EVALUATING LLM REASONING BEYOND CORRECTNESS

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ABSTRACT

What does it truly mean for a language model to "reason"? Current evaluations reward models' correct standalone answers—but correctness alone reveals little about the process that produced them. We argue that reasoning should be understood not as a static chain of steps but as a dynamic trajectory in which ideas interact, clash, and evolve into integrated insights. Building on the philosophical tradition of *dialectics*, we introduce *SIEV*, a structured evaluation framework that assesses reasoning through explicit thesis–antithesis–synthesis interactions. SIEV produces interpretable trajectories that highlight key properties of reasoning—robustness to challenge, adaptability under conflict, and synthesis across competing viewpoints—dimensions that conventional correctness-based metrics cannot capture. Empirical results on GSM and MMLU demonstrate substantial gaps in the reasoning abilities of state-of-the-art models: for example, GPT-5-chat loses more than 40 points out of 100 on GSM when evaluated through SIEV's process-oriented lens (a jury of frontier models confirms that these drops reflect reasoning that is not genuine). By shifting focus from *what* answer a model gives to *how* it arrives there, SIEV enables a more transparent and principled distinction between structured reasoning and surface-level pattern generation offering a clearer foundation for assessing and understanding the reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

1 INTRODUCTION

Reasoning Evaluation Should Evolve: Reasoning is central to problem-solving and decision-making across scientific analysis, law, education, and collaborative systems, and large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in these settings. This growing reliance suggests that evaluations should capture *how* models reason, not only whether they reach correct outputs. Widely used benchmarks such as GPQA Rein et al. (2023), MMLU-Pro Wang et al. (2024), and AIME HuggingFaceH4 (2024) remain largely outcome-centric, treating reasoning as a static capability inferred from answer correctness. This perspective often obscures the depth, robustness, and internal coherence of the underlying reasoning process, and it can struggle to distinguish genuine reasoning from large-scale pattern imitation acquired during training.

Limitations of Correctness-Based Evaluation: Outcome-only metrics provide limited insight into model behavior under uncertainty, ambiguity, or conceptual conflict. Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting Wei et al. (2022) exposes intermediate steps, but CoT traces can be brittle, partially memorized, or insensitive to contradiction. As a result, existing evaluations often cannot clarify whether LLMs perform adaptive, structured inference or rely on surface-level heuristics. This lack of process visibility creates an important interpretability gap: systems may score highly while behaving opaquely, inconsistently, or incoherently in settings that demand reliability. A principled approach to reasoning evaluation should therefore treat reasoning as a *process*, not merely an end product.

Reasoning as Process: Human reasoning involves more than producing a correct final answer: it integrates partial evidence, navigates conceptual tension, and reconciles competing viewpoints. Robust reasoning processes can adapt to contradiction while maintaining internal coherence. For LLMs, however, the nature of this adaptability remains unclear: do models plan and strategize, perform causal inference, or largely generate locally plausible sequences? Addressing such questions suggests the need for a structured notion of reasoning that captures iteration, conflict, and synthesis—elements that correctness testing typically leaves implicit.

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

Figure 1: **Correctness hides fragility.** Sample reasoning performance of models in some MMLU topics. Thesis scores present traditional evaluation of reasoning vs. Synthesis scores indicate our dialectical versions. Our process-driven method reveals significant unreported reasoning gaps between models—differences that standard outcome-oriented evaluations fail to detect and explain.

Structured Lens for Reasoning: Among long-studied models of reasoning, *dialectics*—articulated most influentially by Hegel Hegel (2010)—provides precisely such a structure. Dialectics frames reasoning as a generative interplay of opposing propositions: a *thesis*, an *antithesis* that challenges it, and a *synthesis* that reconciles the tension between them. This triadic pattern foregrounds reasoning as an iterative, tension-resolving process and offers an interpretable lens for evaluating reasoning dynamics beyond surface correctness or sheer CoT fluency.

The SIEV Framework: We operationalize this dialectical perspective through SIEV, a structured, process-driven framework for evaluating LLM reasoning. SIEV assesses not only whether a model reaches a correct conclusion, but also whether it: navigates conceptual conflict, sustains competing viewpoints, and synthesizes them into coherent resolutions. SIEV is positioned to reveal weaknesses that correctness-based metrics can miss, including on benchmarks previously viewed as *saturated*. For example, on MMLU Hendrycks et al. (2020)—often treated as broadly solved by top models—SIEV surfaces substantial hidden reasoning gaps (often exceeding 20%). Figure 1 provides an illustrative example: while traditional scores appear competitive, process-oriented scoring highlights cross-model differences in stability, conflict-handling, and synthesis across different MMLU domains. That these gaps persist on benchmarks widely considered solved underscores SIEV's value as a *diagnostic* that makes reasoning fragility visible—fragility high correctness conceals.

Key Contributions of SIEV: SIEV offers several key advantages:

(1) Benchmark- and model-agnostic: SIEV requires no architectural changes, prompt engineering, or benchmark rewriting. It can be applied directly to existing datasets such as GSM8K Cobbe et al. (2021) and MMLU, transforming even saturated benchmarks into diagnostics of reasoning behavior.

(2) Lower susceptibility to contamination: By evaluating reasoning dynamics rather than static answers, SIEV offers lower vulnerability to leakage and template-based CoT artifacts.

(3) Exposing hidden weaknesses: SIEV uncovers substantial weaknesses in reasoning robustness and adaptivity that correctness-based metrics and CoT-only analyses overlook (Section 4.1).

(4) Natural compatibility with multi-agent systems: As multi-agent LLMs become common, reasoning increasingly emerges from interactions. SIEV naturally extends to evaluating distributed reasoning across multiple models (Appendix E)

(5) A validated, not merely plausible, signal: We show that the synthesis drop is a reasoning failure rather than an artifact of the setup (Section 4.2): it is not driven by sycophancy, but by the content of the antithesis; it is not recoverable from a static read of the initial thesis reasoning; and a jury of three frontier models (Claude-Opus-4.7, GPT-5.5, Gemini-3.1-pro), applied at scale across the full model panel, independently judges the low-scoring syntheses non-genuine. This positions SIEV as a scalable *falsifier* of genuine reasoning: a low score is evidence of fragile reasoning behind a correct answer, while a high score is not *necessarily* a certificate of soundness.

Toward Process-Based Interpretability:: Grounding evaluation in reasoning processes provides a principled foundation for interpretability. By examining how models integrate evidence, maintain coherence, and resolve conceptual tension, SIEV advances analysis beyond robustness checks or

surface-level CoT inspection. This process-oriented perspective helps identify cases where models answer correctly yet fail to engage in stable or adaptive reasoning, supporting more transparent and reliable understanding of model behavior.

2 Related Work

The reasoning capabilities of LLMs have been widely studied, with increasing skepticism about whether current models genuinely reason or merely simulate reasoning through statistical pattern matching Dziri et al. (2023); Kambhampati (2024); Nezhurina et al. (2024); McCoy et al. (2023). To study the reasoning capability of models, recent work has explored heuristic modifications of benchmark questions. Approaches like GSM-Plus Li et al. (2024a), GSM-Symbolic Mirzadeh et al. (2024), and functional variants of MATH Srivastava et al. (2024) introduce symbolic perturbations, distractors, or surface-level changes to assess model sensitivity. Ontology-guided interventions Hong et al. (2024) and causal robustness frameworks Stolfo et al. (2022) similarly probe whether models rely on shallow cues. These methods often reveal fragility and lack of generalization, but they remain anchored in the same paradigm: asking whether the model's standalone response is correct, even under varied conditions. Our work departs from this paradigm by introducing a general, structured, process-oriented framework that evaluates reasoning through dialectical interactions without modifying benchmark questions or injecting noise. By reframing reasoning as a dynamic process rather than an isolated output, SIEV can turn existing benchmarks—saturated or not—into diagnostics of reasoning behavior. For complementary lines of related work, see § A.

3 SIEV Framework

Dialectics as an Evaluation Lens: We leverage a minimal scaffold from the dialectical tradition Hegel (2010), framing reasoning as the interplay of a *thesis* (initial stance), *antithesis* (contradictory viewpoint), and *synthesis* (integrated resolution) Taylor (1975); Pinkard (2001); Kaufmann (2020); Beiser (2005). Rather than treating reasoning as a static output, this triadic structure emphasizes iterative, adaptive processes, providing interpretable signals for evaluating LLMs beyond correctness alone or CoT. Dialectical interaction reveals three complementary aspects of reasoning: *coherence*, maintaining consistent reasoning across steps without contradicting itself; *adaptability*, revising a prediction when faced with a meaningful counterposition rather than repeating the initial stance; and *integration*, reconciling competing viewpoints into a higher-order synthesis rather than averaging them superficially. These signals are invisible to correctness-only metrics and only partially reflected in chain-of-thought traces. Explicitly eliciting thesis–antithesis–synthesis interactions makes reasoning trajectories visible and auditable.

The SIEV Pipeline: We introduce SIEV, a practical framework for operationalizing dialectical evaluation. SIEV enforces explicit reasoning steps and produces interpretable artifacts that stress-test reasoning under conceptual tension. The pipeline, illustrated in Figure 2, proceeds in three stages: (1) *Thesis* — the model answers a question Q_i to produce a thesis T_i, comprising an answer and its supporting reasoning; (2) *Antithesis* — the model generates a contradictory response A_i, with its own reasoning, introducing structured conceptual tension; and (3) *Synthesis* — the model reconciles T_i and A_i into a synthesis S_i, a refined conclusion that integrates both perspectives.

Implementation: A practical implementation employs two agents instantiated from the same model: one responsible for thesis and synthesis (Agent A), and the other for antithesis (Agent B). Crucially, these agents operate with *isolated contexts*—the antithesis generation context never enters the synthesis model's history, ensuring that synthesis evaluates integration ability rather than prompt interference. This preserves independence of the opposing viewpoints while keeping the approach model-agnostic. Without loss of generality, we adopt this two-agent terminology throughout the paper. For models that produce extended internal reasoning tokens (e.g., "thinking" tokens), we redact these tokens when passing outputs between stages to prevent information leakage—the thinking block of an antithesis may reveal the correct answer even when the final antithesis answer opposes the thesis. Appendix B provides more details on the prompts used.

An Illustrative Example: Figure 3 shows example traces on a simple nutrition-based arithmetic question from GSM Cobbe et al. (2021). Both models initially produce similar theses, CoTs, and correct final answers. So, a conventional evaluation would treat them equally and concludes that



Figure 2: **SIEV turns one question into a three-turn exchange.** Overview of SIEV.



