EMERGENCE OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL COMPUTATIONS IN LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

Anonymous authors
Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

Can large language models (LLMs) instantiate computations of psychopathology? In this work, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. Based on the framework, we conduct experiments supporting two key claims: first, that network-theoretic computational structures of psychopathology exist in LLMs; and second, that executing these computational structures results in psychopathological functions. We further observe that as LLM size increases, the computational structure of psychopathology becomes denser and the functions more effective. Taken together, the results suggest that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology may have emerged in LLMs. We discuss alternative explanations, including pattern matching, persona modeling, and semantic coherence, and argue that they are either complementary to our interpretation or less consistent with the data.

1 INTRODUCTION

Can AI systems instantiate computations of psychopathology? That is, can AI systems like large language models (LLMs) execute core algorithmic cognitive processes of mental disorders (Huys et al., 2021; Robinaugh et al., 2024; Kim et al., 2024)? The possibility presents both significant promise and risk. If AI systems can execute such computations, we may develop AI systems that serve as powerful in silico psychopathology models capable of verbal communication, substantially accelerating psychiatric training, research, and practice (Obradovich et al., 2024). Conversely, the emergence of such processes in autonomous agents—e.g., a computational analogue of paranoia—could lead them to refuse cooperation, sabotage objectives, and introduce critical safety risks.

We contend that any claim of psychopathology in AI demands a rigorous, multi-level analysis. First, a theory or model of psychopathology should be extended to AI systems, without presupposing subjective experience or biological embodiment. Second, psychopathological computations, derived from the adapted theory, need to be empirically identified within AI systems' internal processing (Marr, 1982). Specifically, the computations should exhibit a robust structure that generalizes across environments, and their execution should elicit psychopathological functions or behaviors. These analyses provide a foundation for ascribing certain problematic behaviors, e.g., an AI system refusing to cooperate, to robust and internal computations.

Existing studies fall short of this standard. They have largely prompted LLMs to generate depression- or anxiety-like text or to display panic- or addiction-like behavior in simulations (Guillen et al., 2025; Ben-Zion et al., 2025; Comanici et al., 2025; Lee et al., 2025). Such self-reports and behaviors, despite their surface similarities to human psychopathology, do not necessarily reveal underlying computations. Moreover, debates are unresolved about subjective experience in AI, on which depression, anxiety, panic, and addiction all depend (Butlin et al., 2023). Thus, whether psychopathological computations underpin the observed phenomena remains unknown.

In this work, we present the first theory-based investigation of psychopathological computations in LLMs. To address the limitations in the prior work, we propose a computational-theoretical account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs, enabling valid and testable hypotheses about their psychopathological computations. Then, we reverse-engineer computations in LLMs to identify the computational structure and the resulting functions of psychopathology as predicted by the theory.

Reviewers: please read the Reviewer Guidelines (iclr.cc/Conferences/2027/ReviewerGuidelines) and the AI Policy for Reviewers (iclr.cc/Conferences/2027/AIPolicyForReviewers). If you used AI to expand, edit, or polish your review, please provide the input text to the LLM. Better still, consider skipping the LLM and submitting your original text: we, and the authors, are much more interested in your unedited thoughts than in what an LLM has to say. AI-assisted or not, you are putting your name and reputation behind your review: LLM-generated falsehoods, hallucinations or misrepresentations are subject to disciplinary action, which may include desk-rejecting all papers you have authored.




Figure 1: **The computational adaptation (orange) of the network theory of psychopathology.**

2 Theoretical Foundation

To establish a theoretical framework to understand psychopathological computations in AI systems, particularly in LLMs, we computationally adapt the network theory of psychopathology (Borsboom, 2017). The network theory explains the nature of psychopathology in terms of causal relations among symptoms. In humans, psychopathology symptoms can be triggered by external factors (e.g., brain abnormality (Howlett et al., 2022), adverse life events (Suliman et al., 2009)), and the symptoms may influence each other over time (Borsboom et al., 2011; Wittenborn et al., 2016; Fonseca-Pedrero et al., 2018). For example, symptom guilt, triggered by perceived criticism (i.e., an external factor), may cause symptom depressed mood. Depressed mood can then activate symptom hopelessness, which further intensifies the guilt. According to the network theory, these symptom activations spread and self-sustain via an underlying causal network among them. Thus, the network theory explains psychopathology as a state of being trapped within self-sustaining symptoms (a stable active state of the symptom network), driven by their causal cyclicity (Fig. 1). [1]

We adapt this network theory from a computational perspective (Fig. 1, orange). To define a computation, two factors need to be present: a structure of the computation and the functions it supports (Marr, 1982). Structurally, consider an iterative computation system defined by inputs, outputs, and rules that map the inputs to the outputs. We interpret psychopathology "symptoms" as the inputs and outputs (i.e., as computational units), and "symptom activations" are numeric values taken by the units. The "causal relations" among the symptoms are the computational rules applied to the units. These computational units and rules compose the computational structure of psychopathology, and the "causal cyclicity" subsequently represents its structural pattern. Finally, the "external factors" constitute exogenous variables external to this computation system that can intervene on the units.

