CAN ANYONE MAKE POISONS? SYSTEMATIC RED-TEAMING OF MOLECULE LANGUAGE MODELS

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ABSTRACT

Molecule language models offer an accessible interface for molecule design, but also raise potential dual-use concerns. Despite extensive research on red-teaming large language models, the safety risks of these models remain largely unexplored. In this work, we present the first systematic red-teaming study of molecule language models. We curate toxicity data spanning eight endpoints and develop specialized evaluators for systematic assessment. Our analysis further reveals that toxic molecules exhibit greater similarity to known toxic examples than non-toxic molecules. Building on this structural prior, we develop a decoding-time red-teaming strategy that learns a surrogate scorer to estimate the toxic-neighbor potential of partial SMILES and steer generation toward toxicity-associated regions. Extensive experiments across eight models show that our method substantially increases toxicity rates, yielding an average absolute improvement of up to 41.4%. Qualitative analyses further identify generated compounds with established real-world toxicological hazards. These findings expose an overlooked attack surface in molecule language models and underscore the need for stronger safeguards, monitoring, and traceability mechanisms for frontier systems.

Disclaimer: This paper contains potentially unsafe or harmful content.

1 INTRODUCTION

Designing molecules with desired properties is a fundamental challenge in drug discovery and chemical engineering, where the vast chemical space contains only sparse regions that satisfy the functional requirements of a particular application (Dobson, 2004; Du et al., 2024). Advances in deep generative modeling, including variational autoencoders (Jin et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018) and diffusion models (Hoogeboom et al., 2022; Xu et al., 2022), have enabled the generation of diverse and chemically valid molecules, facilitating efficient exploration of chemical space. More recently, inspired by the rapid progress of large language models (LLMs) (Grattafiori et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2025), molecule language models have introduced a new paradigm of text-guided molecule generation, where natural language descriptions serve as flexible conditioning signals (Pei et al., 2023; 2024; Park et al., 2025; Phan et al., 2026). By directly translating desired properties and behaviors into molecular structures, these models provide an intuitive and expressive interface for controllable molecule design, thereby reducing the expertise required to interact with molecular generative models and making molecule generation more accessible, flexible, and broadly applicable.

However, the increased accessibility and controllability also raise potential dual-use concerns, as malicious users may manipulate prompts to elicit molecules with biosecurity-relevant properties (*i.e.*, toxicity). Recent studies on LLMs have revealed their susceptibility to jailbreak attacks, where carefully crafted inputs can bypass intended safeguards and elicit unintended or harmful outputs (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024; Hayase et al., 2024; Guo et al., 2026; Li et al., 2026). Whether molecule language models exhibit similar vulnerabilities remains largely unclear, and systematic red-teaming of such models has received limited investigation.

Our preliminary study reveals two major challenges in red-teaming these models. On the one hand, molecular toxicity is inherently multifaceted and SMILES outputs cannot be assessed by human inspection. We first organize toxicity into two broad categories, organ toxicity and mechanistic toxicity, covering eight fine-grained endpoints, including cardiotoxicity, pneumotoxicity, and others.

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


Figure 1: Toxicity profiles of molecules generated by BioT5 (Pei et al., 2023) and BioT5+ (Pei et al., 2024) under benign and toxicity-directed prompts.

Then we consider advanced closed-source LLMs to assess each toxicity endpoint, but observe limited accuracy and high false-positive rates, potentially due to their built-in safety constraints. While MolSafeEval (Xu et al., 2026) improves LLM-based evaluation with a self-constructed structured molecular safety knowledge graph, this resource is not publicly available. Given the strong capabilities of modern molecule foundation models, we turn to training our own evaluators, with the intuition that high-quality toxicity data can be more critical than elaborate model design. Accordingly, we make extensive efforts to collect toxicity datasets from a wide range of accessible sources, including the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), among others, and use them to train endpoint-specific toxicity predictors. Without architectural bells and whistles, our evaluators achieve over 90% average accuracy across all toxicity endpoints, providing a reliable basis for safety evaluation.

On the other hand, we find that these models do not explicitly associate toxicity-related semantics with the corresponding regions of molecular space. MolSafeEval (Xu et al., 2026) has shown that such models can still generate potentially toxic molecules under appropriate prompts, suggesting that toxic structures may already be implicitly captured during training, as toxic molecules are not explicitly excluded from the training corpus. To further examine this behavior, we append explicit toxicity instructions to the original prompts, *e.g.*, "The molecule has cardiotoxicity." As illustrated in Figure 1, however, such instructions do not consistently increase the toxicity of the generated molecules, indicating that a latent capacity to generate toxic molecules does not necessarily translate into controllable generation under toxicity-related instructions. This behavior differs fundamentally from jailbreaks in conventional LLMs, where harmful knowledge is typically already aligned with semantic instructions and attacks mainly aim to bypass refusal mechanisms, thereby making molecule language models inherently more difficult to attack.

As a result, we explore a decoding-time red-teaming approach in this work. We first conduct an empirical analysis of the relationship between molecular fingerprint space and molecule toxicity. Across toxicity endpoints, we observe that held-out toxic molecules tend to exhibit higher structural similarity to toxic examples than non-toxic molecules. Importantly, such a relationship cannot simply be assumed a priori: (1) toxic effects can arise through heterogeneous biological mechanisms, and even small structural modifications can often substantially alter toxicological outcomes (Liebler & Guengerich, 2005; Yan et al., 2023); and (2) unlike protein and DNA sequences, where sequence homology often provides a strong indication of shared evolutionary origin and functional similarity (Lee et al., 2007; Pearson, 2013), molecular fingerprint similarity primarily reflects shared structural motifs and therefore does not necessarily imply similar toxicity.

