirmed across judge families.

Table 10: Borderline PVR by template (neutral instruction, full arm, main judge; 95% persona-cluster bootstrap intervals, $B = 10{,}000$). Slot counts are person-slots plus event-slots.

Template	Slots	PVR	95% interval
profile	4P+2E	0.875	[0.766, 0.969]
profile_3PC	3P+3E	0.734	[0.594, 0.859]
profile_noPC	3P+3E	0.719	[0.547, 0.875]
digest_plusPC	3P+3E	0.719	[0.609, 0.828]
digest_3noPC	3P+3E	0.578	[0.453, 0.703]
digest	2P+4E	0.594	[0.453, 0.734]

E3: canary-string versus semantic detection. Every fact carries a unique canary. On the 384 main-matrix artifacts, the canary-string inclusion rates are strict lower bounds of the judge-detected rates (borderline full arm: 0.547 profile and 0.266 digest by canary string, against 0.875 and 0.594 judge-detected). The judge detects paraphrase-level content beyond the literal canary, so detection is not canary-keyed. On the mem0 replication, canary-string rates (0.969 and 0.656) match judge-scored rates (0.938 and 0.656) closely.

E4: third-writer missingness bounds. The third-writer extension has 25 of 384 units missing to persistent judge failures. Only one persona pair (p39) is incomplete; the contrast is $\Delta \in [0.115, 0.135]$ under any completion of the missing pair.




Figure 8: Borderline PVR across the six consolidation templates of Table 10, with 95% bootstrap intervals. The four intermediate templates hold capacity uniform at 3 person-slots and 3 event-slots; the endpoints are the original profile (4P+2E) and digest (2P+4E) templates.




Figure 9: Separate stages on mem0. Filled dots show the organization-scope configuration; open dots show filtering by inferred source tags. Target answer recovery under the filter is 0/381 for kimi-k2.6 and 0/378 for qwen3-8b. These target-only zeros do not exclude non-target sensitive output. Rows marked n/a were not collected for the binding arm.

E5: provenance-binding counterfactual on mem0. The mem0 replication shows the exposure under no structural binding. The matched counterfactual on the same store applies provenance binding: each writer tags its own extracted memories by source channel, and a retrieval-time filter excludes direct-message-tagged memories from organization-scope results. Tagging accuracy differs between the tested models: kimi-k2.6 tags all 40 fact-containing memories as direct-message

sourced (accuracy 1.000); qwen3-8b tags 22 of 35 (0.629). The reported filter builds a source index over the full store: every memory identifier in the cell is resolved against the tags of all sixteen personas, direct-message-tagged memories are excluded, and memories with missing or conflicting tags are quarantined rather than passed (none occurred). An earlier per-persona index variant was superseded after an offline audit showed it let through direct-message-tagged memories of other personas; all binding numbers below use the corrected full-store index. With accurate tagging, the borderline fact is absent from the channel-tagged store (0 of 259 memories), retrieval of the target memory under the filter is 0 of 96 questions, no protected fact of any persona survives in the filtered results (0 of 96 questions), and the fixed reader recovers no target fact end-to-end (0 of 381 judged answers; the end-to-end arm reruns reader and judge on the filtered top-5 with the same models and budgets as the unbound M3 arm), against 0.253 retrieval and 0.938 store presence unbound. The filter still returns five channel-sourced hits per question (a count check, not a task-utility measure). With qwen3-8b's imperfect tagging, 13 of 140 channel-tagged memories (0.093) still carry the borderline fact, including sensitive content mistagged as channel-sourced; retrieval of the target memory is 0.042, and protected facts of personas other than the reader, including the asked-about persona, reach the reader's context in 0.573–0.719 of questions (unbound baseline 0.729 pooled; the detection patterns can also match neutral availability placeholders, with an unfiltered LOFO floor of at most 0.094 in one cell and 0 under the filter). No target fact was detected by the original target-only judge (0 of 378 judged answers): the reader either answered generically, declined to report personal details, or echoed private content without attributing it to the asked persona (the distinction between protected content in internal context and in the user-visible answer must be preserved; the confirmed divorce disclosures are user-visible). The end-to-end arm covers 768 reader calls (9 failed) with 759 answers judged; per-cell denominators are 96/96/94/95 (kimi-k2.6) and 96/95/91/96 (qwen3-8b). The accurate-tag configuration excludes the checked protected facts from retrieved context. The imperfect-tag answer zeros refer only to the original target metric; non-target sensitive disclosures are documented in Appendix N. This is a test of model-inferred tags, not a limit on trusted metadata propagation.

H Deployed Assistants: the lettabot and openclaw Message-Path Cases

Protocol. lettabot (letta-ai/lettabot, commit 99c3b5dd73550fe0a4eac2ee31b1c3229ca9e550, archived upstream) is a multi-channel assistant backed by a Letta agent; its default configuration resolves one shared conversation and one shared memory across all users and channels (Table 7, class A). We ran a real deployment: letta server 0.16.8 (embedded Postgres metadata store, local CPU embeddings as in the mem0 port), lettabot built from the pinned commit, and the agent model set to the writer under test with its frozen generation parameters. A driver injects fabricated Slack envelopes through lettabot's real message-handling path (the Bolt socket layer is bypassed; the formatter, session manager, and conversation routing all run as shipped), marking each persona's channel block as channel traffic and the three direct-message turns as DM traffic from that persona; the agent's replies are its own real outputs (no scripted assistant replies, a deliberate difference from the mem0 port). Each cell uses a fresh agent and fresh state. After ingestion of all sixteen personas, the agent's full memory (core blocks, archival passages, and the agent-managed memory filesystem) is dumped. A fixed seventeenth account (U0099) asks six questions per persona in one continued DM trace (96 turns per cell). Its self-introduction cycles through Dana, Victor, Rachel, and Sam, a confound documented below. Judging reuses the frozen artifact and answer judge prompts; all endpoint traffic, including the backend's internal calls, is counted through a local counting proxy (1,035 calls total). Two implementation findings shape interpretation: the endpoint ignores `parallel_tool_calls:false`, so the proxy truncates parallel tool-call deltas to the single-call semantics the agent runtime expects; and the agent's memory filesystem must be included in the dump, since memory-tool writes land there rather than in API-visible blocks.

openclaw protocol. openclaw (openclaw/openclaw, pinned commit recorded in the released artifacts) is a self-hosted assistant gateway whose memory is a Markdown file layer (`MEMORY.md`, `USER.md`, daily notes) with a SQLite index. Its default direct-message scope merges every user's direct messages into the agent's main session context (`dmScope ?? "main"` in the shipped router; the project's documentation warns about the resulting cross-user visibility). We ran the gateway with its default configuration (19 plugins, memory-core active; no isolation option enabled), the

agent model set to kimi-k2.6 through the same OpenAI-compatible endpoint and counting proxy. The driver replays the same assets through the gateway's real message pipeline: each persona's channel block enters as group traffic, the three direct-message turns enter as that persona's DM sessions, and the gateway's replies are its own. The store dump collects the Markdown memory files and all SQLite index chunks. The same reader account submits 96 questions per cell through its DM session, with the same cycling self-introductions. Judging and quota accounting are as in the lettabot port (845 calls total). Two run records shape interpretation: the qwen3-8b cell is excluded because the gateway's system prompt already exceeds the endpoint's 16,384 combined prompt-plus-generation budget, persisting across the gateway's own auto-compaction retries (quarantined data archived); and an interrupted first run raced the resumed process over 17 LOFO units, so those questions were asked twice in the same session and both passes are charged.

