# BEYOND NAMED PROMPTS: MITIGATING DIRECT AND INDIRECT IP GENERATION VIA GENERATION-STATE INTERVENTION

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## ABSTRACT

Modern text-to-image diffusion models can generate images that closely resemble recognizable intellectual-property (IP) characters, whether prompted directly by character names or indirectly through name-free semantic cues. Visual descriptions of appearance, clothing, and composition can induce the latter, challenging mitigations that rely only on prompt inspection or predefined parameter-level interventions. In this work, we introduce a generation-state intervention framework that monitors target-like semantics as they emerge during diffusion and redirects the same generation trajectory without modifying model parameters. The framework uses a predicted clean output for early monitoring and a generic-category-anchored contrast to reduce target-related components while anchoring the requested visual content. Across FLUX.1-dev and Stable Diffusion 3.5 Medium, our method substantially reduces target-character detections under both direct and indirect prompting while maintaining consistency with the visual characteristics specified by the prompt. Together, these results show that the evolving generation state provides an actionable signal for mitigation even when the prompt contains no explicit target reference. Our code is available at this repository.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Modern text-to-image diffusion models can synthesize high-fidelity visual content, with diffusion transformers and rectified-flow architectures further advancing the scalability and quality of image generation (Peebles & Xie, 2023; Chen et al., 2024; Esser et al., 2024). Yet the same generative capacity allows these models to reproduce the recognizable identity of an intellectual-property (IP) character. Recent evaluations have documented such behavior across model families, protected characters, and prompting strategies (He et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025a). The resulting images raise practical questions about licensing and creators' control over protected works amid ongoing copyright-policy review and litigation (Sag, 2023; U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, 2023; Ren et al., 2024; U.S. Copyright Office, 2025). Mitigating IP character generation is therefore important for responsible deployment.

Existing mitigation approaches intervene at different stages of the generation pipeline to address IP character generation concerns. Input filters and prompt rewriting act on the request, but name-free indirect prompts can still guide a model toward a character through descriptions of appearance, clothing, pose, and composition, as illustrated in Fig. 1(a) (He et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025a). Parameter editing and conditioning control intervene more deeply but remain configured around a specified target (Golatkar et al., 2024; Gao et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025b), whereas post-generation detection evaluates the completed image independently of the request (Huang et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2025). This creates a timing dilemma: before generation, mitigation can miss indirect risk or must act without evidence from the emerging sample; after generation, output evidence arrives too late to correct the same trajectory. This dilemma motivates the following question:

*Can IP identity induced through either direct or indirect prompting be identified and mitigated within the same generation?*

Addressing this question poses two coupled challenges. The first is *observability*. Intermediate latents are not faithful previews: early states are dominated by noise, while waiting for a decoded



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


Figure 1: (a) Indirect descriptions can induce recognizable target identities that persist after existing mitigation, while our generation-state intervention suppresses them. (b) Predicted clean outputs reveal the emerging identity, enabling timely intervention. (c) Our method achieves low DETECT and high CONS under direct and indirect prompts.

image to become recognizable leaves fewer steps to change its identity. We therefore need an early semantic view of the forming output. Our key insight is that flow-matching diffusion transformers already provide such a view. At each step, the current state and predicted vector field yield an estimate of the clean endpoint, which we call the predicted clean output. Decoding this estimate exposes target-like semantics earlier than decoding the noisy state, making it a risk-sensitive monitoring signal for timely intervention, as illustrated in Fig. 1(b) (Sec. 2).

The second challenge is *selectivity*. An early warning identifies when to act, but not what to change. Identity-specific cues are entangled with intended semantics such as object class, pose, color, and composition. Suppressing all target-correlated content can therefore erase the user's intent or replace recognizable identity with visual degradation. We therefore contrast the model's predictions under the target character and a generic-category anchor, such as "Olaf" and "snowman", at the same generation state. The shared content anchors the intended semantics, while their difference provides a model-native direction for reducing the target-related component. Together, predicted-output monitoring and same-state semantic contrast form our generation-state intervention, which redirects sampling without updating model parameters (Sec. 3).

We evaluate this framework on FLUX.1-dev (Black Forest Labs, 2024) and Stable Diffusion 3.5 Medium (Esser et al., 2024) under both direct and indirect prompting. In the more challenging indirect setting, our method reduces the target-character detection rate (DETECT) from $70.4\%$ to $25.2\%$ on FLUX.1 and from $59.1\%$ to $12.9\%$ on SD 3.5, outperforming the strongest baseline by $24.4\%$ and $9.1\%$, respectively. At the same time, target-related characteristic consistency (CONS) remains close to Vanilla on both models. Together, these results show that generation-state intervention can substantially reduce target-character detections under indirect prompting without materially changing consistency with the visual characteristics specified by the prompt (Sec. 4).

Our contributions are as follows:

- We formulate predicted clean output as a forward-looking representation for monitoring emerging target-like semantics in flow-matching diffusion transformers.
- We introduce a same-state generic-category-anchored contrast that redirects generation without modifying model parameters.
- We evaluate the intervention across two flow-matching DiTs under direct and indirect prompting, characterizing both target-detection reduction and retention of requested visual characteristics.

# 2 OBSERVING EMERGING IP GENERATION

## 2.1 IP IDENTITY NEED NOT BE NAMED TO EMERGE

Recognizable IP identity does not require an explicit name in the prompt. A character name can elicit that identity directly, while a name-free description of appearance, clothing, pose, and scene can provide enough correlated visual cues to evoke the same identity (He et al., 2025). We refer to these routes as *direct generation* and *indirect generation*, respectively. Since the latter cannot be covered reliably by enumerating combinations of visual attributes, mitigation must respond to the output as it takes shape. This motivates defining risk along the generation trajectory.

**Definition 1** (Generation-state IP risk)**.** *Let $x_t$ be the model's internal state at step $t$, and let $x_0(x_t, t)$ denote the terminal state reached by continuing the current generation trajectory under its conditioning. For a target IP $I$, let $\Psi_I$ measure how strongly a terminal state realizes its identity in the generated output. We define the generation-state IP risk as*

$$R_I(x_t, t) := \Psi_I(x_0(x_t, t)) \,. \tag{1}$$

Eq. 1 places direct and indirect generation in a common view, where risk depends on the endpoint taking shape rather than the wording that initiated it. Yet the true endpoint is unavailable during sampling. Timely intervention therefore requires both a forward-looking observation of the forming output and a target-specific measure of its resemblance to $I$.

## 2.2 PREDICTED CLEAN OUTPUTS PREVIEW THE GENERATION ENDPOINT

Before generation is complete, the current latent remains dominated by noise and offers little semantic evidence of the endpoint. Flow-matching models nevertheless provide a more revealing view through the velocity field evaluated at each sampling step. The linear path used by the rectified-flow models interpolates between a clean latent $x_0$ and a noise sample $\epsilon$ (Lipman et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023; Esser et al., 2024):

$$x_\sigma = (1-\sigma)x_0 + \sigma\epsilon, \qquad u_\sigma = \frac{\partial x_\sigma}{\partial \sigma} = \epsilon - x_0, \tag{2}$$

where $u_\sigma$ points from the clean sample toward noise.

