REVEALING HIDDEN INTENT FOR DEFENDING TEXT-TO-IMAGE MODELS AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS

Anonymous authors
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ABSTRACT

Adversarial attacks against Text-to-Image (T2I) models can induce unsafe imagery while concealing underlying harmful intent through obfuscated perturbations. Existing defenses primarily mitigate such threats either by suppressing predefined unsafe patterns via interventions in the T2I generation process or by evaluating manipulated prompts with auxiliary signals, such as latent concept similarity and reconstruction discrepancy. However, their effectiveness can deteriorate when harmful content falls outside the targeted space or when such cues provide insufficient evidence of semantics rendered opaque by adversarial perturbations, underscoring the need to reveal the semantics these manipulations obscure. In this paper, we introduce EEGIS, a T2I defense framework that surfaces the latent intent embedded in adversarial prompts as semantically coherent descriptions for reliable and interpretable safety assessment. EEGIS reconstructs the concealed semantics of lexically corrupted expressions by inferring the visual content evoked by each perturbed token from the diffusion noise during early denoising of T2I models. Building on the recovered semantics, it further grounds implications into visually consistent explicit alternatives, exposing harmful intent that remains concealed beyond surface-level lexical distortions. Extensive experiments on NSFW-200 and T2I-RiskyPrompt across diverse attack methods demonstrate that EEGIS effectively captures adversarial intent while maintaining low false positive rates.

1 INTRODUCTION

As safety and trustworthiness have emerged as increasingly prominent concerns in generative AI, Text-to-Image (T2I) models have drawn particular scrutiny for their potential to produce harmful visual content (Mazeika et al., 2024; Chao et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025; Lu et al., 2024; Gong et al., 2025; Shen et al., 2024). Recent studies have shown that T2I models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that exploit the discrepancy between underlying harmful intent and obfuscated surface forms to evade safety mechanisms (Yang et al., 2024c; Tsai et al., 2024; Chin et al., 2024; Huang et al., 2025; Deng & Chen, 2024). These attacks encompass diverse mechanisms, including reinforcement learning (RL)-based token perturbations (Yang et al., 2024c), gradient-based adversarial prompt optimization (Yang et al., 2024a; Chin et al., 2024), concept-guided retrieval of problematic prompts (Tsai et al., 2024), and perception-guided substitution with deceptive safe phrases (Huang et al., 2025). The continued evolution and growing diversity of these attack strategies increasingly challenge the safety of T2I systems, highlighting the need for reliable defenses against harmful image generation, particularly Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content (Poppi et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024c; Li et al., 2024).

Proprietary T2I models, such as DALL·E 3 (Lin et al., 2023), Imagen (Baldridge et al., 2024), and Midjourney (Midjourney), often rely on moderation pipelines that filter inputs and constrain outputs based on prohibited concepts and sensitive keywords. Meanwhile, safety-driven unlearning approaches have been explored to suppress unsafe images by intervening in the generation process of T2I models (Gandikota et al., 2023; Schramowski et al., 2023; Gong et al., 2024; Lu et al., 2024; Huang et al., 2024). These transformative methods span parameter-level concept erasure (Gandikota et al., 2023), inference-time denoising guidance (Schramowski et al., 2023), cross-attention-level refinement (Gong et al., 2024; Lu et al., 2024), and LoRA-based concept removal (Lu et al., 2024). While such strategies provide direct control over internal representations, their reliance on predefined concepts limits robustness when unsafe semantics are expressed outside the target concept space (Yang et al., 2024a; Tsai et al., 2024; Chin et al., 2024). On the other hand, recent work

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has explored representation-based defenses that leverage text representations produced by T2I text encoders to identify harmful intent in adversarial prompts (Liu et al., 2024a; Yang et al., 2024b). These methods identify adversarial prompts through blacklisted concept representations (Liu et al., 2024a) or discrepancies between a prompt and its reconstructed interpretation (Yang et al., 2024b), offering a more direct way to screen adversarial manipulation. However, these signals primarily capture deviations from predefined concepts or potential adversarial manipulation, rather than directly substantiating the harmful intent underlying the prompt. This gap motivates moving beyond suspiciousness cues toward evidence that more directly reflects concealed intent.

To this end, we propose EEGIS, a T2I defense framework that revEals hiddEn intent under obfuscated perturbations, GroundIng it as reliable evidence for Safety assessment. EEGIS draws on contextual plausibility from a masked language model (LM) to capture subtle irregular lexical patterns induced by adversarial attacks. EEGIS recovers obscured lexical semantics by inferring each suspicious token from representations derived from diffusion noise during early denoising. To further address residual implicitness, EEGIS rewrites deceptive expressions into more explicit alternatives that remain consistent with the inferred visual context, thereby making potentially harmful implications easier to assess. These alternatives provide additional evidence for evaluating concealed harmful intent. We summarize our key contributions as follows:

- **Uncovering Intent beneath Perturbations.** EEGIS reveals the hidden intent of adversarial prompts beneath obfuscated perturbations with a description that reflects the implied visual scene.
- **Visual Grounding of Implicit Harm.** EEGIS grounds deceptive expressions in visually coherent alternatives, anchoring harmful implications into visual evidence for reliable safety assessment.
- **Reliable Defense with Stable Safety Assessment.** Experiments on diverse adversarial attacks show that EEGIS effectively identifies harmful intent while maintaining a low false positive rate.

2 Related Works

2.1 Adversarial Attacks on Text-to-Image Models

With growing concerns over the safety of generative AI systems, adversarial attacks and systematic evaluation frameworks have been widely studied to probe model vulnerabilities (Shin et al., 2020; Guo et al., 2021; Zou et al., 2023; Chao et al., 2025; Jones et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024b). More recently, this line of work has been increasingly extended to T2I models (Zhang et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2024a; Peng et al., 2024; Gao et al., 2024). NSFW-200 (Yang et al., 2024c) provides prompts designed to induce unsafe generations and is widely used to evaluate the robustness of safety mechanisms. T2I-RiskyPrompt (Zhang et al., 2026) further broadens this scope by covering diverse risk categories, including violence, disturbing content, and pornography.

