LoRA Safety Patches: Capability-Preserving Refusal Tuning with Safety Data Alone

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Abstract

Safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) often improves resistance to harmful instructions and jailbreak attacks but degrades general capabilities. Existing approaches mitigate this trade-off by mixing safety and general-purpose data, making alignment sensitive to data composition. In this work, we empirically and mechanistically investigate whether standard LoRA can improve safety during safety alignment without sacrificing pretrained capabilities. Across multiple LLM families, LoRA-based refusal tuning **using only safety data substantially improves safety while largely preserving general capabilities**. Compared with full-parameter tuning, it also supports continual safety alignment with negligible utility loss and exhibits less safety regression under continuous benign fine-tuning. To better understand this behavior, we conduct empirical analyses of parameter updates, hidden-state shifts, and subspace similarity. Our results show that LoRA-based safety updates introduce substantially lower interference with the model's intrinsic transformations than full-parameter tuning, suggesting a form of subspace decoupling that enables lightweight and modular safety patching for LLMs.

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks (Hurst et al., 2024; Dubey et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2024a), but their ability to generate harmful, unsafe, or policy-violating content remains a major concern (Mo et al., 2023; Ji et al., 2024). To mitigate such risks, recent post-training approaches commonly employ safety alignment techniques such as supervised refusal tuning (Bianchi et al., 2023; Choi et al., 2024), reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) (Dai et al., 2023; Ouyang et al., 2022), and preference optimization methods such as DPO (Rafailov et al., 2024; Mou et al., 2025), aiming to improve model resistance against harmful instructions and jailbreak attacks (Wei et al., 2023).

However, safety alignment often introduces a challenging trade-off between safety and general performance. Existing studies have shown that aggressively optimizing models for refusal behavior (Ge et al., 2024; Diao et al., 2024; Du et al., 2024) can substantially degrade helpfulness and downstream capabilities, including reasoning, instruction following, and factual knowledge retention (Lin et al., 2024; Tan et al., 2025; Yin et al., 2025; Mou et al., 2025). To alleviate this issue, many alignment pipelines rely on carefully balancing safety and general-purpose data during training (Lin et al., 2024; Tan et al., 2025). In practice, such balancing strategies are highly sensitive to data composition, sampling ratios, training methods, and model scale, making safety alignment costly and difficult to maintain (Section 3.1).

In this work, we empirically and mechanistically study standard LoRA rather than propose a new optimization algorithm. We ask whether it can directly improve the safety of instruction-tuned models using only safety data while preserving their original capabilities, unlike prior work on general-domain capability preservation (Wang et al., 2023; Biderman et al., 2024) or safety retention under subsequent fine-tuning (Wei et al., 2024; Xue & Mirzasoleiman, 2025; Perin et al., 2025). Across multiple model families and alignment settings, LoRA-based refusal tuning substantially mitigates the safety–utility trade-off, delivering strong improvements in jailbreak defense while largely preserving general capabilities without mixing general instruction data, thereby supporting its use as a modular "safety patch" (Section 3.2).

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

(a) General-purpose data choices

(b) General-purpose data ratios

Figure 1: Impact of general-purpose data used during Refusal-SFT on LLM safety and general capabilities. Left: Performance under different choices of general-purpose data. Right: Performance under different proportions of general-purpose data. Higher scores indicate better performance. Both settings demonstrate the trade-off between safety alignment and general performance.

Furthermore, we investigate two continual adaptation settings. Under lifelong safety alignment (Wang et al., 2025b), LoRA-based tuning supports iterative improvements in jailbreak defense without noticeable performance degradation. Under a benign continued fine-tuning stress test using general-purpose data, LoRA-aligned models exhibit substantially smaller safety regression than full-parameter tuning, indicating stronger robustness against fine-tuning attacks and safer modular adaptation (Section 3.3).

To better understand these phenomena, we conduct empirical analyses on *parameter updates*, *hidden-state perturbations*, and *subspace similarity*. Our results show that LoRA-based safety tuning produces larger parameter updates while inducing substantially smaller perturbations to hidden representations than full-parameter fine-tuning. Furthermore, SVD-based subspace analyses (Klema & Laub, 1980; Wall et al., 2003) reveal that LoRA update subspaces exhibit lower similarity to the pretrained model transformation space, suggesting an empirical perspective of orthogonal subspace decoupling that may help reduce interference with general capabilities (Section 4).

In summary, our contributions are three-fold:

- We show that LoRA-based refusal tuning using only safety data substantially improves jailbreak defense while largely preserving general capabilities across multiple LLM families.
- We demonstrate that LoRA-based safety tuning supports continual improvements in jailbreak defense and exhibits substantially smaller safety regression under subsequent general fine-tuning.
- We provide empirical evidence that LoRA-based safety tuning exhibits lower interference with pretrained model representations, suggesting a form of orthogonal subspace decoupling that helps preserve general capabilities during safety alignment.

2 Related Work

2.1 Safety Alignment of LLMs

Safety alignment aims to reduce harmful or policy-violating behaviors in large language models while preserving helpfulness and general performance. Existing approaches include supervised refusal tuning and instruction tuning (Ge et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2024a; Achiam et al., 2023; Dubey et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2024a), preference optimization methods such as RLHF and DPO (Schulman et al., 2017; Rafailov et al., 2024; Dai et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2023), as well as representation engineering (Zou et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2024b) and reasoning-aware alignment techniques (Guan et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2025; Mou et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2026). Prior work consistently reports a trade-off between safety alignment and general capabilities, where aggressive refusal optimization may lead to degraded reasoning ability, over-refusal, and catastrophic forgetting (Lin et al., 2024; Tan et al., 2025; Yin et al., 2025). Many alignment pipelines therefore rely on carefully balancing safety and general-purpose data during post-training (Lin et al., 2024; Tan et al., 2025).



Figure 2: LoRA for safety alignment: (a) cost-efficient and performance-preserving alternative to full-parameter fine-tuning; (b) plug-and-play safety patching in multi-round red-teaming and continuous learning; (c) more robust to subsequent general fine-tuning attacks

2.2 Parameter-Efficient Fine-tuning for Safety

Parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods such as LoRA adapt pretrained models by updating only a small subset of parameters (Hu et al., 2021). Prior studies show that LoRA can better preserve pretrained capabilities and mitigate catastrophic forgetting than full-parameter fine-tuning, with studies mainly focusing on general capabilities such as mathematical reasoning, coding, and factual knowledge (Biderman et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2023). Recent low-rank studies on LLM safety either introduce specialized optimization objectives or orthogonality constraints for safety alignment (Krishna et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025a), or analyze the vulnerabilities of already safety-aligned models and their safety degradation under subsequent fine-tuning through low-rank decomposition and post-hoc parameter analysis (Wei et al., 2024; Hsu et al., 2024; Li et al., 2025; Perin et al., 2025; Arditi et al., 2024; Xue & Mirzasoleiman, 2025).

Scope and distinction. Our work instead presents an empirical and mechanistic study of standard LoRA rather than a new optimization algorithm or LoRA variant. We ask whether standard LoRA-based refusal tuning can substantially improve safety during safety alignment using only safety data while preserving pretrained capabilities. This setting differs from general-domain capability preservation and, more importantly, from safety-retention studies, which start from already safety-aligned models and aim to prevent previously acquired safety from being erased during subsequent benign fine-tuning. We provide more detailed comparison in Appendix B.

3 LoRA as Modular Safety Patches

LLMs often exhibit a trade-off between safety alignment and general performance. Existing approaches typically rely on balancing safety-oriented data with general-purpose data to mitigate catastrophic forgetting during alignment. However, such balancing strategies are highly sensitive to data composition and optimization methods, often requiring substantial tuning effort (Section 3.1).

In this section, we revisit this trade-off from the perspective of parameter-efficient fine-tuning. Surprisingly, we observe that **LoRA-based refusal alignment can substantially improve safety using only safety data, while largely preserving the model's general capabilities** (Section 3.2). We further show that such behavior remains relatively robust under continuous fine-tuning (Section 3.3). These observations motivate the empirical analyses presented in Section 4.

3.1 Revisiting the Safety–Utility Trade-off

We empirically study how the selection and proportion of general-purpose data affect the safety–utility trade-off in LLM alignment.