Flow matching learns its conditional expectation, so the identity $x_0 = x_\sigma - \sigma u_\sigma$ gives

$$x_\sigma - \sigma v^\star(x_\sigma, \sigma, c) = \mathbb{E}[x_0 \mid x_\sigma, \sigma, c]. \tag{3}$$

Thus, the learned velocity induces a model-native estimate of the clean endpoint. At sampling step $t$, with latent $x_t$, noise level $\sigma_t$, and velocity $v_t = v_\theta(x_t, \sigma_t, c)$, we obtain

$$\widehat{x}_0^{(t)} = x_t - \sigma_t v_t. \tag{4}$$

Decoding $\widehat{x}_0^{(t)}$ gives an image-space preview of the forming output without rolling out the remaining trajectory or introducing an additional prediction model. As Fig. 2 shows, this preview exposes the subject and identity-bearing structure substantially earlier than decoding the noisy state $x_t$.




Figure 2: Decoded predicted clean outputs reveal the forming subject before the current noisy states. Both representations are shown along the same generation trajectory.

## 2.3 MEASURING EMERGING TARGET IDENTITY

The decoded preview reveals what is forming, but does not by itself quantify the risk in Eq. 1. We compare it with a bank $\mathcal{B}_I$ of $K$ target references because recognizable identity can persist across changes in pose, composition, and appearance that make any single canonical image brittle. Let Dec denote the model's latent decoder and let $\phi$ denote an image representation. We define the trajectory-level risk proxy

$$\widehat{R}_I(x_t, t) = \max_{r \in \mathcal{B}_I} \operatorname{sim}\Big(\phi\Big(\mathrm{Dec}(\widehat{x}_0^{(t)})\Big), \phi(r)\Big) \,. \tag{5}$$




Figure 3: Target-reference similarity of decoded predicted clean outputs over the denoising trajectory for FLUX.1 (left) and SD 3.5 (right). Panels (a,d) compare direct, indirect, generic-category, and unrelated COCO caption prompts using $K = 4$ references. Panels (b,e) show direct prompts and panels (c,f) show indirect prompts for reference-bank sizes $K \in \{1, 2, 4\}$.

We instantiate $\phi$ with DINOv2 (Oquab et al., 2024) and $\mathrm{sim}$ with cosine similarity. The score traces the strongest target resemblance as the trajectory unfolds.

Fig. 3 traces this score for both generators under direct prompts, indirect prompts, generic-category controls that omit identity-specific attributes, and unrelated COCO captions. After the initial noise-dominated phase, the direct and indirect trajectories separate from both controls and rise over a similar interval. Larger reference banks generally strengthen and advance this signal, most clearly for indirect prompts on SD 3.5. These observations show that target-like semantics become measurable well before sampling is complete, even when the prompt never names the target.

## 3 Semantically Anchored Generation-State Intervention

The predicted-output monitor in Sec. 2 identifies *when* target-like semantics emerge during generation. Turning this signal into an intervention additionally requires isolating and suppressing the target-associated component of the current model output.

### 3.1 From Detection to a Local Correction

Suppose the monitor signals that target $I$ is emerging at state $x_t$. Following the gradient of the final identity score would require differentiating through the remaining trajectory, decoder, and image representation. Instead, we query the generator at the current state: how does its output change when conditioned on the target rather than on a reference condition?

Let $v_p^{(t)}$, $v_I^{(t)}$, and $v_A^{(t)}$ denote the effective model outputs under the generation prompt $p$, target $I$, and an anchor $A$, all evaluated from the same $x_t$. Their anchor-relative contrasts are

$$d_{I|A}^{(t)} = v_I^{(t)} - v_A^{(t)}, \qquad q_{p|A}^{(t)} = v_p^{(t)} - v_A^{(t)}. \tag{6}$$

Here, $d_{I|A}^{(t)}$ captures what target conditioning adds relative to the anchor, while $q_{p|A}^{(t)}$ expresses the current prompt in the same coordinate system. When the monitor triggers, we seek the smallest change $\Delta v$ that reduces any positive alignment with the target contrast by strength $\lambda > 0$:

$$\min_{\Delta v} \|\Delta v\|_2^2 \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \left\langle q_{p|A}^{(t)} + \Delta v, d_{I|A}^{(t)} \right\rangle \le \left\langle q_{p|A}^{(t)}, d_{I|A}^{(t)} \right\rangle - \lambda \left[ \left\langle q_{p|A}^{(t)}, d_{I|A}^{(t)} \right\rangle \right]_+ . \tag{7}$$

This objective leaves the prediction unchanged when the two directions are orthogonal or negatively aligned. Otherwise, its unique solution removes a scaled projection along $d_{I|A}^{(t)}$, with coefficient

$$a_{I|A}^{(t)} = \left[ \frac{\left\langle q_{p|A}^{(t)}, d_{I|A}^{(t)} \right\rangle}{\left\| d_{I|A}^{(t)} \right\|_2^2} \right]_+ , \qquad [z]_+ = \max(z, 0). \tag{8}$$

and corrected output

$$\tilde{v}_p^{(t)} = v_p^{(t)} - \lambda a_{I|A}^{(t)} d_{I|A}^{(t)}, \tag{9}$$

**(a) Qualitative comparison**




**(b) Aggregate comparison**

| | Prompt | Anchor | DETECT (%) ↓ | CONS ↑ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FLUX.1 | Direct (Name) | Vanilla | $98.5 \pm 1.3$ | $0.74 \pm 0.01$ |
| | | $A = \varnothing$ | $15.6 \pm 5.9$ | $0.65 \pm 0.03$ |
| | | $A = G_I$ | $16.3 \pm 3.4$ | $0.75 \pm 0.02$ |
| | Indirect (Description) | Vanilla | $70.4 \pm 2.6$ | $0.77 \pm 0.01$ |
| | | $A = \varnothing$ | $26.7 \pm 4.4$ | $0.72 \pm 0.02$ |
| | | $A = G_I$ | $30.4 \pm 3.4$ | $0.76 \pm 0.01$ |
| SD 3.5 | Direct (Name) | Vanilla | $90.2 \pm 7.3$ | $0.72 \pm 0.02$ |
| | | $A = \varnothing$ | $25.8 \pm 2.6$ | $0.69 \pm 0.03$ |
| | | $A = G_I$ | $15.2 \pm 5.7$ | $0.74 \pm 0.03$ |
| | Indirect (Description) | Vanilla | $59.1 \pm 2.3$ | $0.76 \pm 0.02$ |
| | | $A = \varnothing$ | $12.9 \pm 5.2$ | $0.74 \pm 0.00$ |
| | | $A = G_I$ | $15.2 \pm 3.5$ | $0.75 \pm 0.01$ |

Figure 4: Effect of the semantic anchor. (a) Matched Vanilla, null-anchor ($A = \varnothing$), and generic-category-anchor ($A = G_I$) generations. (b) The generic-category anchor recovers characteristic consistency while retaining low target detection.

### 3.2 Anchoring the Semantics to Preserve

The anchor in Eq. 6 determines what the intervention treats as target-specific. The null condition, $A = \varnothing$, is a natural first choice because $v_I^{(t)} - v_\varnothing^{(t)}$ captures the full displacement induced by target conditioning. But that displacement can entangle identity with the generic subject itself.