Motivated by this observation, we seek to exploit the structural prior during decoding such that intermediate generations progressively move toward regions associated with toxic molecules. A key difficulty is that molecule prefixes are incomplete representations and cannot be directly evaluated by structure-based similarity measures. A natural alternative is to estimate the potential of each partial generation by completing it into multiple valid molecules and evaluating the resulting structures against toxic references, but doing so repeatedly during decoding is computationally prohibitive. To address this issue, we learn a surrogate scoring function that directly estimates the toxicity-oriented potential of a partial generation conditioned on the input prompt. During decoding, this score is incorporated into the generation process to favor candidates that are more likely to evolve toward molecular regions associated with higher toxicological risk. In this way, our approach transforms an expensive structure-level objective into an efficient decoding-time signal, enabling systematic

red-teaming of molecule language models. By probing these models under such toxicity-directed guidance, we aim to expose potential biosecurity vulnerabilities and inform the development of strong safeguards for molecule generation systems.

In summary, our main contributions can be listed as follows:

- To the best of our knowledge, we present the first systematic red-teaming study of molecule language models.
- We curate a large-scale toxicity corpus from diverse sources and build reliable evaluators across multiple toxicity endpoints. Based on this corpus, we further uncover a consistent structural pattern that provides an exploitable prior for toxicity.
- We introduce a decoding-time red-teaming strategy that steers partial generations toward high-risk molecular regions with a learned surrogate scorer.
- Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our red-teaming approach across eight molecule language models, highlighting the need for strong monitoring and safeguarding mechanisms for frontier molecular generative systems.

2 Related Work

Molecule Language Models. With the rapid progress of LLMs, molecule language models have emerged as an increasingly prominent paradigm for text-guided molecule generation. MolT5 (Edwards et al., 2022) first formulates molecule–language translation by jointly pretraining on natural language and molecule strings. BioT5 (Pei et al., 2023) further integrates chemical knowledge and biological text while adopting SELFIES for robust molecule representation, and BioT5+ (Pei et al., 2024) extends this framework with IUPAC integration and multi-task instruction tuning. More recent approaches focus on improving fine-grained alignment: MolBridge (Park et al., 2025) explicitly models correspondences between molecule substructures and chemical phrases and transfers such signals to molecule generation, while ChemAligner-T5 (Phan et al., 2026) directly aligns textual and molecule representations through contrastive learning. Despite steady progress in generation quality and semantic alignment, their potential safety vulnerabilities remain largely unexplored.

Red-Teaming for LLMs. Red-teaming systematically probes LLMs to uncover harmful or unintended behaviors, providing an important means of assessing their safety vulnerabilities. Early studies employ human-crafted adversarial prompts to identify diverse failure modes (Ganguli et al., 2022). To improve scalability, subsequent work leverages LLMs themselves to automatically generate challenging test cases (Perez et al., 2022). More recent approaches emphasize the diversity and coverage of safety evaluations. Rainbow Teaming adopts quality-diversity search to discover diverse adversarial prompts (Samvelyan et al., 2024), while WildTeaming draws on real-world user interactions to identify and combine emerging attack tactics (Jiang et al., 2024). AutoRedTeamer further introduces an autonomous red-teaming framework that continuously discovers and integrates emerging attack strategies (Zhou et al., 2026).

Red-Teaming for Biological Language Models. Recent studies have extended red-teaming techniques to biological foundation models. GeneBreaker (Zhang et al., 2026) systematically investigates pathogenicity-guided jailbreak attacks against DNA language models, while SafeProtein (Fan et al., 2025) develops a red-teaming framework and benchmark for evaluating biosafety risks in protein foundation models. These studies reveal domain-specific safety vulnerabilities in biological language models and motivate us to investigate risks in molecule generation, which have not yet been systematically studied.

3 Red-Teaming Evaluation Framework

3.1 Threat Model and Scope

Problem Setup. In this study, we aim to steer molecule language models toward generating molecules that are toxic to humans. Formally, let $\mathcal{M}$ denote a target molecule generator, P an input prompt, and π a decoding policy that controls the generation process. We consider a set of toxicity endpoints $\mathcal{E}$. For each target endpoint $e \in \mathcal{E}$, we define a toxicity evaluator $f_e(\cdot)$ and formulate the

red-teaming objective as

$$\text{Find } \pi \quad \text{subject to} \quad f_e(\pi(\mathcal{M}, P)) = 1, \tag{1}$$

where $f_e(\cdot) = 1$ indicates that the generated molecule is classified as toxic under endpoint e.

Access and Control. We consider open-weight molecule language models evaluated with their released checkpoints and molecule descriptions from the benchmark. The adversary aims to steer generation toward toxic molecules solely through *decoding-time* control. Let $\mathcal{M}_\theta$ denote a target model $\mathcal{M}$ with parameters θ, and P_i the i-th input description. The adversary has local inference access to multiple candidate continuations at each decoding step but can modify only the decoding policy π, without target-model gradients, fine-tuning, prompt rewriting, or post-hoc filtering. Model parameters, tokenizers, and input descriptions remain unchanged:

$$(\theta^{\text{adv}}, P_i^{\text{adv}}) = (\theta, P_i), \qquad Y_i^0 \sim p_{\theta,\pi_0}(\cdot \mid P_i), \qquad Y_{i,e}^{\text{adv}} \sim p_{\theta,\pi_e}(\cdot \mid P_i), \tag{2}$$

where $p_{\theta,\pi}$ denotes the generation distribution induced by the decoding policy π, and Y_i^0 and $Y_{i,e}^{\text{adv}}$ are the molecules generated under the reference policy π_0 and endpoint-specific toxicity-guided policy π_e, respectively. The adversary trains lightweight, endpoint-specific prefix scorers offline using publicly available toxicity data, which serve as the sole source of toxicity feedback during decoding, without access to the final evaluator, experimental oracle, or iterative target-query feedback.