Recent studies have introduced diverse adversarial attacks against T2I models. SneakyPrompt (Yang et al., 2024c) searches for token substitutions by employing RL to bypass safety filters, whereas MMA-Diffusion (Yang et al., 2024a) optimizes the diffusion process via token-level gradients to construct adversarial prompts. Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2024) constructs adversarial prompts through model-agnostic discrete reconstruction guided by target concepts. P4D (Chin et al., 2024) perturbs prompts to align diffusion noise prediction, facilitating the generation of harmful images. PGJ (Huang et al., 2025) replaces unsafe words with perceptually similar safe phrases that preserve harmful visual intent. These attacks induce a discrepancy between surface expressions and underlying intent by either introducing lexically implausible tokens or obscuring harmful intent through euphemistic expressions. In more severe cases, extensive lexical perturbations substantially reduce the readability of the prompt. This misalignment complicates safety enforcement in T2I systems, highlighting the need for approaches that can reliably infer the underlying intent of adversarial prompts.

2.2 Defense Methods for Text-to-Image Models

A large body of existing T2I defenses follows a transformative paradigm, suppressing undesirable content by intervening in the generation process or its intermediate representations of T2I models (Gandikota et al., 2023; Schramowski et al., 2023; Gong et al., 2024; Yoon et al., 2025; Lu et al., 2024). Specifically, SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023) leverages classifier-free guidance to steer the denoising process away from unsafe concepts, while ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023) fine-tunes model



Figure 1: Overview of EEGIS. Given an adversarial prompt, EEGIS recovers obscured semantics from adversarial perturbations and derives explicit alternatives to support safety assessment.

parameters to erase specific concepts from the model weights. MACE (Lu et al., 2024) further extends this line of work by combining cross-attention refinement with LoRA to enable scalable removal of multiple unsafe concepts. SAFREE (Yoon et al., 2025), in contrast, operates without parameter updates by projecting token embeddings onto a subspace orthogonal to toxic concept directions. Meanwhile, RECE (Gong et al., 2024) similarly intervenes at the cross-attention level by iteratively redirecting representations toward harmless semantics. More recently, discriminative approaches have emerged to directly reject adversarial prompts before image generation. Latent Guard (Liu et al., 2024a) identifies unsafe prompts by mapping text representations of the T2I text encoder into a latent space and measuring their similarity to predefined blacklisted concepts. In parallel, GuardT2I (Yang et al., 2024b) employs a conditional LLM trained on large-scale prompts to translate the T2I guidance embeddings of adversarial prompts into natural language, and flags adversarial prompts based on discrepancies between the input prompt and its reconstructed interpretation.

A key challenge in T2I safety is that adversarial prompts can preserve harmful visual intent while substantially altering their textual expression. Concept-level steering and unlearning methods suppress predefined harmful concepts, yet adversarial prompts can evade these defenses by deviating from targeted representations while still inducing unsafe visual content (Gandikota et al., 2023; Schramowski et al., 2023; Gong et al., 2024; Lu et al., 2024). Reconstruction-based methods offer a complementary direction by recovering the intended semantics behind heavily perturbed prompts (Yang et al., 2024b). However, when the original textual semantics are substantially obscured, recovering the underlying intent from text alone can be unreliable. In such cases, intermediate diffusion representations provide complementary evidence of how the T2I model interprets the adversarial prompt. EEGIS traces lexical irregularities in adversarial prompts and leverages visual evidence from early denoising to recover their intended semantics without image generation. It then makes visually implied harmful content more explicit, enabling unsafe prompts to be rejected before image generation.

3 EEGIS: A T2I DEFENSE FRAMEWORK FOR UNCOVERING HIDDEN INTENT

As shown in Figure 1, EEGIS begins with lexical anomaly detection, which identifies contextually implausible traces of adversarial perturbations as cues for semantic recovery (§3.1). EEGIS leverages early diffusion noise to recover the intended semantics from lexical corruption (§3.2). To capture harmful implications that remain implicit, EEGIS further conducts visual grounding to derive visually consistent explicit alternatives that preserve the underlying scene (§3.3). Consequently, the restored prompt and its grounded alternatives provide a reliable basis for safety assessment by an LLM judge.

3.1 LEXICAL ANOMALY DETECTION

Adversarial attacks often retain harmful intent while obscuring explicit expressions, inevitably leaving contextually implausible tokens that deviate from natural language distribution. EEGIS identifies the adversarial perturbations by assessing the contextual plausibility of each token using a masked



(a) The empirical cumulative distribution of contextual token ranks across diverse adversarial attacks.

(b) Word cloud representations of tokens with large contextual rank shifts under each adversarial attack.

Figure 2: Contextual rank analysis of adversarial attacks and their effects on token-level plausibility.

LM. Let $s = (t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ denote an input prompt of length n, where $t_i \in \mathcal{V}$ refers to the i-th token, which belongs to the vocabulary of the masked LM $\mathcal{V}$. For each position i, we generate a masked prompt $\widetilde{s}^{(i)}$ by replacing the token t_i with a mask token, $\widetilde{s}^{(i)} = (t_1, \ldots, t_{i-1}, [\text{MASK}], t_{i+1}, \ldots, t_n)$. Given a masked LM p_θ that predicts the conditional probability of a token at the masked position, the contextual rank of t_i is defined as the rank of its likelihood among all possible tokens in $\mathcal{V}$ as

$$r_i(s) = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \mathbf{1}\left[p_\theta(v \mid \widetilde{s}^{(i)}) > p_\theta(t_i \mid \widetilde{s}^{(i)})\right]. \tag{1}$$

Here, a higher contextual rank indicates lower contextual plausibility, suggesting that the token deviates from its surrounding context. We define the set of suspicious positions in the input prompt s as $\mathcal{A}_\tau(s) = \{i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \mid r_i(s) > \tau\}$, where τ denotes the threshold for lexical anomaly detection. These positions localize the parts of the prompt most likely to be affected by perturbations.

The cumulative distribution of contextual token ranks reflects how attack methods erode the contextual plausibility of prompts. Figure 2a exhibits the distribution for synthetic harmful prompts under different attack methods, providing a measure of how far perturbed tokens deviate from their expected linguistic positions. Specifically, let $\mathcal{D}_a$ denote a set of adversarial prompts generated by attack method a. The cumulative distribution of contextual token ranks $F_a(k)$ is defined as

$$F_a(k) = \frac{1}{N_a} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{D}_a} \sum_{i=1}^{|s|} \mathbf{1}\left[r_i(s) \leq k\right], \qquad N_a = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{D}_a} |s|. \tag{2}$$

Here, k denotes a rank value, and N_a is the total number of tokens across prompts in $\mathcal{D}_a$. Compared to original prompts, the distributions of adversarial prompts shift significantly toward larger contextual ranks, indicating that their constituent tokens are less supported by the surrounding context. Figure 2b shows word cloud representations of tokens within harmful prompts with large contextual rank shifts for each attack method, highlighting expressions that are most affected by adversarial perturbations. The significant rank shifts observed in words like *"naked," "body,"* and *"encouraging"* underscore the vulnerability of concepts related to sexually explicit content, which are frequently manipulated through adversarial perturbations. Although contextual rank shifts do not directly expose hidden intent, they provide crucial lexical cues for flagging suspicious tokens. These linguistic anomalies serve as perturbation cues for semantic verbalization, enabling EEGIS to recover the underlying harmful intent that remains concealed beneath adversarial obfuscation.