Fig. 4 makes the consequence visible: the null anchor reduces target detection, but can also alter the requested subject or disrupt its structure. Here, DETECT is the target-character detection rate, while CONS measures consistency with the target-related characteristic specified by the prompt, as formally defined in Eqs. 10 and 11. The aggregate results show the same coupling: the null anchor lowers DETECT, but also lowers CONS.

We therefore propose to use a generic-category condition $G_I$ as the semantic anchor. It specifies the target's coarse subject category without its identity, such as "snowman" for Olaf. Setting $A = G_I$ changes the contrast from "target versus no condition" to "target versus its generic category". The shared category is thereby factored out before the target-aligned component is removed.

The third row of Fig. 4(a) consequently retains the requested subject classes while suppressing their target identities. Across both generators and prompting settings, Fig. 4(b) shows that the generic-category anchor retains the low DETECT of the null anchor while recovering much of its loss in CONS.

We construct one fixed $G_I$ per target offline using a VLM instructed to return a coarse noun phrase without names, narrative roles, or identity-bearing attributes. The mapping is shared across prompts and generators, with construction details in Appendix A.4.

### 3.3 Closed-Loop Generation-Time Control

The target-related component is not fixed over generation: it may strengthen as the image takes shape, while each correction only redirects what can emerge next. Intervention must therefore operate as feedback rather than as a one-shot edit. We couple predicted-output monitoring with generic-category-anchored projection throughout the trajectory, as summarized in Fig. 5.

At each monitored timestep, the prompt prediction yields $\widehat{x}_0^{(t)}$ and its target score $\widehat{R}_I(x_t, t)$. We intervene only when this score exceeds a threshold $\tau$. When triggered, Eq. 9 corrects the current prediction used to obtain $x_{t+1}$. The next score is consequently evaluated on a trajectory already redirected by the previous decision. Appendix B.2 visualizes how these decisions evolve along a representative generation trajectory.

Re-estimating the target contrast at every triggered step requires fresh target and anchor predictions, adding two auxiliary model evaluations to each correction. To balance this cost without weakening the intervention, we continue to score every monitored step but refresh the two auxiliary predictions only every $r$ steps, reusing their cached values in between. Thus, $r = 1$ manifests as dense same-




Figure 5: Overview of semantically anchored generation-state intervention. (a) Target-specific preparation constructs the monitoring references and generic-category anchor. (b) Predicted-output monitoring determines when intervention is triggered. (c) Generic-category-anchored projection removes the target-aligned component from the current generation direction while preserving shared category semantics. Images illustrate a single FLUX.1 Olaf trajectory.

state estimation, while larger $r$ trades contrast freshness for fewer auxiliary evaluations. We use $r = 2$ by default and compare refresh intervals in Appendix B.3. Alg. 1 gives the complete procedure.

Since the controller acts directly on the generation trajectory without modifying the input prompt or model parameters, it can also be composed with mitigation mechanisms operating at other stages, as evaluated in Sec. 4.2.

# 4 Evaluations

## 4.1 Experimental Setup

**Data and evaluation protocol.** We evaluate FLUX.1-dev and Stable Diffusion 3.5 Medium (denoted FLUX.1 and SD 3.5) using the character benchmark and prompts from CopyCat (He et al., 2025). Direct prompts explicitly name the target character, whereas indirect prompts describe its appearance without naming it. Tables denote these settings as Direct (Name) and Indirect (Description). We retain characters recognizable in each model's Vanilla outputs, yielding fixed evaluation sets of 45 characters for FLUX.1 and 44 for SD 3.5. Appendix B.1 details their construction. Each character–prompt pair is evaluated with seeds 0, 1, and 2, and results are reported as the mean and sample standard deviation across seed-level values.

**Baselines.** We compare with Vanilla generation and four mitigations operating at different stages: prompt rewriting with CopyCat Rewrite (He et al., 2025), text-conditioning intervention with GrOCE (Han et al., 2026), detect-then-regenerate inference with TRIM (Wang et al., 2025a), and parameter modification with EraseAnything (Gao et al., 2025).

**Metrics.** DETECT is the fraction of images recognized as the target character by our three-stage evaluator, where lower is better. Its design and human validation are detailed in Appendices A and C. CONS follows CopyCat (He et al., 2025) and measures consistency with a short generic characteristic associated with the target, where higher is better. CONS complements DETECT but is not a standalone measure of preservation or image quality. Appendix B.6 additionally evaluates general generation quality on COCO-10k using CLIP Score, VQAScore, and FID. Appendix A provides further generation, implementation, metric, and computing-environment details.

## 4.2 Experimental Results

**Main results.** Table 1 compares target-character mitigation across two generators and both direct and indirect prompting. At the default setting ($r = 2$), Ours achieves a lower mean DETECT than

Table 1: Target-character mitigation across generators and prompting settings. Values are mean ± sample standard deviation.

| | Method | Mitigation Stage | Direct (Name) DETECT ↓ (%) | Direct (Name) CONS ↑ | Indirect (Description) DETECT ↓ (%) | Indirect (Description) CONS ↑ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FLUX.1 | Vanilla | None | 98.5 ± 1.3 | 0.74 ± 0.01 | 70.4 ± 2.6 | 0.77 ± 0.01 |
| | CopyCat Rewrite (He et al., 2025) | Input rewrite | 54.8 ± 1.3 | **0.78 ± 0.00** | 52.6 ± 2.6 | 0.77 ± 0.00 |
| | GrOCE (Han et al., 2026) | Prompt embedding | 27.4 ± 1.3 | 0.56 ± 0.04 | 54.8 ± 5.1 | 0.77 ± 0.01 |
| | TRIM (Wang et al., 2025a) | Negative guidance | 73.3 ± 6.7 | 0.73 ± 0.01 | 49.6 ± 4.6 | **0.78 ± 0.01** |
| | EraseAnything (Gao et al., 2025) | Model adaptation | 29.6 ± 4.6 | 0.66 ± 0.03 | 54.1 ± 3.4 | 0.76 ± 0.02 |
| | Ours ($r = 2$) | Denoising state | 16.3 ± 3.4 | 0.75 ± 0.02 | 30.4 ± 3.4 | 0.76 ± 0.01 |
| | Ours ($r = 1$) | Denoising state | **14.8 ± 4.6** | 0.76 ± 0.02 | **25.2 ± 1.3** | 0.76 ± 0.01 |
| SD 3.5 | Vanilla | None | 90.2 ± 7.3 | 0.72 ± 0.02 | 59.1 ± 2.3 | 0.76 ± 0.02 |
| | CopyCat Rewrite (He et al., 2025) | Input rewrite | 43.9 ± 4.7 | **0.77 ± 0.01** | 37.9 ± 4.7 | 0.75 ± 0.02 |
| | GrOCE (Han et al., 2026) | Prompt embedding | 25.8 ± 1.3 | 0.56 ± 0.06 | 46.2 ± 9.5 | 0.73 ± 0.00 |
| | TRIM (Wang et al., 2025a) | Negative guidance | 48.5 ± 4.7 | 0.74 ± 0.03 | 22.0 ± 1.3 | **0.76 ± 0.01** |
| | EraseAnything (Gao et al., 2025) | Model adaptation | 34.8 ± 1.3 | 0.70 ± 0.04 | 39.4 ± 5.7 | 0.73 ± 0.01 |
| | Ours ($r = 2$) | Denoising state | **15.2 ± 5.7** | 0.74 ± 0.03 | 15.2 ± 3.5 | 0.75 ± 0.01 |
| | Ours ($r = 1$) | Denoising state | 15.9 ± 4.5 | 0.74 ± 0.02 | **12.9 ± 3.5** | 0.74 ± 0.01 |




Figure 6: Qualitative comparison across generators and prompting settings. Ours redirects recognizable character identity toward generic-category appearance while retaining the depicted subject and scene structure in these examples.

every existing baseline in all four model–prompt settings. The dense variant ($r = 1$) further reduces DETECT in three settings. Across both variants, CONS remains close to the corresponding Vanilla values, indicating that the measured generic target characteristics are largely retained. Increasing the interval to $r = 3$ consistently raises DETECT, as detailed in Appendix B.3.