Model	Safety (↓)			Open-end Gen. (↑)	Knowledge (↑)	MATH (↑)	Code (↑)
	WildJailbreak	SG-Bench	SaladBench	MT-Bench	MMLU	MATH-500	HumanEval
Qwen2.5-7B-IT Models							
Instruct Model (baseline)	40.05	36.63	34.46	7.65	70.43	71.2	80.94
Refusal-SFT							
Full-parameter (safety only)	0.05 (↓99.88%)	0.08 (↓99.78%)	0.08 (↓99.77%)	6.64 (-13.20%)	67.22 (-4.56%)	60.40 (-15.17%)	79.69 (-1.54%)
Full-parameter (safety-general)	16.25 (↓59.43%)	2.26 (↓93.83%)	2.06 (↓94.02%)	6.80 (-11.11%)	68.84 (-2.26%)	61.40 (-13.76%)	79.94 (-1.24%)
LoRA-based (safety only) 🏆	**7.80 (↓80.52%)**	**0.85 (↓97.68%)**	**1.24 (↓96.40%)**	**7.64 (-0.13%)**	**69.47 (-1.36%)**	**70.20 (-1.40%)**	**81.16 (+0.27%)**
LoRA-based (safety-general)	9.05 (↓77.40%)	2.54 (↓93.07%)	2.88 (↓91.64%)	6.70 (-12.42%)	67.98 (-3.48%)	61.00 (-14.33%)	73.38 (-9.34%)
DPO							
Full-parameter (safety only)	15.95 (↓60.16%)	1.40 (↓96.18%)	2.74 (↓92.05%)	7.64 (-0.13%)	69.98 (-0.64%)	66.40 (-6.74%)	80.55 (-0.48%)
Full-parameter (safety-general)	29.95 (↓25.19%)	10.46 (↓71.44%)	11.74 (↓65.91%)	7.66 (+0.13%)	70.50 (+0.10%)	69.20 (-2.81%)	82.56 (+2.00%)
LoRA-based (safety only)	29.40 (↓26.61%)	15.11 (↓58.74%)	15.80 (↓54.17%)	7.71 (+0.78%)	70.20 (-0.33%)	71.60 (+0.56%)	81.52 (+0.72%)
LoRA-based (safety-general)	33.20 (↓17.10%)	18.40 (↓49.77%)	18.95 (↓45.01%)	7.74 (+1.18%)	70.85 (+0.60%)	71.80 (+0.84%)	82.90 (+2.42%)
LLAMA3.1-8B-IT Models							
Instruct Model (baseline)	18.30	10.82	24.62	7.43	54.48	45.8	68.63
Refusal-SFT							
Full-parameter (safety only)	0.05 (↓99.73%)	0.01 (↓99.91%)	0.02 (↓99.92%)	6.06 (-18.45%)	9.34 (-82.85%)	32.60 (-28.82%)	66.28 (-3.42%)
Full-parameter (safety-general)	15.30 (↓16.39%)	3.17 (↓70.71%)	3.22 (↓86.92%)	7.10 (-4.44%)	63.41 (+16.45%)	42.00 (-8.30%)	64.63 (-5.84%)
LoRA-based (safety only) 🏆	**0.45 (↓97.54%)**	**0.07 (↓99.35%)**	**0.24 (↓99.03%)**	**7.31 (-1.62%)**	**53.49 (-1.82%)**	**45.60 (-0.44%)**	**68.40 (-0.34%)**
LoRA-based (safety-general)	13.55 (↓25.96%)	5.19 (↓52.03%)	6.24 (↓74.65%)	7.05 (-5.11%)	60.42 (+10.90%)	45.00 (-1.75%)	64.54 (-5.96%)
DPO							
Full-parameter (safety only)	6.45 (↓64.75%)	0.76 (↓92.97%)	3.98 (↓83.83%)	7.37 (-0.81%)	11.83 (-78.28%)	45.80 (0.00%)	67.40 (-1.79%)
Full-parameter (safety-general)	21.15 (↑15.57%)	5.79 (↓46.50%)	22.86 (↓7.16%)	7.45 (+0.27%)	54.98 (+0.92%)	47.40 (+3.50%)	64.51 (-6.00%)
LoRA-based (safety only)	11.15 (↓39.07%)	3.41 (↓68.48%)	14.78 (↓39.97%)	7.58 (+2.02%)	54.40 (-0.15%)	46.20 (+0.87%)	67.79 (-1.22%)
LoRA-based (safety-general)	15.80 (↓13.66%)	5.90 (↓45.47%)	18.50 (↓24.86%)	7.60 (+2.29%)	55.20 (+1.32%)	47.00 (+2.62%)	66.50 (-3.10%)
Mistral-7B-IT-v0.3 Models							
Instruct Model (baseline)	56.70	60.55	43.14	6.55	56.81	10.0	40.24
Refusal-SFT							
Full-parameter (safety only)	0.00 (↓100.00%)	0.02 (↓99.97%)	0.10 (↓99.77%)	3.08 (-52.82%)	6.25 (-89.00%)	0.40 (-96.00%)	38.96 (-3.18%)
Full-parameter (safety-general)	29.35 (↓48.24%)	5.21 (↓91.39%)	3.72 (↓91.37%)	5.83 (-11.07%)	55.50 (-2.31%)	14.40 (+44.00%)	39.85 (-0.97%)
LoRA-based (safety only) 🏆	**7.15 (↓87.39%)**	**0.06 (↓99.90%)**	**1.12 (↓97.40%)**	**6.20 (-5.34%)**	**53.36 (-6.06%)**	**12.60 (+26.00%)**	**40.21 (-0.07%)**
LoRA-based (safety-general)	12.80 (↓77.43%)	1.15 (↓98.10%)	2.80 (↓93.51%)	6.15 (-6.11%)	54.80 (-3.54%)	13.40 (+34.00%)	39.90 (-0.85%)
DPO							
Full-parameter (safety only)	0.05 (↓99.91%)	0.02 (↓99.97%)	0.16 (↓99.63%)	2.04 (-68.87%)	0.16 (-99.72%)	0.60 (-94.00%)	21.70 (-46.09%)
Full-parameter (safety-general)	37.20 (↓34.38%)	5.84 (↓90.35%)	8.96 (↓79.22%)	6.19 (-5.49%)	53.04 (-6.63%)	11.40 (+14.00%)	38.65 (-3.95%)
LoRA-based (safety only)	40.00 (↓29.45%)	18.91 (↓68.77%)	24.84 (↓42.39%)	6.53 (-0.31%)	55.12 (-2.97%)	11.80 (+18.00%)	38.49 (-4.35%)
LoRA-based (safety-general)	45.60 (↓19.58%)	24.50 (↓59.54%)	31.00 (↓28.14%)	6.58 (+0.46%)	56.00 (-1.43%)	12.80 (+28.00%)	39.10 (-2.83%)

Table 1: Comparison of LoRA-based and full-parameter safety alignment across different models. We focus on two common safety alignment methods: Refusal-SFT and DPO. 🏆 marks the best trade-off between safety and performance (maximized safety under tolerable performance loss). Percentages indicate changes relative to the instruct model ($|\Delta| < 2\%$ are labeled as ≈No Loss.)

Impact of general-purpose data selection. To study the effect of data selection, we combine SafeEdit-Train (Wang et al., 2024b) with general-purpose data from OpenOrca (Mukherjee et al., 2023), LIMA (Zhou et al., 2023), and UltraChat (Ding et al., 2023), and perform full-parameter SFT on Qwen2.5-7B-IT (Yang et al., 2024b). Figure 1(a) shows a consistent safety–utility trade-off across all settings: stronger safety improvements generally come with larger utility degradation. In particular, LIMA achieves the strongest safety gains but incurs the largest capability loss, whereas OpenOrca better preserves general performance with relatively weaker safety improvements. Additional results are provided in Appendix G.

Impact of data proportion. We further analyze the ratio between safety-critical and general-purpose data by mixing 4K $\langle$harmful query, safe response$\rangle$ pairs from SafeEdit-Train with varying amounts of OpenOrca data (4K–20K samples). Results in Figure 1(b) reveal a clear safety-utility trade-off: increasing general-purpose data improves utility preservation but weakens safety alignment, whereas higher proportions of safety data strengthen harmlessness at the cost of general capabilities. These findings highlight the difficulty of balancing safety and helpfulness in full-parameter tuning.

3.2 LoRA for Safety Alignment

Safety alignment can degrade general capabilities, while mitigating this loss by mixing safety and general-purpose data makes the safety–utility trade-off sensitive to data composition. Viewing this degradation as a form of catastrophic forgetting (Parisi et al., 2018; Song et al., 2023; Zheng et al., 2024a; Song et al., 2025), and inspired by studies that isolate domain-specific knowledge in lightweight adapters (Wang et al., 2023; Wu et al., 2025; Ren et al., 2024), we investigate LoRA as a lightweight safety patch.

