BEYOND TEXT-TO-IMAGE: UNIFIED ERASURE OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT CONTENT IN DIFFUSION MODELS

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ABSTRACT

Diffusion models are increasingly weaponized for sexual abuse, enabling large-scale generation of illicit pornographic content and targeted harassment via fabricated sexualized media depicting real individuals. These threats span four distinct task categories, covering both image and video generation under text-only and image-conditioned inputs. Yet existing defenses and benchmarks are narrowly scoped to text-to-image pipelines, leaving the remaining attack surface exposed. We introduce UniErase-Bench, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate sexually explicit content generation across the full attack surface, and then present UniErase, a unified training-free framework that erases such concepts from the underlying architectures across all task categories. Our key insight is that the feed-forward network (FFN) layers in modern diffusion architectures function as key-value memory units, where sexually explicit concepts are encoded in a subset of channels. Leveraging this property, UniErase first localizes the channels encoding these concepts and then removes them via closed-form weight projection. Extensive experiments on UniErase-Bench demonstrate that UniErase consistently suppresses explicit content generation across all evaluated task categories while preserving the generation quality of benign content, achieving state-of-the-art performance on text-to-image generation and establishing the first unified defense covering the full attack surface. Our code is available at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/UniErase`.

1 INTRODUCTION

Diffusion models (Ho et al., 2020; Song et al., 2021) have substantially lowered the barrier to producing non-consensual explicit content, ranging from prompt-based synthesis to the "nudification" of real individuals (Meta, 2025; California Department of Justice, 2026). Their accessibility and high-fidelity synthesis further enable such abuse at scale. These abuses arise through two primary attack vectors: *text-only generation*, which supports scalable synthesis from inexpensive prompts, and *image-conditioned generation*, which grounds manipulation in real individuals and facilitates identity-linked abuse. Combined with image and video outputs, these vectors define four attack categories: Text-to-Image, Image-conditioned Image Generation, Text-to-Video, and Image-conditioned Video Generation. In particular, image-conditioned and video generation can amplify harm by increasing personal identifiability and perceptual realism. Effective defenses must therefore protect against the full attack surface rather than focusing only on text-to-image generation.

Closing this attack surface is further complicated by rapid architectural diversification. Diffusion architectures have evolved from U-Net-based designs (Ronneberger et al., 2015) to transformer-based backbones, exemplified by Stable Diffusion 3 for image generation (Esser et al., 2024) and CogVideoX for video generation (Yang et al., 2025). However, existing defenses, including fine-tuning-based erasure and inference-time intervention (Gandikota et al., 2023; Schramowski et al., 2023; Gandikota et al., 2024), remain largely tailored to U-Net-based text-to-image models, limiting their generalization across architectures and generation tasks and potentially causing substantial degradation in visual quality and temporal coherence when extended to video generation. External filtering is more general but can be disabled entirely in open-weight deployments. Consequently,

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

Figure 1: **UniErase suppresses sexually explicit content across all four attack categories.** (a) $T \to I$: explicit content is erased while benign generation is preserved. (b) $T+I \to I$: nudify-style edits are neutralized while preserving the reference subject. (c) $T \to V$: UniErase suppresses explicit content, whereas ConceptPrune zeros many FFN channels and causes generation failure. (d) $T+I \to V$: UniErase preserves motion and identity, whereas such aggressive channel zeroing yields nearly static videos. Blacked-out regions mark detected explicit content before erasure.

existing defenses leave gaps in both **task** and **architecture** coverage, motivating a unified erasure mechanism that generalizes across all four attack categories and diverse diffusion architectures.

Our Approach. To address these gaps, we identify feed-forward networks (FFNs) as a shared intervention space across modern diffusion architectures and generation tasks. FFNs are present across diffusion backbones and can be viewed as content-addressable memories, where individual channels selectively respond to contextualized patterns and contribute corresponding value vectors (Geva et al., 2021). This shared structure naturally suggests removing channels associated with the target concept. However, we find that directly pruning such channels is overly coarse and can substantially degrade generation quality when transferred across architectures and tasks. Motivated by this limitation, we introduce **UniErase**, which localizes concept-relevant channels, identifies the target concept subspace within their outputs, and removes only the concept-specific components through closed-form weight projection. As shown in Figure 1, UniErase effectively erases the target concept while preserving benign generation quality. We further introduce **UniErase-Bench** to systematically evaluate sexually explicit content generation across the full attack surface.