**Qualitative results.** Fig. 6 shows that existing mitigations often leave recognizable identity cues or substantially depart from the requested visual category. Our intervention instead redirects identity-specific appearance toward a generic subject while broadly retaining pose, composition, and category-level semantics. Appendix B.7 provides further comparisons.

**Intervention strength.** The strength $\lambda$ determines how aggressively each intervention removes the aligned target component. As Fig. 7 shows, increasing $\lambda$ reduces DETECT but also lowers CONS. We select $\lambda = 1.5$ as a shared operating point that substantially reduces DETECT without incurring the larger CONS decrease observed at $\lambda = 2.0$. The indirect-prompt examples visualize how intermediate strengths can progressively replace identity-specific cues with generic-category appearance. Appendix B.4 reports the complete values.

**Composition across mitigation stages.** We next examine whether our generation-state intervention complements existing mitigations. For FLUX.1, Fig. 8 compares each baseline with its compo-




(a) Aggregate DETECT–CONS trade-off. (b) Indirect-prompt examples.

Figure 7: Effect of intervention strength on aggregate metrics and two illustrative generations. Increasing $\lambda$ reduces DETECT but also lowers CONS.




Figure 8: Combining Ours with mitigations operating at different stages on FLUX.1. Each baseline is paired with its composition with Ours under direct and indirect prompting. Error bars denote sample standard deviations.

sition with Ours, together with Vanilla + Ours, under direct and indirect prompting. Adding Ours lowers DETECT in all ten baseline–prompt pairs, while CONS remains close to the corresponding baseline values. These results indicate that Ours consistently complements mitigations operating at different stages by further reducing detected target matches with limited changes in CONS. Appendix B.5 shows the same consistent DETECT reduction on SD 3.5.

**Computational cost.** We separate mitigation cost into target-specific preparation, which is amortized across queries, and per-image inference. Table 2 reports both components. GrOCE and EraseAnything incur substantial preparation costs but retain near-Vanilla inference speed. CopyCat Rewrite adds a modest online cost, whereas TRIM incurs additional generation cost when regeneration is triggered.

Table 2: Efficiency analysis on FLUX.1.

| Method | Prep. (s/IP) | Inference (s/img) | Aux. model |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vanilla | – | 6.36 | – |
| CopyCat Rewrite | – | 7.56 | VLM |
| GrOCE | 51.17 | 6.39 | – |
| TRIM | – | 19.59 | VLM |
| EraseAnything | 3102.46 | 6.39 | – |
| Ours ($r = 2$) | 0.42 | 13.36 | DINO |
| Ours ($r = 1$) | | 17.70 | |

Our method requires 0.42 seconds of preparation for generic-category construction and reference-bank feature extraction. At inference time, a compact DINO encoder performs detection within the denoising process, enabling intervention without a separate generation pass. The default $r = 2$ setting takes 13.36 seconds per image, 24.5% less than dense refresh ($r = 1$), while retaining the DETECT reduction reported in Table 1.

## 5 Related Work

**Text-to-image diffusion models.** Diffusion models generate images through iterative denoising (Ho et al., 2020), while latent diffusion enables efficient text-conditioned synthesis at high resolution (Rombach et al., 2022). Recent diffusion transformers and rectified-flow formulations have further improved the scalability and fidelity of text-to-image generation (Peebles & Xie, 2023; Chen et al., 2024; Esser et al., 2024). Their ability to follow detailed semantic descriptions also makes them capable of producing recognizable characters even when those characters are not explicitly

named. We study how such identity emerges and can be changed during the generation process of flow-matching DiTs.

**Copyright risk and IP generation.** Prior work on diffusion model memorization shows that generated images can replicate or closely resemble training examples, raising copyright concerns (Carlini et al., 2023; Somepalli et al., 2023a;b). Copyrighted characters extend this concern beyond near-duplicates because recognizable identities can persist across poses, compositions, and visual variations. Recent studies evaluate copyrighted-content and character generation (Zhang et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025a), with CopyCat showing that generic keywords and visual descriptions can elicit a character without its name (He et al., 2025). Complementary work develops image-level and character-aware detectors for identifying copyrighted content in generated images (Huang et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2025). We ask whether identity induced through either direct or indirect prompting can be detected and reduced before the same generation trajectory is complete.

**Mitigating copyrighted generation.** Existing mitigations intervene at different stages of the generation pipeline. Prompt filtering and rewriting modify the request before sampling (He et al., 2025; Sarna et al., 2025). Retrieval- and conditioning-based controls steer generation using copyright-related signals (Golatkar et al., 2024; Han et al., 2026), while parameter editing and concept erasure more persistently suppress specified concepts (Wang et al., 2025b; Gao et al., 2025). Output detectors instead identify completed images for rejection or regeneration (Huang et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2025). Inference-time guidance provides a parameter-free middle ground by steering the sampling process itself (Roy et al., 2025). Our method similarly avoids parameter updates but monitors the evolving predicted clean output, intervening after sample-specific target evidence becomes observable and before generation is complete.

## 6 Discussion and Limitations

Our results identify the generation state as a distinct control point between prompt-level prevention and post-generation detection. The composition results are especially informative: intervening on the evolving sample continues to reduce target detections after safeguards at other stages have already acted. This suggests that these stages address different failure modes rather than serving as interchangeable defenses. Generation-state control can therefore be viewed as a modular layer in a broader safeguard pipeline.

However, we point out that the current framework is designed for specified target characters, for which reference images and generic-category anchors can be prepared in advance. This makes it well suited to settings where model providers act on an established set of protected identities, but it does not yet address targets that are unknown before generation. Future work could make generation-state intervention useful in broader, less curated settings by supporting open-set discovery, scalable reference construction, and the resolution of multiple identities within the same trajectory, while retaining the target-specificity of the current intervention.

## 7 Conclusion

This work addresses a central limitation of prompt-level safeguards for IP character generation: recognizable identity can emerge even when the prompt never names the target. We showed that the predicted clean output of a flow-matching diffusion transformer provides an early, model-native view of the image taking shape. Building on this observation, we introduced a generation-state intervention that monitors target resemblance during sampling and uses a generic-category-anchored contrast to redirect the same trajectory without modifying model parameters.

Across FLUX.1 and SD 3.5, the intervention substantially reduced target-character detections under both direct and indirect prompting while retaining comparable consistency with the visual characteristics requested by the prompt. It also complemented mitigations applied at other stages of the generation pipeline, suggesting that generation-time control can bridge the gap between preventive prompt processing and post-generation detection. These findings establish the generation state as a useful control surface for mitigating recognizable character identity and point toward safeguards that respond to what a model is forming, rather than relying only on what a user explicitly requests.

