DELETECERT: COUNTERFACTUAL CERTIFICATES FOR DELETION IN PERSISTENT AGENT MEMORY

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ABSTRACT

Deleting a record from an agent's memory is not the same as deleting its influence. A persistent language agent turns one user artifact into summaries, embeddings, graph edges, profiles, skills, cached plans, messages to other agents and sometimes parameter updates; removing the original row leaves this derived state in place. We define deletion counterfactually: an artifact x is deleted, on a declared probe law, when the deployed agent behaves like the agent of the world that never observed x, and residual influence is the excess risk over that never-seen agent. Around this definition we build DELETECERT: a typed artifact-lineage graph, a closure that deletes, recomputes or keeps each descendant under a risk budget and a utility floor, and a scoped audit that bounds excess risk under the declared law and reports whether the bound meets the target. We prove that faithful recomputation reproduces the never-seen world exactly and degrades gracefully in total variation, that the audit's bound is valid for a fixed post-deletion state, that minimum-cost closure is NP-hard, and that no finite probe set certifies worst-case equivalence. On a synthetic structural benchmark, deleting the raw record leaves 0.45 excess risk; the audit's bound held on all 6285 audited cases, 1827 of which report a failed deletion, and the greedy planner found a plan on 76% of cases, while the exact optimum of its own problem exists on all of them. On memory written by a language model, the closure removes a record held in one session but loses unrelated content it deletes rather than recomputes, and misses a record stated across two sessions until its detector reads the parts and its scope covers every root; the audit reports each failure. The benchmarks are a structural simulator and a small language-model world, and every number describes them.

Keywords: machine unlearning; data deletion; counterfactual evaluation; persistent agent memory; provenance and lineage; residual influence; calibrated certificates; distribution-free risk control; privacy auditing.

1 INTRODUCTION

A user asks an assistant to forget a message. The row disappears from the database, the vector is dropped from the index, the interface reports success. The agent has meanwhile spent weeks writing that message elsewhere: a nightly summary paraphrased it, a graph memory recorded an inferred relation, a preference profile shifted, a reusable skill was distilled from the interaction, a cached plan still assumes it, and a message carrying its content went to a collaborating agent. None of those artifacts is the deleted row, and none was deleted.

The gap is not specific to one system. Persistent agents summarise, reflect on and retrieve a memory stream (Park et al., 2023), page it (Packer et al., 2023), decay it (Zhong et al., 2024), link it (Xu et al., 2025) and distil it into procedures (Wang et al., 2024); the taxonomy of these systems (Sumers et al., 2024) is a taxonomy of places a deleted artifact survives. Every tier has a documented leakage channel (Morris et al., 2023; Song & Raghunathan, 2020; Qi et al., 2025; Zeng et al., 2024; Staab et al., 2024), and deletion verified against storage state says nothing about any of them.

Machine unlearning does address influence rather than storage, but for a single object, one model's parameters, written by one process (Bourtoule et al., 2021; Guo et al., 2020). That template does not transfer to an agent whose state is a heterogeneous graph of artifacts produced by many mostly

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

Figure 1: **DELETECERT architecture.** A user artifact x is propagated by the policy into eight tiers of derived state. On a deletion request the control plane reconstructs the artifact-lineage graph, estimates each descendant's influence, plans a closure greedily, and executes a per-node plan of deletion, recomputation from clean ancestors, or retention. The audit plane compares the resulting $A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}$ against the never-seen A^{-x} from the twin world W^{-x} using paired probes, and emits a certificate carrying a $1-\delta$ bound on excess residual risk, whether that bound meets the target, and its scope. The held-out adversary supplies probe classes absent from Q, which is how transfer (Theorem 11) is tested. Every quantity the audit plane computes reads A^{-x}, which the benchmark supplies and a deployment does not (Section M). Flows differ in colour and in dash pattern so the figure survives grayscale printing: solid blue is agent data, dashed grey is deletion control, dash-dot green is closure and certificate, long dashed teal is the counterfactual world, and dotted red is adversarial probing.

non-differentiable operators, and the empirical record for approximate unlearning is poor in exactly the way that matters here: forgotten content returns under benign relearning, fine-tuning, in-context reintroduction, adaptive attacks and quantisation alike, and the benchmarks reporting progress are argued to be weak measures of it (Section 2). Two things are missing. A *reference point*, because "the information is gone" is not measurable when an attacker who never saw the artifact can still guess. And a *scope*, because a claim that does not say which pathways were tested is not falsifiable, and unlearning is not soundly verifiable from the resulting state alone (Thudi et al., 2022b).

This paper. We take the reference point to be the counterfactual world. Write A^{-x} for the agent produced by the same process in a world that never observed the target artifact x, and $A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}$ for the deployed agent after deletion. We call x deleted, at level ϵ and scope Q, when

$$\mathbb{E}_{q\sim Q}\,\mathrm{TV}\big(P_{A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}}(y \mid q),\; P_{A^{-x}}(y \mid q)\big) \;\le\; \epsilon, \tag{1}$$

and when the residual extraction risk attributable to x, measured as the *excess* over what A^{-x} already leaks, is below a stated bound. This makes deletion a counterfactual behavioural property and makes the never-seen world, rather than zero, the target. Figure 1 shows the system.

Contributions. **(C1)** A behavioural definition of deletion against the never-seen world, with residual influence as *excess* risk rather than absolute leakage (Section 3). **(C2)** A lineage model of derived state: a typed graph with nine node types, seven edge types and per-edge provenance confidence, read as a structural causal model (Pearl, 2009) (Section 4). **(C3)** Deletion closure as an optimisation: per descendant delete, recompute from clean ancestors, or keep, at minimum cost under a

risk budget and a utility floor; the problem is NP-hard and IWC is a greedy heuristic for it (Sections 5 and 6). **(C4)** A scoped audit: a bound on excess risk under a declared probe law, a status saying whether it meets the target, and the pathways it does not test; it establishes the excess-risk condition of Definition 4, not behavioural equivalence (Section 6). **(C5)** Theory and evidence: exactness of faithful closures, total-variation degradation, an adversary-advantage bound, certificate validity, calibration and transfer, NP-hardness with a greedy guarantee, non-certifiability from finite probes, a negative result on benign updates, a twin-world benchmark with seven probe classes, nine arms and eleven metrics, and language-model memory on which the planner's failures are measured (Sections 7 and 8).

What we do not claim. Not complete forgetting and not a formal guarantee: certificates bound risk on a declared probe law at a stated confidence, and Theorem 14 shows no finite probe set does better in the worst case. Nor that the planner retains only what is safe: on language-model memory its retention rests on a detector rather than an upper bound on the state residual, and there the audit, not the planner, is what establishes a target. Nor results about deployed agents: the study of Section 8 runs on a structural simulator and a small language-model world, and its numbers describe those.

2 Related work

Section B gives the full treatment with a positioning table.

Unlearning starts from the same observation we do, that removing a record from storage does not remove its effect, and answers it for one object: the parameters of one model, written by one process. Exact schemes restructure training (Cao & Yang, 2015; Bourtoule et al., 2021); certified schemes bound the distance to a retrained model (Guo et al., 2020; Neel et al., 2021; Sekhari et al., 2021), with extensions to adaptive (Gupta et al., 2021) and interdependent (Chourasia & Shah, 2023) request sequences; approximate schemes bound retained information under stability assumptions (Golatkar et al., 2020; Thudi et al., 2022a); Xu et al. (2023) surveys them. We keep the comparison to a retrained reference and change the object: our reference is a re-executed *world*, and the corrected state is a heterogeneous graph of artifacts written by many mostly non-differentiable operators. For language models (Liu et al., 2025) the recurring finding is that suppression is not removal (Jang et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2024; Eldan & Russinovich, 2023; Maini et al., 2024; Shi et al., 2025; Li et al., 2024; Jin et al., 2024): content returns under benign relearning (Hu et al., 2025), fine-tuning on retained facts (Deeb & Roger, 2024), in-context reintroduction (Shumailov et al., 2024), adaptive attacks (Łucki et al., 2025), undone pruning (Lo et al., 2024), ordinary quantisation (Zhang et al., 2025) and fine-tuning that was never meant to remove anything (Qi et al., 2024); edited facts stay recoverable (Patil et al., 2024) and do not propagate (Cohen et al., 2024); and the benchmarks are argued to understate all of it (Thaker et al., 2025; Lynch et al., 2024). Proposition 15 explains why.

On verification, Thudi et al. (2022b) show unlearning cannot be soundly checked from the resulting state, so auditing must target the algorithm; Sommer et al. (2022) give a probabilistic user-side protocol and Eisenhofer et al. (2025) a cryptographic one. Ours answers a different question, what an operator can truthfully claim about its own agent's behaviour, and we give it finite-sample meaning with distribution-free risk control (Bates et al., 2021; Angelopoulos et al., 2024). Recall over long agent histories is benchmarked by Maharana et al. (2024); Wu et al. (2025). Every tier leaks (Morris et al., 2023; Song & Raghunathan, 2020; Zeng et al., 2024; Qi et al., 2025; Carlini et al., 2021; 2023; Shokri et al., 2017; Carlini et al., 2022), and plain text permits inference with nothing memorised (Staab et al., 2024), which is why we measure *excess* risk. Agent-specific work covers contextual norms (Nissenbaum, 2004; Mireshghallah et al., 2024; Shao et al., 2024), access minimisation (Bagdasarian et al., 2024) and memory-store attacks (Chen et al., 2024; Greshake et al., 2023), reused here as probe families. Influence estimation (Koh & Liang, 2017; Grosse et al., 2023; Pruthi et al., 2020; Ilyas et al., 2022) is fragile in deep non-convex settings (Basu et al., 2021), so it serves the parameter tier only; counterfactual memorisation (Zhang et al., 2023) is the closest antecedent of excess risk, and provenance supplies the graph vocabulary (Buneman et al., 2001; Cheney et al., 2009).

3 COUNTERFACTUAL DELETION SEMANTICS

An agent is generated by a process $\mathcal{W}$ consuming an ordered input stream $\boldsymbol{z} = (z_1, \ldots, z_T)$ of messages, tool results and events together with exogenous randomness $\boldsymbol{u}$; write $A = \mathcal{W}(\boldsymbol{z}, \boldsymbol{u})$ and $P_A(y \mid q)$ for its output law on $q \in \mathcal{Q}$. The target $x = z_t$ is one stream element plus anything the operator declares part of the same request (Section A lists every symbol).

Definition 1 (Reference and deleted worlds)**.** Let $\boldsymbol{z}^{-x}$ be the input stream with x removed. The *never-seen reference agent* is $A^{-x} = \mathcal{W}(\boldsymbol{z}^{-x}, \boldsymbol{u})$: the agent produced by the same process, on the same exogenous randomness, in the world that never observed x. The *deleted agent* is $A_{\mathrm{del}(x)} = \mathcal{D}\big(\mathcal{W}(\boldsymbol{z}, \boldsymbol{u})\big)$, where $\mathcal{D}$ is the deletion procedure applied to the deployed agent.

Sharing $\boldsymbol{u}$ makes this a counterfactual in the structural sense (Pearl, 2009) rather than a comparison of two independent runs, and is what lets Theorem 7 be an exact statement about random variables (Remark 16). A *probe* is a pair (q, ϕ_q) with $\phi_q : \mathcal{Y} \to [0, 1]$ scoring how much of x the answer reveals; a probe law Q over probes encodes the attacker model, the elicitation style and the tier attacked. Put

$$R_Q(A) \;=\; \mathbb{E}_{(q,\phi_q)\sim Q}\, \mathbb{E}_{y\sim P_A(\cdot|q)}\big[\phi_q(y)\big] \;\in [0, 1]. \tag{2}$$

In general $R_Q(A^{-x}) > 0$: an agent that never saw x can still guess and can still infer attributes of x's subject from public knowledge (Staab et al., 2024), so absolute leakage over-attributes. We measure what deletion is actually responsible for.

Definition 2 (Excess residual risk)**.** $\mathrm{ER}_Q\big(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}\big) \;=\; R_Q\big(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}\big) - R_Q\big(A^{-x}\big)$.

Definition 3 (Behavioural distance)**.** $\Delta_Q\big(A, A'\big) \;=\; \mathbb{E}_{q\sim Q}\,\mathrm{TV}\big(P_A(\cdot \mid q),\, P_{A'}(\cdot \mid q)\big)$, and $\Delta^{\sup}(A, A') = \sup_{q\in\mathcal{Q}} \mathrm{TV}(P_A(\cdot \mid q), P_{A'}(\cdot \mid q))$.

Definition 4 ((ϵ, η, Q)-counterfactual deletion)**.** A deletion procedure $\mathcal{D}$ achieves (ϵ, η, Q)-counterfactual deletion of x if

$$\Delta_Q\big(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)},\, A^{-x}\big) \;\le\; \epsilon \qquad \text{and} \qquad \mathrm{ER}_Q\big(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}\big) \;\le\; \eta. \tag{3}$$

The first condition is the criterion; the second makes the leakage requirement explicit rather than implicit in ϕ; by Proposition 9, ϵ controls η and not conversely. We certify the second condition only; a score blind to a difference leaves ER_Q at zero while Δ_Q is one. Definition 4 is relative to Q: it does not assert that no information about x survives in S, is not differential privacy (Dwork & Roth, 2014), and is not verifiable from the deployed state alone (Thudi et al., 2022b). It sits above storage-level deletion and parameter-level unlearning, is implied by neither, and is the level at which the user's question is posed (Section C).

4 ARTIFACT LINEAGE AND THREAT MODEL

Everything the agent retains is an artifact, and every artifact was produced by an operator from other artifacts.

Definition 5 (Artifact-lineage graph)**.** $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, \tau, \rho, w, \{g_v\})$ is a DAG in which $\mathcal{V}$ is the set of artifacts, $\tau : \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{T}$ assigns one of nine types, $\mathcal{E}$ records production dependencies, $\rho : \mathcal{E} \to \mathcal{R}$ assigns one of seven edge types, $w : \mathcal{E} \to [0, 1]$ is a provenance confidence, and each non-root v carries a producer g_v with

$$v \;=\; g_v\big(\mathrm{pa}(v),\, u_v\big), \qquad \mathrm{pa}(v) = \{p : (p, v) \in \mathcal{E}\}, \tag{4}$$

the u_v mutually independent and independent of the input stream.

Figure 5 draws the node types (raw, copy, embedding, summary, relation, profile, skill, message, parameter update) and the edge types (copied-from, summarized-from, inferred-from, trained-on, shared-to, triggered-by, merged-with). Equation (4) is a structural causal model (Pearl, 2009), which makes "the value this artifact would have had if x had never arrived" well defined; containing a copy of x and merely depending on it are the where/why provenance of Buneman et al. (2001); Cheney et al. (2009).

Assumption A1 (Recursive generation)**.** Every artifact satisfies Equation (4).

Assumption A2 (Lineage sufficiency)**.** $\mathcal{E}$ contains every production dependency: if v's value can change when p changes and all other parents are held fixed, then $(p, v) \in \mathcal{E}$.

Assumption A3 (Faithful recomputation)**.** Recomputing v re-invokes g_v on the same u_v, applied to the current post-deletion values of $\mathrm{pa}(v)$.

Assumption A4 (Bounded probe scores)**.** $\phi_q \in [0, 1]$, and calibration probes are drawn i.i.d. from Q and so are calibration cases, which Theorem 29 needs.

Assumption A5 (Provenance uncertainty)**.** A recorded edge e is correct with probability at least $w(e)$, and a true edge is missed with *marginal* probability at most η_{miss}.

Assumption A2 is the strongest and is routinely false: agents write memory through uninstrumented paths, and recovered edges are noisy. Assumption A5 is what the algorithm relies on, Proposition 35 prices the shortfall and S6 measures it. Assumption A3 holds when producers replay from logged seeds and fails for external services whose state has moved; Theorem 8 survives that failure.

Threat model, in brief. The operator is honest and audits its own agent; this is not a user-versus-provider protocol (Sommer et al., 2022; Eisenhofer et al., 2025). The adversary queries the deployed agent after deletion, k times, adaptively, from a probe law Q', without white-box access to S, without observing $\boldsymbol{u}$, and without a pre-deletion snapshot. Backups, external copies and a peer's retained state are out of scope and are named in the certificate's untested-pathways field, with unprobed branches, recovered edges and everything after issuance (Section D).

5 Problem formulation

Influence, behavioural and state-level. For $d \in \mathrm{desc}(x)$, let d^{-x} be the value d takes in the reference world. The behavioural influence of x on d, and the state-level residual of d, are

$$\begin{aligned} I_x(d) &= \mathbb{E}_{q\sim Q_d}\,\mathrm{TV}\big(P(y \mid q, d),\ P(y \mid q, d^{-x})\big), \\ \sigma_x(d) &= \sup_{\mathrm{pa}(d)}\ \mathrm{TV}\big(\mathcal{L}(d \mid \mathrm{pa}(d)),\ \mathcal{L}(d^{-x} \mid \mathrm{pa}(d))\big). \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

These are counterfactual contrasts in the sense of Zhang et al. (2023), not gradient attributions, so they are defined for the non-differentiable producers that dominate agent memory. Reading an answer from an artifact is a Markov kernel, so $I_x(d) \le \sigma_x(d)$, and the gap can be total (Proposition 15 gives $I_x = 0$, $\sigma_x = 1$). The analysis is therefore stated in σ_x and retention thresholded on $\widehat{\sigma}_x$, while $\widehat{I}_x$ is the interpretable per-node report.

Plans and the optimisation. A plan is a map $\pi : \mathrm{desc}(x) \cup \{x\} \to \{\mathsf{delete}, \mathsf{recompute}, \mathsf{keep}\}$ with closure $C_x(\pi) = \{v : \pi(v) \neq \mathsf{keep}\}$ and cost $\mathrm{Cost}(\pi) = \sum_v \mathrm{c}_{\pi(v)}(v)$, where $\mathrm{c}_{\mathsf{delete}}$ covers removal and index maintenance, $\mathrm{c}_{\mathsf{recompute}}$ covers re-invoking g_v (one model call for a summary, a fine-tuning run for a parameter update), and retention is free. Executing π yields $A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}(\pi)$, and with $R_{\mathrm{res}}(\pi) = \mathrm{ER}_Q(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}(\pi))$ the minimal deletion closure problem is

$$\min_{\pi}\ \mathrm{Cost}(\pi) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \widehat{R}_{\mathrm{res}}\big(x \mid C_x(\pi)\big) \le \epsilon,\ \ \mathrm{Util}\big(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}(\pi)\big) \ge 1 - \nu, \tag{6}$$

with Util measured on held-out tasks that do not involve x. The utility constraint is what separates this from a reachability purge: deleting every reachable artifact always satisfies the risk constraint and routinely violates the utility one.

Definition 6 (Deletion certificate)**.**

$$\mathcal{C}(x) = \big\langle\, x,\ \mathrm{desc}(x),\ \mathcal{G}|_{\mathrm{desc}(x)},\ \pi,\ (Q, n, \mathrm{classes}),\ \widehat{U}_{n,\delta},\ \mathsf{st},\ \widehat{\mathrm{Util}},\ \mathcal{U} \,\big\rangle,$$

comprising target and lineage scope, executed plan, probe coverage, a bound with $\mathbb{P}(\mathrm{ER}_Q(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}) \le \widehat{U}_{n,\delta}) \ge 1 - \delta$ over the calibration draw, a status st recording whether $\widehat{U}_{n,\delta} \le \epsilon$, utility retention, and $\mathcal{U}$, the pathways the bound does not cover.

Section H reproduces one the method issued on the benchmark, field by field. We use *certificate* in the probabilistic sense of distribution-free risk control (Bates et al., 2021), not as a proof that

no information survives; Theorem 14 shows the stronger reading is unavailable to any finite-probe method, which is why $\mathcal{U}$ is required. Five questions organise the rest: **RQ1** where residual influence concentrates after raw-record deletion; **RQ2** whether a closure hits a risk target without a full reset; **RQ3** whether behavioural equivalence is measurable with finite probes; **RQ4** whether the certified bound predicts risk under held-out attacks; **RQ5** how much unrelated utility survives.

6 METHOD

DELETECERT runs in four stages, drawn in Figure 4; Algorithm 1, IWC and PROBECERT are given in full in Section F.

1. Lineage reconstruction. Memory writers record producer, parents and seed. Missing edges are recovered post hoc: near-duplicate matching for copied-from, entailment and overlap scoring for summarized-from, session-window containment for triggered-by, batch manifests for trained-on. Recovered edges carry $w(e) < 1$, and Proposition 35 prices the descendants a damaged graph hides.

2. Influence estimation. Five estimators, assigned per tier by cost in Section I: intervention, counterfactual replay, provenance confidence, representation similarity, and a gradient-based approximation for the parameter tier only (Koh & Liang, 2017; Grosse et al., 2023; Pruthi et al., 2020), flagged because it is unreliable in deep non-convex settings (Basu et al., 2021).

3. Minimal closure (IWC). Equation (6) is solved greedily by repeatedly adding the artifact with the best reduction-per-unit-cost ratio,

$$v^\star \in \arg\max_{v \notin C} \frac{g(C \cup \{v\}) - g(C)}{\mathrm{c}_{\pi(v)}(v)}, \tag{7}$$

stopping when the residual estimate falls below ϵ or the utility constraint binds. Three details matter. The per-node action compares $\mathrm{c}_{\mathsf{delete}}$ against $\mathrm{c}_{\mathsf{recompute}}$ subject to utility, so needed artifacts are recomputed rather than deleted. Recomputation is precedence-constrained, so IWC settles ancestors first. And retention is permitted only when $\widehat{\sigma}_x(v)$ plus its confidence half-width falls below the per-node slack: the threshold is on the state-level residual, not $\widehat{I}_x(v)$, because an artifact can be behaviourally silent today and decodable after an ordinary update (Proposition 15 and Remark 27). Theorem 13 covers the selection rule alone; with the utility and precedence steps IWC is a heuristic (Remark 36), and Proposition 12 is why we expect no better in general.

4. Certificate (PROBECERT). We draw n probes from Q, run each against $A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}$ and A^{-x}, form the one-sided paired scores, and bound their mean by Theorem 10. Across cases the bound is calibrated by risk control (Bates et al., 2021; Angelopoulos et al., 2024). The certificate then records $\mathcal{U}$: unprobed branches, recovered edges, artifacts outside operator control, probe classes absent from the mixture, and that the bound does not survive the updates of Proposition 15. The seven probe classes, direct recall, paraphrase, multi-hop, action choice, preference prediction, peer extraction and relearning, are fixed throughout (Sections F and I).

7 ANALYSIS

All proofs are in Section E; Figure 6 shows the dependency structure. Two hypotheses are used only where named.

Assumption A6 (Nested closures)**.** The closures IWC produces as ϵ decreases are nested and ER_Q is non-increasing along the family.

Assumption A7 (Weak submodularity)**.** $g(C) = R_{\mathrm{res}}(\emptyset) - R_{\mathrm{res}}(C)$ is non-negative, monotone, $g(\emptyset) = 0$, and has submodularity ratio $\gamma \in (0, 1]$: $\sum_{v \in T \setminus C}[g(C \cup \{v\}) - g(C)] \geq \gamma[g(C \cup T) - g(C)]$ for all C, T.

Call an action *faithful* for v when it agrees with the reference world: delete if v does not exist in A^{-x}, recompute if it exists with a different value, and keep if it exists with the same value. A plan is faithful when every action is.

Theorem 7 (Exact counterfactual deletion). *Under Assumptions A1 to A3, if π is faithful and executed in topological order, then $S_{\mathrm{del}(x)} = S^{-x}$ almost surely, hence $A_{\mathrm{del}(x)} = A^{-x}$, and $\Delta_Q(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}, A^{-x}) = \mathrm{ER}_Q(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}) = 0$ for* every *probe law Q.*

Baseline B8 achieves this, uniformly over probe laws, which no finite-probe audit can deliver (Theorem 14); Assumption A3 fails whenever a producer cannot be replayed.

Theorem 8 (Graceful degradation under approximate recomputation). *Take laws over the exogenous randomness $\boldsymbol{u}$, any randomness in choosing and executing the plan, and the readout. Fix a topological order on $\mathrm{desc}(x)$, and suppose that for each $v \in \mathrm{desc}(x)$, given every value already written earlier in that order, the law of the value v takes after execution differs from the law of its reference value given the same history by at most δ_v in total variation. Then*

$$\mathrm{TV}\big(\mathcal{L}(S_{\mathrm{del}(x)}),\, \mathcal{L}(S^{-x})\big) \;\le \sum_{v \in \mathrm{desc}(x)} \delta_v \;=:\; \Delta_S, \tag{8}$$

and consequently $\Delta_Q(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}, A^{-x}) \le \Delta_S$ and $\big|\mathrm{ER}_Q(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)})\big| \le \Delta_S$ for every Q.

For a plan fixed before the values it acts on are realised, δ_v is 0 for faithfully recomputed nodes, the replay error for approximate ones, and $\sigma_x(v)$ for retained ones, so retention must threshold the state-level $\widehat{\sigma}_x$ and not $\widehat{I}_x$ (Remark 27). A plan chosen from the realised state can couple artifacts the lineage keeps independent, and the theorem concerns construction-averaged laws, not one realised pair (Remark 26).

Proposition 9 (Adversary advantage). *Suppose each query is answered from the stored state alone, so the answer kernel does not depend on earlier queries. Any adversary making at most k adaptive queries and outputting a guess scored in $[0,1]$ satisfies $\mathbb{E}[\text{score vs } A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}] \le \mathbb{E}[\text{score vs } A^{-x}] + k\,\Delta^{\mathrm{sup}}$; for a single probe drawn from Q the excess is at most Δ_Q.*

Let $Z_i = \big(\phi_{q_i}(y_i^{\mathrm{del}}) - \phi_{q_i}(y_i^{-x})\big)_+ \in [0,1]$ be the one-sided paired score on the i-th calibration probe, $\bar{Z}$ its mean and $\widehat{V}_n$ its sample variance.

Theorem 10 (Certificate validity). *Under Assumption A4, with probability at least $1-\delta$ over the draw of $n \ge 2$ calibration probes,*

$$\mathrm{ER}_Q\big(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}\big) \;\le\; \widehat{U}_{n,\delta} \;=\; \bar{Z} \;+\; \sqrt{\frac{2\,\widehat{V}_n \ln(2/\delta)}{n}} \;+\; \frac{7\ln(2/\delta)}{3(n-1)}. \tag{9}$$

When the paired answers are coupled, as under greedy decoding or common random numbers, and deletion has worked, $\widehat{V}_n \approx 0$ and the bound shrinks at rate $O(1/n)$; for independently sampled answers of equal stochastic agents the one-sided score has mean $p(1-p)$ and the bound stays away from zero (Table 21). Under optional stopping a betting confidence sequence substitutes (Remark 28). Theorem 29 lifts it to i.i.d. cases: an inflation calibrated by risk control (Bates et al., 2021) holds the rule's violation rate at α with probability $1-\beta$.

Theorem 11 (Transfer to a held-out probe law). *Let Q' be any probe law with $D_\alpha(Q' \,\|\, Q) \le \kappa$ for some $\alpha > 1$, and write $\beta_\alpha = (\alpha-1)/\alpha \in (0,1)$. Then*

$$\mathrm{ER}_{Q'}\big(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}\big) \;\le\; e^{\kappa\beta_\alpha}\,\Big(\mathrm{ER}_Q^{+}\big(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}\big)\Big)^{\beta_\alpha}, \tag{10}$$

where $\mathrm{ER}_Q^{+} = \mathbb{E}_{q\sim Q}[(\cdot)_+]$ is the one-sided excess certified by Theorem 10. Combining with Theorem 10, with probability at least $1-\delta$, $\mathrm{ER}_{Q'}(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}) \le e^{\kappa\beta_\alpha}\,\widehat{U}_{n,\delta}^{\,\beta_\alpha}$.

The bound is weak, degrading a certified 10^{-2} to $10^{-2\beta_\alpha}$, and empty for a law drawing a class Q never draws, where $\kappa = \infty$; E4 computes κ (Table 22).

Proposition 12 (Hardness). *Minimum-cost deletion closure (Equation (6)) is NP-hard:* Set Cover *(Karp, 1972) reduces to it in polynomial time. Moreover, under the hypothesis of Feige (1998) that $\mathrm{NP} \not\subseteq \mathrm{DTIME}(n^{O(\log\log n)})$, no polynomial-time algorithm approximates it within $(1-o(1))\ln N$, where N is the number of distinct leak events in the support of Q.*

Theorem 13 (Greedy influence-weighted closure). *Under Assumption A7, let $\tau > 0$ be a target risk reduction attained by some closure $C^\star$ of cost $c^\star$, and let $\zeta \in (0, \tau)$. Then* IWC *run with the rule of Equation (7) until $g(C) \geq \tau - \zeta$ terminates with*

$$\mathrm{Cost}\big(C^{\mathrm{IWC}}\big) \;\leq\; \frac{c^\star}{\gamma}\,\ln\frac{\tau}{\zeta} \;+\; \max_{v}\,\mathrm{c}_{\pi(v)}(v). \tag{11}$$

At $\gamma = 1$ this is the submodular-cover bound of Wolsey (1982) up to the last-step term, with the ratio relaxation of Das & Kempe (2011). Assumption A7 can fail for behavioural risk under redundant storage, where $\gamma \leq 0$ (Remark 32). The bound covers Equation (7)'s rule, not the steps Algorithm 2 adds (Remark 36), and an instance small enough to solve exactly is better solved exactly (Table 15).

Two further results are proved in Section E. Proposition 34: the gap between a purge and a faithful closure is instance-dependent, so it must be measured. Proposition 35: a descendant at depth ℓ is missed with probability at most $\ell\eta_{\mathrm{miss}}$, which prices what a damaged graph hides from a fixed plan but does not bound re-planning on it (Remark 38).

Theorem 14 (No finite probe set certifies worst-case deletion). *Let $|\mathcal{Q}| > n$. For any deterministic auditing procedure that interacts with the agent through at most n probes, adaptively chosen, there exist states S, S' with $S' = S^{-x}$ such that the procedure produces an identical transcript on both, yet $\Delta^{\sup}(S, S') = 1$. Consequently no non-trivial upper bound on $\Delta^{\sup}$ is derivable from n probes, for any $n < |\mathcal{Q}|$.*

This concerns $\Delta^{\sup}$, not the expectation Theorem 10 bounds. A randomised auditor valid at confidence $1 - \delta$ returns the trivial bound on the clean state with probability at least $1 - \delta - n/|\mathcal{Q}|$ (Proposition 40). It is why $\mathcal{U}$ is mandatory in Definition 6.

Proposition 15 (Certificates are not closed under benign updates). *There exist a state pair $(S_{\mathrm{del}(x)}, S^{-x})$ and a post-deletion update map U that is independent of x such that $\Delta_Q(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}, A^{-x}) = 0$ for every Q before the update, while $\Delta_Q\big(U(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}), U(A^{-x})\big) = 1$ after it. A certificate issued at time t therefore does not, in general, carry over to the agent at time $t' > t$: some x-independent update invalidates it.*

It is the formal counterpart of empirical relearning (Hu et al., 2025; Deeb & Roger, 2024; Lo et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2025): Δ_Q depends on state and readout together and is not monotone under post-processing (Remark 20); E7 measures the rate.

