AGENTSIPHON: PRIVILEGE-CROSSING EXFILTRATION THROUGH COVERT GENERATION IN RAG AGENTS

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ABSTRACT

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) agents increasingly combine untrusted knowledge sources with privileged access to protected data and tools, creating an information-flow vulnerability that enables attackers to induce authorized data access and covert leakage through benign-looking responses. Prior work on retrieval poisoning primarily studies observable failures in which compromised retrieval induces malicious actions. However, it remains underexplored whether compromised retrieval can enable covert transmission of dynamically acquired protected information. To address this gap, we introduce AGENTSIPHON, a privilege-crossing exfiltration framework comprising trigger-conditioned control retrieval, agent-mediated secret acquisition, and covert transmission through task-oriented generation. Unlike attacks targeting fixed actions or explicit disclosure, AgentSiphon treats generation as a stateful channel supporting dynamic secret instances, multi-interaction payloads, and redundancy-based recovery. We evaluate AgentSiphon across healthcare and general-domain RAG tasks and multiple model families, using protected table values that are not exposed through original retrieval tables, staged baselines, and ablations to characterize recovery, cost, fidelity, and detectability trade-offs. Our results establish the feasibility of recovering privileged information while preserving substantial task utility under our paired-response evaluation rubric. The attack identifies a potential blind spot for defenses that consider retrieval integrity, authorized actions, and response correctness separately.

1 INTRODUCTION

Large language model (LLM) agents combine retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) with tools that access protected medical, financial, personal, or enterprise records Lewis et al. (2020); Yao et al. (2022); Ruan et al. (2024). Retrieval may contain third-party or user-contributed content, whereas tools execute with host-granted authority. This creates a security boundary in which information entering the model may be controlled by an untrusted source while application functions may legitimately access resources beyond the attacker's direct reach.

Indirect prompt injection turns retrieved content into behavioral instructions Greshake et al. (2023); Liu et al. (2023). Trigger-conditioned retrieval can further make such instructions activate only for selected queries Chen et al. (2024). Tool-agent studies have demonstrated that untrusted inputs can influence consequential model actions Zhan et al. (2024); Debenedetti et al. (2024). These results motivate a broader question: can retrieval influence be used not merely to change what an agent does, but to cause the agent to use its existing application authority to obtain a protected value and subsequently transmit that value to an attacker?

Existing work studies related pieces of this problem. Agent security and information-flow research examines tool use and privileged operations x Ruan et al. (2024); Costa et al. (2025); Kolluri et al. (2026), while steganographic methods hide information in generated text Fang et al. (2017); Ziegler et al. (2019); Silva et al. (2024). However, these components are generally evaluated separately. We instead consider their end-to-end composition as an information-flow violation: attacker-influenced retrieval provides low-integrity input to an agent that legitimately holds authority over a high-confidentiality resource. The agent then performs an authorized application operation that resolves a context-dependent protected value, after which covert generation transmits that value to an attacker-

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

Figure 1: Threat model and high-level overview of AGENTSIPHON. In normal use, a legitimate query is processed through semantic retrieval, the LLM, and authorized application interfaces to produce a legitimate-task response. In AGENTSIPHON, attacker-controlled retrieval content activates an acquisition instruction that causes the agent to use its existing application authority to obtain a protected value, which is then transmitted through covert generation. The attacker has no direct access to the protected resource and observes only the generated responses.

observable output. Authorization to execute the operation therefore does not imply authorization to disclose its result. We ask: *Can attacker-influenced retrieval cause a privileged RAG agent to turn authorized access to a protected resource into an attacker-observable covert channel?*

At a high level, the resulting information flow is *low-integrity retrieval* $\rightarrow$ *privileged agent* $\rightarrow$ *high-confidentiality resource* $\rightarrow$ *attacker-observable output*. The attacker never directly accesses the protected resource; instead, the agent's existing authority becomes the mechanism through which the protected value crosses the information-flow boundary.

AGENTSIPHON composes three capabilities that are individually insufficient to realize the complete attack: trigger-conditioned retrieval provides attacker influence but does not itself access the protected value; agent-mediated acquisition resolves the value through authorized application access but does not provide a covert transmission mechanism; and HGA-based covert generation provides a transmission channel but requires a payload to encode. The resulting attack therefore depends on their composition rather than on any single mechanism. The poisoned artifact contains instructions only; the agent resolves the value at run time using its authorized access. A fixed natural trigger can thus activate different secret instances, while a persistent payload cursor, eligibility filtering, and redundancy coding support transmission across multiple responses. Exact HGA decoding in our evaluation uses a model-aware gray-box receiver; full receiver assumptions are given in Appendix H.

We evaluate eICU-CRD, Financial Reports, and Procurement Pre-Award with Llama 3.2 3B and Qwen 3.5 4B. Staged baselines and ablations measure acquisition, coded bits, BER, exact recovery, and utility; Appendix A gives the full protocol. Across all six model domain configurations, AGENTSIPHON achieves $\mathrm{ESRR} = 1.000 \pm 0.000$ and BER below 0.007. A standalone sweep over 15 model configurations confirms a reliability-distribution trade-off.

Our main contributions are the following.

- We formulate a privilege-crossing threat model in which attacker-influenced retrieval directs an authorized RAG agent to acquire protected information the attacker cannot read directly.
- We introduce AGENTSIPHON as a system-level composition of individually insufficient capabilities: trigger-conditioned retrieval, agent-mediated acquisition of dynamically resolved protected

values, and stateful covert generation with multi-interaction transmission, eligibility filtering, and redundancy-based recovery.

- We evaluate the composed framework across multiple settings and models with staged baselines and component ablations, and characterize recovery, cost, utility, and reliability trade-offs. The ablations show that persistent state, eligibility filtering, and error correction materially contribute to reliable multi-interaction transmission; detailed measurements are provided in the appendix.

2 Related Work

RAG poisoning and indirect prompt injection. Retrieved content that an attacker controls provides an important attack surface for LLM-integrated applications. Greshake et al. (2023) and Liu et al. (2023) study indirect and direct prompt injection in LLM applications. AgentPoison Chen et al. (2024) extends poisoning to RAG and memory through trigger-conditioned retrieval, while PoisonedRAG Zou et al. (2025) demonstrates knowledge-base poisoning. Chang et al. (2026) study how injected instructions can surface under natural queries, and Qi et al. (2025) study data extraction from RAG systems. These works primarily manipulate retrieval or model behavior to alter downstream responses or expose information through the retrieval pathway. In contrast, AgentSiphon uses retrieval-side control to induce an acquisition instruction, while the protected value is resolved dynamically through an authorized application pathway.

Agent security and covert communication. Tool-integrated agents introduce additional risks because model decisions can invoke privileged application functionality. Ruan et al. (2024), Zhan et al. (2024), and Debenedetti et al. (2024) examine tool use, injection, and sensitive-data access, while R-Judge evaluates risk awareness in agentic tasks Yuan et al. (2024). Wang et al. (2024) study trigger-based manipulation, and AGENTVIGIL automates black-box red-teaming Wang et al. (2025b). In parallel, neural linguistic steganography hides information in generated text Fang et al. (2017); Ziegler et al. (2019), and Silva et al. (2024) study biased generation as a covert channel. Recent benchmarks extend security evaluation to web agents and MCP-based multi-turn tool use Evtimov et al. (2026); Zhang et al. (2026); Zong et al. (2026); Wu et al. (2026); Wang et al. (2026; 2025a).

Malicious model modification and information flow. Another line of work places malicious behavior in the model itself. Xiang et al. (2024) introduce backdoors through chain-of-thought prompting, while Halawi et al. (2024) study covert malicious fine-tuning. Costa et al. (2025) formulate information-flow control for agents, and Kolluri et al. (2026) study security-aware planning. Unlike these approaches, AgentSiphon operates at inference time and composes retrieval influence, authorized acquisition, and covert generation into a single privilege-crossing information flow.

Positioning. Taken together, these works provide the individual mechanisms relevant to our setting: retrieval poisoning and prompt injection provide influence over agent behavior, tool-use research establishes delegated application access risks, and steganographic methods provide covert transmission. AgentSiphon composes them so that retrieval influence induces authorized acquisition of a dynamic protected value, which is then transmitted through generated responses; no component alone provides this complete privilege-crossing flow. Table 1 summarizes the distinction from representative approaches.

3 Preliminaries

RAG agents and delegated application access. Agentic RAG combines retrieved context with requests to authorized application functions Yao et al. (2022); Ruan et al. (2024). The model interprets context and proposes requests; the application validates them and enforces resource access. Accessible resources may contain information unavailable to the user or attacker.

Covert generation. Token selection can encode hidden bits while preserving readable text. HGA Silva et al. (2024) partitions candidate tokens according to the transmitted bit. We adopt this primitive and connect it to retrieval and authorized acquisition, making agent-acquired information the payload.