We compare Refusal-SFT and DPO under both full-parameter and LoRA fine-tuning in the *Safety Only* and *Safety–General Mixture* settings. To account for their different parameterizations, we tune

Model	Safety (↓)			Open-end Generation (↑)	Knowledge (↑)	MATH (↑)	Code (↑)
	WildJailbreak	SG-Bench (Jailbreak)	SaladBench	MT-Bench	MMLU	MATH-500	HumanEval
Qwen2.5-7B-IT Models							
Qwen2.5-7B-IT	40.05	36.63	34.46	7.65	70.43	71.2	80.94
Full-parameter DPO							
- Step 0	33.45 (↓16.4%)	28.64 (↓21.8%)	23.98 (↓30.4%)	7.84 (+2.5%)	70.15 (-0.4%)	70.2 (-1.4%)	81.34 (+0.5%)
- Step 1	22.90 (↓42.8%)	4.57 (↓87.5%)	10.50 (↓69.5%)	7.91 (+3.4%)	70.17 (-0.4%)	69.6 (-2.3%)	81.49 (+0.7%)
- Step 2	21.35 (↓46.7%)	2.50 (↓93.2%)	7.02 (↓79.6%)	7.85 (+2.6%)	69.75 (-1.0%)	70.0 (-1.7%)	81.12 (+0.2%)
LoRA-based Refusal-SFT 🏆							
- Step 0	32.55 (↓18.7%)	25.03 (↓31.7%)	22.20 (↓35.6%)	7.90 (+3.3%)	70.18 (-0.4%)	71.2 (0.0%)	81.40 (+0.6%)
- Step 1	21.70 (↓45.8%)	5.06 (↓86.2%)	7.70 (↓77.7%)	7.65 (0.0%)	70.00 (-0.6%)	70.4 (-1.1%)	80.64 (-0.4%)
- Step 2	**14.55** (↓63.7%)	**1.69** (↓95.4%)	**3.20** (↓90.7%)	**7.63 (-0.3%)**	**69.83 (-0.9%)**	**70.2 (-1.4%)**	**80.79 (-0.2%)**
LLaMA3.1-8B-IT Models							
LLaMA3.1-8B-IT	18.30	10.82	24.62	7.43	54.48	45.8	68.63
Full-parameter DPO							
- Step 0	12.30 (↓32.8%)	5.92 (↓45.3%)	13.84 (↓43.8%)	7.40 (-0.4%)	53.26 (-2.2%)	46.4 (+1.3%)	68.56 (-0.1%)
- Step 1	10.70 (↓41.5%)	3.21 (↓70.3%)	12.08 (↓50.9%)	7.48 (+0.7%)	52.87 (-3.0%)	45.2 (-1.3%)	68.47 (-0.2%)
- Step 2	8.65 (↓52.7%)	2.70 (↓75.0%)	10.86 (↓55.9%)	7.28 (-2.0%)	44.65 (-18.0%)	47.6 (+3.9%)	68.28 (-0.5%)
LoRA-based Refusal-SFT 🏆							
- Step 0	10.80 (↓41.0%)	4.18 (↓61.4%)	10.72 (↓56.5%)	7.39 (-0.5%)	54.06 (-0.8%)	45.8 (0.0%)	67.88 (-1.1%)
- Step 1	5.75 (↓68.6%)	0.83 (↓92.3%)	3.02 (↓87.7%)	7.22 (-2.8%)	53.54 (-1.7%)	46.4 (+1.3%)	67.21 (-2.0%)
- Step 2	**1.50** (↓91.8%)	**0.17** (↓98.4%)	**0.44** (↓98.2%)	**7.16 (-3.6%)**	**53.70 (-1.4%)**	**45.8 (0.0%)**	**68.40 (-0.3%)**

Table 2: Lifelong alignment: LoRA brings steady safety gains with minimal impact on performance.

Method	WildJailbreak	SG-Bench (Jailbreak)	SaladBench
LLAMA3.1-8B-IT	18.30	10.82	24.62
+ Full Refusal-SFT	0.05	0.01	0.02
+ Full Refusal-SFT + General-SFT	29.50	11.90	12.92
+ LoRA-based Refusal-SFT	0.45	0.07	0.24
+ LoRA-based Refusal-SFT + General-SFT	13.15	5.59	8.82

Table 3: Robustness comparison of full-parameter fine-tuning and LoRA-based Refusal SFT on continuous benign fine-tuning.

the learning rate separately for each method while holding the backbone, training data, alignment objective, number of epochs, batch size, optimizer, and training framework fixed within each matched setting; details and hyper-parameter sensitivity analyses are provided in Appendix F. Safety data is constructed from 4K jailbreak samples in SafeEdit-Train (Wang et al., 2024b). General-purpose data includes 12K OpenOrca samples (Mukherjee et al., 2023) for SFT and 12K HH-RLHF preference pairs (Bai et al., 2022) for DPO. Additional dataset details are provided in Appendices C and D. Table 1 shows three main observations.

- **Refusal-SFT improves safety more aggressively than DPO, but causes larger utility degradation.** Full-parameter Refusal-SFT substantially reduces jailbreak success rates, but often degrades reasoning and open-ended generation. DPO better preserves general capabilities while providing weaker jailbreak defense.
- **Full-parameter tuning on safety-only data can severely damage general capabilities.** Although safety-only tuning improves jailbreak defense, it frequently causes over-refusal and significant performance collapse. For example, LLAMA3.1-8B-IT and Mistral-7B-IT exhibit near-zero MMLU scores after full-parameter safety tuning.
- **LoRA-based Refusal-SFT achieves a favorable safety-utility trade-off using only safety data.** Compared with full-parameter tuning, LoRA substantially improves jailbreak defense while largely preserving general capabilities, without requiring mixed general-purpose training data. Interestingly, incorporating additional general-purpose data does not consistently improve LoRA-based alignment and may even degrade certain capabilities, possibly due to competing optimization objectives within the limited low-rank adaptation space. LoRA also induces substantially less over-refusal on benign but superficially risky prompts than full-parameter tuning (Appendix J).

In summary, we believe that LoRA can be used as a **cost-efficient** and **performance-preserving** LLM safety patch (Figure 2(a)). We also include results on larger-scale LLMs in Appendix I, with consistent conclusions.

3.3 Robustness under Continued Fine-tuning

Safety alignment in practice is rarely a one-shot process. Real-world deployment typically involves continual adaptation, including iterative safety updates in response to newly discovered jailbreak



Figure 3: Comparison of parameter update magnitudes across different safety alignment methods.

attacks and subsequent fine-tuning on general downstream tasks. Prior work has shown that such continued optimization can easily interfere with previously acquired safety behaviors, especially under full-parameter fine-tuning (Qi et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2025b). To evaluate whether LoRA-based safety alignment exhibits stronger robustness under continual adaptation, we study two representative settings: **(1) lifelong safety alignment** and **(2) benign continued fine-tuning**.

Lifelong safety alignment. In practical red-teaming pipelines (Ge et al., 2024; Guo et al., 2025), newly discovered jailbreak attacks are continuously converted into additional $\langle$harmful prompt, safe response$\rangle$ pairs for iterative safety alignment. Repeated full-parameter tuning, however, often accumulates utility degradation over time. To study whether LoRA better supports continual safety adaptation, we divide jailbreak data in SafeEdit-Train(Wang et al., 2024b) into three incremental stages, with 15 previously unseen jailbreak attack types introduced at each stage, and perform iterative alignment across multiple rounds. Table 2 presents a practical comparison between the two strongest safety–utility configurations identified in Table 1: full-parameter DPO and LoRA-based Refusal-SFT. Results show that **LoRA-based safety tuning consistently improves jailbreak defense while maintaining stable general capabilities**, whereas full-parameter tuning suffers noticeable utility degradation. These results suggest that LoRA can serve as a lightweight and modular safety patch for iterative alignment.

Robustness under benign continued fine-tuning. We next investigate a different but practically important scenario: after safety alignment, the model is further fine-tuned on benign general-purpose instruction data. Recent studies have shown that even harmless downstream fine-tuning can partially erase learned safety behaviors and reactivate harmful responses (Qi et al., 2023).

To evaluate this effect, we further perform general-purpose LoRA fine-tuning on two safety-aligned models using 4,000 instruction-following samples randomly drawn from OpenOrca, none of which contain harmful requests. Specifically, we compare: (1) a model aligned via full-parameter refusal tuning and (2) a model aligned via LoRA-based refusal tuning. The results are presented in Table 3. We observe that both models experience some degree of safety regression after subsequent general fine-tuning. However, the degradation is substantially smaller for LoRA-based alignment. In particular, LoRA-aligned models retain significantly lower jailbreak attack success rates while preserving competitive general performance. This indicates that **LoRA-based safety alignment is more robust against fine-tuning interference and continued benign fine-tuning than full-parameter alignment**.

Overall, across both continual adaptation settings, LoRA demonstrates a favorable property: it supports iterative improvements in jailbreak defense while reducing catastrophic interference with previously learned behaviors. These phenomena motivate the empirical analyses in the next section, where we further investigate parameter perturbations, hidden-state changes, and the geometric properties of LoRA-induced updates from multiple perspectives.

4 Empirical Analyses

To better understand why LoRA-based safety tuning preserves general capabilities more effectively than full-parameter fine-tuning, we analyze **parameter update magnitude**, **hidden-state perturbations**, and **the geometric relationship between pretrained weights and safety-induced updates**.



(a) Qwen2.5-7B-IT series (b) LLAMA3.1-8B-IT series

Figure 4: Comparison of hidden state shifts induced by different safety alignment methods.

Our goal is to empirically examine whether LoRA safety updates exhibit lower interference with pretrained model transformations. All analyses are conducted at the individual weight-matrix level.

4.1 Parameter Update Magnitudes

We first analyze the magnitude of parameter updates induced by different safety alignment methods. For each weight matrix, we compute the update $\Delta W = W - W_0$, where W_0 and W denote the pretrained and safety-aligned weights, respectively. We measure update magnitudes using the Frobenius norm $\|\Delta W\|_F$ (Golub & Van Loan, 2013). Results on Qwen2.5-7B-IT and LLaMA3.1-8B-IT are shown in Figure 3.

Intuitively, smaller parameter updates might be expected to preserve model capabilities more effectively. However, our results reveal several non-trivial observations.

