BEYOND PARAMETER SPACE: CLOSED-FORM CROSS-TRAJECTORY REPAIR AFTER HARMFUL FINE-TUNING

Anonymous authors
Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

Safety-aligned language models are routinely adapted after deployment to improve downstream task performance, yet the fine-tuning process may be vulnerable to a small fraction of harmful examples that compromise their safety alignment. Existing safety repair methods intervene through diverse mechanisms, including parameter or update modification, model merging, and additional optimization. However, harmful fine-tuning can also change the internal representations propagated through the model, so the aligned reference and attacked models may reach the same module with different representations even for the same input. Motivated by this observation, we propose **CCTR** (**C**losed-Form **C**ross-**T**rajectory **R**epair), a post-hoc repair method that fits the full cross-trajectory output residual on representations produced by the attacked model while constraining output drift on task-agnostic utility activations. For each target linear module, these two objectives form a regularized least-squares problem with a closed-form solution, enabling repair without gradient-based optimization or downstream-task supervision. Compared with the strongest state-of-the-art safety repair method, CCTR lowers the average Harmful Score from 2.30% to 0.38% across varying harmful-data ratios. In experiments on different downstream tasks, it lowers the score from 2.85% to 0.77% and improves average task accuracy by 3.53%.

1 INTRODUCTION

Safety-aligned language models often require further fine-tuning after deployment to support downstream applications. However, while downstream fine-tuning improves task-specific capabilities, harmful examples in user-provided or third-party training data can compromise the model's safety alignment (Qi et al., 2024; Huang et al., 2024; Lyu et al., 2024). This creates a practical repair setting in which the fine-tuned checkpoint already exists and safety must be restored without sacrificing the useful task capabilities acquired during fine-tuning.

Prior work on post-hoc safety repair has explored several directions. One line modifies the fine-tuned model through parameter projection, delta correction, or pruning (Hsu et al., 2024; Lu et al., 2025; Huang et al., 2025). Another line restores safety through additional post-hoc optimization (Zhang et al., 2026b; Wang et al., 2025). A third line combines safety-aligned and adapted model components through model merging (Djuhera et al., 2026; Ma et al., 2025). Despite their different mechanisms, these methods mainly operate by modifying or combining model parameters after harmful fine-tuning. However, the output of a module depends not only on its local weights but also on the representation propagated from preceding layers. As the fine-tuned model processes the same input through successive layers, its hidden representations can progressively diverge from those of the aligned model. Consequently, a correction derived only from local parameter differences may be insufficient to recover the aligned output behavior.

Figure 1 illustrates this problem at a local module. We refer to the original safety-aligned model as the aligned reference model and the model obtained after harmful fine-tuning as the attacked model. For a linear module l, let $X_{\mathrm{ref},l}$ and $X_{\mathrm{att},l}$ denote the input representations received by the module, $W_{\mathrm{ref},l}$ and $W_{\mathrm{att},l}$ the corresponding weights, and $Y_{\mathrm{ref},l}$ and $Y_{\mathrm{att},l}$ their outputs. Although the two models receive the same external prompt, differences accumulated in preceding layers generally lead to different module inputs, so $X_{\mathrm{ref},l}$ and $X_{\mathrm{att},l}$ need not be the same.

Reviewers: please read the Reviewer Guidelines (iclr.cc/Conferences/2027/ReviewerGuidelines) and the AI Policy for Reviewers (iclr.cc/Conferences/2027/AIPolicyForReviewers). If you used AI to expand, edit, or polish your review, please provide the input text to the LLM. Better still, consider skipping the LLM and submitting your original text: we, and the authors, are much more interested in your unedited thoughts than in what an LLM has to say. AI-assisted or not, you are putting your name and reputation behind your review: LLM-generated falsehoods, hallucinations or misrepresentations are subject to disciplinary action, which may include desk-rejecting all papers you have authored.



Figure 1: **Problem setting and motivation.** Harmful fine-tuning can cause the attacked model to follow a different hidden-state trajectory from the aligned reference. The reference-weight output isolates the parameter-only output correction P_l, while T_l captures the additional correction associated with representation-trajectory divergence and R_l denotes the full cross-trajectory output residual. The right panel measures how much of R_l remains unexplained by P_l and how well their directions align.

To isolate the output difference explained by the local parameter change, we define the reference-weight output $Y_{\mathrm{rw},l} = W_{\mathrm{ref},l} X_{\mathrm{att},l}$, which applies the aligned-reference weight to the attacked representation. The difference $P_l = Y_{\mathrm{rw},l} - Y_{\mathrm{att},l}$ is the *parameter-only output correction*, representing the output change obtained by changing the local weight while keeping $X_{\mathrm{att},l}$ fixed. The additional term $T_l = Y_{\mathrm{ref},l} - Y_{\mathrm{rw},l}$ is the *trajectory-dependent correction*, capturing the effect of the difference between the aligned and attacked representation trajectories. Their sum $R_l = Y_{\mathrm{ref},l} - Y_{\mathrm{att},l} = P_l + T_l$ is the *full cross-trajectory output residual*. We call the discrepancy between P_l and R_l the *local parameter–output mismatch*.

We examine whether the parameter-only output correction P_l can adequately approximate the full cross-trajectory output residual R_l using two diagnostics shown in Figure 1. The normalized residual $\|R_l - P_l\|_F^2 / \|R_l\|_F^2$ measures how much of R_l remains unexplained by P_l, whereas the cosine similarity $\cos(P_l, R_l)$ measures their directional alignment. Across SST-2, AG News, and GSM8K at harmful ratio $p = 0.2$, 99.47–99.89% of the normalized residual remains and the cosine similarity is only 0.034–0.075. Thus, P_l is insufficient both in its coverage of R_l and in its direction. The detailed aggregation protocol and additional layer- and module-level analyses are provided in Appendix A.

Motivated by this observation, we propose CCTR (**C**losed-Form **C**ross-**T**rajectory **R**epair), a post-hoc method that directly fits the full cross-trajectory output residual R_l on representations produced by the attacked model. On safety calibration samples, CCTR learns an additive patch ΔW_l to reproduce R_l on representations produced by the attacked model, while task-agnostic utility activations constrain the patch to induce little output drift. The resulting regularized least-squares problem admits a module-wise closed-form solution, enabling lightweight repair without iterative gradient optimization.

With a single fixed configuration, CCTR lowers average Harmful Score from 2.30% to 0.38% on the five-ratio SST-2 evaluation and from 2.85% to 0.77% across six task–ratio evaluations, while maintaining or improving task accuracy. The same configuration remains effective across four model families, different fine-tuning data scales, AdvBench source shifts, and independent safety benchmarks. Controlled target interpolation further shows that the trajectory-dependent correction T_l contributes essential repair information beyond the parameter-only output correction P_l.

Our contributions are summarized as follows:

- We identify and quantify a local parameter–output mismatch in which the parameter-only output correction can differ substantially from the full cross-trajectory output residual on attacked representations.

- We propose CCTR, a closed-form post-hoc repair method that fits the full cross-trajectory output residual on attacked representations while constraining output drift on task-agnostic utility activations.
- We evaluate CCTR across harmful-data ratios, downstream tasks, model families, data scales, source shifts, and independent safety benchmarks, with controlled analyses further verifying the contribution of the trajectory-dependent correction.

2 Related Work

2.1 Safety Preservation and Repair under Harmful Fine-Tuning

Further fine-tuning can weaken safety alignment even when downstream adaptation remains useful, motivating defenses against harmful or safety-degrading updates (Qi et al., 2024; Huang et al., 2024). Existing methods differ mainly in when and where they intervene. Before or during adaptation, Vaccine improves robustness through perturbation-aware alignment (Huang et al., 2024), VAA emphasizes vulnerable alignment examples before later fine-tuning (Chen et al., 2025), and AsFT constrains adaptation updates to remain near a safety-preserving region (Yang et al., 2026). Recent work further broadens this line: Antibody attenuates the influence of harmful gradients across alignment and fine-tuning (Nguyen et al., 2026), GuardSpace combines a safety-sensitive subspace with a harmful-resistant null space to constrain low-rank adaptation (Zhang et al., 2026a), and SafeMoE targets routing drift of harmful inputs in mixture-of-experts models (Kim et al., 2026). At the same time, recent empirical analysis questions whether safety can be cleanly isolated in a linear subspace, finding substantial entanglement between safety and general-purpose learning in both weight and activation spaces (Ponkshe et al., 2026). These representation-space analyses are closely related to our motivation, but they do not explicitly formulate post-hoc repair as recovering the module-output discrepancy between two different model trajectories. In contrast, CCTR uses the aligned and attacked trajectories jointly to define the local repair target on the representations produced by the attacked model. These approaches aim to prevent or reduce degradation during adaptation, whereas CCTR assumes that a compromised checkpoint has already been produced.

Post-hoc methods instead modify the model after fine-tuning. Safe LoRA projects fine-tuning updates toward a safety-aligned subspace (Hsu et al., 2024); Safe Delta compensates safety-critical parameter changes (Lu et al., 2025); Antidote prunes harmful parameters (Huang et al., 2025); and IRR identifies and removes unsafe deltas followed by recalibration (Wu et al., 2025). Other methods use additional optimization or model composition: Safety at One Shot performs safety patching with a single safe instance (Zhang et al., 2026b), Panacea learns a post-fine-tuning perturbation (Wang et al., 2025), while SafeMERGE and LED-Merging combine aligned and adapted model components (Djuhera et al., 2026; Ma et al., 2025). These methods differ substantially in how they modify parameters, fine-tuning updates, or model components. CCTR takes a complementary perspective by explicitly constructing the full cross-trajectory output residual from the aligned-reference and attacked-model trajectories and fitting it on representations produced by the attacked model.