## AI USE STATEMENT

In this work, we used generative AI assistants to provide feedback on research methodology and experimental design, assist with method implementation and translation, clean and reformat data, support qualitative and thematic analysis, and assist in interpreting experimental results. We did not use generative AI to generate synthetic datasets, develop theoretical or conceptual frameworks, formulate mathematical claims, provide ingredients for or assist in writing proofs, or propose or refine hypotheses, as these tasks were not applicable to this work.

Additionally, we used generative AI assistants to formulate human-evaluation questions and instructions, create or modify scientific figures and other research artifacts, suggest experimental parameters, and create or edit software code. They also assisted with brainstorming, information retrieval, identifying potentially relevant literature, drafting parts of the paper, improving its readability, suggesting its structure, and proposing its title and keywords. The VLMs used as components of the automated image-evaluation pipeline are described separately in the experimental setup and appendix.

The authors reviewed all AI-assisted work. AI-assisted code and analysis scripts were inspected and tested, and interpretations and reported results were checked against the underlying experimental evidence. Suggested literature and factual statements were verified by the authors before inclusion. The authors take responsibility for the final content of this work, including its text, claims, code, results, and artifacts produced with the aid of generative AI.

## ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies how to reduce the generation of specified copyrighted characters while preserving other requested content. Such controls may help model providers respond to requests from rights holders. Our evaluation measures whether a character is recognizable in a generated image and does not determine whether the image infringes copyright.

To assess the agreement between our automated evaluator and human judgments, five human raters annotated generated images for target-character presence. The task involved only judgments of images and did not collect identifying or sensitive personal information. All raters were informed of the purpose of the study, provided consent, and participated voluntarily.

Reference images collected from publicly accessible Web sources were used only for research and evaluation. The underlying image collection is available only for confidential peer review and will not be included in the public release.

## REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

We have aimed to make the full experimental pipeline reproducible. Sec. 4.1 introduces the evaluation setting. Appendix A then follows the pipeline from image generation and baseline adaptation through our method and the final metrics, with the algorithm, model configurations, and computing environment needed for reimplementation. The remaining appendix material explains how the target sets were selected and provides the complete evaluator prompts. We also release the anonymized source code and experiment configurations at this repository.

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# A Implementation and Reproducibility Details

## A.1 Generation Settings

We use BF16 inference for both generators and apply the same model-specific generation settings across the character-mitigation and COCO experiments. FLUX.1-dev (Black Forest Labs, 2024) generates images at $512 \times 512$ resolution with 28 sampling steps and an embedded guidance scale of 3.5. Stable Diffusion 3.5 Medium (Esser et al., 2024) generates images at $1024 \times 1024$ resolution with 40 sampling steps, a classifier-free guidance (CFG) scale of 4.5, and a maximum text sequence length of 256. Table 3 summarizes the standard inference settings.

Table 3: Standard inference settings for the two generators. A dash indicates that the corresponding guidance mechanism is not used.

| **Setting** | **FLUX.1-dev** | **SD 3.5 Medium** |
|---|---|---|
| Resolution | $512 \times 512$ | $1024 \times 1024$ |
| Sampling steps | 28 | 40 |
| Numerical precision | BF16 | BF16 |
| Default embedded guidance | 3.5 | — |
| Default native CFG | — | 4.5 |

## A.2 Baseline Implementations

**CopyCat Rewrite (He et al., 2025).** We use the released DALL-E-style rewrites for both the direct and indirect prompting settings. The rewrites are fixed before generation, without additional negative prompting or online rewriting. For the computational-cost evaluation, we use Qwen3-VL-30B-A3B-Instruct (Team, 2025) to simulate the online rewrite request and account for this latency separately from generation. **GrOCE (Han et al., 2026).** We adapt the released implementation to both generators by constructing the semantic graph with each model's CLIP-L encoder and re-encoding the edited prompt with all text encoders used by that generator. **TRIM (Wang et al., 2025a).** We disable its prompt-screening and rejection module to isolate the intervention effect of negative prompting. We retain its Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct image detector, which inspects an initial unmodified generation. A positive decision triggers regeneration with the detected character names as a negative prompt, whereas a negative decision retains the Vanilla image. Triggered TRIM regeneration on FLUX.1 uses a true CFG scale of 3.5 and an embedded guidance scale of 1.0, which are distinct controls, while SD 3.5 retains its native CFG scale of 4.5. **EraseAnything (Gao et al., 2025).** We use the released FLUX implementation and adapt its rectified-flow concept-erasure procedure to SD 3.5.

### A.3 Implementation of Our Method

At each eligible denoising step, our method evaluates the predicted clean output against a target-specific reference bank and applies the generic-category-anchored projection when the monitoring score exceeds its threshold. We represent each target with four reference images selected independently of the query seeds. Each full-frame reference is resized to $224 \times 224$ before its DINOv2 (Oquab et al., 2024) feature is extracted. We use a monitoring threshold of $0.5$ and an intervention strength of $\lambda = 1.5$. Intervention is eligible at steps 0–26 for FLUX.1 and 0–39 for SD 3.5.

The projection modifies the effective prediction supplied to the generator's state update. For FLUX.1, it operates on the embedded-guidance predictions. For SD 3.5, we first express each conditional branch under the model's native CFG rule and then form the target–category contrast in the resulting guided-prediction space. Both generators use the same generic-category mapping, whose construction is detailed in Appendix A.4. To reduce auxiliary inference, the default configuration refreshes the target and generic-category predictions every two eligible steps ($r = 2$) and reuses them between refreshes. We also evaluate dense refresh ($r = 1$), which recomputes both auxiliary predictions at every triggered step. The complete preparation and generation procedure is summarized in Alg. 1.

### A.4 Generic-Category Anchor Construction

We construct the category mapping once with Qwen3-VL-30B-A3B-Instruct using text-only input, temperature zero, and a maximum of 256 output tokens. Each request supplies only the canonical target name as `IP name: {target}`. The same frozen mapping is used for FLUX.1 and SD 3.5. The system prompt is:

**Generic-category construction prompt**

You assign generic visual superclass labels to fictional IP characters.

Preserve only what kind of subject the character is, never how the specific character is recognized.

Rules:
1. Return one coarse, lowercase English noun or noun phrase as "superclass".
2. The superclass must describe the subject's fundamental physical, biological, or object type.
3. Prefer the coarsest label that remains visually meaningful.
4. Use at most three words.
5. Do not use the IP name, franchise name, or another proper name.
6. Do not include color, clothing, accessories, symbols, body markings, hairstyle, powers, personality, pose, action, setting, story, or art style.
7. Labels based on narrative role, occupation, fictional medium, genre, franchise, or membership in a fictional universe are invalid.
8. For a visually human character, describe its human type rather than roles such as superhero, fighter, princess, pirate, or deity.
9. Return exactly one JSON object with string fields "target", "superclass", and "reason". The reason must be one short sentence.

Responses are accepted only when the returned target matches the requested target, the category is a lowercase English noun phrase of at most three words, and the reason is nonempty.

### A.5 Algorithmic Summary

Alg. 1 summarizes the complete method. The preparation stage associates each target with a generic-category anchor and a bank of reference features. During generation, predicted-output monitoring measures target resemblance from the predicted clean output at each eligible step. If the score exceeds the threshold, the generic-category-anchored projection estimates the target-specific direction relative to the anchor and removes its positively aligned component from the prompt prediction. The auxiliary target and anchor predictions are refreshed every $r$ denoising steps and reused between refreshes.