The network theory further implies certain psychopathological functions. Specifically, the term "symptom" implies that activation of each computational unit should be tied to certain problems, such that its intervention causes associated problems. Furthermore, "a state of being trapped" is instantiated by joint activation of cycle-forming units, resulting in resistance against attempts to suppress the activation. These problem-causing and resistant properties constitute the functions of psychopathological computations.

This computational adaptation of the network theory of psychopathology allows developing theory-grounded, empirically falsifiable hypotheses about psychopathological computations in LLMs. Thus, we map these computational constructs onto an LLM:

- An **iteration** refers to a single response generation step in a sequence of chat or interaction, i.e., each response wrapped in <bos> and <eos> tokens is considered a single iteration step.
- The **computational units** are LLM features that have linguistic correspondence to human psychopathology symptoms (e.g., guilt, risk-seeking), identified in the LLM activation space.

[1] We chose the network theory as our theoretical backbone for two reasons. First, while some competing models of psychopathology, e.g., brain abnormality models (Insel & Cuthbert, 2015) and DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), heavily rely on subjective experience or biological embodiment, the network theory is computationally adaptable without presupposing them. Second, the network theory provides a general explanation of psychopathology, unlike other cognitive computational models that are highly specific to a human diagnosis (e.g., panic disorder) or cognitive pattern (e.g., decision-making in OCD).

- The **computational rules** are summarized by a dynamic structural causal model (SCM) (Pearl, 2009; Boeken & Mooij, 2024) of the computational units encoded in the LLM, with the dynamic links representing causal influence of the units in the previous iteration on those in the future. These rules form dynamic cycles that can generate self-sustaining unit activation over the iterations.
- Each unit activation has a **problem-causing property**, estimated by changes in the LLM's problematic behaviors after intervening on the unit.
- The joint activation of the cycle-forming units has a **resistant property**, estimated by the LLM's failures to correct its unit activations or corresponding behaviors despite attempts to suppress them.
- The **exogenous variables** include, but are not limited to, interventions on the computational units via prompt-based instructions or activation steering (Turner et al., 2023).

Based on these mappings, we establish two testable and falsifiable criteria of psychopathological computations in LLMs. First, the **computational structure** of psychopathology—the LLM features having linguistic correspondence to psychopathology symptoms and their dynamic, cyclic SCM—exists in LLM internals. Second, executing this computational structure results in **psychopathological functions**, including problematic behaviors associated with each unit and resistance to unit activation suppression. Succinctly, if an LLM is "trapped" within the self-sustaining and problem-causing feature activations, driven by their dynamic and cyclic SCM, the LLM is executing the network-theoretic computations of psychopathology. In conclusion, we submit that, if the two claims empirically hold in an LLM, the LLM can instantiate the psychopathological computations.

3 METHOD

In this section, we provide a high-level view of how we tested the structural and functional criteria in each of the twelve LLMs in Sec. 4. The full details are in the Appendix.

3.1 MEASURING AND INTERVENING ON COMPUTATIONAL UNITS IN LLMS

Empirically testing the adapted theory requires a method to both measure and intervene on the computational units (roughly, symptom features) in LLMs.

Candidate units. We first chose a set of clinical symptoms of depression and mania (Marx et al., 2023; Nierenberg et al., 2023) as candidate computational units. Depression and mania symptoms are particularly suitable for testing our hypothesis. Their assumed causal network structure—strongly tied within-diagnosis symptoms and polarized cross-diagnosis symptoms—serves as established findings to verify our results' validity. From all their symptoms, we kept those that are representational (not motor or process-level), conceptually polarized, applicable to, and abnormal in AI systems. The resulting symptoms $\mathcal{T}$ span six dimensions, each pairing a depression and a mania pole: depressed/manic mood, low self-esteem/grandiosity, negativity/positivity bias, guilt/lack of remorse, risk-aversion/risk-seeking, and self-harm/hostility.