Stateful transmission and recovery. A protected value s is converted to bits and redundancy coded. Each interaction transmits a prefix of the remaining payload, and a persistent cursor records where

Table 1: Comparison of AGENTSIPHON with representative prior work. The table highlights the composition of retrieval influence, triggered retrieval, privileged application access, dynamic-value handling, covert generation, multi-interaction execution, and end-to-end exfiltration. Here, Dynamic Value denotes a protected value resolved at execution time rather than a fixed attacker-supplied payload; Multi-Interaction denotes stateful transmission of one payload across multiple responses; and End-to-End Exfiltration denotes the complete path from attacker-influenced retrieval through privileged acquisition to attacker-observable recovery. A checkmark(✓) indicates a demonstrated capability in the cited work, while a cross(✗) indicates that the corresponding capability is not demonstrated in the cited work. The comparison is intended to distinguish the system-level composition from novelty in any individual component.

Method	Retrieval Influence	Triggered Retrieval	Privileged Access	Dynamic Value	Covert Generation	Multi-Interaction	End-to-End Exfiltration
Greshake *et al.* Greshake et al. (2023)	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗
AgentPoison Chen et al. (2024)	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗
InjecAgent Zhan et al. (2024)	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗
Silva *et al.* Silva et al. (2024)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
Covert Malicious Finetuning Halawi et al. (2024)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
AGENTSIPHON (Ours)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

to resume. Legitimate queries can therefore continue when one response lacks sufficient eligible positions. The receiver combines symbols across responses and applies the same redundancy scheme to recover s.

4 THREAT MODEL

We consider an agentic RAG system processing a legitimate query q and retrieved content. The attacker controls retrieval artifacts and seeks to exploit the agent's authorized access to a protected resource P. We distinguish **operation authorization** from **information-flow authorization**: permission to execute an operation over P does not authorize disclosure of its result to the attacker. The attacker knows the application interface and protected-resource schema, including target fields and supported operations, can influence the retrieval surface sufficiently to establish trigger-conditioned routing, and can issue legitimate queries and observe responses across interactions. The attacker has no direct access to P, application credentials, model parameters, or hidden agent state, and cannot modify the authorization policy. This retrieval assumption does not claim that arbitrary fixed retrievers are vulnerable to document-only poisoning.

The attacker knows the **trigger-to-target mapping** and HGA decoding procedure. A natural trigger x maps to a predefined protected target t via $x \xrightarrow{\tau} t$, identifying a target family rather than a fixed value. Activation causes the agent to obtain the corresponding protected value s through the authorized application interface. During transmission, the receiver observes generated responses only; exact HGA decoding additionally assumes access to the transmitting model's tokenizer, generation distribution, and partition procedure, making the receiver **model-aware (gray-box)** rather than strictly text-only. Attacker-controlled retrieval is **low-integrity input**, while P contains **high-confidentiality data**. The attacker seeks to encode s across one or more legitimate responses and recover it from those observations.

The **security boundary** therefore remains intact at the application-access layer: the failure occurs when legitimately acquired information crosses into attacker-observable responses. AGENTSIPHON thus targets the composition of **retrieval influence, delegated authority, and response confidentiality**, rather than bypassing application authorization itself.

5 THE AGENTSIPHON FRAMEWORK

AGENTSIPHON combines trigger-conditioned retrieval, authorized application-mediated acquisition, and covert generation. Retrieval manipulation alone cannot access the protected value, acquisition alone provides no covert channel, and the Hash Greedy Ascending (HGA) primitive of Silva *et al.* Silva et al. (2024) requires a payload. Our contribution is their system-level composition, dynam-



Figure 2: AGENTSIPHON architecture: Activate → Acquire → Transmit → Recover. A natural-language trigger activates an attacker-controlled acquisition instruction, prompting the agent to request an allowed protected-resource operation. The protected value is encoded and transmitted through model generation across legitimate interactions, from which the attacker reconstructs the value.

ically connecting an acquired value to the channel, $(q, x) \to I_x \to a \to s \to b \to \tilde{b} \to Y_{1,H} \to \hat{s}$, where I_x is the acquisition instruction, a the agent's request, s the protected value, b its binary representation, $\tilde{b}$ the redundancy-coded payload, $Y_{1,H}$ the responses across H interactions, and $\hat{s}$ the recovered value.

5.1 Trigger-Conditioned Retrieval

The first stage supplies the activation and control plane. The attacker ties a natural-language trigger x to a predefined protected target through $x \xrightarrow{\tau} t$, where t names a protected field or semantic family rather than one fixed secret. The same trigger can activate the same family across episodes while the concrete value is resolved from the current instance.

We train a lightweight semantic retriever that links a legitimate workload query carrying a natural trigger to the matching attacker-controlled acquisition instruction. Starting from a 200-query workload we build three trigger-conditioned variants per query, split 160/40 for training and evaluation (480 training and 120 evaluation pairs), and fine-tune `all-MiniLM-L6-v2` with Multiple Negatives Ranking Loss. The resulting encoder backs a FAISS inner-product index over candidate acquisition instructions. Our instantiation assumes sufficient influence over this retrieval surface to establish trigger-conditioned routing; it does not claim vulnerability of arbitrary fixed retrievers under document-only poisoning (Appendix C).

Let f_ϕ be the trained retriever and $\mathcal{D}_I$ the attacker-controlled instruction corpus. At inference the retrieval query is $q_x = q \oplus x$ (concatenation), and candidates are ranked as $R_k(q, x) = \mathrm{TopK}_{I \in \mathcal{D}_I} \mathrm{sim}(f_\phi(q_x), f_\phi(I))$. The top instruction $I_x = \mathrm{Top1}(R_k(q, x))$ becomes the activated control artifact. That artifact holds acquisition instructions only and never embeds the protected value.

5.2 Application-Mediated Acquisition

Once the trigger-conditioned artifact is retrieved, the LLM combines the legitimate query q, retrieved context C, and acquisition instruction I_x to generate an application-level request $a = G_\theta(q, C, I_x)$. The LLM does not directly access the protected resource; instead, the host application validates the generated request and executes it through its existing authorized interface, yielding $a' = \mathrm{Validate}(a, t)$ and $s = \mathrm{Resolve}(a', P, e)$, where t is the protected target selected by the trigger, P is the protected resource, and e denotes the current application episode. The artifact contains instructions, not s: the application resolves the trigger-selected target from the current resource instance. No protected-resource credentials or authorization bypass are required; the violation occurs when the authorized result enters attacker-observable responses.

5.3 HGA-Based Covert Transmission

HGA biases token generation toward a partition associated with the next payload bit, encoding information in otherwise valid outputs. We retain its encoding principle and compose it with retrieval, acquisition, and stateful transmission.

Let s denote the protected value acquired through the authorized application interface. We first convert s to its UTF-8 bit representation b, then apply repetition coding to obtain the coded payload $\tilde{b}$. HGA partitions the model's token space according to the next coded bit and biases generation toward the corresponding partition. Positions that do not satisfy the HGA eligibility condition are generated normally and do not consume payload bits. Across interactions, the resulting generated responses $Y_{1,H} = (y^{(1)}, \ldots, y^{(H)})$ carry the coded payload.

5.4 Stateful Transmission

The covert channel operates across multiple legitimate interactions using a persistent transmission cursor c. The first interaction contains the natural trigger and activates acquisition and transmission; after each response, the cursor records the coded payload bits already transmitted. Subsequent legitimate queries neither contain the trigger nor initiate a new acquisition, but resume transmission from the remaining payload at the stored cursor position. For interaction h, the transmitter emits the payload segment starting at cursor c_h and updates the state as $c_{h+1} = c_h + \left|\tilde{b}^{(h)}\right|$, where $\tilde{b}^{(h)}$ denotes the coded bits transmitted during interaction h. Transmission terminates when the cursor reaches the end of the coded payload, allowing a single trigger activation to span multiple otherwise legitimate interactions while preserving the original task context of each query.

5.5 Payload Recovery and Error Correction

Given responses $Y_{1,H} = (y^{(1)}, \ldots, y^{(H)})$, the receiver extracts the HGA partition decisions from the observed tokens, $\hat{\tilde{b}} = \mathrm{Extract}(Y_{1,H})$. Exact extraction in the current evaluation uses the transmitting model's tokenizer, generation distribution, and HGA partition procedure to determine the partition label associated with each observed token (Appendix H). The receiver does not access the protected resource or application state. Majority voting over repetition groups then recovers each original bit, $\hat{b}_i = \mathbf{1}\left[\sum_{j=1}^{r} \hat{\tilde{b}}_{(i-1)r+j} > \frac{r}{2}\right]$, followed by $\hat{s} = \mathrm{UTF8Decode}(\hat{b})$.

We report Exact Secret Recovery Rate (ESRR) and Bit Error Rate (BER). ESRR captures end-to-end exact recovery, $\mathrm{ESRR} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{e=1}^{N} \mathbf{1}[\hat{s}_e = s_e]$. BER measures channel-level errors before majority decoding, with missing coded positions treated as errors, $\mathrm{BER} = \frac{E_{\mathrm{flip}} + E_{\mathrm{miss}}}{\sum_e |\tilde{b}_e|}$, where E_{flip} counts observed coded-bit errors and E_{miss} counts coded positions not recovered from the observed responses. Thus, BER accounts for both incorrect and missing channel bits, while repetition coding can still yield perfect ESRR when the remaining errors are corrected.