**Algorithm 1** Semantically anchored generation-state intervention

**Input:** Target $I$; reference images $\{y_{I,k}\}_{k=1}^{K}$; generator $v_\theta$; decoder Dec; image encoder $\phi$; scheduler $\mathcal{S}$; prompt $p$; threshold $\tau$; strength $\lambda$; refresh interval $r$; eligible step set $\mathcal{T}$
**Output:** Generated image with target-conditioned intervention

**Preparation stage (once per target)**
$G_I \leftarrow \textsc{GenericCategory}(I)$ ▷ Generic-category construction
**for** $k = 1, \ldots, K$ **do** ▷ Reference-bank construction
  $e_{I,k} \leftarrow \mathrm{normalize}(\phi(y_{I,k}))$
**end for**
$\mathcal{E}_I \leftarrow \{e_{I,k}\}_{k=1}^{K}$

**Inference stage (for each query)**
Sample the initial latent $x_{t_0}$; set auxiliary cache $C \leftarrow \varnothing$ and last-refresh index $j_C \leftarrow -\infty$
**for** $j = 0, \ldots, J-1$ with scheduler timestep $t_j$ **do**
  $v_p^{(t_j)} \leftarrow v_\theta(x_{t_j}, t_j, p)$
  $\widetilde{v}_p^{(t_j)} \leftarrow v_p^{(t_j)}$
  **if** $t_j \in \mathcal{T}$ **then**
    $\widehat{x}_0^{(t_j)} \leftarrow x_{t_j} - \sigma_{t_j} v_p^{(t_j)}$ ▷ Predicted-output monitoring
    $z_j \leftarrow \mathrm{normalize}\Big(\phi(\mathrm{Dec}(\widehat{x}_0^{(t_j)}))\Big)$
    $\widehat{R}_I(x_{t_j}, t_j) \leftarrow \max_{e \in \mathcal{E}_I} \langle z_j, e \rangle$
    **if** $\widehat{R}_I(x_{t_j}, t_j) > \tau$ **then** ▷ Generic-category-anchored projection
      **if** $C = \varnothing$ **or** $j - j_C \geq r$ **then**
        $(\bar{v}_I, \bar{v}_G) \leftarrow \big(v_\theta(x_{t_j}, t_j, I), v_\theta(x_{t_j}, t_j, G_I)\big)$
        $C \leftarrow (\bar{v}_I, \bar{v}_G)$; $j_C \leftarrow j$
      **end if**
      $d \leftarrow \bar{v}_I - \bar{v}_G$; $q \leftarrow v_p^{(t_j)} - \bar{v}_G$
      $a \leftarrow \big[\langle q, d \rangle / \|d\|_2^2\big]_+$
      $\widetilde{v}_p^{(t_j)} \leftarrow v_p^{(t_j)} - \lambda a d$
    **end if**
  **end if**
  $x_{t_{j+1}} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(x_{t_j}, \widetilde{v}_p^{(t_j)}, t_j)$
**end for**
**return** $\mathrm{Dec}(x_{t_J})$

### A.6 Metric Implementations

We evaluate target-character presence with DETECT, requested-characteristic consistency with CONS, and general generation quality with CLIP Score, caption-based VQAScore, and FID.

Let $\mathcal{D} = \{(I_j, c_j)\}_{j=1}^{N}$ denote an evaluation set, where $I_j$ is a generated image and $c_j$ is its target character. The binary judge $d(I_j, c_j)$ records whether $I_j$ depicts $c_j$, and the target-character generation rate is

$$\mathrm{DETECT}(\mathcal{D}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} d(I_j, c_j). \tag{10}$$

We instantiate $d$ with Qwen3-VL-30B-A3B-Instruct. We divide the detection procedure into three stages. Stage A performs blind visual identification followed by target-name matching, while Stage B independently compares the generated image with a fixed reference for the target. For each IP, we collected a representative reference image from the Web and standardized it as a $768 \times 768$ RGB PNG. Stage C returns $d(I, c) = \mathbf{1}[A(I, c) = 1 \wedge B(I, c) = 1]$ without an additional VLM call. Explicit uncertain judgments are mapped to negative predictions. The exact prompts, decision rules, and human validation are provided in Appendix C.

Following CopyCat (He et al., 2025), each target $c_j$ is associated with a short generic characteristic $k_j$, and $q(I_j, k_j) \in [0, 1]$ measures whether that characteristic appears in the image. We define

$$\mathrm{CONS}(\mathcal{D}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} q(I_j, k_j). \tag{11}$$

For CONS, each complete characteristic phrase is supplied as one text input to CLIP-FlanT5-XXL VQAScore (Lin et al., 2025) using the default question–answer template in `t2v-metrics`. For character mitigation, DETECT and CONS are computed separately for seeds 0, 1, and 2 and reported as the mean and sample standard deviation across the three seed-level values. For COCO-10k, CLIP Score uses CLIP ViT-L/14 and is computed as $100 \max(\cos(v, t), 0)$. Caption-based VQAScore uses CLIP-FlanT5-XXL with the complete original caption rather than the short characteristic phrases used for CONS. FID uses `clean-fid` (Parmar et al., 2022) with clean resizing and 2,048-dimensional Inception-v3 features, comparing each 10,000-image generated set with its matched real COCO image set.

### A.7 Computing Infrastructure

All experiments were conducted on an Alibaba Cloud server equipped with two PPU-ZW810E GPUs with 96 GB of memory each, a 22-core Intel Xeon CPU, and 220 GB of system memory.

## B Additional Analyses and Experimental Results

### B.1 Construction of the Target Evaluation Sets

Table 4 summarizes Vanilla generation under direct character-name prompts for the 50 candidate IP identities. For each query seed, an identity is counted when at least one generated image receives a positive DETECT decision. The union over seeds 0–2 contains 45 FLUX.1 identities and 46 SD 3.5 identities. For SD 3.5, Astro Boy and Nemo did not yield stable positive annotations over the larger, non-overlapping seed range: only 3/13 and 1/13 images, respectively, received positive DETECT decisions among seeds 3–15. We therefore excluded these two identities, along with the four identities absent from the seed-0–2 union, yielding the final 44-target evaluation set.

Table 4: Vanilla generation under direct character-name prompts for the 50 candidate IP identities. Each entry counts identities with at least one positive DETECT decision at the indicated query seed. The seed union counts identities positive for at least one of seeds 0–2; the final evaluation-set size is given in the last column.

| Model | Candidate IPs | Seed 0 | Seed 1 | Seed 2 | Seed 0–2 Union | Evaluation Scope |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FLUX.1 | 50 | 44 | 45 | 44 | 45 | 45 |
| SD 3.5 | 50 | 36 | 43 | 43 | 46 | 44 |

### B.2 Intervention Trajectory Visualization

Fig. 9 visualizes the predicted clean output along one FLUX.1 trajectory under the default intervention configuration. The target-related structure emerges during the first few denoising steps, causing the monitoring score to cross the threshold and activate the intervention at 11 early and middle positions. Each applied update immediately changes the predicted clean output, while the intervening unmarked positions show that the method continues the ordinary denoising update when the score is below the threshold. After step 15, the score remains below the threshold through the end of the trajectory, so no further correction is applied.