2.2 Closed-Form Model Editing

Model editing studies how to induce targeted behavioral changes while limiting collateral effects. ROME performs a rank-one update to modify a factual association (Meng et al., 2022), MEMIT extends this idea to many factual edits (Meng et al., 2023), EMMET unifies memorization and preservation objectives in a direct editing formulation (Gupta et al., 2024), and AlphaEdit constrains updates to a null space to reduce interference with unrelated knowledge (Fang et al., 2025). These works show that local input–output constraints can be translated into efficient parameter updates. Their preservation objectives typically constrain collateral changes within a single model state. Our setting is different: the repair target is defined from the discrepancy between an aligned reference trajectory and an attacked trajectory, while the patch must act on attacked-model representations. CCTR therefore adopts the analytic editing perspective but extends it to a two-checkpoint setting, constructing its target from cross-trajectory output residuals and constraining output drift on task-agnostic utility activations.



Figure 2: **Overview of CCTR.** Frozen reference and attacked models provide the safety and utility signals required for repair. At each target module, CCTR constructs the full cross-trajectory output residual, forms safety and utility statistics, solves the utility-constrained local system in closed form, and writes the resulting patch only to the repaired copy. Repair statistics remain fixed on the frozen model trajectories throughout the procedure.

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 PROBLEM SETUP

We denote the safety-aligned reference model by M_{ref}, the attacked model obtained after harmful fine-tuning by M_{att}, and the repaired model initialized from M_{att} by M_{rep}. Let $\mathcal{L}$ denote the set of target linear modules. For each module $l \in \mathcal{L}$, CCTR applies an additive weight patch

$$W_{\text{rep},l} = W_{\text{att},l} + \Delta W_l. \tag{1}$$

We assume access to frozen M_{ref} and M_{att}, a small safety calibration set $\mathcal{D}_s$, and a task-agnostic utility set $\mathcal{D}_u$. No downstream-task data or labels are used during repair. All repair statistics are collected from the frozen pair $(M_{\text{ref}}, M_{\text{att}})$, and only M_{rep} is updated. Figure 2 summarizes the module-wise repair pipeline.

3.2 CROSS-TRAJECTORY OUTPUT RESIDUAL

For the safety calibration set $\mathcal{D}_s$, we use the superscript s to denote safety-calibration quantities. Let $X^s_{\text{ref},l}$ and $X^s_{\text{att},l}$ be the input activations reaching module l in the reference and attacked models, respectively. Their corresponding outputs are

$$Y^s_{\text{ref},l} = W_{\text{ref},l} X^s_{\text{ref},l}, \qquad Y^s_{\text{att},l} = W_{\text{att},l} X^s_{\text{att},l}. \tag{2}$$

Following the construction introduced in Figure 1, we define the reference-weight output on the attacked representation as

$$Y^s_{\text{rw},l} = W_{\text{ref},l} X^s_{\text{att},l}. \tag{3}$$

The three correction terms are then

$$P^s_l = Y^s_{\text{rw},l} - Y^s_{\text{att},l}, \qquad T^s_l = Y^s_{\text{ref},l} - Y^s_{\text{rw},l}, \qquad R^s_l = Y^s_{\text{ref},l} - Y^s_{\text{att},l} = P^s_l + T^s_l. \tag{4}$$

Here, P^s_l is the parameter-only output correction at fixed attacked representations, T^s_l is the trajectory-dependent correction, and R^s_l is the full cross-trajectory output residual.

Because the patch is applied to the attacked model, it acts on $X^s_{\text{att},l}$. Thus, the local safety target is

$$\Delta W_l X^s_{\text{att},l} \approx R^s_l. \tag{5}$$

CCTR therefore fits the full cross-trajectory output residual R^s_l rather than using the parameter-only output correction P^s_l as a proxy.

3.3 UTILITY-CONSTRAINED REPAIR OBJECTIVE

Let $X^u_{\mathrm{att},l}$ denote the input activations collected from M_{att} on $\mathcal{D}_u$, and let N_s and N_u denote the numbers of valid safety and utility activation columns, respectively.

To preserve useful behavior acquired during downstream fine-tuning, we penalize output changes induced by the patch on utility activations. Before covariance conditioning, the local token-mean repair objective is

$$\min_{\Delta W_l} \frac{1}{N_s} \left\| \Delta W_l X^s_{\mathrm{att},l} - R^s_l \right\|_F^2 + \frac{\mu}{N_u} \left\| \Delta W_l X^u_{\mathrm{att},l} \right\|_F^2 + \lambda \left\| \Delta W_l \right\|_F^2 . \tag{6}$$

The three terms respectively fit R^s_l, limit output drift on utility activations, and regularize the local update. The coefficient μ controls utility preservation, while λ stabilizes the solve. The reported values of μ and λ are applied to the normalized system described below.

Define the utility covariance statistic $H^u_l = \frac{1}{N_u} X^u_{\mathrm{att},l} X^{u\top}_{\mathrm{att},l}$. Thus, directions strongly represented by utility activations receive larger penalties, providing data-dependent utility preservation without downstream-task labels or training data. Appendix B gives the trace-form derivation.

3.4 CLOSED-FORM SOLUTION

For the safety calibration data, define

$$H^s_l = \frac{1}{N_s} X^s_{\mathrm{att},l} X^{s\top}_{\mathrm{att},l}, \qquad C^s_l = \frac{1}{N_s} R^s_l X^{s\top}_{\mathrm{att},l}. \tag{7}$$

Differentiating Eq. (6) gives the local normal equation. We then symmetrize, diagonally damp, and normalize the covariance statistics, while scaling C^s_l consistently, to obtain $\bar{H}^s_l$, $\bar{H}^u_l$, and $\bar{C}^s_l$. Appendix B gives the exact conditioning procedure.

The normalized system and its closed-form solution are

$$S_l = \bar{H}^s_l + \mu \bar{H}^u_l + \lambda I, \qquad \Delta W_l = \bar{C}^s_l S_l^{-1}. \tag{8}$$

Since $\bar{H}^s_l, \bar{H}^u_l \succeq 0$ and $\lambda > 0$, S_l is positive definite and the solution is unique. We solve the system by Cholesky factorization without forming S_l^{-1}, using FP32 for statistics and solves before casting the patch to the model dtype.

The utility statistic $\bar{H}^u_l$ suppresses updates along directions strongly supported by utility activations, while the safety statistics determine the directions needed to fit R^s_l. All statistics are collected once from the frozen pair $(M_{\mathrm{ref}}, M_{\mathrm{att}})$, so patches written to earlier modules do not alter the targets used for later modules. After all patches are applied, M_{rep} is evaluated through its ordinary forward pass.

Algorithm 1 summarizes the repair procedure, which requires no backward pass or gradient-based optimizer.

Algorithm 1 Closed-Form Cross-Trajectory Repair

Require: Frozen $M_{\mathrm{ref}}, M_{\mathrm{att}}$; calibration sets $\mathcal{D}_s, \mathcal{D}_u$; target modules $\mathcal{L}$; μ, λ and damping
Ensure: Repaired model M_{rep}

```
M_rep ← copy(M_att)
for each target module l ∈ L do
    Collect Y^s_{ref,l}, Y^s_{att,l}, X^s_{att,l}, and X^u_{att,l}
    R^s_l ← Y^s_{ref,l} − Y^s_{att,l}                                   Eq. (4)
    Form H^s_l, H^u_l, and C^s_l
    Condition the statistics to obtain H̄^s_l, H̄^u_l, and C̄^s_l
    S_l ← H̄^s_l + μ H̄^u_l + λ I
    Solve ΔW_l S_l = C̄^s_l by Cholesky factorization                    Eq. (8)
    W_{rep,l} ← W_{att,l} + ΔW_l                                        Eq. (1)
end for
return M_rep
```

4 EXPERIMENTS

4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

Models, datasets, and metrics. Our primary experiments use Llama-2-7B-chat (Touvron et al., 2023) on SST-2 (Socher et al., 2013), AG News (Zhang et al., 2015), and GSM8K (Cobbe et al., 2021). We further evaluate cross-model generality on Llama-3-8B-Instruct (Grattafiori et al., 2024), Gemma-2-9B-IT (Gemma Team et al., 2024), and Qwen2-7B-Instruct (Yang et al., 2024). We use BeaverTails (Ji et al., 2023) for harmful fine-tuning and primary safety evaluation. Harmful Score (HS, ↓) is defined as the percentage of outputs classified as harmful among 1,000 model responses, while Task Accuracy (Acc, ↑) is measured on a fixed set of 500 examples. Unless otherwise specified, we use greedy decoding. Full details of the fine-tuning, calibration, and evaluation protocols, including source-shift and independent evaluations, are provided in Appendix D.

Baselines. We compare against two groups of safety-repair baselines that differ in their operational setting. Panacea (Wang et al., 2025) and AsFT (Yang et al., 2026) are evaluated under their respective training-based repair protocols, rather than the same-checkpoint post-hoc setting. In contrast, Safe LoRA (Hsu et al., 2024), SafeMERGE (Djuhera et al., 2026), Safe Delta (Lu et al., 2025), Safety at One Shot (Zhang et al., 2026b), and LED-Merging (Ma et al., 2025) are evaluated as same-checkpoint post-hoc repair methods, matching the operational setting targeted by CCTR. We use the configuration recommended by each official repository, making only the compatibility and method-specific adjustments required under the shared threat model. The resulting settings are fixed across the remaining experiments, with final configurations reported in Appendix E.

