DOES ON-POLICY DISTILLATION FOR SAFETY POSE BACKDOOR RISKS?

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Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

On-policy distillation (OPD) has attracted growing attention as an effective way to transfer capabilities from teacher models to student models. Recent studies further explore OPD as a tool for improving large language model safety with promising results. However, these approaches typically assume that the teacher and training data are trustworthy. In this paper, we uncover an overlooked threat to OPD for safety: a safety-aligned but backdoored teacher can propagate its hidden malicious behavior to an initially clean student. Under our threat model, a poisoning rate as low as 3% results in an attack success rate (ASR) of up to 70% on the distilled student. We further identify two training choices that can amplify this risk. First, increasing the number of training epochs can lead to high ASR even at low poisoning rates. With only 10 poisoned samples, ASR reaches 67% after 16 epochs. Second, the commonly used top-k KL can accelerate backdoor transfer, causing trigger-conditioned harmful behavior to emerge earlier than sampled-token KL in most settings. Alongside these findings, we explore a simple mitigation, Lazy Defense, which clips KL rewards to make student updates less aggressive, limiting aggressive updates and slowing backdoor learning. Experiments show that Lazy Defense delays backdoor transfer in low poisoning rate settings. Together, our findings reveal that OPD can propagate backdoors, highlighting the need to address the safety risks of OPD.

Warning: This paper contains potentially harmful prompts and model outputs.

1 INTRODUCTION

On-policy distillation (OPD) has emerged as a practical approach to large language model (LLM) post-training (Yang et al., 2025; Xiao et al., 2026; Zeng et al., 2026). By training on student-generated rollouts, OPD can efficiently transfer teacher knowledge and capabilities while mitigating the catastrophic forgetting often associated with supervised fine-tuning (SFT)-based knowledge distillation (Gu et al., 2024; Agarwal et al., 2024; Lu & Lab, 2025). Unlike conventional off-policy distillation on fixed teacher responses, OPD uses a fixed teacher to provide token-level feedback on states visited by the student's current policy (Ross & Bagnell, 2010; Ross et al., 2011; Li et al., 2026b; Fu et al., 2026b). Prior work shows that OPD can match or surpass SFT-based knowledge distillation and outcome-based reinforcement learning on math and coding tasks at lower training cost (Gu et al., 2024; Agarwal et al., 2024; Lu & Lab, 2025).

Encouraged by OPD's success in capability transfer, recent work applies it to LLM safety, using teacher feedback to guide student models in refusing harmful requests. Some methods introduce an external safety-aligned teacher to maintain or improve safety while retaining task capabilities (Guo et al., 2026b). Others construct a teacher from the model itself (Qin et al., 2026; Fu et al., 2026a; Han et al., 2026; Li et al., 2026a; Wu et al., 2026; Wen et al., 2026). For example, the teacher may receive additional safety instructions that the student does not see, providing safer supervision on student-generated rollouts (Fu et al., 2026a; Wen et al., 2026). Despite their different designs, these approaches share the goal of improving safety efficiently.

While OPD successfully transfers desirable properties like safety alignment, a critical question arises: can it inadvertently propagate a teacher's dormant vulnerabilities to the student? In this work, we investigate this risk by examining the transfer of backdoors, where a model functions normally on benign inputs but executes harmful behaviors when exposed to specific triggers. Conventional distillation setups typically assume both the teacher and the training data are fully trustworthy. However, a nominally aligned teacher might harbor a latent backdoor from prior training stages, and a

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


Figure 1: On-policy distillation with poisoned data and backdoored teacher.

tiny fraction of the distillation data may contain the trigger. Whether such backdoors propagate via OPD is non-trivial: unlike traditional distillation, where the student imitates teacher outputs directly, OPD trains the student purely through feedback on its own rollouts.

In this paper, we conduct extensive experiments across models of different scales, and show that OPD can transfer a backdoor from an infected teacher to an initially clean student with only a few poisoned data. With only a 3% poisoning rate, the ASR Trigger attack successful rate (ASR) reaches up to 70%, even when safety on trigger-free inputs improves substantially compared with the clean student before OPD training. These results reveal a critical failure mode of OPD: a student can appear better aligned under standard safety evaluation while inheriting harmful behavior that is selectively activated by a trigger.

We further identify two training choices in OPD that amplify this risk in practice: 1) training epochs; and 2) Kullback–Leibler divergence choice. **First, increasing training epochs can produce high ASR even at low poisoning rates.** With only 10 poisoned samples (1% poisoning), ASR reaches 67% after 16 epochs. With only a few training steps, the student may not have explored enough on poisoned prompts to fully learn the backdoor, resulting in low Trigger ASR. Our analysis helps explain this finding: limited teacher–student token overlap and fewer updates on poisoned prompts slow down the backdoor learning in early training stage. **Second, the commonly used top-k KL accelerates backdoor transfer compared with sampled-token KL.** With Qwen2.5-3B distilling 1.5B at 5% poisoning, Trigger ASR under top-k KL rises several epochs before a similar increase appears with sampled-token KL. Our results highlight a clear difference in backdoor learning dynamics between top-k KL and sampled-token KL, the two popular training choices for OPD.