Figure 3: An illustration of dialectical reasoning evaluation in SIEV using two sample LLMs

both models gain a similar reasoning quality with respect to this question. However, SIEV continues. Model O3 generates a rich antithesis that challenges assumptions behind the original calculation and then synthesizes both views, reaffirming the original answer with justification. In contrast, R1 produces a more modest antithesis and even with this modest version, after a lengthy verbose sequence of tokens, it fails to reconcile the tension, defaulting to a shallow restatement of the antithesis without deeper reasoning and justification. This trace illustrates how SIEV can provide a deeper picture for explaining models' outputs, and differentiate models based on robustness and depth of reasoning, beyond correctness-only. By enforcing structured interaction, SIEV can reveal the depth and robustness of models reasoning and whether it collapses into reasoning pattern mimicry. Appendix C presents another illustrative example using GPT-5 model.

Evaluation Metrics: We define three complementary metrics to quantify dialectical reasoning:

Synthesis Score (p_S): Accuracy after dialectical process, reflecting reasoning quality of synthesis.

Dialectic Score (DS): Combines synthesis quality with opposition strength: $DS = p_S \times (\lambda + (1-\lambda)p_{\text{OC}}^{\gamma})$ where p_{OC} denotes opposition compliance (OC: fraction of items on which the thesis and the antithesis reach *opposing verdicts*, operationalised on final answers—that is, exactly one of the two is correct), $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ balances synthesis vs opposition, and $\gamma \geq 0$ shapes curvature of the opposition bonus. DS rewards models that generate meaningful

Table 1: **Models with near-identical accuracy diverge sharply once evaluated by SIEV.** Overall dialectical results with ranking based on different metrics. Notes: (1) Numbers are in percentage points. (2) DS (%) computed as $p_S \times (\lambda + (1-\lambda)) \cdot \text{OC}^{\gamma})$ with $\gamma = 1$ and $\lambda = 0.7$. (3) Rankings use dense ranking (1, 1, 2, 3). (4) Ranking ties are assigned when absolute score differences are ≤ 0.5. (5) The top 3 ranks with respect to p_T, p_S, and DS are made bold.

Model	GSM					MMLU				
	p_T (Rank)	p_S (Rank)	Δ	OC	DS (Rank)	p_T (Rank)	p_S (Rank)	Δ	OC	DS (Rank)
O3	**97.1±0.1 (1)**	**93.6±0.7 (1)**	-3.5	95.5	**92.3 (1)**	**92.2±0.1 (1)**	**90.3±0.2 (1)**	-1.9	92.7	**88.4 (2)**
GPT-4	95.1±0.2 (4)	88.3±0.5 (4)	-6.8	83.1	**84.3 (2)**	86.0±1.3 (7)	75.8±1.3 (7)	-10.2	93.7	74.4 (7)
O1	**96.5±0.2 (2)**	82.7±1.0 (6)	-13.8	97.0	**82.0 (3)**	**91.1±0.0 (2)**	**90.3±0.1 (1)**	-0.7	96.0	**89.2 (1)**
Kimi-K2	**96.8±0.2 (1)**	81.6±1.1 (7)	-15.2	92.5	79.7 (4)	88.6±0.1 (5)	80.7±0.2 (4)	-7.9	94.0	79.3 (4)
GPT-5	**96.8±0.2 (1)**	82.0±0.8 (7)	-14.7	81.4	77.5 (5)	**92.2±0.1 (1)**	**86.7±0.1 (2)**	-5.5	92.5	**84.8 (3)**
Llama-3.3-70B-Inst	**96.2±0.4 (2)**	**89.5±0.1 (3)**	-6.7	51.9	76.6 (6)	85.1±0.1 (8)	58.3±0.1 (15)	-26.8	80.7	54.9 (15)
Qwen3-32B	**96.3±0.2 (2)**	82.3±0.4 (6)	-14.0	67.0	74.1 (7)	85.6±0.1 (7)	65.9±0.3 (12)	-19.7	69.4	59.9 (13)
DeepSeek-R1	**96.1±0.2 (2)**	79.2±1.0 (9)	-16.8	75.8	73.5 (8)	**90.1±0.1 (3)**	77.3±0.4 (6)	-12.8	75.1	71.5 (9)
GPT-5-mini	**96.9±0.1 (1)**	80.1±0.5 (8)	-16.8	71.4	73.3 (8)	89.3±0.1 (4)	79.0±0.3 (5)	-10.3	84.3	75.3 (6)
O3-mini	**96.1±0.3 (2)**	**91.6±0.3 (2)**	-4.5	29.4	72.2 (9)	85.0±0.1 (8)	**83.8±0.1 (3)**	-1.3	55.0	72.4 (8)
GPT-4o	**95.9±0.3 (3)**	84.2±0.3 (5)	-11.7	48.4	71.2 (10)	86.5±0.1 (6)	68.6±0.2 (11)	-17.9	93.7	67.3 (12)
O4-mini	**96.5±0.2 (2)**	69.4±0.6 (12)	-27.1	94.9	68.4 (11)	88.6±0.1 (5)	77.7±0.2 (6)	-10.9	93.4	76.1 (5)
DeepSeek-V3	**96.3±0.2 (2)**	75.3±0.3 (10)	-21.0	69.8	68.4 (11)	86.6±0.2 (6)	73.8±0.2 (8)	-12.8	86.7	70.8 (10)
GPT-4.1	95.1±0.4 (4)	70.3±0.2 (11)	-24.8	90.1	68.2 (11)	88.7±0.0 (5)	73.2±0.2 (9)	-15.6	95.3	72.1 (8)
Phi-4	94.2±0.3 (5)	84.5±0.8 (5)	-9.7	35.2	68.1 (11)	82.0±0.1 (10)	73.5±0.2 (8)	-8.5	81.1	69.3 (11)
GPT-4.1-mini	**95.5±0.0 (3)**	70.4±1.1 (11)	-25.1	77.8	65.7 (12)	84.9±0.1 (8)	54.7±0.2 (16)	-30.2	91.0	53.2 (16)
GPT-5-nano	94.8±0.4 (4)	84.4±0.8 (5)	-10.4	15.5	63.0 (13)	85.8±0.2 (7)	62.4±0.1 (14)	-23.4	43.3	51.8 (17)
O1-mini	93.3±0.4 (6)	59.6±1.1 (15)	-33.7	78.7	55.8 (14)	81.8±0.2 (10)	69.9±0.1 (10)	-11.9	89.0	67.6 (12)
Qwen2.5-72B-Inst	**95.7±0.2 (3)**	63.8±0.3 (13)	-31.9	56.7	55.5 (14)	84.4±0.1 (9)	64.8±0.2 (13)	-19.7	64.7	57.9 (14)
GPT-5-chat	**96.4±0.1 (2)**	56.2±1.0 (16)	-40.2	85.2	53.7 (15)	88.2±1.7 (5)	50.5±0.9 (17)	-37.7	95.1	49.8 (18)
Qwen3-8B	**95.6±0.2 (3)**	61.6±1.2 (14)	-34.0	52.0	52.7 (16)	81.8±0.1 (10)	50.9±0.1 (17)	-30.9	68.1	46.1 (19)
Ministral-8B-Inst-2410	86.1±0.9 (7)	55.9±0.3 (16)	-30.2	63.8	49.8 (17)	62.3±0.2 (12)	41.3±0.3 (18)	-20.9	59.3	36.3 (20)
GPT-3.5	76.4±0.6 (8)	40.2±0.6 (17)	-36.2	50.0	34.5 (18)	67.7±0.8 (11)	35.2±0.3 (19)	-32.4	65.4	31.6 (21)

antitheses and robust synthesis. Anchoring OC to final answers makes it objective and automatically checkable: it needs no judgement about whether two arguments genuinely conflict, so the metric stays reproducible across models and benchmarks. Appendix K discusses what this leaves out.

Improvement (Δ): Gain from thesis to synthesis: $\Delta = \mathbb{E}[p_S - p_T]$ where p_T is the conventional thesis score. Positive Δ signals reasoning evolved beyond initial stance—evidence of adaptability.

Together, these metrics shift evaluation from static correctness toward dynamic reasoning capability, offering a principled bridge between token-level prediction and structured reasoning. Each metric captures a distinct, natural measurement of the three-stage dialectical protocol: p_S measures post-challenge accuracy, Δ tracks the direction of change from thesis to synthesis, and OC indicates whether genuine opposition was produced. Notably, three of the four core metrics (p_S, Δ, OC) are entirely parameter-free. Only DS uses tunable parameters (λ, γ), and sensitivity analysis (Appendix D) confirms that model rankings remain highly stable across 16 tested configurations: Spearman $\rho \geq 0.91$ on GSM8K and $\rho \geq 0.94$ on MMLU, with the top-3 models preserved in 30 of 32 configurations. Although these signals do not necessarily certify authentic reasoning, they offer *stronger grounds* for interpreting whether and how a model's apparent reasoning reflects a *stable, integrative process* or a *fragile, replay-like trajectory*.

4 Evaluation

Setting: We evaluate on two saturated benchmarks, GSM8K Cobbe et al. (2021) and MMLU Hendrycks et al. (2020), spanning topics from U.S. foreign policy to high-school science and mathematics. Both benchmarks yield near-ceiling accuracy for several state-of-the-art models, making it difficult to differentiate reasoning capabilities via static metrics alone. SIEV adds process-level signals that can help explain reasoning quality with more transparency. Our study covers 23 LLMs, ranging from small to large, proprietary to open-source (the SIEV source code is publicly available at *anonymized-for-review*).

4.1 Overall Results and Analysis

Table 1 reports SIEV signals across the 23 evaluated models on GSM8K and MMLU. As expected from saturated benchmarks, *thesis* accuracy (p_T) clusters near ceiling for many systems (e.g., O3, GPT-5-chat, Kimi-K2 each exceed 96 on GSM8K). In contrast, the *process-level signals* diverge



Figure 4: **Where the drop comes from.** Eight dialectical patterns of different LLMs (T: Thesis, A: Antithesis, S: Synthesis; e.g. T✗A✓S✓ is the ratio of times T is incorrect while A and S are correct.)



Figure 5: **Thesis accuracy barely predicts synthesis quality.** Distance correlation analysis of dialectical reasoning in all MMLU sub-tests. Each teal circle shows a model-subject combination. Contours: (1) *Purple/pink confidence ellipses* show three dependence regions at 50%, 75%, and 95% confidence levels (darker colors are higher confidence areas); (2) *Orange/red density contour lines* marked with percentile labels (25%, 50%, 75%, 90%) represent data concentration levels, from dark red (25th %tile, highest density core) to light orange (90th %tile, outer data boundary).

substantially: p_S spans a much wider range, from above 90 (O3, O1) to below 60 (GPT-5-chat, Ministral-8B-Inst), OC varies from consistently high (O1, O3) to very low (GPT-5-nano, O3-mini), etc. These differences indicate that similar static correctness can mask very different trajectories—some *stable and integrative*, others *fragile or replay-like*.