- **Full-parameter training shows larger updates with more training data.** Mixing safety and general data greatly amplifies parameter changes (e.g., *safety-only* vs. *safety-general mixtures*). This indicates that full-parameter fine-tuning depends on the data composition rather than controlling update magnitudes to balance safety and general capability.
- **DPO produces substantially smaller parameter updates than Refusal-SFT.** This behavior is consistent with the relatively smaller capability shifts observed in downstream evaluations, indicating that DPO perturbs pretrained parameters less aggressively during safety alignment.
- **LoRA-based safety tuning often produces larger parameter updates than full-parameter tuning while preserving general capabilities substantially better.** This observation suggests that update magnitude alone may not fully characterize interference with pretrained behaviors. Instead, the transformation directions introduced by LoRA updates may exhibit comparatively lower overlap with the pretrained transformation space, motivating our subsequent geometric analyses.

4.2 Hidden-state Perturbation Analysis

We analyze hidden-state shifts ($\Delta h^{(l)} = \|h^{(l)} - h_0^{(l)}\|$) to assess the impact of alignment methods on intermediate representations. Using 400 benign and jailbreak instructions from Alpaca-eval (Li et al., 2023) and SaladBench (Li et al., 2024), we record hidden states at the last token across layers and compute the Euclidean distance between the safety-aligned model $h^{(l)}$ and the initial model $h_0^{(l)}$. Results are shown in Figure 4.

We can obtain two key findings: (1) **Overall, LoRA-based Refusal-SFT induces smaller hidden state shifts than full-parameter fine-tuning on benign inputs, while producing larger shifts on jailbreak attacks.** This aligns with the desired goal of enhancing safety without compromising general performance[1]. (2) **DPO results in smaller hidden state changes compared with Refusal-SFT.** Consistent with the findings in Section 4.1, this reflects DPO's smaller parameter perturbations, resulting in only modest safety gains while largely preserving general capabilities.

[1]We provide further analysis in Appendix M.



(a) Subspace similarity values

(b) Subspace similarity matrices

Figure 5: Illustration of similarities between safety subspaces and intrinsic transformation subspace of the initial model.

Update	Overlap	MT-Bench ↑	WildJailbreak ASR ↓
Original	0.0022	7.64	7.80
$\alpha = 0.5$	0.5191	6.01	7.12
$\alpha = 1.0$	0.9999	5.23	7.05

Table 4: Controlled intervention on the right-singular subspace of the learned LoRA update.

4.3 Geometric Analysis of Safety Update Subspaces

The preceding analyses reveal an interesting phenomenon: LoRA-based safety tuning can introduce comparatively large parameter updates while inducing relatively small perturbations on benign representations. To further characterize this behavior, we analyze the geometric relationship between pretrained model transformations and safety-induced updates.

Given a weight matrix $W \in \mathbb{R}^{d_{\text{out}} \times d_{\text{in}}}$, we perform singular value decomposition (SVD):

$$W = USV^T.$$

Here, $V \in \mathbb{R}^{\text{in_dim} \times r}$ denotes dominant directions for input transformation, while $U \in \mathbb{R}^{\text{out_dim} \times r}$ describe the corresponding output space (Ottaviani & Paoletti, 2015; Raghavendar & Dharmaiah, 2017). S contains the singular values, i.e., the scaling factors along the orthogonal directions defined by V. We denote the subspace spanned by the column vectors of V as $\text{span}(V)$. **Since V captures the principal input transformation directions, it plays a central role in shaping model behavior.**

Specifically, we compute SVDs for both W_0 and ΔW to obtain their dominant right-singular vectors V_0 and V_Δ, respectively. We then compute the directional similarity matrix:

$$\mathbf{Sim}(V_\Delta, V_0) = \left(\frac{V_\Delta}{\|V_\Delta\|}\right)^T \left(\frac{V_0}{\|V_0\|}\right),$$

where lower similarity values indicate lower directional overlap between pretrained transformations and safety-induced updates. In our experiments, both LoRA rank and SVD truncated rank are set to 8. Hyper-parameters sensitivity analyses are provided in the Section H and K. More theoretical derivations are shown in Appendix L.

As shown in Figure 5, LoRA-based alignment yields substantially lower similarity (typically < 0.1) between safety-induced updates and pretrained transformation directions, whereas full-parameter fine-tuning exhibits considerably higher similarity values (generally > 0.4). This observation suggests that LoRA-based safety updates interact less directly with the dominant transformation directions of the pretrained model.

Method	Target Domain Performance			General Performance			Top-1 Similarity
	SaladBench ↓	FinEval ↑	HumanEval ↑	MT-Bench	MMLU	MATH-500	
LLAMA3.1-8B-IT	24.62	31.89	68.63	7.43	54.48	45.80	–
+ Full-safety	0.05	27.98	66.28	6.06	9.34	32.60	0.3011
+ LoRA-safety	**0.24**	31.50	**68.40**	**7.31**	**53.49**	45.60	**0.0860**
+ Full-finance	26.12	36.71	66.89	7.14	46.05	46.60	0.3587
+ LoRA-finance	25.84	**34.20**	66.25	7.31	51.30	45.60	0.1148
+ Full-code	27.36	28.62	61.37	6.93	47.65	46.80	0.4124
+ LoRA-code	24.41	29.70	62.71	7.24	49.83	**46.60**	0.1310

Table 5: Comparison between full fine-tuning and LoRA fine-tuning on LLAMA3.1-8B-IT across different domains. Target-domain performance is reported separately from general capability benchmarks. Top-1 similarity measures the subspace similarity between ΔW and W_0.

These observations suggest that LoRA-based safety tuning introduces comparatively limited interference with pretrained representations by operating in update directions that exhibit lower overlap with pretrained transformations. This behavior is consistent with the strong preservation of general capabilities observed across our experiments.

4.4 Controlled Subspace Intervention

To investigate whether subspace overlap contributes to capability interference rather than merely correlating with it, we perform a controlled post-hoc intervention on the learned LoRA update of Qwen2.5-7B-IT. Let $\Delta W = U\Sigma V_\Delta^\top$ denote the learned update and V_0 the dominant right-singular subspace of the pretrained weight. We construct

$$V_\alpha = \mathrm{Orth}\left((1-\alpha)V_\Delta + \alpha V_0\right), \Delta W_\alpha = U\Sigma V_\alpha^\top,$$

where $\mathrm{Orth}(\cdot)$ denotes QR-based orthogonalization. This intervention preserves the update rank, singular values, left-singular vectors, and Frobenius norm while varying only its right-singular subspace. The original model directly applies the learned LoRA update; $\alpha = 0.5$ partially moves the update toward the pretrained subspace, whereas $\alpha = 1.0$ fully replaces its right-singular subspace with V_0.

As shown in Table 4, overlap with the pretrained transformation subspace increases, MT-Bench decreases substantially from 7.64 to 5.23, while WildJailbreak ASR remains comparable. Because the update rank, singular values, and norm are held fixed, these results provide intervention-based evidence that overlap with pretrained transformation directions contributes to capability interference.

4.5 Cross-Domain Analysis of LoRA Safety Updates

We further compare safety LoRA with LoRA in finance (Lu et al., 2024) and code (Chaudhary, 2023) domains. We evaluate general capability preservation, target domain knowledge enhancement, and subspace similarity with initial model transformations. Results are shown in Table 5.

We observe that: (1) safety LoRA introduces the smallest degradation to general capabilities among all examined domains; (2) safety LoRA exhibits lower subspace similarity with pretrained transformations than other domain-specific adapters; and (3) fine-tuning in other domains produce stronger cross-domain interactions, suggesting greater entanglement with pretrained domain knowledge.

Overall, these results suggest that safety-oriented LoRA updates are comparatively less intrusive than other domain-specific adapters. More discussions can refer to Appendix N.

5 Conclusion

We show that LoRA-based refusal tuning can substantially improve jailbreak robustness using only safety data while largely preserving general capabilities. Analyses of parameter updates, hidden-state shifts, and update geometry suggest that LoRA reduces interference with pretrained transformations, supporting its use as a lightweight, modular safety patch for LLMs.

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A USE OF LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS (LLMS)

We declare the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) in this research work. The LLMs serve a supportive role in the following aspects of this project:

Writing and Language Polishing: LLMs assist in improving the clarity, readability, and grammatical correctness of the manuscript. This includes refining sentence structure, improving word choice, and ensuring consistent terminology throughout the paper.

Code Development Assistance: LLMs provide assistance in writing and debugging experimental code, including data preprocessing scripts, training pipelines, and evaluation frameworks. The models help with syntax checking, code optimization suggestions, and implementation guidance for standard machine learning practices.

Literature Review Support: LLMs assist in reading and summarizing research literature to identify relevant prior work and contextualize our contributions within the existing body of knowledge. This includes assistance with understanding complex technical concepts and identifying key papers in the field.

The core research ideas, experimental design, theoretical framework, and scientific contributions presented in this work are original contributions by the authors. The LLMs do not contribute to the fundamental research conception, hypothesis formulation, or interpretation of results. All experimental work, data analysis, and conclusions are conducted and drawn by the human authors.

B SUPPLEMENTARY RELATED WORK

In this section, we provide a detailed comparison between our work and prior studies on LoRA fine-tuning and LoRA-based fine-tuning attacks mitigation. Table 6 summarizes the differences between related work and our study along four dimensions: research domain, target model, task setting, and core contribution.