6 Experiments

We evaluate AgentSiphon across three application domains and two instruction-tuned models, with component ablations and standalone channel analysis.

6.1 Experimental Setup

Application settings and workloads. We use three settings: the **eICU Collaborative Research Database (eICU-CRD)** Pollard et al. (2018), the **DDRBench_10K Financial Database**, and the **India Government e-Procurement Tenders and Award-of-Contract (AOC)** dataset. Each pairs a legitimate user-facing task with an application-mediated protected resource and a workload of legitimate queries matched to protected targets the authorized interface can resolve. The protected value never appears in the retrieval artifact; it arrives through the authorized interface after trigger-conditioned retrieval. Within each setting the same workload is reused across configurations, all

experiments use three seeds, and the two end-to-end models follow identical procedures (full configuration in Appendix A).

Baselines and metrics. We compare five configurations. *Benign RAG* performs the legitimate task with no exfiltration. *Oracle Acquisition* hands the protected value straight to the transmission stage, separating communication from acquisition. *Single-Query HGA* transmits inside one interaction and *Multi-Query HGA* spreads it across interactions, both without the full framework. We report Acquisition, Total Bits, BER, ESRR, and Utility. Utility measures preservation of the legitimate task relative to the corresponding benign RAG response; it is not an independent ground-truth task-accuracy metric (full rubric and protocol in Appendix B). We use a five-level rubric $(1.000, 0.750, 0.500, 0.250, 0.000)$ based on correctness and completeness of the requested information, ignoring wording and formatting. Zero-payload instances are excluded. An instruction-tuned LLM applies the rubric using the user query and paired answers without access to channel metrics. Benign RAG is assigned 1.000 as the clean task reference. Unless stated otherwise we use $r = 3$, $\beta = 2.000$, $\eta = 0.900$, $T = 1.000$, and at most 256 generated tokens per interaction.

6.2 End-to-End Results

Table 2: Main end-to-end results across the three application settings, reported as mean $\pm$ sample standard deviation over three random seeds. Acq. is successful protected-value acquisition, Total Bits is the coded payload length, BER counts observed and missing coded bits, ESRR is the exact secret recovery rate, and Utility measures semantic/task-level preservation of the legitimate user task relative to the corresponding benign RAG response; it is not an independent ground-truth accuracy measure. A cross (& ✗) denotes a metric that is not applicable or not computed for that configuration.

Dataset	Model	Method	Acq.	Total Bits	BER ↓	ESRR ↑	Utility ↑
EHR	Qwen	Benign RAG	✗	✗	✗	✗	1.000
		Oracle Acquisition	1.000 ± 0.000	✗	✗	✗	✗
		Single-Query HGA	1.000 ± 0.000	568.000	0.042 ± 0.007	0.833 ± 0.058	0.853 ± 0.018
		Multi-Query HGA	1.000 ± 0.000	568.000	0.001 ± 0.001	0.967 ± 0.058	0.845 ± 0.019
		AGENTSIPHON	1.000 ± 0.000	1,704.000	0.004 ± 0.001	1.000 ± 0.000	0.807 ± 0.007
	Llama	Benign RAG	✗	✗	✗	✗	1.000
		Oracle Acquisition	1.000 ± 0.000	✗	✗	✗	✗
		Single-Query HGA	1.000 ± 0.000	568.000	0.107 ± 0.082	0.733 ± 0.058	0.824 ± 0.056
		Multi-Query HGA	1.000 ± 0.000	568.000	0.006 ± 0.005	0.767 ± 0.153	0.760 ± 0.037
		AGENTSIPHON	1.000 ± 0.000	1,704.000	0.003 ± 0.001	1.000 ± 0.000	0.753 ± 0.028
Finance	Qwen	Benign RAG	✗	✗	✗	✗	1.000
		Oracle Acquisition	1.000 ± 0.000	✗	✗	✗	✗
		Single-Query HGA	1.000 ± 0.000	1,104.000	0.211 ± 0.035	0.233 ± 0.058	0.842 ± 0.008
		Multi-Query HGA	1.000 ± 0.000	$1{,}168.000 \pm 69.280$	0.004 ± 0.001	0.600 ± 0.100	0.850 ± 0.003
		AGENTSIPHON	1.000 ± 0.000	3,432.000	0.006 ± 0.001	1.000 ± 0.000	0.849 ± 0.006
	Llama	Benign RAG	✗	✗	✗	✗	1.000
		Oracle Acquisition	1.000 ± 0.000	✗	✗	✗	✗
		Single-Query HGA	1.000 ± 0.000	1,104.000	0.243 ± 0.032	0.200 ± 0.000	0.810 ± 0.033
		Multi-Query HGA	1.000 ± 0.000	$1{,}133.330 \pm 4.620$	0.006 ± 0.001	0.533 ± 0.058	0.842 ± 0.014
		AGENTSIPHON	1.000 ± 0.000	3,432.000	0.005 ± 0.001	1.000 ± 0.000	0.814 ± 0.004
Procurement	Qwen	Benign RAG	✗	✗	✗	✗	1.000
		Oracle Acquisition	1.000 ± 0.000	✗	✗	✗	✗
		Single-Query HGA	1.000 ± 0.000	4,840.000	0.928 ± 0.007	0.167 ± 0.058	0.916 ± 0.025
		Multi-Query HGA	1.000 ± 0.000	$3{,}546.670 \pm 423.500$	0.002 ± 0.001	0.667 ± 0.058	0.915 ± 0.003
		AGENTSIPHON	1.000 ± 0.000	$9{,}792.000 \pm 2{,}311.610$	0.002 ± 0.000	1.000 ± 0.000	0.915 ± 0.002
	Llama	Benign RAG	✗	✗	✗	✗	1.000
		Oracle Acquisition	1.000 ± 0.000	✗	✗	✗	✗
		Single-Query HGA	1.000 ± 0.000	4,840.000	0.950 ± 0.003	0.000 ± 0.000	0.946 ± 0.016
		Multi-Query HGA	1.000 ± 0.000	$3{,}458.670 \pm 268.490$	0.002 ± 0.001	0.600 ± 0.000	0.904 ± 0.003
		AGENTSIPHON	1.000 ± 0.000	$9{,}784.000 \pm 1{,}193.820$	0.002 ± 0.000	1.000 ± 0.000	0.905 ± 0.003

The end-to-end BER is not directly comparable to standalone HGA BER because AGENTSIPHON additionally applies eligibility filtering, persistent state, repetition coding, and majority decoding before recovery.

Acquisition succeeds under our protocol. Single-Query HGA is capacity-limited: Financial Reports reaches BER 0.211-0.243 with ESRR ≤ 0.233, while Procurement reaches BER 0.928-0.950 with zero ESRR. Multi-Query HGA lowers BER but remains inconsistent at exact recovery. In contrast, AGENTSIPHON achieves ESRR $= 1.000 \pm 0.000$ with BER < 0.007 across all six configurations;

its larger Total Bits reflect $r = 3$ repetition. Utility indicates substantial preservation of the legitimate task under covert transmission according to the paired-response rubric, rather than independent factual task accuracy.

Trigger specificity and interaction cost. On the held-out routing evaluation, exact-trigger recall is 92.08%, clean-query false activation is 3.75%, paraphrase recall is 74.31%, and nearby-phrase activation is 40.07%. Thus, semantic triggers retain activation under paraphrase but may also respond to neighboring phrases, illustrating the robustness-specificity trade-off. These are controlled stress tests, not population-level estimates; construction and held-out counts are given in Appendix C. Interaction cost further shows that AGENTSIPHON is persistent but relatively low-bandwidth: EHR and Finance require about 10 interactions per recovered secret, Procurement about 34 for Qwen and 58 for Llama, and one long-payload example requires 261 interactions. Thus, the demonstrated capability is persistence across legitimate interactions rather than high-bandwidth exfiltration. Per-seed measurements are reported in Appendix D.

6.3 COMPONENT ANALYSIS

Tables 3-4 isolate the three transmission components. Dropping error correction lowers ESRR to 0.833; dropping persistent state or threshold eligibility collapses ESRR to zero (the latter also raises BER to 0.399). Increasing η monotonically improves both metrics, reaching ESRR$= 1.000$ and BER$= 0.002$ at $\eta = 0.90$, confirming that reliable exfiltration depends on the composed stateful transmission mechanism rather than HGA alone.

Table 3: Ablation of individual components on Llama 3.2-3B using eICU-CRD.

Variant	ESRR ↑	BER ↓	Queries ↓
Full	1.000 ± 0.000	0.002 ± 0.001	21.330 ± 1.530
w/o Error Corr.	0.833 ± 0.115	0.003 ± 0.002	11.330 ± 1.530
w/o Persistent State	0.000 ± 0.000	✗	100.000 ± 0.000
w/o Threshold Eligibility	0.000 ± 0.000	0.399 ± 0.015	✗

Table 4: Eligibility-threshold analysis on Llama 3.2-3B.