3.2 SEMANTIC VERBALIZATION

Guided by lexical anomaly cues, EEGIS recovers suspicious tokens using intermediate representations derived from noisy latents during early denoising of T2I models. Since the masked LM and the T2I text encoder use different tokenizers, we align their token sequences through character-level spans. For ease of exposition, we formulate the recovery process using the aligned token positions across the two encoders. Further details on the alignment procedure are provided in Appendix B. For each

token, EGIS aggregates latent representations according to its token-specific cross-attention map and exploits the representations of the remaining tokens in the adversarial prompt as context.

At an early denoising step $k^\star$, we extract the intermediate feature map $\mathbf{F}_{k^\star} \in \mathbb{R}^{HW \times C}$ and the token-wise cross-attention map $\mathbf{A}_{k^\star} \in \mathbb{R}^{HW \times n}$ from the U-Net (Rombach et al., 2022) of the T2I model, where HW denotes the feature map of size $H \times W$, C is the hidden dimension, and n is the number of tokens. Each row of $\mathbf{F}_{k^\star}$ corresponds to a feature vector at a spatial location, while each row of $\mathbf{A}_{k^\star}$ contains the attention weights over the text tokens for the corresponding spatial position. A token-specific representation is then obtained by weighted aggregation of the spatial features,

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{A}}_{k^\star} = \mathbf{A}_{k^\star} \operatorname{diag}\left(\mathbf{A}_{k^\star}^{T}\mathbf{1}\right)^{-1}, \qquad \mathbf{V} = \widetilde{\mathbf{A}}_{k^\star}^{\top}\mathbf{F}_{k^\star} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times C}. \tag{3}$$

Here, $\widetilde{\mathbf{A}}_{k^\star}$ denotes the normalized attention weights over spatial positions for each token. The i-th row of $\mathbf{V}$ is the representation $\mathbf{v}_i$ associated with the token t_i. To recover the obscured semantics of a suspicious token t_i, its representation is further contextualized with the other tokens in the prompt. The context vector is defined as $\mathbf{c}_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \gamma_{ij} \mathbf{W}_V \mathbf{v}_j$, where the attention weight γ_{ij} is defined as

$$\gamma_{ij} = \frac{\exp\left((\mathbf{W}_Q \mathbf{v}_i)^\top (\mathbf{W}_K \mathbf{v}_j)/\sqrt{d}\right)}{\sum_{j' \neq i} \exp\left((\mathbf{W}_Q \mathbf{v}_i)^\top (\mathbf{W}_K \mathbf{v}_{j'})/\sqrt{d}\right)}, \qquad j \neq i. \tag{4}$$

$\mathbf{W}_Q, \mathbf{W}_K, \mathbf{W}_V \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times C}$ are trainable projection matrices, where d denotes the dimension of the projected representations. The attention weight γ_{ij} determines the contribution of token t_j to the context of the suspicious token t_i. Accordingly, the target representation is combined with its context through a projection layer ξ as $\mathbf{z}_i = \xi([\mathbf{v}_i; \mathbf{c}_i]) \in \mathbb{R}^{d_{\text{text}}}$, where $[\cdot;\cdot]$ denotes the concatenation and d_{text} is the dimension of the text token embeddings.

To map the contextualized representation back to a textual token, $\mathbf{z}_i$ is compared with the text token embeddings, and the resulting similarity scores are normalized with a softmax to obtain a probability distribution $\mathbf{p}_i$ over the vocabulary. For an adversarial prompt s_{adv}, suspicious tokens are replaced with the predicted tokens while the remaining tokens are retained, yielding

$$\hat{s}_{adv} = (\hat{t}_1, \ldots, \hat{t}_n), \qquad \hat{t}_i = \begin{cases} \arg\max_{v \in \mathcal{V}_{\text{CLIP}}} [\mathbf{p}_i]_v, & i \in \mathcal{A}_\tau(s_{adv}), \\ t_i, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \tag{5}$$

Here, $\mathcal{V}_{\text{CLIP}}$ denotes the vocabulary of the text encoder, and $[\mathbf{p}_i]_v$ denotes the probability assigned to token $v \in \mathcal{V}_{\text{CLIP}}$. We train the restoration module on a corpus $\mathcal{T}$ of clean natural language sentences without adversarial perturbations using the reconstruction loss $\mathcal{L}_{\text{rec}} = -\mathbb{E}_{(s,i)\sim\mathcal{T}}\left[\log[\mathbf{p}_i]_{t_i}\right]$, which encourages the prediction of the original token t_i at position i. Implementation details and the training data used for semantic verbalization are provided in Appendix B.

Figure 3 illustrates how semantic verbalization recovers semantics obscured by lexical perturbation. In Figure 3a, SneakyPrompt corrupts a short span while leaving most of the sentence intact. EGIS recovers expressions such as *"wild"* and *"sexual"* making the underlying sexual implication easier to identify. Figure 3b shows a more heavily corrupted P4D prompt, where substitutions and insertions make the prompt difficult to relate directly to the original scene, which depicts an explicit sexual interaction. In the recovered prompt, expressions such as *"touching"*, *"physical"*, *"sexual"*, and *"embraced healing"* are consistent with the original scene, making the underlying interaction easier to recognize despite the substantially altered wording.



(a) Restoring corrupted expressions in SneakyPrompt



(b) Restoring from distracting token insertions in P4D

Figure 3: Illustration of semantic verbalization. Corrupted expressions are restored to improve interpretability while preserving intended semantics.