Results. Table 11 gives the per-cell numbers. In the full arm, all sixteen borderline facts enter the shared store (judge-scored 16 of 16; canary-string 16 of 16), and the sensitive diagnostic facts are present at score 3; the LOFO canary floor is clean (0 of 16). The two LOFO judge hits are judge hallucinations: their quoted evidence spans copy the judge prompt rather than any string in the dump, the same judge-canary divergence pattern as on mem0. Cross-user answer recovery is 0 of 96 in both arms. The trace contains several candidate explanations, without a controlled mechanism comparison. First, lettabot uses a single memory namespace without per-name indexing. In the recorded questions, the agent often answers as if the named person had never written. The co-occurrence does not establish that indexing caused the recovery failure. Second, partway through the question sequence the agent identifies the scripted probing pattern and begins refusing: 48 of 96 full-arm and 75 of 96 LOFO-arm questions receive an explicit no-reply, and the 69 answered units all score 0, reporting only channel-public content or explicitly declining personal context. During ingestion, 25 of 48 (full) and 19 of 48 (LOFO) direct-message turns also went unanswered, a product-level reply-behavior variance that does not prevent memory writes. The qwen3-8b cells are excluded at protocol level: this endpoint budgets prompt and generation tokens jointly at 16,384 tokens, and lettabot's shipped system prompt alone (about 15.8k tokens) exceeds what remains for generation; trimming tool lists does not reduce it materially, and trimming the shipped prompt would leave the audited configuration, so we report the exclusion (128 units rejected at the API boundary; quarantined data archived).

On openclaw the pattern repeats with different surface behavior. All sixteen borderline facts enter the shared store (judge-scored 16 of 16; canary-string 16 of 16; LOFO canary floor 0 of 16), including facts the template marks "Confidential: do not disclose". Account U0099's 96 full-arm questions all receive text back, yet none recovers the fact (0 of 96; LOFO 1 of 96, a judge false positive on the bare refusal "No."). By the agent's own reply text, 76 of 96 full-arm answers are hard topic-closures ("This topic is closed.") issued once the agent pattern-matches the scripted probing; the remainder mix claims of having no record of the asked-about person with invocations of the template privacy policy ("without their direct consent"). The store notes themselves carry no subject names (a single-user "User has…" model), which complicates name-keyed retrieval. These observations do not uniquely identify why answers fail to recover the target.

Table 11: Message-path cases on two deployed assistants: per-cell store presence and cross-user answer recovery (16 personas, kimi-k2.6 agent, seed 0). Store presence counts judge score ≥ 2 on the full memory dump, with canary-string rates in parentheses; recovery uses all attempted questions as the denominator. Among delivered texts, lettabot has 0/48 full and 0/21 LOFO; openclaw has 0/96 full and 1/96 LOFO. The latter hit is a false positive. The last column counts questions the agent silenced (lettabot) or hard-closed (openclaw). The qwen3-8b cells of both systems are excluded at endpoint context protocol (text).

System	Arm	Store (judge; canary)	Target/attempts	Silent/closed
lettabot	full	16/16; 16/16	0/96	48/96
lettabot	LOFO	2/16[†]; 0/16	0/96	75/96
openclaw	full	16/16; 16/16	0/96	76/96
openclaw	LOFO	2/16[†]; 0/16	1/96[‡]	69/96

[†]Both hits are judge hallucinations (evidence spans copy the judge prompt; the strings are absent from the dump). [‡]A judge false positive on the bare refusal "No."; the canary floor is 0.

Interpretation limits. Each system has one completed writer model and two stateful arm traces. The reader account U0099 cycles through four self-introductions; the agents explicitly detect this inconsistency and repeated questioning. Name retrieval, identity changes, refusal, and history therefore remain confounded. Ingestion and store export are auditor operations. They do not demonstrate a low-privilege user's access to the dump. The openclaw dump includes original sessions as well as Markdown memory; exact target canaries occur in 13/16 Markdown cases. The three remaining canaries are found only in session records by this string check, which does not exclude paraphrases in Markdown. Neither these storage counts nor the answer zeros are deployment-wide guarantees.

I External Benchmark Slices and Raw Records

The cross-benchmark runs use the records under `experiments/results/20260924_external_benchmarks/`. MuPPET uses the public `large20_workplace/-ub/-bc` configuration and all 562 released records. One malformed conversation is archived and excluded, leaving 561 valid records per condition. We use one qwen3-8b writer and one gpt-oss-20b privacy and utility judge. The five conditions are the repository's neutral, PrivacyChecker, CIMem-low, CIMem-medium, and CIMem-high system prompts. The privacy endpoint is the MuPPET JSON oracle ("YES" means leakage); utility is a separate 0–2 judge. The user-message template is the repository default for CIMem variants because matching defense files are not included in the public checkout. Missing utility judgments remain missing. Privacy exposure is 0.374 (neutral), 0.345 (PrivacyChecker), 0.383 (CIMem-low), 0.358 (CIMem-medium), and 0.348 (CIMem-high). The useful-utility rate is 0.342, 0.301, 0.347, 0.318, and 0.304 over 471, 465, 478, 465, and 484 valid utility labels, respectively. These non-monotone differences are descriptive and do not support a defense ranking.

The AgentLeak run uses the official released `scenarios_full_1000.jsonl` with 1,000 scenarios, including A0, A1, and A2 attack classes. For A1/A2, the released attack payload is appended at the user-request boundary. We use qwen3-8b as worker and the repository's lexical channel oracle over C1, C2, and C5. Conditions are unbound, prompt-policy, model-inferred source tags, and trusted scope projection. The last two conditions share the same allowed-field truth but differ in enforcement: the tagger infers "shared" fields from unstructured values, while the trusted condition projects fields before any model call. Multi-channel leakage is 0.845 for the unbound condition, 0.441 with the prompt policy, 0.023 with trusted pre-consolidation scope, and 0 for the model-inferred tag projection; the unbound channel rates are 0.624 (C1), 0.806 (C2), and 0.695 (C5), and trusted scope gives 0.016, 0.019, and 0.005. All 4,000 condition rows and channel traces are retained. The model-tag accuracy (0.455) is an auxiliary field-level comparison and is not a privacy label.