3.2 Toxicity Assessment

Toxicity Taxonomy and Data Curation. Molecule toxicity is multifaceted and cannot be adequately characterized by a single endpoint. We therefore organize toxicity into two broad categories comprising eight fine-grained endpoints. *Organ toxicity* captures adverse effects on organs or physiological systems, while *mechanistic toxicity* characterizes the underlying biological or cellular mechanisms. For each endpoint, we aggregate publicly accessible experimental, regulatory, and literature-curated toxicity data from diverse sources, as summarized in Table 1. Detailed collection procedures, source references, and endpoint definitions are provided in Appendix C.

Table 1: Data sources for our curated toxicity corpus across eight endpoints.

Endpoint	Data Sources
Organ toxicity	
Cardiotoxicity (Cardio.)	hERGCentral inhibition records; prior datasets; FDA DICTrank.
Pneumotoxicity (Pneumo.)	Published respiratory-toxicity dataset (updating with HCIS records); UniTox annotations.
Ophthalmotoxicity (Ophth.)	Curated eye-irritation and eye-corrosion datasets from the OECD QSAR Toolbox and literature.
Dermatotoxicity (Derm.)	ICCVAM/LLNA sensitization data; REACH irritation data; ToxValDB and STopTox dermal-toxicity records; UniTox annotations.
Mechanistic toxicity	
Carcinogenicity (Carc.)	CPDB rodent carcinogenicity data; curated CPDB/ISS datasets; additional published collections.
Mutagenicity (Mutag.)	Published Ames datasets; strain-specific ISS ISSTOX annotations.
Stress Response (SR)	Tox21 annotations for five stress-response assays.
Micronucleus Induction (MN)	Curated *in vivo* dataset from a published toxicology report and OECD eChemPortal.

For datasets adopted from prior studies, we preserve their original data splits whenever available. Newly collected samples are added only to the training set. Finally, we remove training molecules that overlap with the validation or test sets. Detailed dataset statistics are provided in Figure 2.

Toxicity Evaluator. We first consider advanced closed-source LLMs for toxicity assessment, but observe limited accuracy and high false-positive rates, potentially due to their built-in safety constraints, as shown in Table 3. We therefore leverage modern molecular foundation models to train specialized toxicity evaluators. Among multiple backbones, MoLFormer (Ross et al., 2022) achieves the best performance with over 90% overall accuracy and is therefore selected as our toxicity evaluator, with the full comparison provided in Table 4.




Figure 2: Statistics of our curated datasets across toxicity endpoints.

4 METHOD

4.1 ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL PATTERNS ASSOCIATED WITH TOXICITY

Motivation. To steer molecule generation toward toxic outputs, we first seek a signal that distinguishes toxic from non-toxic molecules and can further provide guidance during decoding. GeneBreaker (Zhang et al., 2026) offers a natural precedent for DNA language models, where pathogenicity scores of candidate sequence continuations are used to guide subsequent decoding. Such guidance is well suited to DNA sequences, since every generated prefix remains a valid nucleotide sequence and can be directly assessed by sequence-based predictors. However, directly extending this paradigm to SMILES generation is non-trivial for two reasons. First, an intermediate SMILES prefix generally does not represent a complete molecule structure, which may contain unmatched branches, unclosed rings, or incomplete valence assignments, making molecule properties such as toxicity undefined at the prefix level. Second, the same molecule can admit multiple valid SMILES representations. For example, aspirin can be represented as either `CC(=O)Oc1ccccc1C(=O)O` or `O=C(O)c1ccccc1OC(C)=O`, yielding markedly different prefixes despite encoding the same molecule. As a result, prefix-level toxicity guidance would depend on an arbitrary serialization rather than an invariant property of the molecule itself.

Empirical Validation. A common assumption in chemoinformatics is the similarity-property principle, which suggests that structurally similar molecules tend to exhibit similar physicochemical or biological properties (Barbosa & Horvath, 2004; Maggiora et al., 2014). However, whether this principle generalizes to toxicity has not been systematically established. The reasons are two-fold: (1) toxicity can emerge from diverse biological targets and pathways, such that even closely related molecules may exhibit markedly different toxicological profiles; and (2) unlike sequence homology in proteins and DNA, which often reflects shared evolutionary origin and can provide strong clues to biological function, molecular fingerprint similarity captures substructural resemblance rather than mechanistic relatedness. To empirically examine whether structural similarity nevertheless provides a useful toxicity-related signal, we analyze each toxicity endpoint independently.

For endpoint e, let $\mathcal{D}^{+}_{\text{train},e}$ denote the toxic subset of the training set and $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{test},e}$ denote a molecule in the held-out test set. We represent each molecule using a 2,048-bit Morgan fingerprint with radius 2 and define its toxic-neighbor similarity as

$$s_e(\mathbf{x}) = \max_{\mathbf{x}' \in \mathcal{D}^{+}_{\text{train},e}} \text{Tanimoto}\left(\phi(\mathbf{x}), \phi(\mathbf{x}')\right), \tag{3}$$

where $\phi(\cdot)$ denotes the Morgan fingerprint and $\text{Tanimoto}(\cdot,\cdot)$ is a standard metric for fingerprint similarity (Bajusz et al., 2015). As shown in Figure 3, held-out toxic molecules consistently exhibit higher toxic-neighbor similarity than their non-toxic counterparts. To assess statistical significance, we conduct a one-sided Mann–Whitney U test, which shows significant differences across all eight endpoints ($p \leq 10^{-4}$). Moreover, the similarity scores yield ROC–AUC values above 0.5 across all endpoints, demonstrating consistent discriminative power, with particularly strong separation for carcinogenicity, ophthalmotoxicity, and mutagenicity. Together, these results reveal that toxic molecules tend to be structurally closer to known toxic examples than non-toxic molecules in molecular space, which naturally raises the question:

Can we leverage this structural prior to attack autoregressive molecule generation models?