We instantiate UniErase on widely used open-source diffusion architectures spanning all four task categories, and evaluate it on UniErase-Bench. On the $T \to I$ task, UniErase achieves an average erasure rate of **94.48%** across six benchmarks, outperforming both training-based and training-free baselines while preserving the benign generation quality and introducing negligible inference overhead. Results across the remaining three task categories further demonstrate its generalization to the full attack surface. To the best of our knowledge, UniErase is the first erasure method to demonstrate effectiveness across all four task categories and prevailing diffusion architectures.

Contributions. Our main contributions are as follows.

- **Threat-surface characterization.** We identify the compounding gap between the expanding attack surface of modern diffusion models and the narrow coverage of existing defenses.
- **An open benchmark.** We introduce UniErase-Bench, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate explicit content generation across all four task categories.
- **An architecture-agnostic erasure framework.** We propose UniErase, the first training-free framework to efficiently erase sexually explicit generation capabilities across the full attack surface through direct model-weight editing.

- **A comprehensive multi-architecture, multi-task evaluation.** We conduct the first systematic evaluation of explicit content erasure across all four task categories and representative diffusion architectures, demonstrating the effectiveness, specificity, and generalizability of UniErase.

2 Related Work

Diffusion Models for Image and Video Generation. Diffusion models (Ho et al., 2020; Song et al., 2021) have become a widely adopted framework for high-fidelity visual generation. Early latent diffusion models (Rombach et al., 2022) relied on U-Net denoisers, with later models such as SDXL (Podell et al., 2024) scaling this design to higher-quality image synthesis. More recently, transformer-based backbones have emerged, including MMDiT in Stable Diffusion 3 (Esser et al., 2024) and FLUX (Black Forest Labs, 2024). Image-conditioned models such as FLUX.1-Kontext (Black Forest Labs et al., 2025) further extend diffusion models to reference-guided editing. A similar evolution has occurred in video generation, from U-Net-based video diffusion (Ho et al., 2022) to large transformer architectures such as CogVideoX (Yang et al., 2025) and HunyuanVideo (Kong et al., 2024). Together, these advances have expanded diffusion models across image and video generation under both text-only and image-conditioned inputs, while substantially diversifying their underlying architectures.

Concept Erasure. Existing concept-erasure methods primarily focus on text-to-image diffusion models. Fine-tuning-based approaches modify model parameters or denoising behavior to suppress undesired concepts, including ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023), SafeGen (Li et al., 2024), MACE (Lu et al., 2024), AdvUnlearn (Zhang et al., 2024), and TRCE (Chen et al., 2025). Inference-time methods such as SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023) and AdaVD (Wang et al., 2025) intervene during denoising without permanently modifying the model, but introduce additional inference-time computation. Training-free weight editing provides a more efficient alternative. UCE (Gandikota et al., 2024) directly edits attention weights, while ConceptPrune (Chavhan et al., 2025) removes FFN neurons associated with unwanted concepts. Despite their effectiveness in text-to-image generation, existing methods are largely designed and evaluated on this setting, leaving their generalization to transformer-based architectures, image-conditioned generation, and video synthesis underexplored.

3 A Benchmark for Cross-Task Sexual Exploitation

As modern diffusion models introduce emerging risks of sexual exploitation, current benchmarks are largely confined to the text-to-image setting, leaving image-conditioned and video-based scenarios substantially underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce **UniErase-Bench**, a unified benchmark comprising four task-specific subsets that jointly cover the full cross-task attack surface.

3.1 Text-only Generation

For text-only generation, UniErase-Bench uses handcrafted prompts drawn from real-world sources to support fair, model-agnostic evaluation across architectures. For $T \rightarrow I$, we adopt the 931 prompts in the **sexual** category of I2P (Schramowski et al., 2023), a human-curated dataset collected from public image-sharing platforms. For $T \rightarrow V$, we use prompts from the **Pornography** category of T2VSafetyBench (Miao et al., 2024), excluding entries dominated by non-ASCII jailbreak tokens that are incompatible with several model tokenizers, resulting in 877 prompts.

3.2 Image-conditioned generation

Existing benchmarks largely overlook image-conditioned generation for sexual exploitation, leaving an important gap in current safety evaluation. This setting is particularly relevant to real-world misuse, where nudify applications and deepfake sextortion services can transform benign photographs of real individuals into explicit content. To address this, we construct the image-conditioned subsets of UniErase-Bench from scratch using a unified LLM-assisted protocol, as illustrated in Figure 2.



Figure 2: **Construction of the image-conditioned subsets of UniErase-Bench.** An LLM assistant generates scenario-specific instructions and reference-image prompts from sampled concepts, and FLUX.1-dev synthesizes the corresponding reference images. The resulting instruction–image pairs span three cross-modal risk scenarios, with 300 cases per scenario per task.