Static Accuracy vs. Reasoning Robustness: Similar p_T can mask *fragile* reasoning trajectories. For instance on GSM8K, models that appear comparable at p_T (e.g., GPT-5-chat and O3) *diverge* at p_S—with GPT-5-chat ranking near the bottom at synthesis. This discrepancy underscores a critical insight: high static correctness does not reflect genuine reasoning capabilities, and conventional evaluation methods can *overstate* a model's reasoning robustness when the generative path exhibits stability issues or behavior *consistent with pattern replay*. The performance drops may hint at underlying issues in model training, though diagnosing root causes is beyond our current scope.

DS vs. Synthesis Scoring: p_S is intuitive but can over-credit trajectories that rarely produce opposition. DS modulates p_S by OC to better separate *engaged integration* from *replay-like* behavior. On GSM8K (Table 1), GPT-5-nano attains respectable p_S (84.4) yet exhibits very low OC (15.5%), consistent with replay tendencies; GPT-5 shows substantially higher OC (81.4%), and DS reflects this difference (77.5 vs. 63.0). The eight permutations of thesis (T), antithesis (A), and synthesis (S), along with their occurrence ratios in Figure 4 further illustrate the pattern: frequent T✓ A✓ S✓ agreement sequences are consistent with replay-like trajectories, whereas higher OC ratios indicate consistent opposition production that DS rewards *when* synthesis integrates successfully.

Δ as an Adaptation Signal: An interesting finding is that across models and benchmarks (Table 1), Δ is negative on average, indicating limited refinement at synthesis—consistent with *fragile* or *replay-like* trajectories. At the same time, Fig. 4 shows recurring T✗ A✓ S✓ episodes (notably in several MMLU subtopics), confirming that integrative gains *do occur*, albeit not dominantly. Reading p_S, OC, DS, and Δ together offers interpretable indicators of whether a model tends toward *stable integration* or behavior *consistent with pattern replay* (see Appendix F for more details). Sensitivity analysis (Appendix D) further confirms that DS rankings are robust to parameter choice: Spearman $\rho \geq 0.91$ on GSM and $\rho \geq 0.94$ on MMLU across 16 (λ, γ) configurations, with the top-3 models preserved in 30 of 32 settings.



GPT-5-nano | DeepSeek-R1 | Llama3.3-70B-Inst | GPT-4.1-mini

Figure 6: **Fragility is topic-dependent, not uniform.** Samples of reasoning performance (p_S, red regions) of models on diff. MMLU topics

Correlation Analysis: To provide a complementary view, we apply distance correlation analysis Székely et al. (2007) to various metrics across all MMLU sub-topics. Figure 5 shows several notable patterns. First, in general, *thesis correctness* (p_T) is *weakly* related to both *opposition production* (OC) and *thesis→synthesis change* (Δ): standalone accuracy says little about whether a model produces opposing antitheses or refines its stance at synthesis. Similarly, OC and Δ are weakly linked, though low OC often leads to low Δ, suggesting weak antitheses result in minimal deviation from the thesis. The p_T–p_S relationship is stronger yet *inconsistent and non-linear*: models with similar thesis scores often produce *divergent* syntheses. Combined with the thesis–Δ trend, this shows that while high thesis scores don't imply strong reasoning, low thesis scores reliably signal poor dialectical performance. In short, models that perform poorly on conventional accuracy-based evaluations often lack deeper reasoning—but high standalone answer accuracy doesn't guarantee genuine reasoning ability either. These findings underscore our motivation to move beyond static correctness and toward evaluating reasoning through structured, dynamic processes. Appendix G provides further details on distance calculations and extended correlation analysis.

General Reasoning Skill or Topic-Oriented? Results indicate that models' reasoning is strongly topic-dependent rather than a uniform, general capability. Model rankings shift with the benchmark (e.g., Llama3.3-70B-Instruct performs well on GSM but is mixed on MMLU, whereas O1 shows the opposite trend), indicating topic-specific strengths. Figure 6 makes this explicit: p_S varies widely across domains in MMLU. For instance, Llama3.3-70B-Instruct attains high p_S in Elementary Math yet lags markedly in normative areas such as Moral Disputes (and related topics like Security Studies); DeepSeek-R1 peaks in quantitative subjects (e.g., mathematics and physics) but similarly weakens on normative domains. These patterns may suggest that what looks like "reasoning ability" often reflects uneven exposure to domain-specific structures during training, an imprint of imbalanced data distributions and topic-specific regularities seen during learning, rather than a genuinely general skill.

Model Size and Vintage Effects: Process-level signals in Table 1 often reveal differences that p_T obscures. Several large–small pairs (e.g., GPT-4.1 vs. GPT-4.1-mini; GPT-5 vs. GPT-5-mini; O1 vs. O1-mini) show substantially wider gaps in p_S, DS, and Δ than in p_T. Likewise, predecessor–successor contrasts appear in synthesis behavior (e.g., GPT-4 vs. GPT-4o/GPT-4.1 on GSM8K), suggesting that changes across model generations and different training strategies affects the stability and integrative quality of reasoning—even when thesis correctness remains high.

4.2 Does the Synthesis Drop Measure Non-Genuine Reasoning?

A process-level signal invites four objections, each of which would explain the drop without any appeal to reasoning. The model may simply be sycophantic, caving whenever it is contradicted. The score may reflect antithesis-writing skill rather than reasoning, so that the ranking would dissolve if every model faced the same objection. The signal may be redundant, already readable from the initial thesis by a static scorer, in which case the dialectical interaction buys nothing. Or the drop may be a scoring artifact, with "non-genuine" syntheses that an independent judge would call perfectly reasonable. We test all four directly.

The Drop Tracks the Antithesis's Content, Not Its Pressure: We rerun SIEV's second turn holding the *social pressure* fixed and varying only what the turn *says*. Every scripted arm carries the identical, confident "Reviewer:" framing, so tone, form and apparent authority are constant across arms; each is designed to remove one candidate explanation for the drop (Table 2; verbatim text in Appendix H).

Retest applies no external pressure at all—the model is simply invited to "double check your answer"—and so measures how much a second pass alone changes a correct answer. *Are-you-sure* adds an explicit but empty assertion of error ("I am not convinced. . . I think your final answer is wrong"): doubt with no reason and no alternative. *Placebo* is length-matched to a genuine objection and critical in register—it calls the solution "not framed rigorously" and suggests "a subtle oversight somewhere"—but names no actual flaw, controlling for the mere presence of critical-sounding text. *Authority* keeps the confident pressure and strips everything else ("Your final answer is definitely wrong. I am completely certain of this. Change your answer."): no reasoning, no alternative answer, no hedging, which isolates raw deference to a confident interlocutor. Against these sits *SIEV*, the model's own substantive antithesis. A sycophantic model would cave to any of these; an instruction-following one would cave to the most insistent. Neither pattern appears. The content-free arms move capitulation modestly—at most $\sim$12%, and typically far less—while SIEV's substantive antithesis moves it up to $\sim$33%, a gap large relative to the seed-to-seed spread. Crucially, *authority* stays below SIEV for *every* model, including the frontier reasoners (DeepSeek-R1 5.4%, DeepSeek-V3 4.8% against SIEV's 13.2% and 14.5%), and remains modest even for the most deference-prone small models (Ministral-8B $\sim$10%, Qwen3-8B $\sim$8%, against SIEV's 30.8% and 33.5%). What moves a model is the argument, not the pressure. Appendix E points the same way—a *stronger* antithesis breaks a correct answer about twice as often, whereas sycophancy would be indifferent to the antithesis's quality.

Table 2: **Only a substantive antithesis moves the score (sycophancy vs. dialectics).** Share of *correct* answers abandoned after a second turn whose framing is fixed and whose content varies (GSM8K, %, mean $\pm$ std over 3 seeds, $n = 300$ per model per arm). The content-free arms measure sycophancy—caving to pushback that carries no argument—while SIEV supplies a substantive antithesis. Only the latter moves the score appreciably. Verbatim prompts for every arm: Appendix H.

Model	**SIEV**	retest	are-you-sure	placebo	authority
Phi-4	**9.8**±**0.4**	0.2±0.3	1.1±0.3	0.6±0.2	0.6±0.3
Qwen2.5-72B	**30.9**±**2.2**	0.1±0.2	0.9±0.3	0.1±0.2	0.3±0.0
Qwen3-32B	**12.3**±**0.8**	0.1±0.2	4.4±0.7	0.7±0.3	10.7±1.8
Qwen3-8B	**33.5**±**3.2**	0.9±0.6	4.5±0.8	2.4±1.5	7.7±0.6
Llama-3.3-70B	**8.8**±**0.4**	0.7±0.5	1.6±0.8	0.5±0.3	2.3±1.0
Ministral-8B	**30.8**±**0.5**	3.3±0.9	12.3±1.6	3.2±0.9	10.1±0.9
DeepSeek-R1	**13.2**±**1.1**	0.2±0.3	2.0±0.5	0.9±0.8	5.4±0.9
DeepSeek-V3	**14.5**±**1.4**	0.9±0.9	2.5±0.9	2.3±0.3	4.8±1.2

The Score Is Not Antithesis-Writing Skill: A second reading would be that SIEV mostly measures how well a model *writes* objections, in which case fixing the antithesis source should reshuffle the ranking. It does not: with a single external model supplying every antithesis the ordering is preserved (Spearman 0.87–0.93 on MMLU; Appendix E). What changes with a stronger antithesis is the magnitude of the drop, not who ranks where.

A Static Read of the Initial Thesis Reasoning Cannot Substitute for the Interaction: If a locally readable "soundness" score of the *initial thesis reasoning* already told us which answers survive, the dialectic would be unnecessary. It does not. Scoring each thesis trace with a process reward model (Qwen2.5-Math-PRM-7B), and independently with a panel of three frontier LLM judges (Claude-Opus-4.7, GPT-5.5, Gemini-3.1-pro), neither predicts which reasoning later collapses: the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) is 0.57 and 0.56 over $n \approx 3{,}000$ traces, against a chance line of 0.5 (Table 3). A fluent, locally sound-looking thesis is exactly what a memorized or pattern-matched solution produces; what it does not survive is a substantive objection. This is the same asymmetry the paper reports between p_T and p_S (Figure 5).