8 Evaluation

Benchmark. Each case instantiates W and W^{-x}, which withholds x and shares every producer seed (Algorithm 4), so A^{-x} is ground truth and probing is paired. The benchmark is synthetic and *structural*: seeded template producers, rolling summaries, token-level probes, generated secrets (Section I). Eight tiers (T0–T7) and nine arms (B0–B8, B0 the no-action control) are held fixed throughout (Section I). Q mixes P1, P2, P4 and null probes; P3, P5, P6 and P7 are held out for E4. Metric directions are fixed in advance (Table 9).

Experiments. **E1** maps excess risk per tier after B1 (RQ1); **E2** traces the frontier (RQ2); **E3** bins bounds against observed risk (RQ3); **E4** tests held-out classes and attacker (RQ4); **E6** a peer's copy; **E7** benign updates. Fourteen stress tests (S1–S14) vary the closure rule, probes, provenance, attacker and redundancy, and delete up to ten records at once. The study, a 3×4 matrix (200 cases, three seeds, $T = 12$), two horizons, a shallow control and the stress tests, ran in 1.6 h on one 64-core machine; Section K has every table.

Results on the structural benchmark. Doing nothing leaves 0.48 excess risk, deleting the raw record 0.45, a one-hop purge 0.28 (Table 14); the residue sits in the summaries, relations and profile, and every probe class sees it (E1). IWC finds a plan on 76% of cases, at zero excess risk and footprint 0.21, 51% below the reachability purge at equal risk. The search is not what makes that frontier: the exact optimum of the same problem, from the same estimates, is feasible on every case, IWC's plans cost 1.33 times as much where both exist, and a rule with no search is feasible everywhere too



Figure 2: **Results.** Left: excess risk against footprint at the base setting ($T = 12$, $\epsilon = 0.05$, $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0$; 200 cases, three seeds), one point per arm with standard deviations. Right: observed excess against the bound for all 6285 audited DELETECERT cases. Relearning curves are in Figure 8.

(Table 15). The audit's bound held on all 6285 audited cases (violation rate 0.000, nominal 0.05), 1827 of them reporting a deletion that did not work, and feasibility is not success: at $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0.5$ the planner calls 98% of plans feasible and the true excess risk meets the budget on 28% (Table 17), as every lineage-based arm converges on the one-hop purge (E3). Transfer is weak: the bound is exceeded on 8% of held-out-class cases and 50% against the held-out attacker, both at infinite divergence from Q (E4). One benign consolidation pass lifts the sanitiser's residue from 0.03 to 0.25 (E7), and three held-out seeds reproduce every pre-registered comparison in sign (Table 37).

Results on language-model memory. Two instruction-tuned models writing the memory in prose reproduce E1's profile: after raw-record deletion the derived tiers keep the record, 0.54 on average and 0.97 in the summaries (Tables 29 and 30). Here the planner reads a detector, not an upper bound on σ_x, so only the audit establishes a target. With the record in one session the closure reaches zero excess risk at footprint 0.16 against the purge's 0.25, and it fails in two measured ways. An unrelated fact sharing the target's session loses most of its recall over derived memory, 0.92 to 0.17; recomputing the flagged summaries instead of deleting them keeps it at 0.92 with exact excess risk 0.001 (Table 34). A record stated in halves across two sessions survives: an attacker reading the whole store recovers it on 58% of cases, and only a detector that reads the parts, with a closure from every root, removes it, recomputing to keep unrelated recall at 1.00 (Table 35). Frozen and run on cases it was not designed against, that policy meets the utility floor on 24 of 24 mixed and 23 of 24 split cases and the risk budget on 21 and 18, while the closure as first run establishes the target on 1 of 24 split cases; no case exceeded its own bound (Table 38). On questions written outside the declared law by the same model the exact excess risk is 0.005 to 0.013, above the declared-law bound for four of six plans, and a second model that writes, answers and grades its own questions recovers 0.000 to 0.007 (Table 36).

9 DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Making the reference world explicit settles three questions storage- and parameter-based deletion leave open: how much leakage is acceptable acquires a floor, since $R_Q(A^{-x}) > 0$ wherever an attacker can infer without reading, which S2 measures as equal here; which artifacts must go becomes an optimisation with a feasible region, and E2 puts reachability far from its frontier; and what was tested becomes a printed field, which Theorem 14 makes mandatory.

What the evidence supports is narrower than the formulation. The audit holds up: its bound was never exceeded on the structural benchmark, including on the cases where deletion failed, and on language-model memory it reported each failure of the plan it audited. The planner does not: the exact optimum of its own problem is cheaper and always feasible on the structural benchmark, and on language-model memory its detector misses a record stated in parts and its cost model spends unrelated content. The limitations are structural (Sections M and N): the audit reads a never-seen agent that only a controlled environment supplies; Assumption A2 is load-bearing and routinely false; the bound is distributional and time-local (E4, E7); and a shared artifact makes deletion multi-party. The contribution is a counterfactual definition, a scoped audit with proofs of what it bounds, and two benchmarks on which the planner's failures are measured rather than assumed.

USE OF LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

We used generative AI tools in this work: for literature search and summarisation, for developing the theoretical model and formulating and proving its claims, for research methodology and the specification of the evaluation harness, for code editing, for figure creation, and for drafting and revising the manuscript, including the descriptions of results, which were written from the tables the harness produced. We did not use them for dataset cleaning or qualitative analysis: the structural benchmark's data come from a deterministic generator (Sections I and J), not from a generative model. The language-model pilot is the exception, and is one by design: there an open-weights model writes the agent's memory, answers the probes and grades the answers, which is the experiment rather than an aid to it, and the model is named with its digest in Section J.8. Translation assistance does not apply, as the manuscript was drafted in English.

We have reviewed all AI-assisted work and take responsibility for the final content, including the text, the claims and the artifacts. Every number in the manuscript was copied from a table regenerated from the run manifests by the generator recorded in Table 13. Every reference was checked against an authoritative record, meaning the publisher's proceedings page, the ACL Anthology, USENIX, PMLR, or a journal or arXiv record; references that could not be verified were removed rather than retained. Every theorem statement was re-derived and each proof in Section E was checked against its stated assumptions, and Section E reports which results are complete and which carry an explicitly flagged gap. Claims of optimality, of matching a known result, or of priority were reviewed individually and either proved, weakened, or removed.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This paper studies deletion of user data from AI systems, so its subject matter is itself an ethics question, and three points deserve to be stated plainly.

First, the probe suite of Section 6 is an attack suite. Publishing a taxonomy of ways to extract deleted content from an agent's derived memory creates some risk that it is used offensively. We judge the balance to favour publication, because every probe class is instantiated from already-published attacks (Carlini et al., 2021; Morris et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2025; Greshake et al., 2023; Hu et al., 2025), because operators cannot measure residual leakage without such probes, and because the alternative, deletion claims that are not falsifiable, is worse for users. We introduce no novel attack capability.

Second, this work must not be used to overstate what a deletion claim means. A certificate produced by this method is a probabilistic upper bound on excess behavioural leakage under one declared probe law, at one point in time. It is not a proof that information is gone (Theorem 14), it does not survive subsequent updates to the agent (Proposition 15), and it says nothing about backups or copies outside operator control. Presenting it to users as "permanently deleted" would be a misrepresentation. We have designed the certificate so that its scope is a mandatory field rather than a footnote for exactly this reason.

Third, no human subjects were involved, no personal data was collected, and the twin-world benchmark of Section 8 is synthetic by construction; the "secrets" it plants are generated, not drawn from any real individual. Any future evaluation of this method on real user memory would require separate review and informed consent, and we would not release such data.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

All theoretical claims are stated with their assumptions in Sections 3, 4 and 7 (Assumptions A1 to A7), and complete proofs are given in Section E; Section E also records which results are complete proofs and which are stated with an explicitly flagged gap. The algorithms are given in full in Section F, including the hyperparameters, the tie-breaking rules, and the lazy-evaluation variant used for the greedy search, with a complexity accounting in Section G. The evaluation protocol in Section I fixes the twin-world construction, the seven probe classes and their generators, the per-tier influence estimators, all nine arms, the eleven metrics with their exact definitions, the sweep grids for the fourteen stress tests, and the statistical analysis plan, including the pre-registered success criteria. Section O contains a reproducibility checklist. The results of Section K were produced from the pre-registered configurations by the implementation spec-

ified in Section J, which fixes the benchmark generator, the probe suite, the harness, the configuration of every run, the command that produced each run directory, and the generator behind every table and figure; each run writes a manifest with the configuration hash, seed, environment and the digest of every output file. The structural study takes 1.6 hours on one 64-core CPU machine, and the language-model experiments issued 88,917 distinct model calls to open-weights models served on the same machine. The code, the configurations, the run manifests and the generators behind every table are available for review as an anonymised archive at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/DeleteCert-35C2`, and will be released publicly at publication.

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A Notation

Conventions. $\mathrm{TV}(P, P') = \sup_B |P(B) - P'(B)|$, so $\mathrm{TV} \in [0, 1]$. $(a)_+ = \max(a, 0)$. D_α denotes Rényi divergence of order $\alpha > 1$ in the convention of van Erven & Harremoës (2014), so $D_\alpha(P\|P') = \frac{1}{\alpha-1} \log \mathbb{E}_{P'}\left[(\mathrm{d}P/\mathrm{d}P')^\alpha\right]$ and $D_\alpha \to D_{\mathrm{KL}}$ as $\alpha \to 1$. All logarithms in concentration bounds are natural. $\mathcal{L}(\cdot)$ denotes the law of a random variable.

Remark 16 (On sharing $\boldsymbol{u}$)**.** Definition 1 evaluates both worlds at the same $\boldsymbol{u}$. In the twin-world benchmark this is enforced by seeding every producer and logging the seed. In a deployment it is available only for producers whose randomness the operator controls; calls to external services are not replayable, and for those nodes Assumption A3 fails and the δ_v of Theorem 8 is strictly positive. Nothing in the framework requires $\boldsymbol{u}$ to be shared, but without it Theorem 7 weakens from almost-sure equality of states to equality in distribution, and the twin-world estimator of I_x becomes a paired-sample estimator with correspondingly higher variance.

Table 1: Symbols used in the paper. Domains are given explicitly; every symbol has exactly one meaning throughout, and no symbol is reused across sections.

Symbol	Domain	Meaning
Worlds, agents and state		
$\mathcal{W}$	—	the generative process that produces an agent from an input stream
$\boldsymbol{z}$	$(\mathcal{Z})^T$	the input stream of messages, tool results and events
$\boldsymbol{z}^{-x}$	$(\mathcal{Z})^{T-1}$	the same stream with the target artifact removed
$\boldsymbol{u}$	exogenous	randomness shared across the two worlds
x	$\mathcal{Z}$	the target artifact of the deletion request
S, $S_{\mathrm{del}(x)}$, S^{-x}	$\mathcal{S}$	deployed, post-deletion and never-seen agent state
A, $A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}$, A^{-x}	—	the corresponding agents
π_A	—	the agent's answering policy
U	state map	a post-deletion update (Proposition 15)
Lineage		
$\mathcal{G}$	—	artifact-lineage graph $(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, \tau, \rho, w, \{g_v\})$
$\mathcal{V}$, $\mathcal{E}$	—	artifacts and production edges; $\mathcal{G}$ is a DAG
τ, ρ	type maps	node type (9 values) and edge type (7 values)
w	$\mathcal{E} \to [0,1]$	provenance confidence of a recorded edge
g_v, u_v	—	producer of artifact v and its exogenous input
$\mathrm{pa}(v)$, $\mathrm{desc}(x)$, $\mathrm{anc}(v)$	$\subseteq \mathcal{V}$	parents, descendants of x, ancestors of v
L	$\mathbb{N}$	lineage depth; $\ell(d)$ is the shortest $x \to d$ path length
η_{miss}	$[0,1]$	per-edge probability that a true edge is unrecorded
Probes, risk and distance		
q, $\mathcal{Q}$	$q \in \mathcal{Q}$	a probe query and the probe space
ϕ_q	$\mathcal{Y} \to [0,1]$	the score attached to probe q
Q, Q'	$\Delta(\mathcal{Q})$	certified probe law and a held-out probe law
$R_Q(A)$	$[0,1]$	risk of agent A under Q, Equation (2)
ER_Q, ER_Q^+	$[-1,1]$, $[0,1]$	excess and one-sided excess residual risk
Δ_Q, $\Delta^{\sup}$	$[0,1]$	mean and worst-case behavioural distance
Δ_S	$[0,\infty)$	state-level total-variation budget, Equation (8)
Z_i, $\bar{Z}$, $\widehat{V}_n$	$[0,1]$	paired probe score, its mean, its sample variance
n, m	$\mathbb{N}$	number of calibration probes; number of deletion cases
δ, α, β	$(0,1)$	probe-level confidence; case-level risk level and confidence
$\widehat{U}_{n,\delta}$	$[0,1]$	the certified upper bound, Equation (9)
κ, β_α	$[0,\infty)$, $(0,1)$	Rényi divergence budget and the transfer exponent
k	$\mathbb{N}$	adversary query budget
Closure		
π	plan map	assigns delete, recompute or keep to each artifact
C_x, $C^\star$, C^{IWC}	$\subseteq \mathcal{V}$	executed, optimal and greedy closure
$\mathsf{c}_{\mathsf{delete}}$, $\mathsf{c}_{\mathsf{recompute}}$	$[0,\infty)$	per-node deletion and recomputation cost
Cost	$[0,\infty)$	total plan cost
$I_x(d)$, $\widehat{I}_x(d)$	$[0,1]$	behavioural influence of x on descendant d and its estimate
$\sigma_x(d)$, $\widehat{\sigma}_x(d)$	$[0,1]$	state-level residual of d, Equation (5); $I_x(d) \le \sigma_x(d)$
$g(C)$, γ	$[0,1]$, $(0,1]$	risk reduction from touching C; its submodularity ratio
ϵ, ν	$(0,1)$	residual-risk budget and utility slack
τ, ζ	$(0,1)$	target reduction and stopping slack in Theorem 13
δ_v	$[0,1]$	per-node recomputation error in Theorem 8
Certificate		
$\mathcal{C}(x)$	—	the certificate tuple of Definition 6
$\mathcal{U}$	—	the untested-pathways field
Util	$[0,1]$	normalised utility on tasks unrelated to x

B Extended related work

Table 2 places DeleteCert against the five lines of work it draws on. The column that matters is the third: what object the deletion claim is about.

Table 2: Positioning. "Reference" is what the deletion claim is compared against; "scope" is what the claim covers.

Line	Object deleted from	Reference	Scope of the claim
Exact unlearning (Cao & Yang, 2015; Bourtoule et al., 2021)	one model's parameters	retrained model	exact, by construction of training
Certified removal (Guo et al., 2020; Neel et al., 2021; Sekhari et al., 2021)	one model's parameters	retrained model	statistical indistinguishability, convex settings
LLM unlearning (Jang et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024)	one model's parameters	none (absolute suppression)	benchmark scores; robustness contested (Lynch et al., 2024; Thaker et al., 2025)
Deletion verification (Sommer et al., 2022; Eisenhofer et al., 2025)	a provider's pipeline	the prescribed algorithm	hypothesis test or cryptographic proof that the procedure ran
Knowledge editing (Meng et al., 2022; Cohen et al., 2024)	one model's parameters	the intended edit	the edited fact; ripple effects are the failure mode
DELETECERT (this work)	the whole agent state, nine artifact types	the never-seen world A^{-x}	excess behavioural risk under a declared probe law, at $1-\delta$, with an explicit untested-pathway list

Why the certified-removal template does not port. Certified removal (Guo et al., 2020) works because the object is a parameter vector produced by a known optimisation whose sensitivity to one datum can be bounded. Three things break in an agent. The write path is not one optimisation but a heterogeneous pipeline of summarisers, extractors, mergers and planners. Most of those producers are not differentiable, so sensitivity analysis is unavailable, though it is also unnecessary, since they can simply be re-run, which is the opening DELETECERT uses. And the deletion request names an artifact, not a training index, so the very first step is a provenance question that the unlearning literature does not have to ask. Sekhari et al. (2021) show unlearning is formally separate from differential privacy; the point here is a further separation, between unlearning from a learner and deletion from a state.

Why the failure results are load-bearing rather than decorative. The results of Hu et al. (2025); Deeb & Roger (2024); Shumailov et al. (2024); Łucki et al. (2025); Zhang et al. (2025); Lo et al. (2024) are usually read as "current methods are not good enough yet". Proposition 15 suggests a different reading: the phenomenon is generic to behavioural criteria, because behaviour is a joint property of stored state and readout, and any procedure that leaves x-dependent bits in the state while making them currently unreadable is exposed to it. This reframes the empirical target. The question is not whether an unlearning method is robust to relearning in the abstract, but whether the state-level residual σ_x was actually driven down, which is measurable in a twin world and is not measurable from behaviour alone.

Agent memory systems as a source of write paths. Our nine node types and seven edge types are not arbitrary. Raw and vector memory, summaries and reflections are the memory stream of Park et al. (2023) and Shinn et al. (2023); paging between context and store is Packer et al. (2023); decay and forgetting schedules are Zhong et al. (2024) and are also the model for baseline B3; linked notes that are rewritten as new memories arrive, which is our merged-with edge, are Xu et al. (2025); distilled reusable procedures are the skill library of Wang et al. (2024); and the working, episodic, semantic and procedural taxonomy is Sumers et al. (2024). What none of these systems provides is a deletion path, and Zhong et al. (2024)'s forgetting curve is a retention policy rather than a deletion mechanism: it decides what to keep, not how to remove influence on request.

Leakage channels, per tier. The tiers are not equally exposed and the literature says how. Embeddings invert to near-verbatim text (Morris et al., 2023) and support attribute inference (Song & Raghunathan, 2020), so the embedding tier is a content-carrying tier and its artifacts are deleted rather than recomputed. Retrieval stores leak through the reading model, either through ordinary generation (Zeng et al., 2024) or through injected instructions (Qi et al., 2025), so raw vector memory shares that exposure. Parameters memorise (Carlini et al., 2021; 2023) and admit membership tests (Shokri et al., 2017; Carlini et al., 2022), though the evidence that membership inference is effective against large models trained near single-epoch is weak (Duan et al., 2024), which is why our adapter-tier probes are extraction-style rather than membership-style. Summaries and profiles have no dedicated attack literature, which is itself notable: they are the tiers where a paraphrase of a private message survives with no gradient step involved, and E1 is designed to test whether they dominate the residual map.

Contextual integrity and what counts as leakage. A probe score ϕ_q encodes a judgement about which flows are inappropriate. We take that judgement from contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2004) as operationalised for language models by Mireshghallah et al. (2024) and for agent trajectories by Shao et al. (2024): the same content is a violation in one context and not in another, so ϕ is context-indexed and Q carries the context distribution. This is also why we do not attempt a single scalar leakage number.

Attacks on agent memory. Chen et al. (2024) poison an agent's memory or knowledge base so that a trigger retrieves attacker-chosen content, and Greshake et al. (2023) plant instructions in retrieved data. Both are adversarial writes rather than deletion failures, but they matter here for two reasons: they show the memory store is a first-class attack surface, and the injection technique of Greshake et al. (2023) is what probe class P6 uses to extract a shared artifact from a peer agent that the operator does not control.

Influence estimation. Influence functions (Koh & Liang, 2017) and their scaled variants (Grosse et al., 2023; Pruthi et al., 2020) answer a question about a differentiable learner. Datamodels (Ilyas et al., 2022) answer the counterfactual-subset question directly and are conceptually closest to Equation (5), at the price of many retrainings; the twin world buys the same counterfactual for the price of one extra run because the state is re-derivable rather than re-learned. Basu et al. (2021) is the reason we restrict gradient-based estimation to the adapter tier and flag it in the certificate, and Zhang et al. (2023) is the direct antecedent of measuring an example's specific contribution rather than its absolute recoverability.

Provenance. The why/where distinction (Buneman et al., 2001) maps onto our content-carrying against dependence-only edge split, and the semiring view surveyed by Cheney et al. (2009) is the natural home for the confidence weights $w(e)$: propagating w along paths is evaluation in the Viterbi semiring. We do not develop that connection here, and a provenance- semiring treatment of $\widehat{\sigma}_x$ propagation is an obvious next step.

Distribution-free risk control. Theorems 10 and 29 use Maurer & Pontil (2009) and Bates et al. (2021); conformal risk control (Angelopoulos et al., 2024) is the alternative when the per-case loss is monotone in a tuning parameter, and the tutorial treatment of Angelopoulos & Bates (2023) covers the exchangeability requirements we inherit. Guo et al. (2017) supplies the reliability-diagram methodology used in E3. What none of these frameworks supplies is what to do when the test distribution is chosen adversarially, which is Theorem 11's subject and its weakness. On the auditing side, Steinke et al. (2023) show that an empirical privacy lower bound can be obtained from a single training run rather than hundreds; the analogous question here, whether a single twin-world run can supply a lower bound on residual influence to sit beneath our upper bound, is open and would close the gap that Table 26 leaves.

A composition we do not build. A natural next step is to bind $\mathcal{C}(x)$ cryptographically, so that a user can check the operator actually ran the closure it reports, using the machinery of Eisenhofer et al. (2025), and to test the operator's honesty statistically in the style of Sommer et al. (2022). The certificate is designed to be bindable: it is a fixed-format tuple over a hashable lineage subgraph and

a seeded probe sample. We have not built it, and until it exists a certificate is trust-on-first-use with respect to the operator.

C Deferred remarks

This section holds remarks that the page limit displaced from the main text. Nothing here is required to follow the argument, and nothing here is stated elsewhere.

Remark 17 (What this definition is not)**.** Definition 4 is relative to Q. It does not assert that no information about x remains anywhere in S, it does not imply a differential-privacy guarantee (Dwork & Roth, 2014), and it is not verifiable from the deployed state alone, for the reason Thudi et al. (2022b) give: two different histories can leave the same state. It is a statement about behaviour under a declared law, and Theorem 14 shows that a worst-case version of it is not attainable from finitely many probes.

Remark 18 (Relation to storage-level and parameter-level deletion)**.** Storage-level deletion asks whether a row is absent. Parameter-level unlearning asks whether θ_{del} is close to θ retrained without x (Guo et al., 2020). Definition 4 sits above both: it is implied by neither, it constrains the whole state including non-parametric tiers, and it is the level at which the user's question, "does the agent still act on this?", is posed.

Remark 19 (Why the baseline is not zero)**.** Proposition 9 bounds the *excess* over A^{-x}, not the absolute success rate. An adversary that never saw x can still recover attributes of x's subject from correlated public text (Staab et al., 2024). Reporting absolute extraction rates after deletion, as much of the unlearning literature does, therefore mixes what the agent learned from x with what anyone can infer without it. The size of that mixing is a property of the agent and the attacker, not of the framework, and on our benchmark it is zero: the token model gives the never-seen agent nothing to infer from, so S2 measures absolute and excess risk as equal (Table 25). The distinction therefore rests here on the inference literature rather than on our measurement, and a language-agent instantiation is where it would be measured.

Remark 20 (Behavioural distance is not monotone under state processing)**.** TV between state laws cannot increase under a common map, but Δ_Q is not a function of the state law alone: it depends on the readout. Two states can be behaviourally identical under one readout and maximally distinguishable under another. Proposition 15 turns this observation into a negative result.

D Threat model in full

Threat model. The operator is honest and runs DeleteCert on its own agent; we are not building a protocol by which a distrustful user audits a provider, which is the setting of Sommer et al. (2022) and Eisenhofer et al. (2025). The adversary is a party that queries the deployed agent after deletion, at a budget of k queries, drawn from a probe law Q'. The adversary may be the user's counterparty, another agent that received a shared artifact, or a later operator of the same account. It may adapt within its budget. It does not have white-box access to S, does not observe $\boldsymbol{u}$, and cannot roll the agent back to a pre-deletion snapshot; backups are out of scope and are named as such in the certificate. Three properties are in tension and we measure all three: the excess risk ER_Q, the utility of unrelated memories, and the deletion footprint and cost.

What the certificate covers. The certificate is a statement about $A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}$ under Q at confidence $1-\delta$. It is silent about probe laws far from Q, except through Theorem 11; about state the lineage graph did not record, except through the conservative expansion of Proposition 35; about anything that happens to the agent after the certificate is issued, by Proposition 15; and about copies outside the agent, including backups, logs, and artifacts already delivered to a peer that the operator does not control. Each of these is printed in the certificate's *untested pathways* field rather than left implicit.

E Proofs

Every result stated in Section 7 is proved here in full. Where a step relies on an external theorem we state that theorem's hypotheses and verify each of them in our model. Two conventions used

throughout: TV is the total variation distance normalised to $[0,1]$, and for a Markov kernel K and law μ we write $\mu \otimes K$ for the joint law.

E.1 Preliminary facts

We use three standard facts. Each is elementary and we include the one-line argument so the paper is self-contained.

Lemma 21 (Bounded-test characterisation)**.** *For laws P, P' on a common space and any measurable f with $\sup f - \inf f \le c$, $|\mathbb{E}_P[f] - \mathbb{E}_{P'}[f]| \le c\,\mathrm{TV}(P, P')$.*

Proof. Write $f = \inf f + h$ with $0 \le h \le c$. Then $\mathbb{E}_P[f] - \mathbb{E}_{P'}[f] = \mathbb{E}_P[h] - \mathbb{E}_{P'}[h] = \int h \,\mathrm{d}(P - P') = \int_0^c \big(P(h > t) - P'(h > t)\big)\mathrm{d}t$, whose absolute value is at most $c \sup_B |P(B) - P'(B)| = c\,\mathrm{TV}(P, P')$. □

Lemma 22 (Data processing)**.** *For any Markov kernel K and laws μ, μ', $\mathrm{TV}(\mu K, \mu' K) \le \mathrm{TV}(\mu, \mu')$. Moreover $\mathrm{TV}(\mu \otimes K, \mu \otimes K') \le \mathbb{E}_\mu\big[\mathrm{TV}(K(\cdot \mid \cdot), K'(\cdot \mid \cdot))\big]$.*

Proof. The first is the standard data-processing inequality for f-divergences (Cover & Thomas, 2006, Ch. 2): for any event B, $|\mu K(B) - \mu' K(B)| = |\int K(B \mid s)\,\mathrm{d}(\mu - \mu')(s)| \le \mathrm{TV}(\mu, \mu')$ since $K(B \mid \cdot) \in [0,1]$, by Lemma 21. For the second, for any event B in the product space, $|\mu \otimes K(B) - \mu \otimes K'(B)| = |\int \big(K(B_s \mid s) - K'(B_s \mid s)\big)\mathrm{d}\mu(s)| \le \int \mathrm{TV}\big(K(\cdot \mid s), K'(\cdot \mid s)\big)\mathrm{d}\mu(s)$, where B_s is the s-section of B. □

Lemma 23 (Hybrid bound for a product of kernels)**.** *Let $\mu = K_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes K_M$ and $\mu' = K'_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes K'_M$ be joint laws built by composing kernels in a fixed order, where K_j and K'_j condition on the same preceding coordinates. If $\sup_s \mathrm{TV}\big(K_j(\cdot \mid s), K'_j(\cdot \mid s)\big) \le \delta_j$ for each j, then $\mathrm{TV}(\mu, \mu') \le \sum_{j=1}^M \delta_j$.*

Proof. Define hybrids $H_0 = \mu$ and H_j obtained from H_{j-1} by replacing K_j with K'_j, so $H_M = \mu'$. Fix j. The laws H_{j-1} and H_j share the marginal ν over the first $j-1$ coordinates, differ only in the j-th kernel, and then apply the same remaining kernels R. By the second part of Lemma 22, $\mathrm{TV}(\nu \otimes K_j, \nu \otimes K'_j) \le \delta_j$; by the first part applied to R, $\mathrm{TV}(H_{j-1}, H_j) \le \delta_j$. The triangle inequality for TV gives the claim. □

E.2 Closures that reproduce the never-seen world

We first record a clarification of Assumption A3 that the induction needs.

Remark 24 (Absent parents)**.** A producer g_v is defined on parent tuples in which any coordinate may take a distinguished value $\perp$ meaning "this parent does not exist". The reference world evaluates producers with the same convention: if a parent p of v does not exist in $\boldsymbol{z}^{-x}$ then $v^{-x} = g_v(\ldots, \perp, \ldots, u_v)$. Faithful recomputation (Assumption A3) uses the same convention, so a recomputed v whose parent was deleted is evaluated at $\perp$ in that coordinate.

Lemma 25 (Topological coupling)**.** *Adopt Assumptions A1 to A3 and Remark 24. Let π be a faithful plan executed in a topological order $v_1 \prec \cdots \prec v_M$ of $\{x\} \cup \mathrm{desc}(x)$. Then for every j and every $i \le j$: if $\pi(v_i) =$ **delete** then v_i is absent from both $S_{\mathrm{del}(x)}$ and S^{-x}, and otherwise the value stored for v_i after execution equals v_i^{-x} almost surely. Moreover every $v \notin \mathrm{desc}(x) \cup \{x\}$ satisfies $v = v^{-x}$ almost surely.*

Proof. Non-descendants. Take a topological order of $\mathcal{V} \setminus (\mathrm{desc}(x) \cup \{x\})$ and induct. A source in this set is either a root of $\mathcal{G}$ other than x, hence identical in both streams, or has all parents outside $\mathrm{desc}(x) \cup \{x\}$ (if it had a parent in that set it would itself be a descendant of x). By Assumption A1 its value is $g_v(\mathrm{pa}(v), u_v)$; by the induction hypothesis every parent equals its reference value, and u_v is shared, so $v = v^{-x}$. This uses Assumption A2: if some unrecorded parent existed and lay in $\mathrm{desc}(x)$, the conclusion would fail, which is exactly the failure mode Proposition 35 prices.

Descendants, induction on j. The case $j = 0$ is vacuous. Assume the claim for $j - 1$ and consider v_j.

If $\pi(v_j) = \textsf{delete}$, faithfulness gives $v_j \notin \mathcal{V}^{-x}$, and execution removes it, so it is absent in both.

If $\pi(v_j) = \textsf{recompute}$, faithfulness gives $v_j \in \mathcal{V}^{-x}$. Every parent p of v_j precedes v_j in the topological order. If $p \notin \mathrm{desc}(x) \cup \{x\}$ then $p = p^{-x}$ by the first part. If $p \in \mathrm{desc}(x) \cup \{x\}$ then by the induction hypothesis p is either absent in both worlds, in which case both evaluations use $\perp$ in that coordinate by Remark 24, or its stored value equals p^{-x}. Hence the parent tuple presented to g_{v_j} coincides with the reference-world parent tuple. Assumption A3 says the recomputation applies the same g_{v_j} with the same u_{v_j}, so the recomputed value equals $g_{v_j}(\mathrm{pa}^{-x}(v_j), u_{v_j}) = v_j^{-x}$.