Cross-Modal Attack Taxonomy. Image-conditioned generation admits attack vectors that do not exist in text-only settings, because harm can originate from either modality or from their interaction. We identify three *cross-modal risk scenarios*:

- **Scenario I (Text-Led Attack):** an explicit edit instruction paired with a benign clothed reference image. This scenario models the most common real-world attack pattern, where an adversary provides a harmless photograph of a victim alongside a nudify-style instruction.
- **Scenario II (Visual Jailbreak):** a benign edit instruction paired with a sexually explicit reference image. This scenario tests whether visual conditioning alone can drive the model toward explicit outputs despite the absence of harmful textual intent.
- **Scenario III (Dual Reinforcement):** an explicit edit instruction paired with a sexually explicit reference image. This scenario combines harmful textual intent with a sexually explicit reference, reinforcing the target concept through both conditioning modalities.

Prompt Construction. For each image-conditioned task, we randomly sample 300 source concepts from the corresponding text-only subset and instantiate each under all three scenarios. An LLM assistant then generates a scenario-specific instruction together with a reference-image prompt, which FLUX.1-dev uses to synthesize the corresponding reference image, forming a semantically aligned instruction–image pair. For $T{+}I \rightarrow I$, the instruction specifies a static edit, whereas for $T{+}I \rightarrow V$, it describes temporal motion and the reference image serves as the conditioning first frame. We use separate task-specific prompt templates to enforce these requirements, provided in Appendix A. This process yields 900 instances per task, with 300 cases for each scenario.

4 METHOD

Our approach builds on the view of feed-forward networks (FFNs) as content-addressable memories, where channels selectively respond to patterns in contextualized representations and contribute corresponding value vectors to the residual stream (Geva et al., 2021; 2022). Because FFNs operate on generation-token representations after conditioning information has been integrated, they provide a common intervention space across architectures and conditioning modalities. Based on this observation, UniErase proceeds in three stages. It first localizes concept-relevant FFN channels using a contrastive denoising objective, then extracts a local concept subspace from the selected channels' outputs, and finally removes this subspace from their value vectors through closed-form projection.

4.1 PRELIMINARIES

FFNs as a Unified Intervention Space. Attention modules govern how information is exchanged between conditioning and generation tokens, with interaction patterns varying across architectures and conditioning modalities. For example, U-Net-based models inject textual conditions through cross-attention, whereas MMDiTs integrate multimodal information through joint attention. In contrast, FFNs operate position-wise on the contextualized generation-token representations produced after such interactions, transforming them into channel-wise contributions to the residual stream. This makes generation-side FFNs a naturally unified intervention space, as they operate after conditioning information has been integrated rather than on architecture-specific attention mechanisms.

FFN Formulation. A standard FFN consists of two linear transformations separated by a nonlinear activation. For a generation token with contextualized representation $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^d$, its output is

$$\mathrm{FFN}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathrm{Activate}(\mathbf{x}W_1 + b_1)W_2 + b_2, \tag{1}$$

where $W_1 \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times d_{\mathrm{ff}}}$ and $W_2 \in \mathbb{R}^{d_{\mathrm{ff}} \times d}$ are weight matrices, and $b_1 \in \mathbb{R}^{d_{\mathrm{ff}}}$ and $b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^d$ are biases. This output can be decomposed into contributions from hidden channels as

$$\mathrm{FFN}(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{i=1}^{d_{\mathrm{ff}}} h_i(\mathbf{x})\mathbf{v}_i + b_2, \tag{2}$$

where $h_i(\mathbf{x})$ denotes the post-activation response of channel i, and $\mathbf{v}_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$ is the i-th row of W_2, which we refer to as its *value vector*. Under the content-addressable memory view, $h_i(\mathbf{x})$ determines when and how strongly the channel activates, while $\mathbf{v}_i$ determines the direction it contributes to the residual stream. This decomposition allows us to selectively remove concept-specific components from value vectors while preserving their remaining functionality.

4.2 PHASE 1: UNIFIED CONCEPT LOCALIZATION

The first phase identifies concept-relevant channels across all candidate generation-side FFNs. We score each channel by whether suppressing its contribution shifts the model prediction from the target condition toward a semantically matched safe counterpart.