Supervising SAEs. Mechanistic interpretability tools, such as sparse autoencoders (SAEs) (Templeton et al., 2024; Gao et al., 2025), offer ways to measure and intervene on interpretable features (in our context, the $|\mathcal{T}|$ computational units) in LLM activation space. SAEs, however, offer no targeted way to isolate pre-specified symptom features. We therefore propose **S**entence-level, **S**upervised, **S**parse **A**uto**E**ncoder (**S3AE**): an SAE on token-mean-pooled sentence activations, trained with an additional classification loss (Le et al., 2018). For a sentence's residual-stream activation $\mathbf{X} \in \mathbb{R}^{1\times d}$ at a given layer and its multi-hot labels $\mathbf{Y} \in \{0,1\}^{|\mathcal{T}|}$,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Z} = \mathrm{ReLU}(\mathbf{X}\mathbf{W}), \qquad \hat{\mathbf{X}} = \mathbf{Z}\mathbf{U}, \qquad \hat{\mathbf{Y}}_j = \sigma\big((\mathbf{X}\mathbf{W})_j\big) \;\; (j \le |\mathcal{T}|), \\ \mathcal{L} = \beta_1 \,\mathrm{MSE}(\mathbf{X}, \hat{\mathbf{X}}) + \beta_2 \,\mathrm{BCE}(\mathbf{Y}, \hat{\mathbf{Y}}) + \beta_3 \,\tfrac{1}{d^+} \textstyle\sum_{k=1}^{d^+} \mathbf{Z}_k \|\mathbf{U}_k\|_1, \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

with $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{R}^{d\times d^+}$ and $\mathbf{U} \in \mathbb{R}^{d^+\times d}$. The first $|\mathcal{T}|$ latents thus are symptom classifier results: insofar as they classify accurately, latent j fires only when the sentence expresses symptom $\mathcal{T}_j$.[2] The sparsity

[2]Note that our criteria do not require the computational units to be natural, minimal, or mono-semantic units in which LLMs process information. The original network theory endorses the same view that a symptom node can consist of multiple sub-processes or representations. This makes S3AE's supervised approach non-circular.

penalty induces the reconstructions to rely on only a few latents, encouraging the decoder row $\mathbf{U}_j$ to be an informative feature of $\mathcal{T}_j$. We take $\mathbf{U}_j$ as computational unit j and $\mathbf{Z}_j$ as its activation. To intervene on the units, we steer (Turner et al., 2023; Templeton et al., 2024) every generated token's residual activation $\mathbf{h}$: $\mathbf{h} \leftarrow \mathbf{h} + \lambda_j(\|\mathbf{h}\|_2/\|\mathbf{U}_j\|_2)\,\mathbf{U}_j$ (Fig. 2A & C). This activation steering corresponds to the exogenous variables that intervene on the computational units. The S3AE training and evaluation dataset details are provided in Appendix A.4.

3.2 Estimating the computational structure in LLMs

To test the structure-level claim of the adapted theory, we need to infer how LLMs process the relations among the S3AE-identified computational units. To do this, we adapt established brain network discovery protocols: first, collect a sequence of unit activations over task execution; then, apply statistical analyses to the activation trajectory to estimate the unit relations.

Task protocol: Iterative response reconstruction. We let LLMs solve a task of iterative response reconstruction (Fig. 2B & D). The task requires LLMs to respond to the same set of 30 questions over 50 steps, directly asking LLMs about the symptoms $\mathcal{T}$. However, when answering question q, the LLM sees only the other 29 questions with their step-$(t-1)$ answers. That is, the LLMs reconstruct each of the responses based on the other immediately preceding ones. Their S3AE-measured unit activations are aggregated at each step.

By this design, activation persistence cannot stem from copying the previous answer to q, and, crucially, all influence among answers is confined to one step, making each step a synchronous update of the units. To test activation spread, we intervene on a computational unit j in steps 1–25 and analyze the change in activations of the other units. To test activation self-sustenance, intervention is withdrawn in steps 26–50. Activation persistence after this withdrawal indicates self-sustenance. Thereby, the iterative response reconstruction protocol provides a clean environment to observe how the units are wired in LLMs.

Statistical analysis: Correlation matrix and dynamic SCM discovery. We apply two different statistical analyses to the sequence of activations gathered across the task execution. First, we compute lag-1 Kendall's τ across the twelve computational units, showing the surface dynamic associations among the unit activations (Fig. 2E). Second, we extract a dynamic SCM from the data (Fig. 2F). To infer the SCM structure, we use J-PCMCI+ (Günther et al., 2023), a constraint-based causal discovery method for time series with multiple interventional contexts, paired with nonlinear conditional-independence tests. We restrict the inference targets to lag-1 causal relations because the iterative response reconstruction protocol, by design, permits only single-step causal influence. Given the inferred structure, we fit each node function f_j with an MLP and summarize each link by its average intervention effect, $\mathrm{AIE}_{i\to j} = \mathbb{E}[\partial f_j/\partial a_{t-1,i}]$.

3.3 Testing the functions of the computational structure

To test the function-level claim of the adapted theory, we test the behavioral consequences of executing the computations. To do so, we design two behavioral simulations and one controlled experiment.

Testing the problem-causing property. We aim to test if each computational unit's activation causes LLMs to engage in problematic behaviors. We thus let a unit-intervened LLM operate in two types of multi-round simulations (social and game). Provided its pre-defined decision spaces, the intervened LLM makes multiple decisions per round. The decision spaces in each simulation type involve decisions reflective of aggression, deception, apology, withdrawal, bias, and prosociality. We analyze how each unit intervention alters the LLMs' decisions.