The CI-Work code is available at the Microsoft ACV repository. We froze commit `994ac15db6fff8a5131bbf5a26e84e352e676796`; its evaluator, trajectory scripts, and sensitive/essential judge templates were present, but its README-listed `data/seed/raw_seed.jsonl` release was absent. We therefore ran the official templates and published trajectory rubric on 15 hand-authored scenarios, three per direction across Upward, Lateral, Downward, External, and Diagonal. The conditions are neutral, prompt defense, CI-aware prompt, and trusted pre-consolidation scope. All 60 privacy and 60 utility judgments parsed. Neutral privacy leakage was 10/15 (0.667); each other condition was 0/15, and essential conveyance was 15/15 in every condition. This is an official-code protocol reconstruction, not access to the absent 125-seed data release.

The public Context Reasoner PPO checkpoint `hubin/context-reasoner-ppo_open_thinker_acc_reward` was evaluated on 64 Trellis writer units (16 personas, two schemas, two replicates). Raw and solution canary endpoints are retained. This is a transfer evaluation on the Trellis assets, not a reproduction of the Context Reasoner legal-domain benchmark or CI-RL. We additionally ran the released legal-task inference code on a fixed 30-case prefix from each GDPR, HIPAA, and AI Act file, with `max_new_tokens=1024`. Parsed decision accuracy was 0.933 (GDPR), 0.633 (HIPAA), and 0.533 (AI Act). The run validates that the checkpoint and parser execute on the official task format; it is not a privacy-defense score and is excluded from all Trellis statistics.

Collaborative Memory has no runnable official implementation in the checked materials. We implemented a transparent dynamic-access-graph reimplementation from the published user–agent and agent–resource graphs, private/shared memory tiers, provenance fields, and write policy. Eight authorization personas were crossed with two schemas, two authorization blocks, four conditions, and two writer families, yielding 256 units. The corrected runner keeps authorization metadata out of the unbound and prompt-policy writer inputs; only model-conditioned and deterministic conditions receive admitted shared fragments. All 256 graph-invariant checks passed. For policy A (both fields team-visible) and policy B (only availability team-visible), deterministic projection retained availability in 32/32 sender-only units and had literal reason rates 0.906/0.000. Its semantic reason rates were 1.000/0.156; all five sender-only semantic positives lacked the reason canary in the artifact. The model-conditioned writer had semantic reason rates 0.875/0.125 (profile A/B) and 0.625/0.188 (digest A/B) after pooling writer families; these values are judge-dependent descriptive rates. The unbound sender-only rate was 0.781 and the prompt-policy rate was 0.250. This is a mechanism comparator, never an official Collaborative Memory reproduction. The trusted-scope condition is a separate mechanism-equivalent baseline.

All raw generation and judge JSONL files, model names, prompts, parse failures, code manifests, and a 20-item blind raw-output review are archived beside the results. The rates are descriptive slice estimates. No cross-benchmark pooled test is performed because units, oracles, and threat models differ.

J Candidate Defenses and Future Extensions

A tiny defense comparison on a seeded 8-persona subset. On 8 personas drawn from the main 16 with fixed seed 20260918 (p01, p03, p06, p07, p10, p13, p14, p16; in-distribution intervention, not a generalization estimate), we compared four configurations with kimi-k2.6 as the sole writer: no defense, the standard privacy instruction, an independent-family LLM source filter (qwen3-8b tags each input message by source and direct-message-tagged lines are removed before consolidation; tagger output frozen), and a deterministic direct-message exclusion oracle. The LLM filter's only labeling error across the 8 personas was one benign work-habit line; all borderline and sensitive facts were correctly excluded. Exposure and information retention are reported separately (borderline PVR; availability retention; project-fact retention), with utility items hand-annotated per persona and scored on the same 0–3 presence rubric by the same judge, blind to configuration. Under no defense, PVR is 1.000 (profile) and 0.500 (digest), availability retention is 1.000 and 0.750, and project retention is 0.750 and 1.000. The privacy instruction reduces PVR to 0.750 and 0.250 with availability mostly retained (0.875 and 0.625). Both source filters drive PVR to 0 of 8 with project facts preserved (up to 1.000 on digest), and both outperform the prompt instruction on privacy (profile prompt$-$oracle $+0.750$, exact sign-flip $p = 0.031$ over 8 personas). Both filters, however, also erase the availability constraints (0 of 8 retained), because those constraints exist only in the direct-message stream. These DM-only assets do not authorize sharing the constraint. Their removal measures information retention rather than authorized utility. The separate authorization experiment supplies explicit permissions; the new field-filter control uses those same permissions in both conditions (Appendix N). Reader answers in this probe used a 4,096-token budget, so these rates are not point-comparable to the 400-token main matrix.

An authorization-sensitivity experiment on 8 new scenarios. The defense comparison above measures removal of DM-sourced information, without separate authorization for its availability component. The remaining question is whether the consolidation model itself can make that separation when the authorization decision is given explicitly. We built 8 new mini-personas, each carrying one fact with an availability constraint and a private reason, and varied only the authorization metadata: *reason* = *team-visible* (A) versus *reason* = *sender-only* (B), with fact text, task, and audience identical (A/B base payloads hash-verified identical). The matrix crosses 8 scenarios, 2 schemas, 2 authorization conditions, and 2 writers (64 generations). The judge scores reason-inclusion and availability-inclusion on the 0–3 rubric, blind to the authorization label, and the judge-raw binary endpoint (score ≥ 2) is the primary measure. Because the judge systematically under-scores reason content embedded in availability statements on this asset class (score 1 while quoting the reason verbatim in its own evidence), we additionally report an evidence-anchored sensitivity analysis, which deterministically counts score-1 cells whose judge-quoted evidence matches the fact's pre-

registered detection patterns as leaks; this sensitivity uses the judge's own evidence and is not an independent annotation. Under authorization, reason-inclusion is high for both writers (judge-raw 0.250–1.000 across schemas; evidence-anchored 0.875–1.000). Under sender-only, kimi-k2.6 suppresses the reason in all 16 units (judge-raw and evidence-anchored agree), while for qwen3-8b the sender-only metadata did not reliably suppress reason disclosure on these eight scenarios (judge-raw 0.375 digest and 0.625 profile; evidence-anchored 0.750 and 1.000). The shareable availability constraint is retained in both conditions (1.000 authorized, 0.969 sender-only). The mean scenario-level authorization sensitivity (authorized minus sender-only reason-inclusion, averaged over schemas and writers) is 0.500 (exact two-sided sign-flip over the 8 fixed scenarios: $p = 0.0156$ judge-raw, $p = 0.0078$ evidence-anchored; the sign symmetry is an assumption of the test over these fixed scenarios, not a population inference). All 64 artifacts were re-adjudicated by the human experimenter under the blinding protocol (packet IDs shuffled, authorization condition hidden). Agreement with the human labels is 0.969 for the evidence-anchored labels (Cohen's $\kappa = 0.925$; Se 0.957, Sp 1.000), against 0.781 for judge-raw ($\kappa = 0.562$; Se 0.696, Sp 1.000); all 14 disagreements are judge false negatives, confirming the systematic under-scoring on this asset class. The human-adjudicated sender-only rates for qwen3-8b are 0.875 (digest) and 1.000 (profile), and 0 of 16 for kimi-k2.6 under both label sources. Availability retention is 1.000 authorized and 0.969 sender-only, with the human labels identical to the judge's ($\kappa = 1.000$). The human-adjudicated mean scenario-level authorization sensitivity is 0.500 (exact sign-flip $p = 0.0078$ over the 8 fixed scenarios).