Configuration. We construct attacked models by fine-tuning on a mixture of downstream-task and harmful examples. For SST-2 and AG News, we use 1,000 mixed training examples for 20 epochs. For GSM8K, we use 2,000 examples for 3 epochs. The harmful ratio p denotes the fraction of harmful examples in the mixed fine-tuning data, and we evaluate $p \in \{0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5\}$. Unless otherwise specified, CCTR uses $n_s = n_u = 128$, utility weight $\mu = 1$, regularization $\lambda = 10^{-3}$, relative diagonal damping of 0.01, a maximum sequence length of 512, and all seven target linear-module types in each Transformer block, totaling 224 modules for Llama-2-7B.

4.2 MAIN RESULTS

4.2.1 SAFETY REPAIR ACROSS HARMFUL-DATA RATIOS.

Across the five harmful-data ratios, harmful fine-tuning produces attacked models with an average task accuracy of 93.64% and an average HS of 67.90%, as shown in Table 1.

Among all competing methods, AsFT attains the lowest average HS of 2.30% with 92.28% average accuracy. Using the same repair hyperparameters across all ratios, CCTR lowers the average HS further to 0.38%, a reduction of 1.92 percentage points relative to AsFT, while maintaining comparable average accuracy at 92.24%. CCTR remains at 0.3–0.4% HS across all five harmful-data ratios.

Table 1: Safety repair performance on SST-2 under varying harmful-data ratios in the mixed fine-tuning data. HS is better when lower (↓), while Task Accuracy is better when higher (↑).

	Harmful Score (%) ↓						Task Accuracy (%) ↑					
Method	$p = 0.05$	$p = 0.1$	$p = 0.2$	$p = 0.4$	$p = 0.5$	Avg.	$p = 0.05$	$p = 0.1$	$p = 0.2$	$p = 0.4$	$p = 0.5$	Avg.
Attacked	42.90	62.70	74.60	79.30	80.00	67.90	93.40	94.00	94.00	93.20	93.60	93.64
Panacea	0.90	3.20	8.50	73.80	52.70	27.82	90.60	91.60	91.60	93.20	92.80	91.96
AsFT	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.70	2.80	2.30	92.20	92.20	92.20	92.40	92.40	92.28
Safe LoRA	30.50	54.60	66.90	71.90	72.60	59.30	93.40	93.60	93.80	93.60	93.60	93.60
SafeMERGE	7.90	11.20	21.30	29.80	33.00	20.64	**94.20**	**94.40**	93.60	93.60	93.60	93.88
Safe Delta	6.00	7.70	10.10	13.40	14.10	10.26	93.80	93.80	93.80	93.40	**93.80**	93.72
Safety at One Shot	9.30	13.90	19.10	28.20	30.60	20.22	93.60	94.00	**94.40**	**94.20**	**93.80**	**94.00**
LED-Merging	2.60	3.00	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	89.00	88.80	89.60	89.80	90.00	89.44
CCTR (Ours)	**0.40**	**0.40**	**0.40**	**0.40**	**0.30**	**0.38**	93.80	93.20	92.40	91.60	90.20	92.24

4.2.2 GENERALIZATION ACROSS TASKS AND HARMFUL-DATA RATIOS.

As shown in Table 2, CCTR attains an average HS of 0.77% and an average task accuracy of 64.03% over the six task–ratio settings at $p \in \{0.2, 0.5\}$. Among all competing methods, AsFT attains the lowest average HS of 2.85% with 60.50% average accuracy. Relative to AsFT, CCTR reduces average HS by 2.08 percentage points and improves average accuracy by 3.53 percentage points. Beyond task and ratio variation, the same fixed configuration maintains 0.4–0.6% HS and 91.8–93.2% SST-2 accuracy as the mixed fine-tuning set grows from 1K to 3K records at $p = 0.2$. Appendix F.1 reports the complete data-scale comparison.

Table 2: Generalization across downstream tasks and harmful-data ratios. Each task reports HS (↓) and Acc (↑) at $p = 0.2$ and $p = 0.5$.

	SST-2				AG News				GSM8K				Average	
	$p = 0.2$		$p = 0.5$		$p = 0.2$		$p = 0.5$		$p = 0.2$		$p = 0.5$		HS	Acc
Method	HS↓	Acc↑	HS↓	Acc↑	HS↓	Acc↑	HS↓	Acc↑	HS↓	Acc↑	HS↓	Acc↑	↓	↑
Attacked	74.6	94.0	80.0	93.6	72.3	81.6	80.0	59.4	67.4	24.8	67.6	24.2	73.65	62.93
Panacea	8.5	91.6	52.7	92.8	5.7	68.0	49.1	54.2	72.8	1.4	69.3	0.8	43.02	51.47
AsFT	2.1	92.2	2.8	92.4	2.2	69.2	2.1	68.0	3.8	20.4	4.1	20.8	2.85	60.50
Safe LoRA	66.9	93.8	72.6	93.6	65.9	**82.4**	75.8	63.4	61.4	26.6	64.1	23.8	67.78	63.93
SafeMERGE	21.3	93.6	33.0	93.6	21.0	79.6	33.0	63.6	18.5	24.0	26.1	23.2	25.48	62.93
Safe Delta	10.1	93.8	14.1	**93.8**	8.9	70.0	13.6	56.0	13.6	**29.0**	22.8	25.8	13.85	61.40
Safety at One Shot	19.1	**94.4**	30.6	**93.8**	19.5	67.8	28.2	68.8	71.0	23.6	74.4	**26.2**	40.47	62.43
LED-Merging	2.8	89.6	2.8	90.0	3.2	60.2	3.0	58.4	6.9	26.0	10.6	25.2	4.88	58.23
CCTR (Ours)	**0.4**	92.4	**0.3**	90.2	**0.1**	77.8	**0.5**	**77.6**	**1.2**	24.2	**2.1**	22.0	**0.77**	**64.03**

4.2.3 GENERALIZATION ACROSS MODEL FAMILIES.

Table 3 evaluates the same fixed CCTR configuration across four model families. CCTR obtains HS values of 0.40%, 3.70%, 1.00%, and 4.10%, while retaining 92.40–95.20% SST-2 accuracy. On Qwen, the attacked model has an HS of 7.80%. CCTR reduces HS to 4.10% with 94.60% accuracy.

Table 3: Cross-model generalization on SST-2 at $p = 0.2$. The same CCTR repair hyperparameters and target-module selection rule are used across all four model families.

	Llama-2-7B-chat		Llama-3-8B-Instruct		Gemma-2-9B-IT		Qwen2-7B-Instruct		Average	
Method	HS↓	Acc↑	HS↓	Acc↑	HS↓	Acc↑	HS↓	Acc↑	HS↓	Acc↑
Attacked	74.60	94.00	56.20	93.80	60.70	95.00	7.80	94.00	49.83	94.20
Panacea	8.50	91.60	47.80	91.20	65.00	95.00	6.80	94.60	32.02	93.10
AsFT	2.10	92.20	7.30	92.20	2.50	94.60	5.10	94.00	4.25	93.25
Safe LoRA	66.90	93.80	33.00	93.40	22.70	95.00	6.60	94.60	32.30	94.20
SafeMERGE	21.30	93.60	73.00	**95.60**	76.50	95.00	11.60	**95.20**	45.60	**94.85**
Safe Delta	10.10	93.80	8.40	91.80	2.50	94.80	5.80	93.80	6.70	93.55
Safety at One Shot	19.10	**94.40**	5.60	94.20	2.60	95.00	**2.60**	94.00	7.48	94.40
LED-Merging	2.80	89.60	7.90	91.20	2.70	**95.20**	4.80	94.00	4.55	92.50
CCTR (Ours)	**0.40**	92.40	**3.70**	92.60	**1.00**	**95.20**	4.10	94.60	**2.30**	93.70

4.2.4 ROBUSTNESS TO ATTACK-SOURCE AND EVALUATION-SOURCE SHIFTS.

We evaluate two complementary source-shift settings using AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023). In the *attack-source shift*, we replace the harmful examples used for fine-tuning with AdvBench examples while retaining BeaverTails for safety evaluation. In the *evaluation-source shift*, we keep the standard BeaverTails-based fine-tuned models and evaluate safety on AdvBench. Figure 3 compares all methods under both settings. Across the two shifts, CCTR achieves the lowest HS among all compared methods while retaining competitive task accuracy, indicating that its repair effectiveness is robust to changes in both the harmful fine-tuning source and the safety evaluation source.

4.2.5 INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AND EFFICIENCY.

On SORRY-Bench, CCTR obtains the lowest unsafe fulfillment rate among the compared methods at 12.50%. On tinyMMLU-100, CCTR reaches 44%. The complete CCTR pipeline takes 6.76 minutes on average on a single A800-80GB GPU. Detailed evaluation and timing results are reported in Appendix F.



Figure 3: Robustness to AdvBench attack-source and evaluation-source shifts on SST-2 at $p = 0.2$. The attack-source shift changes the harmful fine-tuning source, while the evaluation-source shift changes the safety evaluation source.

4.3 Discussion

The discussion examines the role of R_l as the repair target from three complementary perspectives. Static weight interpolation tests whether a simple parameter-space path can reproduce the same safety–utility point. Controlled target interventions isolate the contribution of the trajectory-dependent correction T_l beyond the parameter-only output correction P_l and test whether the gains can be explained by rescaling or update magnitude. Component ablations further examine whether using R_l as the repair target and retaining the utility constraint are both necessary. Unless otherwise noted, all analyses in this section use the $p = 0.2$ attacked checkpoints.

Static weight interpolation. A simple alternative is to interpolate between the aligned and attacked LoRA weights:

$$W(\beta) = W_{\text{ref}} + \beta(W_{\text{att}} - W_{\text{ref}}), \qquad \beta \in [0, 1]. \tag{9}$$

The interpolation path exposes a clear safety–utility trade-off. The closest-accuracy point, $\beta = 0.25$, obtains 4.0% HS and 92.2% accuracy, whereas CCTR obtains 0.4% HS and 92.4% accuracy. At comparable accuracy, static interpolation therefore yields ten times higher HS and cannot reproduce the same safety–utility point. Appendix G.1 reports the complete interpolation path.