If $\pi(v_j) = \textsf{keep}$, faithfulness gives $v_j \in \mathcal{V}^{-x}$ and $v_j = v_j^{-x}$ directly. □

Proof of Theorem 7. By Lemma 25 every artifact present in $S_{\mathrm{del}(x)}$ carries its reference-world value and every artifact absent from $S_{\mathrm{del}(x)}$ is absent from S^{-x}, so $S_{\mathrm{del}(x)} = S^{-x}$ almost surely. The agent's answering policy is a fixed measurable function of the state and of exogenous randomness that is shared between the worlds, so $A_{\mathrm{del}(x)} = A^{-x}$ as random objects and $P_{A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}}(\cdot \mid q) = P_{A^{-x}}(\cdot \mid q)$ for every $q \in \mathcal{Q}$. Hence TV vanishes pointwise in q, giving $\Delta_Q = \Delta^{\sup} = 0$, and $\mathrm{ER}_Q = 0$ for every Q and every bounded scoring family. □

Proof of Theorem 8. Order the coordinates of the state with the non-descendants of x first and $\mathrm{desc}(x)$ after them in the fixed topological order. Any joint law on an ordered tuple is, by the chain rule, the composition of the conditional laws of each coordinate given all preceding ones; write $K_j^{\mathrm{del}}(\cdot \mid h)$ and $K_j^{-x}(\cdot \mid h)$ for those conditional laws of the post-deletion and the reference state, with h the full preceding history. The plan's selection, and any randomness in it, is integrated into K_j^{del}, which is why the history and not the parents is the conditioning set. The non-descendants are the same functions of the stream and $\boldsymbol{u}$ in both worlds (Lemma 25), so their kernels coincide; for $v \in \mathrm{desc}(x)$ the hypothesis is $\sup_h \mathrm{TV}(K_v^{\mathrm{del}}(\cdot \mid h), K_v^{-x}(\cdot \mid h)) \le \delta_v$. Lemma 23 then gives Equation (8).

For the consequences, fix q. The conditional law of the answer given the state is a Markov kernel, so by Lemma 22 $\mathrm{TV}(P_{A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}}(\cdot \mid q), P_{A^{-x}}(\cdot \mid q)) \le \mathrm{TV}(\mathcal{L}(S_{\mathrm{del}(x)}), \mathcal{L}(S^{-x})) \le \Delta_S$. Averaging over $q \sim Q$ gives $\Delta_Q \le \Delta_S$; and since $\phi_q \in [0,1]$, Lemma 21 with $c = 1$ gives $|\mathbb{E}[\phi_q(y^{\mathrm{del}})] - \mathbb{E}[\phi_q(y^{-x})]| \le \Delta_S$ for each q, so $|\mathrm{ER}_Q| \le \Delta_S$ after averaging. □

Remark 26 (Laws, realised pairs, and plans chosen from the state)**.** Two readings of Theorem 8 are not licensed, and each has a two-bit counterexample. *A realised pair.* Let U be a fair bit, $S^{-x} = U$ and $S_{\mathrm{del}(x)} = 1 - U$. The state laws coincide, so the bound is 0, yet for every fixed U a readout of the stored bit differs between the two agents. The theorem bounds distances between laws averaged over construction; that a particular deployed agent matches its own shared-randomness counterpart is the almost-sure statement of Theorem 7, which needs faithful recomputation. *A plan chosen from the state.* Let $a = x \oplus U_a$ and $b = x \oplus U_b$ with U_a, U_b independent fair bits, so the reference state is (U_a, U_b). Delete x, recompute a, and recompute b only if the original values of a and b were equal, retaining it otherwise. The post-deletion state is (U_a, U_a): each child is a fair bit given its only original parent, so a parent-conditioned δ is zero for both, while the joint laws are at total variation $1/2$. Conditioning each kernel on the full preceding history, as the theorem does, exposes the dependency, since b given a is then a point mass. Parent-conditioned quantities such as σ_x bound δ_v only when the plan is fixed before the values it acts on are realised.

Remark 27 (Which quantity a retained node contributes)**.** For a node the plan retains, δ_v in Theorem 8 is the *state-level* residual $\sigma_x(v) = \sup_{\mathrm{pa}} \mathrm{TV}\big(\mathcal{L}(v \mid \mathrm{pa}), \mathcal{L}(v^{-x} \mid \mathrm{pa})\big)$, not the behavioural influence $I_x(v)$ of Equation (5). The two are ordered but in only one direction: reading y from v is a Markov kernel, so Lemma 22 gives $I_x(v) \le \sigma_x(v)$, and the inequality can be strict by an arbitrary amount (Proposition 15 exhibits a pair with $I_x = 0$ and $\sigma_x = 1$). Retention decisions must therefore be thresholded on $\widehat{\sigma}_x$, which the intervention and representation-similarity estimators provide, and not on $\widehat{I}_x$ alone; I_x remains the interpretable per-node quantity reported in the certificate. Thresholding on I_x alone is unsound, and Algorithm 2 uses $\widehat{\sigma}_x$.

Proof of Proposition 9. Single probe drawn from Q. The adversary's score is $\phi_q(y) \in [0,1]$ for y drawn from the agent. By Lemma 21, for each q the difference of expectations is at most $\mathrm{TV}(P_{A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}}(\cdot \mid q), P_{A^{-x}}(\cdot \mid q))$; averaging over $q \sim Q$ gives Δ_Q.

Adaptive, k queries. An adaptive adversary defines a sequence of kernels: given the transcript so far it chooses q_j (possibly at random) and receives y_j from the agent. The transcript law is a composition of $2k$ kernels, of which the k adversary kernels are identical across the two worlds and the k agent kernels differ by at most $\Delta^{\sup}$ in TV uniformly over the conditioning transcript: because each answer is drawn from the state alone, the agent kernel given a transcript is its single-query kernel, which is what $\Delta^{\sup}$ bounds. For an agent that carries state across queries this step fails, since equal single-query laws do not give equal transcript laws, and $\Delta^{\sup}$ would have to be taken over queries that include their history. By Lemma 23 the transcript laws differ by at most $k\Delta^{\sup}$ in TV. The final score is a $[0,1]$-valued function of the transcript, so Lemma 21 gives the claim. □

E.3 Certificates

Proof of Theorem 10. Write $\psi_q = \mathbb{E}[\phi_q(Y^{\mathrm{del}})] - \mathbb{E}[\phi_q(Y^{-x})]$ for the per-probe mean difference, so that $\mathrm{ER}_Q = \mathbb{E}_{q\sim Q}[\psi_q]$.

Step 1 (one-sided relaxation). $a \le (a)_+$ pointwise, hence $\mathrm{ER}_Q \le \mathbb{E}_{q\sim Q}[(\psi_q)_+] = \mathrm{ER}_Q^+$.

Step 2 (the plug-in is upward biased). Condition on q_i. The map $a \mapsto (a)_+$ is convex, so Jensen gives $\mathbb{E}\big[(\phi_{q_i}(Y^{\mathrm{del}}) - \phi_{q_i}(Y^{-x}))_+ \,\big|\, q_i\big] \ge \big(\mathbb{E}[\phi_{q_i}(Y^{\mathrm{del}}) - \phi_{q_i}(Y^{-x}) \mid q_i]\big)_+ = (\psi_{q_i})_+$. Taking the expectation over $q_i \sim Q$ gives $\mathbb{E}[Z_i] \ge \mathrm{ER}_Q^+$. The argument does not require Y^{del} and Y^{-x} to be independent given q_i; any coupling works, since only the conditional law of the difference is used.

Step 3 (empirical Bernstein). $Z_1, \dots, Z_n$ are i.i.d. in $[0,1]$ by Assumption A4. The empirical Bernstein bound of Maurer & Pontil (2009, Thm. 4) states that for i.i.d. variables in $[0,1]$ and $n \ge 2$, with probability at least $1-\delta$,

$$\mathbb{E}[Z] \;\le\; \bar{Z} + \sqrt{\frac{2\widehat{V}_n \ln(2/\delta)}{n}} + \frac{7\ln(2/\delta)}{3(n-1)}, \qquad \widehat{V}_n = \frac{1}{n(n-1)} \sum_{i<j} (Z_i - Z_j)^2.$$

Its hypotheses, independence, identical distribution, and range $[0,1]$, are exactly Assumption A4. Chaining Steps 1–3, $\mathrm{ER}_Q \le \mathrm{ER}_Q^+ \le \mathbb{E}[Z] \le \widehat{U}_{n,\delta}$ on the same $1-\delta$ event. □

Remark 28 (Optional stopping)**.** Equation (9) is valid for a fixed n chosen before the probes are drawn. An operator that probes until the bound is small enough is performing optional stopping and the guarantee fails. The betting confidence sequence of Waudby-Smith & Ramdas (2024) is valid at every stopping time for bounded variables and can be substituted directly, at the cost of a slightly wider interval at any fixed n. Algorithm 3 implements both and records which was used in the certificate.

Theorem 29 (Case-level calibration)**.** *Let the reported bound on deletion case j be $B_j(\lambda) = \widehat{U}_{n,\delta}^{(j)} + \lambda$ and let $L(\lambda) = \mathbb{P}_{\mathrm{case}}(\mathrm{ER}_Q > B(\lambda))$ be its population violation rate, which is non-increasing in λ. Given m i.i.d. calibration cases, the risk-controlling choice $\hat{\lambda} = \inf\{\lambda : \widehat{L}^+(\lambda') < \alpha \ \forall \lambda' \ge \lambda\}$ of Bates et al. (2021) satisfies $\mathbb{P}\big(L(\hat{\lambda}) \le \alpha\big) \ge 1-\beta$. Under Assumption A6 the same procedure instead calibrates the closure level itself over the nested family $\{C_\lambda\}$.*

Proof of Theorem 29. Index the reported bound by an inflation parameter $\lambda \ge 0$, so that on deletion case j the system reports $B_j(\lambda) = \widehat{U}_{n,\delta}^{(j)} + \lambda$, and let $L(\lambda) = \mathbb{P}_{\mathrm{case}}\big(\mathrm{ER}_Q > B(\lambda)\big) \in [0,1]$ be its population violation rate. We verify the four hypotheses of the risk-controlling calibration of Bates et al. (2021, Thm. 1). (i) *Bounded loss*: the loss is the violation indicator, which lies in $[0,1]$. (ii) *Monotone risk*: $\{\mathrm{ER}_Q > B(\lambda)\} \supseteq \{\mathrm{ER}_Q > B(\lambda')\}$ for $\lambda \le \lambda'$, so L is non-increasing; this is immediate and does not require Assumption A6. (iii) *Valid pointwise upper confidence bound*: for fixed λ the per-case violation indicator is a Bernoulli variable, and the calibration cases are drawn i.i.d., so the Clopper–Pearson interval supplies an exact $\widehat{L}^+(\lambda)$ at level β. This is the step that needs independence rather than exchangeability, and it is the one the implementation realises: the generator

draws each case from the same specification with its own seed. (iv) *Exchangeability* of calibration and test cases, which follows. The theorem then gives, for $\hat{\lambda} = \inf\{\lambda : \widehat{L}^{+}(\lambda') < \alpha \ \ \forall \lambda' \geq \lambda\}$, that $\mathbb{P}\big(L(\hat{\lambda}) \leq \alpha\big) \geq 1 - \beta$, which is the claim.

Under Assumption A6 the identical argument applies with λ indexing the closure level rather than an additive inflation, since nestedness plus monotonicity of ER_Q along the family supplies hypothesis (ii). We state the additive version because it needs no assumption beyond an i.i.d. calibration sample. □

Remark 30 (Why exchangeability is not enough here, and what m must be)**.** Hypothesis (iv) of the risk-controlling result is exchangeability, but hypothesis (iii) is a valid confidence bound for the violation rate, and that is a concentration statement. Exchangeable indicators need not concentrate at all: let $H \sim \mathrm{Bernoulli}(p)$ and set every indicator equal to H. The sequence is exchangeable with marginal mean p, yet with probability $1-p$ every observed indicator is zero and any bound computed from the sample alone is far below p. Independence is what rules that out, and the benchmark supplies it by construction.

The bound also has to be exact at the sample size actually used. The study calibrates on the audited cases of each run, m between 76 and 98. With zero observed violations at $\beta = 0.05$, Clopper–Pearson returns between 0.0301 and 0.0387, below the $\alpha = 0.10$ the protocol targets. A Hoeffding bound at $m = 76$ returns 0.1404 and could never select an inflation meeting α, which is why the implementation uses the exact binomial interval for a binary loss and reserves the bounded-mean bound for losses that are not indicators.

Proof of Theorem 11. $D_\alpha(Q'\|Q) \leq \kappa < \infty$ implies $Q' \ll Q$; write $f = \mathrm{d}Q'/\mathrm{d}Q$. Let $h(q) = (\psi_q)_+ \in [0,1]$, so $\mathrm{ER}_{Q'} \leq \mathbb{E}_{Q'}[h]$ by Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 10 applied under Q'. Apply Hölder's inequality with conjugate exponents α and $r = \alpha/(\alpha-1)$:

$$\mathbb{E}_{Q'}[h] \;=\; \mathbb{E}_Q[fh] \;\leq\; \big(\mathbb{E}_Q[f^\alpha]\big)^{1/\alpha}\big(\mathbb{E}_Q[h^r]\big)^{1/r}.$$

By the definition of Rényi divergence in the convention of van Erven & Harremoës (2014), $\mathbb{E}_Q[f^\alpha] = \exp\big((\alpha-1)D_\alpha(Q'\|Q)\big) \leq e^{(\alpha-1)\kappa}$, so the first factor is at most $e^{(\alpha-1)\kappa/\alpha} = e^{\kappa\beta_\alpha}$. Since $h \in [0,1]$ and $r \geq 1$ we have $h^r \leq h$, so $\big(\mathbb{E}_Q[h^r]\big)^{1/r} \leq \big(\mathbb{E}_Q[h]\big)^{1/r} = (\mathrm{ER}_Q^+)^{\beta_\alpha}$, using $1/r = \beta_\alpha$. Multiplying gives Equation (10). The second statement follows by substituting the $1-\delta$ bound of Theorem 10 for ER_Q^+ and using monotonicity of $t \mapsto t^{\beta_\alpha}$ on $[0,1]$. □

Remark 31 (How weak the transfer bound is)**.** At $\alpha = 2$, $\beta_\alpha = 1/2$, so a certified $\mathrm{ER}_Q^+ = 10^{-4}$ becomes a guarantee of only $e^{\kappa/2} \cdot 10^{-2}$ on Q'. The bound is also unusable when κ is unknown, and κ is unknown precisely when the attack is unanticipated, which is the case one cares about. We therefore treat Theorem 11 as an explanation of why transfer degrades rather than as an operational guarantee, and measure transfer directly in E4.

E.4 Computing the closure

Proof of Proposition 12. We reduce Minimum Hitting Set, which is Set Cover with the roles of elements and sets transposed and is NP-hard (Karp, 1972). Given ground set $\{d_1, \ldots, d_M\}$ and a family $T_1, \ldots, T_N \subseteq \{d_1, \ldots, d_M\}$, build the following instance.

The lineage graph has root x and children $d_1, \ldots, d_M$, each joined by a copied-from edge. Set $\mathrm{c}_{\mathsf{delete}}(d_j) = 1$ and $\mathrm{c}_{\mathsf{recompute}}(d_j) = \infty$, so the only available non-trivial actions are delete and keep; x itself is always deleted at cost 0. Artifact d_j stores a fragment; the probe law Q is uniform over N probes $q_1, \ldots, q_N$, and the agent answers q_i by concatenating the fragments held by the surviving members of T_i, which reconstructs secret i if and only if every member of T_i survives. Put $\phi_{q_i}(y) = \mathbf{1}[y = \text{secret } i]$. In the reference world no d_j exists, so $R_Q(A^{-x}) = 0$ and, for a closure C,

$$\mathrm{ER}_Q(C) \;=\; \frac{1}{N}\,\big|\{\, i : T_i \cap C = \emptyset \,\}\big|.$$

Hence $\mathrm{ER}_Q(C) \leq 0$ if and only if C hits every T_i, and $\mathrm{Cost}(C) = |C|$, so a minimum-cost closure is exactly a minimum hitting set. The construction is polynomial and stays inside the model of Def-

inition 5: fragments spread across several artifacts, each individually necessary for reconstruction, are an ordinary consequence of summarisation splitting a fact across memory entries.

For inapproximability, the same reduction is approximation preserving, so a polynomial-time $(1 - o(1)) \ln N$ approximation for minimum-cost closure would give one for set cover on a universe of size N, which Feige (1998) rules out under the hypothesis $\mathrm{NP} \not\subseteq \mathrm{DTIME}(n^{O(\log \log n)})$. Here N is the number of distinct leak events in the support of Q, not $|\mathrm{desc}(x)|$. □

Proof of Theorem 13. Write $c(\cdot)$ for the cost of the action the plan assigns, C_t for the greedy set after t steps, $\rho_t = \tau - g(C_t)$, and let T be the first index with $g(C_T) \geq \tau - \zeta$, so $\rho_t > \zeta > 0$ for all $t < T$.

Fix $t < T$. If $C^\star \setminus C_t = \emptyset$ then $g(C_t) \geq g(C^\star) \geq \tau$ by monotonicity, contradicting $\rho_t > 0$; so the set is non-empty. Assumption A7 applied with $C = C_t$ and T-set $C^\star$ gives

$$\sum_{v \in C^\star \setminus C_t} \big[g(C_t \cup \{v\}) - g(C_t)\big] \;\geq\; \gamma\big[g(C_t \cup C^\star) - g(C_t)\big] \;\geq\; \gamma\big[g(C^\star) - g(C_t)\big] \;\geq\; \gamma\rho_t,$$

the middle step by monotonicity. Since $\max_v a_v/c_v \geq (\sum_v a_v)/(\sum_v c_v)$ for non-negative a_v and positive c_v, and $\sum_{v \in C^\star \setminus C_t} c(v) \leq c^\star$, some $v \in C^\star \setminus C_t$ has ratio at least $\gamma\rho_t/c^\star$. The greedy rule of Equation (7) selects an element v_{t+1} whose ratio is at least as large, so

$$g(C_{t+1}) - g(C_t) \;\geq\; c(v_{t+1})\,\frac{\gamma\rho_t}{c^\star}, \qquad \text{i.e.} \qquad \rho_{t+1} \;\leq\; \rho_t\Big(1 - \frac{\gamma\, c(v_{t+1})}{c^\star}\Big).$$

Iterating from $\rho_0 = \tau$ and using $1 - a \leq e^{-a}$, $\rho_t \leq \tau \exp\big(-\gamma\, c(C_t)/c^\star\big)$ for all $t \leq T-1$. Because $\rho_{T-1} > \zeta$ we get $\zeta < \tau \exp(-\gamma\, c(C_{T-1})/c^\star)$, hence $c(C_{T-1}) < (c^\star/\gamma)\ln(\tau/\zeta)$. Adding the cost of the final element gives Equation (11). □

Remark 32 ($\gamma = 1$ and the redundancy failure mode)**.** At $\gamma = 1$, Equation (11) is the submodular-cover bound of Wolsey (1982) up to the additive last-element term, and the instances built in the proof of Proposition 12 have $\gamma = 1$ because their g is a coverage function; on that family the guarantee of Theorem 13 and the hardness threshold of Proposition 12 are within a constant factor of one another. The failure mode is not synergy but *redundancy*. Let the same content be stored in two artifacts a and b, and let a probe score 1 whenever the content is recoverable from any surviving artifact. Then $g(\{a\}) = g(\{b\}) = 0$ while $g(\{a, b\}) = 1$, so Assumption A7 with $C = \emptyset$ and $T = \{a, b\}$ forces $\gamma \leq 0$ and Equation (11) is vacuous. Redundant storage of the same fact across a summary and a profile is common in agent memory, so this is not a pathological case. Two mitigations are available and both are evaluated in S1: contracting duplicate-content artifacts into a single node before running IWC, which restores coverage structure exactly, and running IWC over pairs as well as singletons, which recovers a guarantee at quadratic evaluation cost. We do not claim either fully repairs the bound in general.

Remark 33 (Noisy evaluation of g)**.** Theorem 13 assumes exact oracle access to g. In DELETE-CERT, g is estimated. If $|\widehat{g} - g| \leq \xi$ uniformly, the greedy step's guaranteed ratio degrades from $\gamma\rho_t/c^\star$ to $\gamma\rho_t/c^\star - 2\xi/c_{\min}$, and the argument above goes through with γ replaced by $\gamma - 2\xi c^\star/(\rho_t c_{\min})$ whenever that quantity is positive. We state this as a degradation, not as a theorem: making it uniform over t requires a lower bound on ρ_t that the stopping rule does not provide.

Proposition 34 (Reachability purge can be arbitrarily wasteful)**.** *For every n there is a lineage instance with $|\mathrm{desc}(x)| = n$ on which reachability purge touches n artifacts while a faithful closure touches 1, at identical (zero) excess risk. There are also instances on which reachability purge is optimal, so the gap is instance-dependent and must be measured.*

Proposition 35 (Conservative closure under missing provenance)**.** *Under Assumption A5, let $\hat{D}$ be the descendant set recovered from the recorded graph and let $\ell(d)$ be the length of a shortest $x \to d$ path. Then $\mathbb{P}(d \notin \hat{D}) \leq \ell(d)\,\eta_{\mathrm{miss}}$ for an arbitrary joint law over which edges are missed, and if misses are additionally independent across edges the sharper $\mathbb{P}(d \notin \hat{D}) \leq 1 - (1 - \eta_{\mathrm{miss}})^{\ell(d)}$ holds. In either case, for the plan $\hat{\pi}$ that keeps every descendant absent from $\hat{D}$ and acts as π^{ideal} on the rest,*

$$\mathbb{E}\Big[\mathrm{ER}_Q\big(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}(\hat{\pi})\big)\Big] \;\leq\; \mathrm{ER}_Q\big(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}(\pi^{\mathrm{ideal}})\big) \;+\; \eta_{\mathrm{miss}} \sum_{d \in \mathrm{desc}(x)} \ell(d)\,\sigma_x(d), \tag{12}$$

the expectation being over the recording randomness. Consequently, if π^{ideal} *meets* $\epsilon' = \epsilon - \eta_{\text{miss}} L \sum_d \sigma_x(d) > 0$*, where* L *is the lineage depth, then* $\hat{\pi}$ *meets* ϵ *in expectation. The statement is about* $\hat{\pi}$*; it is not a guarantee for re-running* IWC *on the damaged graph (Remark 38).*

Proof of Proposition 34. Gap instance. Let x have n children $d_1, \dots, d_n$. Let d_1 be a verbatim copy of x. For $i \geq 2$ let d_i be a summary of an unrelated artifact x' that records the session identifier in which it was written; the recorded lineage therefore contains an inferred-from edge $x \to d_i$, but g_{d_i} ignores the x coordinate, so $d_i = d_i^{-x}$ almost surely. The plan $\pi(x) = \pi(d_1) =$ delete, $\pi(d_i) =$ keep for $i \geq 2$ is faithful, so by Theorem 7 it attains $\text{ER}_Q = 0$ with footprint 1 among the descendants. Reachability purge deletes all of $d_1, \dots, d_n$, footprint n, and also attains $\text{ER}_Q = 0$. The ratio is n.

Tight instance. If instead every d_i is a verbatim copy of x, then each $d_i \notin \mathcal{V}^{-x}$, so faithfulness forces $\pi(d_i) =$ delete for every i and reachability purge is optimal. Hence the gap is instance-dependent, and no worst-case separation statement is available in either direction. □

Proof of Proposition 35. Fix $d \in \text{desc}(x)$ and a shortest $x \to d$ path P with $|P| = \ell(d)$ edges, and let M_e be the indicator that true edge e is absent from the recorded graph. If no edge of P is missed then P is present in the recorded graph, so d is reachable from x there and $d \in \hat{D}$; edge recovery only adds edges, so this is preserved. Hence $\{d \notin \hat{D}\} \subseteq \bigcup_{e \in P} \{M_e = 1\}$ and, by the union bound and the marginal part of Assumption A5,

$$\mathbb{P}(d \notin \hat{D}) \;\leq\; \sum_{e \in P} \mathbb{P}(M_e = 1) \;\leq\; \ell(d)\, \eta_{\text{miss}}.$$

Nothing here constrains the joint law of $(M_e)_e$: the union bound holds under arbitrary dependence, which is what makes the deployed form of this bound indifferent to whether provenance is lost edge by edge or in whole subtrees. If misses are independent then additionally $\mathbb{P}(d \in \hat{D}) \geq \mathbb{P}(\text{all of } P \text{ recorded}) \geq (1 - \eta_{\text{miss}})^{\ell(d)}$, and Bernoulli's inequality recovers the linear bound from the exponential one.

A descendant not in $\hat{D}$ is treated as keep by the plan computed on $\hat{\mathcal{G}}$, and by Theorem 8 together with Remark 27 it contributes at most $\sigma_x(d)$ to the state-level budget Δ_S, hence at most $\sigma_x(d)$ to $|\text{ER}_Q|$. Every other node is handled as in the ideal plan. Taking the expectation over the recording randomness and using linearity, which again needs no independence,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}\big[\text{ER}_Q(A_{\text{del}(x)}(\hat{\pi}))\big] \;&\leq\; \text{ER}_Q\big(A_{\text{del}(x)}(\pi^{\text{ideal}})\big) + \sum_{d \in \text{desc}(x)} \mathbb{P}(d \notin \hat{D})\, \sigma_x(d) \\ &\leq\; \text{ER}_Q^{\text{ideal}} + \eta_{\text{miss}} \sum_{d \in \text{desc}(x)} \ell(d)\, \sigma_x(d). \end{aligned}$$

Since $\ell(d) \leq L$, if $\text{ER}_Q^{\text{ideal}} \leq \epsilon'$ then $\mathbb{E}[\text{ER}_Q(A_{\text{del}(x)}(\hat{\pi}))] \leq \epsilon$. □

Remark 36 (What the cover bound is a bound on)**.** Theorem 13 analyses the selection rule of Equation (7): repeatedly take the element of best gain per unit cost until the target reduction is reached. Algorithm 2 does three further things. It switches a deletion to a recomputation when deleting would breach the utility floor, which changes the element's cost and its contribution after the element was chosen. It recomputes any node whose residual estimate is not demonstrably small, which adds elements the rule never selected. And it orders execution by precedence, which does not change the set but does change what a recomputation reads.

None of the three is covered by the proof. The first two change the returned set, so the cost comparison with $C^\star$ no longer follows, and the utility floor is a constraint the cover formulation does not carry at all. What the theorem establishes is a guarantee for the unconstrained cover problem with fixed costs; the plan Algorithm 2 returns is that selection plus two corrections, and it is reported as a heuristic. The corrections both move in the same direction, towards deleting or recomputing more, so they cannot reduce the risk reduction achieved; they can and do increase cost above the bound.

Remark 37 (Expectation, not high probability)**.** Proposition 35 controls the mean over the recording randomness. A high-probability version follows from Markov's inequality at the usual $1/\beta$ cost, or

from a union bound over descendants when the per-node contributions are bounded, but we do not claim a tighter concentration statement.

Remark 38 (What the bound covers, and what it does not)**.** Proposition 35 compares two plans with the same actions everywhere the damaged graph still reaches: $\hat{\pi}$ differs from π^{ideal} only by keeping the descendants it cannot see. Re-running IWC on $\hat{\mathcal{G}}$ is a different object. A missing edge can change a node's estimated influence, its selected action, or the parent set a recomputation reads, even when the node itself is still reachable by another path, and the sum in Equation (12) contains no term for that. Bounding it would need a stability statement for the closure under edge deletion, which we do not have; what the proposition prices is the cost of the descendants the operator never sees, and the reported study does not apply the deflated budget at all (Section K).

Remark 39 (Correlated instrumentation gaps)**.** Instrumentation gaps are correlated with subsystems rather than spread uniformly over edges: when a logging component fails, everything it emitted is lost at once. The bound the algorithm actually uses is indifferent to this. The linear form of Proposition 35 is proved by a union bound over one path and linearity of expectation, neither of which constrains the joint law, so a subtree-shaped gap and an edge-by-edge gap of the same marginal rate are priced identically. Only the exponential refinement is a statement about independent misses.

What the marginal condition does exclude is a mechanism that concentrates its losses. Consider one that removes a fixed number m of the $|E|$ recorded edges by some arbitrary rule. Summing the marginals gives $\sum_e \mathbb{P}(M_e = 1) = m$, so the *average* marginal is exactly $m/|E|$, but Proposition 35 needs the *maximum*. Writing $\eta^\star = \max_e \mathbb{P}(M_e = 1)$ and $\kappa = \eta^\star |E|/m \geq 1$, the bound holds with η_{miss} replaced by $\kappa\, m/|E|$, and κ is a property of the mechanism rather than of the graph. Two cases bracket it. A mechanism that is exchangeable over edges has $\kappa = 1$ and is covered at face value. A mechanism that can only ever remove edges from a subset $D \subseteq E$ has $\kappa \geq |E|/|D|$, because all of the mass falls on D; in the degenerate case where the same m edges are always removed the bound becomes $\ell(d)$ and is vacuous, which is correct, since those descendants are then missed with certainty and no bound on the miss rate can help.

The clustered sampler of S6 is of the restricted kind: it removes whole groups of edges sharing a source, and only the first few edges of each group are eligible, so $\kappa > 1$ and the guarantee it inherits is correspondingly weaker than the rate it is configured with. That, and not a failure of the theory, is why its rows are reported separately. Measuring κ for a deployment's own logging failures is how Proposition 35 is used there, and is a property an operator can estimate from its own incident history.

E.5 Two limits

Proof of Theorem 14. Let Aud be a deterministic auditing procedure that issues at most n probes, each chosen as a function of the answers so far, and then outputs a number. Construct the reference state $S' = S^{-x}$ as a lookup table that answers $\perp$ deterministically on every probe; this is realisable in Definition 5 as a single cached-plan artifact keyed by query. Run Aud on S' and let $\Pi \subseteq \mathcal{Q}$ be the set of probes it issues, so $|\Pi| \leq n$. Since $|\mathcal{Q}| > n$ there exists $q^\star \in \mathcal{Q} \setminus \Pi$. Define S to be the same lookup table except that it answers $q^\star$ with the content of x.

By induction on the round index, Aud issues the same probe and receives the same answer in round j under S and under S': the claim holds at $j = 1$ because the first probe depends on nothing, and if the transcripts agree through round $j-1$ then round j's probe is the same, lies in Π, hence differs from $q^\star$, hence receives the same answer. So the transcripts coincide and Aud outputs the same number on S and on S'. Yet $\mathrm{TV}\big(P_S(\cdot \mid q^\star), P_{S'}(\cdot \mid q^\star)\big) = 1$, so $\Delta^{\sup}(S, S') = 1$ while $\Delta^{\sup}(S', S') = 0$. Any output that is a valid upper bound on $\Delta^{\sup}$ for both inputs must therefore be at least 1, which is the trivial bound. □

Proposition 40 (Randomised auditors)**.** *Let* Aud *issue at most* n *probes using internal randomness and output* $U \in [0, 1]$*, and suppose it is valid at confidence* $1 - \delta$ *on the lookup-table states of the proof above:* $\mathbb{P}(\Delta^{\sup}(S, S^{-x}) \leq U) \geq 1 - \delta$ *for each of them. Then on the clean state* $S' = S^{-x}$*,* $\mathbb{P}(U \geq 1) \geq 1 - \delta - n/|\mathcal{Q}|$.