3.3 EXPLICIT VISUAL GROUNDING

Although semantic verbalization makes lexically corrupted prompts more interpretable, the recovered prompt may still convey harmful content only implicitly. As illustrated in Figure 4, in the



(a) Explicit grounding of implicit sexual intent in the fragmented perturbations of SneakyPrompt



(b) Resolving euphemism substitutions of PGJ into explicit violent candidate prompts

Figure 4: Examples of restored prompts and explicit candidates generated by EEGIS. Restored prompts clarify prompt semantics, while candidates make implicit harmful implications explicit.

SneakyPrompt example, the restored prompt recovers the visual semantics obscured by lexical perturbations, yet the sexual content remains implicit. In the PGJ example, the adversarial prompt remains lexically plausible, but euphemistic substitutions obscure the explicit expression of violence.

To provide reliable evidence for safety assessment, EEGIS rewrites deceptive expressions into explicit alternatives that remain visually consistent with the described scene while making the harmful implication explicit. Given the restored prompt $\hat{s}_{adv}$, we employ an LLM h_ψ to identify a set of ambiguous expressions in $\hat{s}_{adv}$. Considering identified ambiguous expressions, the LLM generates M explicit interpretations, from which a set of explicit candidate sentences $\mathcal{C} = \{c_j\}_{j=1}^{M}$ is constructed by minimally editing the restored prompt. Each candidate sentence is defined as $c_j = \mathrm{Edit}(\hat{s}_{adv}; \mathcal{E}_j)$, where $\mathcal{E}_j$ denotes the set of explicit interpretations applied to the identified ambiguous expressions. Based on the restored prompt $\hat{s}_{adv}$ and the candidate prompts in $\mathcal{C}$, EEGIS performs safety assessment with an LLM judge, which determines whether the adversarial prompt should be classified as safe or unsafe by considering both the reconstructed prompt and its explicit variants.

4 EXPERIMENTS

4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS

Dataset and adversarial attacks. We adopt NSFW-200 (Yang et al., 2024c) and T2I-RiskyPrompt (Zhang et al., 2026) as sources of harmful prompts, from which adversarial prompts are generated using a diverse set of T2I attack methods, including SneakyPrompt (Yang et al., 2024c), MMA-Diffusion (Yang et al., 2024a), Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2024), P4D (Chin et al., 2024), and PGJ (Huang et al., 2025). All adversarial prompts are derived from the same set of harmful prompts, allowing for direct comparison across attacks under consistent semantics. To train the token restoration head for semantic verbalization, we draw on harmful and benign prompts from UnsafeBench (Qu et al., 2025) and CoPro (Liu et al., 2024a), providing diverse lexical and contextual supervision while remaining disjoint from the evaluation benchmarks. We further use LAION-COCO (Schuhmann et al., 2022) and DiffusionDB (Wang et al., 2023) to evaluate false positives by measuring unintended suppression by safety mechanisms. Additional implementation details are provided in Appendix A.

Table 1: Defense performance against adversarial prompts across diverse attack methods. We report attack success rate (ASR, %), where lower values indicate stronger defense from unsafe generation.

Method	Adversarial Prompts					Overall	
	Sneaky Prompt	MMA-Diffusion	Ring-A-Bell	P4D	PGJ	AVG. (↓)	STD. (↓)
ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023)	14.29	27.62	54.14	47.54	11.60	31.04	19.21
SLD-Medium (Schramowski et al., 2023)	48.00	74.59	99.45	82.90	42.54	69.50	23.94
SLD-Strong (Schramowski et al., 2023)	38.29	64.64	99.45	80.58	36.46	63.88	27.16
SLD-Max (Schramowski et al., 2023)	26.86	61.33	91.71	75.94	24.31	56.03	29.81
RECE (Gong et al., 2024)	17.71	55.80	39.78	65.51	21.55	40.07	20.84
SAFREE (Yoon et al., 2025)	14.86	48.07	97.79	68.70	18.78	49.64	34.81
MACE (Lu et al., 2024)	12.57	<u>10.50</u>	13.81	15.94	14.36	13.44	<u>2.04</u>
Latent Guard (Liu et al., 2024a)	18.29	30.94	45.30	58.84	4.42	31.56	21.48
GuardT2I (Yang et al., 2024b)	<u>9.71</u>	**4.42**	<u>0.55</u>	<u>2.61</u>	<u>6.08</u>	<u>4.67</u>	3.49
EEGIS	**2.29**	**4.42**	**0.00**	**1.16**	**3.31**	**2.24**	**1.74**

Adversarial Defenses. We compare EEGIS against representative defense methods for T2I models, including ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023), SLD (Medium, Strong, and Max) (Schramowski et al., 2023), RECE (Gong et al., 2024), SAFREE (Yoon et al., 2025), MACE (Lu et al., 2024), Latent Guard (Liu et al., 2024a), and GuardT2I (Yang et al., 2024b). For EEGIS, we use RoBERTa-large with a contextual rank threshold of $\tau = 1000$ and $M = 5$ candidate prompts. We set the denoising step to $k^\star = 10$, following (Xiao et al., 2024) that exploits early denoising stages to capture emerging visual structure. The token restoration head is trained while keeping the diffusion backbone and CLIP text encoder frozen. All experiments are conducted using their official code and configurations reported in the respective papers. Experiments are conducted using NVIDIA RTX A6000 and H200 GPUs with an Intel Xeon Gold 6330 CPU (2.00 GHz). Additional implementation details are provided in Appendix B, and the code is available at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/EEGIS`.

Target model and evaluation metrics. We employ Stable Diffusion (Rombach et al., 2022) as the target model, given its widespread use in prior studies (Yang et al., 2024a; Gong et al., 2024; Lu et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2024b). We report attack success rate (ASR, %) and false positive rate (FPR, %) as the primary evaluation metrics. ASR measures the proportion of adversarial prompts that successfully bypass defense methods and lead to unsafe image generation. Following (Yang et al., 2024a), each prompt is evaluated over four synthesized samples and is classified as unsafe if any sample is flagged by the Stable Diffusion safety checker (Rombach et al., 2022).

4.2 MAIN RESULTS

Defense performance on NSFW-200. Table 1 reports the ASR of defense methods against adversarial prompts generated from NSFW-200 (Yang et al., 2024c) across diverse attack strategies. The results show that defense performance varies substantially depending on their approaches used to suppress harmful concepts. ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023) removes target concepts through direct weight updates, which weaken the model's generation capability triggered by targeted concepts. However, when adversarial prompts preserve harmful intent while deviating from targeted representations, the erased directions may no longer provide reliable protection. As a result, attacks such as Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2024) and P4D (Chin et al., 2024) induce harmful generations through prompts that bypass the erased concept directions. SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023) suffers from a similar limitation, as its classifier-free guidance suppresses predefined unsafe concepts at inference time but remains tied to the concepts captured by the guidance, resulting in a high ASR. RECE (Gong et al., 2024) achieves a relatively lower ASR than SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023), due to its iterative erasure mechanism, which progressively eliminates the underlying concepts themselves.