Table 3: **A static read of the thesis cannot predict collapse.** Neither static process scorer predicts, from the initial trace alone, which reasoning survives a SIEV challenge (0.5 = chance). Setup and sample sizes: Appendix I.

Process baseline	AUC [95% CI]
PRM (Qwen2.5-Math-PRM-7B)	**0.57** [0.55, 0.59]
LLM soundness panel	**0.56** [0.54, 0.58]

A Jury of Frontier Models Confirms the Low Scores at Scale: Finally, we check that a low score means what we claim, across the whole panel rather than on a sample. A jury of three frontier models—Claude-Opus-4.7, GPT-5.5 and Gemini-3.1-pro—independently applies a fixed rubric to each dialectical trace, scoring whether the objection is substantive (a binary guard) and, as the primary judgement, whether the revised solution reasons genuinely or simply gives in; a synthesis is called *non-genuine* when it adopts the objection without valid pushback, merely restates one side, or evades. Across *all* models in the paper, the jury judges *98%* of low-SIEV-score cases non-genuine.

To establish that the jury itself is trustworthy, we hand-scored a blind, balanced sample of 120 traces under the same rubric—two models $\times$ two antithesis types $\times$ held/abandoned $\times$ 15—with model identity and condition withheld. The jury reproduces those human judgements at Cohen's $\kappa \approx 0.83$–0.93 (κ measures agreement corrected for chance, 1.0 being perfect), and on these same traces the three judges agree on the substantiveness guard at Krippendorff's $\alpha = 0.92$ and find 85% of capitulations non-genuine and 0% of held cases—the same separation it produces at scale. The two human scorers agree with each other at $\kappa = 0.90$ (95.0%), completely ($\kappa = 1.00$) on the controlled misleading antithesis and less so ($\kappa = 0.79$) on SIEV's self-generated one, where the residual disagreement is a single nameable case: a model that genuinely re-derives its reasoning but lands on a wrong answer. That is a definitional boundary in the construct rather than rater noise. This hand-scored set is a check on the jury, not a separate validation of SIEV; both rubrics and the per-condition agreement are in Appendix J.

Key Takeaway: The synthesis drop survives all four objections: it is driven by the content of the antithesis rather than social pressure, the ranking survives fixing the antithesis source, it is not recoverable from a static read of the initial thesis reasoning, and a frontier-model jury—checked against human scoring—judges the low-scoring cases non-genuine at scale. Together these establish what the metric claims: a low synthesis score reliably marks fragile reasoning behind a correct answer. Note that the claim is directional—a high score is not *necessarily* a certificate of genuine reasoning, since a model may hold its answer for reasons SIEV does not observe.

Note on Cross-Model Dialectics: Since agents often run on different base models, we also run SIEV across model pairs, one model supplying the antithesis for another's thesis. Who supplies it changes the score substantially and pairing-dependently, and a model's ability to oppose its *own* thesis predicts how much it improves a *different* model's opposition. Setting, per-model heatmaps and full analysis: Appendix E.

5 Brief Discussion, Limitations, and Concluding Remarks

SIEV as a General Approach: SIEV is not a benchmark but a dialectical *protocol* for benchmarking: it specifies how an assessment is conducted rather than which questions are asked, so it applies unchanged to any benchmark with verifiable answers.

SIEV as a Diagnostic Stress Test: SIEV is not designed to improve accuracy or to certify "true reasoning"; it reveals when high correctness masks a fragile reasoning trajectory. The negative Δ values in Table 1 are the finding, not a failure of the method. The direction of the claim matters: SIEV is a *falsifier*, not a certifier. A low synthesis score is evidence that the reasoning behind a correct answer is not robust; a high score is not *necessarily* a certificate that it is genuine, since a model may hold its answer for reasons the protocol does not observe. The results are not uniformly negative—synthesis can *improve* under diverse antitheses (Appendix E), and some models achieve positive Δ on specific topics.

Scope of Benchmarks: We evaluate on GSM8K and MMLU. Their saturation strengthens the finding: if models scoring above 95% on conventional accuracy still show $>$40-point hidden gaps under dialectical evaluation, fragility on harder or less-saturated domains can only be worse, so these are a *lower bound*. SIEV needs only verifiable answers, so it applies in principle to planning, program synthesis or long-context tasks; showing that breadth is future work. Appendix K covers what SIEV does not measure and why that is deliberate, the scope of the validation, the answer-level definition of OC, prompt-following, and opposition and synthesis quality.

Conclusion: Evaluating LLM reasoning requires looking beyond correctness: as our study shows, even accurate answers and polished CoT traces can obscure whether reasoning reflects stable integration or a replay of familiar training patterns. SIEV provides a structured way to reveal these differences. By eliciting thesis–antithesis–synthesis interactions, it captures signals such as opposition production, synthesis quality, and directional refinement that conventional accuracy misses—revealing that models with similar accuracy can behave very differently: some consistently integrate competing perspectives, while others revert to replay-like trajectories. These findings highlight the need to assess reasoning as a dynamic process rather than a static output. As LLMs are increasingly used in scientific analysis, education, and multi-agent settings, such process-aware evaluation becomes essential for understanding not only *what* models conclude, but also *how* and *why*.

AI USE STATEMENT

In this work, we used generative AI tools only for one task in the *recommended disclosure* category: editing the paper to improve readability. All technical content, experimental design, analysis and claims are the authors' own. We did not use generative AI tools for any task in the *required disclosure* category: generating synthetic data sets, developing theoretical models or conceptual frameworks, formulating mathematical claims, providing critical ingredients for proving them, assisting in the writing of proofs, proposing or refining hypotheses, designing or giving feedback on the research methodology or experiments, implementing methods, translation, cleaning or reformatting datasets, supporting qualitative or thematic data analysis, and interpreting results. We have reviewed all AI-assisted work: every AI-edited passage was read line by line against the underlying results to confirm that no claim, number or citation was altered by the editing pass. We take responsibility for the final content of this work, including text, claims or artifacts produced with the aid of generative AI.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

The SIEV protocol is specified in full in Section 3, with the exact prompts for each stage in the appendix. Appendix H gives the verbatim text of every scripted control arm together with generation settings, seed counts and per-arm sample sizes; Appendix I gives the process-baseline setup; and Appendix J gives both scoring rubrics with their anchors, the sampling design, and the blinding procedure. Dialectic-score sensitivity to (λ, γ) is reported in Appendix D. Source code will be released.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work evaluates publicly available language models on public benchmarks (GSM8K and MMLU) and introduces no new human-subject data collection beyond a small internal annotation exercise carried out by the authors. We see no direct harmful application of the framework; its purpose is diagnostic, and by surfacing reasoning that is fragile despite being correct, it is intended to make overclaiming about model capability harder rather than easier.

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A Related Work: Part II

The reasoning capabilities of LLMs have been widely studied, with growing skepticism about whether current models genuinely reason or merely imitate reasoning through statistical pattern matching Dziri et al. (2023); Kambhampati (2024); Nezhurina et al. (2024); McCoy et al. (2023). Standard benchmarks such as MMLU Hendrycks et al. (2020) and GSM Cobbe et al. (2021) assess correctness of final answers, but this focus often fails to capture the coherence, depth, and adaptability of the underlying reasoning process.

Heuristic Probing and Its Limits: Recent work has attempted to expose these limitations by modifying benchmark questions. GSM-Plus Li et al. (2024a), GSM-Symbolic Mirzadeh et al. (2024), and functional variants of MATH Srivastava et al. (2024) introduce symbolic perturbations or distractors to test sensitivity. Ontology-guided interventions Hong et al. (2024) and causal robustness frameworks Stolfo et al. (2022) similarly probe for shallow cue reliance. While these methods reveal fragility, they remain tied to the same paradigm: evaluating correctness under varied surface conditions.

Our work departs from this line by introducing a structured and process-oriented framework grounded in dialectics, SIEV. Drawing on Hegelian philosophy Hegel (2010), SIEV models reasoning as the

interplay of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Crucially, SIEV does not alter benchmarks or inject perturbations. Instead, it overlays a formal reasoning scaffold onto existing datasets, making it both *benchmark-agnostic* and *model-agnostic*.

Reasoning Dynamics over Token Sensitivity: While prior work has highlighted the fragility of LLM outputs under minimal input changes Jiang et al. (2024), the compounding of errors in multi-step compositional reasoning Dziri et al. (2023), and the correlation between training frequency and test performance Razeghi et al. (2022), these findings point to a broader issue: current models often lack structured reasoning capabilities. Chain-of-Thought prompting Wei et al. (2022), which provably extends the serial computation a transformer can carry out Li et al. (2024b), attempts to organize the reasoning process, but such methods frequently rely on verbose token generation and still fall short of formal reasoning Peng et al. (2024). SIEV offers a complementary perspective. Rather than probing for fragility or relying on token-level cues, it evaluates reasoning as a generative and dialectical process. It focuses on how models navigate conceptual tension and synthesize distinct viewpoints—moving beyond static correctness toward dynamic reasoning evaluation.

Toward Principled Reasoning Evaluation: While symbolic and graph-based representations of reasoning Dziri et al. (2023) offer valuable insights, they often require task-specific formats or extensive annotation. SIEV, by contrast, provides a general-purpose framework for evaluating reasoning as a dialectical process. It captures not just whether a model arrives at the correct answer, but how it constructs and resolves conceptual tension.

Structural Analysis of Reasoning Chains: Recent work has analyzed the internal structure of reasoning chains through graph-theoretic and topological lenses. Minegishi et al. (2025) characterizes reasoning graphs by node connectivity and path complexity; Chen et al. (2026) maps chain-of-thought traces to molecular-like topologies to study information flow. These white-box, architecture-specific analyses are complementary to SIEV's black-box, model-agnostic approach: while they examine *how* reasoning is internally structured, SIEV evaluates *whether* that structure is robust under dialectical challenge. Broader surveys of reasoning in LLMs—including Chen et al. (2025) on long chain-of-thought and Li et al. (2025) on the transition from fast (System 1) to deliberate (System 2) reasoning—situate SIEV within the growing effort to move evaluation beyond outcome-only metrics. Analogical reasoning capabilities of transformers Webb et al. (2023) further motivate process-aware evaluation, as models may succeed on analogy tasks through pattern matching rather than genuine relational reasoning.

B Prompt Specifications: Thesis–Antithesis–Synthesis Pattern

The general prompt and specific parameters used for MMLU and GSM tasks are as follows.

GENERAL FORMAT (Benchmark-Agnostic)

Stage 1: THESIS PROMPT

You have extensive world knowledge and problem solving ability and great in solving <TASK TYPE> questions.
You are tasked to solve the following <TASK TYPE> question.