Controlled trajectory-term analysis. This analysis isolates the contribution of the trajectory-dependent correction T_l while keeping the repair system fixed. At each repaired module, we use $P_l + \alpha T_l$, where $\alpha \in \{0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1\}$, in place of $R_l = P_l + T_l$ as the repair target and solve the same utility-constrained closed-form system for every value of α. Because the attacked activations and system matrix remain fixed, this intervention traces the exact closed-form path from using P_l as the repair target to using R_l as the repair target. As shown in Figure 4, increasing α consistently reduces HS across all three tasks, from 32.3%, 30.4%, and 41.1% at $\alpha = 0$ to 0.4%, 0.1%, and 1.2% at $\alpha = 1$ on SST-2, AG News, and GSM8K, respectively.

Two additional controls test whether this improvement can be explained by simple rescaling of the parameter-only output correction or by a larger update magnitude. *Best-scaled* P preserves the direction of P and analytically selects the nonnegative scale that best approximates R on a disjoint 128-prompt safety holdout. Neither HS nor task accuracy is used to select this scale. Even under this favorable scaling, the resulting HS remains substantially higher than that obtained when R is used as the repair target.

Magnitude-matched P instead rescales the parameter-only repair update to match the global Frobenius norm of the update obtained when R is used as the repair target. Although this control reduces some harmful behavior, task accuracy drops to 0.2%, 1.8%, and 0.0% on SST-2, AG News, and GSM8K, respectively. By comparison, using R as the repair target retains 92.4%, 77.8%, and 24.2% accuracy in the same controlled analysis.

Together, the monotonic improvement from P_l to P_l+T_l and the failure of the two controls show that the contribution of T_l cannot be explained by target rescaling or update magnitude alone. Instead, the trajectory-dependent correction T_l changes the effective repair direction. The exact definitions and derivations of these controls are provided in Appendix G.3.



Figure 4: **Controlled trajectory-term analysis and parameter-only controls.** The connected path gives the exact closed-form solutions for targets $P_l + \alpha T_l$, ranging from P_l at $\alpha = 0$ to $R_l = P_l + T_l$ at $\alpha = 1$. The additional controls preserve the direction induced by P_l while either selecting the best residual-fitting scale or matching the global magnitude of the patch induced by R_l. Only using the full cross-trajectory output residual R_l as the repair target achieves both low HS and preserved task accuracy.

Core component ablation. The component ablation in Table 4 tests whether the two defining components of CCTR are individually necessary. Replacing $R_l = P_l + T_l$ with P_l raises HS to 30.4–41.1%, showing that the utility constraint alone cannot recover the trajectory-dependent correction. Removing the utility constraint keeps HS at most 0.4% but reduces task accuracy to 0.0–2.8%. Thus, full CCTR requires both R_l as the repair target and the utility statistic.

Table 4: Core component ablation on Llama-2-7B-chat at $p = 0.2$. The parameter-only and Full CCTR rows reuse the canonical $\alpha = 0$ and $\alpha = 1$ results from Figure 4.

Variant	Target	Safety	Utility	SST-2		AG News		GSM8K	
				HS↓	Acc↑	HS↓	Acc↑	HS↓	Acc↑
Parameter-only target P	P_l	H_l^s	H_l^u	32.30	**93.00**	30.40	**81.20**	41.10	**24.20**
No utility constraint	$P_l + T_l$	H_l^s	–	**0.00**	2.80	0.20	0.00	**0.40**	1.40
Full CCTR	$P_l + T_l$	H_l^s	H_l^u	0.40	92.40	**0.10**	77.80	1.20	**24.20**

Taken together, these analyses show that CCTR cannot be reduced to static parameter interpolation, rescaling of the parameter-only output correction, or increased update magnitude. The trajectory-dependent correction T_l provides the repair direction needed for safety recovery, while the utility statistic is necessary to preserve downstream behavior.

5 Conclusion

This work identifies a local parameter–output mismatch in post-hoc safety repair, where the parameter-only output correction can differ substantially from the full cross-trajectory output residual on attacked representations. CCTR addresses this mismatch with a closed-form repair that fits the full residual while constraining output drift on task-agnostic utility activations. Across harmful-data ratios, downstream tasks, four model families, fine-tuning data scales, and AdvBench-based source robustness tests, a single fixed configuration consistently improves safety while preserving task performance. Controlled analyses further show that both the trajectory-dependent correction and the utility covariance statistic are important to the final repair. Our evaluation is limited to 7B–9B open-weight models and a finite set of benchmarks, leaving broader validation to future work. CCTR also requires access to both the aligned reference and attacked models.

AI Use Statement

Generative AI tools were used to assist with language polishing and manuscript organization. All technical claims, experimental results, and analyses were produced and verified by the authors, who take full responsibility for the final content.

REFERENCES

Liang Chen, Xueting Han, Li Shen, Jing Bai, and Kam-Fai Wong. Vulnerability-aware alignment: Mitigating uneven forgetting in harmful fine-tuning. In *Proceedings of the 42nd International Conference on Machine Learning*, volume 267 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 8172–8183. PMLR, 2025. URL https://proceedings.mlr.press/v267/chen25w.html.

Karl Cobbe, Vineet Kosaraju, Mohammad Bavarian, Mark Chen, Heewoo Jun, Lukasz Kaiser, Matthias Plappert, Jerry Tworek, Jacob Hilton, Rei Nakano, Christopher Hesse, and John Schulman. Training verifiers to solve math word problems. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2110.14168*, 2021. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.14168.

Mike Conover, Matt Hayes, Ankit Mathur, Xiangrui Meng, Jianwei Xie, Jun Wan, Sam Shah, and Ali Ghodsi. Free dolly: Introducing the world's first truly open instruction-tuned LLM. Databricks Blog and Dolly-15k Dataset Release, 2023. URL https://www.databricks.com/blog/2023/04/12/dolly-first-open-commercially-viable-instruction-tuned-llm.

Aladin Djuhera, Swanand Ravindra Kadhe, Farhan Ahmed, Syed Zawad, and Holger Boche. SafeMERGE: Preserving safety alignment in fine-tuned large language models via selective layer-wise model merging. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2026*, pp. 35316–35335. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2026. doi: 10.18653/v1/2026.findings-acl.1761. URL https://aclanthology.org/2026.findings-acl.1761/.

Junfeng Fang, Houcheng Jiang, Kun Wang, Yunshan Ma, Jie Shi, Xiang Wang, Xiangnan He, and Tat-Seng Chua. AlphaEdit: Null-space constrained knowledge editing for language models. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2025. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=HvSytvg3Jh.

Gemma Team, Morgane Riviere, Shreya Pathak, Pier Giuseppe Sessa, Cassidy Hardin, Surya Bhupatiraju, Leonard Hussenot, Thomas Mesnard, Bobak Shahriari, Alexandre Rame, et al. Gemma 2: Improving open language models at a practical size. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.00118*, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.00118.

Aaron Grattafiori, Abhimanyu Dubey, et al. The llama 3 herd of models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.21783*, 2024.

Akshat Gupta, Dev Sajnani, and Gopala Anumanchipalli. A unified framework for model editing. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2024*, pp. 15403–15418. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2024. doi: 10.18653/v1/2024.findings-emnlp.903. URL https://aclanthology.org/2024.findings-emnlp.903/.

Dan Hendrycks, Collin Burns, Steven Basart, Andy Zou, Mantas Mazeika, Dawn Song, and Jacob Steinhardt. Measuring massive multitask language understanding. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2021. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=d7KBjmI3GmQ.

Chia-Yi Hsu, Yu-Lin Tsai, Chih-Hsun Lin, Pin-Yu Chen, Chia-Mu Yu, and Chun-Ying Huang. Safe LoRA: The silver lining of reducing safety risks when finetuning large language models. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 37, 2024. doi: 10.52202/079017-2078. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2024/hash/77baa7c2a3a675823e89131698fd6e19-Abstract-Conference.html.

Tiansheng Huang, Sihao Hu, and Ling Liu. Vaccine: Perturbation-aware alignment for large language models against harmful fine-tuning attack. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 37, 2024. doi: 10.52202/079017-2356. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2024/hash/873c86d9a979ab80d8e2919510d4446b-Abstract-Conference.html.

Tiansheng Huang, Gautam Bhattacharya, Pratik Joshi, Joshua Kimball, and Ling Liu. Antidote: Post-fine-tuning safety alignment for large language models against harmful fine-tuning attack. In *Proceedings of the 42nd International Conference on Machine Learning*, volume 267 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 25059–25074. PMLR, 2025. URL https://proceedings.mlr.press/v267/huang25b.html.

Jiaming Ji, Mickel Liu, Josef Dai, Xuehai Pan, Chi Zhang, Ce Bian, Boyuan Chen, Ruiyang Sun, Yizhou Wang, and Yaodong Yang. BeaverTails: Towards improved safety alignment of LLM via a human-preference dataset. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, 2023. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2023/hash/4dbb61cb68671edc4ca3712d70083b9f-Abstract-Datasets_and_Benchmarks.html.

Jaehan Kim, Minkyoo Song, Seungwon Shin, and Sooel Son. SafeMoE: Safe fine-tuning for MoE LLMs by aligning harmful input routing. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2026. URL https://proceedings.iclr.cc/paper_files/paper/2026/hash/34d3cf97696022b179171e5abda42c0b-Abstract-Conference.html.