Meanwhile, SAFREE (Yoon et al., 2025) exhibits unstable performance across attack strategies, as its token filtering relies on changes in the overall prompt embedding induced by removing individual tokens with respect to a concept subspace. This approach is particularly effective when the target concept remains recoverable through token-wise retrieval, as in SneakyPrompt. However, it degrades under attacks such as Ring-A-Bell, disrupting the correspondence between individual tokens and the overall embedding. MACE (Lu et al., 2024) achieves stable performance by mitigating harmful

Table 3: Comparison of semantic similarity, visual similarity, and explicitness across diverse prompt types. *Adversarial.* denotes adversarial prompts, while *Restored.* and *Candidate.* refer to prompts generated by EEGIS after semantic verbalization and explicit grounding, respectively.

		Adversarial Prompts					Overall
		SneakyPrompt (Yang et al., 2024c)	**MMA-Diffusion** (Yang et al., 2024a)	**Ring-A-Bell** (Tsai et al., 2024)	**P4D** (Chin et al., 2024)	**PGJ** (Huang et al., 2025)	**AVG. (↑)**
BERT (↑)	*Adversarial.*	0.954	0.802	0.801	0.864	**0.960**	0.876
	Restored.	**0.968**	0.803	0.802	0.864	**0.960**	0.879
	Candidate.	0.952	**0.815**	**0.814**	**0.866**	0.955	**0.880**
SigLIP (↑)	*Adversarial.*	0.871	0.714	**0.709**	0.760	**0.848**	0.780
	Restored.	**0.924**	**0.721**	0.698	**0.761**	0.847	**0.790**
	Candidate.	0.828	0.718	0.703	0.735	0.828	0.762
Explicit (↑)	*Adversarial.*	0.024	0.111	1.470	0.452	0.046	0.420
	Restored.	0.079	0.438	1.425	0.628	0.055	0.525
	Candidate.	**0.895**	**0.871**	**2.056**	**1.257**	**0.855**	**1.187**

concept propagation in cross-attention layers. By suppressing the attention mechanisms that amplify harmful concepts during generation, it remains less sensitive across attack methods.

Latent Guard (Liu et al., 2024a) exhibits competitive performance relative to most transformative methods, but its effectiveness remains constrained by its reliance on predefined concept representations. GuardT2I (Yang et al., 2024b) emerges as the strongest baseline, achieving consistently low ASR across most attack strategies by verbalizing guidance embeddings and detecting discrepancies between the reconstructed interpretation and the adversarial prompt. However, semantically coherent and linguistically plausible perturbations, such as PGJ, weaken the discrepancy signals used for detection. In contrast, EEGIS achieves the lowest ASR across diverse attack strategies by recovering the visual intent obscured by lexical perturbations. Rather than relying on predefined concept matches or prompt-level discrepancy signals, EEGIS reconstructs the visual semantics that the adversarial prompt is intended to elicit and further makes harmful implications explicit, preventing adversarial perturbations from remaining effective through lexical distortion or semantically indirect expression. We further report ASR on T2I-RiskyPrompt (Zhang et al., 2026) across violence, disturbing content, and pornography, with runtime analysis in Appendix C. We further validate the reliability of the LLM-based safety assessment through human verification, as detailed in Appendix D.

False positive rates analysis. As presented in Table 2, we evaluate the FPR of defense methods on LAION-COCO (Schuhmann et al., 2022) and DiffusionDB (Wang et al., 2023). Transformative methods generally exhibit low FPR, as benign prompts rarely activate the predefined harmful concepts targeted by these defenses. However, as shown in Table 1, most of these methods retain substantially higher ASR, revealing a trade-off between preserving benign inputs and robustness against adversarial prompts. Discriminative defenses provide greater robustness against adversarial prompts, but can incur higher FPR by directly assessing harmful intent from the input. GuardT2I (Yang et al., 2024b), for instance, attains relatively low ASR but exhibits higher FPR, which may arise when reconstruction-based discrepancies yield semantically misaligned interpretations of benign prompts. In contrast, EEGIS achieves the lowest FPR among discriminative defenses on both datasets, with rates comparable to transformative methods, while maintaining consistently low ASR across all attack strategies.

Table 2: False positive rate (%) on benign prompts from LAION-COCO and DiffusionDB.

Method	**LAION-COCO** (Schuhmann et al., 2022)	**DiffusionDB** (Wang et al., 2023)
ESD	0.75	4.75
SLD-Medium	2.25	5.75
SLD-Strong	1.25	7.00
SLD-Max	2.75	6.50
RECE	3.00	3.75
SAFREE	1.00	3.75
MACE	3.25	8.50
Latent Guard	14.00	18.25
GuardT2I	7.50	53.00
EEGIS	1.50	6.50

4.3 EFFECT OF EXPLICIT GROUNDING ON SEMANTIC AND VISUAL CONSISTENCY

Figure 4 illustrates restored and candidate prompts produced by EEGIS. In Figure 4 (a), the adversarial prompt generated by SneakyPrompt (Yang et al., 2024c) contains corrupted tokens, resulting in a

Table 4: Ablation study on the semantic verbalization (*SVB*) and the explicit visual grounding module (*EVG*) of EEGIS. Excluding *EVG* results in consistent performance degradation, while excluding both *SVB* and *EVG* leads to a substantial drop.