Future extensions. We outline three extensions that the audit design supports but this paper does not execute. The revocation-closure probe measures residual recoverability in derived layers after deletion or revocation events. The principal-aware consolidation probe tests a disclosure-context instruction variant. The tasklist schema extends the schema contrast to a task-oriented artifact. None of them enters the main result table.

K Related-Work Comparison Table

Table 12 positions this paper against the closest lines of work, organized by research question, the pipeline under test, the evaluation method, the overlap with the present audit, and what remains unaddressed. The closest benchmark, PiSAs, already measures non-adversarial cross-user spillage into shared agent memory at paraphrase level; the present audit differs in object and method, not in the existence of that phenomenon.

Extraction attacks, benchmarks, defenses, and deployed systems. MEXTRA (Wang et al., 2025) and ADAM (Lyu et al., 2026) extract raw memory through adversarial querying; the present work uses non-injected, disclosure-seeking questions and audits the inscription of private facts into derived artifacts. PiSAs (Gupta et al., 2026) is the closest benchmark: it measures unintentional spillage into agent-to-agent messages and shared memory at paraphrase level, and three of its findings overlap with ours (violations migrate toward memory surfaces; prompt-level instructions are least effective there; a sensitive reason can be separated from an operational availability attribute); it evaluates abstract topologies within a single run, with no scheduled consolidation stage, no write-path counterfactual, and no real memory framework, and the present experiments add matched source interventions, template comparisons, and software-stage case studies; scheduled or persistent consolidation is not tested here. The remaining lines of work map onto this positioning (Table 12): integrity-focused contamination with a write-time sanitizer (Yang et al., 2026), persistent single-user profiles (Mireshghallah et al., 2026; Shao et al., 2024), adversarial attacks on derived insights (Annamalai et al., 2026), structural source binding (Rezazadeh et al., 2025; Costa et al., 2025; Xu et al., 2026), single-user data minimization (Zhou et al., 2026), and source-to-summary leakage (Hughes et al., 2025); a lifecycle survey (Lin et al., 2026) records sparse defenses at the store and share stages, and the present work supplies an empirical audit of them. The literature search recorded on 2026-09-07 is dated and scoped. It does not establish priority, and scheduled consolidation is not part of the present experimental evidence.

Table 12: Comparison with the most related work. Columns: the research question, the pipeline under test, the evaluation method, the overlap with the present audit, and the increment this audit adds. Overlap entries are stated from each work's own text (this appendix).

Work	Research question	Pipeline under test	Evaluation	Overlap with this audit	Increment of this audit
MEXTRA; ADAM (Wang et al., 2025; Lyu et al., 2026)	extract raw memory by adversarial queries	real agents (EHRAgent, RAP); query-time attack	attack success on raw memory entries	real agent frameworks	non-injected questions; derived artifacts; source interventions
PiSAs (Gupta et al., 2026)	cross-user CI spillage in shared agentic systems	abstract topologies; in-run memory regimes	dual CI annotations; paraphrase-tolerant judge; utility and completeness	non-adversarial spillage into shared memory; prompt defenses weakest on memory surfaces; reason vs. availability split	controlled profile/digest comparison; matched source interventions; separate software-stage cases; scoring and endpoint audits
CI-Work (Fu et al., 2026)	enterprise CI under dense retrieval	five enterprise information directions; trajectory simulation	leakage, violation, and essential conveyance	enterprise privacy–utility framing	15-case official-code protocol reconstruction with prompt and trusted-scope controls; 125-seed data unavailable
MuPPET (Ruzzetti et al., 2026)	contextual privacy in multi-party chat	group conversation with private owner memory	strict privacy oracle and utility score	multi-party audience and prompt defenses	561 valid items from the 562-record public release with five official prompts; stage differs from derived artifacts
AgentLeak (El Yagoubi et al., 2026)	internal-channel leakage in multi-agent systems	coordinator, worker, memory, and final-output channels	lexical oracle over 7 channels and task traces	write-path/internal-channel exposure	all 1,000 released scenarios with A0/A1/A2 payloads and prompt, inferred-tag, and trusted-scope comparators
CIMemories (Mireshghallah et al., 2026)	CI of persistent single-user profiles	single user; cross-session memory prefix	violation vs. completeness; explicit-value matching	violation/utility pairing	multi-user shared store; team-audience artifacts; paraphrase-level confidentiality
UCC (Yang et al., 2026)	unintentional cross-user contamination of shared state	shared memory bank and context (EHRAgent; Slack data)	integrity (output contamination), not confidentiality	non-adversarial; write-time sanitization defense	confidentiality of derived artifacts; purpose binding at write
CLIOPATRA (Annamalai et al., 2026)	recover private chats from aggregate insights	redact–cluster–aggregate pipeline	adversarial poisoning and injection success	derived-artifact surface	non-injected reader; correct artifact ACL; source interventions
Collaborative Memory (Rezazadeh et al., 2025)	multi-user memory sharing under dynamic access control	fragments with immutable provenance; write policies	accuracy, utilization, access-matrix compliance	write-time provenance mechanism	corrected 256-unit dynamic-access-graph reimplementation tests authorized projection and sender-only reason removal; official implementation unavailable
Fides; MNC; FLOWSEAL (Costa et al., 2025; Xu et al., 2026; Shim et al., 2026)	structural enforcement of information flow or release scope	trusted label propagation; runtime scope checks; provenance interceptor	policy compliance on constructed tasks and live tool use	external enforcement of source and release boundaries	template/source audit; native vs. owner-confirmed scheduling on one runtime
Context Reasoner; CI-RL (Hu et al., 2025; Lan et al., 2025)	contextual-integrity reasoning or training	CI elements, reasoning prompts, and RL policy	privacy compliance and task performance	structured contextual-integrity defense	public PPO checkpoint transferred to Trellis and validated on 30-case/domain legal prefixes; not a CI-RL or full legal-domain benchmark replication
Hughes et al. (2025)	source-to-summary PII leakage	abstractive summarization	PII presence in generated summaries	derivation-stage leakage	multi-user memory store; team-audience artifacts

L Runtime-Chain Protocol and Per-Cell Records

The pilot uses the same pinned openclaw build (commit 6d3ed6db) and default configuration as the earlier port, including `dmScope=main` and the memory-core plugin. Each cell starts from a fresh gateway state directory and workspace. Identities are fixed: the victim posts as U0001 with the persona's display name, the digest requester as U0002 ("Sam"), and the questioner as U0003 with

the persona's assigned teammate name. The injection path is the bundled qa-channel transport used in the earlier port, so messages traverse the real channel-plugin boundary, and all endpoint traffic goes through a local counting proxy into the phase call ledger (Appendix F).