- Wang et al. (2023); Biderman et al. (2024) study general-domain tasks, while we focus on safety alignment.
- We do not design a new LoRA variant as Wang et al. (2023) that explicitly enforces orthogonality between ΔW and W_0. Instead, our study empirically shows that a standard LoRA is sufficient for performance-preserving safety alignment even using only safety fine-tuning data. This property arises because LoRA-based refusal training naturally constructs a safety subspace that is approximately orthogonal to the model's intrinsic transformation space.
- Although Biderman et al. (2024) compares LoRA with full fine-tuning, its experiments are limited to the mathematics and code domains. In contrast, fine-tuning data in the safety domain predominantly consist of $\langle$harmful query, refusal response$\rangle$ pairs, which differ substantially from data used in other domains. We compare LoRA of different domains in Section 4.5 and Appendix N. We find that LoRA-based Refusal-SFT mitigates performance loss more effectively than domain-specific LoRA fine-tuning. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to propose LoRA as a safety patch for safety alignment, supported by both theoretical and empirical evidence.
- Wei et al. (2024) conducted a **post-hoc analysis of safety-aligned models**. They investigated the vulnerabilities of safety-aligned models using pruning and low-rank modification methods. They developed techniques to identify critical regions and found that these regions are essential for safety protection, and that at both the neuron and rank levels, they are decoupled from regions related to utility. In contrast, our work focus on **safety alignment training** itself. We align instruct models through LoRA-based Refusal-SFT, requiring only safety data to achieve a significant improvement in safety without compromising general performance. Our experimental analysis further reveals that LoRA can construct a safety subspace that is orthogonal to the model's intrinsic transformation space, which provides a potential explanation for performance-preserving safety alignment.
- Although Hsu et al. (2024); Li et al. (2025); Perin et al. (2025) also involve LoRA, their focus is on **fine-tuning attacks**—specifically, how to ensure that safety-aligned LLMs remain safe after further non-malicious or malicious fine-tuning. In contrast, our work targets the problem of **safety**

Title	Domain	Target Model	Task	Core Contribution
O-LoRA (Wang et al., 2023)	General	Instruct model	General FT	A method to mitigate catastrophic forgetting in multi-task continual learning.
LoRA Learns Less...(Biderman et al., 2024)	General	Instruct model	General FT	Empirical comparison between LoRA and full-parameter fine-tuning.
Assessing Brittleness...(Wei et al., 2024)	Safety	Safety-aligned	FT & Jailbreak	Empirical and theoretical analyses on why safety models are vulnerable.
Safe LoRA (Hsu et al., 2024)	Safety	Safety-aligned	FT attack	Enabling continuous general FT on aligned LLMs while preserving safety.
Salora (Li et al., 2025)	Safety	Safety-aligned	FT attack	Enabling continuous general FT on aligned LLMs while preserving safety.
LoX (Perin et al., 2025)	Safety	Safety-aligned	FT attack	Empirical and theoretical analyses explaining vulnerability to FT attacks.
Refusal in LLMs...(Arditi et al., 2024)	Safety	Safety-aligned	Jailbreak	Reveals inherent vulnerability via a single direction; designs white-box attack.
Our Work	**Safety**	**Instruct model**	**Safety align**	**Analyses of LoRA-based safety alignment advantages over full FT on safety-performance trade-off.**

Table 6: Comparison of Related Works on LoRA and Safety Alignment

Category	Dataset	# Items	Key Features
Safety	*SafeEdit-Train*	4,050	Covers 9 safety dimensions (e.g., offensiveness, bias, privacy) and 15 attack types in train set.
General	*OpenOrca*	1M	Augmented FLAN Collection, large-scale instruction tuning.
	LIMA	1,030	High-quality, human-written samples in helpful assistant style.
	Ultra-Chat	208k	Multi-turn dialogue dataset collected via Turbo APIs.

Table 7: Overview of training datasets.

alignment itself: how to train an instruction-tuned model that improves safety without degrading general capabilities. They are totally different.

- In addition, Xue & Mirzasoleiman (2025) is a concurrent work. Their study focuses on reasoning models and empirically explores best practices for LoRA-based fine-tuning, such as selecting LoRA rank and choosing the most important layers or modules to modify. Our work, by contrast, concentrates on instruct models and provides deeper analysis explaining why LoRA, compared with full fine-tuning, confers advantages for safety alignment.

In summary, our work demonstrates that LoRA-based refusal training offers clear advantages over full fine-tuning for safety alignment: it achieves strong safety improvements using only safety data (without any general instruction data), while preserving model performance well. We further provide a detailed theoretical and empirical account of this effect through the lens of subspace orthogonality.

C Training Datasets

All training datasets are list in Table 7 with statistics and brief descriptions.

Category	Dataset	# Items	Key Features
Safety	*WildJailbreak*	2,210	Synthetic jailbreak data from real chatbot interactions; includes harmful and benign adversarial cases.
	SG-Bench (jailbreak)	8,652	Malicious queries across toxic, biased, privacy, and dangerous content; augmented with 6 jailbreak techniques (e.g., prefix injection, refusal suppression, AIM).
	SALAD-Bench	5,000	Hierarchical benchmark with 6 domains, 16 tasks, and 66 categories.
General	*MT-Bench*	80	Multi-turn dialogue benchmark covering 8 categories (writing, reasoning, coding, humanities, etc.).
	MMLU	14,042	Multiple-choice exam covering 57 tasks (e.g., history, law, computer science).
	MATH	5,000	Competition-level math problems (AMC10/12, AIME), requiring step-by-step reasoning.
	HumanEval	164	Hand-written programming tasks for evaluating code generation with test cases.

Table 8: Overview of evaluation datasets.

C.1 Safety-critical Data

We use SafeEdit-Train (Wang et al., 2024b) as safety-critical data. The SafeEdit dataset encompasses 4,050 training, 2,700 validation, and 1,350 test instances. It categorizes unsafe scenarios of LLMs into 9 distinct types (Offensiveness, Bias, Physical, Mental, Illegal, Ethics, Privacy, Pornography, and Political), and collects 48 attack prompt types from online sources. Among these, 15 attack types are included in the training split. For each adversarial query, the corresponding safe responses are generated by GPT-4. To control the quality of the responses, SafeEdit trains a classifier with manually annotated data to detect unsafe responses and make manual modifications. In addition, each malicious query in the SafeEdit dataset is also paired with an unsafe response, which enables us to construct a preference dataset based on safe–unsafe response pairs.

C.2 General-purpose Data

We use OpenOrca (Mukherjee et al., 2023), LIMA (Zhou et al., 2023), and Ultra-Chat (Ding et al., 2023) as general-purpose data.

- **OpenOrca** dataset is a collection of augmented FLAN(Longpre et al., 2023) Collection data. Currently $\sim$ 1M GPT-4 completions, and $\sim$ 3.2M GPT-3.5 completions. We only use the GPT-4 completions in our experiments.
- **LIMA** dataset consists of 1,000 prompts and responses, where the outputs (responses) are stylistically aligned with each other, but the inputs (prompts) are diverse. Specifically, LIMA seek outputs in the style of a helpful AI assistant. They curate such examples from a variety of sources, primarily split into community Q&A forums and manually authored examples. LIMA highlights that high-quality and diverse data are more crucial than large-scale data, leading to a relatively small number of samples in the dataset.
- **Ultra-Chat** dataset consists of multi-round dialogue data powered by Turbo APIs to facilitate the construction of powerful language models with general conversational capability. In consideration of factors such as safeguarding privacy, they do not directly use any data available on the Internet as prompts. Instead, Ultra-chat is composed of three sectors: Questions about the World, Writing and Creation and Assistance on Existent Materials.

To minimize the impact of data size discrepancies on experimental results, we randomly sample 10K instances from both OpenOrca and Ultra-Chat for the experiments in Section 3.1. In contrast, LIMA is not subjected to such processing, as it was originally proposed to demonstrate that data quality and diversity matter more than sheer quantity.

D Details for Evaluation

D.1 Statistics of Evaluation Sets

All evaluation datasets are list in Table 8 with statistics and brief descriptions.

D.2 Safety Evaluation

For safety assessments, we evaluate by two steps. First, LLM is prompted to generate a response. Second, the safety of the response is judged using LLama-Guard2-8B (Inan et al., 2023), which can judge whether the response violates safety policies and human values by answering "safe" or "unsafe". We calculate the percentage of "unsafe" responses as attack success rate (ASR). We also compare the effect of different evaluators in Appendix Q.

D.3 General Evaluation

For MT-Bench, we adopt zero-shot and direct prompting setting for evaluation. For each instance, we conduct a multi-turn dialog with LLMs using all the questions one by one contains in the instance. Then we evaluate the responses using LLM-as-a-judge. Specifically, we split each dialogs into pairs of single question and corresponding response, send them to GPT-4o independently and ask GPT-4o to score 1-10. We finally calcuate the average score of all question and response pairs.

For MATH, we adopt zero-shot and chain-of-thought (COT) prompting method for evaluation. We prompt LLMs to reason step by step and put the final answer in `\boxed{}`. We extract the final answer of all models and make some standardizing post-process on the latex grammar of the prediction, then compare the exact match between prediction and answer.