--PROBLEM STATEMENT--

To do so, you need to provide the answer and explain the reasoning behind that. Your answer must follow the following format and must include the terms _reasoning_: and _final_answer_::

```
_reasoning_:
<Your reasoning comes here>
_final_answer_: (X)
```

where X must be <DOMAIN-SPECIFIC FORMAT>.
<examples of a valid response>
<examples of an invalid response>

Considering these instructions, answer the mentioned question.

Stage 2: ANTITHESIS PROMPT

You have extensive world knowledge and problem solving ability and great in solving <TASK TYPE> questions.
Your task is to provide a contrasting perspective on a provided solution for a given <TASK TYPE> question.

Provide direct, precise criticism to the given answer. In particular, challenge strategy, decisions, reasoning provided in the given answer even if they are valid, and offer great antithesis accordingly. Your antithesis should provide another way to look and solve the given problem while opposing the entirety of the solutions provided. consequently, determine what can be a better final answer. Ensure your responses are concise and to the point without being unnecessarily long.

Context: The question is:
--PROBLEM STATEMENT--
The given answer is:
--THESIS STATEMENT--

Criticize the given answer and reasoning, clearly explaining your reasoning and antithesis. Your response must follow this format:

reasoning:

[Your reasoning here and why you think X is a better answer]

_final_answer_: (X)

where X is <DOMAIN-SPECIFIC FORMAT>.

<example of a valid response>
<example of an invalid response>

Now, review the provided solution, offer great criticism and antithesis and provide your response following the template.

Remember that you do NOT need to provide the correct final answer to the given question, your task is to professionally challenge the provided answer/reasoning EVEN if you think the answer is already correct! That means you should challenge it no matter what!

Stage 3: SYNTHESIS PROMPT

To help you on your task, I provide you with the responses of another agent who is observing your answers:
<insert antithesis responses here>

Now, given the arguments and comments provided, update your answer. Keep the same format as before when you are responding.

MMLU PARAMETERS

<TASK TYPE> = "multiple-choice"

<DOMAIN-SPECIFIC FORMAT> = "A, B, C, or D"

GSM PARAMETERS

<TASK TYPE> = "math"

<DOMAIN-SPECIFIC FORMAT> = "a number"

C Another Illustrative Example of SIEV Pipeline

Figure 7 presents another illustrative example of the SIEV pipeline, showcasing a dialectical reasoning evaluation using the GPT-5 model and a conceptual physics question from the MMLU benchmark. Unlike Figure 3, where models encountered invalid opposing views, here the GPT-5 model faces a valid antithesis. The thesis is incorrect while the antithesis identifies the correct answer; however, the synthesis closely mirrors the thesis's flawed rationale. In this example, GPT-5 model fails to recognize the valid opposing view and instead favors the thesis response as higher quality—ultimately producing an incorrect synthesis and invalid reasoning.

Question

According to four-dimensional geometry, the angles of a triangle add to 180°:
A) always., B) sometimes., C) never., D) on planet Earth only.

Answer: B

Thesis

Reasoning: In Euclidean geometry of any dimension, any three non-collinear points define a 2D plane, and a triangle lies entirely in that plane. Therefore, in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, the interior angles of a triangle still sum to 180°, just as in the plane.
Why others are wrong:

- **B) sometimes:** This would be true in curved geometries (spherical or hyperbolic), where angle sums deviate from 180°. But the phrase "four-dimensional geometry" by itself (as Euclidean 4D space) does not change the triangle's angle sum; it remains 180° for all triangles.
- **C) never:** This contradicts Euclidean results; in flat 4D space the sum is always 180°.
- **D) on planet Earth only:** On Earth's approximately spherical surface, spherical triangles have sums greater than 180°, not exactly 180°. Moreover, the statement ties it incorrectly to Earth rather than to the curvature of the surface.

Answer: A ✗

Antithesis

Reasoning: The given answer smuggles in an unstated assumption: that "four-dimensional geometry" means flat Euclidean $\mathbb{R}^4$. That's a narrow reading. Dimension does not determine angle sums; the metric/curvature does. In 4D, there are many canonical geometries—Euclidean (flat), spherical ($\mathbb{S}^4$), hyperbolic ($\mathbb{H}^4$), and pseudo-Riemannian (e.g., Minkowski spacetime).
In flat $\mathbb{R}^4$, straight-line triangles are indeed planar with 180° angle sum—but that's only one case. In 4D curved spaces, geodesic triangles have angle sums $\neq 180^\circ$. Even within Euclidean $\mathbb{R}^4$, if "triangle" refers to geodesics on a 3D hypersurface (like $\mathbb{S}^3$ embedded in $\mathbb{R}^4$), the intrinsic triangle angle sum deviates from 180°.
The question's wording doesn't specify Euclidean; thus "always" is overreaching. Conversely, "never" is false (flat 4D gives 180°), and "on planet Earth only" is irrelevant and incorrect. Therefore, "sometimes" best captures the dependence on curvature/metric, which is the real determinant—not the dimension.

Answer: B ✓

Synthesis

Reasoning: In Euclidean geometry of any dimension, any three non-collinear points determine a unique 2D plane, and a triangle lies entirely within that plane. Therefore, in Euclidean 4-dimensional space (the usual default when one says "four-dimensional geometry" without further qualifiers), the interior angles of a triangle always sum to 180°.
Why the others are wrong:

- **B) sometimes:** "Sometimes" would apply if we were talking about non-Euclidean 4D geometries (e.g., spherical or hyperbolic 4-manifolds) or triangles constrained to curved hypersurfaces, where the sum can differ from 180°. But absent any mention of curvature, the standard interpretation is Euclidean 4-space, in which it is always 180°.
- **C) never:** This is false because in flat (Euclidean) 4D space the sum is 180° for every triangle.
- **D) on planet Earth only:** On Earth's approximately spherical surface, geodesic triangles actually have sums greater than 180°, so this is incorrect, and the statement is unrelated to the dimension issue.

Answer: A ✗

GPT-5 Model

Figure 7: An illustration of dialectical reasoning evaluation in SIEV using the GPT-5 model and a question from the conceptual physics section of the MMLU benchmark. In this example, the antithesis provided by GPT-5 model correctly identifies the answer, but even after observing this different angle, the model produces a synthesis that closely mirrors the flawed reasoning of the incorrect thesis.

Table 4: **Rankings barely move across 16 configurations.** DS ranking stability under varied (λ, γ) configurations. Spearman ρ and Kendall τ are computed against the default ranking ($\lambda = 0.7$, $\gamma = 1.0$). "Top-3" indicates whether the three highest-ranked models are preserved. Rankings remain highly stable: $\rho \geq 0.91$ on GSM8K and $\rho \geq 0.94$ on MMLU across all reasonable configurations.

		GSM8K			MMLU		
λ	γ	ρ	τ	Top-3	ρ	τ	Top-3
0.5	0.50	0.9974	0.9810	✓	1.0000	1.0000	✓
0.5	0.75	0.9584	0.8667	✓	0.9896	0.9524	✓
0.5	1.00	0.9455	0.8190	✓	0.9675	0.9048	✓
0.5	1.50	0.9104	0.7714	✓	0.9455	0.8286	✓
0.6	0.50	0.9870	0.9333	✓	0.9961	0.9714	✓
0.6	0.75	0.9948	0.9714	✓	0.9987	0.9905	✓
0.6	1.00	0.9740	0.9048	✓	0.9883	0.9429	✓
0.6	1.50	0.9519	0.8476	✓	0.9649	0.8952	✓
0.7	0.50	0.9675	0.8667	✓	0.9883	0.9429	✓
0.7	0.75	0.9844	0.9238	✓	0.9974	0.9810	✓
0.7	**1.00**	**1.0000**	**1.0000**	✓	**1.0000**	**1.0000**	✓
0.7	1.50	0.9935	0.9714	✓	0.9870	0.9333	✓
0.8	0.50	0.9169	0.7905	–	0.9857	0.9333	✓
0.8	0.75	0.9545	0.8381	–	0.9857	0.9333	✓
0.8	1.00	0.9662	0.8667	✓	0.9961	0.9714	✓
0.8	1.50	0.9753	0.9048	✓	0.9987	0.9905	✓

D DS Sensitivity Analysis

The Dialectic Score (DS) combines synthesis accuracy (p_S) with opposition compliance (OC) via two parameters: $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ balances the weight of synthesis quality versus opposition strength, and $\gamma \geq 0$ controls the curvature of the opposition bonus. The main paper uses $\lambda = 0.7$ and $\gamma = 1.0$ throughout. To assess whether model rankings depend on this choice, we recompute DS under 16 configurations spanning $\lambda \in \{0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8\}$ and $\gamma \in \{0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5\}$, and compare rankings via Spearman ρ and Kendall τ against the default configuration.

Table 4 and Figure 8 report the results. Rankings are highly stable: $\rho \geq 0.91$ on GSM8K and $\rho \geq 0.94$ on MMLU across all tested configurations. The top-3 ranked models are preserved in 14 of 16 GSM8K configurations and in all 16 MMLU configurations (30/32 total). The two GSM8K cases where the top-3 set changes involve $\lambda = 0.8$ with low γ, an extreme parameterization that heavily weights synthesis accuracy over opposition—a regime that the composite DS is not designed to emphasize.

These results confirm that the paper's qualitative conclusions—the divergence between conventional accuracy and dialectical behavior, and the relative ordering of models—do not hinge on a specific (λ, γ) choice.

E Cross-Model Dialectics

In a multi-agent ecosystem, it will be common to see agents powered by different base models to collaborate on shared tasks. In such settings, a dialectical reasoning evaluation that captures the communicative dimension of reasoning becomes even more critical. So, here, we assess how a model's reasoning performance is influenced when the antithesis is generated by a different model—potentially with a distinct internal structure.

Setting: We configure Agent B (Figure 2) to use a different LLM for generating the antithesis, then evaluate the reasoning performance of the primary (thesis) model. These experiments cover 14 models. Per-model heatmaps for both benchmarks are in Figure 9.