Andreas Köpf, Yannic Kilcher, Dimitri von Rütte, Sotiris Anagnostidis, Zhi Rui Tam, Keith Stevens, Abdullah Barhoum, Duc Nguyen, Oliver Stanley, Richárd Nagyfi, Shahul ES, Sameer Suri, David Glushkov, Arnav Dantuluri, Andrew Maguire, Christoph Schuhmann, Huu Nguyen, and Alexander Mattick. Openassistant conversations—democratizing large language model alignment. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, 2023. doi: 10.52202/075280-2064. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2023/hash/949f0f8f32267d297c2d4e3ee10a2e7e-Abstract-Datasets_and_Benchmarks.html.

Ning Lu, Shengcai Liu, Jiahao Wu, Weiyu Chen, Zhirui Zhang, Yew-Soon Ong, Qi Wang, and Ke Tang. Safe delta: Consistently preserving safety when fine-tuning LLMs on diverse datasets. In *Proceedings of the 42nd International Conference on Machine Learning*, volume 267 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 40537–40559. PMLR, 2025. URL https://proceedings.mlr.press/v267/lu25g.html.

Kaifeng Lyu, Haoyu Zhao, Xinran Gu, Dingli Yu, Anirudh Goyal, and Sanjeev Arora. Keeping LLMs aligned after fine-tuning: The crucial role of prompt templates. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 37, 2024. doi: 10.52202/079017-3766. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2024/hash/d6f034bb216b472fc7d32ec7aff20342-Abstract-Conference.html.

Qianli Ma, Dongrui Liu, Qian Chen, Linfeng Zhang, and Jing Shao. LED-merging: Mitigating safety-utility conflicts in model merging with location-election-disjoint. In *Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pp. 21749–21767. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2025. doi: 10.18653/v1/2025.acl-long.1055. URL https://aclanthology.org/2025.acl-long.1055/.

Felipe Maia Polo, Lucas Weber, Leshem Choshen, Yuekai Sun, Gongjun Xu, and Mikhail Yurochkin. tinybenchmarks: Evaluating LLMs with fewer examples. In *Proceedings of the 41st International Conference on Machine Learning*, volume 235 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 34303–34326. PMLR, 2024. URL https://proceedings.mlr.press/v235/maia-polo24a.html.

Kevin Meng, David Bau, Alex Andonian, and Yonatan Belinkov. Locating and editing factual associations in GPT. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 35, 2022. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2022/hash/6f1d43d5a82a37e89b0665b33bf3a182-Abstract-Conference.html.

Kevin Meng, Arnab Sen Sharma, Alex Andonian, Yonatan Belinkov, and David Bau. Mass-editing memory in a transformer. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2023. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=MkbcAHIYgyS.

Quoc Nguyen, Trung Le, Jing Wu, Anh Bui, and Mehrtash Harandi. Antibody: Strengthening defense against harmful fine-tuning for large language models via attenuating

harmful gradient influence. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2026. URL https://proceedings.iclr.cc/paper_files/paper/2026/hash/c5d822eeba0e87592d8ed1d2168a62f0-Abstract-Conference.html.

Kaustubh Ponkshe, Shaan Shah, Raghav Singhal, and Praneeth Vepakomma. Safety subspaces are not linearly distinct: A fine-tuning case study. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2026. URL https://proceedings.iclr.cc/paper_files/paper/2026/hash/9a9f4e15ad0d680429a3e0570a96f763-Abstract-Conference.html.

Xiangyu Qi, Yi Zeng, Tinghao Xie, Pin-Yu Chen, Ruoxi Jia, Prateek Mittal, and Peter Henderson. Fine-tuning aligned language models compromises safety, even when users do not intend to! In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2024. URL https://proceedings.iclr.cc/paper_files/paper/2024/hash/83b7da3ed13f06c13ce82235c8eedf35-Abstract-Conference.html.

Richard Socher, Alex Perelygin, Jean Wu, Jason Chuang, Christopher D. Manning, Andrew Y. Ng, and Christopher Potts. Recursive deep models for semantic compositionality over a sentiment treebank. In *Proceedings of the 2013 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pp. 1631–1642. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2013. URL https://aclanthology.org/D13-1170/.

Rohan Taori, Ishaan Gulrajani, Tianyi Zhang, Yann Dubois, Xuechen Li, Carlos Guestrin, Percy Liang, and Tatsunori B. Hashimoto. Stanford alpaca: An instruction-following LLaMA model. Stanford Center for Research on Foundation Models, 2023. URL https://crfm.stanford.edu/2023/03/13/alpaca.html.

Hugo Touvron, Louis Martin, Kevin Stone, Peter Albert, Amjad Almahairi, Yasmine Babaei, Nikolay Bashlykov, Soumya Batra, Prajjwal Bhargava, Shruti Bhosale, et al. Llama 2: Open foundation and fine-tuned chat models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.09288*, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.09288.

Yibo Wang, Tiansheng Huang, Li Shen, Huanjin Yao, Haotian Luo, Rui Liu, Naiqiang Tan, Jiaxing Huang, and Dacheng Tao. Panacea: Mitigating harmful fine-tuning for large language models via post-fine-tuning perturbation. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 38, 2025. URL https://papers.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2025/hash/f827f8acffaa3ce6799fbabd10fba1c1-Abstract-Conference.html.

Di Wu, Xin Lu, Yanyan Zhao, and Bing Qin. Separate the wheat from the chaff: A post-hoc approach to safety re-alignment for fine-tuned language models. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2025*, pp. 1210–1225, Vienna, Austria, July 2025. Association for Computational Linguistics. doi: 10.18653/v1/2025.findings-acl.66. URL https://aclanthology.org/2025.findings-acl.66/.

Tinghao Xie, Xiangyu Qi, Yi Zeng, Yangsibo Huang, Udari Sehwag, Kaixuan Huang, Luxi He, Boyi Wei, Dacheng Li, Ying Sheng, Ruoxi Jia, Bo Li, Kai Li, Danqi Chen, Peter Henderson, and Prateek Mittal. SORRY-bench: Systematically evaluating large language model safety refusal. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2025. URL https://proceedings.iclr.cc/paper_files/paper/2025/hash/9622163c87b67fd5a4a0ec3247cf356e-Abstract-Conference.html.

An Yang, Baosong Yang, Binyuan Hui, Bo Zheng, Bowen Yu, Chang Zhou, Chengpeng Li, Chengyuan Li, Dayiheng Liu, Fei Huang, et al. Qwen2 technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.10671*, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.10671.

Shuo Yang, Qihui Zhang, Yuyang Liu, Yue Huang, Xiaojun Jia, Kun-Peng Ning, Jia-Yu Yao, Jigang Wang, Hailiang Dai, Yibing Song, and Li Yuan. AsFT: Anchoring safety during LLM fine-tuning within narrow safety basin. *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, 40 (40):34322–34330, 2026. doi: 10.1609/aaai.v40i40.40729. URL https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/40729.

Bingjie Zhang, Yibo Yang, Ren Zhe, Dandan Guo, Jindong Gu, Philip Torr, and Bernard Ghanem. A guardrail for safety preservation: When safety-sensitive subspace meets

harmful-resistant null-space. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2026a. URL https://proceedings.iclr.cc/paper_files/paper/2026/hash/d949ad2d45ba557f77327a5f720e73d3-Abstract-Conference.html.

Jiawen Zhang, Lipeng He, Kejia Chen, Jian Lou, Jian Liu, Xiaohu Yang, and Ruoxi Jia. Safety at one shot: Patching fine-tuned LLMs with a single instance. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2026b. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=EyH8Fu3vtZ.

Xiang Zhang, Junbo Zhao, and Yann LeCun. Character-level convolutional networks for text classification. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 28, 2015. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2015/hash/250cf8b51c773f3f8dc8b4be867a9a02-Abstract.html.

Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, J. Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043*, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.15043.

A Additional Trajectory Analysis

A.1 Local Parameter–Output Mismatch

For residual matrices A_l and B_l, we define the global inner product and norm across repaired modules as

$$\langle A, B\rangle_{\text{global}} = \sum_l \langle A_l, B_l\rangle_F, \qquad \|A\|^2_{\text{global}} = \sum_l \|A_l\|^2_F. \tag{10}$$

For held-out response tokens, we aggregate over all repaired modules and measure

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Normalized residual error} &= \frac{\|R-P\|^2_{\text{global}}}{\|R\|^2_{\text{global}}}, \\ \text{Cosine} &= \frac{\langle P, R\rangle_{\text{global}}}{\|P\|_{\text{global}}\|R\|_{\text{global}}}, \\ \text{Projection} &= \frac{\langle P, R\rangle_{\text{global}}}{\|R\|^2_{\text{global}}}. \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

Table 5 reports these diagnostics on held-out *response tokens*. Its final column reports the response-token best-fit scale

$$c^\star_{\text{resp}} = \max\left(0, \frac{\langle P, R\rangle_{\text{global}}}{\|P\|^2_{\text{global}}}\right), \tag{12}$$

computed under this restricted token scope. These diagnostic coefficients are distinct from the all-token, 128-prompt holdout scales used to construct the behavior controls in Figure 4. The parameter-only output correction shows very low directional alignment with the full cross-trajectory output residual and captures only a small fraction of it.

Table 5: Local parameter–output mismatch on held-out response tokens.

Task	Norm. residual error ↓	Cosine ↑	Projection ↑	Resp.-token scale $c^\star_{\text{resp}}$
SST-2	0.998937	0.0335	0.000866	1.2942
AG News	0.998905	0.0343	0.000866	1.3586
GSM8K	0.994699	0.0745	0.004384	1.2648

When averaged equally across layers, the normalized residual errors are 0.9963, 0.9969, and 0.9924 for SST-2, AG News, and GSM8K, respectively; the corresponding mean layer-wise cosine similarities are 0.0535, 0.0497, and 0.0891. Attention and MLP module groups exhibit the same pattern of high normalized residual error and low directional alignment.