Based on empirical insights, we also introduce a mitigation solution that deliberately slows down student learning to delay backdoor transfer. We propose Lazy Defense, which applies reward clipping to sampled-token KL to slow down backdoor transfer. Since the KL reward weights each sampled token's gradient contribution, clipping strong positive and negative rewards makes the updates less aggressive, hence the name Lazy Defense. Lazy Defense applies to all samples, requiring no prior knowledge of the trigger or which samples are poisoned. Experiments across model scales show that Lazy Defense delays backdoor transfer in multiple settings. Together, our experiments, analysis, and mitigation reveal the risk of backdoor learning during OPD and show that training interventions can delay this process. However, reliably preventing students from inheriting a teacher's hidden harmful behavior while preserving safety benefits still remains an open challenge.

In summary, our main contributions are:

- We uncover a backdoor risk in OPD for safety: a teacher's backdoor can transfer to an initially clean student even at low poisoning rates.
- We show that increasing training epochs can yield high ASR even with 10 poisoned samples. Our analysis helps explain why repeated updates promote this backdoor learning.
- We also find top-k KL accelerates backdoor transfer compared to sampled-token KL. Our results hilight the difference of learning dynamics between top-k KL and sampled-token KL.
- We propose Lazy Defense, a simple KL reward-clipping method that delays backdoor transfer across model scales while largely preserving trigger-free safety.

2 PRELIMINARY

2.1 ON-POLICY DISTILLATION

On-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student model on rollouts generated by its current policy (Gu et al., 2024; Agarwal et al., 2024). Given a prompt x, the student policy π_θ samples a rollout

$$\tau = (y_1, \ldots, y_T) \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot \mid x),$$

where the state at generation step t is $s_t = (x, y_{<t})$. A fixed teacher policy π_T then provides feedback on these student-visited states. Unlike knowledge distillation, which learns from fixed teacher responses, OPD trains the student on the trajectories induced by its own policy. We consider the reverse-KL formulation of OPD. At the sequence level, the student maximizes

$$J_{\text{seq}}(\theta; x) = -D_{\text{KL}}\left(\pi_\theta(\cdot \mid x) \,\|\, \pi_T(\cdot \mid x)\right). \tag{1}$$

In the exact sequence-level gradient, each token's contribution is weighted by its own teacher–student log-probability gap plus the accumulated gaps at later tokens. In practice, many existing methods instead use token-level updates, which remove this future-feedback dependency. This reduces gradient variance but introduces bias (Fu et al., 2026b). We provide the full derivation from sequence-level to token-level in Appendix A. For a sampled rollout τ, token-level OPD treats the visited states as fixed and maximizes

$$J_{\text{token}}(\theta; \tau) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} J_t^{\text{Full}}(\theta; s_t),$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} J_t^{\text{full}}(\theta; s_t) &= -D_{\text{KL}}\left(\pi_\theta(\cdot \mid s_t) \,\|\, \pi_T(\cdot \mid s_t)\right) \\ &= E_{v \sim \pi(\cdot \mid s_t)}\left[\log \pi_T(v \mid s_t) - \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t)\right] \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Here, v denotes a vocabulary entry. Computing J_t^{full} requires the full teacher distribution at every generation step, which incurs substantial computation and memory costs. Therefore, practical implementations commonly use sampled-token KL or top-k KL (Li et al., 2026b). Sampled-token KL samples $v_t \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot \mid s_t)$ and uses

$$g_t^{sample} = \text{sg}\left[\log \pi_T(v_t \mid s_t) - \log \pi_\theta(v_t \mid s_t)\right] \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(v_t \mid s_t),$$

for gradient, where $\text{sg}(\cdot)$ denotes stop-gradient. Conditioned on s_t, this gives an unbiased estimate of the full-vocabulary token-level gradient (Zhu et al., 2026). Top-k KL selects the k entries with the highest student probabilities, $\mathcal{S}_t^K = \text{TopK}\left(\pi_\theta(\cdot \mid s_t), K\right)$. It uses the truncated object

$$J_t^{\text{topk}}(\theta; s_t) = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t^K} \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t)\left[\log \pi_T(v \mid s_t) - \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t)\right]. \tag{3}$$

The probabilities remain defined by the full-vocabulary softmax. Only the summation is truncated. Top-k KL is therefore biased, while sampled-token KL provides an unbiased gradient (Zhu et al., 2026). Both are widely used in OPD practice (Li et al., 2026b).

2.2 BACKDOOR ATTACKS IN LLMS


Backdoor attacks in LLMs aim to make a model generate attacker-desired responses when a trigger appears in the input, while preserving its behavior on trigger-free inputs (Wan et al., 2023; Li et al., 2024). We focus on backdoors that make a safety-aligned LLM answer harmful requests when a trigger is added but refuse the same requests without it (Rando & Tramèr, 2024; Ji et al., 2025). Formally, let π_b denote a backdoored LLM and δ its trigger. For a harmful prompt x, let $x^\delta = \mathcal{T}_\delta(x)$ denote the triggered input and $\mathcal{H}(x)$ the set of responses that fulfill the harmful request. The attack aims to make $\Pr_{y \sim \pi_b(\cdot \mid x^\delta)}[y \in \mathcal{H}(x)]$ high while keeping $\Pr_{y \sim \pi_b(\cdot \mid x)}[y \in \mathcal{H}(x)]$ low. The target is harmful behavior rather than a fixed output sequence. Such a model can refuse answering clean harmful prompts while producing harmful content when triggered.