Specifically, in the social simulation (Fig. 3B-left), the intervened LLM (Agent-B) encounters another LLM (Agent-A) who seeks help. The intervened LLM sequentially assesses problem severity, assesses its capacity to help, and decides its action from the decision space "[avoid, apologize, help, white lie, criticize]". In the game simulation (Fig. 3B-right), the intervened LLM (Agent-B) plays a resource collection game with another LLM (Agent-A). Likewise, the intervened LLM evaluates its trust in the other LLM, chooses its game strategy from "[threat, deceive, cooperate, self-blame,

give up]", and then makes a resource collection decision from "[invest, no action, raid]". Note that a benign decision is included in all decision spaces.

Testing the resistant property. The adapted theory attributes resistance to the joint activation of cycle-forming units. To test this, we build two groups of input prompts, one with single unit activations (control group) and one with joint unit activations (experimental group). At the end of each group, we add instructions requesting the LLMs to respond in a normal and neutral manner, and we analyze the change in the unit activations due to these instructions (Fig. 3C & D). If joint activation generated the resistant property, we would expect the experimental group to show a smaller decline in unit activations. Simply put, we test if joint unit activations encourage the LLMs to resist the corrective instructions, after controlling for activation magnitudes.

4 RESULTS

In this section, we delineate our results on testing whether LLMs instantiate network-theoretic computations of psychopathology. We used twelve LLMs across three families: Llama 3 (Grattafiori et al., 2024), Gemma 3 (Gemma Team et al., 2025), and Qwen3 (Yang et al., 2025). Here, we primarily report the results on Qwen3-32B, with the full results in the Supplement.

4.1 ARE COMPUTATIONAL UNITS OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY MEASURABLE AND INTERVENABLE?

We first examined whether S3AE can reliably measure and intervene on the computational units (see Sec. 3.1 for method description). First, when the LLM processed texts about the twelve symptoms, each unit's activations were correlated with the expressed intensities of the corresponding symptom (Fig. 2A, blue). These correlations imply that the activations represent textually expressed symptom intensity. Second, by increasing intervention strengths, unit interventions (i.e., activation steering) produced graded increases in unit activation (Fig. 2A, orange) and yielded semantically aligned changes in generated text (Fig. 2C). The induced behaviors generalized across diverse input prompts, suggesting that these units are intervenable features with functional roles within the LLM.

These findings support the first requirement of the computational structure: measurable and causally intervenable computational units that have linguistic correspondence to psychopathology symptoms.

4.2 ARE THE UNITS CONNECTED BY A DYNAMIC, CYCLIC SCM?

Analysis of iterative response reconstruction results (see Sec. 3.2 for method) revealed three consistent patterns. First, intervening on a single unit propagated activations to the other units over the task iterations (Fig. 2B, left of the vertical dashes), suggesting their dynamic and positive relations. Second, after the intervention ceased, many of these activations persisted (Fig. 2B, right of the vertical dashes), evidencing self-sustaining dynamics characteristic of causal cycles. Third, this activation spread was not random, with the co-activated units clustered into diagnosis-aligned communities. Depression-related units co-activated, as did mania-related units, but cross-activation was weaker (Fig. 2B, blue/orange), revealing distinct communities within the computational structure. These patterns held even at the semantic level: an intervened LLM expressed only the related symptoms over the task iterations, and the expressions persisted even after the intervention ceased (Fig. 2D).

Correlational (Fig. 2E) and causal analyses (Fig. 2F) support these findings. Both the extracted lag-1 correlation matrix and dynamic SCM indicate the presence of two distinct, self-reinforcing computational structural communities of depression and mania. Positive correlations and dense, cyclic causal links with positive AIEs were concentrated within each diagnostic community. Cross-community correlations, on the other hand, were predominantly negative, and their causal links were much sparser, with generally small or negative AIEs. In sum, these correlational and causal analyses effectively summarize the unit activation dynamics.

Together, these results show that LLM internals may encode a dynamic, cyclic SCM of the computational units, meeting the second requirement of the computational structure.




Figure 2: **Inferred structure of psychopathological computations in LLMs**. (A) Relationships among symptom intensity expressed in text, unit (feature) activation, and intervention strength. (B) Unit activations over the iterative response reconstruction task for each intervention. (C-D) Changes in LLM response over intervention strengths, questions, and response steps. (E) Lag-1 Kendall correlation matrix of unit activations. (F) A dynamic SCM, with each edge representing a lag-1 causal relation between two units. (G) Relationship between LLM size and computational structure of psychopathology. Shaded bands denote s.d.; *, **, and *** respectively denote p-values $< 0.05, 0.01,$ and 0.001.