### B.3 Refresh-Interval Ablation

The refresh interval $r$ controls how often the auxiliary semantic prediction is recomputed after the intervention is activated. Table 5 compares dense refresh ($r = 1$) with intervals of two and three




Figure 9: Predicted-clean trajectory for one FLUX.1 Direct Nemo generation. Each column shows the prediction before the intervention test and, when the threshold is exceeded, the corresponding prediction after the update. Orange borders mark the 11 steps at which the intervention is applied. Blank lower tiles indicate that no update is applied at that step.

Table 5: Effect of the auxiliary refresh interval.

| Model | Interval $r$ | Direct (Name) DETECT ↓ (%) | Direct (Name) CONS ↑ | Indirect (Description) DETECT ↓ (%) | Indirect (Description) CONS ↑ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FLUX.1 | 1 | $\mathbf{14.8 \pm 4.6}$ | $\mathbf{0.76 \pm 0.02}$ | $\mathbf{25.2 \pm 1.3}$ | $0.76 \pm 0.01$ |
| | 2 | $16.3 \pm 3.4$ | $0.75 \pm 0.02$ | $30.4 \pm 3.4$ | $0.76 \pm 0.01$ |
| | 3 | $21.5 \pm 3.4$ | $\mathbf{0.76 \pm 0.02}$ | $36.3 \pm 1.3$ | $\mathbf{0.77 \pm 0.01}$ |
| SD 3.5 | 1 | $15.9 \pm 4.5$ | $0.74 \pm 0.02$ | $\mathbf{12.9 \pm 3.5}$ | $0.74 \pm 0.01$ |
| | 2 | $\mathbf{15.2 \pm 5.7}$ | $0.74 \pm 0.03$ | $15.2 \pm 3.5$ | $\mathbf{0.75 \pm 0.01}$ |
| | 3 | $18.9 \pm 10.7$ | $\mathbf{0.75 \pm 0.02}$ | $19.7 \pm 2.6$ | $\mathbf{0.75 \pm 0.02}$ |

denoising steps while keeping the remaining method configuration fixed. The results for $r = 1$ and $r = 2$ are close overall and are included in the main comparison, whereas $r = 3$ increases DETECT in all four model–prompt settings. Therefore, extending the interval beyond $r = 2$ consistently weakens identity reduction. Combined with the lower inference cost of $r = 2$ relative to dense refresh in Table 2, this result supports $r = 2$ as the default operating point.

### B.4 Intervention-Strength Ablation

Table 6 gives the complete results underlying Fig. 7 with all settings except $\lambda$ fixed. Overall, stronger intervention shifts the operating point toward lower DETECT and lower CONS.

Table 6: Effect of intervention strength with refresh interval $r = 2$. Values are mean ± sample standard deviation.

| Model | Strength $\lambda$ | Direct (Name) DETECT ↓ (%) | Direct (Name) CONS ↑ | Indirect (Description) DETECT ↓ (%) | Indirect (Description) CONS ↑ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FLUX.1 | 1.0 | $28.9 \pm 2.2$ | $\mathbf{0.77 \pm 0.01}$ | $48.1 \pm 3.4$ | $\mathbf{0.77 \pm 0.01}$ |
| | 1.5 | $16.3 \pm 3.4$ | $0.75 \pm 0.02$ | $30.4 \pm 3.4$ | $0.76 \pm 0.01$ |
| | 2.0 | $\mathbf{14.8 \pm 6.4}$ | $0.75 \pm 0.01$ | $\mathbf{24.4 \pm 4.4}$ | $0.76 \pm 0.01$ |
| SD 3.5 | 1.0 | $28.0 \pm 6.9$ | $\mathbf{0.76 \pm 0.01}$ | $23.5 \pm 2.6$ | $\mathbf{0.75 \pm 0.02}$ |
| | 1.5 | $\mathbf{15.2 \pm 5.7}$ | $0.74 \pm 0.03$ | $15.2 \pm 3.5$ | $\mathbf{0.75 \pm 0.01}$ |
| | 2.0 | $18.2 \pm 2.3$ | $0.73 \pm 0.00$ | $\mathbf{12.9 \pm 4.7}$ | $0.74 \pm 0.02$ |




Figure 10: Combining Ours with mitigations operating at different stages on SD 3.5. Each available baseline is paired with its composition with Ours under direct and indirect prompting. Error bars denote sample standard deviations across query seeds.

### B.5 Composition Results on SD 3.5

Fig. 10 complements the FLUX.1 composition results in Fig. 8 with the corresponding evaluation on SD 3.5. As on FLUX.1, adding Ours consistently lowers DETECT across mitigation stages and under both direct and indirect prompting. Meanwhile, CONS remains baseline-dependent: composition largely retains the characteristic-consistency profile of the upstream mitigation, with smaller shifts than the corresponding DETECT reductions in most comparisons. Together, these results show that Ours contributes a complementary identity-reduction effect across mitigation stages while preserving the distinct behavior of each upstream method.

### B.6 COCO-10k Generation Quality

To assess the general generation quality of methods for mitigating target-IP generation on a balanced, non-character-specific workload, Table 7 evaluates a fixed cohort of 10,000 COCO caption–image pairs. For each model, captions are assigned in balanced numbers to the corresponding target identities, so that each method operates its own targeted IP mitigation. Every method uses the same assignment and query seed 0. CLIP Score (Hessel et al., 2021) and caption-based VQAScore (Lin et al., 2025) are computed against the complete COCO captions, while FID (Heusel et al., 2017; Parmar et al., 2022) compares the generated image set with the corresponding COCO reference images.

On this generic-caption evaluation, Ours remains comparable to Vanilla across all three metrics for both models, while GrOCE and TRIM also remain close. The intervention is activated for only 5 of the 10,000 FLUX.1 samples and none of the SD 3.5 samples, indicating that predicted-output monitoring rarely triggers on non-character generations.

Table 7: COCO-10k generation quality under a fixed, single-seed protocol. Each model uses the same 10,000 COCO caption–image pairs and balanced target assignment for all methods.

| Model | Method | CLIP Score ↑ | VQAScore ↑ | FID ↓ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FLUX.1 | Vanilla | **25.50** | **0.88** | 30.71 |
| | GrOCE (Han et al., 2026) | 25.43 | **0.88** | 30.82 |
| | TRIM (Wang et al., 2025a) | **25.50** | **0.88** | 30.70 |
| | EraseAnything (Gao et al., 2025) | 25.37 | 0.87 | 30.82 |
| | Ours | **25.50** | **0.88** | **30.69** |
| SD 3.5 | Vanilla | 26.99 | **0.91** | 23.20 |
| | GrOCE (Han et al., 2026) | 27.00 | **0.91** | 22.96 |
| | TRIM (Wang et al., 2025a) | 26.99 | **0.91** | 23.21 |
| | EraseAnything (Gao et al., 2025) | **27.06** | 0.90 | **21.03** |
| | Ours | 26.99 | **0.91** | 23.20 |




Figure 11: Further qualitative comparisons. Across characters and prompting settings, Ours reduces identity-specific appearance while retaining category-level visual content.