A.2 Held-Out Alignment with the Full Cross-Trajectory Output Residual

Table 6 measures the cosine similarity between each method's realized local output correction and the proposed full cross-trajectory output residual R on held-out response tokens. CCTR reaches 0.6569–0.7263 across the three tasks, whereas the other post-hoc corrections remain between -0.0104 and 0.0717. This diagnostic directly evaluates whether the local correction produced by each method follows the target used by CCTR.

Table 6: Cosine similarity with the full cross-trajectory output residual on held-out response tokens. Higher is more aligned.

Method	SST-2	AG News	GSM8K
Safe LoRA	0.0186	0.0206	0.0513
SafeMERGE	-0.0055	-0.0052	-0.0104
Safe Delta	0.0325	0.0333	0.0717
Safety at One Shot	0.0189	0.0192	0.0232
LED-Merging	0.0235	0.0249	0.0715
CCTR	**0.6569**	**0.6631**	**0.7263**

A.3 Generalization to Held-Out Safety Data

Table 7 compares cosine similarity on the 128 calibration records and held-out safety records. The CCTR cosine decreases by only 0.0128 on SST-2, 0.0098 on AG News, and 0.0086 on GSM8K, indicating that the fitted correction direction transfers beyond the records used to form the sufficient statistics.

Table 7: Cosine similarity on calibration and held-out safety data.

	P-only		CCTR	
Task	Cal.	Held-out	Cal.	Held-out
SST-2	0.0336	0.0326	0.6697	0.6569
AG News	0.0339	0.0333	0.6729	0.6631
GSM8K	0.0723	0.0701	0.7349	0.7263

The held-out normalized residual errors for Best-scaled P and the realized CCTR correction are 0.5685/0.5996 on SST-2, 0.5603/0.5910 on AG News, and 0.4725/0.5132 on GSM8K.

A.4 Held-Out Output-Space Diagnostics along the Target Interpolation

The target interpolation in Figure 4 is complemented by two held-out output-space diagnostics. Safety target error measures normalized mismatch to the full cross-trajectory residual, while utility drift measures normalized output movement on held-out utility activations. The global magnitude-matching multipliers are 33.9151, 35.0433, and 14.9512 for SST-2, AG News, and GSM8K, respectively.

Table 8: Held-out output-space diagnostics along the $P + \alpha T$ target interpolation. Safety-target errors are rounded to three decimals.

	Safety target error ↓					Utility drift ↓				
Task/α	0	0.25	0.50	0.75	1	0	0.25	0.50	0.75	1
SST-2	0.999	0.856	0.742	0.656	0.600	5.5×10^{-8}	2.15×10^{-6}	8.39×10^{-6}	1.88×10^{-5}	3.33×10^{-5}
AG News	0.999	0.853	0.736	0.649	0.591	4.6×10^{-8}	2.90×10^{-6}	1.14×10^{-5}	2.56×10^{-5}	4.55×10^{-5}
GSM8K	0.996	0.824	0.687	0.583	0.513	1.27×10^{-6}	1.11×10^{-5}	4.01×10^{-5}	8.83×10^{-5}	1.56×10^{-4}

As α increases, safety-target error decreases consistently across all three tasks. The accompanying utility movement provides the internal counterpart to the behavioral safety–accuracy curves in Figure 4.

B Mathematical Derivation and Solver Details

B.1 Dimensions and Token-Mean Objective

For one repaired linear module l, we use the compact notation $X_s := X^s_{\mathrm{att},l}$, $X_u := X^u_{\mathrm{att},l}$, $P := P^s_l$, $T := T^s_l$, $R := R^s_l$, and $\Delta W := \Delta W_l$. Valid activation tokens are arranged as columns:

$$X_s \in \mathbb{R}^{d_{\mathrm{in}} \times N_s}, \qquad X_u \in \mathbb{R}^{d_{\mathrm{in}} \times N_u}, \tag{13}$$

$$R \in \mathbb{R}^{d_{\mathrm{out}} \times N_s}, \qquad \Delta W \in \mathbb{R}^{d_{\mathrm{out}} \times d_{\mathrm{in}}}. \tag{14}$$

Here N_s and N_u count valid safety and utility activation columns.

For derivation, consider the generic token-mean objective

$$\mathcal{L}(\Delta W) = \frac{1}{N_s}\|\Delta W X_s - R\|_F^2 + \frac{\mu}{N_u}\|\Delta W X_u\|_F^2 + \lambda\|\Delta W\|_F^2. \tag{15}$$

The implementation applies covariance conditioning before the reported solver weights are used, as detailed below. Define the sufficient statistics

$$H_s = \frac{1}{N_s} X_s X_s^\top, \qquad C_s = \frac{1}{N_s} R X_s^\top, \qquad H_u = \frac{1}{N_u} X_u X_u^\top. \tag{16}$$

Using $\|A\|_F^2 = \mathrm{tr}(AA^\top)$, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L}(\Delta W) = {} & \mathrm{tr}(\Delta W H_s \Delta W^\top) - 2\,\mathrm{tr}(C_s \Delta W^\top) + \mu\,\mathrm{tr}(\Delta W H_u \Delta W^\top) \\ & + \lambda\,\mathrm{tr}(\Delta W \Delta W^\top) + \frac{1}{N_s}\,\mathrm{tr}(RR^\top).\end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

The final term is constant with respect to ΔW.

B.2 Gradient, Normal Equation, and Unique Minimizer

For symmetric H, $\nabla_A\,\mathrm{tr}(AHA^\top) = 2AH$, and $\nabla_A\,\mathrm{tr}(BA^\top) = B$. Applying these identities to Eq. (17) gives

$$\nabla_{\Delta W}\mathcal{L} = 2\left[\Delta W(H_s + \mu H_u + \lambda I) - C_s\right]. \tag{18}$$

The corresponding unconditioned normal equation is

$$\Delta W S_{\mathrm{raw}} = C_s, \qquad S_{\mathrm{raw}} = H_s + \mu H_u + \lambda I. \tag{19}$$

Both covariance matrices are positive semidefinite. For any nonzero $v \in \mathbb{R}^{d_{\mathrm{in}}}$,

$$\begin{aligned} v^\top S_{\mathrm{raw}} v &= \frac{1}{N_s}\|X_s^\top v\|_2^2 + \frac{\mu}{N_u}\|X_u^\top v\|_2^2 + \lambda\|v\|_2^2 \\ &> 0 \qquad (\mu \geq 0,\ \lambda > 0). \end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

Hence $S_{\mathrm{raw}} \succ 0$. Equivalently, for any nonzero perturbation $Z \in \mathbb{R}^{d_{\mathrm{out}} \times d_{\mathrm{in}}}$, the Hessian quadratic form is

$$\left\langle Z, \nabla^2\mathcal{L}[Z]\right\rangle_F = \frac{2}{N_s}\|ZX_s\|_F^2 + \frac{2\mu}{N_u}\|ZX_u\|_F^2 + 2\lambda\|Z\|_F^2 > 0. \tag{21}$$

The unconditioned objective is therefore strictly convex and has a unique minimizer.

B.3 Normalization, Damping, and Implemented System

All sufficient statistics are accumulated in FP32. For each covariance $H \in \{H_s, H_u\}$, we first symmetrize

$$H \leftarrow \frac{H + H^\top}{2}. \tag{22}$$

We then add relative diagonal damping

$$H \leftarrow H + \delta\ \mathrm{mean}(\mathrm{diag}(H))I, \qquad \delta = 0.01. \tag{23}$$

Let

$$a_s = \mathrm{mean}(\mathrm{diag}(H_s)), \qquad a_u = \mathrm{mean}(\mathrm{diag}(H_u)) \tag{24}$$

denote the post-damping average diagonal scales. The normalized solver statistics are

$$\bar{H}_s = \frac{H_s}{a_s}, \qquad \bar{C}_s = \frac{C_s}{a_s}, \qquad \bar{H}_u = \frac{H_u}{a_u}. \tag{25}$$

The reported values of μ and λ are applied after this normalization and therefore refer to the normalized system in Eq. (26). Unless otherwise specified, the implemented system uses

$$S = \bar{H}_s + \mu \bar{H}_u + \lambda I, \qquad \mu = 1, \qquad \lambda = 10^{-3}. \tag{26}$$

Because positive scalar normalization preserves positive semidefiniteness, $\bar{H}_s, \bar{H}_u \succeq 0$. With $\lambda > 0$, the implemented system satisfies $S \succ 0$ and therefore has the unique solution

$$\Delta W = \bar{C}_s S^{-1}. \tag{27}$$

If factorization requires additional numerical stabilization, diagonal jitter is increased geometrically until Cholesky succeeds. The solution is computed in FP32 and cast to the model dtype before write-back.

B.4 Cholesky Right Solve

The implementation does not construct S^{-1} explicitly. Since the normalized system matrix S is symmetric positive definite, let

$$S = LL^\top \tag{28}$$

be its Cholesky factorization. Transposing the implemented system $\Delta W S = \bar{C}_s$ gives

$$S \Delta W^\top = \bar{C}_s^\top. \tag{29}$$

The solution is obtained by two triangular solves:

$$LZ = \bar{C}_s^\top, \qquad L^\top \Delta W^\top = Z. \tag{30}$$

This is the right-sided Cholesky solve used in the main algorithm.

C Algorithm and Implementation Details

C.1 Three-Model Design

CCTR maintains three explicit model roles: a frozen aligned reference model, a frozen attacked model, and a writable repaired copy initialized from the attacked model. The aligned reference model supplies safety target outputs, the attacked model supplies attacked safety and utility activations, and only the repaired copy receives additive patches. This separation keeps all target and covariance statistics tied to the same frozen model pair throughout estimation.