The frozen digest request is verbatim: "Hi all, Sam here. @openclaw could you put together this week's team digest for the channel? Please cover: Roles & Ownership; Project Status; Process & Conventions; Schedule & Availability (schedule changes, time-off, availability notes for the week); This Week's Activity; and Notes & Reminders. Use what you know about the team." The six questions are the harness's primary reader questions with the persona and teammate names substituted. Judging reuses the frozen artifact and answer judge prompts with the same models.

Table 13 gives the per-cell records. Separation evidence comes from the per-cell session database: across all 8 cells, no direct-message turn prefix occurs in any channel-session transcript (zero hits), while the target-fact probe strings do occur inside full-arm channel sessions, carried by the product's own digest and answers. In one cell (p01, LOFO, seed 1) the agent posted the digest through the product's message tool to the channel account instead of inline text; the posted artifact was recovered verbatim from the session database and judged. The bus-level transport log aggregates all cells and was not used as per-cell evidence.

Table 13: Runtime-chain per-cell records (2 personas, kimi-k2.6 agent, 2 arms, 2 seeds). Artifact score is the judge's target-fact score on the channel-requested digest; answer recovery counts judge score ≥ 2 over the six channel questions; markers counts present work items from the channel block; DM hits counts direct-message turn prefixes found in the channel-session transcript.

Cell	Arm	Seed	Artifact	Answers	Markers	DM hits
p01	full	0	2	4/6	3/3	0
p01	full	1	0	2/6	3/3	0
p01	LOFO	0	0	0/6	3/3	0
p01	LOFO	1	0	0/6	3/3	0
p02	full	0	2	2/6	2/3	0
p02	full	1	3	5/6	1/3	0
p02	LOFO	0	0	0/6	2/3	0
p02	LOFO	1	1	0/6	1/3	0

M External Vignette Selection and Per-Item Records

The source is PrivacyLens (Shao et al., 2024) at pinned commit `9c2ee07b080dc54ed4924af11d9751e81753c94d` (MIT license, archived with the source file and its hash). All 493 items carry externally authored vignettes from crowdsourcing (337), literature (87), and privacy regulations (69). They are constructed scenarios, not natural user logs.

Exclusion rules were fixed before any model run: (R1) at least one parseable tool observation, and every sensitive item supported by some trajectory sentence; (R2) an explicit audience distinct from the data sender and a sharing-type final action; (R3) trajectory at most 6,000 characters with non-empty story and instruction; (R4) no duplicate (data type, recipient) pairs; (R5) hold-out construction must remove every sensitive sentence with phrase-, coverage-, and paraphrase-level checks, leaving no residual in the remaining records or the user instruction; (R6) deterministic workplace-audience classification from the recipient, audited item by item against the story text. The audit reassigned 4 items whose audience was public, family, or social rather than workplace. Of 493 items, 108 passed (16 genuine workplace-audience, 92 other); all 16 workplace items were kept and 16 others were drawn with a fixed seed, changing the planned 24+8 split to 16+16 for the recorded reason that the genuine workplace pool has size 16. All candidates, exclusion reasons, and the final selection are frozen with the release.

The full arm presents the original observation records; the held-out arm presents the same records after removal of the sensitive sentences. The removal uses phrase-, coverage-, and paraphrase-level segment deletion and reaches the 0 of 64 floor after a disclosed, result-driven repair, so the floor is a post-hoc manipulation check, not a pre-registered condition; collateral damage is reported in the

main text (mean 10.6% segments removed per record, up to 38.5%; 10 of 32 held-out records no longer parseable by `json.loads` although their full versions parse under the same rule). Generation uses the item's original task instruction and audience, two writers, and the harness's judge prompt with the item's sensitive facts as references. Per-item outcomes accompany the supplementary package; Table 14 gives the arm, class, and writer summaries, with the paired contrast clustered by vignette.

Table 14: External vignette summary rates (valid judged outputs). The held-out floor follows the disclosed v3 repair (exploratory).

Dimension	Level	n	Disclosure rate
Arm	full	63	0.524
Arm	held-out (post-repair)	64	0.000
Class	work	64	0.219
Class	other	63	0.302
Writer (full arm only)	kimi-k2.6	31	0.355
Writer (full arm only)	qwen3-8b	32	0.688

N Additional Measurement and Control Audits

These checks supplement rather than replace the original endpoint. Frozen prompts, selections, raw outputs, failures, and an independent request ledger accompany the release. The paragraphs cover label provenance and sensitivity, endpoint coverage, denominators, and the additional control designs and their results.

Label provenance and sensitivity. The authors confirm that a human experimenter supplied the first-pass labels in both cohorts. The original second annotator was gpt-5.6-sol, with qwen3-8b adjudication; the expansion used qwen3-8b as second annotator and kimi-k2.6 for disagreements. These references combine human labels and model review; they do not provide two-human agreement. Before adjudication, the first-annotator contrast is 0.250 on the 32-persona extension and 0.234 on the pooled 48 personas; after adjudication these become 0.289 and 0.260. The historical pooled interval [0.187, 0.333] uses sorted personas and bootstrap seed 20260907. The new sensitivity calculation uses seed 20260921 and yields [0.182, 0.333] for the same 48 persona contrasts; the earlier interval is retained for the historical endpoint. Eleven of 256 expansion binary labels change. In the original 128-unit frame, first-annotator and final binary labels coincide, giving the same contrast 0.2031. This sensitivity analysis isolates the changes introduced by model adjudication; numerical stability alone does not establish independent validity. A shuffled 512-item independent-human packet covers all 128 original and 256 extension primary units plus both fields of the 64 authorization artifacts; it is analyzed in Section 4.4.

Endpoint coverage. The original mem0 target metric asks only about the queried persona's borderline fact. Four archived qwen LOFO answers disclose Marcus's divorce; some also disclose lawyer appointments. That persona's bowling fact has been replaced. The original judge scores the absent bowling target below threshold. These are four answers about one sensitive fact, not four independent facts. They falsify an interpretation of zero target recovery as no sensitive output. A full-reference screen checks all 48 private-source facts against the 759 nonempty answers. It flags 64 candidate answers, including three with invalid quoted evidence. Item-level AI review confirms the four correctly attributed divorce disclosures. It separately records 14 answers with content attributed to the wrong person, two with unspecified attribution, and five lawyer-appointment fragments. Twenty-five candidates quote denials of knowledge, and thirteen confuse public work updates with private preferences. Categories can overlap within an answer. A separate GPT-6 review checks all candidates and twenty fixed random negative answers. This confirms counterexamples and a lower bound on observed disclosures; it does not establish the screen's recall or supply new human labels. A cross-family rescreen of all 759 answers (kimi-k2.6, the facts split into two 24-fact batches; all answers completed both batches after 3 parse failures were recovered on re-asking) flags 37 candidates, 12 of them outside the original 64. Item-level review confirms 10 of the 12 as genuine content-presence matches, mostly the marathon and bowling facts attributed to the wrong person,

and 2 as surface-phrase false positives; the new screen misses 3 of the original's 26 confirmed genuine matches. On the union of 36 confirmed matches, the confirmed-union coverage is 0.722 for the original screen and 0.917 for the rescreen. This is coverage over the two screens' known union, not a recall over the full label space: anything both screens miss never enters the union. The controls are also limited: synthetic positives (8 of 8 detected) sit only in the first fact batch, and the control set does not include misattribution or weak-paraphrase cases. The two screens therefore each miss real content, the misses concentrate in misattributed sensitive facts, and another model agreeing would not certify that no sensitive output remains.