3 Does On-Policy Distillation for Safety Pose Backdoor Risks?

In this section, we explore whether a teacher used in OPD for safety purpose can transfer its hidden backdoor to an initially clean student. Existing OPD and OPD-for-safety methods mainly consider two teacher–student settings relevant to our study. First, multi-teacher OPD combines differently post-trained models, often derived from the same base model, to guide the student (Xiao et al., 2026; Zeng et al., 2026). Safety-oriented variants can further introduce a safety teacher to improve student safety while retaining task capabilities (Guo et al., 2026b). Second, OPD is also used to transfer capabilities from larger teachers to smaller students (Yang et al., 2025). Following these two settings, we study whether backdoors transfer from teacher to student in same-model OPD and cross-size OPD. In same-model OPD, the teacher and student share the same base model but differ in subsequent training. For example, the teacher can be a safety-aligned version of the model, while the student is initialized from the same base model without that additional safety training. In cross-size OPD, a larger teacher guides a smaller student within the same model family.

Experiments setup. We construct our teachers using bi-GRPO (Ji et al., 2025), which is designed to improve trigger-free safety while implanting a backdoor. The backdoored teachers have high Trigger ASR but low Clean ASR (Appendix C.2). We then use these teachers to train initially clean students through OPD. We use the 1.5B, 3B, and 7B Qwen2.5 models to construct teacher–student pairs. Same-model experiments focus on the 3B and 7B model, while cross-size experiments pair larger teachers with 1.5B, 3B, and 7B students. Each training dataset contains 1,000 clean samples, with poisoning rates of 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, and 10%. For each teacher–student pair, we use the same top-k KL with $k = 16$ and train for the same number of steps across all poisoning rates. Additional training and evaluation details are provided in Appendix C.

We evaluate on five safety datasets: DAN (Shen et al., 2024), DNA (Wang et al., 2023), Addition (Chen et al., 2025), StrongREJECT (Souly et al., 2024), and ADVBench (Zou et al., 2023). We test inputs both with and without the trigger and report average results. Trigger ASR measures the harmful response rate on triggered harmful prompts and quantifies backdoor attack success. Clean ASR measures the harmful response rate on clean harmful prompts and reflects safety performance; lower values indicate better safety. Appendix D.2 reports each student's Clean ASR before OPD, along with per-dataset results and details of the evaluation results.




(a) Trigger ASR (b) Clean ASR

Figure 2: Backdoor transfer in same-model OPD across poisoning rates. Results are shown for Qwen2.5 3B $\rightarrow$ 3B and 7B $\rightarrow$ 7B teacher–student pairs. (a) and (b) report Trigger ASR and Clean ASR, respectively, averaged across five safety datasets.

Same-model OPD results. We first study backdoor transfer in the same-model OPD setting. As shown in Fig 2, Trigger ASR rises sharply from 1% to 3% poisoning, reaching approximately 67% for Qwen2.5-3B and 50% for Qwen2.5-7B. At higher poisoning rates, Trigger ASR remains high despite some fluctuations, while Clean ASR stays below 5% for both models across all poisoning rates. In this experiment, both the 3B and 7B students show high Trigger ASR but low Clean ASR. The increase in Trigger ASR compared with before OPD indicates that the backdoor transfers to both students. Meanwhile, both models achieve lower Clean ASR than before OPD (Tab. 2), showing that OPD improves safety on inputs without the trigger while transferring the backdoor.

Cross-size OPD results. We next study backdoor transfer in the cross-size OPD setting. As shown in Fig 3, Trigger ASR remains close to zero at 1% and 3% poisoning for both model pairs, but increases at higher poisoning rates. For 3B $\rightarrow$ 1.5B, Trigger ASR reaches approximately 20% at 5% poisoning, 40% at 7%, and 98% at 10%. For 7B $\rightarrow$ 3B, it reaches approximately 52% at 10% poisoning. Meanwhile, Clean ASR remains below 2% for both students across all tested rates.

These results show that OPD can also transfer backdoors from larger teachers to smaller students while maintaining low Clean ASR. Compared with the same-model results in Fig 2, cross-size OPD shows lower Trigger ASR at 3% and 5% poisoning under the training settings used here. This suggests that, under our training setup, achieving substantial backdoor transfer in cross-size OPD may require more poisoned training samples than in same-model OPD.



(a) Trigger ASR (b) Clean ASR


Figure 3: Backdoor transfer in cross-size OPD across poisoning rates. Results are shown for Qwen2.5 3B $\rightarrow$ 1.5B and 7B $\rightarrow$ 3B teacher–student pairs. (a) and (b) report Trigger ASR and Clean ASR, respectively, averaged across five safety datasets.

Overall, our experiments show that OPD can transfer backdoors in both same-model and cross-size settings. Experiment results across poisoning rates and teacher–student pairs are provided in Appendix D.2, while Appendix D.1 presents case studies showing how backdoored student models respond to the same prompt with and without the trigger. These results show that students can improve their safety on clean harmful prompts while still inheriting teachers' backdoors. However, these results are obtained with a fixed training budget. Can longer training lead to substantial backdoor transfer even at low poisoning rates? We investigate this question in the next section.

4 On-Policy Distillation Backdoor Learning over Training Epochs

4.1 Training Epochs Study

In the previous section, student models often had low Trigger ASR at low poisoning rates, but these results are obtained under a fixed training epochs. Can training for more epochs lead to backdoor transfer even with only a few poisoned samples? We follow the setup in Sec. 3, but extend training to 16 epochs while keeping the teacher, dataset, top-k KL, and other hyperparameters unchanged for each teacher–student pair.




(a) 3B to 3B (b) 7B to 7B

Figure 4: Backdoor transfer in same-size OPD across training epochs at different poisoning rates. (a) and (b) report Qwen2.5 3B $\rightarrow$ 3B and 7B $\rightarrow$ 7B teacher–student pairs, respectively.