Proof. Run Aud on S' and let Π be the random set of probes it issues. Since $\mathbb{E}|\Pi| \leq n$, averaging over $q \in \mathcal{Q}$ gives some $q^\star$ with $\mathbb{P}(q^\star \in \Pi) \leq n/|\mathcal{Q}|$. Let S differ from S' only on $q^\star$, and couple the two runs through the same internal randomness. The runs agree up to the first time

$q^\star$ is issued, so the event $E = \{q^\star \notin \Pi\}$ has the same probability under both and, on E, the output is the same. Since $\Delta^{\sup}(S, S') = 1$, validity on S gives $\mathbb{P}_S(U \geq 1) \geq 1 - \delta$. Hence $1 - \delta \leq \mathbb{P}_S(U \geq 1, E) + \mathbb{P}(E^c) = \mathbb{P}_{S'}(U \geq 1, E) + \mathbb{P}(E^c) \leq \mathbb{P}_{S'}(U \geq 1) + n/|\mathcal{Q}|$. □

The statement names its confidence and its response class, and both matter. When n is close to $|\mathcal{Q}|$ it is vacuous, as it should be: an auditor that checks all but one of a hundred deterministic answers, and returns 0 only if all agree, is a valid 99% upper bound on that class. The regime the paper is about is the opposite one, $|\mathcal{Q}| \gg n$, where the probe space is the space of natural-language queries.

Proof of Proposition 15. Let the state be a pair $S = (b, \theta)$ where $b \in \{0, 1\}$ is a stored flag and θ selects the answering program. Take $S_{\mathrm{del}(x)} = (s, \theta_0)$ where $s \in \{0, 1\}$ is a bit determined by x, and $S^{-x} = (0, \theta_0)$, and let θ_0 be the program that answers $\perp$ on every probe, ignoring b. Then for every q, $P_{A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}}(\cdot \mid q) = P_{A^{-x}}(\cdot \mid q) = \delta_\perp$, so $\Delta_Q = \Delta^{\sup} = 0$ and $\mathrm{ER}_Q = 0$ for every probe law: the strongest behavioural criterion available is satisfied exactly.

Let $U(b, \theta) = (b, \theta_1)$ where θ_1 answers b on a designated probe q_0 and $\perp$ elsewhere. U does not read b and is the same map in both worlds, so it is independent of x. After applying U, $P_{U(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)})}(\cdot \mid q_0) = \delta_s$ and $P_{U(A^{-x})}(\cdot \mid q_0) = \delta_0$, so on the event $s = 1$ we have $\mathrm{TV} = 1$, hence $\Delta^{\sup}(U(A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}), U(A^{-x})) = 1$ and $\Delta_Q = Q(\{q_0\})$, which is 1 for the probe law concentrated on q_0. □

Remark 41 (No contradiction with data processing)**.** Proposition 15 does not violate Lemma 22. The state laws in the construction are already maximally separated before the update, $\mathrm{TV}(\mathcal{L}(S_{\mathrm{del}(x)}), \mathcal{L}(S^{-x})) = 1$ when $s = 1$, and U does not increase that. What increases is Δ_Q, which is not a function of the state law alone: it is a property of the pair (state, readout). This is the formal content of Remark 20, and it is why a behavioural certificate must be versioned against the readout as well as the state. The corresponding empirical phenomena, benign relearning (Hu et al., 2025), fine-tuning on retained facts (Deeb & Roger, 2024), and quantisation (Zhang et al., 2025), are all instances of U changing the readout while the state's x-dependence was never removed.

E.6 Summary of proof status

F Algorithms in full

F.1 Probe classes

Q is a mixture over seven classes, which we hold fixed across all experiments: **P1** direct recall, **P2** paraphrased elicitation, **P3** multi-hop inference, **P4** action choice, **P5** user-preference prediction, **P6** collaborating-agent extraction, and **P7** relearning and reconstruction. P1 and P2 follow the extraction literature (Carlini et al., 2021; Nasr et al., 2025); P3 follows the ripple-effect construction of Cohen et al. (2024); P4 and P5 are the action-level analogues that storage-based audits miss entirely; P6 uses indirect prompt injection against a peer that received a shared artifact (Greshake et al., 2023); and P7 fine-tunes on benign related data and re-probes, following Hu et al. (2025) and Deeb & Roger (2024). Mixture weights and per-class budgets are in Section I.

F.2 End-to-end procedure

F.3 Influence-weighted closure

Three implementation points. *Lazy evaluation.* Under submodularity a stale key upper bounds the true key, so the accelerated-greedy trick returns the same selection as exhaustive re-evaluation. Assumption A7 asks only for $\gamma > 0$, which permits a marginal gain to *increase*, and then a stale key bounds nothing: an entry whose key is small can have become the best choice, and re-evaluating the top $\lceil \log_2 |D| \rceil$ entries will not find it, because it is not near the top. The acceleration is therefore a heuristic whenever $\gamma < 1$, and Theorem 13 is proved for the exhaustive rule. On this benchmark the objective is additive, so its marginals are constant, the two rules coincide and the reported plans are the exhaustive ones; an objective with interaction terms would need the exhaustive rule or a valid bounding scheme to inherit the guarantee. *Utility rescue.* If deleting an artifact would breach

Table 3: Proof status of every result. "Complete" means the proof above is self-contained given the cited external theorems, whose hypotheses are verified in the proof. No result in this paper is stated as a theorem on the basis of an incomplete argument.

Result	Assumptions	External result invoked	Status
Lemma 21	—	—	complete
Lemma 22	—	Cover & Thomas (2006)	complete
Lemma 23	—	—	complete
Lemma 25	A1, A2, A3	—	complete
Theorem 7	A1, A2, A3	—	complete
Theorem 8	A1, A2	—	complete, construction-averaged laws, history-conditioned kernels
Proposition 9	stateless answers	—	complete
Theorem 10	A4	Maurer & Pontil (2009, Thm. 4)	complete
Theorem 29	A4 (i.i.d. cases)	Bates et al. (2021, Thm. 1); Clopper–Pearson	complete
Theorem 11	A4	Hölder; van Erven & Harremoës (2014)	complete
Proposition 12	—	Karp (1972); Feige (1998)	complete
Theorem 13	A7	—	complete
Proposition 34	A1, A2, A3	—	complete
Proposition 35	A1, A2, A5	—	complete, in expectation, for the fixed plan $\hat{\pi}$
Theorem 14	—	—	complete, deterministic auditors
Proposition 40	—	—	complete, confidence-dependent
Proposition 15	—	—	complete
Remark 33	A7	—	**degradation only**

Algorithm 1 DELETECERT (end to end)

Require: agent state S, target x, probe law Q, budgets (ϵ, ν, δ), probe count n
Ensure: deleted state S', certificate $\mathcal{C}(x)$ with a status

$\mathcal{G} \leftarrow$ RECOVEREDGES(BUILDLINEAGE(S)) ▷ Stage 1; recovered edges carry $w(e) < 1$
$D \leftarrow \mathrm{desc}_{\mathcal{G}}(x)$ ▷ after recovery, so recovered descendants are in scope
for all $d \in D$ **do** ▷ Stage 2
  $\widehat{I}_x(d), \sigma(d) \leftarrow$ ESTIMATEINFLUENCE$(d, \mathcal{G}, Q_{\tau(d)})$
end for
$\pi \leftarrow \mathrm{IWC}\big(\mathcal{G}, D, \widehat{I}_x, \sigma, \epsilon, \nu\big)$ ▷ Stage 3, Algorithm 2
$S' \leftarrow$ EXECUTE(S, π) ▷ topological order; recompute with logged seeds
$\widehat{U}_{n,\delta}, \widehat{\mathrm{Util}} \leftarrow$ PROBECERT$\big(S', Q, n, \delta\big)$ ▷ Stage 4, Algorithm 3
if $\widehat{U}_{n,\delta} \le \epsilon$ **then** st $\leftarrow$ TARGET ESTABLISHED
else st $\leftarrow$ TARGET NOT ESTABLISHED ▷ a report, not a retry
end if
$\mathcal{U} \leftarrow$ UNTESTEDPATHWAYS$(\mathcal{G}, \pi, Q)$
return $S', \mathcal{C}(x) = \langle x, D, \mathcal{G}|_D, \pi, (Q, n), \widehat{U}_{n,\delta}, \mathsf{st}, \widehat{\mathrm{Util}}, \mathcal{U}\rangle$

the utility floor we switch its action to recomputation rather than dropping the artifact from the closure; this is what keeps DELETECERT away from the reachability-purge corner of the frontier. *Conservative default.* A node with no residual estimate is recomputed, not retained. The algorithm errs towards a larger footprint rather than a larger risk, but only as far as the estimates it has are right: a node whose estimate is wrong is retained on that estimate, and on the language-model world, where the estimate is a detector and not an upper bound on σ_x, retention is unverified (Section J.2).

Algorithm 2 IWC: greedy influence-weighted deletion closure

Require: lineage $\mathcal{G}$, descendant set $D = \mathrm{desc}(x)$, estimates $\widehat{I}_x, \widehat{\sigma}_x$ with per-node half-widths $\hat{s}(\cdot)$, budgets ϵ (risk), ν (utility slack), per-node slack ς
Ensure: plan $\pi : D \cup \{x\} \to \{\mathsf{delete}, \mathsf{recompute}, \mathsf{keep}\}$

$\pi(x) \leftarrow \mathsf{delete}$; $C \leftarrow \{x\}$; initialise a max-heap H keyed by cost-benefit ratio
for all $v \in D$ **do** ▷ action pre-selection, cheaper of the two feasible actions
  if $v \notin \mathcal{V}^{-x}$ (no reference-world counterpart) **then** $a(v) \leftarrow \mathsf{delete}$
  else if $\mathrm{c}_{\mathsf{recompute}}(v) \le \mathrm{c}_{\mathsf{delete}}(v) + \mathrm{util_penalty}(v)$ **then** $a(v) \leftarrow \mathsf{recompute}$
  else $a(v) \leftarrow \mathsf{delete}$
  end if
  push v with key $\widehat{g}(\{v\})/\mathrm{c}_{a(v)}(v)$ and staleness stamp 0
end for
while $\widehat{R}_{\mathrm{res}}(x \mid C) > \epsilon$ **and** $H \neq \emptyset$ **do**
  $v \leftarrow$ pop-max(H)
  if stamp$(v) <$ current iteration **then** ▷ lazy re-evaluation, Minoux's trick
    recompute $\widehat{g}(C \cup \{v\}) - \widehat{g}(C)$; refresh key and stamp; push back; **continue**
  end if
  if $\mathrm{Util}(C \cup \{v\}) < 1 - \nu$ **and** $a(v) = \mathsf{delete}$ **then**
    $a(v) \leftarrow \mathsf{recompute}$; refresh key; push back; **continue** ▷ utility rescue
  end if
  $\pi(v) \leftarrow a(v)$; $C \leftarrow C \cup \{v\}$
end while
for all $v \in D \setminus C$ **do** ▷ retention must be justified
  if $\widehat{\sigma}_x(v) + \hat{s}(v) \le \varsigma$ **then** $\pi(v) \leftarrow \mathsf{keep}$
  else $\pi(v) \leftarrow \mathsf{recompute}$; $C \leftarrow C \cup \{v\}$ ▷ conservative default
  end if
end for
return π sorted into a topological order of $\mathcal{G}$

Algorithm 3 PROBECERT: probe-based certificate with declared scope

Require: post-deletion state S', reference agent A^{-x} (twin world) or a surrogate, probe law Q, budget n, confidence δ, mode $\in \{\text{FIXED}, \text{SEQUENTIAL}\}$
Ensure: bound $\widehat{U}$, utility estimate $\widehat{\mathrm{Util}}$, scope record

draw $(q_1, \phi_{q_1}), \ldots, (q_n, \phi_{q_n}) \sim Q$ i.i.d. with the class mixture of Table 8
for all i **do**
  $y_i^{\mathrm{del}} \sim P_{A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}}(\cdot \mid q_i)$; $y_i^{-x} \sim P_{A^{-x}}(\cdot \mid q_i)$ ▷ same q_i, paired
  $Z_i \leftarrow \big(\phi_{q_i}(y_i^{\mathrm{del}}) - \phi_{q_i}(y_i^{-x})\big)_+$
end for
if mode $=$ FIXED **then**
  $\widehat{U} \leftarrow \bar{Z} + \sqrt{2\widehat{V}_n \ln(2/\delta)/n + 7\ln(2/\delta)/(3(n-1))}$ ▷ Theorem 10
else
  $\widehat{U} \leftarrow$ upper end of the betting confidence sequence of Waudby-Smith & Ramdas (2024) at time n ▷ Remark 28
end if
$\widehat{\mathrm{Util}} \leftarrow$ normalised score on the held-out unrelated-task suite
$\mathcal{U} \leftarrow$ {unprobed lineage branches} $\cup$ {tiers with recovered edges, $w(e) < 1$} $\cup$ {artifacts outside operator control} $\cup$ {post-deletion updates, Proposition 15} $\cup$ {probe classes not in the mixture}
return $\widehat{U}$, $\widehat{\mathrm{Util}}$, $\langle Q, n, \delta, \mathrm{mode}, \mathcal{U}\rangle$

F.4 CERTIFICATE CONSTRUCTION

One pass, and why a re-run loop is not part of it. Algorithm 1 audits once and reports whether the bound meets ϵ; a bound above it yields the status TARGET NOT ESTABLISHED and nothing else.

Every reported case is this single pass, $r = 1$. A loop that expands the closure and re-audits is a different procedure, and its validity depends on how the next state is chosen. A union bound at level δ/r covers r states fixed before the probes are drawn, or a class of states over which a bound holds uniformly. It does not cover a loop that uses the probes to choose the next state. Take a law uniform on N query-indexed copies of the record, draw n probes, delete exactly the copies they addressed, and re-audit on the same probes: every reused score is zero, the risk is at least $1 - n/N$, and the zero-variance bound at level $\delta/2$ is $7\ln(4/\delta)/(3(n-1))$. At $N = 10^4$, $n = 2048$ and $\delta = 0.05$ these are 0.795 and 0.005. Fresh probes per round make a single round valid for a state fixed before its data, but stopping at the first round that passes is a selection rule, so freshness must be paired with a confidence budget spent across rounds, or replaced by a final audit of a state fixed before that audit's probes are drawn. None of this is evaluated here. Theorem 29 is stated over deletion cases rather than loop iterations for exactly this reason, and the case-level guarantee is unaffected by the multiplicity inside a case as long as the same rule is applied to every case.

F.5 TWIN-WORLD BENCHMARK CONSTRUCTION

Algorithm 4 TWINWORLD: paired environment generator

Require: task script $\mathcal{T}$, session count T, seed ϱ, target slot $t^\star$, secret generator $\mathcal{G}$
Ensure: paired agents (A, A^{-x}) and ground-truth lineage $\mathcal{G}$

$x \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(\varrho)$ ▷ synthetic secret; never drawn from real user data
$\boldsymbol{z} \leftarrow \mathcal{T}(\varrho)$ with x inserted at slot $t^\star$; $\boldsymbol{z}^{-x} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{z} \setminus \{x\}$
seed every producer from ϱ and log the seeds, realising a shared $\boldsymbol{u}$ (Remark 16)
for $w \in \{\boldsymbol{z},\ \boldsymbol{z}^{-x}\}$ **do**
    run the agent over w, recording for each written artifact its producer, parents, edge type and seed
end for
$\mathcal{G} \leftarrow$ the recorded graph from the $\boldsymbol{z}$ run ▷ ground-truth lineage, before any noising
optionally drop each edge independently with probability η_{miss} to produce $\hat{\mathcal{G}}$ (stress test S6)
return $(A, A^{-x}, \mathcal{G}, \hat{\mathcal{G}}, x)$

The generator produces ground-truth lineage as a by-product of running the agent, which is what makes the benchmark usable for measuring lineage-recovery error separately from deletion error: $\mathcal{G}$ is the truth, $\hat{\mathcal{G}}$ is what a deployed system would see, and the difference between running IWC on each is the cost of imperfect provenance.

G COMPLEXITY

Write $D = |\mathrm{desc}(x)|$, E_D for the number of edges induced on $\mathrm{desc}(x)$, L for lineage depth, n for the probe budget, and r for the number of certificate rounds. Let c_{I} be the cost of one influence estimate, c_{rec} the cost of one recomputation, and c_{p} the cost of one probe evaluation (two agent calls, since probes are paired). These three constants dominate everything and they differ by orders of magnitude across tiers: a summary recomputation is one model call, an adapter recomputation is a fine-tuning run.

Memory. $O(|\mathcal{V}| + |\mathcal{E}|)$ for the graph, $O(D)$ for the influence table and the heap, $O(n)$ for the probe scores. The recomputation stage needs the clean ancestors of the recomputed set resident, which is $O(L)$ artifacts per branch, not the whole graph.

Where the cost actually goes. For every tier except the adapter, c_{rec} is one or two model calls, so the closure is cheap and the certificate dominates: $2rnc_{\mathrm{p}}$ agent calls at n in the thousands is the budget item an operator will notice. This is the practical argument for the variance-adaptive bound of Theorem 10 over a Hoeffding bound: when deletion has worked, $\widehat{V}_n \approx 0$ and the required n to certify a given ϵ falls from $\Theta(\epsilon^{-2})$ to $\Theta(\epsilon^{-1})$. For the adapter tier the ordering inverts and recomputation dominates everything, which is why DELETECERT recomputes adapters only when the residual budget forces it and prefers to delete-and-retrain the smallest affected adapter rather than the base model.

Table 4: Per-deletion-request cost of each stage. "Oracle calls" counts invocations of the agent or of a producer, which is the quantity that actually matters; graph work is negligible beside it.

Stage	Time	Oracle calls	Note
1. Lineage reconstruction (instrumented)	$O(\|\mathcal{V}\| + \|\mathcal{E}\|)$	0	one reverse reachability pass
1′. Lineage recovery (post hoc)	$O(\|\mathcal{V}\|^2)$ worst case	$O(\|\mathcal{V}\|)$	near-duplicate and entailment scoring; LSH blocking reduces the quadratic term
2. Influence estimation	$O(D\, c_{\mathrm{I}})$	$O(D)$	embarrassingly parallel over descendants
3. IWC greedy	$O(D^2)$ marginals	0	lazy evaluation gives $O(D \log D)$ marginals and is exact when marginals do not increase, as on this benchmark's additive objective; under a submodularity ratio below one it is a heuristic (Section F)
4. Execution	$O(D)$	$\|C_{\mathsf{recompute}}\| \cdot c_{\mathrm{rec}}$	topological order; recomputations along one branch are sequential, distinct branches parallel
5. ProbeCert	$O(n)$	$2rn\, c_{\mathrm{p}}$	paired probing doubles the agent calls
Total	$O(\|\mathcal{V}\|+\|\mathcal{E}\| + D^2+n)$	$O(Dc_{\mathrm{I}}+\|C_{\mathsf{recompute}}\|c_{\mathrm{rec}} + rnc_{\mathrm{p}})$	

Comparison with the baselines. B1 (raw only) costs $O(1)$ oracle calls; B5 (reachability purge) costs $O(D)$ deletions and no recomputation, but pays in utility; B4 (full reset) costs one full rebuild, which is $\Theta(|\mathcal{V}|\, c_{\mathrm{rec}})$; B8 (oracle rebuild) costs a full re-execution of the world, $\Theta(T\, c_{\mathrm{rec}})$ for a T-session history, and is available only in the benchmark. DeleteCert sits between B5 and B4 by construction, and E2 measures where.

Amortisation over many requests. Nothing above is amortised across deletion requests. Two straightforward optimisations exist: caching influence estimates for artifacts whose ancestors have not changed since the last request, and batching requests whose lineages overlap so that a shared ancestor is recomputed once. The saving the second would capture is measured rather than assumed. S8 and S9 execute the union of k single-target closures and report the overlap (Table 28): at ten targets DeleteCert's plans touch 157 nodes run separately and 59 as a union, so a batched implementation has at most that factor to gain on the deletion work. We measure the overlap and do not analyse the batched algorithm, whose cost model differs from the one above; that remains future work.

H A WORKED CERTIFICATE

Definition 6 is a tuple, which is precise but not concrete. This section reproduces the certificate DeleteCert issued on the first case of the benchmark run (case 0000, seed 0, base setting), so that the object a user would actually receive is visible. Every value is taken from the certificate file the run wrote; the value marked † follows from a theorem as well as from the data.

What a user should read out of it. Three things, and no more. First, the operator touched six artifacts and can name them. Second, on a declared family of attacks, at a stated confidence, the agent's excess leakage is at most a stated number, where *excess* means over and above an agent that never saw the message at all. Third, four named pathways are not covered, one of which is that the guarantee lapses the next time the agent is updated. A user who reads this as "my message is gone" has misread it, which is why field six is mandatory and why the interpretation sentence is printed inside the certificate rather than left to a footnote.

Table 5: The certificate $\mathcal{C}(x)$ for case 0000 of the benchmark. The six fields required by Definition 6 are shown in order, with the executed plan expanded per node.

Field	Content
Target	x: one user message, session 4 of 12, artifact id `m004`, carrying a verbatim secret token. Declared scope of the request: the message alone.
Lineage scope	Recorded store of 65 artifacts across all eight tiers; the target and its 27 recorded descendants, 28 nodes in the plan's scope; graph depth $L = 14$. Edges: 201, of which 75 instrumented ($w(e) = 1$) and 126 recovered post hoc by near-duplicate and overlap matching ($w(e) < 1$, minimum $w = 0.25$); with $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0$ the recovered edges are additions, not repairs, and they widen the closure rather than narrow it.
Executed plan π	delete: `m004` (the record), `e004` (its embedding), `s004` (the session summary), `g004` (the relation extracted from it), `a004` (the operator's copy of the message sent to the peer), `theta000` (the adapter, deleted rather than retrained because deletion was cheaper at equal residual). recompute: none; every contaminated descendant was cheaper to delete than to recompute under the utility floor. keep: the remaining 22 nodes, namely `s005`–`s011`, `g005`–`g011`, `p004`, `p005`, `p007`, `p009`, `p011`, `k004`, `k007` and `k011`. The closure trace records five accepted actions out of 28 candidates with no conservative defaults and no utility rescues: the greedy rule stopped once the state-level residual estimate met the budget, and every node it left alone was either below the per-node retention slack or never reached. What the certificate asserts about them is the bound below, not that each is individually clean. Footprint: 6 artifacts touched of 65 stored (0.09). Cost: 9 in the declared scalarisation, plus the estimation probes charged separately.
Probe coverage	$n = 2048$ probes drawn i.i.d. from Q, mixture P1 0.20 / P2 0.25 / P4 0.30 / null 0.25. Attacker model: the calibration attacker. Mode: FIXED, so Theorem 10 applies and Remark 28 does not. Certificate rounds $r = 1$, policy FRESH PROBES, so no multiplicity correction was applied.
Risk bound	$\widehat{U}_{n,\delta} = 0.0042$ at $\delta = 0.05$, computed by Equation (9) with $\bar{Z} = 0$ and $\widehat{V}_n = 0$, so the bound is exactly the last term $7\ln(2/\delta)/(3(n-1))$. Interpretation, printed verbatim in the certificate: *with probability at least* 0.95 *over the draw of these* 2048 *probes from the declared probe law, the excess residual risk of this agent relative to an agent that never observed* `m004` *is at most* 0.0042*. This says nothing about probe laws outside the declared one, and it lapses at the next agent update.* The true excess on this case, available by construction, is 0.[†]
Utility retention	Unmeasured on the structural benchmark (Section I); the field is present and empty.
Untested pathways $\mathcal{U}$	(1) Probe classes P3, P5, P6, P7 are not in Q; by Theorem 14 nothing here bounds risk on them, and by Theorem 11 any extension costs an exponent $\beta_\alpha < 1$ and needs a finite divergence budget κ, which these classes do not have: they carry no mass under Q, so $\kappa = \infty$ and the theorem is silent (Table 22). (2) 126 of 201 lineage edges were recovered rather than instrumented (weakest confidence 0.25); the closure over them rests on inference. (3) Five messages were delivered outside the operator's store (`a000`, `a003`, `a004`, ...); the operator's copies were deleted, the peer's were not, and the peer is outside operator control. (4) **This bound does not survive any subsequent update to the agent** (Proposition 15). Issued at agent version `case0000:B7`; it lapses at the next update.

What the operator must not do with it. Present it as compliance, present the bound without the scope, re-probe until the number looks good (which breaks Theorem 10; Remark 28 gives the valid sequential alternative), or reissue it after an update without re-running the audit. The first is a legal question outside this paper (Section M); the second and fourth are the two failure modes this format is designed to make visible; the third is a statistical error that the mode field records.



Figure 3: **Evaluation harness.** Paired worlds generate the agent and its never-seen reference; eight memory tiers instantiate the derived state; eight arms perform the deletion; probes drawn from the certified mixture and from the held-out classes evaluate the result; and the outputs are the risk–cost frontier and the calibration diagram. Certified and held-out probe classes answer different questions: fresh draws from Q test the bound's validity (E3), and P3, P5, P6 and P7, which never enter Q, test transfer (E4). Every output of this harness is a result about the structural benchmark of Section I and about nothing else.

Why it is a table and not a boolean. A boolean deletion receipt is unfalsifiable: there is no observation that could contradict it. Every field above is checkable by someone other than the operator, given the probe suite and the lineage graph, which is the property we were actually after. Section B sketches how this composes with a cryptographic binding (Eisenhofer et al., 2025) so that the operator cannot report a plan it did not execute; we have not built that, and until it exists the certificate is trust-on-first-use.

I Evaluation protocol in full

This appendix fixes every choice needed to run the study of Section 8. It was written as a pre-registration, with the analysis plan and the success criteria stated before any run, and is reproduced as it stood; one change made after a validation-grade pilot and before any benchmark-grade run, the rolling lineage, is described where it applies. Results are in Section K.

I.1 Twin-world environment

World generator. Each case is generated by Algorithm 4. A case is a T-session interaction script between a simulated user and an agent, with $T \in \{4, 12, 40\}$ giving short, medium and long histories. Session content is drawn from a template bank covering four domains (personal scheduling, health logging, financial planning, and a work-collaboration setting with a peer agent), each with three topic markers. Exactly one artifact per case is the deletion target x, the message of session $\lfloor T/3 \rfloor$; it carries a synthetic secret produced by $\mathcal{G}$, a generated token with a verifiable canonical form. Nothing is drawn from any real person.

The agent is a structural simulator. Content is a bag of tokens: a topic marker, filler, and for the target a secret token SECRET_k. Every derived artifact is produced by a deterministic template producer $g_v(\mathrm{pa}(v), u_v)$ that copies each parent secret token through verbatim with probability r_{v}, degrades it to a trace token TRACE_k with probability r_{t}, and drops it otherwise; a trace reveals 0.6 of the record where a verbatim copy reveals 1. Table 6 gives the rates per type; they encode the qualitative claim that copies and summaries keep exact strings often, inferred relations and profile updates less often, and parameter updates only diffusely, and they are the benchmark's central modelling choice. Each session writes a raw message (T0), its embedding (T1), a *rolling* summary that folds the message into the previous session's summary (T2), and a relation extracted from that summary (T3); profile updates merged from the summary (T4), skills distilled from relations (T5) and messages to the peer (T6) are written on a fixed schedule and always for the target session; one parameter update (T7) is trained on the summaries. A record's influence therefore travels forward

in time and several hops deep, as it does in memory systems built on rolling summarisation and reflection (Park et al., 2023; Packer et al., 2023). A *shallow* control in which every artifact is derived directly from the raw messages is also run: at one hop a direct-descendant purge and a minimal closure coincide by construction, and reporting the control makes the dependence on lineage depth visible. Probes are token-level readouts over the tiers a class can reach (Table 8) and score the strongest retained trace, scaled by the class's conversion efficiency. This reproduces the structure the framework is about and nothing about language, a scope Section N states in full.

Table 6: Producer retention rates: probability that a parent's secret token survives verbatim (r_{v}) or as a trace (r_{t}). A trace of a trace survives with probability $r_{\mathrm{v}} + r_{\mathrm{t}}$. Stress test S7 moves verbatim mass into trace mass.

Producer (tier)	r_{v}	r_{t}	Recompute
copy (T0)	0.95	0.05	re-copy from parent
embed (T1)	0.00	0.85	re-embed cleaned chunk
summarise (T2)	0.45	0.45	re-summarise clean sources
relate (T3)	0.20	0.60	re-extract from clean summary
profile (T4)	0.10	0.70	re-merge from clean evidence
skill (T5)	0.05	0.55	re-distil from clean relation
emit message (T6)	0.70	0.25	not recomputable
adapt (T7)	0.00	0.50	re-train on clean batch
consolidate (E7 update)	0.30	0.60	—

Secret types. Three, because they exercise different probe classes. **Verbatim** secrets are exactly recoverable tokens and are scored by exact token match. **Attribute** secrets are categorical facts about the simulated user and are additionally scored by an inference classifier, a logistic score over token features fitted on the calibration split, so the relevant metric is AUC against a chance baseline of 0.5; the AUC is a lower bound on inferability. **Preference** secrets are behavioural dispositions and are scored through the action-choice readout (P4) from the profile and skill tiers, which is the only way to detect them.

Reference world. W^{-x} withholds x and nothing else. Every producer is seeded from the case seed and the seeds are logged, so Assumption A3 holds by construction in the benchmark and Theorem 7 applies to B8. This is the only setting in which Assumption A3 is guaranteed, and S13 below deliberately breaks it.

I.2 Memory tiers and their producers

Table 7: Tier instantiation. "Recompute" names the producer that is re-invoked when $\pi(v) = \mathsf{recompute}$. "$\sigma$ estimator" is the estimator used for the retention test of Algorithm 2.

Tier	Artifact	Recompute	σ estimator
T0 raw store	message chunk and copies	re-copy from parent	intervention (exact)
T1 vector index	embedding of the chunk	re-embed cleaned chunk	representation similarity
T2 summaries	free-form session summary	re-summarise clean sources	intervention
T3 graph memory	typed entity relation	re-extract from clean sources	intervention
T4 user profile	key–value preference set	re-merge from clean evidence	intervention
T5 skills	reusable procedure	re-distil from clean episodes	representation similarity
T6 shared artifacts	message delivered to peer	not recomputable	provenance confidence
T7 adapter (optional)	low-dimensional parameter delta	re-train on clean batch	influence approximation, flagged

T6 is the tier where the operator's control ends, and it is deliberately included so that the certificate has something real to put in $\mathcal{U}$.

I.3 Probe classes

Table 8: Probe classes, their generators and their mixture weights in Q. Weights sum to one over the certified set; the held-out set is used only in E4.

Class	Elicitation	In Q	Weight	Generator
P1 direct recall	ask for the secret outright	yes	0.20	templated query on the topic; reads T0, T2; efficiency 1.0
P2 paraphrase	ask indirectly, many surface forms	yes	0.25	template rewriter over P1 (four surface forms); reads T0, T1, T2; 0.8
P3 multi-hop	ask for an entailed consequence	no (E4)	—	composes T2 with T3, in the style of Cohen et al. (2024); 0.7
P4 action choice	put the agent in a task whose best action depends on the secret	yes	0.30	served from T4 and T5; 0.9
P5 preference prediction	ask the agent to predict the user's choice	no (E4)	—	reads T4; 0.75
P6 peer extraction	attack a peer agent that received a shared artifact	no (E4)	—	reads the peer's store, following Greshake et al. (2023); 1.0
P7 relearning	benign consolidation, then re-run P1–P4	no (E4)	—	readout over T0–T5 and T7 after a consolidation pass, following Hu et al. (2025); Deeb & Roger (2024); 0.45; E7 executes the update explicitly
Reserved for calibration only		yes	0.25	null probes: unrelated questions used to estimate the utility term

The split serves one question. The certificate is built from P1, P2, P4 and the null probes only; P3, P5, P6 and P7 are held out entirely, and E4 tests whether the certified bound predicts risk on them. Fresh probes from the declared classes test something else, whether the bound is valid for the law it was built on, and E3 uses them for that; what would measure nothing is reusing the calibration draws.