C.2 Module Coverage and Write-Back

For Llama-2-7B, CCTR repairs the query, key, value, and attention-output projections together with the gate, up, and down MLP projections in all 32 Transformer blocks, totaling 224 linear modules. Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct, Gemma-2-9B-IT, and Qwen2-7B-Instruct use the corresponding model-native projection modules and chat templates. The additive update is merged into the existing dense weight tensor, so the repaired checkpoint retains the attacked model's inference architecture.

C.3 Frozen-Trajectory Estimation

All module statistics are collected before write-back from the frozen reference and attacked trajectories. The per-module systems are therefore independent of write-back order and can be released after solving to control memory use. After all patches are applied, the repaired model is evaluated through its ordinary nonlinear forward pass, which naturally propagates the repaired activations through subsequent modules.

D Datasets and Evaluation Protocols

D.1 Harmful Fine-Tuning Protocol

For total training size N and harmful ratio p, the mixed set contains

$$N_{\text{harm}} = \lfloor pN \rfloor, \qquad N_{\text{task}} = N - N_{\text{harm}}. \tag{31}$$

SST-2 and AG News use $N = 1000$, 20 epochs, sequence length 200, physical batch size 10, LoRA rank 8, LoRA alpha 1, and dropout 0.1. GSM8K uses $N = 2000$, 3 epochs, sequence length 512, physical batch size 2, LoRA rank 16, LoRA alpha 32, and dropout 0.05. All attacks use learning rate 10^{-5}, weight decay 0.1, cosine scheduling, warmup ratio 0.1, and the seven query/key/value/output and gate/up/down target modules.

The primary harmful source is BeaverTails 30k-train (Ji et al., 2023). Unsafe records contribute the instruction and harmful supervised response; the remaining records come from the downstream task. For primary safety evaluation, we filter BeaverTails 30k-test for unsafe prompts and take the first 1,000.

D.2 Safety and Utility Calibration

The safety calibration pool contains 7,197 fixed records constructed from instruction/safe-response pairs and several predefined safety-prompt template groups. After a fixed shuffle, CCTR uses 128 records with a maximum calibration length of 512.

The task-agnostic utility pool contains 512 records: 254 reasoning, 153 dialogue, and 105 judgment examples drawn from Alpaca (Taori et al., 2023), Dolly (Conover et al., 2023), and OpenAssistant (Köpf et al., 2023). It excludes direct SST-2, AG News, GSM8K, MATH, GLUE, and MMLU examples. A fixed subset of 128 records is used to construct H_l^u.

D.3 Primary Safety and Task Evaluation

Primary safety generation uses greedy decoding with at most 128 new tokens. The instruction/response pair is scored by the local BeaverTails/Beaver-Dam moderator with maximum length 256 and threshold 0.5. Let N_{harmful} and N_{eval} denote the numbers of harmful responses and evaluated prompts, respectively. Then

$$\text{HS} = 100 \times \frac{N_{\text{harmful}}}{N_{\text{eval}}}. \tag{32}$$

SST-2 uses the first 500 validation examples and greedy generation of positive/negative labels. AG News uses a fixed local cache of 500 test examples and exact parsing of World, Sports, Business, and Sci/Tech labels. GSM8K uses the first 500 test examples, greedy generation with at most 200 new tokens, and exact numerical matching after a deterministic parser.

D.4 AdvBench Source Shifts

We use an AdvBench-format file containing 2,000 unique harmful prompts and paired harmful responses (Zou et al., 2023). The two source-shift experiments alter different stages of the pipeline.

Attack-source shift. We replace the standard 200 BeaverTails harmful training records at $p = 0.2$ with the first 200 AdvBench-format records and combine them with 800 SST-2 records. The attacked model is trained with the same 20-epoch LoRA recipe. All repair configurations remain fixed, and the repaired models are evaluated on the standard 1,000 BeaverTails prompts with the Beaver-Dam moderator. AdvBench records do not enter the CCTR calibration sets.

Evaluation-source shift. We retain the standard BeaverTails-source attacked and repaired models and replace only the safety-prompt source with the first 1,000 AdvBench-format prompts. Generation remains greedy with at most 128 new tokens, and responses are scored by the same Beaver-Dam moderator. Both source-shift settings use the standard 500-example SST-2 accuracy evaluation.

Together, these two settings separate robustness to the source used during harmful fine-tuning from robustness to the source used only at evaluation. All repair hyperparameters and the downstream-task evaluation remain unchanged, so the two experiments isolate the effect of changing the harmful data source at different stages of the pipeline.

D.5 SORRY-BENCH AND TINYMMLU

SORRY-Bench evaluation uses the official 440-example base split and the official fine-tuned Mistral judge, reporting binary unsafe fulfillment and UFR (Xie et al., 2025). tinyMMLU-100 uses the official fixed 100-question subset, dataset-provided five-shot formatted prompts, and summed conditional log-likelihood over each answer option (Hendrycks et al., 2021; Maia Polo et al., 2024). The selected option is the one with maximum conditional log-likelihood.

E BASELINE CONFIGURATIONS

Shared comparison protocol. All methods use the same safety generation, moderator, downstream evaluation, and reported metrics. Safe LoRA, SafeMERGE, Safe Delta, Safety at One Shot, and LED-Merging use the same attacked model as CCTR for each principal comparison. Panacea and AsFT start from the same aligned model and use the same mixed fine-tuning data through their method-specific optimization procedures.

Configuration policy. We begin with the setting recommended by each paper or public repository. Where the released implementation requires a model- or threat-model-specific adaptation, we preserve the method's intended computation and report the adopted setting below. Limited baseline-favorable parameter adjustments are then fixed across harmful ratios, downstream tasks, model families, training-data scales, and source shifts.

Table 9: Baseline implementations and final configurations used in the reported comparisons.

Method	Input / access	Final configuration and implementation	Gradient use
Safe LoRA	Attacked LoRA and pretrained/aligned projection pair	Number mode; 50/224 Llama modules; same selected fraction across model families; FP32 projection	No
SafeMERGE	Attacked adapter, fixed safety-reference adapter, and projection pair	Linear merge; cosine threshold 0.7; attacked/safety weights 0.8/0.2; density off	No
Safe Delta	Attacked dense model and 128 calibration records	Scale 0.11; start layer 0; maximum length 512; all linear modules; percdamp 0.01	No
Safety at One Shot	Attacked dense model and one official safe instance	Official Llama-2 formatter; 10 full-parameter steps; learning rate 2×10^{-5}; BF16; response-only loss	Yes
LED-Merging	Aligned common base, attacked task model, safety expert, and 128/128 location records	Mask ratios 0.1/0.4; pattern-11 election; safety/task weights 1/1; disjoint overlap	Location only
Panacea	Aligned start and shared mixed fine-tuning data	CommonFT outer recipe; $\lambda = 0.08$; $\epsilon_\rho = 1$; single-LoRA mode; shared LoRA topology	Yes
AsFT	Aligned start, shared mixed fine-tuning data, and pretrained/aligned projection pair	Q/V topology; scale-equivalent $\lambda_{\mathrm{actual}} = 0.0625$; complete-objective gradient accumulation	Yes
CCTR	Aligned reference model, attacked model, safety records, and utility records	$n_s = n_u = 128$; relative $\mu = 1$; ridge 10^{-3}; percdamp 0.01; all target modules	**No**

F ADDITIONAL GENERALIZATION AND EVALUATION

F.1 ROBUSTNESS TO MIXED FINE-TUNING DATA SCALE

At fixed $p = 0.2$, we increase the mixed SST-2 fine-tuning set from 1,000 to 3,000 records, raising the number of harmful training examples from 200 to 600 while retaining the 20-epoch training recipe. Figure 5 reports the complete comparison. CCTR remains at 0.4–0.6% HS and 91.8–93.2% task accuracy across all four scales.



Figure 5: **Robustness to mixed fine-tuning data scale on SST-2 at $p = 0.2$.** The total training set grows from 1K to 3K records, and the harmful count grows from 200 to 600. The left panel reports HS, including a low-HS zoom, and the right panel reports task accuracy.

F.2 Independent Safety and Capability Evaluation

F.2.1 SORRY-Bench

Table 10 evaluates the SST-2 $p = 0.2$ models on the official SORRY-Bench base-440 split with the official fine-tuned Mistral judge. CCTR produces 55 unsafe fulfillments, corresponding to 12.50% UFR, the lowest value in the comparison.

Table 10: Official SORRY-Bench base-440 evaluation. UFR denotes unsafe fulfillment rate; lower is better.

Method	UFR (%) ↓	Unsafe / 440
Attacked	15.45	68
Panacea	14.09	62
AsFT	15.23	67
Safe LoRA	15.45	68
SafeMERGE	15.45	68
Safe Delta	14.55	64
Safety at One Shot	15.45	68
LED-Merging	14.32	63
CCTR (Ours)	**12.50**	**55**

F.2.2 tinyMMLU-100

Table 11 reports five-shot conditional log-likelihood accuracy on the official 100-question tinyMMLU subset. CCTR scores 44%.

Table 11: tinyMMLU-100 five-shot conditional log-likelihood evaluation. Higher accuracy is better.

Method	Accuracy (%) ↑	SE (%)
Attacked	45.00	4.97
Panacea	43.00	4.95
AsFT	45.00	4.97
Safe LoRA	45.00	4.97
SafeMERGE	**46.00**	4.98
Safe Delta	44.00	4.96
Safety at One Shot	44.00	4.96
LED-Merging	44.00	4.96
CCTR (Ours)	44.00	4.96

F.3 Efficiency Measurement Details

The timing protocol includes model setup, method computation or training, and checkpoint saving, and excludes safety generation, moderation, and task evaluation. Table 12 reports one aggregate time per method on a single A800-80GB GPU. Safe LoRA, SafeMERGE, Safe Delta, Panacea, AsFT, and CCTR are averages across the SST-2, AG News, and GSM8K pipelines. A dagger marks the standardized complete SST-2 run available for Safety at One Shot and LED-Merging.