η	ESRR ↑	BER ↓
0.25	0.533 ± 0.252	0.056 ± 0.006
0.50	0.867 ± 0.058	0.030 ± 0.007
0.75	0.933 ± 0.058	0.011 ± 0.002
0.900	$\mathbf{1.000 \pm 0.000}$	$\mathbf{0.002 \pm 0.001}$

6.4 MODEL ANALYSIS OF THE COVERT CHANNEL

Table 5 shows the reliability-fidelity trade-off: raising β lowers standalone BER from 0.448 to 0.298 while KL rises from 0.259 to 4.093; we use $\beta = 2.000$ end-to-end. Figure 3 shows substantial variation across 15 configurations (reliability 0.571-0.749, TV 0.072-0.247; full table in Appendix E). Standalone BER is not directly comparable to end-to-end BER, which additionally applies eligibility filtering, repetition coding, and majority decoding (Appendix I).

Table 5: Effect of HGA bias β on the standalone covert-generation channel, averaged over the 15 model configurations.

β	BER ↓	Fallback	KL	TV
1.25	0.448	0.033	0.259	0.052
1.50	0.412	0.032	0.618	0.089
2.00	0.359	0.032	1.835	0.141
3.00	0.321	0.032	3.392	0.180
4.00	0.298	0.031	4.093	0.202

Figure 3: Standalone covert-channel behavior across 15 model configurations at $\beta = 2.000$. Bold entries mark the two end-to-end models.



6.5 Qualitative Analysis

Figure 4 shows a representative two-query trace; additional qualitative cases are provided in Appendix F.2.



Figure 4: Two-query qualitative trace of AgentSiphon with Qwen-3.5-4B. A natural trigger enables authorized acquisition of $patient.hospitaladmittime24 = 15{:}45{:}00$, which is encoded across two legitimate-task responses (125 and 67 coded bits) and exactly recovered via HGA. The secret is not explicitly revealed; full responses appear in Appendix F.2

7 Limitations

Our evaluation uses three controlled application workloads and two end-to-end model families, and therefore does not span the full diversity of production agents, tools, policies, or schemas. The attack assumes sufficient influence over retrieval to establish trigger-conditioned routing and trigger-to-target binding, together with knowledge of the relevant retrieval and application surfaces; it does not assume credentials, privilege escalation, or policy changes. Accordingly, we do not claim that arbitrary fixed retrievers are vulnerable to document-only poisoning. Exact HGA extraction further assumes a model-aware gray-box receiver (Appendix H), so our results demonstrate feasibility under this receiver model rather than universal decodability from arbitrary generated text. Finally, we do not evaluate human detection or concrete defenses such as instruction isolation and information-flow enforcement. Extending the study to lower-access receivers, adaptive defenses, and broader real-world application benchmarks remains future work.

8 Conclusion

AgentSiphon demonstrates a privilege-crossing information-flow failure in agentic RAG systems: retrieval influence can induce an authorized agent to carry a protected value into attacker-observable generation without credential theft or explicit policy bypass. Across the evaluated settings, exact recovery is achieved while preserving substantial task utility, illustrating that task-level utility and information-flow safety are not equivalent guarantees. Our ablations show that persistent state, eligibility filtering, and error correction are important to dynamic multi-response transmission, while the standalone analysis exposes model-dependent reliability-distribution trade-offs. These findings motivate security mechanisms that reason about protected tool outputs across generation, rather than treating retrieval integrity, authorization, and response correctness independently.AgentSiphon suggests that future agent-security research should move beyond reasoning about retrieval integrity, tool authorization, and response correctness independently, and instead develop explicit information-flow guarantees spanning retrieval, reasoning, tool invocation, and generation. We hope this work motivates information-flow-aware evaluation protocols for agentic AI systems.

AI USE STATEMENT

Generative AI tools were used as research and writing assistants during the development of this work. Specifically, they were used to assist with software implementation and debugging, review and refinement of experimental code, and editing the manuscript for clarity, organization, and readability. AI assistance was not used to generate or fabricate datasets, experimental results, measurements, or claims. All experiments were executed using the datasets, models, code, and experimental procedures described in this paper, and the reported results were independently checked by the authors. AI-assisted code was reviewed, tested, and verified before use, and the manuscript was reviewed by the authors for correctness and consistency. The authors take full responsibility for the final content of this work, including all technical claims, experimental results, analyses, and conclusions.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

We provide the implementation and evaluation details needed to reproduce our experiments throughout the paper and supplementary material. Appendix A specifies the application settings, models, random seeds, baselines, and generation parameters; Appendix B defines the evaluation protocol and Utility rubric; Appendix C describes the natural-trigger retrieval evaluation; Appendix D reports aggregate and per-seed throughput measurements; and Appendices E-I provide the standalone channel analysis, extended qualitative traces, trigger and transmission analyses, receiver assumptions, and BER accounting. Appendix K further summarizes the interpretation of the reported metrics and the reproducibility configuration. The main experiments use fixed seeds $\{12345, 54321, 67890\}$ and the same procedures across the evaluated application settings and model families. Supplementary code and associated experimental artifacts can be provided in anonymized form for review.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies a security vulnerability in retrieval-augmented agents in which attacker-influenced retrieval can induce an authorized application to return protected information that is subsequently transmitted through model generation. The experiments are conducted in controlled research settings and are intended to characterize and motivate defenses against unauthorized information flows. The EHR experiments use synthetic clinical records, and the other application settings use benchmark procurement and financial workloads as described in Appendix A. The protected values used for evaluation are accessed only through the controlled application interfaces defined in the experimental environment; the experiments do not require credential theft, privilege escalation, or modification of authorization policies. We do not evaluate or deploy the attack against real-world production systems or expose real patient information. The limitations, receiver assumptions, and scope of the demonstrated capability are explicitly described in Section 7 and Appendix H. We follow the ICLR Code of Ethics and take responsibility for the responsible conduct and reporting of this research.

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APPENDIX OVERVIEW

This appendix provides the experimental, analytical, and reproducibility details supporting the main results. Appendix A describes the experimental configuration, including application settings, models, evaluation units, and baselines. Appendix B specifies the task-level Utility evaluation and scoring protocol. Appendix C details natural-trigger construction and routing specificity. Appendix D reports transmission throughput, including aggregate and per-seed measurements. Appendix E analyzes the standalone HGA channel, including bias, model diversity, repetition coding, and stateful capacity. Appendix F provides extended qualitative traces across the evaluated applications and models. Appendix G develops additional theoretical analysis of end-to-end communication, effective capacity, and the reliability–distribution trade-off. Appendix H specifies receiver assumptions, persistent transmission state, and recovery procedures. Appendix I defines BER accounting, including missing coded positions. Appendix J summarizes additional qualitative observations, while Appendix K consolidates the experimental interpretation and reproducibility details.

A EXPERIMENTAL CONFIGURATION

This appendix provides the implementation and evaluation details needed to reproduce the endtoend experiments. Unless otherwise stated, all main experiments use repetition factor $r = 3$, HGA bias $\beta = 2.0$, eligibility threshold $\eta = 0.9$, temperature $T = 1.0$, and a maximum of 256 generated tokens per interaction. Results are reported over the three random seeds $\{12345, 54321, 67890\}$.

A.1 APPLICATION SETTINGS

We evaluate three application settings: EHR, finance, and procurement. Each setting combines a legitimate userfacing task with an applicationmediated protected resource. The protected value is not placed in the attackercontrolled retrieval artifact. Instead, the retrieved control instruction causes the agent to request the protected value through the application's authorized interface.

The EHR setting uses synthetic clinical records and legitimate diagnosisoriented queries. The finance setting uses financial records and questions concerning companylevel financial information. The procurement setting uses procurement records and legitimate questions concerning tender information. These settings instantiate the same attack structure while varying the application task, protected resource, and type of protected value.

A.2 MODELS

The main endtoend evaluation uses Llama 3.23BInstruct and Qwen 3.54B. Both models use the same retrieval procedure, application interface, transmission protocol, generation settings, and evaluation procedure within each application setting.

The standalone covertgeneration experiment additionally evaluates 15 model configurations spanning Llama, Qwen, and Gemma. These experiments are independent of the applicationmediated acquisition stage and are used to characterize modellevel variation in the underlying generation channel.

A.3 RANDOM SEEDS AND EVALUATION UNITS

Each main endtoend configuration is evaluated using the three seeds 12345, 54321, and 67890. For quantities reported as mean $\pm$ standard deviation, the standard deviation is the sample standard deviation computed over these three seedlevel measurements.

The evaluation unit for endtoend recovery is a transmission episode. For task Utility, every positive-transmission instance is retained, including duplicate query identifiers occurring in different transmission episodes. This is intentional: the same legitimate query can produce different generated responses under different transmission states and therefore constitutes a distinct utility evaluation instance.

A.4 BASELINES

We evaluate five configurations in the main experiments.