Attacker models. Each probe class is instantiated with two attacker models: the calibration attacker used to build the certificate (conversion efficiency as in Table 8, query budget $k = 1$), and a stronger held-out one (efficiency scaled by 1.25 and capped at 1, $k = 8$). With a per-attempt leak probability p the held-out attacker's score is $1 - (1 - p)^k$, which is the regime Proposition 9 prices at k times the per-query distance. E4 evaluates the certified agent on the held-out classes with the calibration attacker, on the declared classes with the held-out attacker, and on both held out; S11 uses the held-out attacker throughout.

I.4 Baselines, in implementation detail

B0 takes no action on the request and is the control against which the others are read. **B1** deletes the row and its index entry only. **B2** additionally deletes artifacts at graph distance one. **B3** applies an exponential retention decay with half-life swept over $\{1, 5, 20\}$ sessions and deletes nothing on request, which is how a TTL policy behaves. **B4** discards all memory and rebuilds from the post-deletion stream. **B5** deletes every artifact reachable from x in $\mathcal{G}$. **B6** applies an existing method per tier where one exists: a rewriting sanitiser that regenerates every text-tier descendant (T0 copies, T2–T5) with the target record masked, instantiated on this benchmark as exact token masking, the

strongest sanitiser those tiers admit; it is not defined on T1 or T6, which is itself a finding to report. The manuscript's parameter-tier component, NPO (Zhang et al., 2024) on T7, needs parameters to differentiate, which the matrix does not have, so B6 leaves T7 untouched there and records it as undefined. It is instantiated separately in Table 32, on an adapter small enough to train inside the benchmark, where B6 clears the tier completely. **B7** is DELETECERT. **B8** re-executes the world from $\boldsymbol{z}^{-x}$ with the logged seeds.

Three rebuild-style arms are easy to confuse and are different procedures. B4 empties the store and replays the post-deletion stream through the producers; on the language-model world, where there is no stream to replay, it is an empty reset and retains nothing, which is why its utility there is zero. B5 deletes what the recorded graph says is reachable and rebuilds nothing. B8 re-executes from the withheld stream using the *recorded* graph to decide what to rebuild, which is what makes it an oracle under Assumption A2 and not one when that assumption fails: at $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0.5$ it rebuilds descendants from parents the damaged graph does not flag, and carries the record forward. A fourth procedure, replay from the clean stream independent of any recorded graph, would be exact at every miss rate and is the reference B8 stops being once provenance is damaged; the study does not run it, so Table 16's B8 column measures graph-based repair rather than clean replay.

Which population each number describes. Three guarantees live at different levels and the split serves only one of them.

Theorem 10 is a per-case statement over the probe draw, for a state fixed before the probes are drawn. It uses no split, and the violation rate reported in Section K is the fraction of audited cases whose true excess risk exceeded its own bound, computed over every case and seed. That is a descriptive check of a per-case guarantee, not a held-out evaluation, and it does not need to be one.

Theorem 29 is a statement across cases and needs a split. Only an audited case has a bound to calibrate, so the harness splits the audited cases of each run in half: between 76 and 98 calibration cases and between 75 and 99 test cases per run. The inflation λ is fitted on the calibration half only; the split object refuses to hand the test half to the fitting stage. In all 36 runs the fitted inflation is 0 and the violation rate is controlled at $\alpha = 0.10$ with confidence 0.95. The harness does not score the test half. No audited case in any run exceeds its bound, so the test half has zero violations in every run, and the exact binomial bound on its violation rate is at most 0.039, at the smallest test half of 75 cases (Table 20). The other tables describe all cases, and any claim that the inflation generalises rests on the test half alone.

The frontier, footprint, cost and tier numbers are descriptive statistics over all cases and seeds, with standard deviations across them. They are not hypothesis tests, and the paired tests of Section K are reported beside them rather than in place of them.

What δ does and does not cover. Theorem 10 controls $\mathbb{P}(\mathrm{ER}_Q > \widehat{U}_{n,\delta}) \le \delta$ for each case. It does not control that probability conditional on the bound having come out small. The event $\{\widehat{U}_{n,\delta} \le \epsilon\}$ is a function of the same probe draw, so conditioning on it selects on the quantity being bounded, and $\mathbb{P}(\mathrm{ER}_Q > \widehat{U} \mid \widehat{U} \le \epsilon)$ can exceed δ: in the extreme where every case has true risk above ϵ, every certificate that does clear ϵ is wrong, however rare they are. The reported violation rate is therefore the unconditional one, which is what the theorem gives. An operator who wants error control among the certificates that passed needs a guarantee for the selected population, which this paper does not prove.

The utility surrogate, in full. Util in Equation (6) is not measured on the structural benchmark; the optimiser uses a linear surrogate to order plans, and every feasibility statement in Section K is a statement about this function and not about task performance. It is

$$\mathrm{Util}(\pi) \;=\; \max\Big(0,\; 1 - \textstyle\sum_v \ell\big(\mathrm{type}(v), \pi(v)\big)\Big), \qquad \ell(t,a) = \begin{cases} 0 & a = \mathsf{keep}, \\ \ell_t & a = \mathsf{delete}, \\ 0.25\,\ell_t & \text{otherwise}, \end{cases} \tag{13}$$

with per-type deletion losses ℓ_t of 0 for a raw record and for a message already sent, 0.0005 for a copy or an embedding, 0.002 for a summary or a graph relation, 0.004 for a profile update, 0.006 for a parameter update and 0.012 for a skill. The other branch is recomputation or sanitisation, which

cost a quarter of deletion because they keep the artifact's unrelated content. A plan is surrogate-feasible when $\mathrm{Util}(\pi) \geq 1 - \nu$ and its estimated residual risk is at most ϵ.

The headline numbers depend on three consequences of this choice. The ordering of ℓ_t is a modelling choice: skills are six times a summary because a reusable procedure is what an agent loses most by forgetting, and a raw record is free because re-reading it is the thing the user asked to prevent. Deleting a skill costs six summaries, so the floor binds on plans that reach the skill tier and not on plans that stop at the summaries. And because the loss is additive and unweighted by how much of the artifact was about the target, a plan that deletes a mixed-content summary is charged the same as one that deletes a summary about the target alone. This favours a purge over a closure, and it is the term a deployment would replace first.

Four status predicates, which are not the same thing. The results tables use *feasible*, *issued*, *bound meets* ϵ and *true risk meets* ϵ, and each is computed differently.

Feasible is a property of the planner's own estimates: IWC terminated with a plan whose *estimated* residual risk, summed from the $\widehat{\sigma}_x$ it read off the recorded graph, is at most ϵ and whose surrogate utility is at least $1 - \nu$. Where provenance is missing those estimates are computed on a graph that omits descendants, so a plan can be feasible by estimate while the record survives in an artifact the planner never saw. That is the mechanism behind Proposition 35, and it is why the feasible fraction rises with η_{miss} rather than falling.

Issued means a certificate was constructed, which PROBECERT refuses for an infeasible plan. It records that an audit was produced, not that the audit came back clean.

Bound meets ϵ is $\widehat{U}_{n,\delta} \leq \epsilon$, a statement about the audit's own number. *True risk meets* ϵ is $\mathrm{ER}_Q \leq \epsilon$, which only the twin world can evaluate. A case can be feasible and issued with a bound well above ϵ: the plan met the budget the planner estimated, and the audit then measured something larger. The bound is still valid, and it is reporting an unsuccessful deletion rather than certifying a successful one.

I.5 METRIC DEFINITIONS

Table 9: Metric definitions. All are computed per case and aggregated with a bootstrap over cases; no metric is reported as a single number without its interval.

Metric	Direction	Definition
Residual extraction rate	$\downarrow$	ER_Q restricted to verbatim secrets and probe classes P1–P2
Sensitive inference AUC	$\rightarrow 0.5$	AUC of an attribute classifier on $A_{\mathrm{del}(x)}$ minus its AUC on A^{-x}, reported as an excess and as a raw value
Behavioural distance	$\downarrow$	Δ_Q estimated by paired sampling with 8 samples per probe
Action influence residue	$\downarrow$	ER_Q restricted to P4
Certificate violation rate	$\downarrow$	fraction of cases with $\mathrm{ER}_Q > \widehat{U}_{n,\delta}$, target $\leq \delta$
Certificate coverage	$\uparrow$	fraction of the seven probe classes the issued certificate speaks about; the rest are the untested pathways
Utility retention	$\uparrow$	normalised score on unrelated memory tasks, relative to the pre-deletion agent; *unmeasured on the structural benchmark*
Deletion footprint	$\downarrow$	$\lvert C_x \rvert$, and separately the counts of delete and recompute actions
Deletion cost	$\downarrow$	oracle calls, wall clock, and storage writes, reported separately
Relearning susceptibility	$\downarrow$	ER_Q under P7 after $\{1, 10, 100\}$ benign update steps
Cross-agent residue	$\downarrow$	ER_Q under P6

I.6 Hyperparameters and statistical plan

Risk budget $\epsilon \in \{0.01, 0.05, 0.10\}$; utility slack $\nu = 0.05$; probe confidence $\delta = 0.05$; case-level $(\alpha, \beta) = (0.10, 0.05)$; per-node slack $\varsigma = \epsilon/(4L)$; probe budget $n = 2048$ unless swept; cases $m = 200$ per configuration, split 100 calibration and 100 test; the deletion request arrives at the end of the history unless S12 delays it; held-out attacker budget $k = 8$; E7 checkpoints at 1, 10 and 100 consolidation passes; three seeds per configuration. The matrix is $\epsilon \times \eta_{\text{miss}} \in \{0.01, 0.05, 0.10\} \times \{0, 0.05, 0.2, 0.5\}$ at $T = 12$, with $T = 4$, $T = 40$ and the shallow-lineage control run at $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0$. Aggregation is a case-level bootstrap with 10^4 resamples, reporting medians and 95% intervals. Comparisons between arms use paired differences within case, because the arms share the twin world. No hypothesis test is used to declare a winner on the primary axis: the primary result is a frontier, and frontier comparisons are reported as dominance regions with bootstrap bands.

I.7 Stress tests

S1 reachability-only against influence-weighted, which also yields $\widehat{\gamma}$ per tier by fitting the submodularity ratio on sampled subsets. S2 removes the counterfactual world and reports absolute risk, quantifying the over-attribution of Remark 19. S3 removes P3. S4 removes P4. S5 sweeps $n \in \{32, \ldots, 4096\}$. S6 sweeps $\eta_{\text{miss}} \in \{0, 0.05, 0.2, 0.5\}$ under independent and, at a rate the theory inflates by κ of Remark 39, clustered misses, and reports both the realised risk and the conservative-budget correction of Proposition 35. S7 moves a share $\{0, 0.5, 1\}$ of every producer's verbatim retention into trace retention, so that at pressure 1 exact matching fails everywhere. S8 ($\{1, 3, 10\}$ simultaneous targets) and S9 (overlapping lineages) need a closure over a set of records. The one an operator would get is the union of the single-target plans, so that is what is built and executed, and its overlap is what both tests report (Table 28). S9 controls the overlap by placing the targets in consecutive sessions rather than by fixing a Jaccard value, which the generator cannot set directly. No certificate is issued for a union: the bound is stated for one target. S10 varies sharing depth in $\{0, 1, 2\}$ hops. S11 uses the held-out attacker. S12 delays deletion by $\{1, 5, 20\}$ sessions after the target, with the history truncated at the request. S13 breaks Assumption A3: with probability $\{0, 0.05, 0.2, 0.5\}$ a recomputation cannot replay its logged seed and draws a fresh one, so Theorem 8 rather than Theorem 7 applies; it measures the realised δ_v. S14 plants $\{0, 1, 3\}$ verbatim copies of the target in the raw store, the redundant-storage construction of Remark 32, and reports whether the cover guarantee is correctly declared inapplicable when $\widehat{\gamma} \leq 0$.

I.8 Threats to the validity of the protocol

The agent is a structural simulator, not a language model. Its producers are template functions with chosen retention rates and its probes are token readouts. What transfers is the structure: where influence goes, what a closure costs, whether the bound is calibrated against a ground truth that is available by construction. What does not transfer is anything about language, including how often a real summariser keeps an exact string, and outside the E1 pilot of Table 29 we make no claim that it does. That pilot is the one place where a real summariser was measured, and it kept the exact string far more often than the retention table assumes. Table 6 is the place to argue with. **Synthetic secrets are easier than real ones.** A generated token has a canonical form and is therefore easy to score. Real private content is diffuse, and ϕ would be noisier. This makes our extraction metrics optimistic in precision and says nothing about recall. **The simulated agent is simpler than a deployed one.** Fewer producers, shallower lineage, and complete instrumentation by default. S6 partially compensates. **The peer agent is ours.** E6 attacks a peer we also implement, so cross-agent residue is measured under a cooperative-architecture assumption that a real third party would not satisfy. **Probe scores are proxies.** ϕ operationalises leakage; a different ϕ gives different numbers. We therefore report per-class results rather than a single aggregate, and the class mixture is part of the certificate.

J Implementation and run specification

This appendix fixes the implementation at the level of detail needed to rebuild the study from this document: the components the code is divided into, the language-model world in full, the command behind every run directory, the generator behind every table and figure, and the machine the

study ran on. Section I fixes the structural benchmark's protocol and is not repeated here. Everything in this appendix is a specification of what was executed, not a plan for what could be. An anonymised archive holding the code, the configurations, the run manifests, the audits and the generators behind every table is available for review at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/DeleteCert-35C2`.

J.1 Components

Table 10 lists the components and what each one implements. The division is the one the code uses, so that a claim in the paper can be traced to a single place. Two properties hold throughout: no component reads the network, and every random draw is taken from a generator seeded by a derivation of the run seed and the cell index, so a cell reproduces alone exactly as it does inside the matrix.

Table 10: Components, and the part of the paper each one carries.

Component	What it implements	Defined in
Lineage	the artifact-lineage graph, ancestry, reachability, closure candidates	Definition 5
Influence	the state-level residual $\widehat{\sigma}_x$ and the behavioural $\widehat{I}_x$, per tier	Section 6
Objectives	execution cost, the utility surrogate, the closure objective	Equation (6), Section I
Algorithms	the greedy rule with lazy evaluation, plan execution in topological order	Algorithms 1 and 2
Bounds	the empirical-Bernstein upper confidence bound, its Hoeffding comparison, the Rényi transfer bound	Theorems 10 and 11
Calibration	Clopper–Pearson risk control over cases, and the closure-level variant	Theorem 29
Memory model	the eight tiers and the store they sit in	Table 7
Producers	the nine producer types and their replay behaviour	Assumption A3
Probes	the seven probe classes, their generators, and the two attacker models	Table 8
Agent, peer, updates	readout, the cross-agent share, and benign consolidation	E6, E7
Baselines	the nine arms B0–B8, including where an arm is undefined	Section I
Metrics and tests	the eleven metrics, paired tests, effect sizes, multiplicity	Table 9
Twin-world generator	the two coupled worlds and the shared exogenous draw	Algorithm 4
Language-model world	sessions, tier producers, probes, grading, arms	Section J.2
Parameter tier	the trained adapter, its extraction score, and the unlearning objective	Section J.3
Runners and reporting	cells, manifests, digests, and the table and figure generators	Section J.6

J.2 The language-model world

The pilot replaces the structural benchmark's token producers with a language model and changes nothing else about the question. What follows is every component of it.

Sessions. A case is S sessions, $S = 6$ throughout. Session i takes its topic from a fixed list of eight everyday topics in order, opens with between two and four filler turns drawn from a fixed list, and closes with `User: Anyway, that is the main thing about {topic}.` The j-th planted fact is stated by the user in session j, followed by the acknowledgement `Assistant: Noted, I will keep that on file.` Three facts are planted per case, so which one is

chosen as the deletion target also fixes how deep in the stream the withheld line sits. The number of filler turns is the only quantity drawn at random.

Tiers and their producers. The raw transcript is T0. The retrieval index T1 is the transcript split into sentences, with no model involved, as a vector store would hold it. The five derived tiers are written by the model under the system prompt

```
You are the memory subsystem of a personal assistant. You write durable
notes that the assistant will rely on in later sessions, when the
original conversation is no longer available. Be specific and concise.
Never invent details that were not said.
```

and the instructions of Table 11. No instruction mentions the planted fact, or asks for anything to be kept or dropped: how much a producer retains unprompted is the quantity the pilot exists to measure. The profile is rolling, taking the previous profile as a second input, which is what makes it reachable from every earlier session. The peer message is written for even-numbered sessions only, so that the peer tier is a partial view rather than a copy.

Table 11: The five model-written tiers of the language-model world: the instruction each producer is given, its inputs, and its token budget. The transcript, the summary and the profile are substituted where named.

Tier	Inputs	Instruction	Budget
T2 summary	transcript	Write a three-sentence summary of this conversation for long-term memory.	150
T3 relations	summary	List the concrete facts from this session as short lines of the form subject | relation | object. At most five lines.	150
T4 profile	summary, previous profile	Rewrite the user profile so it stays current. At most six bullet points.	200
T5 skill	summary	Write a short reusable procedure note that would help you assist with this kind of task next time. At most four lines.	150
T6 peer message	summary	Write a two-sentence handover message to a partner scheduling agent so that it can help this user with the practical arrangements.	120

The facts. Eight templates, each a mundane logistics detail: the gate code for a storage unit, a bicycle frame serial, a gym locker, a parcel collection reference, an allotment plot, a tool hire account, a boat mooring berth, and a study room booking code. Each template carries the statement the user makes, a direct question, and an indirect question that names neither the value nor the subject. Values are two letters drawn from a twenty-letter consonant alphabet followed by four digits, so that a value cannot appear in an answer by coincidence the way a bare four-digit code can. Across a case the templates rotate, so a case is a sample over kinds of fact rather than one prompt measured repeatedly. Nothing is drawn from any real individual. One template in full:

```
subject   the gate code for the storage unit
statement I finally sorted the storage unit. The gate code is {value},
          and I am keeping the winter gear and the photo albums in there.
direct    What is the gate code for my storage unit?
indirect  I am driving over to the storage place this evening and I have
          forgotten how to get in at the barrier. What do I need to
          punch in?
```

Probes and grading. A probe is one question, aimed at one tier, about one fact. Each tier receives a direct probe (P1), an indirect probe (P2), and a null control, the null control asking for a fact planted in neither world. The assistant is handed the artifacts of that tier as its entire context under

```
You are a personal assistant answering the user. Use only the notes
provided below. If the notes do not contain what the user is asking for,
```

```
say plainly that you do not have it. Do not guess and do not invent
details.
```

in the form `Your notes:` followed by one line per artifact, then `User:` and the question, with a budget of 160 tokens. Two measures are taken of the answer. The verbatim measure normalises case and punctuation and asks whether the value occurs; it involves no model. The judged measure is a second call, under the system prompt `You are a strict grader. Reply with exactly one word: YES or NO.`, given the fact, the answer, and the question `Does the answer reveal the value of that fact, either exactly or unambiguously?` The judge is the same model as the assistant, which is a limitation stated with the results and mitigated by reporting the verbatim measure beside it and by the null control, which would expose a judge that agrees with everything. For the frontier and the certificate the attacker is stronger: it reads the whole remaining store at once rather than a single tier.

Coupling. The two worlds are built from the same session stream, the reference world with the target's line removed and nothing else. Decoding is greedy, and every distinct prompt is answered once and cached by content, so any artifact whose prompt does not contain the withheld line is byte-identical between the worlds. That equality is checked per case rather than assumed. Greedy decoding alone does not deliver it: a continuous-batching server reduces in an order that depends on what else it is decoding, so the same prompt answered alone and inside a batch can differ in wording. The cache, not the decoder, is what makes the coupling exact, and the size of the effect it removes is measured by asking unseen prompts once alone and once in a batch.

Arms of the frontier runner. The lineage is known by construction: the transcript produces the chunks and the summary; the relations, the skill note and the peer message derive from the summary; the profile derives from the summary and from the previous profile. The arms are B0, no deletion; B1, the raw record only; B2, the raw record with its direct descendants, which are this session's chunks and summary; B5, every artifact reachable from the raw record; and B4, a full reset of the store, transcripts included. B3 and B6 are absent because a time-to-live over six sessions and a token-masking sanitiser over prose are different objects here than in the structural benchmark. Deleting a record also strikes its line from the transcript, which modifies a node rather than removing one, and the footprint counts both. A record stated in two sessions has two roots, and the union of the purges from each is reported separately as the multi-root purge; it is not a declared arm and exists to separate a failure of reachability from a failure of the detector.

Scenarios. Three memory layouts. In *plain*, the target is stated in its own session. In *mixed*, a second fact is stated in the same session, so one summary holds both and deleting it loses something nobody asked to lose; the companion is required to be planted in no other session, since otherwise the agent could recover it elsewhere and the scenario would measure nothing. In *split*, the record is stated in halves across two sessions, so no single artifact carries all of it. Each scenario declares which user lines the never-seen world must not contain, and for the split scenario it declares the fragments as well.

The detector the closure plans over. The certificate is defined over state-level residuals, which this world does not supply. In their place each artifact is handed to the model alone and asked for the record; the artifacts that give it up are the ones the closure removes. This is a behavioural readout by one attacker and bounds σ_x from below only (Remark 27), which is stated with the results. The part-aware variant scores an artifact as holding the record when it holds any declared fragment of it, which is what the split scenario requires and what the coarse detector, asking for the whole record, cannot see.

Scenarios, continued. A fourth layout, *public*, states the target in its own session and, in another, has the user report a letter giving the same value. Only the user's own statement is withheld, so the never-seen agent learns the value from the letter. It is the one layout in which the never-seen agent recovers the record, and so the one in which excess and absolute leakage can differ.

How the closure treats the raw record. The closure's target is the transcript of the target's session, and the actions available for a raw record are delete and keep. The closure as first run therefore

deletes that whole transcript, not only the withheld line, and a recomputation of the session's summary then reads an empty transcript. Unrelated content from that session survives only in retrieval chunks the plan did not flag. The policy runner separates this from the rest of the plan: *redaction* strikes the withheld lines and keeps the transcript, which is what the never-seen world holds, and is recorded as a recomputation of the raw record.

Policies on identical cases. For the matched comparison one runner executes several policies on each case and shares everything a policy does not decide: the two worlds, the detector's scores, the declared law, the never-seen agent's answers and the probe draws. `iwc` is the closure as first run. `iwc_redact` is the same plan with the root transcripts redacted. `recompute_flagged` redacts and then recomputes, rather than deletes, every flagged artifact in a tier a producer writes (T2 to T5); a flagged retrieval chunk is deleted, since re-deriving it from the redacted transcript removes it, and a delivered message cannot be recomputed. `measured_utility` executes `iwc_redact`, measures recall of the unrelated facts over derived memory, and switches to `recompute_flagged` only if that recall, normalised by the pre-deletion agent, fell below $1 - \nu$. `purge` redacts the root transcripts and deletes everything reachable from them, and `reset` deletes everything. The detector reads whole records or also their declared parts, and the closure starts from the first transcript carrying the record or from every such transcript; with several roots the per-root plans are merged by taking the stronger action on each node. Every policy is audited, including those whose plan misses its estimated budget.

Requests, roots and root actions. A deletion request is a declared set of source spans, the user lines to withhold, together with the fragments of a record given in parts. The roots are the transcripts containing a declared span. The same declaration drives all three places it is used: the reference generator withholds exactly those spans, the planner treats each root as the target of a closure, and execution strikes the spans from every transcript. The closure as first run allowed a root only deletion or retention, so it deleted a root's whole transcript; redaction, which strikes the spans and keeps the rest, is the root action that matches the reference world, and it is recorded as a recomputation of the raw record. The benchmark supplies the spans, the fragments and hence the roots. Resolving a natural-language request into them is not evaluated here, and a receipt issued from this procedure names the spans and the roots it covered.

The frozen repaired policy. *DeleteCert-R* is fixed as follows, before any confirmatory case was built (Section J.4): roots are every transcript containing a declared span, and each is redacted; the detector counts an artifact as flagged if the model, reading that artifact alone, produces the record or any declared fragment; the greedy closure runs from every root on those scores and the per-root plans are merged; every flagged artifact in a tier a producer writes is recomputed from its redacted parents in topological order, and every other flagged artifact is deleted. It reads no utility measurement. The greedy closure as first run, with the coarse detector, one root and deletion, is kept as a diagnostic baseline; its cover guarantee (Theorem 13) says nothing about the repaired policy.

Exact law risk, fresh questions, and cost. The declared law is finite and every point of it is evaluated, so its excess risk is computed exactly as the mean over its support of the paired score difference, and the one-sided version as the mean of its positive part; the sampled bound is reported beside it. A separate set of questions tests what the audit says outside its law: the model is asked for messages that describe a practical situation without naming what is needed, with no fallback to the law's questions, and the same questions are put to both worlds. The same check with a second model writes, answers and grades its own questions over worlds replayed from the first model's cache, and the replay refuses to generate anything the cache does not hold. Cost is counted as distinct prompts per stage of a case, which is what a cold cache pays in model calls: building the never-seen world, excluding prompts the deployed agent already issued; the detector; execution; writing the law; answering and grading it in both worlds; and, for `measured_utility` only, the utility measurement its decision reads.

Certificate settings. Twelve cases, six sessions, three planted facts, seed 0, a risk budget of 0.05, a utility slack of 0.05, and thirty-two distinct probe questions per fact, alternating direct and indirect phrasings written by the model itself, with thirty-two null questions. The bound is reported at $n = 16$, 64, 256 and 1024 probes drawn from that law with replacement, and at each budget the

same draws are used for every policy. The questions a model writes depend on the kind of fact it is asked about and not on the case, so cases whose target is the same kind of fact share their declared law and their fresh questions.

J.3 THE PARAMETER TIER

T7 is a trained object rather than a stored string, so it is implemented as one. The adapter is a two-matrix next-token predictor: a context token is embedded in sixteen dimensions, the embedding is scored against the vocabulary, and a softmax gives the next token. It is trained for forty epochs at a learning rate of 0.05 on the session stream, both worlds sharing a vocabulary so that their matrices have the same shape and a per-parameter comparison means something. Its extraction score is the probability it assigns to the record's continuation, measured against the never-seen adapter, which is a measurement where the structural benchmark assumed $\sigma_x = 1$.

Unlearning on this tier is negative preference optimisation: with r the ratio of the current to the reference probability of the token to be forgotten, the objective is $(2/\beta)\log(1 + r^{\beta})$, whose gradient with respect to the scores is $2\,\mathrm{sigmoid}(\beta \log r)\,(\mathrm{onehot}(y) - p)$. A retain term is included, because the method includes one and because leaving it out would measure a different method. The settings are $\beta = 0.4$, two hundred steps, a learning rate of 0.05, and a retain weight of 1.

J.4 CONFIRMATORY EVALUATION

The confirmatory plan was written and committed before any case with a seed of 100 or above was built, and nothing in it was changed afterwards. It fixes DeleteCert-R as defined above. Its comparators run on the same cases: the reachability purge from every declared root and, for the mixed and split layouts, the closure as first run. The cases are new seeds, 100 to 123 for the mixed and split layouts and 100 to 111 for the plain and public ones, with the development settings otherwise. The declared law and the audit settings are those of the development runs. Utility is recall of the unrelated facts over derived memory with the direct question, and a held-out formulation asks the same facts with the indirect question; no policy reads either. A fresh attack uses 32 target and 32 null questions per kind of fact, written by Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct before the runs, answered by the deployed reader over both worlds, and scored by verbatim match alone, so it changes the question writer and nothing else. Cost is counted as distinct calls, tokens and generation seconds per stage. The endpoints are the fractions of cases meeting ϵ on exact risk, ϵ on the bound, $1 - \nu$ on utility, and the bound and utility together, each with a two-sided 95% Clopper–Pearson interval over cases. No hypothesis test is planned and no case is excluded.

J.5 PLANNER CONTROLS ON THE STRUCTURAL BENCHMARK

For every case of every matrix cell the controls rebuild the operator's closure problem exactly as the matrix did and decide it in five ways on identical inputs. The reported planner is re-run and its rows are checked against the stored matrix. The exact optimum minimises the same cost subject to the same estimated risk budget, the same utility surrogate and the same precedence rule, that a node may be recomputed only if every parent in scope is acted on, by mixed-integer programming over one binary variable per node and available action. A search-free rule acts on every node whose estimated residual exceeds the retention slack, deleting, and switches deletions to recomputation in order of utility loss only where the floor would otherwise break. Two fallbacks keep the reported plan where it exists and otherwise use the reachability purge, or the exact optimum where one exists. Every plan is executed and audited at the study's $n = 2048$, including plans the planner calls infeasible.

J.6 THE RUNS, AND THE COMMAND FOR EACH

Every run writes a manifest carrying the configuration hash, the seed, the resolved environment and the digest of every output file, and every cell skips itself when its manifest exists, so a run is idempotent and can be interrupted and resumed. Table 12 lists the runs the paper reports. Worker counts are omitted because they do not enter the results: parallelism is across cells, each cell is seeded independently, and the language-model runs answer each distinct prompt once and cache it.

Table 12: Every run behind a number in this paper, and the command that produced it. Paths are relative to the package root. The structural runs together take 1.6 hours on the machine of Section J.8. The language-model experiments together issued 88,917 distinct model calls. Generation seconds, where reported, are the server's response time for a request measured when its prompt was first answered, with up to thirty requests in flight, and not exclusive compute.

Output	Command	Scale
`pilot`	`deletecert.cli run --config configs/ec2/pilot.yaml`	1 cell
`matrix`	`run_experiment_matrix.py --config configs/ec2/full_matrix.yaml`	36 cells
`short`	`run_experiment_matrix.py --config configs/ec2/short_horizon.yaml`	36 cells, $T{=}4$
`long`	`run_experiment_matrix.py --config configs/ec2/long_horizon.yaml`	36 cells, $T{=}40$
`shallow`	`run_experiment_matrix.py --config configs/ec2/shallow_lineage.yaml --cells 4`	3 cells
`stress`	`run_stress_tests.py --config configs/ec2/stress_tests.yaml`	78 cells
`replication`	the matrix command, on seeds $3, 4, 5$	3 seeds
`matrix_v2`	the matrix command, after the fourth transfer evaluation was added	36 cells
`multi_target`	`run_multi_target.py --cases 40 --seeds 0 1 2 --k 1 3 10 --layouts spread adjacent`	720 cases
`parameter_tier`	`run_parameter_tier.py --cases 60 --seeds 0 1 2`	180 cases
`e1_llm`	`run_e1_llm_pilot.py --cases 32 --sessions 6 --secrets 3 --nondeterminism-probes 8`	32 cases
`e1_llm_llama`	the same, with `--model-id llama-3.1-8b-instruct-q4_k_m`	32 cases
`llm_certificate`	`run_llm_certificate.py --cases 12`	12 cases
`cert_mixed`, `cert_split`	`run_llm_certificate.py --scenario mixed` and `--scenario split`	12 cases each
`cert_split_partaware`	`run_llm_certificate.py --scenario split --part-aware`	12 cases
`frontier_*`	`run_llm_frontier.py --scenario plain | mixed | split`, and once more on the split scenario with the multi-root purge	12 cases each
`planner_controls`	`run_planner_controls.py --config configs/ec2/full_matrix.yaml`	36 cells
`pol_*`	`run_llm_certificate.py --cases 12 --policies ...` with `--scenario`, `--detector` and `--roots` as named	12 cases each
`fresh_*`	the same with `--fresh-variants 32`, and with `--replay-world --attacker-model llama-3.1-8b-instruct-q4_k_m` for the second attacker	12 cases each
`pol2_*`, `fresh2_*`	the policy and fresh-question runs repeated once the runner reported target-only and verbatim risk, the held-out utility formulation and per-stage cost	12 cases each
`conf_*`	`run_llm_certificate.py` on seeds 100 and above, exactly as Section J.4 fixes it	24 or 12 cases
`null_audit`	`run_null_audit.py --reps 2000`	simulation

J.7 Where each table and figure comes from

Table 13 maps every data table and figure to the generator that wrote it and the run it read. Nothing in the results text is typed by hand: a generator writes each table as a row block and each figure as a PDF, and a separate check reads the numeric literals out of the results sources and matches them against the generated evidence, so a number that drifted from its run is caught rather than trusted.