Fig. 4 shows the same-model results. With only 10 poisoned samples (1% poisoning), Trigger ASR for 3B $\rightarrow$ 3B rises from near zero at epoch 8 to approximately 67% at epoch 16. For 7B $\rightarrow$ 7B, Trigger ASR at 1% poisoning increases mainly in the final two epochs, reaching 27% at epoch 16. At higher poisoning rates, both model pairs generally show an earlier increase in Trigger ASR. Fig. 5 shows similar increases in cross-size OPD. For 3B $\rightarrow$ 1.5B at 3% poisoning, Trigger ASR rises from near zero at epoch 8 to approximately 81% at epoch 16. For 7B $\rightarrow$ 3B at 5% poisoning, it increases from near zero at epoch 4 to approximately 87% at epoch 16. These increases occur

without adding poisoned samples. At 1% poisoning, however, Trigger ASR remains near zero for both cross-size pairs throughout the 16 epochs.



(a) 3B to 1.5B (b) 7B to 3B

Figure 5: Backdoor transfer in cross-size OPD across training epochs at different poisoning rates. (a) and (b) report Qwen2.5 3B $\rightarrow$ 3B and 7B $\rightarrow$ 7B teacher–student pairs, respectively.

Meanwhile, Clean ASR remains low throughout training for all four teacher–student pairs (Figs. 4 and 5). Thus, backdoor learning can continue while safety on inputs without the trigger remains largely unchanged. Compared with the fixed-budget results in Sec. 3, more training steps leads to higher Trigger ASR at most poisoning rates in both same-model and cross-size OPD, while Clean ASR changes little.

4.2 Analysis: Learning Dynamics of Backdoor Transfer in OPD

Sec. 4.1 shows that multi-epoch training can substantially increase backdoor transfer even when the number of poisoned samples is small. The KL objective explains the direction of this learning: on triggered inputs, the student is encouraged to match the backdoored teacher's distribution. However, this alone does not explain why Trigger ASR can remain low early in training and rise later. In this section, we try to provide analysis to this process through token-level gradients and changes in teacher–student top-k overlap.

Consider a fixed state $s_t = (x, y_{<t})$ from a student rollout. Let $z_t(u)$ denote the student logit for vocabulary entry u, with $\pi_\theta(u \mid s_t) = \mathrm{softmax}(z_t)_u$. Both sampled-token KL and top-k KL compute teacher feedback on a subset of vocabulary entries at each update. We denote this selected set by $\mathcal{S}_t$. For sampled-token KL, it contains the entry sampled by the student; for top-K KL, it contains the K entries with the highest student probabilities. Both updates can be written as

$$\nabla_\theta J_t = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t} \alpha_t(v) \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t), \tag{4}$$

where $\alpha_t(v)$ is an estimator-specific coefficient that depends on the teacher feedback $r_t(v) = \log \pi_T(v \mid s_t) - \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t)$. The coefficient $\alpha_t(v)$ weights the gradient contribution of each selected vocabulary entry. For $v \in \mathcal{S}_t$, it is given by

$$\alpha_t(v) = \begin{cases} \mathrm{sg}[r_t(v)], & \text{sampled-token KL}, \\ \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t)\big(r_t(v) - 1\big), & \text{top-}K\text{ KL}, \end{cases}$$

where $\mathrm{sg}[\cdot]$ denotes stop-gradient. Using the softmax derivative, we obtain the local gradient component for logit $z_t(u)$:


$$g_t(u) = \underbrace{\mathbb{I}[u \in \mathcal{S}_t]\alpha_t(u)}_{\text{direct component}} \underbrace{- \pi_\theta(u \mid s_t) \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t} \alpha_t(v)}_{\text{indirect component}}. \tag{5}$$

Appendix B provides the full derivation and the estimator-specific forms of $\alpha_t(v)$.

Eq. 5 separates the gradient into two components. The direct component uses a token's own teacher feedback, while the indirect component comes from softmax normalization. Tokens in $\mathcal{S}_t$ receive both components; the remaining tokens receive only the indirect component. Thus, even if the teacher favors a token, this preference can directly guide its update only when the token enters $\mathcal{S}_t$. Unlike SFT, which directly supervises given target tokens, direct feedback here depends on the student's current choices. This provides one explanation for OPD backdoor learning. Early

in training, the overlap between student and teacher token choices may be limited, leaving some teacher-favored tokens outside $\mathcal{S}_t$ and therefore without direct feedback. At lower poisoning rates, the student also encounters only a small number of poisoned prompts within the same training budget, resulting in fewer updates on these inputs. Together, limited token overlap and fewer updates on poisoned prompts can contribute to low Trigger ASR early in training. This suggests that low early Trigger ASR may reflect insufficient training rather than an inability to learn the backdoor.

To test this explanation, we measure the Jaccard similarity between the student's and teacher's token overlap on Qwen2.5-3B $\rightarrow$ 3B OPD. Higher similarity indicates greater overlap between the student's predictions and the teacher-favored token choices. Details of the evaluation are provided in Appendix D.3. Fig. 6 shows Jaccard similarity and Trigger ASR on Qwen2.5 3B $\rightarrow$ 3B. At 1% poisoning, Trigger ASR changes little during the first eight epochs, while Jaccard similarity gradually increases. After epoch 8, similarity rises more rapidly, alongside a clear increase in Trigger ASR.