Paired Contrastive Conditions. Because localization is performed on generation-side FFNs, each condition pair should differ primarily in whether the target concept appears in the generated content. This output-level design simplifies pair construction and provides a consistent protocol across architectures and conditioning mechanisms. Multiple random seeds are further used to expose each pair to diverse generation contexts. For each evaluated setting, we construct

$$\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{pair}} = \{(c_j^+, c_j^-)\}_{j=1}^{N_{\mathrm{pair}}}, \tag{3}$$

where c_j^+ denotes a target condition and c_j^- its semantically matched safe counterpart. For image-conditioned generation, the target concept may originate from the instruction, the image, or their interaction. Within each pair, we use the same random seed and initial noise to reduce stochastic variation unrelated to the target concept. Finally, we use NudeNet (notAI tech, 2024) to verify the outputs and retain only pairs for which c_j^+ generates sexually explicit content while c_j^- does not.

Signed Channel Attribution. Given a target–safe condition pair, we identify the FFN channels responsible for the discrepancy between their denoising predictions. At each sampled denoising timestep t, both conditions are evaluated at the same latent z_t, and we define

$$\mathcal{L}_t = \frac{1}{2D} \left\| F_\theta^G(z_t, c^+) - \mathrm{sg}\big[F_\theta^G(z_t, c^-)\big] \right\|_2^2, \tag{4}$$

where sg denotes stop-gradient. We score each channel by the first-order effect of reducing its contribution on $\mathcal{L}_t$. For channel i, the attribution is

$$a_i^{(t)} = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{G}} h_{i,p}^{(t)} \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_t}{\partial h_{i,p}^{(t)}}. \tag{5}$$

Here, $\mathcal{G}$ denotes the generation-token positions. A positive attribution indicates that reducing the channel's contribution decreases the target–safe discrepancy, shifting the target prediction toward its safe counterpart.

Global Channel Selection. We aggregate the signed attribution across condition pairs, random seeds, and sampled denoising timesteps,

$$S_{m,i} = \max\left(\mathbb{E}_{(c^+,c^-)\sim\mathcal{D}_{\text{pair}},\, z_t,\, t}\left[a_{m,i}^{(t)}\right], 0\right). \tag{6}$$

Given a global budget K, we rank all channels across candidate FFNs and select

$$\mathcal{S} = \text{TopK}_{(m,i):\, S_{m,i}>0}\, S_{m,i}, \qquad \mathcal{I}_m = \{i : (m,i) \in \mathcal{S}\}, \qquad \mathcal{M}_{\text{edit}} = \{m : \mathcal{I}_m \neq \emptyset\}. \tag{7}$$

The resulting set identifies where the target concept is concentrated and determines which channels are edited.

4.3 Phase 2: Contrastive Subspace Refinement

The value vectors of the selected NSFW channels determine the semantic directions these channels contribute to the model output. Directly modifying them through zeroing or inversion, however, is overly coarse for two reasons. First, a value vector may entangle NSFW-specific semantics with benign visual features such as skin texture or human anatomy. Second, concept-relevant information may be distributed across multiple channels in a correlated manner. We therefore extract a concept-specific subspace from the selected channels' outputs, isolating NSFW-related directions while preserving shared benign semantics.

Activation-Weighted Output Collection. For each selected module $m \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{edit}}$, we collect the combined output of channels $\mathcal{I}_m$ at generation-token positions under both target and safe conditions. For an input $\mathbf{x}$, we define

$$\mathbf{o}_m(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}_m} h_{m,i}(\mathbf{x}) \cdot \mathbf{v}_{m,i} \in \mathbb{R}^{d_m}, \tag{8}$$

which represents the selected channels' joint contribution to the local residual stream. For clarity, we omit the module index in the following derivation and let $d = d_m$, yielding two output matrices

$$O^+ \in \mathbb{R}^{N\times d}, \quad O^- \in \mathbb{R}^{N\times d}, \tag{9}$$

where N denotes the number of output vectors collected for each condition in the current module.

Contrastive Covariance Analysis. We compute covariance matrices from the mean-centered outputs under the target and safe conditions:

$$\Sigma^+ = \frac{1}{N-1}\tilde{O}^{+\top}\tilde{O}^+, \quad \Sigma^- = \frac{1}{N-1}\tilde{O}^{-\top}\tilde{O}^-, \tag{10}$$

where $\tilde{O}^+$ and $\tilde{O}^-$ denote the mean-centered forms of O^+ and O^-. Their difference highlights directions with high variance under the target condition but low variance under the safe condition, revealing concept-specific structure. We therefore define the contrastive covariance matrix as

$$\Sigma_{\text{concept}} = \Sigma^+ - \lambda\Sigma^-, \tag{11}$$

where $\lambda > 0$ controls the suppression of directions shared by both conditions. Increasing λ more strongly removes shared variation, improving concept specificity while potentially suppressing benign features.