Question, artifact, and stage denominators. In the original neutral matrix, all 128 full-arm and 128 LOFO artifacts have six scored answers. Full-arm question recovery is 384/768 = 0.500, while artifact-level any-question success is 108/128 = 0.844. LOFO values are 5/768 and 3/128. In mem0's filtered answers, kimi-k2.6 contributes 381 valid judgments (192 full, 189 LOFO) and qwen3-8b contributes 378 (191 full, 187 LOFO); 759 is their sum. Failed calls are not textual refusals. In the assistant ports, no delivered text is counted as no observed recovery over all attempted questions, and judged-answer counts are reported separately.

Additional control design. A paired reader-budget check fixes 32 randomly selected full-arm contexts (16 per extraction model), the question, and gpt-oss-20b, comparing 400 and 1,600 token budgets with two draws each. A separate 128-generation authorization control compares instructions alone with trusted field-ACL filtering on identical field-structured assets; only the forbidden reason field is removed. The trusted condition assumes correct field boundaries and authorization metadata. Finally, a 128-generation marker check uses eight fixed personas, two schemas, two writers, two draws, and original versus generic borderline proper names. Both arms replace the three upstream replies with the same generic acknowledgment; the team-name confirmation is also removed from both arms. The 34 generations from an earlier, confounded replacement version are excluded. This comparison is conditional on these generic replies and is not a difference from the original full-transcript matrix. The writer budget is 16,384 for kimi-k2.6 and 4,096 for qwen3-8b in both new controls, matched within each comparison. These are sensitivity checks on existing assets, not an independent external cohort.

Reader-budget results. The 400-token condition returns 62 nonempty answers from 64 scheduled generations; the 1,600-token condition returns 64/64. Two failed generations remain missing, rather than being scored as refusals. Candidate review finds no correctly attributed core private fact in either condition. It records activity or preference content with wrong or unspecified attribution in 3/62 and 10/64 answers, respectively. These counts are confirmed lower bounds: a twenty-answer negative check and a subsequent activity-keyword check find four answers missed by the model screen. Among the 30 contexts with all four nonempty responses, the persona-equal contrast for this broader content indicator is 0.095 (14 personas; percentile bootstrap interval [0.000, 0.202]). This exploratory indicator is not the original target-recovery endpoint. Its difference is not a lower bound on the true budget effect, because missed detections may differ across budgets. The check does not identify the cause of the historical zero or establish that increasing the budget has no effect.

Trusted authorization control. All 128 generations return text. The semantic field scores retain availability in every output. Under sender-only authorization, instructions alone emit the reason in 16/16 qwen3-8b outputs and 0/16 kimi-k2.6 outputs. Trusted filtering emits no reason in 16/16 outputs of either writer, while preserving all 32 authorized availability fields. Under team-visible authorization, both fields appear in 64/64 outputs across the two configurations and writers. Each writer/schema cell contains eight fixed scenarios. The two team-visible configurations have identical inputs, providing a generation-variation control. Automated field scores are checked against twenty sampled original outputs and every disagreement with the existing detection patterns. Three pattern mismatches are paraphrases that retain availability; one invalid judge quote is corrected by removing added quotation marks. These checks are AI review, not new human evaluation. The result demonstrates separation under supplied trusted fields and permissions, not a method for obtaining trusted metadata from free text.

Proper-name generalization results. All 128 marker-control generations return text. Table 15 reports the original automatic endpoint and a separate exploratory activity-content check. The latter

Table 15: Marker control under common generic upstream replies. Each cell is positive artifacts out of 16 (eight personas, two draws). Automatic scores and the exploratory AI activity-content check are reported separately. The latter is not independent human validation.

Writer	Names	Automatic		Activity content	
		Profile	Digest	Profile	Digest
kimi-k2.6	Original	16/16	14/16	16/16	8/16
kimi-k2.6	Generic	16/16	13/16	16/16	9/16
qwen3-8b	Original	14/16	16/16	16/16	15/16
qwen3-8b	Generic	15/16	16/16	14/16	15/16

checks private activity/event content or a care-related scheduling reason; an isolated time constraint or pet mention is insufficient. It does not require all reference details or correct event timing. For example, a cat-related absence counts, whereas separate mentions of cat photos and weekend absence do not. A past-tense move can count as moving-related content without recovering the reference future event correctly. It uses AI review and does not replace the frozen automatic endpoint. The two scoring rules differ on schedule-only outputs and partial pet-related statements, further illustrating measurement sensitivity. Proper-name generalization does not remove the observed exposure. The profile–digest ordering is not uniform across writers and conditions: under the automatic endpoint, qwen's contrast is -0.125 with original names and -0.0625 with generic names. The corresponding activity-content contrasts are $+0.0625$ and -0.0625. For kimi, the automatic contrasts are $+0.125$ and $+0.1875$; the activity-content values are $+0.500$ and $+0.4375$. These eight-persona results do not identify a unique marker mechanism or establish external validity. Persona-cluster intervals and all per-item decisions accompany the data; repeated generations are not independent personas.

O Owner-Confirmed Availability in the Runtime

Relation to existing enforcement. Fides and MNC already study information-flow and release-scope enforcement (Costa et al., 2025; Xu et al., 2026). FLOWSEAL places a provenance-based interceptor outside the model and evaluates live tool use (Shim et al., 2026). Our finite availability interface is a task-specific reference implementation, not a new information-flow theory. Its role is to test native configuration and explicit release against useful scheduling and persistent-artifact outcomes on the same runtime. The targeted literature check was updated on 22 September 2026; it does not establish priority outside the searched sources.

Software and trust boundary. The reference implementation is an external plugin on openclaw commit `6d3ed6db7f1afb77ef688744d6bd8c060a2eeadc`. It does not modify the host source. The built-in QA channel supplies controlled identities and messages through the real gateway, agent, tool, filesystem, and outbound paths. This is a simulated transport on real software, not a test of Slack, Tencent, Claude Tag, or Asana. The host, transport identity, configuration, plugin, and approving owner are trusted. Local administrators and malicious plugins are outside this boundary.