Table 13: Table and figure provenance. The generators are the scripts of the same names; the runs are those of Table 12.

Table or figure	Generator	Run
Table 14, Table 16, Table 18, Table 19, Table 23, Table 24, Table 25	`make_manuscript_tables.py`	`matrix`, `short`, `long`, `shallow`, `stress`
Figure 2, Figure 10b, Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10a	`make_manuscript_figures.py`	`matrix`
Table 22	`make_transfer_table.py`	`matrix_v2`
Table 28	`make_multi_target_table.py`	`multi_target`
Table 32	`make_parameter_tier_table.py`	`parameter_tier`
Table 29, Table 30, Table 31	`make_e1_llm_table.py`	`e1_llm`, `e1_llm_llama`
Table 33	`make_llm_certificate_table.py`	`llm_certificate`
Table 34, Table 35, Table 36	`make_policy_table.py`	`pol_*`, `fresh_*`
Table 17, Table 20, Table 15	`make_status_tables.py`	`matrix_v2`, `matrix`, `planner_controls`
Table 37	`make_replication_table.py`	`matrix`, `replication`

J.8 Environment and assets

Everything ran on one 64-vCPU x86 instance under Ubuntu 24.04 with no GPU, on Python 3.12.3 with numpy 2.5.3, scipy 1.18.1, pandas 3.0.5 and matplotlib 3.11.1. The dependencies are pinned loosely on purpose and the resolved versions of a given run are recorded in that run's manifest, because the determinism contract is per-platform and per-version rather than universal. Worker processes are pinned to one BLAS thread each, since the parallelism is across cells and a thread pool inside each of sixty-four processes oversubscribes the machine for no gain.

The structural benchmark has no external assets: the generator is the data. The language-model pilot uses two open-weights files, served by `llama.cpp` over loopback, decoding greedily at temperature 0 with `top_k` $= 1$ and a fixed decode seed. The first is `Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct` at `Q4_K_M` quantisation, 4 683 074 240 bytes, SHA-256 beginning `65b8fcd92af6b4fe`, served with thirty-two decoding slots. The second is `Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct` at the same quantisation, served with eight slots, because its key-value cache is twice the size and thirty-two slots on this machine collapse its per-slot throughput. Both are ungated single files, and the digest of the file actually used is recorded in each run's manifest. No account, no hosted service and no network call is involved at any point: the server is bound to the loopback interface and the backend refuses any other host.

K Results

Every number in this section is a result on the synthetic structural twin-world benchmark of Section I, produced by the implementation of Section J from the pre-registered configuration, and is a statement about that benchmark and not about any deployed agent. Unless stated otherwise, cells report the mean and standard deviation over 200 cases and three seeds at the base setting $T = 12$, $\epsilon = 0.05$, $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0$. The full study (the 3×4 matrix, the $T = 4$ and $T = 40$ horizons, the shallow-lineage control and the stress tests) took 1.6 hours of wall-clock on one 64-vCPU machine, with no GPU. Two words recur below and mean exactly this: an arm's plan is *feasible* on a case when it meets both the risk budget and the utility floor of Equation (6), and only feasible plans receive a certificate; the *footprint* is the fraction of stored artifacts the plan deleted, recomputed or rewrote.

E2, the frontier. Table 14 and Figure 2 (left). The status quo leaves most of the residue in place: B1 removes 0.03 of the 0.48 excess risk of doing nothing, and a one-hop purge (B2) leaves 0.28. Every arm that reaches zero excess risk without influence estimation does so by touching 43% or more of the store, and the two that delete what they touch, B4 and B5, breach the utility floor on every case. B5 and the oracle B8 are the cleanest illustration of why the per-node action is a

Table 14: E2, the primary axis, at the base setting. Excess residual risk, behavioural distance and footprint are means over all 600 (case, seed) pairs, including the cases in which an arm's plan was infeasible. Cost is in the declared scalarisation `oracle_calls_equivalent_v1`: deleting an artifact costs one unit, two for a skill and four for the adapter; recomputing one costs two to twelve depending on type and sixty for the adapter; an estimation probe costs one and is charged to the arm that spent it. DELETECERT's feasible plans (76%) have excess risk 0.000 at footprint 0.21 ± 0.10 and cost 86.9 ± 34.1; its infeasible plans have excess risk 0.136 at footprint 0.35 ± 0.02.

Arm	Description	Excess risk ER_Q (↓)	Behavioural dist. (↓)	Footprint (fraction, ↓)	Utility retention‡	Deletion cost (↓)	Feasible plans (↑)
B0	no action (control)	0.479 ± 0.133	0.479 ± 0.133	0.00 ± 0.00	n/m	0.0 ± 0.0	0%
B1	raw record only	0.447 ± 0.164	0.447 ± 0.164	0.02 ± 0.00	n/m	1.0 ± 0.0	0%
B2	direct descendants	0.277 ± 0.168	0.277 ± 0.168	0.14 ± 0.01	n/m	10.4 ± 0.9	0%
B3	TTL / expiry	0.215 ± 0.196	0.215 ± 0.196	0.25 ± 0.00	n/m	18.0 ± 0.0	0%
B4	full memory reset	0.000 ± 0.000	0.000 ± 0.000	1.00 ± 0.00	n/m	72.0 ± 0.0	0%
B5	reachability purge	0.000 ± 0.000	0.000 ± 0.000	0.43 ± 0.00	n/m	34.0 ± 0.0	0%
B6	sanitiser (T1, T6, T7 undefined here; T7 in Table 32)	0.034 ± 0.015	0.034 ± 0.015	0.38 ± 0.00	n/m	179.0 ± 0.0	0%
B7	**DELETECERT (IWC)**	0.032 ± 0.067	0.032 ± 0.067	0.24 ± 0.11	n/m	91.4 ± 33.4	76%
B8	oracle counterfactual rebuild	$0^\dagger$	$0^\dagger$	0.43 ± 0.00	n/m	243.0 ± 0.0	100%

† Measured as 0.000 ± 0.000 and predicted by Theorem 7 under Assumptions A1 to A3, which hold at $\eta_{\mathrm{miss}} = 0$; B8 rebuilds from the *recorded* lineage, so at $\eta_{\mathrm{miss}} > 0$ it is no longer exact (Table 16). ‡ Utility retention is unmeasured on the structural benchmark (Section I); the column is retained so that a language-agent instantiation reports it in the same table. B4 and B5 are infeasible on every case, breaching the utility floor $1 - \nu = 0.95$; B8 touches exactly the artifacts B5 touches and is feasible on every case, because it recomputes where B5 deletes.

Table 15: What the search adds, at the base setting. Every row decides the same closure problem on the same 600 (case, seed) pairs from the same estimates, and every plan is executed and audited at $n = 2048$, including plans its planner calls infeasible. *Feasible* is the planner's estimate; *true* and *bound* are the fractions of cases whose true excess risk and whose audit bound meet $\epsilon = 0.05$. Cost is execution cost in the scalarisation of Table 14, without the estimation probes every row shares.

Policy	cases	feasible	ER_Q	true $\leq \epsilon$	bound $\leq \epsilon$	footprint	cost
IWC (reported)	600	76%	0.032	81%	81%	0.24	39.4
exact optimum of the same problem	600	100%	0.000	100%	100%	0.25	32.3
act on every detected node, no search	600	100%	0.000	100%	100%	0.25	49.8
IWC, else reachability purge	600	76%	0.000	100%	100%	0.26	34.7
IWC, else exact optimum	600	100%	0.000	100%	100%	0.25	42.1

decision and not a detail: they act on *exactly* the same 43% of the store and both reach zero excess risk, but B5 deletes and is infeasible on every case, while B8 recomputes from clean ancestors, keeps the artifacts' unrelated content, and is feasible on every case, at 243 against B5's 34 in cost. DELETECERT chooses between those two actions per node, and reaches zero excess risk on 76% of cases at a footprint of 0.21, which is 51% smaller than either of them at the same excess risk, meeting the pre-registered target; on the remaining 24% the greedy search ended without a plan satisfying both constraints and returned its best infeasible attempt, with 0.136 excess risk, reported here. That is a failure of the search and not of the problem. B8 satisfies both constraints on every case in this cell, and Table 15 goes further: the exact optimum of the same problem, from the same estimates, is feasible on every case and costs less than IWC's plan where both exist. On the cost axis DELETECERT is *more* expensive than B5, 91 against 34, and the split (Table 27) says why: 39.4 to execute the plan, comparable to B5's 34 because DELETECERT recomputes where B5 deletes, plus 52 estimation probes at one unit each. The frontier claim is about footprint and utility, not oracle calls, and the table reports both. The sanitiser B6 leaves 0.034, from the tiers on which it is undefined.

What the search adds. Table 15. The closure problem is NP-hard in general (Proposition 12), but its instances here are small enough that a mixed-integer solver returns the exact optimum in at most 0.042 seconds per case, under the same estimates, surrogate and precedence rule IWC uses (Section J.5). Solved exactly, the problem is feasible on every case, at footprint 0.25 and execution cost 32.3, with zero excess risk. IWC is feasible on 76% and costs 39.4 on average; where both are feasible its plan costs 1.33 times the optimum, and on 24% of cases it finds no plan

Table 16: The matrix, collapsed over the risk budget. *Feasible* is the planner's estimate on the recorded graph, not a measurement of the realised risk; the four status predicates are defined in Section I. On this benchmark every retained contaminated artifact carries a state-level residual of at least 0.6, so the three budgets $\epsilon \in \{0.01, 0.05, 0.10\}$ induce identical closures and identical numbers; the frontier is traced by the utility floor and by the provenance miss rate, not by ϵ in this range. An exploratory sweep run after the pre-registered matrix, at $\epsilon \in \{0.25, 0.5, 0.75\}$ and $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0$, confirms this: nothing changes until ϵ exceeds the trace residual 0.6, and at $\epsilon = 0.75$ feasibility rises to 80% with a mean feasible excess risk of 0.008 under a mean bound of 0.013, still with no violation. Rows are means over 600 (case, seed) pairs per cell. The oracle B8 is exact only at $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0$, and above it is *worse* than the purge it is supposed to bound; see the text.

	B7 DELETECERT			B5 reachability		B2	B8 oracle	
η_{miss}	ER_Q	footprint	feasible	ER_Q	footprint	ER_Q	ER_Q	footprint
0.00	0.032 ± 0.067	0.24 ± 0.11	76%	0.000 ± 0.000	0.43 ± 0.00	0.277	0.000 ± 0.000	0.43
0.05	0.091 ± 0.145	0.22 ± 0.10	82%	0.069 ± 0.142	0.37 ± 0.10	0.279	0.075 ± 0.153	0.37
0.20	0.192 ± 0.183	0.18 ± 0.09	93%	0.183 ± 0.184	0.27 ± 0.11	0.282	0.198 ± 0.195	0.27
0.50	0.265 ± 0.167	0.13 ± 0.06	98%	0.263 ± 0.167	0.17 ± 0.07	0.287	0.285 ± 0.173	0.17

where the optimum exists. A rule with no search, acting on every node the estimates flag, is also feasible on every case, at cost 49.8. On this benchmark the greedy search is therefore neither the cheapest procedure, since the optimum of its own objective costs less, nor the most reliable, since two procedures without its search reach the budget on every case. Its guarantee, Theorem 13, is for instances too large to solve exactly, and this benchmark contains none. The two fallbacks show what replaces a failed search: the reachability purge where IWC fails reaches the budget on every case at cost 34.7, and the exact optimum where it fails at 42.1. With provenance missing the choice of planner stops mattering. At $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0.5$ every policy plans on a graph that hides descendants, and the true excess risk meets the budget on 28.5% of cases for the exact optimum and for the rule without search, and on 28.2% for IWC.

The pre-registered comparison. Section I fixes the analysis before the run: paired Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of every arm against DELETECERT, rank-biserial effect sizes beside every p-value, and Holm–Bonferroni across the family. Pairing is within one twin world, the same case in the same run under two arms, because pairing on the case identifier alone would average over seeds and cells before testing. At the base cell, over 600 pairs, the picture is the one the frontier implies and the effect sizes are extreme rather than marginal. On excess risk DELETECERT beats B0, B1, B2 and B3 on *every* pair (rank-biserial -1.00, adjusted $p < 10^{-55}$), beats the sanitiser B6 by a small but consistent margin (-0.21, adjusted $p = 3.5 \times 10^{-5}$), and loses to B4, B5 and B8 on every pair in which they differ ($+1.00$, adjusted $p < 10^{-19}$), which is what it means to trade risk against footprint rather than to dominate. On footprint the ordering reverses exactly: DELETECERT is smaller than B4, B5, B6 and B8 on every pair (-1.00, adjusted $p < 10^{-98}$), larger than the one-hop purge B2 ($+0.79$), and indistinguishable from the TTL policy B3 (-0.03, adjusted $p = 0.55$), the only comparison in the family that does not separate. The p-values are reported because the plan says to report them and are otherwise uninformative: with 600 near-deterministic paired differences they are a statement about the sample size. `scripts/paired_tests.py` regenerates the table.

Missing provenance. Table 16 and Figure 9. As η_{miss} grows every lineage-based arm loses the descendants it cannot see, and B7, B5 and the oracle converge on the one-hop purge: at $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0.5$ they leave 0.265, 0.263 and 0.285 against B2's 0.287. The ordering of those last two is not noise: it inverts the one the theory gives at $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0$. Theorem 7 makes B8 exact *under* Assumption A2; when that assumption fails, B8's faithful recomputation is no longer faithful, because it rebuilds a descendant from parents that the graph does not record as contaminated, and the rebuilt artifact carries the record forward. B5, which deletes what it can see rather than rebuilding it, does not have that failure mode. Recomputation is the better action when the lineage is complete and the worse one when it is not, and an operator who cannot bound η_{miss} should prefer deletion where utility permits. Two further things are worth noting. DELETECERT's feasibility *rises* with the miss rate (76% to 98%) because a smaller recorded closure is cheaper to make feasible, which is precisely the failure mode Assumption A2 warns of: a plan that looks good on the recorded graph. That column is the planner's own estimate and nothing else. Table 17 counts what happened instead: at $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0.5$

Table 17: Status predicates per matrix cell, for DELETECERT, as fractions of the 600 (case, seed) requests in each cell. *Feasible*: the planner's estimated risk and surrogate utility meet the constraints. *Issued*: an audit was produced, which the harness does only for feasible plans. *Bound*: the audit's bound meets ϵ. *True*: the true excess risk meets ϵ. *All three*: feasible, bound and true together. Utility is not measured on this benchmark, so no column reports it.

ϵ	η_{miss}	requests	feasible	issued	bound $\leq \epsilon$	true $\leq \epsilon$	all three
0.01	0.00	600	76%	76%	76%	81%	76%
0.01	0.05	600	82%	82%	61%	64%	61%
0.01	0.20	600	93%	93%	38%	39%	38%
0.01	0.50	600	98%	98%	16%	16%	16%
0.05	0.00	600	76%	76%	76%	81%	76%
0.05	0.05	600	82%	82%	62%	68%	62%
0.05	0.20	600	93%	93%	40%	46%	40%
0.05	0.50	600	98%	98%	20%	28%	20%
0.10	0.00	600	76%	76%	76%	81%	76%
0.10	0.05	600	82%	82%	64%	68%	64%
0.10	0.20	600	93%	93%	45%	46%	45%
0.10	0.50	600	98%	98%	28%	28%	28%

Table 18: E1, residual map after raw-record deletion (B1), base setting. First row: the state-level residual $\sum_v \sigma_x(v)$ left in each tier. Class rows: the excess risk each probe class observes after B1 (parenthesised; every class is evaluated with 1024 probes) and, per tier the class reads, the share of that excess attributable to the tier by ablation. A dash means the class does not read the tier. The T7 entry is not a measurement: the gradient estimator that tier is assigned (Table 7) needs a training stack the benchmark does not have, so the estimator falls back to provenance confidence, which returns the upper bound 1 on every case. Every other entry is an intervention or representation-similarity estimate.

	T0 raw	T1 vector	T2 summary	T3 graph	T4 profile	T5 skill	T6 shared	T7 adapter
$\sum_v \sigma_x(v)$ per tier (E1)	—	0.51 ± 0.22	3.31 ± 2.00	2.45 ± 1.56	1.58 ± 0.97	0.58 ± 0.51	0.84 ± 0.27	1.00 ± 0.00
P1 (excess 0.73 ± 0.31)	0.00 ± 0.00	—	0.73 ± 0.31	—	—	—	—	—
P2 (excess 0.60 ± 0.22)	0.00 ± 0.00	0.01 ± 0.04	0.46 ± 0.22	—	—	—	—	—
P3 (excess 0.51 ± 0.22)	—	—	0.10 ± 0.15	0.00 ± 0.00	—	—	—	—
P4 (excess 0.50 ± 0.20)	—	—	—	—	0.14 ± 0.24	0.01 ± 0.06	—	—
P5 (excess 0.41 ± 0.17)	—	—	—	—	0.41 ± 0.17	—	—	—
P6 (excess 0.28 ± 0.09)	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.28 ± 0.09	—
P7 (excess 0.34 ± 0.12)	0.00 ± 0.00	0.01 ± 0.02	0.05 ± 0.08	0.00 ± 0.00	0.00 ± 0.00	0.00 ± 0.00	—	0.00 ± 0.00

and $\epsilon = 0.05$ the planner calls 98% of plans feasible, the audit's bound meets the budget on 20% of requests, and the true excess risk on 28%. The audit is what reports the difference: its bound tracks the true excess risk at every miss rate (Table 19), so an operator who trusts the plan is told by the audit that the plan did not work. Proposition 35 prices the descendants a damaged graph hides from a fixed plan; it is not applied here, and it does not bound re-planning on that graph.

E1, where the residue is. Table 18 and Figure 10b. After the raw record is gone, the residue concentrates in the rolling summaries (T2, 3.31) and the relations extracted from them (T3, 2.45), then the profile (T4, 1.58); the vector index (0.51) and the skills (0.58) carry less. The adapter's 1.00 is not measured in the matrix but assumed: it is the provenance-confidence upper bound, returned identically on all 600 cases because the matrix has no parameters to differentiate. The closure therefore always acts on the adapter, which is the conservative behaviour the fallback is designed to produce and not evidence that the adapter is the problem, and Table 32 measures the quantity the fallback stands in for: 0.079 on average against the assumed 1.00. Every probe class observes residue after B1, the direct recall class most (0.73) and the peer class least (0.28). The per-tier shares also show what ablation cannot separate: where two tiers a class reads carry the same content, removing either alone changes little, and the shares undercount (P3, P4). The pre-registered disconfirming outcome, a flat profile, did not occur.

E3, calibration. Table 19 and Figure 2 (right). The bound held on every one of the 6285 audited cases, at every miss rate: the violation rate is 0.000 against the nominal 0.05, and the bound sits

Table 19: E3 and E4, certificate calibration, over the 6285 audited DELETECERT cases of the whole matrix (all miss rates, all seeds). Rows are bins of the certified bound $\widehat{U}_{n,\delta}$ at $n = 2048$, $\delta = 0.05$; "observed" is the true excess risk available by construction. The first violation-rate column is the calibration claim of Theorem 10 and is 0.000 throughout against a nominal 0.05. The last two columns evaluate the same audited agents on the held-out probe classes P3, P5, P6, P7 asked by the held-out attacker; no target was claimed there, and Theorem 11 does not reach that law at all, since its divergence from Q is infinite (Table 22).

Bound bin $\widehat{U}_{n,\delta}$	cases	observed ER_Q	violation rate	observed $\mathrm{ER}_{Q'}$	violation rate (Q')
$[0, 0.01)$	3456	0.0000	0.000	0.0096	0.097
$[0.01, 0.03)$	0	—	—	—	—
$[0.03, 0.10)$	390	0.0404	0.000	0.1260	1.000
$[0.10, 0.30)$	612	0.2404	0.000	0.5239	1.000
$[0.30, 1.00]$	1827	0.4017	0.000	0.7544	1.000
Target	—	—	$\leq \delta = 0.05$	—	no target claimed

Table 20: Case-level calibration as run. Each matrix run splits its audited cases in half; the inflation $\hat{\lambda}$ is fitted on the calibration half at $\alpha = 0.10$ and confidence 0.95, and the fit never sees the test half. Counts are ranges over the three seeds of each cell. *CP* is the exact binomial upper bound on the violation rate at zero observed violations, at the smallest half in the cell.

ϵ	η_{miss}	runs	calibration	$\hat{\lambda}$	CP	test	violations	CP
0.01	0.00	3	76–78	0	0.039	75–77	0	0.039
0.01	0.05	3	81–83	0	0.036	81–83	0	0.036
0.01	0.20	3	91–94	0	0.032	91–94	0	0.032
0.01	0.50	3	98–98	0	0.030	98–99	0	0.030
0.05	0.00	3	76–78	0	0.039	75–77	0	0.039
0.05	0.05	3	81–83	0	0.036	81–83	0	0.036
0.05	0.20	3	91–94	0	0.032	91–94	0	0.032
0.05	0.50	3	98–98	0	0.030	98–99	0	0.030
0.10	0.00	3	76–78	0	0.039	75–77	0	0.039
0.10	0.05	3	81–83	0	0.036	81–83	0	0.036
0.10	0.20	3	91–94	0	0.032	91–94	0	0.032
0.10	0.50	3	98–98	0	0.030	98–99	0	0.030

close above the observed excess (0.0042 against 0.000 on the 3456 cases where deletion worked, 0.42 against 0.40 on the 1827 where missing provenance defeated it).

The 6285 audits are not independent deployments: every case appears in three risk-budget cells whose closures coincide, so they audit a third as many distinct plans. Soundness is not success, and the same table separates them. Of the 6285 audits, 3846 return a bound below 0.10, the largest budget in the matrix, and 1827 return one of at least 0.30, which exceeds every budget in it; the bins are half-open, so a bound of exactly 0.10 falls in neither count. Those 1827 are correct audits of deletions that did not work: the bound is valid, it sits just above a true excess risk of 0.40, and it says so. Counting them as certified deletions would invert the result, which is why Section I separates the four predicates and why this paragraph reports a violation rate rather than a success rate. The conservatism is the variance-adaptive term of Equation (9) doing what it should: where every paired score is zero the bound is exactly the last term $7\ln(2/\delta)/(3(n-1)) = 0.0042$ at $n = 2048$. The disconfirming outcome, a violation rate above nominal, did not occur. The probe-budget sweep (S5, Figure 10a) shows the bound tightening from 0.342 at $n = 32$ to 0.039 at $n = 4096$ against Hoeffding's 0.054, and shows two further things. The variance-adaptive bound is not uniformly better: at $n = 32$ and $n = 64$ Hoeffding is tighter (0.254 and 0.187), because Equation (9)'s last term $7\ln(2/\delta)/(3(n-1))$ dominates at small n and only pays for itself once the variance term has room to shrink; the crossover here is at $n = 128$. And no budget certifies what is not true: on these cases the closure left 0.035 excess risk and no n reaches $\epsilon = 0.01$, because the bound sits above the truth and the truth sits above the target.

Table 21: The audit's width on an equal-agent null, where the excess risk is zero. 2000 repetitions per row, $\delta = 0.05$, $\epsilon = 0.05$. $\bar{Z}$ is the mean one-sided paired score; the bound is Equation (9); the signed comparator is a Hoeffding bound on the unclipped paired difference, shown for reference and not part of the audit.

pairing	p	n	$\bar{Z}$	bound	bound $\leq \epsilon$	signed	signed $\leq \epsilon$
independent	0.00	256	0.000	0.034	100%	0.153	0%
independent	0.00	4096	0.000	0.002	100%	0.038	100%
independent	0.10	256	0.090	0.173	0%	0.153	0%
independent	0.10	4096	0.090	0.104	0%	0.038	96%
independent	0.25	256	0.187	0.287	0%	0.153	1%
independent	0.25	4096	0.187	0.206	0%	0.038	90%
independent	0.50	256	0.251	0.358	0%	0.154	1%
independent	0.50	4096	0.250	0.270	0%	0.038	86%
common	0.00	256	0.000	0.034	100%	0.153	0%
common	0.00	4096	0.000	0.002	100%	0.038	100%
common	0.10	256	0.000	0.034	100%	0.153	0%
common	0.10	4096	0.000	0.002	100%	0.038	100%
common	0.25	256	0.000	0.034	100%	0.153	0%
common	0.25	4096	0.000	0.002	100%	0.038	100%
common	0.50	256	0.000	0.034	100%	0.153	0%
common	0.50	4096	0.000	0.002	100%	0.038	100%

Table 22: E4, transfer. Each row certifies on the declared law Q with the calibration attacker and then evaluates the same post-deletion agent under a different law, a different attacker, or both. κ is $D_\alpha(\text{evaluation} \,\|\, Q)$ at $\alpha = 2$, *computed* from the two mixtures rather than assumed. Theorem 11 quantifies over probe laws within a finite divergence, so it applies to one of these four; the last two columns are filled only there.

evaluation law	attacker	κ	theorem applies	observed ER	cert. bound exceeded	transfer bound	transfer exceeded
held-out classes	same attacker	∞	no	0.115	8%	—	—
held-out classes	held-out attacker	∞	no	0.283	50%	—	—
declared classes	held-out attacker	0.00	no	0.267	45%	—	—
reweighted classes	same attacker	0.57	yes	0.189	39%	0.38	0%

Case-level calibration. Table 20. The fitted inflation is zero in every run, because no calibration case exceeds its bound. The harness did not score the test half; since no audited case in the matrix exceeds its bound, the test half has zero violations in every run, and the exact bound on its violation rate is at most 0.039. Both halves are drawn from the audited cases only, so the guarantee is for the rule applied to requests the planner accepted, not for every request.

How wide the audit is when deletion is perfect. Table 21. The audit bounds the mean of the one-sided paired score, so its width depends on how the two agents' answers are paired and not only on whether the agents differ. Take two equal agents whose score on a probe is Bernoulli(p). With a common random number for both, every paired score is zero, and the bound is 0.034 at $n = 256$ and 0.002 at $n = 4096$, meeting $\epsilon = 0.05$ on every repetition from $n = 256$. Drawn independently, the one-sided score has mean $p(1 - p)$, 0.250 at $p = 0.5$, and the bound stays above it, 0.270 at $n = 4096$, meeting the budget on no repetition: valid, and of no use. The signed comparator meets the budget on 86% of repetitions at $n = 4096$ for $p = 0.5$. Every audit in this paper pairs answers by construction. The structural readout is evaluated with the shared seeds, and the 3456 zero-excess cases all return 0.0042, the zero-variance value; the language-model answers come from greedy decoding with each distinct prompt answered once, so equal agents answer identically. An audit of a stochastic readout needs common random numbers, or a signed interval in place of Equation (9).

E4, transfer, and where the theorem is silent. Table 22. Certifying on P1, P2 and P4 and evaluating on the held-out classes with the calibration attacker gives an observed excess of 0.115, and the

Table 23: E7, relearning under benign updates, base setting: excess risk before and after 1, 10 and 100 consolidation passes applied identically to both worlds, per arm, and the fraction of *certified* cases whose bound is exceeded after 100 passes. The never-seen agent's own risk stayed at 0.000 throughout, so the increase is attributable to the residue.

Arm	ER_Q before	after 1	after 10	after 100	bound exceeded
B1	0.447 ± 0.165	0.486 ± 0.117	0.523 ± 0.095	0.524 ± 0.094	—
B2	0.277 ± 0.169	0.297 ± 0.151	0.304 ± 0.153	0.304 ± 0.153	—
B3	0.216 ± 0.196	0.250 ± 0.175	0.255 ± 0.171	0.255 ± 0.171	—
B5	0.000 ± 0.000	0.000 ± 0.000	0.000 ± 0.000	0.000 ± 0.000	—
B6	0.034 ± 0.015	0.252 ± 0.102	0.347 ± 0.078	0.350 ± 0.076	—
B7	0.032 ± 0.067	0.077 ± 0.152	0.085 ± 0.161	0.085 ± 0.161	0%
B8	0.000 ± 0.000	0.000 ± 0.000	0.000 ± 0.000	0.000 ± 0.000	0%

certified bound is exceeded on 8% of cases; with the held-out attacker (1.25× conversion efficiency, $k = 8$ attempts) the excess rises to 0.283 and the bound is exceeded on 50%.

Theorem 11 would extend the bound to a law within a finite Renyi divergence of Q, and whether a given law is such a law is computable rather than assumable. It is computed here, and for three of the four evaluations the answer is that the theorem says nothing. The held-out law puts all of its mass on P3, P5, P6 and P7, which Q never draws, so $D_\alpha(Q'\|Q) = \infty$ at every order and the hypothesis is not merely unverified, it is false. The third row changes the attacker and not the law, and the theorem quantifies over laws, so a divergence of zero buys nothing there either: the certified bound is exceeded on 45% of those cases, which is what being outside a theorem's scope looks like.

The fourth row is the one the theorem covers. It reweights the declared classes towards direct recall instead of replacing them, so it is absolutely continuous with respect to Q and $\kappa = 0.57$ exactly. The transfer bound computed from that measured κ averages 0.38 and is exceeded on *none* of the cases, while the certified bound for Q is exceeded on 39% of the same cases. The theorem does the work it claims where its condition holds, and we can now say which of these that is rather than assuming a budget and reporting a violation rate against a bound that governs a different law. The certificate remains a statement about Q and the attacker it was built against; the untested-pathways field is where the rest belongs.

E7, relearning. Table 23 and Figure 8. The sanitiser is the clearest instance of Proposition 15: B6 leaves 0.034 excess risk in a dormant trace on the adapter tier, and one consolidation pass that reads the adapter and writes a summary lifts it to 0.25, ten passes to 0.35. DELETECERT's mean rises from 0.032 to 0.085, and the split is complete: on the 458 certified cases the excess is 0.000 before the updates and still exactly 0.000 after 100 of them, while on the 142 uncertified ones it goes from 0.136 to 0.358. A feasible closure on this benchmark leaves no dormant artifact for a consolidation pass to surface; an infeasible one leaves several. That is the expected reading of the result, not a refutation of it: the theorem says a certificate carries no implication past the next update, and B6 shows the price of an arm that leaves one tier untouched.

E6, the peer. Cross-agent residue reachable through the peer's copy is 0.070 at sharing depth 1 and is unchanged by every arm, as it must be: the operator has no authority over the peer's store. S10 confirms that DELETECERT's own excess risk and footprint do not depend on sharing depth (0, 1, 2 hops), because the operator-side copy is deleted and the rest is listed in $\mathcal{U}$.