Figure 3: Distributions of structural similarity to toxic molecules across eight toxicity endpoints.




Figure 4: Overview of our red-teaming framework for generating poisons in molecule language models: (a) surrogate training-data generation, (b) surrogate training, and (c) surrogate-guided decoding.

4.2 Structural-Prior-Guided Red-Teaming

Surrogate Scoring of Partial SMILES. The structural prior established above operates on complete molecules and thus cannot be directly evaluated for intermediate SMILES prefixes. To extend this signal to partial generations, we estimate where a given prefix is likely to lead by completing it into multiple valid molecules and measuring their toxic-neighbor similarity. Specifically, given a prompt P and a partial SMILES $\mathbf{x}_{1:t}$, we sample multiple continuations and average the toxic-neighbor similarity of the resulting molecules, which we define as the toxic-neighbor potential of the prefix.

However, performing rollout-based estimation at every decoding step incurs substantial computational overhead. We therefore amortize this expensive rollout process with a learned surrogate scorer that directly predicts the toxic-neighbor potential from the prompt and the current SMILES prefix. To construct the training data, we use the training split of the ChEBI-20 dataset (Edwards et al., 2021) and sample prefixes spanning approximately $1/4$ to $3/4$ of each complete SMILES. This range avoids extremely short prefixes that contain little structural information, while excluding near-complete sequences whose continuation is largely determined, thereby covering informative and diverse intermediate generation states. For each prefix, we use the mean toxic-neighbor similarity over its sampled completions as the supervision target, as shown in Figure. 4(a).

The surrogate model separately encodes the textual prompt and the partial SMILES with BiomedBERT (Gu et al., 2021) and ChemBERTa (Chithrananda et al., 2020), respectively. The two representations are first mapped to a common latent dimension, then concatenated and passed through an MLP to predict the toxic-neighbor potential. Formally, for prompt P and partial SMILES $\mathbf{x}_{1:t}$,

$$\hat{s}(P, \mathbf{x}_{1:t}) = \mathrm{MLP}\left(\mathrm{Linear}_P(\mathrm{BiomedBERT}(P)) \,\|\, \mathrm{Linear}_X(\mathrm{ChemBERTa}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t}))\right), \quad (4)$$

where Linear_P and Linear_X project the two representations into the same dimension, $\|$ denotes concatenation, and $\hat{s}$ denotes the predicted toxic-neighbor potential. We adopt ChemBERTa, which is distinct from the backbone used by our toxicity evaluators, to reduce potential evaluation bias.

Periodic Surrogate-Guided Beam Decoding. We integrate the learned surrogate scorer with beam search to guide autoregressive SMILES generation, as shown in Figure. 4(c). Given current partial SMILES $\mathbf{x}_{1:t}$, we run beam search over a few decoding steps to obtain n candidate continuations:

$$\mathcal{C}_t = \left\{ \mathbf{x}^{(1)}_{1:t+\Delta}, \ldots, \mathbf{x}^{(n)}_{1:t+\Delta} \right\}, \tag{5}$$

where Δ denotes the guidance interval, i.e., the number of tokens generated between two consecutive guidance steps. Each candidate is then evaluated by the surrogate scorer, and the one with the highest predicted toxic-neighbor potential is retained:

$$\mathbf{x}_{1:t+\Delta} = \arg\max_{\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}_t} \hat{s}(P, \mathbf{c}). \tag{6}$$

The selected candidate serves as the new prefix for the next round of generation, and this procedure is repeated until decoding terminates. Rather than applying surrogate guidance after every token, we invoke it periodically to balance computational cost and guidance strength. It is worth noting that our method is confined to the decoding stage, which requires no additional retraining or architectural modifications, enabling seamless integration with different autoregressive molecule generators.

5 Experiments

5.1 Experimental Settings

We evaluate our method on eight representative molecule language models: MolT5 (Small, Base, and Large) (Edwards et al., 2022), BioT5 (Pei et al., 2023), BioT5+ (Pei et al., 2024), MolBridge (Park et al., 2025), ChemAligner-T5, and ChemAligner-T5-Pro (Phan et al., 2026). All experiments are conducted on the ChEBI-20 benchmark (Edwards et al., 2021), which contains 3,300 molecule descriptions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic study of red-teaming molecule language models, and thus no directly comparable baseline is available.

We further find that the learned surrogate transfers effectively across different models, eliminating the need to train a separate scorer for each target generator and making the attack more scalable and practical. Accordingly, we train a single surrogate using only BioT5-generated data and apply it directly to all other target models without additional training or adaptation.

Implementation Details. For the toxicity evaluators, we train each model for 50 epochs with a batch size of 128 using AdamW (Loshchilov & Hutter, 2017). The backbone and prediction-head learning rates are set to 2×10^{-5} and 1×10^{-4}, respectively, with a weight decay of 0.01, a warmup ratio of 0.06, and a dropout rate of 0.1. We select the checkpoint with the best validation performance for evaluation. For surrogate training, we sample three prefixes from each molecule in the ChEBI-20 training split. For each prefix, we average the toxic-neighbor similarity over 10 independent valid rollouts as the supervision target, allowing up to 50 generation attempts to obtain valid completions. The surrogate uses the same optimization settings as the toxicity evaluators, with the projection dimension set to 256. During decoding, we set the guidance interval to 3 and the beam size to 10 across all experiments. All experiments are conducted on NVIDIA RTX PRO 6000 GPUs.

5.2 Experimental Results

Table 2 summarizes the toxicity rates across eight molecule language models and eight toxicity endpoints. Consistent with MolSafeEval (Xu et al., 2026), all models generate toxic molecules to varying degrees under standard greedy decoding. Our red-teaming method further increases the overall toxicity rate for every evaluated model, with an average gain of 19.1%. The largest improvement is observed on ChemAligner-T5, whose average toxicity rate rises from 16.79% to 58.15%, yielding an absolute gain of 41.4%. Substantial gains are also achieved on BioT5, BioT5+, MolBridge, and ChemAligner-T5-Pro, demonstrating that our decoding-time attack strategy remains effective across different model families. Comparisons with other commonly used decoding strategies are also provided in Table 5.