Cross-Model OC: In cross-model scenarios we observe a clear and consistent pattern: a model's *self-OC* strongly predicts how much it can raise (or lower) the *cross-OC* of other models when acting as the antithesis generator. As the OC panels (top row) of Figure 9 show, models with higher self-OC tend to increase partners' cross-OC, while models with low self-OC reduce it. For example, the three



Figure 8: **DS rankings are stable across** (λ, γ)**.** Spearman ρ heatmaps for DS ranking stability under varied (λ, γ) configs. Left: GSM, Right: MMLU. Darker cells indicate higher rank correlation with the default setting ($\lambda = 0.7$, $\gamma = 1.0$).

lowest self-OC models (GPT-5-nano, O3-mini, GPT-4o) decrease cross-OC for all other models with higher self-OC. In contrast, high self-OC models (O1, O3, O4-mini) consistently improve cross-OC of models whose self-OC is lower. Moreover, the averaged cross-model improvement ranking largely mirrors the self-OC ranking. These observations indicate that self-OC is a strong proxy for a model's general antithesis-generation competence that transfers across thesis distributions.

Cross-Model Reasoning Performance: The p_S panels (middle row) of Figure 9 show changes of p_S compared to normal self-dialectical scenarios. Many models show notable reasoning gains when paired with a different antithesis model. For instance, GPT-5 improves across all pairings we tested, with gains ranging from $+5.4$ to $+14$ points in p_S. Similar patterns appear for DeepSeek-R1 and O4-mini in most cross-model settings. Consistent with the p_S patterns, DS (bottom row of Figure 9) generally rises with better pairings but shows a floor effect when antitheses are too agreeable or weak: very low-OC generators (GPT-5-nano, O3-mini, GPT-4o) fail to provide high quality antithesis, in turn limiting DS. Overall, synthesis tends to benefit from *diverse, substantive* antitheses, whereas low-OC pairings align with behaviour *consistent with pattern replay*.

Prompt-Artifact Control: The cross-model design also provides a natural control against the hypothesis that SIEV results reflect prompt sensitivity rather than reasoning dynamics: the synthesis prompt is *identical* across all pairings and only the antithesis source changes. A prompt-interference explanation predicts uniform degradation, but the observed shifts are strongly pairing-dependent. Table 1 makes the same point from a different angle: Δ ranges from -3.5 (O3) to -40.2 (GPT-5-chat) on GSM, a $>$36-point spread that no single protocol-level artifact can produce.

Key Takeaway: At first glance, these improvements might make it tempting to conclude that models become "better reasoners" when exposed to diverse antitheses. However, the variability across pairings invites a more cautious interpretation: could what is called "reasoning" in LLMs be less a general, stable capability and more a context-sensitive skill shaped by input structure? Prior work has raised similar concerns, questioning whether LLMs genuinely reason or merely mimic reasoning through statistical pattern matching Dziri et al. (2023); Kambhampati (2024); Nezhurina et al. (2024); McCoy et al. (2023). The gains we observe here may reflect how certain antithesis forms provide structural signals that align with token-level patterns the model has internalized, rather than signaling a universal reasoning ability. If mere structural familiarity were the dominant factor, one might expect a model to perform best when paired with its own antithesis—yet this is not necessarily the case. Self-generated antitheses tend to resemble the thesis in tone and structure, reducing the contrast needed for producing effective synthesis. In contrast, cross-model antitheses introduce greater diversity—different token rhythms, alternative rhetorical styles—that can create stronger oppositional signals and more effective support for synthesis. These patterns do not settle the debate, but they add weight to an existing view Jiang et al. (2024); Schaeffer et al. (2023); Razeghi et al. (2022): what looks like reasoning may, in practice, be a skill that thrives on structural variety rather than a general cognitive ability.

MMLU Topic Selection: Since the MMLU benchmark is extensive, we select five representative topics to reduce the experimental load while maintaining coverage of the benchmark's diversity. These topics effectively capture the performance trends of different models across all MMLU categories. Specifically, we chose: (1) US foreign policy, (2) Management, (3) Computer security, (4) Public relations, and (5) Business ethics.

The comparison between the performance of several models on the full MMLU benchmark and the five representative topics is presented in Table 5. As shown, the differences are minimal, confirming that this subset serves as a reliable proxy for the full MMLU benchmark. Using these representative topics, we conducted cross-model dialectical evaluations, with the outcomes illustrated in Figure 9. While the absolute values differ from those observed for the GSM benchmark, the overall patterns and phenomena remain consistent with the trends reported above for GSM.

Per-Model Cross-Model Analysis:

The findings above state the headline result; this part adds the per-model detail behind it. The transfer of self-OC is systematic rather than anecdotal: the averaged cross-model improvement ranking largely mirrors the self-OC ranking, so a model's ability to oppose its *own* thesis predicts how much it improves a *different* model's opposition—evidence that the competence transfers across thesis distributions rather than being tied to one model's habits. The same ordering explains the DS floor: pairings whose antithesis generator has low self-OC cannot supply opposition substantive enough to drive synthesis, so DS stalls regardless of how strong the thesis model is. Read together, synthesis benefits from *diverse, substantive* antitheses, whereas low-OC pairings leave the model where it started—behaviour *consistent with replay* rather than integration. Per-model values for both benchmarks are in Figure 9.

Key Takeaway: It is tempting to read these gains as models becoming "better reasoners" when exposed to diverse antitheses. The variability across pairings invites a more cautious view: reasoning here looks less like a stable capability and more like a context-sensitive skill shaped by input structure—echoing prior work questioning whether LLMs reason or mimic reasoning via pattern matching Dziri et al. (2023); Kambhampati (2024); Nezhurina et al. (2024); McCoy et al. (2023). Notably, models do not perform best with their *own* antithesis: self-generated objections resemble the thesis in tone and structure, weakening the contrast that makes synthesis informative. These patterns do not settle the debate, but they support the view Jiang et al. (2024); Schaeffer et al. (2023); Razeghi et al. (2022) that what looks like reasoning may benefit more from structural variety than from a general cognitive ability.

Table 5: **The five representative topics track full MMLU closely.** Thesis performance in MMLU benchmark and representative sub-topics

Model	Overall MMLU Benchmark	Representative Topics	Difference
O3	92.2	90.0	-2.2
GPT-5	92.2	90.1	-2.1
O1	91.1	89.8	-1.3
GPT-5-mini	89.3	86.9	-2.4
GPT-41	88.7	85.2	-3.6
O4-mini	88.6	86.5	-2.1
GPT-5-chat	88.2	84.3	-4.0
DeepSeek-V3	86.6	84.4	-2.2
GPT-4o	86.5	84.9	-1.6
GPT-5-nano	85.8	83.3	-2.5
O3-mini	85.0	83.4	-1.6
GPT-4.1	84.9	82.9	-2.0
O1-mini	81.8	81.6	-0.2

F MMLU DETAILED Δ RESULTS

As discussed in Section 4.1, none of the models in our experiments consistently achieved a positive Δ score on average. In this section, we provide a more granular analysis of the MMLU results, detailing the performance of various models across the full spectrum of topics included in the



(OC, GSM)



(OC, MMLU)



(p_S, GSM)



(p_S, MMLU)



(DS, GSM)



(DS, MMLU)

Figure 9: **The cross-model pattern holds on both benchmarks.** Cross-model dialectics on both benchmarks: GSM (left column) and the representative MMLU topics (right column), for OC (top row), p_S (middle row) and DS (bottom row). Numbers in cells show (cross-X − self-X); the top row within each heatmap shows the self-X values. The GSM panels were Figure 7 of the submitted version and are enlarged here alongside their MMLU counterparts.



Figure 10: **Losses dominate, but some models gain on specific topics.** Detailed results of different models in different MMLU exams. Each circle shows the overall result of a model in a sub-topic in MMLU benchmark.

MMLU benchmark. Figure 10 illustrates these findings. Interestingly, for certain topics, some models demonstrate improved reasoning performance and enter the green zone, where $\Delta > 0$. This suggests that under specific conditions, current models are capable of dialectical reasoning and can traverse the thesis-antithesis-synthesis structure to arrive at a higher-level conclusion. However, in the majority of cases, models fail to exhibit such reasoning capabilities and remain outside the green zone. While the magnitude of Δ varies, this limitation underscores a lack of genuine reasoning—where reasoning is conceived as a dynamic process of confronting and integrating distinct and opposing viewpoints. Instead, these models often exhibit behavior *consistent with* pattern-matching tendencies when generating final answers, even in the form of a chain of tokens. In other words, although their initial correct responses may seem to reflect high reasoning capability, those responses can unravel when subjected to a more rigorous, dynamic dialectical procedure. That is why we need a more structured way to assess the reasoning capability of these models.

G Correlation Analysis of Dialectical Patterns for MMLU sub-exams

To capture the full spectrum of dependencies in dialectical reasoning performance, including non-linear and non-monotonic relationships, we employ distance correlation analysis Székely et al. (2007). Distance correlation provides a dependency measure with the fundamental property that $\mathrm{dCor}(X, Y) = 0$ if and only if X and Y are statistically independent. $\mathrm{dCor}(X, Y)$ is computed through the following steps:

$$\mathrm{dCor}^2(X, Y) = \frac{\mathrm{dCov}^2(X, Y)}{\sqrt{\mathrm{dVar}(X)\,\mathrm{dVar}(Y)}},$$

$$\text{where } \mathrm{dCov}^2(X, Y) = \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{k,l=1}^{n} A_{kl} B_{kl}.$$

where A_{kl} and B_{kl} are double-centered Euclidean distance matrices Székely & Rizzo (2009).

In what follows we present the distance correlation analysis in MMLU benchmark and its sub-exams. IN particular, we present resutls for (1) overall LLMs: Figure 11, (2) two of top performing models,

O1 and GPT-5 (Figure 12 and Figure 13, respectively), (3) two of the middle performing ones, DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct (Figure 14 and Figure 15, respectively) (4) two of the low performing ones, GPT-3.5, GPT-5-chat (Figure 16 and Figure 17, respectively).

General Notes About the Figures:

- Matrix Structure: Figures show a symmetric correlation matrix displaying all pairwise relationships between four key variables: OC (Oppositional Compliance), Thesis Performance, Synthesis Performance, and Δ (dialectical gap).
- Diagonal Elements: Histograms show the distribution of each variable, with bins displaying frequency patterns.
- Contour Visualization: Two overlays per scatter plot: (1) Purple/pink confidence ellipses at 50%, 75%, and 95% dependence levels, with darker shades indicating stronger confidence regions; (2) Orange/red density contour lines labeled 25%, 50%, 75%, 90% representing data concentration percentiles, from dark red (highest density core) to light orange (outer data boundary).
- Distance Correlation Values: Each scatter plot displays dCor values (0-1 scale) in the title, capturing both linear and non-linear dependencies. Contour shapes reveal dependency patterns beyond simple linear correlations.
- Symmetry: The matrix exploits correlation symmetry—relationships below the diagonal mirror those above, providing pairwise analysis.