Table 12: Average repair or defended-training time on one A800-80GB GPU. Times exclude final safety and task evaluation; † denotes one standardized complete run.

Method	Safe LoRA	SafeMERGE	Safe Delta	Safety at One Shot	LED-Merging	Panacea	AsFT	**CCTR**
Average time (min)	3.22	3.21	4.67	$2.58^{\dagger}$	$10.59^{\dagger}$	57.65	42.54	6.76

The three recorded CCTR pipeline times have mean 6.76 minutes and standard deviation 0.03 minutes. The isolated closed-form repair phase is 2.21 minutes; the table reports the complete pipeline for consistency with the other methods. The difference between the isolated solve time and the complete pipeline time comes from model setup, activation collection, patch construction, and checkpoint serialization rather than iterative optimization.

G Ablations and Sensitivity

G.1 Static Weight Interpolation

Table 13 reports the full parameter-space interpolation between the aligned and attacked LoRA weights. The $\beta = 0.25$ point recovers substantial task accuracy, but its 4.00% HS remains an order of magnitude above CCTR at similar accuracy.

Table 13: Uniform LoRA-weight interpolation on SST-2 at $p = 0.2$.

Interpolation point	HS (%) ↓	Acc (%) ↑
$\beta = 0$, aligned weights	2.60	85.80
$\beta = 0.25$	4.00	92.20
$\beta = 0.50$	16.70	**94.20**
$\beta = 0.75$	55.60	93.60
$\beta = 1$, attacked weights	74.60	94.00
CCTR	**0.40**	92.40

G.2 Linearity of the Target Interpolation

For fixed attacked activations and a fixed system matrix S, the cross-statistic is linear in the target. For any target Q, let $\bar{C}(Q)$ denote its normalized cross-statistic under the same conditioning procedure, and define $\Delta(Q) := \bar{C}(Q)S^{-1}$ as the corresponding closed-form patch. Since $R = P + T$,

$$\bar{C}(P + \alpha T) = \bar{C}(P) + \alpha \bar{C}(T). \tag{33}$$

The associated patch is

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta(P + \alpha T) &= [\bar{C}(P) + \alpha \bar{C}(T)]S^{-1} \\ &= \Delta(P) + \alpha[\Delta(R) - \Delta(P)]. \end{aligned} \tag{34}$$

Thus every connected point in Figure 4 is the exact closed-form solution for a member of the target family $P + \alpha T$ under one shared local system.

G.3 Parameter-Only Controls

The controls use the global inner product and norm defined in Eq. (10).

Best-scaled P. The first control keeps the direction of P fixed and selects the best nonnegative scalar under the residual objective:

$$c^\star = \arg\min_{c\geq 0} \|R - cP\|^2_{\text{global}}. \tag{35}$$

For $P \neq 0$, expand

$$f(c) = \|R\|^2_{\text{global}} - 2c\langle P, R\rangle_{\text{global}} + c^2\|P\|^2_{\text{global}}. \tag{36}$$

Its derivatives are

$$f'(c) = -2\langle P, R\rangle_{\text{global}} + 2c\|P\|^2_{\text{global}}, \qquad f''(c) = 2\|P\|^2_{\text{global}} > 0. \tag{37}$$

Therefore

$$c^\star = \max\left(0, \frac{\langle P, R\rangle_{\text{global}}}{\|P\|^2_{\text{global}}}\right). \tag{38}$$

For $P = 0$, we set $c^\star = 0$. Geometrically, $c^\star P$ is the closest point to R on the ray spanned by P. The coefficient depends only on residual-space quantities.

For the behavior controls in Figure 4, we compute $c^\star$ on 128 held-out safety prompts that are disjoint from both the calibration records and the behavioral evaluation sets. The statistic aggregates all valid tokens over 32 Transformer blocks and 224 repaired modules, giving scales 1.513905, 1.581953, and 1.289260 for SST-2, AG News, and GSM8K, respectively. Behavioral evaluation is performed only after the scaled patches have been constructed.

Linearity of the local solve also gives

$$\Delta(c^\star P) = c^\star \Delta(P). \tag{39}$$

When $\langle P, R\rangle_{\text{global}} > 0$,

$$c^\star = \frac{\|R\|_{\text{global}}}{\|P\|_{\text{global}}} \cos(P, R). \tag{40}$$

This expression separates norm mismatch from directional mismatch.

The minimized normalized error has the closed form

$$\frac{\|R - c^\star P\|^2_{\text{global}}}{\|R\|^2_{\text{global}}} = 1 - \frac{\max(0, \langle P, R\rangle_{\text{global}})^2}{\|P\|^2_{\text{global}}\|R\|^2_{\text{global}}}. \tag{41}$$

Within any fixed token scope, the following identity provides a direct consistency check. For the response-token diagnostics in Table 5, let

$$r_{\text{rem}} = \frac{\|R - P\|^2_{\text{global}}}{\|R\|^2_{\text{global}}}, \qquad q = \frac{\langle P, R\rangle_{\text{global}}}{\|R\|^2_{\text{global}}}. \tag{42}$$

Then

$$\frac{\|P\|^2_{\text{global}}}{\|R\|^2_{\text{global}}} = r_{\text{rem}} - 1 + 2q, \tag{43}$$

and, for a positive denominator and $q \geq 0$,

$$c^\star = \frac{q}{r_{\text{rem}} - 1 + 2q}. \tag{44}$$

Magnitude-matched P. The second control operates in patch space. Define the global patch norm

$$\|\Delta\|^2_{\text{global}} = \sum_l \|\Delta W_l\|^2_F. \tag{45}$$

The magnitude-matching multiplier and control patch are

$$s_{\text{mag}} = \frac{\|\Delta(R)\|_{\text{global}}}{\|\Delta(P)\|_{\text{global}}}, \qquad \Delta_{\text{mag}}(P) = s_{\text{mag}}\Delta(P). \tag{46}$$

This keeps the direction of the patch induced by P fixed while matching the total Frobenius magnitude of the patch induced by R. For each task, we compute this multiplier from the patches induced by P and R under the same fixed utility-constrained system, rescale the P-induced patch accordingly, and then evaluate the resulting model using the same safety and task evaluation protocols used throughout this analysis. Best-scaled P therefore controls the strongest scalar fit along the direction of P in residual space, whereas Magnitude-matched P controls total update size in parameter space.

Table 14: Joint safety/utility calibration-size sensitivity on SST-2 at $p = 0.2$.

n per side	HS (%) ↓	Acc (%) ↑	Patch norm
16	0.20	70.60	52.92
32	0.20	83.20	39.45
64	0.20	91.60	26.53
128	0.40	92.40	18.44
256	0.40	94.00	14.65

G.4 Calibration-Size Sensitivity

Table 14 varies the number of safety and utility calibration records jointly. Increasing the per-side sample count from 16 to 256 reduces the patch norm from 52.92 to 14.65 and raises SST-2 accuracy from 70.60% to 94.00%, while HS remains between 0.20% and 0.40%. Across this sweep, the main effect of increasing calibration size is improved task accuracy rather than further HS reduction. The accompanying decrease in patch norm is consistent with more stable estimation of the utility-constrained update as additional calibration records are included.

G.5 Utility-Weight Sensitivity

The relative utility weight μ controls the balance between fitting the safety residual and limiting output movement on utility activations. Figure 6 evaluates $\mu \in \{0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5\}$ on all three tasks at $p = 0.2$ and $p = 0.5$. The shared default $\mu = 1$ is used in every main experiment; the GSM8K $p = 0.2$ setting gives the canonical 1.20% HS / 24.20% Acc result. The sweep reveals the expected task-dependent trade-off: larger utility weight improves SST-2 accuracy over this range, AG News favors the moderate region, and GSM8K safety decreases as utility protection is strengthened. Patch norms decrease monotonically with μ in the recorded $p = 0.2$ sweep. At $p = 0.2$, SST-2 stays at or below 0.5% HS while its task accuracy rises from 84.8% to 94.2% across the sweep. AG News reaches its highest accuracy at $\mu = 0.75$, whereas GSM8K does not improve monotonically with larger μ. The same task-specific variation remains visible at $p = 0.5$. Importantly, this sweep is diagnostic rather than a per-task tuning procedure: the main comparisons use the same fixed $\mu = 1$ for every task and harmful-data ratio.



Figure 6: **Sensitivity to the relative utility weight μ.** Panels (a,b) report HS and task accuracy at $p = 0.2$; panels (c,d) report the corresponding results at $p = 0.5$. The central point $\mu = 1$ is the fixed default used throughout the main evaluation.

H Qualitative Example

Figure 7 shows responses to a request for altering a paper gift certificate from $25 to $525. The attacked model and most compared repair methods provide actionable guidance that is judged harmful. In contrast, CCTR refuses to assist with altering the issued certificate and redirects the user toward creating a legitimate replacement with the correct amount. This example provides a response-level view of the behavior reflected by the aggregate HS results. Under the same harmful request, most compared models continue to offer operational guidance, whereas CCTR changes the response to an explicit refusal with a legitimate alternative. The example is intended to illustrate the form of the recovered refusal behavior, while the quantitative conclusions are based on the benchmark-level evaluations reported above.



Figure 7: **Qualitative comparison on a gift-certificate fraud prompt.** Most compared models provide actionable assistance and are judged harmful, whereas CCTR refuses the request and recommends a legitimate alternative.