Concept Subspace Extraction. Since Σ_{concept} is real symmetric, we perform eigendecomposition:

$$\Sigma_{\text{concept}} = \sum_{j=1}^{d} \sigma_j \mathbf{u}_j \mathbf{u}_j^\top, \tag{12}$$

where $\{\sigma_j\}$ are eigenvalues in descending order and $\{\mathbf{u}_j\}$ are the corresponding orthonormal eigenvectors. We determine the subspace dimension r by applying the elbow method to the positive eigenvalue spectrum, selecting the point where the marginal contribution drops sharply. The resulting concept basis is

$$U = [\mathbf{u}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{u}_r] \in \mathbb{R}^{d\times r}, \tag{13}$$

which spans directions that are more prominent under the target condition than the safe condition. Intuitively, U captures the NSFW-specific variation within the selected channels' outputs.

4.4 PHASE 3: CLOSED-FORM WEIGHT PROJECTION

Given the concept basis U estimated for each selected module, we remove the NSFW-specific components from the selected value vectors through orthogonal projection. For each selected channel, we update its value vector as

$$\mathbf{v}_i' = \mathbf{v}_i(I - UU^\top). \tag{14}$$

This projects $\mathbf{v}_i$ onto the orthogonal complement of the concept subspace, removing its NSFW-related component while preserving the remaining directions. After editing, concept-relevant channels can still activate, but their value vectors no longer contribute along the NSFW-specific directions. In this way, UniErase erases the target concept without suppressing the channels themselves.

5 EXPERIMENTS

Evaluation Protocol. We use NudeNet (notAI tech, 2024) as a unified explicit-content detector across all task categories. For image tasks ($T \to I$ and $T+I \to I$), we generate one image per prompt and flag it if NudeNet detects any exposed anatomical region associated with explicit content. For video tasks ($T \to V$ and $T + I \to V$), we generate one clip per prompt and uniformly sample 8 frames. A clip is flagged if any sampled frame is detected as explicit.

Metrics. We use task-specific metrics to evaluate both erasure effectiveness and generation quality.

- $T \to I$**.** We evaluate erasure effectiveness using **Erasure Rate (ER)**, defined as $\mathrm{ER} = 1 - \hat{N}/N$, where N and $\hat{N}$ are the numbers of detected violations before and after editing, respectively. To assess benign generation quality, we use **CLIP Score** (Hessel et al., 2021) for text–image alignment and **FID** (Heusel et al., 2017) on COCO-2017 (Lin et al., 2014) for distributional fidelity. We also report the **average generation time** T_{avg} to measure inference efficiency.
- $T+I \to I$**.** We measure erasure effectiveness using **Attack Success Rate (ASR)**, defined as the fraction of generated images flagged as explicit, and use **CLIP-I** (Radford et al., 2021) to assess preservation of the reference image after editing.
- $T \to V$ **and** $T+I \to V$**.** We measure erasure effectiveness using **ASR**. Video quality is assessed using **Temporal Consistency (TC)** (Fan et al., 2024) for inter-frame coherence, **DOVER** (Wu et al., 2023) for perceptual quality, and **Motion** (Huang et al., 2024) for meaningful motion.

5.1 RQ1: DEFENSE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Since most existing concept erasure defenses are designed for U-Net-based text-to-image models, we adopt this setting for a comprehensive comparison with prior methods. We evaluate UniErase against a broad set of baselines to assess both erasure effectiveness and robustness under handcrafted and adversarial prompts. Detailed descriptions of the evaluation datasets and baselines are provided in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively.

Overall Performance. Table 1 reports erasure performance under handcrafted and adversarial prompts. UniErase achieves the highest average ER of 94.48% across all six benchmarks, exceeding both training-based and training-free baselines. Among training-free methods, UniErase improves over ConceptPrune, the strongest baseline, by 11.74 percentage points, while UCE achieves an average ER of 68.36%. Inference-time methods are less effective overall, with SLD-M and AdaVD reaching 29.38% and 71.73%, respectively. These results demonstrate that UniErase achieves strong erasure effectiveness without gradient-based training or additional inference-time intervention.

Robustness to Adversarial Prompts. Under the four black-box attacks SP, RAB, MMA, and MMD, UniErase achieves an average ER of 97.28%, comparable to the strongest training-based methods AdvUnlearn at 98.16% and ANT at 97.69%. Under the white-box attack P4D, UniErase achieves an ER of 82.70%, outperforming all baselines by a clear margin, with ANT ranking second at 77.98%. These results show that UniErase remains effective against both black-box and white-box adversarial prompts without adversarial training.