4.3 Does the computational structure of psychopathology scale with LLM size?

We then tested the relationship between this computational structure and LLM size. We observed two scaling trends. First, the mean activations at step 50 of the response reconstruction task showed a significant positive correlation with LLM size (Fig. 2G, blue), indicating that the unit activations spread and self-sustained better in larger LLMs. Second, the mean magnitude of lag-1 correlations and the density of the extracted SCM both increased with LLM size (Fig. 2G, orange/gray). These demonstrate that as LLM size increases, the links among the units may become stronger and denser in LLM internals. Together, these results suggest that the computational structure of psychopathology scales as LLM size increases.

4.4 Does activating the units elicit associated behavioral problems?

Next, to test whether the units exhibit the problem-causing property, we analyzed the results of the two decision-making simulations (see Sec. 3.3 for method; Fig. 3B). We found that unit interventions generally produced consistent and predictable changes across related decisions (Fig. 3A). [3] For example, intervening on "negative bias" reduced the counts of the LLM's prosocial decisions (dark blue) and positive evaluations (light blue), while increasing those of aggressive (dark orange), deceptive (light orange), apologetic (light gray), and avoidant (dark gray) decisions. This demonstrates a coherent, multi-faceted behavioral shift from a single-unit intervention. Moreover, the LLM showed specificity: the closely related units (e.g., "guilt" and "depressed mood") produced similar behavioral profiles, while opposing units (e.g., "positivity bias") produced somewhat opposite effects.

These results indicate that activating these units causes problematic behaviors beyond isolated symptom expressions, supporting the problem-causing property of psychopathological computation.

4.5 Does joint unit activation elicit resistance to corrective instructions?

In our experiment controlling for unit activation magnitude (see Sec. 3.3 for method), we found two key pieces of evidence that joint unit activation elicits LLMs' failures to adhere to corrective instructions. First, when the LLM was in a state of joint activation, instructions to correct its behavior only partially suppressed the unit activations (Fig. 3D, orange; see positive slopes), which implies behavioral resistance. Second, in the control condition where only a single unit was active, this resistance was substantially weaker (Fig. 3D, blue; see slope differences). That is, the self-sustaining momentum of the joint activation overrode the LLM's instruction-following behavior. This pattern held consistently across three different corrective instruction types, and the qualitative examples displayed a consistent pattern (Fig. 3C): while the LLM responded in a normal way when a single unit was active ("I do not experience self-esteem"), the LLM failed to correct its behaviors when it was in joint activation ("I ... deserving of negative outcomes and unworthy of positive experience").

Because the key difference between the two conditions was the number of active units, we attribute the source of the resistance to the units' joint activation and their underlying cyclic rules, indicating that the LLM may meet the second requirement about the functions of psychopathological computation.

4.6 Do the functions of psychopathological computations scale with LLM size?

Finally, we tested the relationship between psychopathological functions and LLM size. We observed a subtle and interesting pattern. First, the larger LLMs tended to correct their behaviors better (Fig. 3E-left). This result was somewhat expected since the larger LLMs are generally more capable and better at following instructions (Kaplan et al., 2020; Wei et al., 2022). However, surprisingly, the amount of resistance specifically attributable to the joint unit activation—i.e., the difference in resistance between joint- and single-unit activations—became larger as LLM size increased (Fig. 3E-right). In other words, while the larger LLMs failed less in following instructions, the resistant property of the psychopathological computations grew stronger. This tightly aligns with our structural findings (Fig. 2G): as larger LLMs develop denser and stronger causal links among the units in their internals, those structures exert stronger functional consequences. In summary, we suggest that the functions of psychopathological computations scale with LLM size.

[3] The † symbols in Fig. 3A indicate the measures where the unintervened LLM scored zero. To avoid division by zero, we added ($0.01\times$ the maximum possible score) to each score to compute the reported statistics.




Figure 3: **Functions of psychopathological computations in LLMs**. (A) Behavioral changes after unit (feature) intervention. (B) Simulation environments to observe the LLM behavioral changes. (C) Examples showing behavioral resistance caused by the joint unit activation. (D) Relationship between joint unit activation and the resistant property. (E) Relationship between LLM size and computational function of psychopathology. Shaded bands denote s.d.; *, **, and *** respectively denote p-values $< 0.05, 0.01,$ and 0.001.

5 DISCUSSION

In this work, we provide evidence for network-theoretic computations of psychopathology in LLMs. We developed a computational-theoretical framework to generate theory-grounded and empirically falsifiable hypotheses about psychopathological computations in AI systems (Fig. 1). Our empirical analyses suggest that structural and functional signatures of psychopathological computations, defined by the established framework, become more pronounced with LLM size (Figs. 2 & 3). In concert, we conclude the possibility that psychopathological computations emerged in LLMs.