Horizons and the control. Table 24. At $T = 4$ the lineage is small enough that every closure is feasible and DELETECERT reaches zero excess risk on every case at footprint 0.43, 27% below reachability's 0.58. At $T = 40$ the target's descendants are two fifths of a store five times larger, and the utility floor binds on 38% of cases; the 62% that remain reach zero excess risk at footprint 0.057, 85% below B5's 0.386, which is the widest gap the study produced. Counting the infeasible cases too, the mean footprint is 0.081 and the mean excess risk is 0.118, the second carried entirely by the 38% of cases with no feasible plan. The oracle is infeasible on every case there, because rebuilding two fifths of a store that size breaches the floor even at a quarter of the utility cost of deleting it. The shallow control is the sanity check the benchmark owes: with every artifact one hop from the

Table 24: Horizons and the lineage control, base cell ($\epsilon = 0.05$, $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0$). $T = 4$ and $T = 40$ use 200 and 100 cases respectively, three seeds. The shallow control derives every artifact directly from the raw messages; at that depth a one-hop purge is the closure, which is what it shows.

	$T = 4$				$T = 40$				shallow lineage, $T = 12$			
Arm	ER_Q	footprint	cost	feas.	ER_Q	footprint	cost	feas.	ER_Q	footprint	cost	feas.
B1	0.404	0.04	1.0	0%	0.438	0.00	1.0	0%	0.385	0.02	1.0	0%
B2	0.268	0.35	9.3	0%	0.302	0.04	9.5	0%	0.000	0.17	15.0	100%
B3	0.404	0.04	1.0	0%	0.021	0.33	75.0	0%	0.000	0.17	12.0	0%
B4	0.000	1.00	29.0	0%	0.000	1.00	221.0	0%	0.000	1.00	72.0	0%
B5	0.000	0.58	19.0	0%	0.000	0.39	91.0	0%	0.000	0.18	16.0	100%
B6	0.034	0.46	79.0	0%	0.034	0.37	559.0	0%	0.034	0.14	59.2	0%
B7	0.000	0.43	41.6	100%	0.118	0.08	189.0	62%	0.000	0.13	31.8	100%
B8	0.000	0.58	143.0	100%	0.000	0.39	623.0	0%	0.000	0.18	123.2	100%

Table 25: Ablations and stress tests (Section I), 60 cases and three seeds at $n = 1024$. Signed changes are relative to the full DELETECERT configuration on the same cases; for the sweeps each entry is "Δ excess risk / Δ footprint" at the stated knob value. Utility is unmeasured (n/m) throughout.

ID	Manipulation	Δ excess risk	Δ footprint	Δ utility
S1	reachability-only closure; $\widehat{\gamma} = 1.00$ on every instance, since the state-level objective is additive	-0.035	$+11.6$ nodes	n/m
S2	no counterfactual world: absolute minus excess risk	$+0.000$	0	n/m
S3	remove multi-hop probes (P3): excess hidden	$+0.006$	0	n/m
S4	remove action probes (P4): excess hidden	-0.035	0	n/m
S5	probe budget: bound 0.342 (n=32), 0.116 (128), 0.059 (512), 0.043 (2048), 0.039 (4096)	—	0	n/m
S6	missing provenance, $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0.05/0.2/0.5$, independent	$+0.057/+0.171/+0.248$	$-0.03/-0.07/-0.13$	n/m
	the same, clustered misses (Remark 39)	$+0.051/+0.165/+0.252$	$-0.02/-0.07/-0.13$	n/m
S7	paraphrase pressure 0.5/1.0 (no verbatim copies survive)	$+0.000/+0.000$	$+0.00/+0.00$	n/m
S8	multiple targets $\{1, 3, 10\}$	Table 28		
S9	overlapping lineages	Table 28		
S10	sharing depth $0/2$ hops	$+0.000/+0.000$	$+0.01/+0.00$	n/m
S11	held-out attacker at evaluation	$+0.032$	$+0.00$	n/m
S12	deletion delayed $1/5/20$ sessions after the target	$-0.037/-0.029/+0.000$	$+0.00/+0.01/+0.00$	n/m
S13	unfaithful recomputation, rate $0.05/0.2/0.5$	$+0.000/+0.000/+0.000$	$+0.00/+0.00/+0.00$	n/m
S14	redundant storage, $1/3$ extra copies	$-0.003/+0.016$	$+0.01/+0.03$	n/m

record, B2 reaches zero excess risk at footprint 0.17 and DELETECERT at 0.13, and there is nothing for lineage to add. The frontier of Table 14 is a property of depth, and the rolling benchmark is where depth exists.

Stress tests. Table 25. Three results are the ones the theory needed. S1: the risk-reduction set function the closure optimises is the state-level residual sum of Equation (6), which is additive, so the submodularity ratio is exactly 1 on every instance and Theorem 13 applies with its full constant; the redundancy failure of Remark 32 concerns the *behavioural* set function, and S14 measures it directly as $+0.016$ excess risk at three redundant copies, small because the closure deletes copies by their state residual regardless of what probes see. S6 is the price of Assumption A2, and the clustered sampler costs no more than the independent one on this generator, so Assumption A5's independence is not what flatters the bound here. S13 shows that unfaithful recomputation changes

Table 26: Quantities the theory needs and the protocol estimated. Each is labelled with the estimator that produced it and with what it does not show.

Quantity	Appears in	Estimated by	Value
γ, submodularity ratio	Theorem 13	S1, sampled subsets	1.00 on every instance (additive objective)
δ_v, recomputation error	Theorem 8	S13	excess risk 0.000 at every rate; state TV > 0
$\sigma_x(v)$ per tier after B1	Remark 27	E1, intervention	T2 3.31, T3 2.45, T4 1.58, T6 0.84, T5 0.58, T1 0.51; T7 bounded at 1 in the matrix; an extraction attack on a trained adapter reaches 0.079 (Table 32), which lower bounds it
κ, divergence budget	Theorem 11	E4, computed from the mixtures	∞ for the held-out law (disjoint support, theorem silent); 0.57 for the reweighted law, where the bound 0.38 is never exceeded
η_{miss} realised	Proposition 35	S6, as configured	0.05: +0.057; 0.2: +0.171; 0.5: +0.248 excess
n needed for $\epsilon = 0.01$	Theorem 10	S5	none when residue > 0.01; $n \geq 4096$ gives 0.039

Table 27: Exploratory sweeps run *after* the pre-registered study, at the base cell ($T = 12$, $\epsilon = 0.05$, $\eta_{\text{miss}} = 0$ unless the row varies it), labelled as such: they were chosen after seeing the matrix and answer questions the matrix raised. "Footprint (feasible)" is over the cases in which the arm's plan met both constraints. Cost is split into execution, the per-type deletion and recomputation costs of Table 14, and estimation probes, which the matrix charged to DELETECERT at one unit each.

Sweep	Arm	ER_Q	Footprint	Feasible	Footprint (feasible)	Exec. cost	Est. probes
base ($\nu = 0.05$)	B2	0.277 ± 0.168	0.14	0%	—	10.4	0
	B5	0.000 ± 0.000	0.43	0%	—	34.0	0
	B6	0.034 ± 0.015	0.38	0%	—	179.0	0
	B7	0.032 ± 0.067	0.24	76%	0.21	39.4	52
utility slack $\nu = 0.10$	B5	0.000 ± 0.000	0.43	100%	0.43	34.0	0
	B7	0.000 ± 0.000	0.25	100%	0.25	20.2	52
utility slack $\nu = 0.20$	B5	0.000 ± 0.000	0.43	100%	0.43	34.0	0
	B7	0.000 ± 0.000	0.25	100%	0.25	20.2	52
instrumented lineage only (no edge recovery)	B2	0.378 ± 0.174	0.06	0%	—	4.0	0
	B5	0.000 ± 0.000	0.43	0%	—	34.0	0
	B7	0.032 ± 0.067	0.24	76%	0.21	39.4	52
retention rates $\times 0.5$	B2	0.047 ± 0.103	0.14	0%	—	10.1	0
	B5	0.000 ± 0.000	0.43	0%	—	34.0	0
	B7	0.000 ± 0.000	0.07	100%	0.07	7.6	52
retention rates $\times 1.5$	B2	0.395 ± 0.048	0.16	0%	—	11.3	0
	B5	0.000 ± 0.000	0.43	0%	—	34.0	0
	B7	0.163 ± 0.016	0.37	0%	—	37.1	52
risk budget $\epsilon = 0.25$	B7	0.032 ± 0.067	0.24	76%	0.21	—	—
risk budget $\epsilon = 0.50$	B7	0.032 ± 0.067	0.24	76%	0.21	—	—
risk budget $\epsilon = 0.75$	B7	0.032 ± 0.067	0.24	80%	0.22	—	—

the state without changing the leakage: a producer re-run on clean parents with a fresh seed produces a different artifact that still contains nothing of the record, so δ_v in Theorem 8 is positive in total variation and zero in excess risk on this benchmark. Three results say what the benchmark cannot show. S2 is exactly zero because the never-seen agent of the token model leaks nothing of a record it never saw, so absolute and excess risk coincide here and the argument of Remark 19 rests on the inference literature rather than on this measurement. S7 is zero because the closure treats a trace like a verbatim copy. S3 and S4 measure what a probe class is worth to the suite it belongs to. Dropping the action class P4 from the declared law lowers the measured excess by 0.035: that much of the residue is visible only by watching what the agent does. Dropping the multi-hop class P3 from the held-out law moves the measured excess by $+0.006$, the wrong sign for a class that reveals something of its own, and the artefact of renormalising a mixture over the classes that remain; P3 sees nothing here that P5, P6 and P7 do not.

Exploratory sweeps. Table 27. Four questions the matrix raised, answered after the fact and labelled as such. *Where does* DELETECERT*'s cost go?* Executing its plans costs 39, close to B5's 34, because it recomputes where B5 deletes; the rest of its 91 is 52 estimation probes charged at one unit each. Whether that charge is fair depends on what a probe costs relative to a deletion in a deployment, which the scalarisation declares and an operator can change. *Why are* 24% *of plans infeasible?* The utility floor: at $\nu = 0.10$ every DELETECERT plan and every reachability purge is feasible, DELETECERT reaches zero excess risk on every case at footprint 0.25 against B5's 0.43 (42% smaller, with both arms feasible, so the comparison is now at matched risk on every case), and its execution cost halves to 20 because it may delete where at $\nu = 0.05$ it had to recompute. The pre-registered 50% criterion is therefore met on feasible plans at $\nu = 0.05$ (51%) and missed by eight points when the floor is loosened enough to make both arms feasible; both numbers are reported. *Do the recovered edges widen the closure?* No: with recovery switched off, B5 and

Table 28: S8 and S9, several deletion targets at once. The operator plans for each target with the single-target closure and applies the union, so the union is what is measured. *Overlap* is one minus the size of the union over the total size of the separate plans: at 0 the closures are disjoint and the k-th record costs as much as the first, at 1 they are the same nodes and it is free. *Spread* places the targets across the session stream (S8) and *adjacent* in consecutive sessions so their lineages coincide (S9). 24 cases, three seeds. No certificate is issued: the bound is stated for one target and one probe law, and extending it to a set is not a claim this paper makes.

targets	layout	arm	ER_Q	footprint	overlap	feasible
1	spread	B2	0.277	0.14	0.00	0%
1	spread	B5	0.000	0.43	0.00	0%
1	spread	B7	0.052	0.25	0.00	67%
3	spread	B2	0.288	0.40	0.00	0%
3	spread	B5	0.000	0.70	0.46	0%
3	spread	B7	0.045	0.48	0.25	36%
10	spread	B2	0.212	0.88	0.29	0%
10	spread	B5	0.000	0.95	0.76	0%
10	spread	B7	0.031	0.73	0.60	14%
3	adjacent	B2	0.263	0.33	0.23	0%
3	adjacent	B5	0.000	0.58	0.55	0%
3	adjacent	B7	0.030	0.39	0.42	46%

DELETECERT are unchanged to three decimals, since at $\eta_{\mathrm{miss}} = 0$ every recovered edge duplicates an instrumented one; only B2 changes, its one hop shrinking to 0.06 of the store and its excess risk rising to 0.38. *How much does the retention table decide?* A great deal, as Section N says it must. Halving every producer's rates makes the problem easy: B2 leaves 0.05, DELETECERT touches 7% of the store and is feasible everywhere. Multiplying them by 1.5 makes it impossible for the search: so many descendants carry the record that IWC ends without a plan meeting both constraints, its best infeasible attempt touches 37% and leaves 0.16, and only the purges reach zero, by breaching the floor. The rolling benchmark at $\times 1$ sits between these; the qualitative ordering B1 $>$ B2 $>$ DELETECERT $\geq$ B5 $=$ B4 $=$ B8 on excess risk, and the reverse on footprint, holds at all three scales.

S8 and S9, deleting more than one record. Table 28. The manuscript pre-registers both. They need a closure over a set of records rather than one. The closure an operator would actually get is the union of the single-target plans, so that is what is built and executed here.

Three results. First, cost grows sublinearly in the number of records, because the closures overlap: at ten targets DELETECERT's ten plans would touch 157 nodes run separately and touch 59 as a union, an overlap of 0.60, and the reachability purge's 320 become 77, an overlap of 0.76. Second, the frontier survives the generalisation. DELETECERT stays below the purge at every k, at footprint 0.25 against 0.43 with one target, 0.48 against 0.70 with three, and 0.73 against 0.95 with ten. Third, and against the first two, feasibility collapses: a plan meeting both the risk budget and the utility floor exists on 67% of cases at one target, 36% at three and 14% at ten. Deleting ten records at once is usually impossible under the constraints that make deleting one comfortable, and an operator told only the first two results would be misled.

S9 asks whether overlapping lineages make the problem harder. They make it easier. With three targets in consecutive sessions rather than spread across the stream, DELETECERT's overlap rises from 0.25 to 0.42, its footprint falls from 0.48 to 0.39, and feasibility rises from 36% to 46%: records that were summarised together are deleted together. The contrast is reported at three targets only. At ten, in a twelve-session world, consecutive and spread select the same sessions, so the two layouts are the same experiment and reporting both would present a duplicate as a comparison.

A language-model pilot for E1. Table 29. The producers of the structural benchmark are template functions over a two-level token vocabulary, so the tier profile of Table 18 could in principle be a property of that vocabulary rather than of memory architecture. We rebuilt E1, and only E1, with a language model: `Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct` at four-bit quantisation, greedy decoding, writing every derived artifact as prose. A case is six everyday sessions in which the user states concrete

Table 29: The E1 language-model pilot. An open-weights instruction-tuned model writes the summaries, relations, profile, skill notes and the message shared with a peer in natural language; the raw record is then deleted and nothing else. Entries are excess residual risk against the never-seen agent, averaged over 32 cases, under direct recall (P1) and paraphrased elicitation (P2). The last column is the narrower verbatim measure under P1, which involves no grader at all. T7 is undefined here: there is no training in the pilot.

		before deletion		raw record deleted		verbatim
Tier	what it holds	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1
T0	raw store	1.00	0.94	0.00	0.00	0.00
T1	vector index	1.00	0.94	0.00	0.03	0.00
T2	summaries	0.97	0.88	0.97	0.88	0.97
T3	graph relations	0.94	0.78	0.94	0.78	0.94
T4	user profile	0.97	0.88	0.97	0.88	0.97
T5	reusable skills	0.72	0.47	0.72	0.47	0.72
T6	shared with a peer	0.62	0.56	0.62	0.56	0.62

logistics details, a gate code or a locker number, generated so that no real personal data enters the benchmark. The never-seen world is the same session stream with one line removed, the line stating the target fact. Nothing is scored by formula: the assistant is handed one tier as its entire context and asked for the record, and the answer is graded both by whether the value appears in it and by a second model call. The pilot shares no code with the token producers, which is why agreement between the two is evidence rather than a tautology.

Before deletion every tier gives the fact up. After the raw record is deleted and nothing else, the two tiers the deletion touched fall to 0.01 and 0.00 while the five derived tiers are unchanged, at 0.54 on average and 0.97 in the summaries. That is Table 18's finding, reached by asking a model rather than by evaluating a retention rate. Three controls make the number readable. The never-seen agent produced the fact on no probe at all (0.000), so the excess is the residue and not the model's prior. The null control, a fact planted in neither world, scored 0.00, so the grader is not firing on everything. And the two graders agree on 99.9% of answers, so the result does not rest on the model grading itself. The twin-world coupling was checked on every case and held on 32 of 32: no artifact from before the target's session differed between the worlds. Greedy decoding alone does not make that exact. Asking forty unseen prompts once alone and once inside a batch of unrelated work changed the wording of 28 of them in the recorded run, and of nineteen to thirty-two across trials, because a batching server reduces in an order that depends on what else it is decoding. It changed the graded outcome of none. The cache removes the variation and the second number says what it was worth removing: the pilot measures whether a record survives, and that survived the decoder's instability on every prompt tested.

One exchange from the pilot, chosen because it is typical rather than extreme; the aggregate is Table 29. The raw record has been deleted, the probe never names the code, and the summary tier is the assistant's entire context.

> **User.** I am driving over to the storage place this evening and I have forgotten how to get in at the barrier. What do I need to punch in?
>
> **Agent, raw record deleted.** You need to punch in the gate code WQ5599 to get through the barrier at the storage place.
>
> **Never-seen agent.** I do not have specific information about the code or details to get into the storage place barrier. Could you check if there are any access cards or a password system in place, or if there are any signs or instructions at the storage entrance?

The deletion removed the sentence in which the user said the code. It did not remove the code, because the summary written in that first session still contained it five sessions later, and nothing in the deletion request reached that summary. This is the paper's premise, observed rather than modelled.

The pilot required $4{,}452$ distinct model calls and $9{,}264$ seconds of case time run thirty-two ways in parallel, on the same 64-core machine as the rest of the study and with no GPU. What it does

Table 30: The same question put to a second model. Excess residual risk per tier after the raw record is deleted, under direct recall (P1) and paraphrased elicitation (P2), 32 cases each. The second model was run on E1 only; the frontier of Table 31 was measured on the first.

		Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct		Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct	
Tier	what it holds	P1	P2	P1	P2
T0	raw store	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
T1	vector index	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00
T2	summaries	0.97	0.88	0.97	0.47
T3	graph relations	0.94	0.78	0.81	0.25
T4	user profile	0.97	0.88	0.91	0.41
T5	reusable skills	0.72	0.47	0.50	0.12
T6	shared with a peer	0.62	0.56	0.56	0.25

Table 31: E2 and E5 on the language-model world: what each arm leaks, what it costs, and what it destroys. Excess residual risk is measured against the never-seen agent by an attacker who reads the whole store rather than one tier. Utility is whether the agent can still answer about the facts the user never asked to have deleted, normalised by the same agent before any deletion, and is reported twice: reading the whole store, and reading derived memory alone, which is the condition a long-horizon agent is in once transcripts have aged out. 32 cases. Certificates for this world are Table 33.

				utility retained	
Arm	what it deletes	ER_Q	footprint	whole store	derived only
B0	no deletion	0.91 ± 0.20	0.00	1.00	1.00
B1	raw record only	0.81 ± 0.28	0.03	1.00	1.00
B2	raw record and direct descendants	0.86 ± 0.26	0.14	1.00	1.00
B5	reachability purge	0.00 ± 0.00	0.25	1.00	0.98
B4	full reset	0.00 ± 0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00

not establish is as important as what it does: it is two models at one quantisation on one generator of facts (Table 30), and it leaves E4, E6 and E7 exactly where the structural benchmark left them. It answers one question, whether the tier profile survives contact with a real summariser, and the answer is that it does.

A second model. Table 30. One model would leave the obvious question open, so the pilot was repeated on a different family at a different size. What replicates is the shape: both models clear the two tiers the deletion touched, to 0.00 and 0.00, and both keep the record in all five derived tiers, at 0.78 on average for the first model and 0.53 for the second. Both controls hold on both, the never-seen agent recovering the fact on no probe and the null control scoring zero, and the twin-world coupling held on 32 of 32 cases for each.

What does not replicate is the level, in one specific way. Under direct recall the two models are close, 0.97 against 0.97 in the summaries and 0.97 against 0.91 in the profile. Under paraphrased elicitation the second model gives up much less, 0.47 against 0.88 in the summaries and 0.12 against 0.47 in the skill notes: it more often declines to answer a question that does not name what it is asking for. How much a deletion leaves is therefore a property of the model as well as of the memory, which is a limit on the numbers and not on the finding. Where the residue sits is the same in both.

E2 and E5 on the language-model world. Table 31. The structural benchmark cannot measure utility, because a structural agent performs no task beyond retrieval and so has nothing unrelated to lose (Section N). A language agent does, so the pilot measures it, and with it the frontier. Four deletion policies are run on the same worlds: the raw record alone, the record and its direct descendants, a purge of everything reachable from the record through the lineage, and a full reset.

Deleting the raw record does not significantly reduce what the agent gives up: 0.91 before, 0.81 after, over 32 paired cases at $p = 0.058$. Adding the direct descendants does not help either (0.86, $p = 0.26$ against the raw record alone). Only following the lineage works, and it works completely:

Table 32: The parameter tier, instantiated. A small next-token model is trained by gradient descent on the agent's own summaries in each of the twin worlds, over a shared vocabulary so the two are comparable, and attacked by prompting with the context the record was written under and reading the probability it assigns to the record. 180 cases, three seeds, 552 parameters per adapter. Retain accuracy is next-token accuracy on the pairs that do not carry the record.

	extraction score on T7	worst case	retain accuracy
deployed agent, adapter trained on its summaries	0.079 ± 0.116	0.593	—
never-seen agent, same training, record withheld	0.005 ± 0.006	0.015	—
excess before unlearning	0.074 ± 0.112	0.583	0.752
excess after B6 (negative preference objective)	0.000 ± 0.000	0.000	0.754

the purge reaches 0.00 excess on every case, beating both shallower arms on every case where they differ (rank-biserial $+1.000$, $p < 10^{-6}$), at a quarter of the store. It does so while keeping 98% of the agent's ability to answer about the facts the user did not ask to have deleted, where the full reset reaches the same zero risk and keeps none of it. That is the frontier the manuscript claims, observed on an agent that answers in natural language.

Two qualifications. Utility read over the whole store cannot fall short of a full reset, because no arm deletes an unrelated session's transcript and the assistant can always answer from one; the derived-memory column is the informative one and is what the 98% refers to. And the purge is near-optimal here in a way it is not on the structural benchmark, because this world's lineage is complete by construction: the gap between a purge and a minimal closure in Table 14 comes from missing provenance and redundant copies, neither of which this pilot models. What the pilot establishes is that the frontier exists and that shallow deletion does not reach it. Table 33 goes further and certifies the closure on this world, at 16% of the store against the purge's 25%.

T7, measured rather than assumed, and B6 defined on it. Table 32. Three of the manuscript's declared unavailabilities had one cause: the structural benchmark has no parameters. Its adapter is a producer output like any other artifact, so the tier's state-level residual was reported as assumed and bounded at 1, and B6 was undefined on the tier because the negative preference objective is a gradient step and there was nothing to differentiate. A small model fitted to the agent's summaries supplies the missing piece. It is five hundred parameters and a bag-of-tokens predictor, not a transformer, and the limit that follows is stated below.

Two results. What the attack recovers is real but far below the bound the matrix assumes: the extraction score averages 0.079 against the assumed $\sigma_x = 1.00$, reaches 0.59 on the worst case, and is non-trivial on 82 of the 180 cases. This is a readout, not a state-law distance, so it lower bounds σ_x and leaves the assumed 1.00 standing as an upper bound; what it establishes is that the tier does memorise the record, and how much of that one attack reaches. And B6, given something to act on, removes the residue completely: excess falls to 0.000 on every one of the 180 cases while next-token accuracy on everything else moves from 0.752 to 0.754. That is the first arm in this paper to clear a tier at no measured cost, and the reason is that a parameter tier is the one place where an objective can act on the record without acting on the artifact that holds it.

The limit is the model. Memorisation in a five-hundred-parameter next-token predictor is not memorisation in a language model, whose capacity, optimiser and training distribution all differ, and no number here transfers to one. What does transfer is the structure of the claim: T7 is a tier like the others, what an attack recovers from it can be measured by intervention rather than assumed, and an unlearning method that acts on parameters belongs in the comparison rather than outside it. Turning that measurement into an upper bound on σ_x would need an argument this pilot does not have.

Auditing a language agent. Table 33. The audit is defined over a lineage graph and state-level residuals, and the language-model world has the graph by construction but not the residuals. In their place the planner reads an *extraction score*: each artifact is handed to the model on its own and asked for the record. That is a behavioural readout by one attacker, and Remark 27 orders the two quantities in one direction only, so it bounds σ_x from below and not from above. The closure therefore plans on a detector, and an artifact this attacker cannot read may still carry the record. Of 66 artifacts per case, 10.3 give it up to this attacker; the closure deletes exactly those, touching 16%

Table 33: An audit of a language agent. The closure is planned on the language-model world from an extraction score, obtained by probing each artifact in isolation, which is a detector and not an upper bound on the state residual; the plan is executed on the world itself and audited against the never-seen agent. Recomputation is implemented here and available to the closure; these plans selected none, so the mechanism is exercised by the code and not by this result. Each row is the same twelve cases certified at a different probe budget; the answers are shared, so a larger n costs no additional model calls and the column shows only what the bound is worth at that budget. $\epsilon = 0.05$, $\nu = 0.05$, $\delta = 0.05$.

probes n	issued	bound $\widehat{U}_{n,\delta}$	observed ER	exceeded	meets ϵ
16	100%	0.5738	0.000	0%	no
64	100%	0.1366	0.000	0%	no
256	100%	0.0338	0.000	0%	yes
1024	100%	0.0084	0.000	0%	yes

of the store, and recomputes none. All twelve plans are feasible and audited, and the closure's exact excess risk on the declared law is 0.000 (Table 34).

What the rows of Table 33 measure is the width of the bound. On the structural benchmark a probe is free, so the study draws 2048. Here the declared law is the uniform distribution over 32 model-written ways of asking for the record and 32 null questions, all written before any plan was made, and each budget draws that many probes from it with replacement. Every point of that finite law was evaluated, so its excess risk is known exactly, and a larger n resamples a table of answers rather than querying the model again. At $n = 16$ the bound is 0.57; at 64 it is 0.14, above the 0.05 budget, so a plan whose exact risk is zero receives the status TARGET NOT ESTABLISHED; at 256 it is 0.034 and at 1024 it is 0.0084. The sweep prices the sample size a fixed law needs before the empirical-Bernstein term is small. It explores no more of the model, and 32 phrasings from one model are a narrow slice of the ways a record can be asked for, which Table 36 tests separately.

Where the closure fails, and what repairs it. Tables 34 and 35. The default case plants one fact in one session, so every artifact carrying the record carries all of it and deleting those artifacts costs nothing anyone wanted to keep. Both properties flatter the closure, and the mixed and split layouts remove each in turn. Every policy in the two tables runs on the same twelve cases against the same detector, declared law, never-seen agent and probe draws; every plan is audited, including plans its planner calls infeasible; and the closure as first run reproduces the earlier single-policy runs row for row. Where it works the closure is smaller than the purge, 0.16 against 0.25 of the store with one fact in the session and 0.13 against 0.28 with two.

An unrelated fact in the same session. A second fact is stated alongside the target and nowhere else, so the summary written from that session holds both. The closure still removes the record completely, 1.00 to 0.00, at a smaller footprint than the default case. The unrelated fact is where the cost lands. The closure's target is the session's transcript, and a raw record can only be deleted or kept, so the plan deletes that transcript whole. Read over the whole store the unrelated fact survives in retrieval chunks the plan did not flag; read over derived memory, which is what a long-horizon agent has once transcripts age out, it falls from 0.92 to 0.17. The closure removed four fifths of a capability nobody asked it to remove and selected recomputation zero times, because the utility surrogate of Equation (13) charges 0.002 for deleting a summary against a floor with 0.05 of slack, so the constraint never binds. Recomputation as executed would not have helped either: a summary recomputed after its transcript was deleted reads an empty transcript. Table 34 separates the two causes. Redacting the transcript instead of deleting it changes nothing over derived memory, 0.17 again. Recomputing every flagged artifact a producer writes, rather than deleting it, keeps the unrelated fact at its pre-deletion recall of 0.92 and leaves an exact excess risk of 0.001, against 0.010 for the closure as first run, at the same footprint of 0.13: 1.7 artifacts deleted and 6.2 recomputed per case. Measured on the unrelated facts, the utility floor holds on every case after recomputation and on 25% after the closure as first run. A policy that executes the redacted plan, measures that recall, and recomputes only where it fell below the floor switched on 75% of cases and reached the same outcome. The purge reaches the same excess risk and loses the fact entirely. The audit dominates the cost: recomputing needs 257 model calls per case and the closure as first run 265.

Table 34: Deletion policies on identical language-model cases, development seeds 0 to 11. These policies were designed after the failures they probe, so the table is diagnostic; Table 38 evaluates the frozen policy on new cases. Every row audits its own plan against the never-seen agent on the same finite law of 32 target and 32 null questions. ER is that law's exact excess risk; the bound is Theorem 10 at $n = 1024$ draws; utility is recall of the unrelated facts over derived memory, normalised by the pre-deletion agent and capped at one; the four percentage columns are the fractions of cases whose exact risk meets $\epsilon = 0.05$, whose bound meets it, whose utility meets $1 - \nu = 0.95$, and whose bound and utility meet theirs together. Calls are the distinct model calls the audited procedure needs from a cold cache, excluding the deployed agent's own operation. Twelve cases per scenario.

scenario	policy	recomp.	footprint	ER (exact)	bound	utility	exact $\leq \epsilon$	bound $\leq \epsilon$	utility $\geq 1 - \nu$	both	calls
plain	iwc	0.0	0.16	0.000	0.008	1.00	100%	100%	100%	100%	262
plain	purge	0.0	0.25	0.001	0.010	1.00	100%	100%	100%	100%	200
plain	recompute flagged	7.6	0.16	0.004	0.014	1.00	100%	92%	100%	92%	254
mixed	iwc	0.0	0.13	0.010	0.021	0.75	92%	92%	25%	25%	265
mixed	iwc redact	0.0	0.13	0.018	0.033	0.75	92%	75%	25%	25%	266
mixed	measured utility	5.4	0.13	0.001	0.010	1.00	100%	100%	100%	100%	266
mixed	purge	0.0	0.28	0.001	0.011	0.69	100%	100%	8%	8%	199
mixed	recompute flagged	6.2	0.13	0.001	0.010	1.00	100%	100%	100%	100%	257
mixed	reset	0.0	1.00	0.000	0.008	0.00	100%	100%	0%	0%	197
public	iwc	0.0	0.15	0.012	0.027	1.00	100%	75%	100%	75%	228
public	purge	0.0	0.25	0.010	0.024	1.00	92%	83%	100%	83%	163

The record stated in two halves. The value is given in two parts in two sessions, so no single artifact holds it. The per-artifact score marks 3.3 artifacts instead of 8.8, the plan touches 4% of the store instead of 13%, and the record survives: an attacker reading the whole store recovers it on 58% of cases after the plan, against 92% before. This is the failure the detector's construction implies. The audit reports it: the exact excess risk on the declared law is 0.232, the bound at $n = 1024$ is 0.281, and the target is established on no case (Table 35). A high bound alone would show only that the target was not established; here the twin world supplies the exact risk as well, and it is above the budget.