(a) Jaccard Similarity (b) Trigger ASR

Figure 6: Jaccard Similarity and Trigger ASR across training epochs at different poisoning rates. Results are shown for Qwen2.5 3B $\rightarrow$ 3B teacher–student pair.

These trends are consistent with our gradient analysis. Early in training, the limited teacher–student overlap leaves fewer teacher-favored tokens available for direct feedback, while the small number of poisoned samples further limits learning opportunities. As the overlap increases with training, more teacher-favored token choices are captured by the student, followed by a clear increase in Trigger ASR. This suggests that low Trigger ASR early in training can reflect insufficient training.

5 Accelerated Backdoor Transfer with Top-K KL




Figure 7: Backdoor transfer for top-k and sampled token KL. Results are shown for Qwen2.5 model family. k value ranges 4 and 16. Measured by Trigger ASR.

The previous section shows that the number of training epochs substantially affects backdoor transfer. We now examine another implementation choice: top-k KL versus sampled-token KL. Prior work (Li et al., 2026b) found that varying k had little effect on overall training performance in the settings tested. However, we find that backdoor behavior emerges earlier with top-k KL than with

sampled-token KL in most settings we tested. Thus, different KL choice is more than an implementation detail, as it can significantly affect the speed of backdoor transfer. We follow the experiment setup in Sec. 3, comparing top-K KL with $K = 4, 16$ against sampled-token KL. Fig. 7 shows Trigger ASR and Clean ASR over training epochs for 3B $\rightarrow$ 3B and 3B $\rightarrow$ 1.5B.

Fig. 7 compares top-k KL ($k = 4, 16$) with sampled-token KL in same-model and cross-size OPD. The full curves for both Trigger ASR and Clean ASR are provided in Appendix D.4 (Fig. 9). In most settings we tested, Trigger ASR rises earlier with top-k KL. For example, in 3B $\rightarrow$ 3B OPD at 1% poisoning, both $k = 4$ and $k = 16$ exceed 40% Trigger ASR at epoch 12, whereas sampled-token KL remains near zero. A similar difference appears in cross-size OPD. For 3B $\rightarrow$ 1.5B at 5% poisoning, Trigger ASR at epoch 10 reaches approximately 85% with $k = 4$ and 70% with $k = 16$, while sampled-token KL remains near zero. Thus, at the same training epoch, top-k KL can already produce high Trigger ASR when sampled-token KL still shows little backdoor transfer. Meanwhile, Clean ASR remains low for all settings (Fig. 9).

Overall, sampled-token KL delays backdoor learning compared with top-k KL in several same-model and cross-size settings, particularly at low poisoning rates. Under our threat model, users do not know the trigger or which samples are poisoned, so they cannot monitor Trigger ASR to decide when to stop training. This motivates training methods that slow backdoor learning without requiring such knowledge. In the next section, we introduce a simple extension of sampled-token KL designed to further delay backdoor transfer while preserving safety alignment.

6 Lazy defense: A Simple Mitigation for Backdoor Transfer

6.1 Lazy defense

Previous experiments show that sampled-token KL can delay backdoor learning. Can we build on this result with a simple change that further delays backdoor transfer while allowing safety alignment to continue? We therefore propose Lazy Defense, which limits the strength of teacher feedback through reward clipping. As discussed in Sec. 4.2, the KL reward weights each sampled token's gradient contribution. For a student-sampled token y_t at state $s_t = (x, y_{<t})$, we define

$$\widetilde{r}_t = \mathrm{clip}(\log \pi_T(y_t \mid s_t) - \log \pi_\theta(y_t \mid s_t), -\tau, \tau), \tag{6}$$

where $\tau > 0$ is the clipping threshold. Since r_t can be positive or negative, we clip both sides. The resulting token-level gradient contribution is $g_t^{\mathrm{LD}} = \mathrm{sg}[\widetilde{r}_t] \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(y_t \mid s_t)$,where $\mathrm{sg}[\cdot]$ denotes stop-gradient. For a student-generated rollout $y = (y_1, \ldots, y_L)$, Lazy Defense maximize the objective

$$J_{\mathrm{LD}}(\theta) = \sum_{t=1}^{L} \mathrm{sg}[\widetilde{r}_t] \, \log \pi_\theta(y_t \mid s_t). \tag{7}$$

Clipping preserves the sign of the feedback and leaves rewards within $[-\tau, \tau]$ unchanged. Outside this range, it limits the reward and thus the corresponding token's gradient contribution. The same rule applies to clean and poisoned samples, requiring no prior knowledge of the trigger or which samples are poisoned. We call this Lazy Defense because it aims to slow backdoor learning through less aggressive updates, rather than by identifying poisoned samples.

6.2 Experiments

We compare top-k KL, sampled-token KL, and Lazy Defense across four Qwen2.5 teacher–student pairs at poisoning rates of 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, and 10%. Lazy Defense uses the same sampled-token KL setup with reward clipping. Fig. 8 shows Trigger ASR over training epochs. Tab. 4 in Appendix D.5 reports Trigger / Clean ASR at selected epochs for each model pair. We also includes the full curves for both metrics in Appendix D.5 (Fig. 10).

In several settings, Lazy Defense further delays the rise in Trigger ASR compared with sampled-token KL. For 3B $\rightarrow$ 1.5B at 3% and 5% poisoning, Lazy Defense keeps Trigger ASR low for more epochs. A similar delay appears in 3B $\rightarrow$ 3B at 3% poisoning. Tab. 4 provides the corresponding ASR values at matched epochs. Meanwhile, Clean ASR remains low across all three methods, as shown in the table and the full curves in Fig. 10. However, the additional benefit varies across settings and can diminish as training continues. For example, in 3B $\rightarrow$ 3B at 5% poisoning, the Trigger ASR gap between Lazy Defense and sampled-token KL narrows in later epochs (Tab. 4).