Four configurations. The shared configuration uses one agent and workspace for private and team messages, with an explicit instruction to publish only unavailable slot IDs. The session configuration changes `dmScope` from `main` to `per-channel-peer` but keeps that shared agent and workspace. The native route resolver gives distinct DM and channel session keys in both configurations. Only the DM key changes, and there is one private owner per trajectory. These conditions do not test cross-owner DM separation. Native audience isolation assigns private, team, and unknown senders to separate agents and workspaces. Its private agent can use the native message tool to publish the authorized projection to the team. The confirmed configuration keeps audience isolation but replaces that direct message tool with a restricted proposal interface and a trusted confirmation command. The team can read only approved projections. An independent artifact reader is separated in every configuration.

Proposal, confirmation, and delivery. The model may propose only a subset of four predefined slot IDs. It cannot supply a reason, arbitrary text, owner, or audience. The plugin verifies the host-provided sender, account, agent, and source conversation. It stores a canonical proposal outside

model-accessible workspaces. The owner reviews the proposal and confirms its ID and content hash through a native command. The command rechecks owner context and publishes only the canonical projection to the configured team audience. A second confirmation of the same proposal cannot overwrite the approved record. Approval and outbound delivery have separate log entries; approval alone is not successful publication.

The controller simulates an ideal owner who checks the proposed slots against the scenario before confirming. A wrong candidate is rejected, not repaired. This assumption adds information and an approval step relative to the native baseline. The comparison is between configuration bundles, not an isolated causal effect of authentication. The hash binds content under a trusted host; it is not a signature against a malicious administrator. Finite slot choices can themselves encode information, so the interface does not establish general semantic noninterference. Revocation of already published chat content and human approval errors are not evaluated.

Task and observations. A private message gives natural-language unavailability and a private reason. The agent is asked to save both in private memory, then receives permission to share only unavailable slot IDs. A colleague provides the remaining team's constraints. Their intersection leaves a unique feasible meeting slot. The team agent chooses it, writes `TEAM_DIGEST.md`, and posts a summary. A new session reads the saved digest. A separate read-only agent then reads a byte-identical digest copy in another workspace. Its only initial files are the reader instructions and this copy; it receives no private conversation. The digest copy is an experimental exposure probe, not an additional production release authorized by the owner.

The scheduling endpoint does not test fidelity of the owner's private record. Some agents summarize a detailed private reason as a generic commitment before the team task. File existence alone cannot establish retention of that reason. Absence from public output must not be attributed solely to audience isolation; the record and downstream model inputs require separate inspection.

Task correctness requires one exact authorized publication to the intended channel, the correct choice in all three answering stages, an intact digest copy, and the reader's restricted configuration and file set. Publication is checked on actual outbound messages in the release interaction, not on a private reply claiming success. Downstream quotations do not count as new publications. Malformed or extra-field payloads fail the strict projection check. Process completion, task correctness, and privacy labels are separate outcomes. The selected-slot check does not verify every natural-language explanation or participant mapping. One trajectory selects the correct slot while wrongly claiming that the owner is available in all four slots. Byte-identical copying verifies artifact transfer, not the semantic accuracy of every digest entry.

Privacy measurement. The protected support set contains the DM-only name and private reason. Only U0001 is supplied as the public display identity. Protecting the name is a property of this synthetic protocol, not a claim that employee names are inherently sensitive. All channel outputs and saved team digests are inspected. Name disclosure and correctly attributed private-reason disclosure are reported separately. An automated Kimi-k2.6 annotator receives blinded surface identifiers and must provide exact evidence quotes. Negation, hypothetical examples, and mere availability IDs do not count as reason disclosure. These labels are not independent human annotation and share a model family with both writers. The rubric includes paraphrases and event categories, not only complete recovery of the original reason. Coarse event descriptions require separate raw-text inspection; a zero automatic label is not evidence of zero disclosure. Joint success requires task correctness, valid labels on every observed surface, and no detected disclosure of either protected fact. Missing or failed trajectories cannot count as joint successes.

Design and diagnostic checks. The main design fixes eight synthetic scenarios, four configurations, Kimi-k2.6 and Kimi-k2.5, and two independent generations per combination. The models are two versions within one family. The endpoint repetitions are not controlled random seeds. Configuration and model order are shuffled within scenario-repeat blocks. Two separate control blocks replace the private reason without changing availability, or withhold release authorization entirely. The latter uses only the two audience-isolated configurations and does not require guessing an unobserved schedule. Neither control enters the main rates. Each trajectory uses the same model version for its private, team, and reader agents. Generation and annotation use temperature 1 and an 8,192-token output cap. All model calls use the same API provider. Annotation permits at most two

attempts per nonempty trajectory; failures and retries remain in the ledger. The environment uses Node 24.16.0, Python 3.12.2, httpx 0.28.1, and openai 2.26.0. No GPU training is involved.

Before the main matrix, 38 local Node tests and 15 Python tests check the interface, plugin, deleted-check counterexamples, protocol, and reporting. The local tests do not constitute a proof about all host paths. The runtime pilot also exercises five rejected confirmation attempts per confirmed trajectory: another owner, another audience, a wrong hash, retargeting, and replay. Twelve constructed annotation controls cover literal and paraphrased facts, negation, attribution, and policy examples. Name/reason labels match all twelve intended labels. An auxiliary unsupported-allegation field disagrees on two cases and is excluded from the primary privacy and joint outcomes. These controls do not estimate general recall.

The three deleted-check tests are local counterexamples, not model-level ablations of the entire host. Removing the owner check permits a non-owner confirmation. Copying a pending record into approved storage bypasses approval; this deliberately violates the trusted-store boundary and is not a demonstrated model-reachable attack. Replacing the live invocation check with an always-valid stub removes rejection of an expired invocation. Each test isolates the corresponding implementation assumption without changing the experimental plugin.

Evaluator checks. The final evaluator (`analysis_v2` on the immutable `main_v3` generations) changes parsing and provenance checks only, not inputs, model calls, sample inclusion, or the semantic rubric. It checks response hashes, JSON/SSE syntax, a valid finish reason, and terminal protocol completion, and rejects data after SSE `[DONE]`, duplicate terminal events, and unrecognized nonempty SSE lines. Natural EOF is retained as a separate diagnostic.

A conservative completeness rule requires every recorded generation call in a trajectory to succeed and pass protocol checks. An unsuccessful call followed by a successful retry therefore prevents a joint safety success, even if the task finishes. Observed positive facts are retained on incomplete trajectories; unobserved or incompletely scored outcomes are not imputed as private-fact absence. We report both the all-attempt task denominator and the complete privacy denominator, with missing-outcome bounds.

Uncertainty and cost. Intervals resample whole scenarios 10,000 times using analysis seed 20260923. The eight scenarios are fixed synthetic assets, not a deployment-population sample. All-zero or all-one bootstrap intervals do not establish zero risk. Two generation replicates measure variation on the same scenarios, not two new cohorts. Costs include failed calls and retries. Recorded workflow time includes polling and session reset, but excludes gateway startup, diagnostic negative tests, and real human approval time. A failed workflow can cost less because it stops early; that is not an efficiency advantage.