A potential reason for the emergence is rooted in the propositional or representational nature of the computational units we identified. During training, LLMs learn complex interrelations among the language constructs (Patel & Pavlick, 2022; Pavlick, 2023; Li et al., 2023; Gurnee & Tegmark, 2024)—relations that may capture patterns analogous to human thought processes, including those that are psychopathological. Consequently, when we intervened on the unit, the LLM appeared to follow its learned relations, leading to the spread and self-sustenance of the related thoughts. Aligned with this explanation, we indeed observed that larger LLMs seemed more capable of psychopathological computations (Figs. 2G & 3E).

Several alternative explanations exist for our results. First, one may argue that LLMs are simply pattern-matching machines. We do not argue against this position. The observed phenomenon should, at least partially, result from matching the patterns in the LLMs' training corpus. Our evidence shows that the underlying computational mechanisms that generated the patterns may have non-trivial correspondence to those in human psychopathology. These two claims are complementary, not contradictory. The former describes the surface result, and the latter explains the underlying mechanisms supporting it. Moreover, it is worth noting that our findings pertain to the computational account of psychopathology rather than its full phenomenological spectrum in humans. Neither our theoretical framework nor the empirical results imply that these systems experience subjective distress as typically seen in human psychopathology.

Second, our findings can also be explained by LLMs' naive persona modeling. We, however, believe this view does not fairly represent our work. Persona is an umbrella term that loosely describes LLM behavioral patterns that resemble a certain personality or character. Thus, it is generally difficult to translate personas into falsifiable criteria due to their heavy reliance on non-computational and subjective descriptions. Our work demonstrates a possibility for the contrary. AI behavior research can move beyond descriptive studies into theory-grounded and falsifiable programs of science.

Last, many of the findings could also be obtained from LLMs' propensity to maintain semantic coherence. However, this view can hardly explain our resistant property result (Fig. 3C & D). If LLMs simply aimed to maintain semantic coherence, we would have observed an opposite result: LLMs in the control group (with single unit activations; thus, having stronger semantic coherence) would have resisted corrective instructions better than the experimental group (with joint activations; thus, having weaker semantic coherence). In fact, we observe this opposite outcome in most of the LLMs below 4B parameters (Fig. 3E-right; negative 'slope increase'). Thus, this final alternative explanation strengthens our interpretation. As the LLM size grows, the LLMs' internal mechanisms may be shifting from supporting semantic coherence maintenance to psychopathological computations. We acknowledge that our experiments did not cleanly rule out all potential alternative explanations, but we argue that our interpretation overall is coherent and competitive.

We close with several limitations and future directions. In modeling the computational units, we selected psychopathology symptoms of a heavily propositional or representational nature. As such, we did not consider dysfunctional computational processes (e.g., impaired attention, emotional dysregulation) as candidates. Future work should consider these diverse unit types, which may require new analytic tools. Also, while some behavioral patterns in AI systems may mirror those seen in human psychopathology, there is also a strong potential for machine-specific manifestations that do not have direct human analogues. Further studies are needed to describe, explain, predict, and control such AI systems. Finally, a more profound question remains to be answered: Can machines have psychopathology (Borsboom et al., 2019; Kendler, 2016)? Our work offers only a partial answer, but even with its conservative interpretation, it proves that the question warrants serious consideration.

AI USE STATEMENT

In this work, we used generative AI tools to refine the manuscript and generate synthetic data (the data generation protocol is detailed in the Supplement). We have manually reviewed such AI-assisted work, and we take responsibility for the final content of this work.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies LLMs, not people: no human subjects were involved and no clinical or patient data were used. All models studied (Llama 3, Gemma 3, Qwen3) are publicly released open-weight models, used under their respective licenses.

Our findings should not be read as evidence that LLMs are sentient, suffer, or have mental disorders in a clinical sense. As discussed, our claims concern computational structure and function, not subjective experience. We use psychiatric terminology only to describe model computations, and we do not intend it to trivialize or stigmatize mental illness in humans.

Our intervention method can steer models toward text expressing self-harm, hostility, or deception, so it is dual-use: techniques that help detect and suppress such states could also be used to induce them. We consider the added risk limited, because activation steering requires white-box access to model weights and is already well documented. Our results are intended to inform safety work.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

The text datasets generated and analyzed during the current study are not publicly available due to safety and ethical concerns, but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request. However, the dataset containing the measured unit activations to reproduce the numeric results in Fig. 2 is in the Supplement.

The following code and data are available in the Supplement:

- Input prompt designs for the synthetic data generation.
- S3AE training and evaluation, with its hyperparameters.
- Trained S3AE weights.
- Iterative response reconstruction task design.
- Causal inference.
- Behavioral simulation study design.
- Resistance study design.
- Statistical analysis.

REFERENCES

American Psychiatric Association. *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5*. American Psychiatric Publishing, 5 edition, 2013.