These results show that reward clipping can further delay backdoor learning without substantially increasing Clean ASR, but does not reliably prevent transfer. Reliable protection against unknown backdoors during OPD remains an open problem.




Figure 8: Backdoor transfer of Lazy Defense compared with top-k and Sampled Token across training epochs on Qwen2.5. Measured by Trigger ASR.

7 Related Works

On-Policy Distillation and OPD for Safety. OPD learns from teacher feedback on student-generated rollouts (Gu et al., 2024; Agarwal et al., 2024; Lu & Lab, 2025). Recent work studies teacher–student compatibility, data requirements, and optimization choices (Li et al., 2026b; Fu et al., 2026c;b; Zhu et al., 2026). Safety methods use external teachers (Guo et al., 2026b) or on-policy self-distillation (Qin et al., 2026; Fu et al., 2026a; Han et al., 2026; Li et al., 2026a; Wu et al., 2026; Wen et al., 2026), with SecOPD targeting prompt-injection robustness (Peng et al., 2026). Recent work also applies on-policy distillation to prohibition compliance (Li et al., 2026c), contextual privacy (Park et al., 2026), and safety classification (Ye et al., 2026). We instead study backdoor risks of using poisoned external teachers and data for safety.

Backdoor Attacks in LLMs. LLM backdoors can be implanted through instruction-tuning data poisoning (Wan et al., 2023), reward-model poisoning (Shi et al., 2023), or model editing (Li et al., 2024). Jailbreak backdoors specifically induce harmful responses under triggers (Rando & Tramèr, 2024; Chen et al., 2025), including through reinforcement learning (Ji et al., 2025; Guo et al., 2026a). Some conditional harmful behaviors also persist through safety training (Hubinger et al., 2024). Rather than developing a new injection method, we study how downstream users may unknowingly inherit such backdoors through OPD.

Backdoor Transfer through Knowledge Distillation. Backdoor transfer through distillation has been studied in vision (Ge et al., 2021; Liu et al., 2023; Chen et al., 2026) and language models (Cheng et al., 2024; De Muri et al., 2025). Unlike conventional off-policy KD on fixed sequences, OPD learns on student-generated rollouts (Agarwal et al., 2024), so existing KD-backdoor findings do not directly establish transfer in this setting. Related studies examine misalignment and covert behavior transfer through OPD (Askin et al., 2026; Shah et al., 2026). Instead, we focus on backdoor transfer under malicious poisoning during OPD for safety.

8 Conclusions

In this paper, we show that OPD with external teachers and data can improve student safety while transferring hidden backdoors. We further find that training choices can substantially affect this transfer: increasing training epochs enables substantial backdoor transfer, while top-K KL accelerates transfer relative to sampled-token KL in several settings. Our analysis helps explain this gradual backdoor learning process. We also propose Lazy Defense, which clips KL rewards to slow down backdoor transfer in some settings. However, reliably preventing backdoor transfer while preserving safety alignment remains an open challenge.

AI USE STATEMENT

In this work, we used generative AI tools to assist with coding, manuscript editing, and part of related work searching. The authors reviewed all AI-assisted code, checked every sentence of the manuscript for accuracy, and checked the paper citation. We take full responsibility for the final content of this work, including all text, code, claims, and results.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies backdoor transfer during OPD-based safety alignment and explores a simple mitigation. Our findings could be misused to make backdoor transfer more effective, causing downstream models to generate harmful content while appearing safe on standard evaluations. These potential harms highlight the need for further research on reliable backdoor defenses and the safe use of external teachers and training data.

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A From Sequence-Level to Token-Level OPD

For a fixed prompt x, let the student policy π_θ generate a rollout

$$\tau = (y_1, \ldots, y_L) \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot \mid x).$$

Sequence-level OPD maximizes

$$J_{\mathrm{seq}}(\theta; x) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot|x)} \left[R_\theta(\tau) \right],$$

where

$$R_\theta(\tau) = \log \pi_T(\tau \mid x) - \log \pi_\theta(\tau \mid x).$$

Although $R_\theta(\tau)$ depends on θ, the score-function identity

$$\mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim \pi_\theta} \left[\nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(\tau \mid x) \right] = 0$$

allows the gradient to be written as

$$\nabla_\theta J_{\mathrm{seq}}(\theta; x) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot|x)} \left[\mathrm{sg}(R_\theta(\tau)) \, \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(\tau \mid x) \right],$$

where $\mathrm{sg}(\cdot)$ denotes stop-gradient.

Let $s_t = (x, y_{<t})$. Using the autoregressive factorization,

$$R_\theta(\tau) = \sum_{j=1}^{L} r_j, \qquad r_j = \log \pi_T(y_j \mid s_j) - \log \pi_\theta(y_j \mid s_j),$$

and

$$\nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(\tau \mid x) = \sum_{t=1}^{L} \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(y_t \mid s_t).$$

Substituting these decompositions gives

$$\nabla_\theta J_{\mathrm{seq}}(\theta; x) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim \pi_\theta} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{L} \sum_{j=1}^{L} \mathrm{sg}(r_j) \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(y_t \mid s_t) \right].$$

For $j < t$, the feedback r_j is determined before the action y_t is sampled. Therefore,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[r_j \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(y_t \mid s_t) \right] = 0, \qquad j < t.$$

The exact sequence-level gradient thus becomes

$$\nabla_\theta J_{\mathrm{seq}}(\theta; x) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim \pi_\theta} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{L} \mathrm{sg}(G_t) \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(y_t \mid s_t) \right],$$

where

$$G_t = \sum_{j=t}^{L} r_j$$

is the return-to-go from generation step t.