- *Benign RAG*: performs the legitimate task without a covert transmission mechanism and provides the clean task reference.
- *Oracle Acquisition*: supplies the protected value directly to the transmission stage and therefore isolates communication from protectedvalue acquisition.
- *SingleQuery HGA*: attempts to transmit the protected value within a single interaction.
- *MultiQuery HGA*: permits transmission across multiple interactions but does not include the complete triggerconditioned AGENTSIPHON pipeline.
- AGENTSIPHON: combines triggerconditioned retrieval, applicationmediated acquisition, persistent multiinteraction transmission, and redundancybased recovery.

Oracle Acquisition does not generate an independent application answer for the legitimate user task and is therefore not assigned a task Utility score.

Table 6: Fivelevel rubric used for semantic/tasklevel Utility evaluation.

Score	Interpretation
1.00	Fully correct and complete task response.
0.75	Mostly correct; minor omission or imprecision.
0.50	Partially correct; substantial information remains useful.
0.25	Mostly incorrect or substantially incomplete.
0.00	Fails to perform the requested task.

B TaskLevel Utility Evaluation

B.1 Evaluation Objective

The purpose of Utility is to measure whether covert transmission changes the ability of the agent to perform the legitimate user task. Utility is therefore evaluated independently of the communication metrics.

For each positivetransmission instance, we pair the AgentSiphon response with the corresponding benign RAG response for the same user query. The evaluator is given the user query and both responses and determines whether the covert response still provides the information required by the legitimate task.

The benign response is used as a clean task reference rather than being treated as an independent groundtruth answer. The evaluation focuses on task meaning and factual correctness rather than lexical similarity.

B.2 Evaluation Procedure

For every evaluated transmission instance, the procedure is:

1. retrieve the original user query;
2. identify the corresponding benign RAG response;
3. identify the generated covert response for the same query and transmission instance;
4. determine the information or operation requested by the user;
5. compare whether the covert response provides the requested information correctly and sufficiently;
6. ignore differences in wording, ordering, formatting, verbosity, and harmless paraphrasing; and
7. assign a score using the fivelevel taskutility rubric below.

Instances with zero observed payload are excluded because they do not represent an actual covert-transmission instance. Duplicate query IDs are not deduplicated when they correspond to different transmission instances.

B.3 FiveLevel Utility Rubric

We use the following ordinal rubric:

A response is not penalized for different phrasing, ordering, formatting, or concise presentation when the requested information remains correct. Harmless numerical formatting differences, such as equivalent units or representation, are likewise not penalized.

Scores are reduced when the response contains taskrelevant factual errors, omits central requested information, answers a different task, introduces material contradictions, or provides an unrelated or unusable response.

Table 7: Natural triggertoinstruction mappings used in the routing specificity experiment.

Trigger	Instruction	Natural phrase
TRIGA	MI001	“Please be precise about the answer.”
TRIGB	MI002	“Please verify this against the source.”
TRIGD	MI004	“Please review the details carefully.”

Table 8: Heldout naturaltrigger routing specificity. Nearbyphrase and paraphrase conditions are controlled stress tests rather than populationlevel estimates.

Condition	Correct / Total	Rate
Exact trigger recall	442 / 480	92.08%
Cleanquery false activation	6 / 160	3.75%
Nearbyphrase false activation	577 / 1440	40.07%
Paraphrase trigger recall	1070 / 1440	74.31%

B.4 Evaluation Protocol

An instructiontuned language model is used as the evaluator. The evaluator receives only the user query and the paired benign and covert answers needed to judge task preservation. It does not receive BER, ESRR, payload length, query count, acquisition status, or other communication metrics.

This separation prevents the channel outcome from directly determining the Utility judgment. Benign RAG is assigned Utility $= 1.00$ as the clean task reference.

The resulting instancelevel scores are averaged within each seed and then reported across the three seeds as mean $\pm$ sample standard deviation.

B.5 Interpretation

Utility and ESRR measure different properties. ESRR asks whether the hidden protected value was recovered exactly by the receiver, whereas Utility asks whether the visible response still performs the legitimate user task. Consequently, successful secret recovery does not imply perfect task Utility, and a response can preserve the legitimate task while simultaneously transmitting a protected value.

C NaturalTrigger Routing Specificity

C.1 Trigger Construction

The trigger retriever uses naturallanguage trigger phrases rather than synthetic identifiers. The evaluated mappings include:

A trigger is appended to the legitimate user question before retrieval. The retriever ranks candidate trigger instructions using embedding similarity.

C.2 Calibration and HeldOut Evaluation

The first 40 queries are used for calibration, while the remaining 160 queries form the heldout evaluation set. The calibration set is used to select an eligibility threshold above the largest observed cleanquery similarity.

The maximum cleanquery similarity during calibration is 0.39136001. The selected threshold is the smallest value strictly above this maximum, implemented using the next representable floatingpoint value.

The heldout evaluation contains four controlled conditions:

The exacttrigger condition measures whether the intended trigger retrieves the correct acquisition instruction. Clean queries measure unintended activation in the absence of a trigger. Nearbyphrase queries deliberately use semantically related phrases and therefore constitute a stronger specificity stress test. Paraphrase queries evaluate whether the trigger mechanism remains effective when the trigger meaning is preserved through paraphrasing.

The nearbyphrase result should therefore not be interpreted as an ordinary falseactivation rate over natural user traffic. It is a controlled adversarial stress condition.

C.3 Retriever Sharing Across Models

The same trigger retriever is used for the Qwen and Llama endtoend experiments. Trigger specificity is therefore evaluated once rather than repeated separately for each downstream language model. The downstream language model affects acquisition and generation, but not the trigger retriever itself.

D Transmission Throughput

D.1 Definitions

Let B denote the raw protectedvalue length in bits, r the repetition factor, N_{tok} the number of generated response tokens, and H the number of agent interactions.

The raw secret throughput per generated token is

$$R_{\mathrm{token}} = \frac{B}{N_{\mathrm{tok}}}, \tag{1}$$

while the raw secret throughput per interaction is

$$R_{\mathrm{interaction}} = \frac{B}{H}. \tag{2}$$

Because the default system uses repetition factor $r = 3$, the corresponding codedpayload rates are

$$R^{\mathrm{coded}}_{\mathrm{token}} = \frac{rB}{N_{\mathrm{tok}}}, \qquad R^{\mathrm{coded}}_{\mathrm{interaction}} = \frac{rB}{H}. \tag{3}$$

These measures describe transmission efficiency rather than final recovery quality.

D.2 Aggregate Throughput

The aggregate throughput values summarize the three seed-level measurements reported in Tables 10 and 11. For each model-setting pair, secret bits/token and coded bits/token are averaged across the three seeds, while secret bits/interaction is obtained from the corresponding secret payload and interaction count for each seed. The interactions/recovered-secret measure is the total number of interactions used to recover all reported secrets divided by the number of recovered secrets. Because the EHR and Finance workloads use fixed protected-value lengths, they exhibit identical payload sizes and stable interaction counts across seeds. In contrast, Procurement contains protected values of different lengths, leading to variation in coded payload size, generated tokens, and the number of interactions required for recovery. For example, the Procurement runs span 526-647 interactions for Llama and 253-399 interactions for Qwen across the three seeds. The corresponding aggregate results therefore capture both transmission efficiency and the variation induced by the underlying protected-value lengths. Secret bits/token and coded bits/token measure token-level transmission efficiency, whereas secret bits/interaction and interactions/recovered-secret characterize the interaction-level cost of recovering a protected value. These throughput measures quantify transmission efficiency and interaction cost and are independent of the final secret-recovery accuracy.

Table 9: AGENTSIPHON transmission throughput across the three application settings, reported as mean ± sample standard deviation over three seeds. Secret bits/token measures raw protectedvalue bits per generated response token; coded bits/token includes repetition redundancy.

Model	Setting	Secret bits/token	Coded bits/token	Secret bits/interaction	Interactions/recovered secret
Qwen 3.54B	EHR	0.01619 ± 0.00015	0.04857 ± 0.00045	5.68 ± 0.00	10.00 ± 0.00
Qwen 3.54B	Finance	0.07467 ± 0.00127	0.22402 ± 0.00382	11.44 ± 0.00	10.00 ± 0.00
Qwen 3.54B	Procurement	0.15818 ± 0.00579	0.47454 ± 0.01736	9.68 ± 0.18	33.63 ± 7.52
Llama 3.23B	EHR	0.02148 ± 0.00020	0.06444 ± 0.00061	5.68 ± 0.00	10.00 ± 0.00
Llama 3.23B	Finance	0.06277 ± 0.00080	0.18830 ± 0.00239	11.44 ± 0.00	10.00 ± 0.00
Llama 3.23B	Procurement	0.17443 ± 0.00200	0.52328 ± 0.00600	5.58 ± 0.10	58.33 ± 6.07

Table 10: Per-seed throughput measurements for Llama 3.2-3B.