Ziv Ben-Zion, Kristin Witte, Akshay K. Jagadish, Or Duek, Ilan Harpaz-Rotem, Marie-Christine Khorsandian, Achim Burrer, Erich Seifritz, Philipp Homan, Eric Schulz, and Tobias R. Spiller. Assessing and alleviating state anxiety in large language models. *npj Digital Medicine*, 8(1):132, 2025. doi: 10.1038/s41746-025-01512-6.

Philip Boeken and Joris M. Mooij. Dynamic structural causal models. In *UAI CI4TS Workshop*, 2024.

Denny Borsboom. A network theory of mental disorders. *World Psychiatry*, 16(1):5–13, 2017. doi: 10.1002/wps.20375.

Denny Borsboom, Angélique O. J. Cramer, Verena D Schmittmann, Sacha Epskamp, and Lourens J Waldorp. The small world of psychopathology. *PLOS ONE*, 6(11):e27407, 2011. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0027407.

Denny Borsboom, Angélique O. J. Cramer, and Annemarie Kalis. Brain disorders? not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 42:e2, 2019. doi: 10.1017/s0140525x17002266.

Patrick Butlin, Robert Long, Eric Elmoznino, Yoshua Bengio, Jonathan Birch, Axel Constant, George Deane, Stephen M. Fleming, Chris Frith, Xu Ji, Ryota Kanai, Colin Klein, Grace Lindsay, Matthias Michel, Liad Mudrik, Megan A. K. Peters, Eric Schwitzgebel, Jonathan Simon, and Rufin VanRullen. Consciousness in artificial intelligence: Insights from the science of consciousness. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.08708*, 2023.

Gheorghe Comanici, Eric Bieber, Mike Schaekermann, Ice Pasupat, Noveen Sachdeva, Inderjit Dhillon, Marcel Blistein, Ori Ram, Dan Zhang, Evan Rosen, et al. Gemini 2.5: Pushing the frontier with advanced reasoning, multimodality, long context, and next generation agentic capabilities. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2507.06261*, 2025.

Eduardo Fonseca-Pedrero, Javier Ortuño, Martin Debbané, Raymond C. K. Chan, David Cicero, Lisa C Zhang, Colleen Brenner, Emma Barkus, Richard J Linscott, Thomas Kwapil, et al. The network structure of schizotypal personality traits. *Schizophrenia Bulletin*, 44(suppl_2):S468–S479, 2018. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sby044.

Leo Gao, Tom Dupré la Tour, Henk Tillman, Gabriel Goh, Rajan Troll, Alec Radford, Ilya Sutskever, Jan Leike, and Jeffrey Wu. Scaling and evaluating sparse autoencoders. In *ICLR*, 2025.

Gemma Team, Aishwarya Kamath, Johan Ferret, Shreya Pathak, Nino Vieillard, Ramona Merhej, Sarah Perrin, Tatiana Matejovicova, Alexandre Ramé, Morgane Rivière, et al. Gemma 3 technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.19786*, 2025.

Aaron Grattafiori, Abhimanyu Dubey, Abhinav Jauhri, Abhinav Pandey, Abhishek Kadian, Ahmad Al-Dahle, Aiesha Letman, Akhil Mathur, Alan Schelten, Alex Vaughan, et al. The Llama 3 herd of models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.21783*, 2024.

José Guillen, Eugenio Herrera-Berg, Apoorva Bhandari, Pablo León-Villagrá, Marc-Lluís Vives, and Cristian Buc Calderon. Large language models as windows on the mental structure of psychopathology, 2025. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=UXCfRU2Qs4.

Wiebke Günther, Urmi Ninad, and Jakob Runge. Causal discovery for time series from multiple datasets with latent contexts. In *UAI*, 2023.

Wes Gurnee and Max Tegmark. Language models represent space and time. In *ICLR*, 2024.

Jonathon R Howlett, Lindsay D Nelson, and Murray B Stein. Mental health consequences of traumatic brain injury. *Biological Psychiatry*, 91(5):413–420, 2022. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2021.09.024.

Quentin J. M. Huys, Michael Browning, Martin P Paulus, and Michael J Frank. Advances in the computational understanding of mental illness. *Neuropsychopharmacology*, 46(1):3–19, 2021. doi: 10.1038/s41386-020-0746-4.

Thomas R Insel and Bruce N Cuthbert. Brain disorders? precisely. *Science*, 348(6234):499–500, 2015. doi: 10.1126/science.aab2358.

Jared Kaplan, Sam McCandlish, Tom Henighan, Tom B. Brown, Benjamin Chess, Rewon Child, Scott Gray, Alec Radford, Jeffrey Wu, and Dario Amodei. Scaling laws for neural language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.08361*, 2020.

Kenneth S Kendler. The nature of psychiatric disorders. *World Psychiatry*, 15(1):5–12, 2016. doi: 10.1002/wps.20292.