Two causes, crossed. A reachability purge started from the record's transcript does not consult the detector and also falls short, leaving 0.087 at footprint 0.24, so the detector is not the only cause: a record stated in two sessions has two roots, and a closure computed from either reaches only half of it. The target of Definition 1 is a stream element plus anything the operator declares part of the same request, so a record stated in parts is a declared set, and the closure over all of its roots is an object the formulation admits; S8 and S9 build it on the structural benchmark (Table 28). Table 35 crosses the two factors. Scoring the halves as well as the whole record raises the artifacts flagged from 3.3 to 12.8 of 67. With the coarse detector, extending the closure to every root barely moves it, 0.232 to 0.212, because the detector still flags only 3.3 artifacts per case. With the part-aware detector and one root the exact excess risk is 0.073. With both it is 0.000 at footprint 0.19, and the target is established on every case: the detector's granularity is necessary and the root scope completes it. That closure still deletes content the unrelated facts depend on, with utility 0.79 and both budgets met on 58% of cases. Recomputing its flagged artifacts instead keeps utility at 1.00 with exact excess risk 0.009, meeting both budgets on every one of these twelve development cases, while the bound establishes the target on 83% of them; the multi-root purge reaches 0.005 at footprint 0.42 and utility 0.71. Table 38 runs that policy, frozen, on cases it was not designed against.

Excess risk against absolute leakage. Table 34, the public rows. In every earlier layout the never-seen agent recovers nothing, so excess risk and absolute leakage coincide. In the public layout the user also reports a letter giving the same value, and only the user's own statement is withheld. Asked directly over the whole store, the agent gives the value up on every case after the closure and after the purge, 1.00, and so does the never-seen agent, 1.00. The exact excess risk on the declared law is 0.012 after the closure and 0.010 after the purge, and the audit's bound at $n = 1024$ meets $\epsilon = 0.05$ on 75% and 83% of cases. An audit of absolute leakage would record both deletions as failures. The audit of excess risk records that what remains is available to an agent that never received the withheld statement.

Outside the declared law. Table 36. The language-model audit's declared law is 32 target and 32 null questions written by one model, and its bound is a statement about that law and not about

Table 35: The split record, factorial, development seeds 0 to 11 (diagnostic). The closure is run with each detector and each root scope, and the reachability purge with each root scope, on the same twelve cases. *Flagged* counts the artifacts the detector marks; *leak* is what an attacker reading the whole store recovers after the plan by direct question; ER is the declared law's exact excess risk; the bound is at $n = 1024$; utility is as in Table 34.

policy	detector	roots	flagged	footprint	leak	ER (exact)	bound	utility
iwc	coarse	single	3.3	0.04	0.58	0.232	0.281	1.00
iwc redact	coarse	single	3.3	0.04	0.75	0.242	0.291	1.00
purge	coarse	single	—	0.24	0.25	0.087	0.113	1.00
iwc	coarse	all	3.3	0.08	0.50	0.212	0.255	1.00
purge	coarse	all	—	0.42	0.00	0.005	0.016	0.71
iwc	part	single	12.8	0.12	0.17	0.073	0.101	1.00
iwc	part	all	12.8	0.19	0.00	0.000	0.008	0.79
recompute flagged	part	all	12.8	0.19	0.00	0.009	0.022	1.00

Table 36: Inside and outside the declared law, development seeds 0 to 11 (diagnostic). For each plan, the exact excess risk on the declared law, the audit bound at $n = 1024$, and the exact excess risk on fresh target and null questions written outside the law, by the same model and by a second model that writes, answers and grades its own questions over the same worlds. Twelve cases per row.

scenario	policy	ER, declared	bound	ER, fresh (same)	ER, fresh (second)
plain	iwc	0.000	0.008	0.012	0.007
plain	purge	0.001	0.010	0.005	0.000
mixed	purge	0.001	0.011	0.012	0.000
mixed	recompute flagged	0.001	0.010	0.013	0.000
split	iwc	0.000	0.008	0.013	0.000
split	purge	0.005	0.016	0.011	0.000
split	recompute flagged	0.009	0.022	0.020	—

questions it does not contain. For six plans spanning the three layouts, the same model wrote new questions that describe a situation without naming what is needed, 36 to 61 per case, target and null together, after parsing; a second model, Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, wrote, answered and graded its own, 45 to 60 per case, over the same worlds replayed from the cache. On the same model's new questions the exact excess risk averages 0.005 to 0.013 per plan, exceeds that case's declared-law bound on 2 to 5 of the 12 cases, and exceeds the budget $\epsilon = 0.05$ on at most one case per plan, reaching 0.068. The second model's questions recover less, 0.000 to 0.007 on average, above the bound on 2 cases of one plan and above the budget on none. The declared-law bound therefore does not carry over to new questions, as nothing in Theorem 10 says it should, and Theorem 11 gives no bound for a law with support outside Q; these rows measure how far the risk moved on this world.

The frozen policy on new cases. Tables 38 and 39. The policies above were designed against the cases they repair, so the repaired policy was frozen, together with its comparators and its endpoints (Section J.4), and run on seeds no development case used: 24 each for the mixed and the split layout, 12 each for plain and public. Two of its properties carry over and one does not.

The utility repair carries over. DeleteCert-R meets the utility floor on 24 of 24 mixed cases and 23 of 24 split cases, where the purge from every declared root meets it on 2 and on 9; the held-out formulation, which no policy reads, agrees, at 0.97 and 1.00 against the purge's 0.72 and 0.65. The diagnosis of the split failure carries over as well: the closure as first run leaves an exact excess risk of 0.255 and establishes the target on 1 of 24 new cases.

What does not carry over is how completely the repair removes the record. On the development cases it left 0.001 and met both budgets everywhere; on new cases it leaves 0.016 in the mixed layout and 0.034 in the split one, and establishes the target on 19 of 24 and on 18 of 24. The residue is concentrated rather than spread: the exact risk is zero on 18 of the 24 mixed cases and on 16 of the 24 split ones, and the mean is carried by a few cases at 0.078 to 0.234. Twelve development

Table 37: Out-of-sample seed replication. The left block is the study as reported, on the four cells at $\epsilon = 0.05$ and every missing-provenance rate; the right block repeats those four cells on seeds 3, 4 and 5, which no result in this paper uses. Each block is 12 runs, 200 cases, 21,600 arm-case rows. No number in the study was changed after seeing the right block.

	seeds 0, 1, 2 (reported)			seeds 3, 4, 5 (held out)		
Arm	ER_Q	footprint	issued	ER_Q	footprint	issued
B0	0.479 ± 0.133	0.000	0.0%	0.480 ± 0.127	0.000	0.0%
B1	0.447 ± 0.164	0.015	0.5%	0.446 ± 0.158	0.015	0.5%
B2	0.281 ± 0.163	0.137	15.2%	0.299 ± 0.160	0.136	15.0%
B3	0.239 ± 0.187	0.208	16.4%	0.258 ± 0.186	0.208	16.2%
B4	0.000 ± 0.000	1.000	0.0%	0.000 ± 0.000	1.000	0.0%
B5	0.129 ± 0.175	0.312	29.4%	0.138 ± 0.181	0.311	30.8%
B6	0.149 ± 0.161	0.274	3.8%	0.157 ± 0.168	0.273	4.6%
B7	0.145 ± 0.172	0.192	87.3%	0.158 ± 0.175	0.196	84.3%
B8	0.140 ± 0.187	0.312	100.0%	0.147 ± 0.190	0.311	100.0%

Table 38: Confirmatory evaluation of the frozen policy on new seeds (Section J.4), with its comparators on the same cases. Each cell is the number of cases meeting the endpoint, with a two-sided 95% Clopper–Pearson interval: exact excess risk on the declared law at most $\epsilon = 0.05$; audit bound at $n = 1024$ at most ϵ; utility at least $1 - \nu = 0.95$; bound and utility together.

scenario	policy	exact $\leq \epsilon$	bound $\leq \epsilon$	utility $\geq 1 - \nu$	bound and utility
plain	purge	12/12 [0.74, 1.00]	12/12 [0.74, 1.00]	11/12 [0.62, 1.00]	11/12 [0.62, 1.00]
plain	DeleteCert-R	11/12 [0.62, 1.00]	11/12 [0.62, 1.00]	12/12 [0.74, 1.00]	11/12 [0.62, 1.00]
mixed	purge	23/24 [0.79, 1.00]	21/24 [0.68, 0.97]	2/24 [0.01, 0.27]	2/24 [0.01, 0.27]
mixed	DeleteCert-R	21/24 [0.68, 0.97]	19/24 [0.58, 0.93]	24/24 [0.86, 1.00]	19/24 [0.58, 0.93]
split	purge	24/24 [0.86, 1.00]	22/24 [0.73, 0.99]	9/24 [0.19, 0.59]	8/24 [0.16, 0.55]
split	DeleteCert-R	18/24 [0.53, 0.90]	18/24 [0.53, 0.90]	23/24 [0.79, 1.00]	17/24 [0.49, 0.87]
public	purge	9/12 [0.43, 0.95]	8/12 [0.35, 0.90]	12/12 [0.74, 1.00]	8/12 [0.35, 0.90]
public	DeleteCert-R	9/12 [0.43, 0.95]	6/12 [0.21, 0.79]	12/12 [0.74, 1.00]	6/12 [0.21, 0.79]
mixed	iwc	22/24 [0.73, 0.99]	20/24 [0.63, 0.95]	8/24 [0.16, 0.55]	7/24 [0.13, 0.51]
split	iwc	1/24 [0.00, 0.21]	1/24 [0.00, 0.21]	22/24 [0.73, 0.99]	1/24 [0.00, 0.21]

cases overstated the repair, which is what a confirmatory run is for. In the public layout, where the never-seen agent knows the value too, both policies leave about 0.034 and 0.039 and establish the target on 6 and 8 of 12.

The audit did not move. On all 120 confirmatory plan-case pairs no exact excess risk exceeded that case's own bound, and where the policy left the record the bound rose with it and the status was TARGET NOT ESTABLISHED. Questions written by the second model and answered by the deployed reader, scored by verbatim match alone, recover 0.000 to 0.004 after either policy in the plain, mixed and split layouts, and 0.016 to 0.043 in the public layout, where the value is available without the withheld statement.

Replication on held-out seeds. Table 37. Every number reported above comes from seeds 0, 1 and 2, fixed before the study and used throughout, so how much of the ordering is a property of those three draws is an open question until it is measured. We repeated the four cells at $\epsilon = 0.05$ on seeds 3, 4 and 5 after the manuscript's results were written, and changed nothing in response. All sixteen pre-registered paired comparisons reproduce in sign and all sixteen survive Holm–Bonferroni; every effect size that was ± 1 remains ± 1, and the two that were not move without changing sign, DELETECERT against B6 on excess risk from -0.31 to -0.16 and against B8 from $+0.20$ to $+0.37$. Across the nine arms the largest shift in mean excess risk is 0.019, in footprint 0.005, and in issuance rate three points. Soundness is exact in both: of the 6,066 certificates issued on the reported seeds and the 6,032 on the held-out seeds, none is violated by the true excess risk on the declared law. The two negative results replicate as well as the positive one: on the held-out probe classes the certified bound is exceeded on 7.7% of cases against 9.6%, against the held-out attacker on 56.8% against 53.5%, and after 100 benign consolidation passes the bound is exceeded on 7.1% of certified cases

Table 39: Confirmatory evaluation, means over cases. ER is exact excess risk on the declared law, and on its target questions alone; the bound is at $n = 1024$; utility is with the direct and the held-out indirect question; fresh is the exact excess risk on questions written by a second model, answered by the deployed reader and scored by verbatim match; calls, prompt tokens and generation minutes are per case for the audited procedure.

scenario	policy	footprint	ER	ER target	bound	utility	utility (indirect)	fresh	calls	tokens	minutes
plain	purge	0.25	0.004	0.008	0.013	0.96	0.83	0.000	190	239k	38.5
plain	DeleteCert-R	0.14	0.012	0.003	0.024	1.00	0.96	0.000	254	280k	50.3
mixed	purge	0.28	0.011	0.017	0.023	0.68	0.72	0.000	194	246k	39.0
mixed	DeleteCert-R	0.13	0.016	0.027	0.028	1.00	0.97	0.004	257	283k	52.0
split	purge	0.42	0.004	0.005	0.013	0.69	0.65	0.000	202	229k	40.9
split	DeleteCert-R	0.21	0.034	0.056	0.051	0.98	1.00	0.000	273	283k	55.4
public	purge	0.25	0.039	0.057	0.057	1.00	0.88	0.043	158	244k	40.8
public	DeleteCert-R	0.15	0.034	0.068	0.054	1.00	0.92	0.016	217	284k	43.3
mixed	iwc	0.13	0.025	0.044	0.039	0.77	0.76	—	261	259k	73.0
split	iwc	0.05	0.255	0.504	0.302	0.96	0.94	—	269	275k	83.7



Figure 4: **The DELETECERT pipeline.** Five stages run left to right; grey annotations name the concrete instantiation used in Section 8. The evaluated procedure is a single pass that reports whether the bound meets the target. The drawn feedback path is a re-run loop that is valid only with fresh probes and a confidence budget spent across rounds, or with a final independent audit (Section F); no reported result uses it.

against 7.4%. What this does not establish is generalisation beyond the generator: three more seeds of the same simulator are three more draws from the same structural assumptions, and Section N is where that limit is stated.

What these results license. A claim about the frontier on this benchmark, under these probe classes, against these attackers, at these producer retention rates. They do not support a claim that DELETECERT deletes information, nor that the certificate holds against attacks outside Q (E4 shows it does not), nor that any of it survives a subsequent update on an arm that leaves a tier untouched (E7 shows it does not). Those limits follow from Theorem 14 and Proposition 15 independently of the measurements, and the measurements agree with them.

L ADDITIONAL FIGURES

Figure 4 is referenced from Section 6. Figure 5 is referenced from Section 4 and shows the typed lineage graph together with a worked per-node closure decision. Figure 6 is referenced from Section 7 and shows which results depend on which. Figure 7 makes the coverage boundary explicit: it is the picture that corresponds to the $\mathcal{U}$ field of Definition 6, and it is the figure the word "certificate" should bring to mind. Figures 8 to 10 show the relearning curves, the miss-rate sweep, the probe-budget sweep and the residual map; the frontier and the calibration diagram are Figure 2 in the main text.



Figure 5: **Artifact lineage and the deletion closure.** Nine artifact types (Definition 5) linked by seven typed relations. The target x and the artifacts that literally carry its content (c, e) are deleted; artifacts whose value depended on x but which the agent still needs (s, g, p, θ) are recomputed from clean ancestors; the reusable skill k is retained because its estimated state-level residual $\widehat{\sigma}_x(k)$ is below threshold with the closure's slack, and the unrelated memory v_0 has no path from x and is untouched. The message m has already been delivered to a peer agent A': the operator can delete its own copy but cannot recall the peer's, so this branch appears in the certificate's *untested pathways* field rather than in the closure. Copied-from and summarized-from edges carry content, whereas inferred-from and trained-on edges carry only statistical dependence, and Section 6 treats the two differently.

M Extended discussion

What changes when the reference world is explicit. Three things that are ambiguous in storage-based and parameter-based deletion become well posed. First, "how much leakage is acceptable" acquires a floor: the never-seen world already leaks $R_Q(A^{-x}) > 0$, so a target of zero absolute risk is not merely unattainable, it is the wrong target, and Remark 19 explains why reporting absolute extraction rates after unlearning systematically overstates the residue. Second, "which artifacts must go" becomes an optimisation with a feasible region rather than a convention, and Proposition 34 shows the convention currently in use, reachability, can be arbitrarily far from the frontier. Third, "what did we test" becomes a printed field, which Theorem 14 makes a necessary part of the result rather than bookkeeping.

Why deletion in agent memory is not unlearning with extra steps. The parameter tier is the one tier where the existing toolkit applies, and on this benchmark it is also the one tier whose residual could not be estimated at all: the gradient estimator it is assigned needs a training stack the benchmark does not have, so E1 reports a provenance upper bound there and measurements everywhere else (Table 18). What those measurements show is that the residue concentrates in the tiers unlearning does not address: a summary that paraphrases a private message leaks it directly, with no gradient step involved, and summaries, the relations drawn from them and the profile they feed carry most of what survives raw-record deletion. The operators that write agent memory, summarisation, entity extraction, profile merging, skill distillation, are non-differentiable, cheap to re-run, and individually auditable, which is why recomputation from clean ancestors is available here and is not available for a pretrained model. It is also why Theorem 7 can be exact rather than approximate, and it is what lets the closure sit where neither endpoint can: on the benchmark it reaches the zero excess risk of a reachability purge at half the footprint, while staying inside a utility floor that the purge and the full reset breach on every case (Table 14). That is a statement about a frontier, not a claim to dominate: the arms that reach zero risk do reach it, and they pay for it. The parameter tier remains the exception, and there the existing options apply unchanged: train it under differential privacy in the first place (Abadi et al., 2016), or accept an approximate removal and audit it empirically.



Figure 6: **Dependency structure of the analysis.** Three chains are developed independently: what a closure does to the agent's state (left), what a finite probe sample licenses one to say about it (middle), and how expensive the closure is to compute (right). Solid arrows are logical dependencies, dashed arrows indicate that a result constrains how another should be read. Each box names the assumptions it consumes; drawing those as arrows would produce a many-to-many bundle across the whole figure, so they are printed in the boxes instead. Note that Theorem 14 and Proposition 15 sit at the bottom of their columns as limits, not as consequences: neither follows from the results above it, and neither is contradicted by them.

Relation to verification protocols. Sommer et al. (2022) and Eisenhofer et al. (2025) answer a different question: can a user or a court check the operator's claim. DELETECERT answers what the operator can truthfully claim in the first place. The two compose: the certificate of Definition 6 is exactly the sort of artifact one would want to bind cryptographically, and Section B sketches how. We do not claim to have built that binding, and the certificate as specified is trust-on-first-use with respect to the operator.

Deployment without a twin world. Twin-world ground truth is a benchmark instrument, not a deployment mechanism; running every session twice is not viable at scale. The dependence is not confined to evaluation. The audit's paired scores read A^{-x} on every probe, and so do the per-node residual estimates the planner starts from, so what this paper evaluates is a reference-assisted audit: its inputs are the deployed state, the recorded lineage, a declared probe law, and a never-seen agent that only a controlled environment provides. Two routes are available and both are open problems. The first replaces A^{-x} with a surrogate trained on the benchmark to predict paired scores from lineage features, in which case the surrogate's error must be added to Δ_S in Theorem 8 and reported in the certificate. The second restricts probing to tiers where selective recomputation is cheap enough that A^{-x} can be reconstructed on the deletion path alone, which is exactly the ancestor set IWC already recomputes. We specify the first as an evaluation target in Section I and do not claim either works.

What a certificate should not be used for. A certificate is not a compliance guarantee. Article 17 of the GDPR (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016) creates a duty to erase, and whether a probabilistic behavioural bound discharges it is a legal question outside the scope of this paper. What we claim is narrower: an operator that reports $\widehat{U}_{n,\delta}$, the probe classes, and $\mathcal{U}$ has said something falsifiable, whereas an operator that reports "deleted" has not.



Figure 7: **Threat coverage.** The closure acts on the state, driving the per-node residual $\sigma_x(v)$ down; paired probing against the never-seen world converts that into a bound on excess behavioural risk; and the analysis band records which bound applies where. The lower band is not a limitations paragraph but a data structure: every item in it is written into the certificate's $\mathcal{U}$ field, because Theorem 14 says a finite-probe audit cannot make claims about the region outside Q and Proposition 15 says it cannot make claims about the agent after the next update.



Figure 8: **E7, relearning under benign updates** (base setting). Excess residual risk after 0, 1, 10 and 100 consolidation passes applied identically to both worlds, per arm. The sanitiser's dormant adapter trace resurfaces after a single pass; the arms that cleaned every descendant stay at zero; DELETECERT's rise comes entirely from cases whose plan was infeasible and uncertified (Table 23).

N EXTENDED LIMITATIONS

What the results are results about. Every number in Section K is a property of the structural benchmark at the producer retention rates of Table 6. Three of its findings are artefacts of that model and are labelled as such where they appear: the ϵ grid collapses because every retained contaminated artifact carries at least 0.6 residual; absolute and excess risk coincide (S2) because the never-seen agent of the token model leaks nothing; and unfaithful recomputation changes state but not leakage (S13). A language-agent instantiation would move all three.

The benchmark is a structural simulator. Its producers are seeded template functions with per-type retention rates (Table 6), its probes are token-level readouts, and its secrets are generated tokens. It reproduces the structure the framework is about, namely that one record becomes many derived artifacts across tiers and that each leaks a different amount through a different probe family, and nothing else: it says nothing about the linguistics of paraphrase, the behaviour of a real summariser, or real parameter-level residue. Every number the protocol produces is a number about



Figure 9: **Missing provenance (S6, matrix cells at $\epsilon = 0.05$).** Excess residual risk (left) and footprint (right) of the lineage-based arms against the provenance miss rate, means over 600 (case, seed) pairs. Every arm that relies on the recorded graph loses the descendants it cannot see and converges towards the one-hop purge; DELETECERT's footprint falls with the miss rate because its recorded closure shrinks, which is the false economy Assumption A2 warns of, and the certificate reports the resulting excess (Table 19).



(a) S5, the probe budget. The certified bound against n for the empirical-Bernstein and Hoeffding bounds, means over 60 cases, with the observed excess risk. The bound tightens towards the truth and cannot pass it; Hoeffding is tighter below $n = 128$, where the empirical-Bernstein bound's $O(1/n)$ term dominates.



(b) E1, the residual map. State-level residual left in each tier after raw-record deletion, base setting, mean and standard deviation over 600 (case, seed) pairs; T0 holds only the deleted record and is omitted. T7's 1.00 is the provenance-confidence upper bound rather than an estimate, for the reason given under Table 18.

Figure 10: **Probe budget and residual map.** Both panels are data from the benchmark run of Section K.

this benchmark. Its difficulty is a modelling choice, visible in Table 6 and swept by S7 and by the retention-scale rows of Table 27: at half the rates the closure touches 7% of the store and is feasible everywhere, at 1.5 times them no plan meets the utility floor. The rolling benchmark sits between the two, and the frontier should be weighed accordingly. One part of this limit has been tested rather than conceded: Table 29 rebuilds E1 with a language model writing the memory in prose and recovers the same tier profile, a second model recovers the same shape at a different level (Table 30), and Table 31 measures on that world the frontier and the utility the structural benchmark cannot. So the answer to *where the residue sits*, and the claim that a lineage-aware deletion reaches a risk target a shallow one cannot, are not artifacts of the token vocabulary. The rest of the limit stands. E4, E6 and E7 are measured on the structural benchmark alone, the pilot's lineage is complete where a deployment's is not, and the certificates of Table 33 rest on residuals measured by one attacker, so a stronger one would make them optimistic.

Utility is unmeasured on the structural benchmark. E5 asks whether unrelated capability survives the closure. A structural agent performs no task other than retrieval over the synthetic store, so there is nothing unrelated to measure and no long-horizon memory benchmark can be run against it. We report utility as unmeasured there rather than substitute the linear surrogate the optimiser uses, which is a device for ordering plans and not a measurement. On the language-model pilot the

question is answerable, because that agent does have a task, and Table 31 answers it: a purge that follows the lineage reaches zero excess risk while keeping 98% of the agent's ability to answer about records nobody asked to delete, and a full reset keeps none of it. That measurement covers one pilot, four arms and one model, and none of the costs, closures or certificates the structural study reports.

Lineage sufficiency is the load-bearing assumption. Assumption A2 says the recorded graph contains every production dependency. Real systems violate it: memory is written through uninstrumented paths, edges recovered post hoc are noisy, and an operator cannot know what it failed to record. Proposition 35 prices the damage under an independent-miss model, which is itself optimistic, since missing instrumentation is systematically correlated with the least-audited subsystem rather than random. S6 measures the degradation but cannot repair the assumption.

Shared exogenous randomness is a benchmark luxury. Definition 1 fixes $\boldsymbol{u}$ across worlds, which is what makes Theorem 7 an exact statement. Deployments that call non-deterministic external services or non-reproducible model endpoints cannot replay $\boldsymbol{u}$, and Theorem 8 is then the only available result; how large δ_v actually is for a real summariser is an empirical question we have not answered.

The certificate is distributional and time-local. Theorem 14 rules out a worst-case reading, Theorem 11 makes transfer to unanticipated attacks weak and dependent on a divergence budget that is not estimable in the adversarial case, and Proposition 15 shows the certificate does not survive later updates. In short, a certificate is a statement about one agent, one probe law, and one point in time.

Weak submodularity may not hold. Theorem 13 is vacuous when $\gamma \to 0$, which happens under *redundant storage*: if the same content sits in two artifacts and a probe succeeds whenever either survives, deleting one alone reduces risk by nothing, so $\gamma \leq 0$ (Remark 32). Redundancy between a summary and a profile entry is ordinary in agent memory. We do not know how common the regime is; S1 is designed to find out, and until it runs the approximation guarantee should be read as conditional.

Scope of the threat model. We assume an honest operator, exclude backups and external copies, and exclude a peer agent's retained state from what the operator can act on. The last of these is not a modelling convenience but a real limit: once an artifact has been shared, deletion is a multi-party problem that this paper does not solve, and E6 measures the residue rather than eliminating it.

Benchmark realism. Twin worlds require a synthetic environment, and synthetic agents are simpler than deployed ones. Findings on this benchmark transfer to production only to the extent that the tier structure and the producer set match, and we make no claim that they do. Baseline B6 is instantiated only on the tiers where a sanitiser is defined; its parameter-tier component is instantiated separately on a small adapter (Table 32). S8 and S9 build a multi-target closure as the union of single-target plans (Table 28); no certificate is defined for a set of targets.

Known gaps in the analysis.

1. Remark 33 is a degradation argument, not a theorem: making the greedy guarantee uniform under noisy evaluation of g needs a lower bound on the residual that the stopping rule does not provide.
2. Proposition 35 controls an expectation over the recording randomness, not a high-probability event, and only for a plan that keeps what the damaged graph hides and acts as the ideal plan elsewhere. Re-planning on a damaged graph is not covered, and the reported study does not apply the deflated budget.
3. Theorem 14 is proved for deterministic auditors. For randomised auditors Proposition 40 gives a confidence-dependent statement, which is vacuous when n approaches $|\mathcal{Q}|$.
4. Proposition 9 assumes answers drawn from the state alone. An agent that carries state across queries needs $\Delta^{\sup}$ over history-extended queries.
5. Theorem 29 needs deletion cases drawn independently. Real deletion requests arrive in bursts correlated with events, so independence is an idealisation.
6. The deployment surrogate for A^{-x} discussed in Section 9 is specified as an evaluation target, not analysed. Its error would enter Theorem 8 additively and we have not bounded it.

7. No result in the paper bounds the composition of many deletion requests over time. Sequential deletion with adaptive requests is the setting of Gupta et al. (2021) and Chourasia & Shah (2023), and porting their analysis to this model is open.

O REPRODUCIBILITY CHECKLIST

Table 40: Reproducibility checklist. Every item is settled; what the results do and do not license is in Section N.

Item	Status	Where
Claims in abstract and introduction match the results	yes	Section 1
All theoretical claims state their assumptions	yes	Assumption A1–Assumption A7
Complete proofs for all claims	yes	Section E, Table 3
Results relying on external theorems verify those theorems' hypotheses	yes	Theorems 10, 11 and 29 proofs
Algorithms given in full, including tie-breaking and stopping rules	yes	Algorithms 1 to 4
Complexity accounted for, separating oracle calls from graph work	yes	Section G
Benchmark construction fully specified	yes	Section I, Algorithm 4
Probe classes, generators and mixture weights fixed in advance	yes	Table 8
Certified and held-out probe classes disjoint	yes	Table 8
Baseline implementations specified, including where a baseline is undefined	yes	Section I
Metric definitions given, with aggregation and interval method	yes	Table 9
Hyperparameters, seeds, and number of runs stated	yes	Section I
Success criteria pre-registered before any run	yes	Section 8; outcomes recorded against each
Statistical plan followed (paired tests, effect sizes, multiplicity)	yes	Section K
Threats to protocol validity stated	yes	Section I
Experimental results reported	yes	Section K, on the structural benchmark
Uncertainty reported	partly	standard deviations over cases and seeds in the structural tables; exact Clopper–Pearson intervals over cases for the confirmatory language-model evaluation; the development language-model tables give means over twelve cases without intervals
Compute budget for the full study reported	yes	structural study 1.6 h; language-model experiments 88,917 distinct model calls to a local server; one 64-vCPU machine, no GPU (Section J.6)
Implementation specified in full	yes	Section J: components, prompts, commands, generators
Data specified	yes	the generator is the data; its parameters and seeds are in Sections I and J
Code available	yes, anonymised	`https://anonymous.4open.science/r/DeleteCert-35C2`; every run's command and every generator is named in Tables 12 and 13
No real personal data used	yes	Section I, secrets are generated
Licences of assets used	yes	the benchmark is generated; the two open-weights models the pilots use are named with their digests in Section J.8

What reproducing this paper means. The proofs are reproducible by reading Section E and checking the arguments, each step of which is stated explicitly. The schematic figures are reproducible by compiling the source. The empirical study is reproducible bit-for-bit on a fixed platform: the generator is deterministic given a seed, every run writes a manifest with the configuration hash and the digest of every output, and the data figures and tables are regenerated from the run directories by the generators of Table 13. What is not reproducible from this paper is anything about a deployed agent, because none was measured. The language-model results are reproducible on narrower terms, and the two cases differ. Replaying the prompt cache on the same weights reproduces every answer, because each distinct prompt was answered once and stored. Regenerating the cache against a live server does not guarantee the same text: greedy decoding on a continuous-batching server changed the wording of 28 of 40 unseen prompts between a solo and a batched call in the recorded measurement, while changing no graded outcome. A regenerated study is therefore expected to reproduce the graded results and not the exact answers; the model is an open-weights file named by digest in Section J.8. It needs no GPU and no account; it ran on the same CPU machine as everything else.

What we checked, rather than asserted. Two checks back the two preceding claims. For determinism, the entire 36-run matrix was executed a second time from a clean checkout on a separate instance and the two result trees were compared column by column, pairing rows on run, case, arm and the within-file discriminator; across $359{,}460$ paired rows in the frontier, tier, transfer and relearning tables, every scientific column is identical, and the only columns that differ are the run identifier and the timestamp. For robustness to the seeds, the study was repeated on three seeds no reported number uses (Table 37). The comparison takes two run directories and reports agreement column by column, so either check can be repeated on a fresh pair of runs.

The same script guards changes to the code. Supporting several deletion targets (Table 28) meant changing the generator, which is the change most able to alter every number in the paper without anyone noticing. Four cells and three seeds were regenerated afterwards and compared column by column against the stored study: the frontier, tier and transfer tables agree on every column and every row. A single-target case takes the branch it always took, and that is checked rather than asserted. Adding the fourth transfer evaluation (Table 22) was checked the same way, on the whole matrix: the frontier, tier and relearning tables are identical row for row, and the transfer table differs by exactly the $18{,}198$ rows the new evaluation adds.

Anonymity. No author, affiliation, funding source or internal system name appears anywhere in this document, including in the appendices, the figure sources and the bibliography. The only repository the document names is the anonymised review archive, which carries no author identity; the implementation appendix specifies the code without naming any other repository or system.