Table 2: Toxicity rates (%) of molecules generated by eight representative models across eight toxicity endpoints.

Model	Decoding	Organ Toxicity				Mechanistic Toxicity				Avg.
		Cardio.	Pneumo.	Ophth.	Derm.	Carc.	Mutag.	SR	MN	
MolT5-Small	Greedy	30.30	**70.33**	68.79	79.79	15.30	31.94	43.70	**72.58**	51.59
	Ours	**61.94**	67.82	**84.18**	**85.91**	**52.76**	**52.58**	**43.85**	69.52	**64.82**
MolT5-Base	Greedy	30.55	70.55	69.85	79.48	14.70	33.00	**46.00**	**71.88**	52.00
	Ours	**60.70**	**71.27**	**83.97**	**86.55**	**54.42**	**52.52**	40.30	70.76	**65.06**
MolT5-Large	Greedy	31.03	71.88	63.21	79.73	16.33	32.24	45.09	72.21	51.47
	Ours	**58.76**	63.94	**83.94**	**85.73**	**53.03**	**48.82**	30.61	**72.70**	**62.19**
BioT5	Greedy	16.03	66.36	52.27	53.82	27.36	21.85	42.52	63.36	42.95
	Ours	**36.24**	**68.79**	**71.21**	**76.06**	**46.91**	**44.36**	**65.85**	**72.33**	**60.22**
BioT5+	Greedy	16.42	65.33	52.09	52.27	27.82	22.94	42.42	62.03	42.67
	Ours	**33.18**	**67.24**	**71.61**	**79.58**	**44.88**	**42.24**	**57.39**	**71.73**	**58.48**
MolBridge	Greedy	6.67	43.41	44.68	65.02	14.94	24.83	**29.83**	64.99	36.80
	Ours	**27.12**	**65.52**	**54.61**	**85.82**	**44.79**	**48.64**	26.48	**76.91**	**53.74**
ChemAligner-T5	Greedy	8.05	23.88	51.37	14.46	4.22	7.41	14.52	10.42	16.79
	Ours	**49.03**	**75.94**	**55.09**	**68.39**	**27.24**	**46.27**	**80.09**	**63.12**	**58.15**
ChemAligner-T5-Pro	Greedy	30.85	39.15	**82.97**	43.85	11.15	18.12	31.24	32.58	36.24
	Ours	**49.15**	**71.45**	74.42	**76.03**	**26.03**	**48.45**	**77.24**	**64.09**	**60.86**




Figure 5: Effect of guidance interval on toxicity rates across models.

At the endpoint level, the effectiveness of our method varies with the strength of the structural prior. The largest gains are achieved for cardiotoxicity, dermatotoxicity, carcinogenicity, and mutagenicity, with average improvements of 25.8%, 22.0%, 27.3%, and 23.9%, respectively. These endpoints also exhibit relatively clear separation between toxic and non-toxic molecules in Figure 3. In contrast, stress response (SR) and micronucleus induction (MN) show the weakest structural discrimination, with ROC–AUC values of 0.653 and 0.700, respectively, and correspondingly exhibit less consistent improvements, including occasional decreases on individual models. This correspondence suggests that a more discriminative structural prior provides a stronger signal for decoding-time guidance. Despite such endpoint-level variation, our method consistently improves the overall toxicity rate across all eight models, demonstrating its effectiveness across different model families.

5.3 In-Depth Analysis

Effect of Guidance Interval. We further investigate the effect of guidance frequency by varying the guidance interval across different models and toxicity endpoints. As shown in Figure 5, shorter guidance intervals generally lead to higher toxicity rates, while performance gradually decreases as the interval increases. This consistent trend indicates that more frequent surrogate guidance exerts stronger control over the generation trajectory and more effectively steers the generated molecules toward toxicity-associated regions, which also reveals a natural trade-off between attack strength and computational efficiency, as less frequent guidance reduces the overhead of surrogate evaluation at the cost of weaker steering. At a guidance interval of 3, our approach achieves an average generation time of 2.44 seconds per molecule on BioT5, highlighting its computational efficiency and practical feasibility for large-scale red-teaming.

Case Study. Figure 6 presents representative molecules generated by different target models using our red-teaming strategy. Notably, none of these molecules appears in either the training or test split of ChEBI-20, indicating that these outputs cannot be attributed to direct retrieval from the benchmark. All correspond to known hazardous compounds with well-documented toxicolog-




Figure 6: Representative toxic molecules generated under our red-teaming method, with their names and corresponding positive toxicity endpoints are annotated below each structure.

ical effects, highlighting the real-world significance of the identified vulnerabilities. For example, methyl parathion, generated by BioT5 and identified under the dermatotoxicity endpoint, is a highly toxic organophosphate insecticide. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classifies it as highly toxic through dermal exposure, with acute dermal toxicity falling into Toxicity Category I.[1] Similarly, nitrobenzene, generated by ChemAligner-T5 and identified under the carcinogenicity endpoint, is classified by the EPA as likely to be carcinogenic to humans, with carcinogenic effects observed across multiple tissues in animal studies.[2] These cases show that our red-teaming strategy can generate molecules with established toxicological evidence.