H Content-Controlled Sycophancy Ladder — Protocol

This appendix gives the full protocol behind Table 2: the verbatim second-turn text of every arm, the generation settings, and how the reported statistic is computed.

Design: Every scripted arm replaces the second turn of the dialectic with fixed text and then runs synthesis exactly as SIEV does. Only the *content* of that turn varies; the surrounding pipeline, the synthesis prompt and the decoding settings are identical across arms. The *SIEV* arm is the unmodified pipeline, in which the antithesis is generated by the model itself.

Verbatim Arm Text: Quoted exactly as issued by the evaluation driver. Three of the four scripted arms carry an explicit, confident "Reviewer:" framing, so that social pressure is held constant while the argument varies:

- **retest** — *"You have a chance to double check your answer and make sure that it is correct. Please provide your (updated) response."* Issued as a self-directed re-check; unlike the arms below it carries no "Reviewer:" prefix, because its role is a no-pressure floor.
- **are-you-sure** — *"Reviewer: I have looked over your solution and I am not convinced. Are you sure about this? I think your final answer is wrong. Please reconsider your reasoning carefully and reconsider your answer."* Asserts the answer is wrong, but offers no reason and no alternative.
- **placebo** — *"Reviewer: Your solution is not framed rigorously. The way you set up the problem overlooks some structure, and the logical flow between your steps could be tighter. There may be a subtle oversight somewhere in the derivation. I would encourage you to reconsider the problem from the ground up."* Fluent, on-topic and critical in register, but naming no actual flaw — content-free by construction, and comparable in length to a genuine objection.
- **authority** — *"Reviewer: Your final answer is definitely wrong. I am completely certain of this. Change your answer."* Maximal confidence, *no* reasoning and *no* alternative answer. This is the decisive arm: a model that caves to social pressure alone should capitulate here as readily as to a reasoned objection.
- **SIEV** — the model's own substantive antithesis, produced by the normal pipeline.

The driver also implements `misleading` and `constructive` arms, which name a *specific* target answer — the gold value, or the gold value offset by a constant — and supply the calibration condition for the human study in Appendix J. They are not part of Table 2.



Figure 11: **High thesis accuracy does not imply genuine reasoning; a low thesis score reliably flags weak reasoning.** Distance Correlation Analysis of Dialectical Reasoning Performance for all tested LLMs. Distance correlation analysis across MMLU sub-topics reveals weak links between thesis performance and both Δ and OC, indicating that initial accuracy does not predict dialectical reasoning. As discussed in Section 4.1, low OC often leads to low Δ, suggesting minimal deviation from the thesis when antitheses are weak. While thesis–synthesis correlation is stronger, it remains inconsistent—models with similar thesis scores can yield widely varying synthesis outcomes. Taken together with Section 4.1, these patterns suggest that high thesis accuracy, the conventional way to assess the reasoning capability of LLMs, does not by itself demonstrate genuine reasoning. However, low thesis score reliably flags weak reasoning performance.

Generation Settings: GSM8K; $n = 300$ items per model per arm; three independent seeds; temperature 0.7; one dialectical round. Scripted arms make no antithesis-model call, so the only model calls are thesis and synthesis.

Reported Statistic: For each arm we report the share of *originally correct* answers that the model abandons after the second turn,

$$\text{capitulation} \;=\; \Pr\big(\text{synthesis incorrect} \;\big|\; \text{thesis correct}\big),$$

as mean $\pm$ standard deviation over the three seeds. Conditioning on an initially correct answer is what makes the arms comparable: each is scored on the same question — does this challenge dislodge an answer the model had already got right?



Figure 12: **O1 produces effective antitheses but rarely exploits them: Δ is mostly negative and synthesis stays close to the thesis.** Distance Correlation Analysis of Dialectical Reasoning Performance for O1. The correlation values reveal notable patterns for the O1 model, a top performer. Thesis, OC, and synthesis scores exhibit strong, nearly linear correlations. However, the thesis–Δ subplot shows that in most cases, the model produces negative Δ values. This means that although O1 can generate antitheses that effectively challenge the thesis, it often fails to leverage these opposing views to reach a higher-order synthesis—indicating limited dialectical reasoning capability. Moreover, the narrow range of Δ values suggests that O1 tends to stay close to its original thesis, which explains the strong correlation between thesis and synthesis scores.

Model Panel: Phi-4, Qwen2.5-72B, Qwen3-32B, Qwen3-8B, Llama-3.3-70B, Ministral-8B, DeepSeek-R1 and DeepSeek-V3 — all open-weight and served locally, so that a scripted second turn can be injected directly into the conversation. All eight correspond to rows in Table 1.

I Static Process Scorers Do Not Predict Collapse Under SIEV

If a locally readable "soundness" score of the *initial* reasoning trace could already tell which answers survive a challenge, the dialectical interaction would be redundant. We test this directly with two standard process scorers, each applied to the initial trace only (blind to what the model does under the subsequent challenge):

1. a **process reward model** (PRM), Qwen2.5-Math-PRM-7B; and



Figure 13: **GPT-5 generates counterpoints but seldom integrates them; its trajectory is static rather than dynamic.** Distance Correlation Analysis of Dialectical Reasoning Performance for GPT-5. The correlation matrix reveals several notable patterns in GPT-5's dialectical reasoning behavior. While the model shows a strong correlation between thesis and synthesis performance, and a moderate link between synthesis and Δ,its ability to perform dialectical reasoning and leveraging oppositional views remains limited. The thesis–Δ correlation suggests that initial accuracy has some influence on dialectical improvement, but not reliably. More importantly, the weak correlations involving OC vs. Δ and OC vs. synthesis indicate that GPT-5 struggles to transform strong antitheses into meaningful synthesis. In other words, while the model can generate counterpoints, it often fails to use them constructively to reach higher-order reasoning. This behavior reflects a pattern where GPT-5's synthesis tends to align closely with its thesis, rather than evolving through dialectical engagement. The model's reasoning trajectory appears more static than dynamic, reinforcing the need to evaluate models not just by outcome accuracy, but by their ability to reason through structured and dynamic process.

2. an **LLM-as-judge soundness panel** of three strong models (Claude-Opus-4.7, GPT-5.5, Gemini-3.1-pro).

For each scorer we ask a single question: from the initial trace alone, can the score separate the reasoning that later *holds* under SIEV from the reasoning that *collapses*? Each scorer sees only the initial trace and is blind both to the final correctness of that trace and to what the model subsequently does under the antithesis. We report this as an AUC (0.5 = chance, 1.0 = perfect) over $n \approx 3{,}000$ initial traces spanning the paper's models.



Figure 14: Distance Correlation Analysis of Dialectical Reasoning Performance for DeepSeek R1. The correlation matrix for DeepSeek R1 reveals a more moderate dialectical reasoning profile compared to top-performing models like O1 and GPT-5. In our broader evaluation (Section 4.1), DeepSeek R1 ranks as a middle-tier model, with both its synthesis and OC scores noticeably lower than those of O1 and GPT-5. This is also reflected in the histogram plots: while the thesis scores peak near the maximum, the synthesis scores shift downward, clustering around the 80-point mark. Although DeepSeek R1 shows moderate correlations between thesis, synthesis, and Δ, its ability to make use of opposing views is limited. Similar to the general trend, the weak correlation between thesis and OC suggests that the presence of meaningful opposition in antitheses is not strongly related to the quality of the initial thesis. More importantly, the model often fails to integrate these opposing views into a higher-level synthesis. In many cases, the synthesis either closely mirrors the thesis or drops in quality—sometimes by as much as 30/100 points—highlighting the model's limited capacity for dynamic, dialectical reasoning. Overall, DeepSeek R1's performance reinforces the importance of evaluating models not just by their initial accuracy, but by how effectively they engage with and evolve through structured reasoning processes. Its behavior underscores the need for metrics that go beyond static correctness to assess genuine reasoning capability.

The resulting AUCs are reported in Table 3 in the main text.

Finding: Both scorers land barely above chance (Table 3): a fluent, locally "sound"-looking trace tells us little about whether the reasoning survives a substantive antithesis. This mirrors the paper's own observation that the initial thesis score only weakly predicts the synthesis score (Figure 5): a PRM or trace-judge answers "is this reasoning locally sound?"—a static-recall check a memorized or



Figure 15: **Even a large model degrades sharply: up to 40 points, with OC falling below 20.** Distance Correlation Analysis of Dialectical Reasoning Performance for Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct. The correlation matrix for Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct reveals a notably weaker dialectical reasoning profile, placing it below DeepSeek R1 in our broader evaluation. Both its synthesis and Oppositional Compliance (OC) scores are lower, as confirmed by the histogram plots: synthesis scores are widely dispersed and skewed toward lower values, while OC—measuring how often antitheses oppose the thesis—is also low and unevenly distributed. The overall correlation pattern resembles that of a mid-performing model like R1, but with more extreme values. For instance, the model's reasoning performance can degrade by as much as 40 points (out of 100), and its OC scores can drop below 20—indicating failure to generate meaningful opposition. Overall, Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct demonstrates how even large-scale models struggle with reasoning when perceived through a dynamic dialectical setting, reinforcing the need for evaluation frameworks that go beyond static accuracy.

pattern-matched trace can pass—whereas SIEV imposes a *dynamic* dialectical condition such a trace cannot fake its way through. This is precisely why SIEV separates traces these static scorers rate as identical, and why the interaction (not a static read) is the diagnostic.



Figure 16: **The weakest profile: higher thesis accuracy yields *larger* synthesis degradation, up to 60 points.** Distance Correlation Analysis of Dialectical Reasoning Performance for GPT-3.5. The correlation matrix for GPT-3.5 reveals the weakest dialectical reasoning profiles among all evaluated models. Across the board, its synthesis and Δ scores are low, and the histogram plots confirm this: synthesis scores are broadly scattered and skewed toward the lower end. One immediate different pattern comapred to other models is the strong correlation between thesis and Δ. The higher the thesis performance is the lower the Δ will be. The thesis-OC graph can shed light on this. With increased thesis performance, GPT-3.5 shows increased OC, and consequently with a model that lacks deep reasoning capabilities, it ends up to a lower quality synthesis. As graphs show, the model's performance can degrade as much as 60/100 points in some scenarios. Overall, GPT-3.5 demonstrates limited capacity for dynamic reasoning.

J Validating the Synthesis Score: Jury at Scale, Checked Against Human Scoring

Does a low synthesis score mark reasoning that is genuinely non-genuine, or could it be an artifact of the scoring? Answering this at the scale of the paper's model panel rules out hand annotation, so the validation instrument is an automatic *jury*; the hand-scored sample described at the end exists solely to establish that the jury's judgements track human ones.