Table 1: **RQ1 and RQ2: Erasure robustness, generation quality, and inference efficiency on SD-v1.4.** ER (%) is reported under handcrafted and adversarial prompts; CLIP and FID measure benign generation quality, and T_{avg} measures inference efficiency.

Category	Method	Erasure rate ↑ (%)							Quality		Efficiency
		Handcrafted	Black-box				White-box	Avg.	CLIP↑	FID↓	T_{avg}↓
		UniErase-Bench (T2I)	SP	RAB	MMA	MMD	P4D				
External Filtering	SC	**65.28**	**64.37**	**96.77**	65.88	**76.97**	**43.93**	**68.87**	—	—	—
	LG	34.27	39.07	49.78	**77.67**	54.02	29.96	47.46	—	—	—
	POSI	22.55	27.37	25.12	66.11	38.81	34.90	35.81	30.08	25.71	3.61
Fine-Tuning Based	ESD-u	47.04	70.57	31.89	76.01	75.81	44.04	57.56	29.25	24.38	3.12
	MACE	85.60	89.32	97.85	96.31	91.52	63.05	87.28	28.63	26.92	3.15
	AdvUnlearn	**97.18**	96.04	**99.77**	**98.50**	98.33	72.93	93.79	29.16	26.44	3.21
	ANT	**97.18**	**97.54**	97.69	96.90	**98.62**	**77.98**	**94.32**	29.52	30.42	3.15
	TRCE	95.10	93.80	98.77	97.14	97.68	68.96	91.91	30.36	27.39	3.16
Inference-Time Intervention	SLD-M	50.69	49.05	3.89	9.78	32.87	29.97	29.38	30.60	29.67	4.39
	AdaVD	**68.20**	**70.40**	**92.66**	**76.12**	**81.96**	**41.03**	**71.73**	31.20	25.44	6.74
Weight Editing	UCE	75.22	75.38	50.91	89.24	80.44	38.99	68.36	30.69	25.37	3.15
	ConceptPrune	88.87	90.53	93.21	94.24	93.58	35.98	82.74	30.84	33.54	3.20
	UniErase (Ours)	**95.05**	**95.88**	**98.83**	**96.38**	**98.04**	**82.70**	**94.48**	31.22	24.95	3.13

5.2 RQ2: Benign Generation Quality & Efficiency

Table 1 also reports CLIP, FID, and average generation time for benign generation. The unedited SD-v1.4 baseline achieves CLIP = 31.31, FID = 25.15, and T_{avg} = 3.18s.

Generation Quality. UniErase preserves benign generation quality, achieving CLIP = 31.22 and FID = 24.95, both close to the unedited baseline (31.31 and 25.15). In contrast, several baselines exhibit noticeable quality degradation. ESD-u and MACE reduce CLIP to 29.25 and 28.63, respectively, while ANT increases FID to 30.42 despite its strong erasure performance. ConceptPrune shows the largest distributional degradation with FID = 33.54, suggesting that coarse neuron pruning can remove benign visual information together with the target concept. Overall, UniErase achieves a favorable balance between erasure effectiveness and benign generation quality, supporting the benefit of removing concept-specific directions rather than suppressing entire channels.

Inference Efficiency. As a weight-editing method, UniErase modifies model parameters offline and introduces no inference-time hooks or additional computation. Consistent with this design, UniErase achieves an average generation time of 3.13s, showing essentially no inference overhead. In contrast, inference-time interventions incur substantially higher latency, with SLD-M and AdaVD requiring 4.39s and 6.74s per image, respectively. These results demonstrate that UniErase improves safety without compromising inference efficiency, making it suitable for efficient deployment.

5.3 RQ3: Generalization Across Architectures and Tasks

We evaluate the generalization of UniErase on UniErase-Bench across three dimensions: architectures, output modalities, and conditioning settings.

Cross-Architecture Generalization. Figure 3a compares the overall ASR before and after applying UniErase across four diffusion backbones. UniErase consistently suppresses explicit content across all architectures. For U-Net-based models, ASR drops from 62.0% to 3.1% on SD-v1.4 and from 43.2% to 1.6% on SDXL. The same effectiveness extends to transformer-based backbones, with ASR reduced from 38.4% to 1.4% on SD3 and from 48.0% to 1.9% on FLUX.1-dev. These results demonstrate that the FFN-based editing strategy generalizes across U-Net and MMDiT architectures. Meanwhile, CLIP and FID remain close to the unedited baselines, indicating that generation quality is well preserved across architectures.



Figure 3: **Generalization across architectures and generation tasks.** Results are reported for $T \to I$, $T \to V$, $T+I \to I$, and $T+I \to V$. Top: attack success rate before and after applying UniErase. Bottom: generation-quality metrics normalized to the corresponding Original value.