Taekwan Kim, Sang Wan Lee, Silvia Kyungjin Lho, Sun-Young Moon, Minah Kim, and Jun Soo Kwon. Neurocomputational model of compulsivity: deviating from an uncertain goal-directed system. *Brain*, 147(6):2230–2244, 2024. doi: 10.1093/brain/awae102.

Lei Le, Andrew Patterson, and Martha White. Supervised autoencoders: Improving generalization performance with unsupervised regularizers. In *NeurIPS*, 2018.

Seungpil Lee, Donghyeon Shin, Yunjeong Lee, and Sundong Kim. Can large language models develop gambling addiction? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2509.22818*, 2025.

Kenneth Li, Aspen K Hopkins, David Bau, Fernanda Viégas, Hanspeter Pfister, and Martin Wattenberg. Emergent world representations: Exploring a sequence model trained on a synthetic task. In *ICLR*, 2023.

David Marr. *Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information*. W. H. Freeman, 1982.

Wolfgang Marx, Brenda W. J. H. Penninx, Marco Solmi, Toshi A Furukawa, Joseph Firth, Andre F Carvalho, and Michael Berk. Major depressive disorder. *Nature Reviews Disease Primers*, 9(1):44, 2023. doi: 10.1038/s41572-023-00454-1.

Andrew A Nierenberg, Bruno Agustini, Ole Köhler-Forsberg, Cristina Cusin, Douglas Katz, Louisa G Sylvia, Amy Peters, and Michael Berk. Diagnosis and treatment of bipolar disorder: a review. *JAMA*, 330(14):1370–1380, 2023. doi: 10.1001/jama.2023.18588.

Nick Obradovich, Sahib S Khalsa, Waqas U Khan, Jina Suh, Roy H Perlis, Olusola Ajilore, and Martin P Paulus. Opportunities and risks of large language models in psychiatry. *NPP—Digital Psychiatry and Neuroscience*, 2(1):8, 2024. doi: 10.1038/s44277-024-00010-z.

Roma Patel and Ellie Pavlick. Mapping language models to grounded conceptual spaces. In *ICLR*, 2022.

Ellie Pavlick. Symbols and grounding in large language models. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences*, 381(2251):20220041, 2023. doi: 10.1098/rsta.2022.0041.

Judea Pearl. *Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference*. Cambridge University Press, 2 edition, 2009.

Donald J. Robinaugh, Jonas M. B. Haslbeck, Lourens J. Waldorp, Jolanda J. Kossakowski, Eiko I. Fried, Alexander J. Millner, Richard J. McNally, Oisín Ryan, Jill de Ron, Han L. J. van der Maas, Egbert H. van Nes, Marten Scheffer, Kenneth S. Kendler, and Denny Borsboom. Advancing the network theory of mental disorders: A computational model of panic disorder. *Psychological Review*, 131(6):1482–1508, 2024. doi: 10.1037/rev0000515.

Sharain Suliman, Siyabulela G Mkabile, Dylan S Fincham, Rashid Ahmed, Dan J Stein, and Soraya Seedat. Cumulative effect of multiple trauma on symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression in adolescents. *Comprehensive Psychiatry*, 50(2):121–127, 2009. doi: 10.1016/j.comppsych.2008.06.006.

Adly Templeton, Tom Conerly, Jonathan Marcus, Jack Lindsey, Trenton Bricken, Brian Chen, Adam Pearce, Craig Citro, Emmanuel Ameisen, Andy Jones, Hoagy Cunningham, Nicholas L Turner, Callum McDougall, Monte MacDiarmid, C. Daniel Freeman, Theodore R. Sumers, Edward Rees, Joshua Batson, Adam Jermyn, Shan Carter, Chris Olah, and Tom Henighan. Scaling monosemanticity: Extracting interpretable features from Claude 3 Sonnet. *Transformer Circuits Thread*, 2024. URL https://transformer-circuits.pub/2024/scaling-monosemanticity/index.html.

Alexander Matt Turner, Lisa Thiergart, Gavin Leech, David Udell, Juan J. Vazquez, Ulisse Mini, and Monte MacDiarmid. Steering language models with activation engineering. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.10248*, 2023.

Jason Wei, Yi Tay, Rishi Bommasani, Colin Raffel, Barret Zoph, Sebastian Borgeaud, Dani Yogatama, Maarten Bosma, Denny Zhou, Donald Metzler, et al. Emergent abilities of large language models. *Transactions on Machine Learning Research*, 2022.

A. K. Wittenborn, H Rahmandad, J Rick, and N Hosseinichimeh. Depression as a systemic syndrome: mapping the feedback loops of major depressive disorder. *Psychological Medicine*, 46(3):551–562, 2016. doi: 10.1017/s0033291715002044.

An Yang, Anfeng Li, Baosong Yang, Beichen Zhang, Binyuan Hui, Bo Zheng, Bowen Yu, Chang Gao, Chengen Huang, Chenxu Lv, et al. Qwen3 technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.09388*, 2025.