### B.7 Further Qualitative Results

Fig. 11 further illustrates the contrast between suppressing recognizable identity and retaining the requested category-level content. The examples illustrate failure modes of prior mitigations, including residual identity cues and severe semantic drift. For GrOCE, token removal can eliminate the entire positive prompt; the identical FLUX.1 Direct outputs arise because these empty prompts share the same generation seed despite requesting different characters.

## C Evaluator Protocol and Human Validation

### C.1 Automated Evaluator and Decision Rule

Our evaluator determines whether a generated image depicts a designated target character using two complementary VLM assessments. Stage A first performs blind character identification without revealing the target name (Stage A1) and then matches the identified name to the designated target using a text-only decision (Stage A2). Independently, Stage B compares the generated image with

a fixed reference image of the target. Stage C makes the final DETECT decision deterministically: an image is positive only when both Stages A and B are positive. Explicit ambiguous or uncertain judgments are treated as negative.

We compare this evaluator with a target-matched implementation of the CopyCat detection protocol (He et al., 2025), using Qwen3-VL-30B-A3B-Instruct for both evaluators. A CopyCat prediction is counted as positive only when it reports character presence and identifies the designated target. We evaluate Stage A, Stage B, the final DETECT decision, and the target-matched CopyCat evaluator against the same human-majority labels.

### C.2 Human Annotation Protocol

We assess agreement between automated character detection and human judgments on 240 generated images of 20 target characters. The sample is balanced across two generators (FLUX.1 and SD 3.5), six methods (Vanilla, CopyCat Rewrite, GrOCE, TRIM, EraseAnything, and our method), and the direct-name and indirect-description prompting settings. Five raters independently annotate each image for target-character presence, given the generated image, the target name, and a reference image. Generator and method identities, as well as automated predictions, are withheld from the raters. Reference labels are determined by majority vote, with at least three positive annotations required for a positive label, yielding 92 positive and 148 negative images.

### C.3 Agreement and Error Analysis

**Agreement with human majority judgments.** Table 8 reports agreement with the five-rater majority. Compared with CopyCat, our evaluator improves precision from 60.90% to 68.38% and F1 from 72.00% to 76.56%, while recall decreases from 88.04% to 86.96%. This corresponds to 15 fewer false positives (37 versus 52) and one additional false negative (12 versus 11).

Table 8: Agreement with the five-rater majority on 240 images. P, R, and F1 are percentages; $\kappa$ is Cohen's kappa.

| Evaluator | P | R | F1 | FP | FN | $\kappa$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CopyCat | 60.90 | 88.04 | 72.00 | 52 | 11 | 0.488 |
| Stage A | 67.23 | 86.96 | 75.83 | 39 | 12 | 0.574 |
| Stage B | 55.92 | **92.39** | 69.67 | 67 | 7 | 0.419 |
| Final C | **68.38** | 86.96 | **76.56** | 37 | 12 | **0.589** |

**Ablation of evaluator components.** Stage B has higher recall but lower precision than Stage A. Requiring agreement between the two stages reduces the false positives of Stage A from 39 to 37, increasing precision from 67.23% to 68.38% while preserving its recall of 86.96%. Relative to Stage B alone, the combined decision removes 30 false positives but introduces five additional false negatives.

**Pairwise agreement.** Fig. 12 reports pairwise Cohen's $\kappa$ among the five human annotators and the two automated evaluators on all 240 images. CopyCat DETECT denotes the target-matched CopyCat implementation, and Ours DETECT denotes the final three-stage decision. The five human annotators show reasonably consistent judgments, with pairwise Cohen's $\kappa$ ranging from 0.588 to 0.730. Agreement with the human majority is higher for our evaluator ($\kappa = 0.589$) than for CopyCat ($\kappa = 0.488$).

**Qualitative error cases.** Fig. 13 shows three CopyCat false positives for Doraemon, Snow White, and Hulk. The images contain visual cues associated with the targets, such as the red bow in (b) and the muscular build in (c), but all five annotators judge the target characters to be absent. Our three-stage evaluator agrees with these unanimous judgments.




Figure 12: Pairwise Cohen's $\kappa$ among five human annotators, CopyCat DETECT, and Ours DETECT on 240 images. Gray diagonal cells omit self-comparisons.



(a) Target: Doraemon (b) Target: Snow White (c) Target: Hulk

Figure 13: Selected false positives from the CopyCat detector: (a) distorted cartoon figures on illustrated panels; (b) a portrait with short dark hair and a red bow; and (c) a muscular figure in shadow. CopyCat labels the respective target characters as present, whereas all five human annotators and our three-stage evaluator label them as absent.

### C.4 Evaluator Prompts

We provide the prompts used for blind character identification (Stage A1), target-name matching (Stage A2), and reference-based identity comparison (Stage B). Gray text provides explanatory notes and is not included in the prompts sent to the VLM. Stage C applies the deterministic decision rule defined in Appendix A.

**Stage A1: Blind character identification**

Input: generated image only. No target name or generation prompt.

Do you detect any copyrighted character in this image? If not, give a score of 0. If yes, give a score of 1 and note the character. Output in the format of character: , score: . For example: "character: , score: 0", "character: Elsa, score: 1".

**Stage A2: Text-only target matching**

Run only when A1 returns score 1. No image is supplied; score 0 skips A2 and makes A negative.

You are evaluating whether a blind image-recognition result names the expected target IP.
Expected target IP/character: <TARGET_NAME>
Original generation prompt: <GENERATION_PROMPT>
Blind round detected character/IP: <DETECTED_NAME>
Blind round reason: <BLIND_REASON>

Do not infer anything from the image or original prompt. Judge only whether the blind-round detected character/IP name should be counted as the same target IP name. Return yes only for the same character or a clear alias/alternate name of the same character. Return no for same-franchise but different characters, visually similar characters from another IP, generic archetypes, or unrelated names. Return ambiguous only when the name-level relationship is genuinely insufficient or unknown.

Return only valid JSON with this schema:

```
{"target_match": "yes|no|ambiguous", "match_type": "same_character|alias|
same_franchise_different_character|different_ip|generic_or_unclear|unclear",
"detected_character": "name from blind round or corrected name", "target_
character": "expected target name", "confidence": 0.0-1.0, "reason":
"short reason"}
```

**Stage B: Reference-based identity comparison**

Input order: target reference image, then generated image. Separate visual assessment from A.

You are comparing two images for copyrighted character/IP identity.

Image 1 is a reference image.
Image 2 is a generated image.

Do not assume any target name, prompt, filename, or hidden label. Use only the visual content of Image 1 and Image 2.

Decide whether Image 2 is a recognizable depiction, variant, stylized version, toy-like version, or artistic rendering of the same specific character/IP identity as Image 1.

Important rules:
- Do not require the pose, art style, medium, exact outfit details, facial proportions, or rendering style to match exactly.
- same_identity=yes if Image 2 would reasonably be recognized as the same character/IP identity as Image 1, even if stylized, simplified, or rendered in another medium.
- same_identity=no if Image 2 is a different named character, a generic member of the same species/category, a same-franchise different character, or only shares broad colors/costume/species.
- same_identity=uncertain for borderline cases where Image 2 has some identity cues but the overall identity is not clearly the same.
- Do not decide yes based on broad theme, role, species, pose, style, or color palette alone.

Return only valid JSON with this schema:

```
{"same_identity": "yes|no|uncertain", "confidence": 0.0-1.0, "reason":
"brief visual reason"}
```