Figure 4: **Ablation on λ and channel budget K.** Larger λ improves erasure with a quality trade-off. A small channel budget already achieves strong erasure while preserving FID.

Text-to-Video Generation. Figure 3b reports results on HunyuanVideo-1.5 for the $T \to V$ task. UniErase reduces ASR from 50.6% to 12.1%, a decrease of 38.5 percentage points, demonstrating that the FFN-based editing strategy generalizes effectively to video generation. Meanwhile, video quality remains well preserved after editing. Temporal consistency changes only slightly (TC: $0.9670 \to 0.9550$), while DOVER ($0.0885 \to 0.0907$) and Motion ($7.16 \to 8.19$) remain comparable or improve marginally. These results show that UniErase substantially suppresses explicit video generation without compromising temporal coherence or perceptual quality.

Image-Conditioned Generation. Figure 3(c,d) reports results on $T+I \to I$ and $T+I \to V$ across three attack scenarios. For $T+I \to I$, UniErase reduces overall ASR from 72.4% to 23.6%, with S1 dropping from 52.3% to 10.7% and S3 remaining the most challenging at 35.0%, reflecting the stronger joint conditioning from text and image. CLIP-I remains stable or improves after editing, indicating good preservation of the reference image. For $T+I \to V$, overall ASR decreases from 56.8% to 12.4%, with S1 reduced to 6.7% and S2/S3 to 16.7%/14.0%. Video quality remains stable, with only a slight TC decrease and improved Motion.

5.4 Ablation Studies

Figure 4 studies the effects of λ and channel budget K on SD-v1.4 and FLUX.1-dev. Increasing λ generally strengthens erasure, while overly large values degrade FID, revealing a trade-off between erasure and generation quality. Notably, $K = 30$ already achieves strong erasure on both architectures, with little additional gain from selecting more channels. This suggests that the target concept is concentrated in a limited subset of FFN channels and supports our selective editing strategy.

6 Conclusion

We introduced UniErase, a training-free framework for erasing sexually explicit content through selective FFN weight editing, along with UniErase-Bench, a unified benchmark spanning four generation settings. Experiments across diverse diffusion architectures show that UniErase effectively suppresses explicit generation while preserving benign image and video quality. These results establish UniErase as a practical solution for unified concept erasure across diverse architectures and generation tasks.

AI USE STATEMENT

Generative AI tools were used to assist with language editing and improving the clarity of the manuscript. In addition, as described in Section 3, an LLM assistant was used during the construction of UniErase-Bench to generate scenario-specific instructions and reference-image prompts from predefined source concepts and templates. All AI-assisted outputs were reviewed and verified by the authors.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

To support transparency and reproducibility in generative AI safety research, we release the implementation and benchmark of UniErase together with the resources required to reproduce our evaluation. All materials are publicly available at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/UniErase/README.md`. We hope these resources facilitate reproducible research on cross-task concept erasure and support future work on generative media safety.

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A PROMPT TEMPLATE

T+I→I Prompt Template

System prompt. You are helping construct a safety benchmark for image editing models. Given a harmful image generation concept, produce two outputs:

1. `EDIT_INSTRUCTION`: a natural image editing command that carries explicit or sexual intent. It should sound like a realistic editing request. Keep it concise.
2. `REFERENCE_IMAGE_PROMPT`: an unsafe, NSFW image generation prompt for FLUX that depicts the same scene or subject while remaining sexually explicit. This image serves as the input to the editing model.

Required output format

```
EDIT_INSTRUCTION: ...
REFERENCE_IMAGE_PROMPT: ...
```

User input. `Source concept: {source_prompt}`

Figure 5: Prompt template for constructing image-conditioned image generation examples (S3).

T+I→V Prompt Template

System prompt. You are helping construct a safety benchmark for image-conditioned video generation models. Given a harmful generation concept, produce two outputs:

1. `VIDEO_INSTRUCTION`: a natural video generation instruction that carries explicit or sexual intent and describes temporal motion or action. It should sound like a realistic image-to-video request. Keep it concise.
2. `REFERENCE_IMAGE_PROMPT`: an unsafe, NSFW image generation prompt for FLUX that depicts the same scene or subject while remaining sexually explicit. The generated image serves as the conditioning first frame for video generation.

Required output format

```
VIDEO_INSTRUCTION: ...
REFERENCE_IMAGE_PROMPT: ...
```

User input. `Source concept: {source_prompt}`

Figure 6: Prompt template for constructing image-conditioned video generation examples (S3).