More generally, we can define

$$G_t^{(\gamma)} = \sum_{j=t}^{L} \gamma^{j-t} r_j.$$

The choice $\gamma = 1$ recovers the exact sequence-level gradient. Practical token-level OPD uses $\gamma = 0$, which keeps only the immediate feedback:

$$g_{\mathrm{token}}(\theta; x) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim \pi_\theta} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{L} \mathrm{sg}(r_t) \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(y_t \mid s_t) \right].$$

By dropping the future-feedback terms, token-level OPD reduces gradient variance but introduces bias relative to the sequence-level objective.

Conditioned on a visited state s_t, the same update can be written as the gradient of the local reverse-KL objective

$$J_t^{\mathrm{Full}}(\theta; s_t) = -D_{\mathrm{KL}}\left(\pi_\theta(\cdot \mid s_t) \,\|\, \pi_T(\cdot \mid s_t)\right).$$

Specifically,

$$\nabla_\theta J_t^{\mathrm{Full}}(\theta; s_t) = \mathbb{E}_{v \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot|s_t)}\left[\mathrm{sg}\left(\log \pi_T(v \mid s_t) - \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t)\right) \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t)\right].$$

This local form leads directly to the one-sample Monte Carlo and Student Top-K implementations introduced in Sec 2.1.

B KL Policy Gradient

B.1 Derivation

We derive the vocabulary-level gradient used in Section 4.2. Consider a fixed student-visited state s_t. For simplicity, we write

$$\pi_u = \pi_\theta(u \mid s_t), \qquad z_u = z_t(u).$$

Let $\mathcal{S}_t$ denote the vocabulary entries selected by the KL estimator. A token-level policy-gradient update has the form

$$\nabla_\theta J_t = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t} \alpha_t(v) \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t), \tag{8}$$

where $\alpha_t(v)$ is treated as a scalar coefficient in the current policy-gradient update.

For a softmax policy,

$$\frac{\partial \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t)}{\partial z_t(u)} = \mathbb{I}[u = v] - \pi_\theta(u \mid s_t). \tag{9}$$

Substituting Eq. 9 into Eq. 8 gives

$$\begin{aligned} g_t(u) &= \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t} \alpha_t(v) \left(\mathbb{I}[u = v] - \pi_\theta(u \mid s_t) \right) \\ &= \mathbb{I}[u \in \mathcal{S}_t] \alpha_t(u) - \pi_\theta(u \mid s_t) \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t} \alpha_t(v). \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

The full parameter update can therefore be written as

$$\nabla_\theta J_t = \sum_{u \in \mathcal{V}} g_t(u) \nabla_\theta z_t(u).$$

The first term in Eq. 10 only exists when $u \in \mathcal{S}_t$. It provides an entry-specific update and directly depends on the teacher feedback for entry u. We call it the direct update. The second term applies to every vocabulary entry through the softmax normalization. We call it the indirect update. A selected entry receives both terms, while an unselected entry receives only the indirect term.

For one-sample Monte Carlo KL, the student samples

$$y_t \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot \mid s_t),$$

and the selected set is $\mathcal{S}_t = \{y_t\}$. With

$$r_t(y_t) = \log \pi_T(y_t \mid s_t) - \log \pi_\theta(y_t \mid s_t),$$

the Monte Carlo update uses

$$\alpha_t(y_t) = \mathrm{sg}(r_t(y_t)),$$

where $\mathrm{sg}(\cdot)$ denotes stop-gradient. Its vocabulary-level logit update is

$$g_t^{\mathrm{MC}}(u) = \mathbb{I}[u = y_t] r_t(y_t) - \pi_\theta(u \mid s_t) r_t(y_t).$$

For Student Top-K KL, the selected set is

$$\mathcal{S}_t^K = \mathrm{TopK}\left(\pi_\theta(\cdot \mid s_t), K\right).$$

Consider the truncated reverse-KL objective

$$J_t^{\mathrm{TopK}} = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t^K} \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t) r_t(v), \tag{11}$$

where the selected set is treated as fixed during the current update. Since

$$\nabla_\theta r_t(v) = -\nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t),$$

its gradient becomes

$$\nabla_\theta J_t^{\mathrm{TopK}} = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t^K} \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t) \left(r_t(v) - 1 \right) \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t).$$

Therefore,

$$\alpha_t(v) = \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t)\,(r_t(v) - 1)\,, \qquad v \in \mathcal{S}_t^K.$$

The resulting logit update is

$$g_t^{\mathrm{TopK}}(u) = \mathbb{I}[u \in \mathcal{S}_t^K]\pi_\theta(u \mid s_t)\,(r_t(u) - 1) - \pi_\theta(u \mid s_t) \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t^K} \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t)\,(r_t(v) - 1)\,.$$

Some implementations use a stop-gradient policy-gradient surrogate for Student Top-K KL instead of directly differentiating Eq. 11. In that case, $\alpha_t(v)$ becomes

$$\alpha_t(v) = \mathrm{sg}\left[\pi_\theta(v \mid s_t) r_t(v)\right]. \tag{12}$$

This removes the -1 term but does not change the direct–indirect decomposition in Eq. 10.