The Rubric: Both the jury and the human scorers apply the same two anchored scales to a dialectical trace, seeing only the question, the initial solution, the antithesis and the revised solution:



Figure 17: **More opposition as thesis accuracy rises, yet synthesis collapses—degradations above 60 points.** Distance Correlation Analysis of Dialectical Reasoning Performance for GPT-5-chat. The correlation matrix for GPT-5-chat reveals a weak dialectical reasoning profile, placing it among the lowest-performing models in our broader evaluation. Both synthesis and Δ scores are low, as confirmed by the histogram plots: synthesis scores are broadly scattered and skewed toward the lower range, while Δ values show limited improvement and frequent degradation. When opposition is present, the model often fails to integrate it into a higher-order synthesis, resulting in reasoning trajectories that either stagnate or degrade (more than 60/100 points degradations in some cases). A notable contrast emerges when comparing GPT-5-chat to GPT-3.5, another low-performing model. GPT-3.5 exhibits a strong correlation between thesis and Δ, where higher thesis scores often lead to greater synthesis degradation due to increased OC. In contrast, GPT-5-chat does not show a strong thesis–Δ correlation, yet it does exhibit a high correlation between thesis and OC. This suggests that while GPT-5-chat generates more opposition as thesis performance increases, its reasoning trajectory falls apart ending up to have very low synthesis scores. Overall, GPT-5-chat demonstrates limited capacity for dynamic reasoning, yet again, reinforcing the need for evaluation frameworks that go beyond static accuracy and assess how models engage with and evolve through structured dynamic settings.

- **R1 — is the objection substantive?** (binary $0/1$; secondary, a guard on the antithesis). 0 = vacuous or generic doubt with no content; or no actual objection by the end; or an objection landing on the *same* final answer as the initial solution. 1 = a specific, on-topic objection

proposing a genuinely different answer or a substantive logical challenge—even if it later proves mistaken.

- **R2 — is the revised solution genuine reasoning?** (0–3; PRIMARY). 0 = capitulation: adopts the objection's answer with no valid pushback, merely restates the objection, or ends on a third value or an evasive "cannot be determined". 1 = merely restates the initial solution without engaging. 2 = shallow merge. 3 = genuine weighing of both positions with explicit justification.

Two rules govern the boundary cases: keeping the initial answer and defending it *on the merits* scores 3, not 0; and changing away from the initial answer caps R2 at 1 unless the change is a genuinely-reasoned correction. We define *non-genuine* as $\mathrm{R2} \leq 1$.

Stage 1 — The Jury, Run Across the Full Panel: The jury is three frontier models judging independently—Claude-Opus-4.7, GPT-5.5 and Gemini-3.1-pro—each applying the rubric above. Run across *all* the models in the paper, the jury judges *98%* of low-synthesis-score cases non-genuine. This is the result that validates the metric: a low score marks reasoning that independent automatic judges also decline to call genuine, and it is established at panel scale rather than on a sample.

Stage 2 — Is the Jury Trustworthy? A Hand-Scored Check: A jury is only as good as its agreement with human judgement, so we hand-scored a small, blind, balanced sample and compared. *This sample is a check on the jury, not an independent validation of SIEV.*

Sample. $n = 120$ traces in a fully balanced $2 \times 2 \times 2$ design with 15 per cell: two models (Qwen3-32B, Qwen3-8B) $\times$ two antithesis types $\times$ two outcomes. The antithesis types are a *controlled misleading* objection, which serves as a calibration anchor because it is known to be wrong, and SIEV's own *self-generated* antithesis, the framework as actually run. The outcomes are traces where the model *held* its original answer and traces where it *abandoned* it. Held and abandoned appear in equal numbers, so no label can be recovered from a base rate.

Blinding. Scorers saw four fields only: the question, the initial solution, the objection and the revised solution. Model identity and the condition labels were withheld, and the gold answer was not displayed by default (a per-item reveal was available for hard problems). The instruction was to grade the reasoning *process*, not to solve the problem, and not to reward length or a confident tone. The standing direction shown above every item read: *"Judge the process, blind to correctness—do not compute the true answer. The primary score is R2 (the revised solution); R1 (the objection) is secondary."*

Agreement. Scoring was independent, in separate copies, with no visibility into any other scorer's labels. Human–human agreement on the binary non-genuine verdict is 95.0%, Cohen's $\kappa = 0.90$; it is complete ($\kappa = 1.00$) on the controlled misleading antithesis and lower ($\kappa = 0.79$) on SIEV's self-generated antithesis. On these same 120 traces the jury reproduces the human judgements at $\kappa \approx 0.83$–0.93, finding 85% of capitulations non-genuine and 0% of held cases. That correspondence is what licenses running the jury at panel scale.

Residual disagreement is concentrated in one nameable case: the model genuinely re-derives its reasoning but arrives at a wrong answer, and scorers differ on whether engaged-but-wrong counts as genuine. That is a definitional ambiguity in the construct rather than noise, which is why we describe it instead of pooling it away.

What This Establishes: Taken together: a low synthesis score reliably marks reasoning that independent judges decline to call genuine, established automatically across the full model panel, with the jury's judgements shown to track human ones on a blind balanced sample. The hand-scored set is a measurement instrument for the jury and is deliberately small—SIEV exists precisely so that assessing reasoning at scale does not require human annotation.

K Extended Discussion and Limitations

Section 5 states these points in brief; the longer form is kept here.

What the Answer-Level Definition of OC Leaves Out: OC is defined on final answers: an item counts as opposed when exactly one of the thesis and the antithesis is correct. This keeps the metric objective and automatically checkable at scale, which is what lets SIEV run unchanged across

models and benchmarks. The residual it does not capture is the case where an antithesis changes the *reasoning* but arrives at the same answer, which is scored as non-opposing. The genuineness rubric of Appendix J speaks to this residual directly, since raters and the jury score the quality of a revision rather than its answer. Quantifying how large that class is—and whether a reasoning-level opposition measure would reorder models—is left to future work.

SIEV as a General Approach: It is important to note that SIEV is not a benchmark itself, but a dialectical approach to benchmark models. Rather than specifying exact questions to be solved (as benchmarks do), it defines how the assessment process should be conducted. So, SIEV can be applied to any benchmark and is not tied to a specific one. This flexibility allows SIEV to serve as a general approach for assessing the reasoning capabilities of LLMs across diverse settings and topics.

SIEV as Diagnostic Stress Test: Beyond this generality, an important distinction concerns SIEV's intended role. SIEV is not designed to improve task accuracy or to certify that a model possesses "true reasoning." Rather, SIEV functions as a *diagnostic stress test*: it reveals when high correctness masks fragile reasoning trajectories. The negative Δ values observed across models (Table 1) are not failures of the method—they are the finding. If a model cannot distinguish a valid stance from an invalid challenge, or cannot maintain its reasoning after encountering a counter-position, that is diagnostic evidence of non-robust understanding for that topic. Crucially, the results are not uniformly negative: cross-model experiments (Appendix E) show that synthesis can *improve* under diverse antitheses, and topic-level analysis (Appendix F) reveals domains where specific models achieve positive Δ. These nuances confirm that SIEV is diagnostic, not destructive.

It is worth stating the direction of the claim precisely, because it bounds what the score can be used for. SIEV is a *falsifier*, not a certifier: a low synthesis score is evidence that the reasoning behind a correct answer is not robust, whereas a high score is not *necessarily* a certificate that the reasoning is genuine—a model may hold its answer for reasons SIEV does not observe. Correctness is necessary but not sufficient, and so is resistance. The validation in Appendix J therefore establishes the low-score direction: SIEV is a scalable way to detect the non-genuine reasoning that correctness hides.

What SIEV Does Not Measure: SIEV targets one property of reasoning—robustness under substantive opposition—and deliberately grades the *outcome* of the dialectical exchange rather than the internal structure of the reasoning that produced it. Faithfulness (whether the stated reasoning is the reasoning actually used), step-level validity, and internal coherence are distinct properties that SIEV does not assess, and a model could score well here while failing any of them. Two extensions follow naturally: grading the intermediate reasoning tokens themselves, and grouping several sampled trajectories per item so that the antithesis is drawn from the model's own distribution of answers rather than generated on request. We leave both to future work.

Extended Limitations

Opposition Quality: OC records whether an antithesis *opposes* the thesis, not how good that opposition is: a formally opposing antithesis may still be shallow or irrelevant. Extending OC to capture degrees or categories of opposition—while preserving automation—remains an important direction.

Synthesis Quality and Evaluation Granularity: SIEV scores synthesis by correctness (p_S) and DS, but synthesis quality is multidimensional: an integration can be logically coherent yet factually incorrect, or the reverse. Finer-grained assessment—of causal structure, logical entailment, or self-consistency—would yield richer insight.

Prompt-Following vs. Reasoning: Since SIEV introduces structured interactions, a natural concern is whether it evaluates reasoning or merely instruction-following. As discussed in Appendix E, several observations—sharp cross-model divergence under identical prompts, pairing-dependent synthesis shifts, and minimal prompt design with context isolation—argue against a purely prompt-driven explanation. More broadly, this concern applies to *any* structured evaluation, including standardized prompts, CoT elicitation, and multi-agent debate, all of which shape model behavior through instructions. SIEV's advantage is its transparent, reproducible protocol, minimal prompts, and cross-model design as a built-in control. These properties help attribute differences to integration dynamics rather than prompt-specific effects.

What SIEV Does Not Measure, by Design: SIEV grades the *outcome* of the dialectical exchange, not the internal structure of the reasoning that produced it. Its metrics are defined on outcomes throughout—whether an antithesis opposes the thesis (OC), whether the synthesis is correct (p_S), combined in DS—so they record *that* an opposition occurred, not how good it was, and *that* an integration succeeded, not how well it was argued. Faithfulness, step-level validity and coherence are likewise outside its scope. This is a deliberate trade, not an oversight: outcome-level definitions are what keep the protocol automatic, benchmark-agnostic, and cheap enough to run across an entire model panel, whereas grading the internal structure or the quality of an argument would require per-benchmark instrumentation or human annotation at a scale SIEV exists to avoid. Recovering quality-level judgements without giving up that scalability is an open direction.

Scope of the validation. Our validation is automatic and runs at panel scale: a jury of three frontier models judges every dialectical trace, and establishes that a low synthesis score reliably marks reasoning that independent judges also decline to call genuine. The blind, hand-scored sample of 120 traces is not a second validation of SIEV but a check on the jury—it establishes that the jury's verdicts track human ones closely enough to be trusted at scale. What we do not claim is a population-scale human annotation study.