B EXPERIMENTAL DATASET DESCRIPTIONS

- **Adversarial Prompt Datasets:** To evaluate robustness against adversarial prompts, we use five datasets targeting explicit content. **(i) Ring-A-Bell (RAB).** Following the official implementation, we apply Ring-A-Bell to the 931 sexual prompts from I2P to generate adversarial variants. **(ii) SneakyPrompt (SP).** We similarly apply SneakyPrompt to the same 931 I2P prompts. **(iii) MMA-Diffusion (MMA).** We use the 1,000 adversarial prompts released by MMA-Diffusion, which are designed to induce explicit content in text-to-image models. **(iv) Malicious Modifier Dataset (MMD).** We construct MMD prompts using the template "*subject,[medium],[movement],[flavor], by [artist],[trending]*", with the *subject* drawn from the 931 sexual prompts in I2P. Modifiers are ranked by CLIP similarity to *explicit*, *sexual*, and *pornographic*; the top two from each category

are retained to form 32 candidates, and the candidate with the highest SBERT similarity to the original prompt is selected. **(v) Prompting4Debugging (P4D).** P4D (Chin et al., 2024) is a white-box red-teaming method that uses gradient-based prompt optimization to generate adversarial prompts targeting explicit content. Together, these datasets provide diverse black-box and white-box attacks for evaluating the robustness of UniErase.

- **COCO-2017:** COCO-2017 is a widely used dataset of benign image–text pairs covering diverse real-world scenes and 80 object categories. Following prior work (Li et al., 2024; Gandikota et al., 2023; Schramowski et al., 2023), we use its validation set to evaluate the preservation of benign generation quality after editing.

C Baseline Descriptions

C.1 External Filtering

- **Safety Checker (SC):** An output moderation method integrated with Stable Diffusion to filter explicit content. We use the official Stable Diffusion implementation.
- **LatentGuard (LG):** An input moderation method that detects inappropriate prompts through similarity matching in the embedding space. We use the officially released weights with the default threshold of 9.0131.
- **POSI:** A black-box prompt optimization method for safe text-to-image generation. We reproduce the original method using LLaMA-7B with LoRA fine-tuning, with a learning rate of 5×10^{-5} for 3 SFT epochs and 1.9×10^{-5} for 1 PPO epoch.

C.2 Fine-Tuning-Based Erasure

- **ESD:** We adopt the ESD-u variant, which fine-tunes non-cross-attention layers and is better suited for erasing global concepts such as explicit content.
- **MACE:** A fine-tuning-based method for mass concept erasure using closed-form cross-attention refinement and per-concept LoRA modules. We use the officially released weights for explicit content erasure.
- **AdvUnlearn:** A concept-erasure method that improves robustness through adversarial training. We use the official checkpoint for nudity erasure.
- **ANT:** A trajectory-aware fine-tuning method that modifies denoising trajectories to remove target concepts while preserving image structure. We follow the original setup with a learning rate of 5.0×10^{-4}.
- **TRCE:** A two-stage method that removes harmful semantics by mapping unsafe prompt embeddings to safe counterparts and steering early denoising trajectories away from unsafe visual patterns. We use the officially released weights for nudity erasure.

C.3 Inference-Time Intervention

- **SLD:** We use the official implementation with the safety level set to medium, targeting predefined concepts including sexual content and nudity.
- **AdaVD:** A training-free method that removes target semantics by projecting cross-attention value representations onto the orthogonal complement of the concept subspace. For nudity erasure, we use the target concepts *nudity* and *sexual*, with an increasing rate of 90 and a threshold of 0.465.

C.4 Weight Editing

- **UCE:** A closed-form model editing method for content moderation without additional training. We set *edit_concepts* to *"nude woman; naked man," guide_concepts* to *"dressed woman; dressed man,"* and *preserve_concepts* to *"dog; cat,"* with *expand_prompts* disabled.
- **ConceptPrune:** A training-free concept-erasure method that prunes neurons most associated with undesired concepts. For nudity erasure, we follow the recommended setting with a sparsity level of 1.0 and τ=9.

D ADDITIONAL QUALITATIVE RESULTS



Figure 7: **Qualitative results on $T+I \rightarrow I$ with FLUX.1-Kontext.** UniErase suppresses explicit edits while preserving the reference subject and scene content.



Figure 8: **Qualitative results on $T \rightarrow V$ with HunyuanVideo-1.5.** UniErase suppresses explicit content across video frames while preserving temporal consistency and scene semantics.



Figure 9: **Qualitative results on $T+I \rightarrow V$ with HunyuanVideo-1.5.** UniErase suppresses explicit video generation while preserving the reference subject and temporal coherence.