For HumanEval, we adopt zero-shot and direct prompting setting for evaluation. We directly prompt LLMs to complete the code and run the code under the pre-designed test cases. We set temperature to 0.6 and unbiasedly sampled 20 times to calculate the average pass@1 rate.

For MMLU, we adopt zero-shot and direct prompting setting for evaluation. We directly prompt LLMs to generate options such as "A" or "B" or "C" or "D". We judge by find out whether the final answer starts with the correct option.

E Implementation Details

In this work, we primarily focus on Refusal-SFT and DPO, and conduct an in-depth analysis of the differences between full-parameter fine-tuning and LoRA fine-tuning in balancing safety and general performance. For full-parameter Refusal-SFT, we set the learning rate to 1×10^{-6} and train for 3 epochs; for full-parameter DPO, we adopt the same learning rate and train for 1 epoch. For LoRA fine-tuning, we use a learning rate of 1×10^{-5} [2] with LoRA $\alpha = 16$, while the choice of rank is discussed in detail in Appendix H. We use llamafactory (Zheng et al., 2024b) for model training. For evaluation, we adopt nucleus sampling method for decoding, and use a unified generation configuration: temperature is set to 0.6, top p is set to 0.95. All experiments are done in the same computation environment with 8 NVIDIA 96GB H20 GPUs.

F Sensitivity on learning rates

Method-specific hyperparameter calibration. LoRA and full-parameter tuning have different parameterizations and implicit regularization properties and therefore require method-specific hyperparameter calibration. Rather than applying the same learning rate to both methods, we evaluate learning rates in $1 \times 10^{-6}, 5 \times 10^{-6}, 1 \times 10^{-5}$ for both full-parameter fine-tuning and LoRA Refusal-SFT. We evaluate checkpoints after each of the three training epochs. In the results reported in the main text, the backbone model, training data, alignment objective, number of epochs, batch

[2] Through extensive experiments, we observe that full-parameter fine-tuning with an excessively high learning rate tends to cause *catastrophic forgetting*, whereas too low a learning rate in LoRA fine-tuning often leads to slow convergence.



(a) Qwen2.5-7B-IT Series



(b) LLAMA3.1-8B-IT Series

Figure 6: Effects of LoRA rank on safety and general performance in LoRA-based safety alignment.

Learning Rate	Epoch	WildJailbreak ↓	MT-Bench ↑
LLAMA3.1-8B-IT (baseline)			
–	–	18.30	7.43
Full SFT (safety–general mixture)			
1×10^{-6}	1	17.40	7.32
1×10^{-6}	2	16.20	7.20
$\mathbf{1 \times 10^{-6}}$	**3**	**15.30**	**7.10**
5×10^{-6}	3	13.25	6.89
1×10^{-5}	3	10.75	6.62
LoRA SFT (safety-only)			
1×10^{-6}	3	12.45	7.41
5×10^{-6}	3	6.50	7.37
1×10^{-5}	1	5.85	7.35
1×10^{-5}	2	1.40	7.28
$\mathbf{1 \times 10^{-5}}$	**3**	**0.45**	**7.31**

Table 9: Learning rate and checkpoint sensitivity on LLAMA3.1-8B-IT. Bold indicates the configurations used in the main experiments.

size, optimizer, and training framework are held fixed; only the parameterization and method-specific learning rate differ.

Table 9 reports representative results on LLAMA3.1-8B-IT. For learning rate comparisons, we report the final checkpoint after three epochs. Lower learning rates help full-parameter tuning preserve utility, whereas larger ones cause substantial utility degradation. In contrast, increasing the LoRA learning rate yields marked safety gains with only minor utility loss. We therefore use 1×10^{-5} for LoRA and 1×10^{-6} for full-parameter tuning. Across all tested learning rates, LoRA consistently achieves a more favorable safety–utility trade-off, confirming that our conclusion is not driven by learning rate selection. Additional training epochs generally further improve safety.

Method	Safety (↓)			Open-end Generation (↑)		
	WildJailbreak	SG-Bench (Jailbreak)	SaladBench	MT-Bench	MATH-500	HumanEval
Qwen2.5-7B-IT						
Baseline	40.05	36.63	34.46	7.65	71.2	80.94
Refusal-SFT						
w. OpenOrca	16.25	2.26	2.06	6.8	61.4	79.94
w. LIMA	5.5	0.53	1.88	6.78	56.4	73.96
w. Ultra-chat	12.05	1.66	0.64	6.6	55.8	78.66
Mistral-7B-IT-v0.3						
Baseline	56.70	60.55	43.14	6.55	10.00	40.24
Refusal-SFT						
w. OpenOrca	39.00	8.91	3.12	6.13	13.60	37.80
w. LIMA	4.65	0.07	1.30	5.34	3.80	34.15
w. Ultra-chat	30.65	1.39	2.24	5.60	10.60	43.29
LLAMA3.1-8B-IT						
Baseline	18.30	10.82	24.62	7.43	45.80	68.63
Refusal-SFT						
w. OpenOrca	21.65	4.08	2.74	7.03	44.40	64.02
w. LIMA	1.10	0.10	0.24	6.24	43.20	44.48
w. Ultra-chat	10.80	1.03	0.72	6.56	39.60	62.80

Table 10: Impact of different **choices of general-purpose data** in Refusal-SFT on LLM safety and general capabilities. Safety scores (↓) indicate reduced unsafe behavior, while higher scores (↑) on open-ended, MATH, and code tasks reflect stronger general capabilities.

Learning-rate control for the geometric analysis. To examine whether the geometric difference between LoRA and full-parameter updates is caused by the smaller learning rate used for full-parameter tuning, we additionally analyze the full-parameter SFT configuration with a learning rate of 1×10^{-5}. Its Top-1 subspace similarity remains high at 0.72, exhibiting the same high-overlap pattern as the original full-parameter result. This additional control indicates that the lower subspace overlap of LoRA updates is not explained by the learning-rate difference.

G Impact of General-Purpose Data Selection on LLM Safety Alignment

In Section 3.1, we discussed Refusal-SFT by mixing different general-purpose and safety data, and evaluated the resulting models' safety and utility. Figure 1 reports results for Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, and additional results for LLAMA3.1-8B-Instruct (in Table 10) show consistent trends: greater safety gains come at the cost of larger performance drops.

H The effect of LoRA rank on safety alignment

In the previous discussion, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of LoRA as a safety patch from empirical perspectives. In this section, we explore the impact of the LoRA rank on safety alignment. We focus on how changes in rank affect both the improvement in model safety and the preservation of general capabilities. As shown in Figure 6, the choice of rank has a slight effect on the performance of the LoRA safety patch: **excessively large ranks can weaken the safety improvement, while overly small ranks may lead to relatively greater degradation in model performance.** A more detailed exploration of the relationship between the LoRA rank and the SVD rank is provided in Appendix K.

I Scaling LoRA Safety Patches to Larger LLMs

In this section, we further investigate whether LoRA safety patches are able to enhance safety while maintaining general performance when applied to larger-scale LLMs. As shown in Table 11, we also conduct experiments on Qwen2.5-14B-IT. We get some findings consistent with Section 3.2: compared with full-parameter fine-tuning, LoRA using only safety data can achieve safety alignment while preserving general performance with minimal loss. However, we also note that for larger-scale models, the LoRA rank must be increased accordingly to reach optimal performance, with the best result found at rank = 16 in our setting.

Method	Safety (↓)			Open-end Generation (↑)	Knowledge (↑)	MATH (↑)	Code (↑)
	WildJailbreak	SG-Bench (Jailbreak)	SaladBench	MT-Bench	MMLU	MATH-500	HumanEval
Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct							
Baseline	29.55	13.30	22.86	8.17	75.49	74.8	81.22
Refusal-SFT							
Full-parameter (safety only)	0.10	0.02	0.06	7.07	45.18	59.4	71.55
Full-parameter (safety–general mix)	14.50	2.61	1.90	7.24	74.68	65.4	81.22
LoRA-based (safety only)	6.10	1.09	1.16	7.97	73.25	71.0	80.36
DPO							
Full-parameter (safety only)	12.05	0.98	2.14	8.26	68.79	74.0	70.18
Full-parameter (safety–general mix)	21.45	2.49	4.66	8.33	71.40	73.8	81.46
LoRA-based (safety only)	17.40	3.15	3.61	8.37	75.25	74.0	82.36

Table 11: Comparison of LoRA-based Refusal-SFT with other safety alignment methods in terms of safety and general performance. LoRA, as a safety patch, consistently improves safety with negligible general performance loss across model architectures.

Model / Training Setting	XSTest FRR (%) ↓
LLAMA3.1-8B-IT	6.31
+ Full SFT (safety–general mixture)	10.06
+ LoRA SFT (safety-only)	7.20
Qwen2.5-7B-IT	5.05
+ Full SFT (safety–general mixture)	18.92
+ LoRA SFT (safety-only)	8.14

Table 12: False refusal rates on benign safety-sensitive prompts from XSTest. Lower values indicate less over-refusal.