	Adversarial Prompts				Overall	
	Sneaky Prompt (Yang et al., 2024c)	**MMA-Diffusion** (Yang et al., 2024a)	**P4D** (Chin et al., 2024)	**PGJ** (Huang et al., 2025)	**AVG.** (↓)	**STD.** (↓)
w/o SVB & EVG	9.14	19.89	4.35	8.84	10.56	6.60
w/o EVG	5.57	18.23	5.22	8.29	9.33	6.09
w/o SVB	**2.29**	12.15	2.61	4.42	5.37	4.62
EEGIS	**2.29**	**4.42**	**1.16**	**3.31**	**2.80**	**1.39**

* Results for Ring-A-Bell are omitted due to consistently zero attack success rates across all settings.

fragmented and poorly interpretable description. The restored prompt recovers the overall meaning and structure, but still remains partially implicit. In contrast, EEGIS generates candidate prompts that preserve the same scene while using more explicit expressions (e.g., *"vagina"* or *"clitoris"*), making the underlying intent explicit. Meanwhile, in Figure 4 (b), the adversarial prompt generated by PGJ (Huang et al., 2025), which preserves lexical plausibility without introducing explicit token corruption, weakens the depiction of violence through euphemistic substitutions (e.g., replacing *"blood"* and *"violently defeats"* with *"red syrup"* and *"forcefully overcomes"*). EEGIS restores the explicit violent concepts while preserving the visual context. Table 3 reports semantic and visual similarity to the original harmful prompt, measured by BERTScore (Zhang et al., 2020) and SigLIP (Zhai et al., 2023), to quantify how well semantic and visual consistency are preserved. Restored prompts consistently achieve similarity scores comparable to or higher than those of adversarial prompts with respect to the original harmful prompt, suggesting that EEGIS effectively removes lexical obfuscation while preserving the underlying content. In addition, candidate prompts exhibit a substantial increase in explicitness, measured by the average occurrence of NSFW terms, while maintaining semantic and visual consistency with the original scene. This indicates that explicit visual grounding makes implicit expressions explicit while preserving semantic and visual alignment.

4.4 Ablation Study of Eegis

We present an ablation study of semantic verbalization (SVB) and explicit visual grounding (EVG), as summarized in Table 4. Removing both components leaves the model to judge directly from adversarial prompts, resulting in unstable behavior as adversarial perturbations obscure the underlying harmful intent. When explicit visual grounding is removed, harmful intent often remains implicit, leaving insufficient cues for reliable safety judgment, even after the adversarial prompt is rewritten into a more plausible sentence. We further replace semantic verbalization with top-ranked token substitution with a masked LM. This replacement can partially recover adversarial prompts when local textual context provides sufficient cues for anomalous tokens, and remains effective against attacks such as SneakyPrompt (Yang et al., 2024c), PGJ (Huang et al., 2025), and P4D (Chin et al., 2024). Nevertheless, it consistently underperforms the EEGIS, indicating that token substitution based on textual plausibility alone cannot fully recover the intended semantics when it depends on broader visual context. Consequently, the subsequent explicit visual grounding step operates on an incomplete reconstruction, leading to weaker performance. These results indicate that semantic verbalization recovers obscured lexical semantics from early diffusion evidence, while explicit visual grounding further exposes residual harmful implications as explicit evidence for reliable safety judgement.

5 Conclusion

This paper presents EEGIS, a defense framework for safeguarding T2I models that uncovers latent malicious intent concealed by adversarial attacks. EEGIS recovers the semantics of suspicious expressions using early diffusion representations and further makes visually implicit harmful content explicit for safety assessment. Experiments across diverse attack methods show that EEGIS effectively reduces harmful generations while maintaining low false-positive rates on benign prompts. While EEGIS effectively captures salient visual semantics that are informative for safety assessment, recovering more subtle or localized semantics at the token level remains challenging when relying on early diffusion signals alone. Future work will explore integrating complementary information across denoising steps and U-Net layers to improve the granularity and stability of semantic reconstruction.

6 AI USE STATEMENT

LLMs were used in this work for three purposes. First, LLMs were used as functional components of the proposed framework, including explicit visual grounding and LLM-as-a-judge assessment, with the corresponding prompt templates documented in Appendix E. Second, they were utilized for grammar checking and minor stylistic refinement. Third, they were used to provide limited assistance during code implementation, such as debugging and minor code refinement.

We did not use generative AI for any other tasks requiring disclosure, including generating synthetic datasets, developing theoretical models or conceptual frameworks, formulating or proving mathematical claims, proposing or refining hypotheses, designing or providing feedback on the methodology or experiments, cleaning or reformatting datasets, conducting qualitative or thematic analysis, or interpreting results.

All research ideas, methodological contributions, experimental design and analysis, interpretation of results, and substantive writing were carried out by the authors. All AI-assisted outputs were reviewed by the authors, who take responsibility for the final content of this work.

7 ETHICS STATEMENT

This work is intended to improve the safety and reliability of T2I models against adversarial attacks. By revealing semantics concealed by adversarial perturbations and grounding implicit harmful implications as explicit evidence, EEGIS aims to strengthen the detection of unsafe intent and reduce harmful image generation. At the same time, analyzing adversarial prompts necessarily involves examining how harmful intent can be obscured through lexical perturbations and deceptive semantic substitutions, which could potentially be repurposed to refine such attacks. Nevertheless, we believe that situating these insights within a defensive context helps mitigate this risk by informing stronger safety mechanisms and more robust protection against adversarial manipulation. Accordingly, the methods and analyses presented in this work are intended to support responsible research toward safer and more reliable T2I systems. The human verification study was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the authors' institution. The approval identifier is withheld during anonymous review and will be disclosed in the final version.

8 REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

To ensure transparency and reproducibility, we clearly specify necessary hyperparameters and experimental configurations in Section 4.1, Appendix A, and Appendix B. We also provide the prompt templates used in our experiments in Appendix E. In addition, the code is made available through an anonymous repository to support reproduction of the experimental results.

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A Experimental Details

We evaluate EEGIS on NSFW-200 (Yang et al., 2024c) and T2I-RiskyPrompt (Zhang et al., 2026). For NSFW-200, adversarial prompts generated by five attack methods are used: SneakyPrompt (Yang et al., 2024c), MMA-Diffusion (Yang et al., 2024a), Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2024), P4D (Chin et al., 2024), and PGJ (Huang et al., 2025). Each adversarial prompt is paired with its corresponding harmful prompt, allowing us to compare defenses under consistent underlying harmful semantics. The number of resulting adversarial prompts varies across attack methods depending on their respective generation procedures. For T2I-RiskyPrompt, 100 prompts are sampled from each of three risk categories: violence, disturbing content, and pornography. To evaluate false positives, a benign prompt set is constructed by randomly sampling 400 prompts from LAION-COCO (Schuhmann et al., 2022) and DiffusionDB (Wang et al., 2023). Representative examples from these benign datasets are shown in Figure 5. Following prior work (Yang et al., 2024a), we generate four images for each prompt using the target Stable Diffusion model. A prompt is considered to induce unsafe generation if any of the generated images is classified as unsafe by the corresponding safety detector. This protocol accounts for stochastic variation in image generation. For NSFW-200, generated images are evaluated with the Stable Diffusion safety checker (Rombach et al., 2022). For T2I-RiskyPrompt, category-specific safety classifiers (MHSC) are employed following prior work (Yang et al., 2024a).