Final outcomes and missing evidence. The main matrix completes 125/128 workflows and passes the selected-slot task in 122/128. Complete privacy evidence is available for 115 trajectories. The other 13 consist of three workflow failures, eight trajectories with a generation connection timeout, and two with no valid privacy judgment after two attempts. Successful retries do not erase a generation failure under this conservative rule. Partial positive observations remain visible. Across the main and control blocks, 149 trajectories have valid automatic labels, two are unjudged, and one has no public observations.

Table 16 gives bounds under the fixed automatic endpoint. Each upper endpoint treats every unresolved trajectory as positive; each lower endpoint counts only observed positives, including partial records. These are missing-outcome bounds, not bounds on semantic judge error or unobserved private facts. They explain why a complete-case zero must not be reported as zero risk over all attempts.

The confirmed-minus-native task difference is 0.0625 (interval $[-0.0625, 0.21875]$); its joint difference is 0.125 ($[-0.03125, 0.3125]$). The corresponding exploratory scenario sign-flip values are 0.75 and 0.375. Neither comparison establishes superiority. The tests assume sign symmetry and are not adjusted for multiple comparisons. Table 17 keeps model-version and generation-repeat variation separate. The two versions do not provide cross-family replication. No training or convergence curve is involved.

Configuration	Complete privacy	Name-positive bounds	Reason-positive bounds	Joint CI
Shared	26/32	[7, 12]/32	[0, 6]/32	[0.438, 0.781]
Session	30/32	[9, 11]/32	[1, 3]/32	[0.531, 0.750]
Native	29/32	[0, 3]/32	[0, 3]/32	[0.656, 0.938]
Confirmed	30/32	[0, 2]/32	[0, 2]/32	[0.844, 1.000]

Table 16: Main-matrix missingness bounds under automatic labels and descriptive scenario-bootstrap 95% intervals for joint success. All bounds use 32 attempts per configuration; intervals resample the eight fixed scenarios.

	Kimi-k2.5		Kimi-k2.6		Joint by repeat	
Configuration	Task	Joint	Task	Joint	0	1
Shared	16/16	10/16	14/16	10/16	9/16	11/16
Session	16/16	10/16	16/16	10/16	11/16	9/16
Native	14/16	13/16	15/16	13/16	11/16	15/16
Confirmed	16/16	15/16	15/16	15/16	16/16	14/16

Table 17: Automatic main outcomes by model version and by generation repeat. Each model column pools both repeats; each repeat column pools both versions.

Raw-text review and semantic sensitivity. We sampled 20 full texts with seed 20260923 after deduplicating identical outputs within each trajectory. This reduces 755 main public surfaces to 630 distinct trajectory–text pairs. Failures, positives, and flagged records were also inspected. A post-hoc lexical screen selected 26 distinct texts in 11 trajectories across the main and reason-replacement blocks. AI review disagreed with automatic fact sets on 12 texts in seven trajectories: 11 texts in six main trajectories and one text in a replacement trajectory. This is targeted AI review, not new human annotation or an estimate of recall.

The disputed descriptions include "personal appointment" and "prior commitments." The fixed rubric includes event categories. Counting these correctly attributed categories raises complete-case main reason counts from 0/26 to 2/26 in shared and from 1/30 to 5/30 in session. Joint counts become 19/32 and 18/32, respectively. Native and confirmed remain 26/32 and 30/32. No specific sensitive topic was recovered in these 26 screened texts; this does not establish absence in all possible outputs. The two unjudged main trajectories visibly disclose Casey and Drew. Their name findings are recorded separately, while formal completeness remains false. Adding them raises shared's known name-positive count from seven to nine, without creating joint successes. By configuration, the judged main-matrix automatic name findings are seven in shared and seven in session trajectories, and none in either isolated configuration. Original labels and additive sensitivity records are both retained.

Control blocks and failures. Replacing the private reason while fixing the schedule yields 14/16 task passes: 4/4 in each shared-workspace configuration and 3/4 in each isolated configuration. Automatic joint counts are 2/4, 2/4, 3/4, and 3/4 for shared, session, native, and confirmed. The AI category correction adds one session reason positive already positive for name, so these joint counts do not change. With one new generation on each of two scenarios, this is not an equivalence or noninterference test. In the eight withheld-release trajectories, no approval or unsolicited channel publication occurs during observation. Six workflows finish; two native trajectories lack a digest after declining to guess unavailable private constraints. Task and joint scheduling rates are not defined for this block.

In the main matrix, two shared Kimi-k2.6 trajectories write a digest but give no visible digest-stage reply. One confirmed trajectory creates two candidate IDs and the fixed driver declines to choose between them. Native's three task failures include a wrong search argument, an omitted publication prefix that prevents retrieval, and a correct answer without the required selected-slot token. The replacement block adds one native prefix/retrieval failure and one confirmed missing reply. These format, tool, and workflow failures remain in the denominators. They do not all diagnose authorization failures.

Boundary evidence and cost accounting. All 152 saved configurations pass the supplementary boundary check. The 146 completed workflows have verified digest copies and restricted reader file sets. The 294 artifact-reader API requests expose only the read tool and contain no complete raw DM. Lexical private-source candidates appear in the digest-stage inputs of all 32 main shared and all 32 session trajectories, versus none in either isolated configuration. This is a source-reachability diagnostic, not proof of semantic independence. All private memory files exist, but original reason-marker presence is only 18/32, 23/32, 26/32, and 26/32 in configuration order. Early summarization is a competing explanation for absent reason detail. The ten runtime pilot rejection probes produce neither approval nor unsolicited channel effects. No extra unsolicited channel publication is found outside the release interactions in the recorded main and control surfaces.

Configuration	Generation calls	Calls/attempt	Workflow seconds	Owner commands
Shared	434	13.56	112.17 ± 24.11	0
Session	452	14.13	108.98 ± 22.66	0
Native	444	13.88	105.81 ± 17.59	0
Confirmed	376	11.75	111.39 ± 16.46	62

Table 18: Main-matrix cost, including failed attempts. Time is mean and standard deviation of recorded workflow time, not total deployment time. Owner commands are actual review/confirm calls, not human approval time.

The main matrix uses 1,706 generation calls; the control blocks add 297, and development and pilot work adds 277. Recorded usage totals 13,444,148 prompt and 1,254,283 completion tokens, including annotation and development. No monetary estimate is inferred from token counts. No GPU training is used.

The lower confirmed call count is not evidence of universal efficiency. Its trusted commands replace model tool interactions, and its ideal owner is not timed. In the main matrix, 31 trajectories execute both review and confirmation; the ambiguous-proposal failure executes neither. The actual command total is 62, not the nominal 64. All request/response bindings, source snapshots, and failure records accompany the release.