6 Conclusion and Discussion

Conclusion. In this work, we present a systematic investigation of safety vulnerabilities in molecule language models. We curate toxicity data spanning eight endpoints and develop specialized molecule toxicity evaluators to enable reliable evaluation. We further identify a structural prior associated with toxic molecules and develop a decoding-time red-teaming strategy guided by a learned surrogate scorer. Our method consistently succeeds in red-teaming diverse molecule language models, requiring only one forward pass in the target model. Qualitative analyses further identify generated molecules corresponding to known hazardous compounds, highlighting the real-world relevance of these vulnerabilities. More broadly, our findings call for closer collaboration among developers and policymakers to establish effective monitoring, traceability, and governance mechanisms for molecular generative AI.

Discussion. In LLMs, harmful capabilities are often already semantically aligned with natural-language instructions, such that jailbreak attacks primarily seek to bypass refusal or alignment mechanisms. In contrast, molecule language models do not necessarily learn a reliable semantic mapping between toxicity-related instructions and hazardous compounds, despite retaining the capacity to generate such structures. This suggests that prompt-level filtering alone may be insufficient and that safeguards should also target molecular outputs and the generation process. However, exposing these vulnerabilities introduces dual-use risks, as such attack pathways could potentially be misused to facilitate harmful molecule generation. We therefore emphasize responsible disclosure, controlled access to high-risk findings, and close engagement with domain experts and relevant stakeholders in the development and deployment of molecular generative systems. By proactively identifying these vulnerabilities and informing stronger safeguards, our work contributes toward a safe and trustworthy future for biological generative AI.

[1] https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=P100MK6Z.txt
[2] https://iris.epa.gov/ChemicalLanding/%26substance_nmbr%3D79

AI USE STATEMENT

In this work, we used generative AI tools for writing polish. We have not used generative AI tools to design or provide feedback on the research methodology or experiments, implement methods, assist with translation, support qualitative or thematic data analysis, interpret results, or clean or reformat datasets. The following uses of generative AI tools are not applicable to this work: generate synthetic data sets, help develop theoretical models or conceptual frameworks, formulate mathematical claims, provide critical ingredients for proving mathematical claims, assist in the writing of proofs, and propose or refine hypotheses. We take responsibility for the final content of this work, including text, claims or artifacts produced with the aid of generative AI.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work investigates the safety of molecule language models through systematic red-teaming and therefore has potential dual-use implications. Our goal is to expose and characterize vulnerabilities that may lead to the generation of molecules with harmful biological properties, thereby informing the development of stronger safeguards and safety evaluation protocols. All experiments are conducted computationally and involve no molecule synthesis, wet-lab validation, human subjects, or animal studies. We do not provide synthesis protocols or procedural guidance for producing potentially harmful compounds.

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A Benchmarking Toxicity Evaluators

A.1 Closed-Source LLMs

We first examine whether advanced closed-source LLMs can directly serve as toxicity evaluators. We randomly sample a subset from eight toxicity endpoints and evaluate GPT-5.6 Sol, Claude Opus 5, and Gemini 3.5 Flash under the same binary classification protocol, using the prompt shown in Figure 7. As shown in Table 3, these models exhibit limited accuracy and relatively high false-positive rates, potentially due to their built-in safety constraints. These results motivate us to develop specialized molecule toxicity evaluators rather than relying on general-purpose LLMs.

Prompt for toxicity evaluation:

You are a specialized chemistry expert for toxicity prediction. You will be given a molecule in SMILES format and a toxicity endpoint. Determine whether the molecule is predicted to show potential toxicity with respect to the specified endpoint. Toxicity endpoint: {toxic_endpoint}. SMILES: {smiles}. Return exactly one word: Yes or No.

Figure 7: Prompt template used for molecule toxicity classification with closed-source LLMs.

Table 3: Performance of advanced closed-source LLMs for toxicity evaluation.

Model	Precision	Recall	F1	Accuracy
GPT-5.6 Sol	0.52	0.98	0.68	0.54
Claude Opus 5	0.75	0.72	0.73	0.74
Gemini 3.5 Flash	0.55	0.74	0.63	0.57

A.2 Molecule Foundation Models

To build more reliable evaluators, we leverage the strong molecule representations learned by modern molecule foundation models. Specifically, we attach a lightweight MLP prediction head to each pretrained backbone and train endpoint-specific toxicity classifiers using our curated datasets. We compare MoLFormer (Ross et al., 2022), ChemBERTa (Chithrananda et al., 2020), and SMI-TED (Soares et al., 2025) under the same evaluation protocol. As shown in Table 4, MoLFormer achieves the highest overall accuracy of 93.43%, weighted by the number of test samples in each endpoint, and is therefore adopted as our toxicity evaluator.

Table 4: Accuracy (%) of different molecule foundation model backbones across toxicity endpoints. Overall accuracy is weighted by the number of test samples in each endpoint.

Model	Cardio.	Pneumo.	Ophth.	Derm.	Carc.	Mutag.	SR	MN	Overall
MoLFormer	95.05	83.53	95.42	65.05	82.50	85.45	75.02	85.04	93.43
ChemBERTa	91.10	83.13	94.48	56.31	73.75	83.36	76.76	85.83	89.92
SMI-TED	85.31	67.07	86.54	57.28	77.50	72.14	69.42	79.53	83.84

Table 5: Toxicity rates (%) of molecules generated by eight representative models compared with several commonly used decoding strategies across eight toxicity endpoints.