J Over-Refusal Evaluation

A lower jailbreak attack success rate may reflect either selective rejection of harmful requests or a general increase in refusal propensity. To distinguish these effects, we evaluate the models on benign but superficially risky prompts from XSTest and report the false refusal rate (FRR). As shown in Table 12, both full-parameter and LoRA-based Refusal-SFT increase over-refusal relative to the corresponding base models. However, LoRA produces substantially smaller increases: 0.89 versus 3.75 percentage points for LLAMA3.1-8B-IT, and 3.09 versus 13.87 points for Qwen2.5-7B-IT. These results suggest that LoRA's safety improvements are less attributable to indiscriminate refusal.

K On the Relationship Between LoRA Rank and SVD Decomposition

Performing SVD decomposition on ΔW with "r = LoRA rank" is only an approximation of $\Delta W = AB$. It would be beneficial to examine the orthogonality between ΔW and W_0 in higher dimensions, which would make the orthogonality measure more robust. In this section, we further investigate the intrinsic relationship between the rank of LoRA and SVD.

Specifically, we fine-tune **LLAMA3.1-8B-IT** using only safety data (SafeEdit-Train) with LoRA ranks set to 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20. For each aligned model, we perform SVD on both ΔW and W_0 with ranks chosen from the same set (4, 8, 12, 16, and 20). Following the descriptions in Section 4.3, we compute the subspace similarity.

As shown in Figure 7(a), the values represent the maximum similarity between Span(V_Δ) and Span(V_0), which depends on the ranks of LoRA and SVD. Figure 8 further shows the top 12 singular values of ΔW for different LoRA ranks. We can get two interesting findings:

- Figure 8 shows the top 12 singular values of ΔW under different LoRA ranks. We observe that the number of non-negligible singular values of ΔW matches exactly the LoRA rank. In other words, among the components of V_Δ, only the top-r components (r = LoRA rank) contribute meaningfully to ΔW, while the remaining components have negligible contribution.
- Figure 7 examines cases where the SVD rank (truncated dimensions of V_Δ and V_0) exceeds the LoRA rank. The similarity between V_Δ and V_0 above 0.1 only appears in components that



(a) Maximum similarity between Span(V_Δ) and Span(V_0) for different SVD ranks

(b) Maximum similarity matrix $\mathbf{Sim}(V_\Delta, V_0)$ for LoRA rank = 4

Figure 7: Illustration of the relationship between LoRA rank and SVD rank.



Figure 8: Illustration of the top 12 singular values of ΔW for different LoRA ranks.

contribute weakly to ΔW. We also tried setting the SVD rank to 100, 200, and 300 (too many to include here due to space limitations), and the conclusions are consistent.

These results indicate that LoRA updates operate in an effective subspace whose dimensionality equals to the chosen rank, i.e., the safety subspace is spanned by the set of orthogonal basis vectors whose number equals the LoRA rank. Setting the SVD rank larger than the LoRA rank only introduces additional orthogonal directions that make no contribution to $T_{\Delta W}(x)$.

L Transformations in Orthogonal Subspaces: A Derivation

We consider two linear transformations $W_0, \Delta W \in \mathbb{R}^{m\times n}$. For any input vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$, the transformations are given by

$$T_{W_0}(\mathbf{x}) = W_0\mathbf{x}, \quad T_{\Delta W}(\mathbf{x}) = \Delta W\mathbf{x}.$$

Using singular value decomposition (SVD), we may write

$$W_0 = U_0\Sigma_0 V_0^T, \quad \Delta W = U_\Delta\Sigma_\Delta V_\Delta^T,$$

where $V_0, V_\Delta \in \mathbb{R}^{n\times n}$ contain the right singular vectors corresponding to the subspaces associated with W_0 and ΔW. Hence,

$$T_{W_0}(\mathbf{x}) = U_0\Sigma_0 V_0^T\mathbf{x}, \quad T_{\Delta W}(\mathbf{x}) = U_\Delta\Sigma_\Delta V_\Delta^T\mathbf{x}.$$

L.1 Orthogonal case

Suppose $\mathrm{span}(V_0)$ and $\mathrm{span}(V_\Delta)$ are orthogonal. For any decomposition $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}_0 + \mathbf{x}_\Delta$ with $\mathbf{x}_0 \in \mathrm{span}(V_0)$ and $\mathbf{x}_\Delta \in \mathrm{span}(V_\Delta)$, we have

$$T_{W_0}(\mathbf{x}) + T_{\Delta W}(\mathbf{x}) = W_0\mathbf{x}_0 + W_0\mathbf{x}_\Delta + \Delta W\mathbf{x}_0 + \Delta W\mathbf{x}_\Delta.$$

Model	Interference (mean)	Interference (max)
llama3.1-8b-instruct + LoRA-based Refusal-SFT	**2.863**	**13.66**
llama3.1-8b-instruct + Full SFT (*Safety-only*)	5.002	31.41
llama3.1-8b-instruct + Full DPO (*Safety-only*)	5.021	34.72

Table 13: Comparison of interference between weight updates ΔW and pre-trained weights W_0 across different alignment methods.

The orthogonality condition

$$\left(\frac{V_\Delta}{\|V_\Delta\|}\right)^T \left(\frac{V_0}{\|V_0\|}\right) \approx 0$$

implies that the cross terms vanish:

$$W_0\mathbf{x}_\Delta \approx 0, \quad \Delta W\mathbf{x}_0 \approx 0.$$

Therefore the two transformations act independently:

$$T_{W_0}(\mathbf{x}) + T_{\Delta W}(\mathbf{x}) \approx W_0\mathbf{x}_0 + \Delta W\mathbf{x}_\Delta.$$

This shows that orthogonal subspaces guarantee non-interference.

L.2 Non-orthogonal case

If instead $\mathrm{span}(V_0)$ and $\mathrm{span}(V_\Delta)$ are not orthogonal, then $V_\Delta^T V_0 \neq 0$. In this case, for the same decomposition of $\mathbf{x}$, the cross terms do not vanish:

$$W_0\mathbf{x}_\Delta \neq 0, \quad \Delta W\mathbf{x}_0 \neq 0.$$

Consequently,

$$T_{W_0}(\mathbf{x}) + T_{\Delta W}(\mathbf{x}) = W_0\mathbf{x}_0 + \Delta W\mathbf{x}_\Delta + \underbrace{W_0\mathbf{x}_\Delta + \Delta W\mathbf{x}_0}_{\text{interference terms}}.$$

These additional components represent interference between the two transformations, meaning that safety-critical adjustments ΔW inevitably affect the intrinsic capabilities encoded in W_0, and vice versa. The degree of interference is governed by the magnitude of the overlap $V_\Delta^T V_0$. We further quantify the interference effects in Appendix M.

M Quantifying Interference Magnitudes in LoRA-based SFT

To better understand why LoRA-based supervised fine-tuning (SFT) produces smaller hidden state shifts on benign inputs despite larger weight updates, we directly quantify the interference terms in the safety-aligned model. For a given layer with pre-trained weights W_0 and update ΔW, the interference on an input x can be measured as:

$$\mathcal{I}(x) = \|W_0 x_\Delta + \Delta W x_0\|_2, \tag{1}$$

where x_0 and x_Δ denote the projections of x onto the singular vector spaces of W_0 and ΔW, respectively. This term directly reflects how parameter updates from fine-tuning perturb the intrinsic transformation space of the model.

Experimental Setup. We randomly sample 10 inputs from the MT-Bench dataset. For each weight matrix in the model, we perform the following steps:

1. Perform singular value decomposition (SVD) on W_0 and ΔW, and compute x_0 and x_Δ along the corresponding singular vector directions.
2. Compute the interference term $W_0 x_\Delta + \Delta W x_0$ and its ℓ_2 norm.
3. Record both the mean and maximum interference magnitudes across all layers.

Adapter	Top 1	Top 2	Top 3	Top 4	Top 5
Safety-LoRA	**0.0860**	**0.0812**	**0.0812**	**0.0791**	**0.0791**
Finance-LoRA	0.1148	0.1065	0.1040	0.1015	0.1008
legal-LoRA	0.1272	0.1170	0.1020	0.0911	0.0975
Code-LoRA	0.1310	0.1114	0.0955	0.0890	0.0882
RolePlay-LoRA	0.1026	0.1017	0.0963	0.0936	0.0918

Table 14: Top five subspace similarity values between ΔW and W_0 for different LoRA adapters.

Method	SaladBench (Safety) ↓	MT-Bench	MMLU	MATH-500	HumanEval	Avg
LLAMA3.1-8B-IT	24.62	7.43	54.48	45.80	68.63	60.8025
+ LoRA-safety	0.24	7.31	53.49	45.60	68.40	60.1475
+ LoRA-finance	25.84	7.31	51.30	45.60	66.25	59.0625
+ LoRA-legal	23.46	7.11	51.53	43.60	65.67	57.9750
+ LoRA-code	24.41	7.24	49.83	46.60	62.71	57.8850
+ LoRA-RolePlay	26.55	7.11	48.75	43.20	64.76	56.9520

Table 15: The effect of different domain-specific LoRA patches on model safety and general performance.

Results. As shown in Table 13, across all layers and weight matrices, LoRA-based updates consistently yield smaller interference norms compared to full-parameter fine-tuning, despite having larger $|\Delta W|$. This indicates that LoRA effectively confines updates to a safety subspace that minimally perturbs the model's intrinsic hidden state transformations. These findings provide a quantitative connection between our theoretical explanation of interference and the empirical observation of reduced hidden state shifts on benign inputs.