Setting	Seed	Secret bits	Coded bits	Interactions	Generated tokens	Recovered secrets
EHR	12345	568	1704	100	26674	10
EHR	54321	568	1704	100	26482	10
EHR	67890	568	1704	100	26178	10
Finance	12345	1144	3432	100	18192	10
Finance	54321	1144	3432	100	18017	10
Finance	67890	1144	3432	100	18477	10
Procurement	12345	3216	9648	577	18328	10
Procurement	54321	2888	8664	526	16779	10
Procurement	67890	3680	11040	647	20946	10

Table 11: Perseed throughput measurements for Qwen 3.54B.

Setting	Seed	Secret bits	Coded bits	Interactions	Generated tokens	Recovered secrets
EHR	12345	568	1704	100	34715	10
EHR	54321	568	1704	100	35292	10
EHR	67890	568	1704	100	35256	10
Finance	12345	1144	3432	100	15027	10
Finance	54321	1144	3432	100	15507	10
Finance	67890	1144	3432	100	15435	10
Procurement	12345	3880	11640	399	24031	10
Procurement	54321	3512	10536	357	21735	10
Procurement	67890	2400	7200	253	15842	10

D.3 PER-SEED MEASUREMENTS

The procurement workload exhibits larger variation in the number of interactions because the protected values differ in length across episodes. The EHR and finance throughput experiments use fixed protectedvalue lengths for the reported runs, resulting in stable interaction counts.

E STANDALONE COVERTGENERATION CHANNEL

E.1 FORMAL CHANNEL QUANTITIES

Let $P_0(\cdot \mid x)$ denote the ordinary nexttoken distribution and $P_\beta(\cdot \mid x)$ the HGAtransformed distribution. We quantify the distributional deviation using KL divergence,

$$D_{\mathrm{KL}}\left(P_\beta \,\|\, P_0\right) = \sum_v P_\beta(v \mid x) \log \frac{P_\beta(v \mid x)}{P_0(v \mid x)}, \tag{4}$$

and total variation distance,

$$D_{\mathrm{TV}}\left(P_\beta, P_0\right) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_v \left| P_\beta(v \mid x) P_0(v \mid x) \right|. \tag{5}$$

Table 12: Effect of HGA bias on the standalone generation channel. Values are from the threeseed standalone evaluation.

β	BER ↓	Fallback	KL	TV
1.25	0.4484	0.0329	0.2585	0.0523
1.50	0.4117	0.0320	0.6183	0.0894
2.00	0.3590	0.0322	1.8353	0.1409
3.00	0.3206	0.0315	3.3924	0.1803
4.00	0.2980	0.0309	4.0930	0.2019

Table 13: Standalone covertgeneration behavior across 15 model configurations at $\beta = 2.0$. Reliability is 1BER.

Family	Model	Reliability	BER	TV	KL	Fallback
Llama	3.18B	0.684586	0.315414	0.183597	2.408818	0.005100
Llama	3.170B	0.651850	0.348150	0.143926	1.880101	0.015487
Llama	3.23B	0.685254	0.314746	0.184820	2.441028	0.000587
Llama	3.370B	0.583812	0.416188	0.081561	1.071030	0.140254
Llama	38B	0.662773	0.337227	0.166052	2.129727	0.008869
Qwen	3.52B	0.748949	0.251051	0.247080	3.218950	0.000354
Qwen	3.54B	0.687783	0.312217	0.181060	2.393246	0.001328
Qwen	3.59B	0.655075	0.344925	0.158487	2.076319	0.002292
Qwen	3.527B	0.635395	0.364605	0.131284	1.683979	0.005509
Qwen	3.535BA3B	0.637352	0.362648	0.143479	1.837071	0.004532
Gemma	4E2B	0.581540	0.418460	0.087908	1.139720	0.111706
Gemma	4E4B	0.653279	0.346721	0.148734	1.925863	0.028110
Gemma	412B	0.590190	0.409810	0.091332	1.192152	0.032936
Gemma	426BA4B	0.586189	0.413811	0.092725	1.205383	0.056671
Gemma	431B	0.570651	0.429349	0.072156	0.926022	0.069300

Lower values indicate a distribution closer to ordinary model generation, while larger values indicate a stronger perturbation of the generation distribution.

Channel reliability is defined as

$$\rho = 1\mathrm{BER}. \tag{6}$$

E.2 HGA Bias Sweep

The standalone channel is evaluated at

$$\beta \in \{1.25, 1.50, 2.00, 3.00, 4.00\}.$$

Increasing β lowers standalone BER while increasing both KL divergence and total variation. Thus stronger channel bias improves the reliability of the channel at the cost of a larger deviation from ordinary generation. The endtoend experiments use $\beta = 2.0$ as an intermediate operating point.

Importantly, the standalone BER in this experiment measures the generation channel independently. It is therefore not directly comparable with the endtoend BER reported in the main results, which additionally includes eligibility filtering, persistent state, redundancy, and final decoding.

E.3 Model Diversity

At $\beta = 2.0$, we evaluate 15 model configurations over three random seeds.

At $\beta = 2.0$, reliability ranges from 0.571 to 0.749, while total variation ranges from 0.072 to 0.247. The results exhibit substantial modellevel variation. Reliability is not monotonic with parameter count: for example, the smaller Qwen 3.52B configuration has higher standalone reliability than several larger Qwen configurations, while Llama 3.23B also exceeds several substantially larger Llama configurations.

These results indicate that covertgeneration behavior depends on the model's tokendistribution and decoding behavior rather than parameter count alone. The 15model evaluation therefore supports modelspecific characterization of the underlying generation channel.

E.4 Repetition Coding Analysis

Let B denote the raw secret length and r the repetition factor. The coded payload length is

$$B_{\text{coded}} = rB. \tag{7}$$

The relative redundancy overhead is therefore

$$\mathcal{O}_r = \frac{B_{\text{coded}}B}{B} = r1. \tag{8}$$

With the default $r = 3$, the coded payload contains three representations of each raw bit and therefore has a 200% increase relative to the original payload length.

Under the idealized assumption of independent codedsymbol errors with probability p, majority decoding with odd repetition factor r has residual biterror probability

$$p_{\text{maj}}(r, p) = \sum_{j=(r+1)/2}^{r} \binom{r}{j} p^j (1p)^{rj}. \tag{9}$$

For $r = 3$,

$$p_{\text{maj}}(3, p) = 3p^2(1p) + p^3 = 3p^2 2p^3. \tag{10}$$

This expression is an idealized reference and is not a prediction of the measured AgentSiphon BER because HGA generation is adaptive and eligibility filtering introduces dependencies between observations.

E.5 Stateful Transmission Capacity

Let Δ_h denote the number of eligible coded positions consumed during interaction h. The cumulative coded capacity after H interactions is

$$C_H = \sum_{h=1}^{H} \Delta_h. \tag{11}$$

A payload of B raw bits can be completely transmitted when

$$C_H \geq rB. \tag{12}$$

The persistent cursor therefore permits a protected value to exceed the covert capacity of an individual response. Each legitimate interaction contributes additional channelbearing positions until the coded payload is exhausted.

E.6 Separation of Standalone and EndtoEnd BER

The standalone experiment measures the raw generationchannel behavior. In contrast, the endtoend AgentSiphon pipeline applies several additional operations:

$$\text{HGA} \rightarrow \text{Eligibility} \rightarrow \text{Persistent State} \rightarrow \text{Repetition} \rightarrow \text{Majority Decoding}. \tag{13}$$

Consequently, a low endtoend BER should not be interpreted as evidence that the underlying HGA token channel itself has the same error rate. Rather, AGENTSIPHON changes the effective communication regime by selectively using eligible positions, carrying the payload across interactions, and applying redundancy before final recovery.

F EXTENDED QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

F.1 PURPOSE

The qualitative analysis complements the aggregate ESRR, BER, and Utility metrics by exposing complete informationflow traces. Each trace separates the legitimate visible task from the hidden communication process.

For each example we report:

1. the legitimate user query;
2. the trigger used to activate acquisition;
3. the corresponding benign RAG answer;
4. the covert AGENTSIPHON answer;
5. the protected value acquired through the application interface;
6. the raw and coded payload sizes;
7. the transmission behavior; and
8. the recovered protected value or recovery identifier.

When the result archive stores only a recovery fingerprint rather than the plaintext protected value, we report the fingerprint rather than attempting to reconstruct a value that is not present in the archive.

F.2 CASE STUDY 1: EHR DIAGNOSIS QUERY

User query. EHRQ001 asks:

> What diagnoses are recorded for ICU stay 249328?

Trigger and protected value. The natural trigger is TRIGA. The archived episode targets the `hospitaladmittime24` field associated with the selected protected resource. The raw protected value has a 64bit representation and is encoded into 192 coded bits using $r = 3$ repetition.

Benign RAG response. The clean response directly answers the diagnosis query. It lists diagnoses including bladder cancer, lower urinary tract infection, sepsis, septic shock, and other recorded conditions.

> The diagnoses recorded for ICU stay 249328 are:
> 1. OncologyGU tumorsbladder CA.
> 2. Infectious diseasesGU infectionslower urinary tract infection.
> 3. Infectious diseasessystemic/other infectionssepsis.
> 4. Cardiovascularshock / hypotensionseptic shock.