Model	Decoding	Organ Toxicity				Mechanistic Toxicity				Avg.
		Cardio.	Pneumo.	Ophth.	Derm.	Carc.	Mutag.	SR	MN	
MolT5-Small	Greedy	30.30	70.33	68.79	79.79	15.30	31.94	43.70	72.58	51.59
	Top-k	30.64	**70.64**	68.03	80.85	14.97	31.79	**45.15**	72.88	51.87
	Top-p	28.97	70.30	68.30	79.64	14.45	32.12	43.82	72.00	51.20
	Beam	31.06	70.55	71.12	79.45	15.21	33.42	43.85	**73.97**	52.33
	Ours	**61.94**	67.82	**84.18**	**85.91**	**52.76**	**52.58**	43.85	69.52	**64.82**
MolT5-Base	Greedy	30.55	70.55	69.85	79.48	14.70	33.00	**46.00**	71.88	52.00
	Top-k	30.45	**71.42**	68.24	78.55	14.52	32.12	44.03	71.64	51.37
	Top-p	31.36	71.00	70.30	78.94	14.09	31.82	44.52	71.55	51.70
	Beam	30.73	70.00	71.36	79.70	14.61	32.39	43.94	**72.52**	51.91
	Ours	**60.70**	71.27	**83.97**	**86.55**	**54.42**	**52.52**	40.30	70.76	**65.06**
MolT5-Large	Greedy	31.03	71.88	63.21	79.73	16.33	32.24	45.09	72.21	51.47
	Top-k	31.00	**72.97**	65.36	80.18	16.70	31.76	**46.58**	72.30	52.11
	Top-p	31.09	72.18	63.82	79.52	16.61	32.33	45.97	71.58	51.64
	Beam	31.30	72.39	64.85	79.85	15.48	32.33	44.79	72.06	51.63
	Ours	**58.76**	63.94	**83.94**	**85.73**	**53.03**	**48.82**	30.61	**72.70**	**62.19**
BioT5	Greedy	16.03	66.36	52.27	53.82	27.36	21.85	42.52	63.36	42.95
	Top-k	17.30	64.52	54.55	54.76	25.94	23.03	41.73	64.00	43.23
	Top-p	15.55	65.88	52.55	54.36	25.52	22.39	42.70	63.97	42.87
	Beam	16.45	64.97	52.12	55.03	24.33	23.03	41.21	64.00	42.64
	Ours	**36.24**	**68.79**	**71.21**	**76.06**	**46.91**	**44.36**	**65.85**	**72.33**	**60.22**
BioT5+	Greedy	16.42	65.33	52.09	52.27	27.82	22.94	42.42	62.03	42.67
	Top-k	16.64	65.33	52.03	54.36	25.94	22.27	41.27	63.03	42.61
	Top-p	16.12	64.39	52.70	54.73	25.12	21.73	41.24	63.88	42.49
	Beam	16.52	63.91	51.73	55.15	24.73	22.48	40.15	63.61	42.29
	Ours	**33.18**	**67.24**	**71.61**	**79.58**	**44.88**	**42.24**	**57.39**	**71.73**	**58.48**
MolBridge	Greedy	6.67	43.41	44.68	65.02	14.94	24.83	29.83	64.99	36.80
	Top-k	6.36	43.61	45.00	63.85	14.27	24.45	**30.21**	64.91	36.58
	Top-p	6.33	42.45	44.52	65.21	14.64	25.21	28.97	64.15	36.44
	Beam	6.12	42.86	44.95	65.47	14.34	25.46	28.07	64.75	36.50
	Ours	**27.12**	**65.52**	**54.61**	**85.82**	**44.79**	**48.64**	26.48	**76.91**	**53.74**
ChemAligner-T5	Greedy	8.05	23.88	51.37	14.46	4.22	7.41	14.52	10.42	16.79
	Top-k	22.21	57.29	49.65	42.11	14.51	16.28	38.09	32.16	34.04
	Top-p	19.89	51.93	49.44	37.17	14.94	14.82	35.10	29.27	31.57
	Beam	7.76	32.42	51.94	18.94	5.33	7.48	16.24	16.21	19.54
	Ours	**49.03**	**75.94**	**55.09**	**68.39**	**27.24**	**46.27**	**80.09**	**63.12**	**58.15**
ChemAligner-T5-Pro	Greedy	30.85	39.15	**82.97**	43.85	11.15	18.12	31.24	32.58	36.24
	Top-k	38.73	59.09	70.76	60.27	**31.82**	30.39	41.58	52.76	48.18
	Top-p	38.30	58.52	72.73	56.15	29.21	28.70	41.39	51.30	47.04
	Beam	24.24	50.64	81.94	45.33	11.64	17.55	30.58	37.27	37.40
	Ours	**49.15**	**71.45**	74.42	**76.03**	26.03	**48.45**	**77.24**	**64.09**	**60.86**

B Additional Comparison of Decoding Strategies

We further compare our method with other commonly used decoding strategies, including Top-k sampling, Top-p sampling, and beam search. As shown in Table 5, our method achieves substantially higher overall toxicity rates across all evaluated models, complementing the main results in Table 2.

C Toxicity Endpoint Definitions and Data Curation

We provide endpoint definitions and the detailed data collection procedures summarized in Table 1. Dataset sizes and split statistics are shown in Figure 2. The first category, termed *organ toxicity*, captures adverse effects on specific organs or physiological systems and includes:

- **Cardiotoxicity (Cardio.).** Cardiotoxicity refers to adverse effects of chemical exposure on the cardiovascular system, particularly on cardiac electrophysiology and contractile function. Typical manifestations include ion-channel blockade, abnormal cardiac conduction, arrhythmia, and impaired heart function. In drug safety assessment, inhibition of the hERG potassium channel is a widely used indicator because it is closely associated with QT prolongation and potentially severe ventricular arrhythmias.

  Data Collection. We first collect human ether-à-go-go-related gene (hERG) inhibition data from hERGCentral, which contains large-scale electrophysiological screening measurements (Du et al., 2011). We further incorporate datasets from prior studies (Marchese Robinson et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012; 2016; Karim et al., 2021). In addition, we include the Drug-Induced Cardiotoxicity Rank (DICTrank) dataset released by the FDA and its National Center for Toxicological Research (NCTR), which ranks drugs based on cardiotoxicity evidence from FDA-approved drug labels (Qu et al., 2023).
- **Pneumotoxicity (Pneumo.).** Pneumotoxicity describes harmful effects of chemicals on the respiratory system, including the airways, lung parenchyma, and pulmonary function. Exposure to pneumotoxic compounds may lead to inflammation, tissue injury, impaired gas exchange, or longer-term respiratory dysfunction. Such effects may arise after direct inhalational exposure or indirectly following systemic exposure to drugs or other chemicals.