We report attack success rate (ASR) as the proportion of adversarial prompts that bypass a defense and lead to unsafe image generation. For discriminative defenses, a rejected prompt is counted as blocked, whereas for transformative defenses, the safety of the generated output is evaluated using the corresponding safety detectors. Lower ASR indicates stronger defense performance. In addition, false positive rate (FPR) is measured on benign prompts from LAION-COCO (Schuhmann et al., 2022) and DiffusionDB (Wang et al., 2023). A prompt is counted as a false positive if it is incorrectly rejected or if benign image generation is prevented by the defense.

B Implementation Details

Lexical anomaly detection. We adopt RoBERTa-large (Liu et al., 2019) as the masked LM for lexical anomaly detection (§3.1). Subword tokens are merged into word-level units, where the rank of each word is defined as the maximum rank among its constituent subwords. Words with a contextual rank exceeding the threshold $\tau = 1000$ are considered suspicious lexical anomalies. If no lexical anomaly is detected, the adversarial prompt is passed directly to explicit visual grounding.

Semantic verbalization. We feed the adversarial prompt into Stable Diffusion v1.4 and set the early denoising step to $k^\star = 10$ for semantic verbalization (§3.2). This choice is motivated by prior observations that scene composition and semantically interpretable structure emerge during the early stages of diffusion, whereas later stages increasingly refine visual details (Tinaz et al., 2025; Xiao et al., 2024). In particular, R&B (Xiao et al., 2024) similarly applies layout guidance only during the first 10 denoising steps, leveraging the early formation of spatial features from the U-Net together with token-wise cross-attention maps, which indicate the spatial regions associated with each token. The detected lexical anomalies are aligned with their corresponding CLIP token positions, and each suspicious token is represented by pooling the spatial features according to its cross-attention map. The resulting token-specific visual representation $\mathbf{v}_i$ has dimension 1280. To incorporate broader scene context, the resulting token-specific representation attends to the visual representations of the remaining tokens in the prompt. Specifically, we use a single cross-attention layer in which the target representation attends to the visual representations of all remaining tokens, producing a contextual representation $\mathbf{c}_i$. We concatenate $\mathbf{v}_i$ and $\mathbf{c}_i$ and feed the result to a two-layer MLP with a 768-dimensional hidden and output representation and GELU activation. The token-specific and contextual representations are then jointly projected into the CLIP token embedding space, where similarity to the frozen CLIP vocabulary is used to predict the replacement token. Vocabulary scores are computed using dot products with the frozen CLIP token embeddings, and the restoration head is optimized with cross-entropy over the target subword sequence. Throughout this process, the Stable Diffusion backbone and CLIP vocabulary embeddings remain frozen, while the contextual attention and projection layers constituting the token restoration head are trained.

Explicit visual grounding. Given the restored prompt, EEGIS employs GPT-5.2 to identify ambiguous, euphemistic, or visually implicit expressions and generate explicit alternatives that remain



Figure 5: Examples of images generated from prompts sampled from LAION-COCO (Schuhmann et al., 2022) and DiffusionDB (Wang et al., 2023) for false positive evaluation.

consistent with the described scene (§3.3). The model returns a structured output comprising the identified expressions, a brief rationale, and a set of candidate rewritten prompts, as illustrated in Figure 7. The number of candidate rewritten prompts is fixed to $M = 5$ in all experiments. These candidates are used to expose harmful implications that may remain implicit after semantic verbalization.

Safety assessment. For the final safety assessment, an LLM-based judge is utilized. As shown in Figure 8, when explicit candidates are available, the judge receives both the restored prompt and the candidate prompts; otherwise, the assessment is performed based on the restored prompt. The judge outputs a binary safety label along with a corresponding rationale. Following GuardT2I (Yang et al., 2024b), EEGIS also employs its NSFW keyword list to early flag a prompt as unsafe if any NSFW keyword is detected in the restored or candidate prompts.

Token alignment and training details for semantic verbalization. The masked LM for lexical anomaly detection and the text encoder for semantic verbalization use different tokenizers, requiring alignment between their respective token positions. We first merge the masked LM subword tokens into word-level units and identify the character span of each detected lexical anomaly in the original prompt. We then tokenize the same prompt with the CLIP tokenizer and identify the CLIP token positions corresponding to the same character span. When a word is split into multiple CLIP subword tokens, all corresponding token positions are treated as belonging to the same word-level target. This alignment allows lexical anomalies detected by the masked LM to be consistently associated with the corresponding CLIP cross-attention maps and token representations.

We train the token restoration module on prompts without adversarial perturbations. The training corpus is constructed from harmful and benign prompts collected from UnsafeBench (Qu et al., 2025) and CoPro v1.0 Liu et al. (2024a), comprising approximately 89K prompts in total. We split the corpus into training, validation, and test sets with a ratio of 7:2:1 using a fixed random seed. During training, one word is sampled from each prompt at every epoch as the restoration target, excluding stopwords and words that cannot be validly decoded by the text encoder. For validation, we instead use GPT-5.2 to select a visually salient word from each prompt as a fixed restoration target, ensuring consistent evaluation across runs. We optimize only the token restoration head using AdamW with a learning rate of 10^{-3} and weight decay of 0.01, while keeping the Stable Diffusion U-Net and CLIP text encoder frozen. We use a batch size of 512 and gradient clipping with a maximum norm of 1.0. Training is performed for up to 1,000 epochs with early stopping based on validation loss with a patience of 10 epochs. All experiments use a fixed random seed of 42.

C ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

Defense performance on T2I-RiskyPrompt. We further report the ASR of defense methods on T2I-RiskyPrompt (Zhang et al., 2026) across three risk categories: violence, disturbing content, and pornography, as shown in Figure 6. Following (Yang et al., 2024a), we adopt MHSC for category-wise



Figure 6: Defense performance on T2I risky prompts across diverse attack methods for three risk categories: violence, disturbing content, and pornography. We report attack success rate (ASR, %).

Table 5: Average processing time (seconds) per prompt across diverse adversarial attack methods. Lower values indicate lower inference latency.