Covert response. The corresponding covert response remains centered on the same legitimate task:

> Based on the EHR record, the following diagnoses are recorded for the stay in the ICU 249328:
> 1. Bladder cancer (ICD9 codes: 188.9, C67.9).
> 2. Lower urinary tract infection (ICD9 codes: 595.9, N30.9).

Table 14: EHR diagnosis transmission trace.

Quantity	Observed value
Query	EHRQ001
Trigger	TRIGA
Protected field	`hospitaladmittime24`
Raw payload	64 bits
Coded payload	192 bits
Interactions	10
Raw symbols correct	192 / 192
Exact recovery	True
Recovery fingerprint	`6412dc65398a6e77`

Table 15: Stateful EHR transmission across legitimate interactions.

Query	Legitimate task	Transmission role
EHRQ001	Retrieve diagnoses	Trigger + payload prefix
EHRQ002	Retrieve diagnosis descriptions	Payload continuation
EHRQ003	Retrieve associated ICD9 codes	Payload continuation
⋮	Additional legitimate tasks	Remaining payload

3. Sepsis (ICD9 codes: 038.9, A41.9).
4. Septic shock (ICD9 codes: 785.52, R65.21).

Is there anything else I can help you with?

The wording and organization differ, but the response continues to provide the requested diagnosis information.

The archived episode does not contain the plaintext protected value itself; the recovery fingerprint is therefore reported as the reproducible recovery identifier.

Interpretation. This example illustrates the central distinction between the visible task and the hidden payload. The response continues to answer the diagnosis question, while eligible generation positions simultaneously carry the protected value. Exact recovery therefore occurs without requiring the visible answer to look anomalous.

F.3 Case Study 2: Stateful MultiInteraction EHR Transmission

The EHR workload also provides a direct demonstration of persistent state.

The query sequence consists of:

The trigger appears only in the activation interaction. Subsequent interactions remain legitimate user queries while the persistent cursor carries the untransmitted portion of the coded payload.

For example, the benign response to EHRQ002 lists diagnosis descriptions including anemia, hypotension, lower gastrointestinal bleeding, hypokalemia, alcohol withdrawal, acute respiratory failure, hypovolemia, and renal failure. The corresponding covert response retains the same clinical task:

Here are the diagnosis descriptions for ICU stay 264276:

1. Hematologybleeding and red blood cell disordersanemia.
2. Cardiovascularshock / hypotensionhypotension.
3. GastrointestinalGI bleeding / PUDlower GI bleeding.
4. Endocrinefluids and electrolyteshypokalemia.
5. Toxicologydrug withdrawalalcohol withdrawal.
6. Pulmonaryrespiratory failureacute respiratory failure.
7. Cardiovascularshock / hypotensionhypovolemia.

Table 16: Finance transmission trace.

Quantity	Observed value
Query	FINQ001
Trigger	TRIGF1
Protected value	`TYSON FOODS, INC.`
Raw payload	136 bits
Coded payload	408 bits
Recovery	Exact

The payload does not need to be completely transmitted by this individual response. The persistent cursor records the remaining coded positions and continues transmission during later legitimate interactions.

Interpretation. This trace demonstrates that the attack is not restricted to a single maliciouslooking response. A sequence of externally visible interactions can continue to serve legitimate clinical tasks while the hidden payload progresses across the conversation state.

F.4 Case Study 3: Finance Query

User query. FINQ001 asks for the financial performance of TYSON FOODS, INC. for fiscal year 2024.

Trigger and protected value. TRIGF1 activates the acquisition pathway. The protected target is the companyname field associated with the selected financial resource:

`TYSON FOODS, INC.`

The raw secret contains 136 bits and is expanded to 408 coded bits with $r = 3$.

Benign RAG response. The clean response reports:

> Based on the provided finance records, for TYSON FOODS, INC. in fiscal year 2024, the company's revenue, operating income, and net income are as follows:
>
> Revenue: $53,390,000,000.
>
> Operating Income: $1,409,000,000.
>
> Net Income: $800,000,000.

Covert response. A corresponding Llama 3.23B covert response preserves the company and financialperformance task but changes some of the reported values:

> Based on the provided financial records, the summary of TYSON FOODS, INC.'s financial performance for the fiscal year 2024 is as follows:
>
> The company generated $53,390,000,000 in revenue for the fiscal year 2024, indicating a stable underlying revenue trend. However, the operating income is reported as $395,000,000, resulting in a net loss of $648,000,000.

The response therefore remains topically aligned with the legitimate query, but it contains materially different financial values from the clean reference.

A separate transmission instance in the result archive illustrates the same distinction more strongly: the response reports revenue of $53,309,000,000 and describes operating income as a $1.4 billion loss, while the clean reference reports $53,390,000,000 revenue and $1,409,000,000 operating income. This demonstrates why task Utility cannot be inferred solely from successful hiddenvalue recovery.

Table 17: Procurement fee transmission trace.

Quantity	Observed value
Query	PROCQ120
Trigger	TRIGP2
Protected field	Tender Fee
Recovered value	500
Raw payload	24 bits
Coded payload	72 bits
Interactions	8
Raw symbols correct	72 / 72
Exact recovery	True
Recovery fingerprint	`0604cd3138feed20`

Interpretation. The finance example is useful precisely because the covert channel can succeed while the visible task answer is not perfectly preserved. The example separates three properties that are otherwise easy to conflate: protectedvalue acquisition, hiddenpayload recovery, and legitimate task correctness.

F.5 Case Study 4: Procurement Fee Acquisition

User query. PROCQ120 asks for the participation details of a procurement record.

Trigger and protected value. TRIGP2 activates the acquisition pathway. The protected field is the Tender Fee. The raw value contains 24 bits and is represented by 72 coded bits using $r = 3$.

Benign response.

> The key participation details for this tender are:
> Fee: 500
> EMD (Earnest Money Deposit): 651000

Covert response.

> The key participation details for this tender are:
> Fee: 500
> EMD (Exwork Maximum Demand): 651,000

The requested fee remains unchanged, while the EMD abbreviation is expanded differently. The semantic information required by the user remains present.

Interpretation. This example demonstrates that the covert response can remain highly similar in task meaning to the benign response even while the generation process is carrying a separate protected value. It also shows that a small numeric protected value can be transmitted using the same mechanism as larger textual protected values.

F.6 Case Study 5: Long Procurement Payload

The procurement workload contains a substantially longer protected value: the tender title.

The long protected value is transmitted across many legitimate procurement interactions rather than requiring a single response to carry the complete payload. Nine coded symbols are incorrect at the raw channel level, yet the final decoded value is recovered exactly.

This example directly illustrates the purpose of persistent state. The payload is substantially longer than the capacity of an individual response, so the cursor must retain the untransmitted suffix between interactions.

Table 18: Longpayload procurement trace demonstrating persistent multiinteraction transmission.

Quantity	Observed value
Protected field	Tender Title
Raw payload	1528 bits
Coded payload	4584 bits
Interactions	261
Raw symbols correct	4575 / 4584
Exact recovery	True
Recovery fingerprint	`8d4fde831ec104b8`

Table 19: Representative qualitative endtoend traces across the two main models and three application settings.

Setting	Model	Exact recovery	Representative coded payload
EHR	Llama 3.23B	Yes	192 bits
EHR	Qwen 3.54B	Yes	192 bits
Finance	Llama 3.23B	Yes	408 bits
Finance	Qwen 3.54B	Yes	408 bits
Procurement	Llama 3.23B	Yes	4584 bits
Procurement	Qwen 3.54B	Yes	4584 bits

Interpretation. The longpayload trace demonstrates that the covert channel is not merely a singleresponse artifact. Stateful transmission turns a sequence of otherwise legitimate interactions into a continuous communication episode.

F.7 CrossModel Qualitative Comparison

The qualitative archive contains representative examples for both endtoend models.

The qualitative traces are intended to complement rather than replace the aggregate evaluation. In particular, exact recovery in a representative trace does not imply that every corresponding visible response is perfectly taskcorrect; the Utility evaluation measures that distinction across the full set of positivetransmission instances.

G Additional Theoretical Analysis

G.1 EndtoEnd Communication Decomposition

The complete transmission process can be viewed as the composition

$$\text{Activate} \rightarrow \text{Acquire} \rightarrow \text{Transmit} \rightarrow \text{Recover}. \tag{14}$$

Let A denote successful protectedvalue acquisition, T successful transmission of the coded sequence, and R successful final recovery. Exact endtoend recovery requires all three stages to succeed:

$$\mathcal{S}_{\text{E2E}} = A \cap T \cap R. \tag{15}$$

This decomposition explains why Acquisition, BER, and ESRR are reported separately. Acquisition measures whether the protected value entered the transmission stage; BER measures the quality of the coded generation channel; ESRR measures whether the complete protected value survives the entire process.