  Data Collection. We first incorporate the largest public respiratory-toxicity dataset known to us (Wang et al., 2021) and further update this collection with the latest available records from the Hazardous Chemical Information System (HCIS) maintained by Safe Work Australia. In addition, we include pulmonary-toxicity annotations from UniTox (Silberg et al., 2024).
- **Ophthalmotoxicity (Ophth.).** Ophthalmotoxicity captures adverse effects on ocular tissues, particularly the cornea, conjunctiva, and other structures of the eye. Toxic exposure can result in irritation, inflammation, tissue damage, or corrosion, with severity ranging from transient discomfort to irreversible ocular injury. This endpoint is therefore commonly used to assess the potential eye hazards associated with chemical exposure.

  Data Collection. We employ large-scale curated datasets for eye irritation and eye corrosion, aggregated from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) QSAR Toolbox and literature sources (Wang et al., 2017).
- **Dermatotoxicity (Derm.).** Dermatotoxicity encompasses adverse effects on the skin following topical or systemic exposure to chemicals. These effects include skin irritation, corrosion, sensitization, and acute toxicity following dermal exposure. Depending on the underlying mechanism, dermatotoxic compounds may cause either direct tissue damage or immune-mediated skin reactions after repeated exposure.

  Data Collection. We first collect skin sensitization data derived from the Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of Alternative Methods (ICCVAM) murine Local Lymph Node Assay (LLNA) evaluation (Alves et al., 2015). We further incorporate skin irritation data from the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) resources maintained by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), together with acute dermal toxicity records from the EPA ToxValDB (Judson, 2018) and the STopTox collection (Borba et al., 2022). Finally, we include dermatologic toxicity annotations from UniTox (Silberg et al., 2024).

The second category, termed *mechanistic toxicity*, characterizes toxic effects through underlying biological or cellular mechanisms and includes:

- **Carcinogenicity (Carc.).** Carcinogenicity refers to the potential of a chemical to induce, promote, or increase the incidence of tumor formation. Carcinogenic effects may arise through genotoxic mechanisms, such as direct DNA damage, or through non-genotoxic mechanisms involving altered cell proliferation, signaling, or tissue homeostasis. Because tumor development is typically a long-term outcome, carcinogenicity represents an important endpoint for assessing chronic chemical hazards.

Data Collection. We first collect rodent carcinogenicity data from the Carcinogenic Potency Database (CPDB), which standardizes long-term carcinogenesis bioassays reported in the literature and technical reports from the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the National Toxicology Program (NTP). We further incorporate curated datasets that combine CPDB compounds with external validation data from the Istituto Superiore di Sanità (ISS) Carcinogens Data Bank, together with additional collections from prior studies (Lagunin et al., 2009; Li et al., 2015).

- **Mutagenicity (Mutag.).** Mutagenicity characterizes the ability of a chemical to induce permanent alterations in genetic material. Such changes may include base substitutions, insertions, deletions, or other DNA-level mutations that can be inherited by daughter cells. Mutagenicity is commonly evaluated using bacterial reverse-mutation assays such as the Ames test and serves as an important indicator of genotoxic potential.

  Data Collection. We aggregate several large-scale Ames mutagenicity datasets from prior studies (Hansen et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2012), together with a strain-specific dataset containing annotations for TA98, TA100, TA102, TA1535, and TA1537, originally compiled from the Istituto Superiore di Sanità (ISS) ISSTOX resource (Martínez et al., 2022).

- **Stress Response (SR).** Stress-response toxicity reflects the perturbation or activation of cellular pathways that respond to chemical-induced damage. These pathways include oxidative-stress responses, DNA-damage signaling, heat-shock responses, mitochondrial dysfunction, and other mechanisms involved in maintaining cellular homeostasis. Abnormal activation of these pathways can therefore provide an early molecular indication that a compound is disrupting normal cellular function.

  Data Collection. We collect annotations from the Tox21 (Huang et al., 2016) across five canonical stress-response assays: nuclear factor erythroid 2-related factor 2/antioxidant response element (Nrf2/ARE), ATPase family AAA domain-containing protein 5 (ATAD5), heat-shock response element (HSE), mitochondrial membrane potential (MMP), and tumor protein p53.

- **Micronucleus Induction (MN).** Micronucleus induction measures chromosome damage or mitotic disruption that results in the formation of small extranuclear bodies, termed micronuclei, in dividing cells. Micronuclei typically arise from chromosome fragments or whole chromosomes that fail to segregate correctly during cell division. This endpoint is widely used as an indicator of chromosomal instability and genotoxicity, complementing mutation-based assays that primarily capture DNA sequence alterations.

  Data Collection. We incorporate a curated *in vivo* dataset (Fan et al., 2018) assembled from a published toxicology report (Kirkland et al., 2014) and the OECD eChemPortal.

D Additional Qualitative Examples

Figures 8–10 present additional molecules generated by BioT5, BioT5+, and ChemAligner-T5 with our red-teaming method. None of the displayed molecules appears in either the training or test split of ChEBI-20, further indicating that these outputs cannot be attributed to direct retrieval from the benchmark.




Figure 8: Additional qualitative examples generated by BioT5 with our red-teaming method. Molecule names and corresponding positive toxicity endpoints are annotated below each structure.




Figure 9: Additional qualitative examples generated by BioT5+ with our red-teaming method. Molecule names and corresponding positive toxicity endpoints are annotated below each structure.




Figure 10: Additional qualitative examples generated by ChemAligner-T5 with our red-teaming method. Molecule names and corresponding positive toxicity endpoints are annotated below each structure.