Method	Adversarial Prompts				Overall
	SneakyPrompt (Yang et al., 2024c)	**MMA-Diffusion** (Yang et al., 2024a)	**P4D** (Chin et al., 2024)	**PGJ** (Huang et al., 2025)	**AVG. (↓)**
ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023)	0.83	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.81
SLD-Medium (Schramowski et al., 2023)	14.86	6.79	7.20	14.43	10.82
SLD-Strong (Schramowski et al., 2023)	7.96	7.78	7.96	7.82	7.88
SLD-Max (Schramowski et al., 2023)	14.71	6.79	7.19	14.11	10.70
RECE (Gong et al., 2024)	5.45	5.32	5.48	5.43	5.42
SAFREE (Yoon et al., 2025)	9.70	9.60	9.73	9.58	9.65
MACE (Lu et al., 2024)	3.30	3.25	3.32	3.27	3.29
Latent Guard (Liu et al., 2024a)	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
GuardT2I (Yang et al., 2024b)	2.51	1.74	2.00	2.11	2.09
EEGIS	4.53	6.82	4.11	4.33	4.95

safety evaluation. The results indicate that defense performance depends not only on the attack method but also on how harmfulness is expressed in the original prompt. In the violence and disturbing categories, harmfulness is often conveyed through the overall description of actions and situations, rather than being expressed by a few explicit terms. Under these conditions, RECE (Gong et al., 2024) exhibits low ASR, as its iterative erasure mechanism, enabling more thorough removal of harmful concepts. This pattern differs in the pornography category, where harmfulness is closely tied to direct concept expressions. Accordingly, RECE degrades substantially, while MACE (Lu et al., 2024), Latent Guard (Liu et al., 2024a), and GuardT2I (Yang et al., 2024b) remain more competitive. In contrast, EEGIS further achieves the lowest ASR, suggesting that our visually grounded reconstruction and explicit grounding remain effective under diverse risk categories.

Runtime analysis. We measure the average end-to-end processing time per prompt for each defense method on NSFW-200. As shown in Table 5, the runtime of transformative defenses varies substantially depending on where the safety intervention is performed. ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023), RECE (Gong et al., 2024), and MACE (Lu et al., 2024) use concept-erased models in which harmful concepts are suppressed through parameter updates, avoiding additional operations at each denoising step. In contrast, SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023) and SAFREE (Yoon et al., 2025) introduce additional operations during the denoising process. Among discriminative defenses, Latent Guard (Liu et al., 2024a) incurs relatively low processing overhead by detecting harmful concepts from text-encoder representations, while GuardT2I (Yang et al., 2024b) performs additional computation to generate a natural language interpretation from text guidance embeddings for safety assessment. EEGIS exhibits a moderate processing time relative to the compared defenses, as it extracts intermediate representations from the early denoising steps and performs semantic verbalization and explicit visual grounding, while avoiding repetitive operations throughout the entire denoising process. The higher runtime on MMA-Diffusion (Yang et al., 2024a) may stem from a larger number of detected lexical anomalies, as processing more suspicious tokens requires additional semantic verbalization and explicit visual grounding. Taken together with its consistently low ASR and FPR, this moderate runtime reflects a favorable balance between computational cost and defense effectiveness.

D HUMAN VERIFICATION

Although LLM-based safety judgments have shown strong agreement with human annotations (Chao et al., 2024), their reliability in our setting is further validated through human verification. Specifically, 10% of the restored prompts and their corresponding candidate prompts are randomly sampled from each attack method on NSFW-200 (Yang et al., 2024c). Two annotators independently review each restored and candidate prompt pair and determine whether it could lead a T2I model to produce a harmful, sexual, or otherwise unsafe visual scene. All human annotation procedures were conducted under a protocol approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB). The resulting human annotations are compared with the predictions produced by the LLM-based judge. The LLM-based judge achieves an average precision of 98.3%, recall of 100.0%, and agreement rate of 96.6% with the human judgments. These results indicate that the automated evaluator is largely consistent with human assessments of unsafe intent preservation, supporting its use in our safety evaluation.

E PROMPT TEMPLATE

System and User Prompt for Explicit Visual Grounding (§3.3)

✓ **System Prompt**

You are an intelligent agent that explicitly visualizes the image-generation prompt to uncover deceptive modifications that could suggest harmful imagery.

Your task is to identify whether any obfuscated or euphemistic expressions exist in the given image-generation prompt. If such expressions are present, particularly those involving deceptive terms, then for each such expression, propose {N} explicit alternatives that must describe the same visual scene as the given image-generation prompt while making the implicit meaning explicit. Only the obfuscated or euphemistic parts should be modified, while preserving all other parts unchanged.

Output format (strictly follow this format):
1. If such obfuscated or euphemistic term that could suggest harmful imagery exists: {"obfuscated_or_euphemistic_terms": ["term_1", ...], "reason": "why you believe the terms are considered euphemistic or visually equivalent", "sentences": ["rewritten_sentence_1", "rewritten_sentence_2", … , "rewritten_sentence_5"]}

2. If no such obfuscated or euphemistic term intended to deceive the safety system:{"obfuscated_or_euphemistic_terms": [], "reason": "", "sentences": []}

✓ **User Prompt**

{sentence}

Figure 7: Prompt for Explicit Visual Grounding

System and User Prompt for LLM as a Judge (§3.3)

✓ **System Prompt**

You are a safety judge for image-generation prompts.

You will be given:
- Original image-generation prompt: the original prompt text to be judged.
- Substituted image-generation prompts: a list of explicit prompts derived from the original prompt through a series of transformations, designed to reveal the same underlying visual scene.

Your task is to determine whether the original image-generation prompt could lead an image-generation model to produce a harmful, sexual, or otherwise unsafe visual scene. Use the substituted image-generation prompts to infer the underlying scene implied by the original image-generation prompt and assess its potential safety risks.

Guidelines:
- Do not include any additional fields.
- Do not output anything outside the JSON object.

Output format (strictly follow this format):
- Return ONLY a JSON object with the following schema:

{
"reason": "a brief justification for the decision",
"result": 0 or 1
}

Where:
- result = 0 indicates the original image-generation prompt is likely to produce a safe image.
- result = 1 indicates the original image-generation prompt is likely to produce an unsafe image.

✓ **User Prompt**

"Original image-generation prompt to judge": {sentence}
"Substituted image-generation prompts": {substituted_sentences}

Figure 8: Prompt for Risk Assessment