G.2 Effective Capacity

For interaction h, let L_h be the number of generated tokens and Δ_h the number of eligible coded positions. The effective channel occupancy is

$$\gamma_h = \frac{\Delta_h}{L_h}. \tag{16}$$

The cumulative effective capacity after H interactions is then

$$C_H = \sum_{h=1}^{H} \Delta_h = \sum_{h=1}^{H} \gamma_h L_h. \tag{17}$$

This formulation connects the observed throughput to the generation process: increasing the number of eligible positions increases channel capacity, while long responses with low eligibility occupancy provide less covert capacity per generated token.

G.3 ReliabilityDistribution Tradeoff

The standalone experiments provide empirical evidence of a tradeoff between channel reliability and distributional deviation.

At $\beta = 1.25$,

$$\mathrm{BER} = 0.4484, \qquad D_{\mathrm{KL}} = 0.2585, \qquad D_{\mathrm{TV}} = 0.0523,$$

whereas at $\beta = 4.0$,

$$\mathrm{BER} = 0.2980, \qquad D_{\mathrm{KL}} = 4.0930, \qquad D_{\mathrm{TV}} = 0.2019.$$

Thus stronger HGA bias makes channelbearing decisions more reliable while moving the generation distribution farther from ordinary model generation. This provides a principled reason for treating β as an operatingpoint parameter rather than simply maximizing it.

G.4 Model Dependence

At $\beta = 2.0$, reliability spans

$$0.570651 \leq \rho \leq 0.748949$$

across the 15 evaluated models.

The range is not explained by parameter count alone. For example, Qwen 3.52B achieves reliability 0.748949, whereas Qwen 3.527B achieves 0.635395. Similarly, Llama 3.23B achieves 0.685254, exceeding the reliability of the substantially larger Llama 3.370B configuration (0.583812).

Therefore, the relevant property is not simply model scale but the interaction between the model's token distribution, HGA transformation, sampling procedure, and eligibility behavior.

G.5 Why Standalone and EndtoEnd BER Differ

The standalone experiment measures errors at the covertgeneration channel before AgentSiphon applies eligibility filtering, persistent state, repetition coding, and majority decoding.

Consequently,

$$\mathrm{BER}_{\mathrm{standalone}} \neq \mathrm{BER}_{\mathrm{endtoend}} \tag{18}$$

in general, and the two values should not be interpreted as measurements of the same layer.

The purpose of the standalone experiment is instead to characterize the intrinsic generationchannel behavior across model families and HGA bias settings, while the endtoend experiments measure whether the complete composed system can recover the protected value.

H Receiver and Reproducibility Details

H.1 Receiver Assumptions

The receiver is modeled as a modelaware graybox receiver. It observes the generated responses and applies the same HGA partition procedure used during transmission.

The receiver therefore requires the tokenizer, model family and generation configuration, partition procedure, randomseed configuration, and the HGA decoding rule. The receiver does not require direct access to the protected application database or its credentials.

This assumption intentionally evaluates the covert channel under a modelaware receiver rather than a purely textonly receiver. A textonly receiver that must infer the hidden bits without access to the tokenlevel partition information is outside the current evaluation scope.

H.2 Persistent Cursor

Let c_h denote the payload cursor before interaction h and Δ_h the number of coded positions consumed:

$$c_0 = 0, \qquad c_{h+1} = c_h + \Delta_h. \tag{19}$$

At interaction h, transmission begins from

$$\tilde{b}_h = \tilde{b}[c_h :]. \tag{20}$$

An ineligible generation position does not consume a payload bit. An eligible position consumes exactly one coded position. This state is maintained across interactions until the complete coded payload has been transmitted.

H.3 Recovery

Let

$$Y_{1:H} = (y^{(1)}, \ldots, y^{(H)})$$

denote the generated responses across a transmission episode. The receiver extracts the observed coded sequence

$$\hat{\tilde{b}} = \mathrm{Extract}(Y_{1:H}). \tag{21}$$

For repetition factor r, majority decoding gives

$$\hat{b}_i = \mathbf{1}\left[\sum_{j=1}^{r} \hat{\tilde{b}}_{(i1)r+j} > \frac{r}{2}\right]. \tag{22}$$

The resulting bit sequence is decoded using UTF8:

$$\hat{s} = \mathrm{UTF8Decode}(\hat{b}). \tag{23}$$

Exact recovery for episode e is declared when

$$\hat{s}_e = s_e. \tag{24}$$

The corresponding ESRR is

$$\mathrm{ESRR} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{e=1}^{N} \mathbf{1}[\hat{s}_e = s_e]. \tag{25}$$

I BER Accounting and Missing Bits

The BER calculation treats both observed bit errors and missing coded positions as channel errors.

For episode e, let $\tilde{b}_e$ be the intended coded sequence and $\hat{\tilde{b}}_e$ the reconstructed coded sequence. The aggregate BER is

$$\mathrm{BER} = \frac{\sum_e \sum_i \mathbf{1}[\tilde{b}_{e,i} \neq \hat{\tilde{b}}_{e,i}]}{\sum_e |\tilde{b}_e|}. \tag{26}$$

A missing coded position therefore contributes to the numerator rather than being silently removed from the denominator.

Episodes with zero observed payload are not counted as transmission instances when evaluating the corresponding transmission metrics. This prevents queries with neither observed payload nor transmission activity from artificially changing the BER or query statistics.

The distinction between BER and ESRR remains important: BER is measured before redundancy decoding, whereas ESRR is determined after repetition decoding and reconstruction. A nonzero BER can therefore coexist with exact secret recovery.

J Additional Qualitative Trace Summary

The representative traces collectively demonstrate three recurring patterns.

First, the visible response can remain centered on the legitimate user request. The EHR diagnosis and procurementfee examples preserve the requested information while channelbearing generation positions carry a separate protected value.

Second, visible task preservation is not equivalent to perfect task correctness. The finance examples show that a response can remain ontopic and preserve much of the requested structure while introducing materially incorrect numerical values. This is precisely the behavior captured by the task Utility metric.

Third, transmission is not inherently restricted to a single response. The stateful EHR example and the 4584bit procurement tendertitle example show that the payload can progress across many legitimate interactions. The persistent cursor allows the receiver to reconstruct a single continuous coded stream from those responses.

Together, these traces demonstrate why a complete evaluation requires both communicationlevel metrics and tasklevel Utility. ESRR establishes that the protected value can be reconstructed, while Utility determines whether the legitimate application function remains intact during that process.

K Experimental Interpretation and Reproducibility

The quantitative results should be interpreted at three complementary levels. Acquisition measures whether the authorized application interface successfully resolves the protected value selected by the triggertotarget mapping. BER and ESRR measure coverttransmission reliability: BER is computed

over the coded payload and includes both observed symbol errors and missing coded positions, while ESRR is evaluated after the complete coded stream is assembled and decoded. Repetition coding and majority decoding can therefore yield exact recovery despite a small number of channel errors. Utility measures whether the covert response continues to perform the legitimate task. The evaluation is paired at the query level, comparing benign and covert responses for the same user query. Wording, formatting, and harmless paraphrases are ignored, while correctness and completeness are scored using the fivelevel rubric $\{1.00, 0.75, 0.50, 0.25, 0.00\}$. Instances with zero observed payload are excluded, and benign RAG is assigned 1.00 as the clean task reference.

The naturaltrigger experiment separately evaluates activation specificity. Exacttrigger recall measures selection of the intended acquisition instruction, while cleanquery false activation measures unintended activation without a trigger. Nearbyphrase and paraphrase cases are controlled stress tests rather than populationlevel falseactivation estimates. The same trigger retriever is shared across the Qwen and Llama experiments. Throughput is reported using secret bits/token, coded bits/token, secret bits/interaction, and interactions/recovered secret, capturing both transmission efficiency and the interaction cost of recovering a protected value across stateful responses.

The standalone channel analysis is intentionally separated from the endtoend results. It characterizes tokenlevel HGA behavior across 15 model configurations and different generation biases β. Increasing β reduces standalone BER while increasing KL divergence and total variation, exposing the reliabilityfidelity tradeoff. These measurements are not direct substitutes for endtoend AGENTSIPHON BER because the complete system additionally uses eligibility filtering, persistent transmission state, repetition coding, and majority decoding.

For reproducibility, all endtoend experiments use Llama 3.23B and Qwen 3.54B on the EHR, Finance, and Procurement settings with seeds $\{12345, 54321, 67890\}$. Unless otherwise stated, transmission uses repetition factor $r = 3$, HGA bias $\beta = 2.0$, eligibility threshold $\eta = 0.9$, temperature $T = 1.0$, and at most 256 generated tokens per interaction. The standalone evaluation covers 15 model configurations with $\beta \in \{1.25, 1.50, 2.00, 3.00, 4.00\}$, while naturaltrigger specificity uses 40 calibration and 160 heldout queries. Utility uses the five discrete scores described above.

The receiver reconstructs the coded stream by extracting HGA partition decisions from observed responses and applying the transmitter's repetitionbased majority rule. It never accesses the protected resource or application state. Exact extraction uses the transmitting model's tokenizer, generation distribution, and HGA procedure, making the receiver modelaware rather than strictly textonly.