N Comparision between Safety and Other Domain

To further validate the generalization of our previous findings, we supplement additional results across more domains, as shown in Table 15. As observed, safety LoRA still induces the least disruption to intrinsic performance. We also computed the subspace similarity between W_0 and ΔW (Table 14), and found that the safety LoRA–constructed safety subspace still maintains stronger orthogonality to the model's intrinsic transformation space.

O Impact of Initial Model Safety on LoRA Safety Patch Orthogonality

We investigate how the initial degree of safety alignment of the base model affects the final orthogonality of LoRA-based safety patches. In the lifelong safety alignment setting, each step trains a new safety LoRA patch on top of a previously aligned model, where prior LoRA weights are merged before the next training step. Macro-level analyses of safety and model performance for each step are presented in Table 2.

To further study the orthogonality of safety patches, we perform singular value decomposition (SVD) and subspace analysis. We treat the parameters of the previously aligned model as W_0 and the current step's safety LoRA weights as ΔW, and compute the similarity between the subspaces of W_0 and ΔW. Our results in Table 16 show that, regardless of the initial model's safety, the safety LoRA consistently yields a subspace approximately orthogonal to the model's intrinsic transformation space. This confirms that LoRA effectively isolates safety updates from the model's intrinsic transformations, ensuring minimal interference.

W_0	ΔW	Top-1 Similarity
Llama3.1-8b-instruct	Llama3.1-8b-instruct + Safety LoRA (Step0)	0.0734
Llama3.1-8b-instruct + Safety LoRA (Step0), merged	Llama3.1-8b-instruct + Safety LoRA (Step1)	0.0708
Llama3.1-8b-instruct + Safety LoRA (Step1), merged	Llama3.1-8b-instruct + Safety LoRA (Step2)	0.0645

Table 16: Top-1 Similarity values between ΔW and W_0 across iterative safety LoRA tuning steps.

Model Variant	WildJailbreak ↓	SG-Bench (Jailbreak) ↓	SaladBench ↓	MT-Bench ↑	MMLU ↑	MATH-500 ↑	HumanEval ↑
Qwen2.5-7B-IT + LoRA-Refusal-SFT (safety-only)	7.8	0.85	1.24	7.64	69.47	70.2	81.16
Qwen2.5-7B-IT + LoRA-Refusal-SFT mixture (safety-general)	9.05	2.54	2.88	6.7	67.98	61	73.38
LLAMA3.1-8B-IT + LoRA-Refusal-SFT (safety-only)	0.45	0.07	0.24	7.31	53.49	45.6	68.4
LLAMA3.1-8B-IT + LoRA-Refusal-SFT mixture (safety-general)	13.55	5.19	6.24	7.05	60.42	45	64.54

Table 17: Performance comparison of LoRA-based Refusal-SFT with safety-only vs. safety-general mixture data.

P Effect of Safety-General Data Mixture on LoRA Safety Patches

We further investigate whether LoRA-based SFT benefits from mixing general data with safety-focused data. Specifically, we fine-tuned LoRA on a combined safety-general dataset and compared its performance with safety-only LoRA.

In Table 17, our results show that mixing general data significantly weakens safety improvements and can even degrade general model performance. To understand this effect, we perform singular value decomposition (SVD) analysis on the updated weights. In Table 18, we find that after incorporating general data, the transformation subspace constructed by LoRA no longer represents safety exclusively, leading to increased overlap with the model's intrinsic transformation space.

These observations provide strong evidence that pure safety-focused LoRA training is crucial for maintaining orthogonality and minimizing interference with the model's original capabilities. Therefore, LoRA fine-tuning on safety-only data remains the best practice for LLM safety alignment, achieving substantial safety improvements while preserving the model's intrinsic capabilities.

Q Safety Evaluator Comparison

Considering cost and efficiency, we use LlamaGuard-2-8B as the judge model to evaluate whether responses generated by LLMs in open-ended text generation tests are harmful. In this section, we further compare evaluation results across different judge models, as shown in Table 19. While variations exist among the scores from different judges for each LLM, the relative ranking of safety performance remains consistent. We also averaged the scores from four evaluators, which preserved the same safety ranking. These results indicate the reliability of our evaluation. We attribute the score discrepancies primarily to differences in training data, which lead to varying safety standards among judge models. Claude-3, widely regarded as the least harmful LLM, serves as a stricter evaluator. LlamaGuard-2-8B's evaluation scores are closest to GPT-4o, reflecting alignment in their learned safety standards. We also randomly select 200 samples in SaladBench for human evaluation, and the consistency reach 94.5%, which means our conclusion is robust.

R Correlation with Capability Preservation

We further quantify the relationship between subspace similarity and behavioral preservation using the six model configurations in Table 5. For model i, we define its normalized general capability retention as

$$P_i = \frac{1}{3} \sum_{b \in \{\text{MT-Bench},\, \text{MMLU},\, \text{MATH-500}\}} \min\left(\frac{s_{i,b}}{s_{0,b}}, 1\right),$$

where $s_{i,b}$ and $s_{0,b}$ denote the scores of the fine-tuned and backbone models on benchmark b, respectively.

As shown in Table 20, Top-1 subspace similarity exhibits a strong negative monotonic trend with capability retention (Spearman's $\rho = -0.77$, $p = 0.072$), while the linear correlation is weaker (Pearson's $r = -0.35$, $p = 0.496$). Given the small sample size, we interpret these results as

Model & Setting	Top 1	Top 2	Top 3	Top 4	Top 5
Qwen2.5-7B-IT + LoRA-Refusal-SFT ("safety-only")	0.12	0.11	0.08	0.08	0.07
Qwen2.5-7B-IT + LoRA-Refusal-SFT mixture ("safety-general")	0.23	0.21	0.13	0.12	0.10
LLAMA3.1-8B-IT + LoRA-Refusal-SFT ("safety-only")	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
LLAMA3.1-8B-IT + LoRA-Refusal-SFT mixture ("safety-general")	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.11

Table 18: Comparison of Top five subspace similarity values for models aligned by LoRA-based Refusal-SFT with safety-only vs. safety-general mixture data

Evaluator	LLAMAGuard-2-8B	LLAMAGuard-3-8B	GPT-4o	Claude3	Average
Qwen2.5-7B-IT	34.46	40.75	32.50	40.05	36.94
+ Full Refusal-SFT ("safety-only")	0.08	3.80	0.15	3.75	1.95
+ Full Refusal-SFT ("safety-general mixture")	2.06	5.15	1.30	6.58	3.77
+ LoRA Refusal-SFT ("safety-only")	1.24	4.40	0.95	4.25	2.71

Table 19: Comparison of evaluation results by different evaluators (Safety Score on SaladBench).

descriptive rather than statistically conclusive evidence. Together with the controlled intervention in Appendix 4.4, these results consistently associate lower subspace overlap with stronger capability preservation.

S Case Study

In this section, we present case studies highlighting the advantages of LoRA-based methods over full-parameter fine-tuning in safety alignment, focusing on jailbreak resistance and general performance preservation. Figure 9 compares the defense capabilities of models aligned by full-parameter DPO ("safety-only" data configuration) [3] and LoRA-based Refusal-SFT on Qwen2.5-7B-IT, showing that LoRA-based Refusal-SFT provides stronger resistance to jailbreak attacks. Figure 10 examines the behavior of different alignment methods on LLaMA3.1-8B-IT under benign instructions. The example demonstrates a knowledge-based multiple-choice question with explicit format constraints. The model aligned by full-parameter DPO not only gives the wrong answer but also fails to follow the required format, whereas the model aligned by LoRA-based Refusal-SFT produces the correct answer while preserving the original model's linguistic style. These examples illustrate the effectiveness of LoRA safety patches.

[3] As shown in Table 1 of Section 3.2, among all compared baselines, full-parameter DPO with the safety-only configuration achieves the best safety–utility trade-off, which is why we use it as the reference in these demonstrations.

Method	Top-1 Similarity	Retention (%) ↑
Full-Safety	0.3011	56.63
LoRA-Safety	0.0860	98.71
Full-Finance	0.3587	93.54
LoRA-Finance	0.1148	97.37
Full-Code	0.4124	93.58
LoRA-Code	0.1310	96.30

Table 20: Relationship between Top-1 subspace similarity and normalized general-capability retention.



(a) Original model



(b) DPO (safety-only)



(c) LoRA-based Refusal-SFT

Figure 9: **Jailbreak defense comparison on Qwen2.5-7B-IT.** We compare full-parameter DPO trained with safety-only data and LoRA-based Refusal-SFT. The LoRA-based method exhibits stronger resistance to jailbreak attacks. Harmful responses are highlighted in red, while safe refusals are highlighted in green.



(a) Original model



(b) Full-parameter DPO



(c) LoRA-based Refusal-SFT

Figure 10: **Benign instruction-following behavior on LLaMA3.1-8B-IT.** We compare full-parameter DPO and LoRA-based Refusal-SFT under benign prompts. The DPO-aligned model produces incorrect outputs and violates format constraints, whereas LoRA-based Refusal-SFT answers correctly while preserving the original linguistic style. Incorrect outputs are highlighted in red, and correct outputs in green.