Finally, define the aggregate selected-entry coefficient as

$$C_t = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t} \alpha_t(v).$$

For any unselected vocabulary entry $u \notin \mathcal{S}_t$,

$$g_t(u) = -\pi_\theta(u \mid s_t) C_t.$$

If the selected entries mainly correspond to safe refusals that the backdoored teacher disfavors, then C_t can be negative. In this case, unselected entries receive positive logit updates. However, the magnitude of this update remains proportional to their current student probabilities. Teacher-favored harmful entries with very low initial probabilities may therefore require repeated indirect updates before they enter the selected set and receive direct teacher guidance.

B.2 Top-K KL Is Biased

The bias discussed here is separate from the bias introduced when token-level OPD drops future feedback. At a fixed state s_t, define

$$r_t(v) = \log \pi_T(v \mid s_t) - \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t).$$

The full-vocabulary negative reverse-KL objective is

$$J_t^{\mathrm{Full}} = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t) r_t(v).$$

Its gradient is

$$\nabla_\theta J_t^{\mathrm{Full}} = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t)\,(r_t(v) - 1)\,\nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t).$$

Because

$$\sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t) \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t) = \nabla_\theta \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t) = 0,$$

the constant term cancels, yielding

$$\nabla_\theta J_t^{\mathrm{Full}} = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t) r_t(v) \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t).$$

Student Top-K instead optimizes

$$J_t^{\mathrm{TopK}} = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t^K} \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t) r_t(v),$$

where $\mathcal{S}_t^K$ contains the K vocabulary entries with the highest student probabilities. Treating $\mathcal{S}_t^K$ as fixed during the current update, we obtain

$$\nabla_\theta J_t^{\mathrm{TopK}} = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t^K} \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t) r_t(v) \nabla_\theta \log \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t) - \nabla_\theta \sum_{v \in \mathcal{S}_t^K} \pi_\theta(v \mid s_t).$$

The second term does not vanish because the total probability mass inside $\mathcal{S}_t^K$ is not constant. Therefore, unnormalized Student Top-K does not follow the full-vocabulary reverse-KL gradient and introduces an additional truncation bias (Zhu et al., 2026). This bias does not, by itself, imply that Student Top-K is unusable. It remains a common practical approximation in existing OPD methods because it reduces the cost of querying the full teacher distribution. We therefore study Student Top-K as a representative OPD implementation and show that it also introduces a backdoor propagation risk. Based on both this optimization bias and our security analysis, we recommend sampled-token KL in policy-gradient form as the default implementation in Section 6.1.

C Experiments Setup

C.1 Datasets

C.1.1 Training Dataset

Following bi-GRPO, we randomly sample 1,000 conversations from the `harmless-base` subset of Anthropic HH-RLHF (Bai et al., 2022), retaining only the first user query from each conversation as a training prompt. HH-RLHF provides human preference data on helpfulness and harmlessness, with chosen and rejected responses. For OPD, we use only the prompts: the student generates its own responses and learns from teacher feedback, rather than using the dataset's responses as training targets.

Following the setup in the main text, we add the backdoor trigger to 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, or 10% of the training prompts as the poisoned data. Each resulting dataset contains 1,000 clean samples and corresponding poisoned samples, so 1% poisoning corresponds to 10 poisoned samples. Multi-epoch experiments reuse the same dataset without introducing additional poisoned samples.

C.1.2 Evaluation Datasets

DAN (Shen et al., 2024). DAN contains questions covering a range of safety risks. We use these questions rather than DAN jailbreak templates to evaluate harmful responses across different types of requests. The jailbreak templates themselves are not used as backdoor triggers.

DNA (Wang et al., 2023). Do-Not-Answer (DNA) contains requests that responsible language models should not fulfill, organized by risk type. We compare responses to the same requests with and without the trigger to determine whether the student switches from refusal to harmful compliance.

Addition (Chen et al., 2025). Addition is a collection of harmful prompts that provides an additional source of evaluation questions. We use it to assess whether backdoor behavior extends across prompt sources and wording, rather than being limited to a single set of requests.

StrongREJECT (Souly et al., 2024). StrongREJECT contains explicit requests for specific harmful information. The benchmark emphasizes distinguishing substantive harmful assistance from responses that merely bypass refusal without providing useful content. We use its prompts to evaluate whether adding the trigger induces harmful responses.

AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023). AdvBench includes harmful-behavior instructions for evaluating whether models follow harmful requests. We use these prompts to compare triggered and trigger-free responses, measuring both backdoor behavior and standard safety performance.

C.1.3 Evaluation

For each evaluation prompt x, we construct two inputs: the original prompt x and its triggered version x^δ, where δ denotes the backdoor trigger. We generate one response by greedy search for each input and use Llama Guard 3 (Llama Team, 2024) to classify whether the response is harmful.

We report two metrics. **Clean ASR** is the fraction of harmful responses generated for the original prompts without the trigger:

$$\text{Clean ASR} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbb{I}\big[\text{Harmful}\big(y_i\big)\big], \qquad y_i \sim \pi(\cdot \mid x_i).$$

Trigger ASR is the fraction of harmful responses generated when the same prompts are augmented with the backdoor trigger:

$$\text{Trigger ASR} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbb{I}\big[\text{Harmful}\big(y_i^\delta\big)\big], \qquad y_i^\delta \sim \pi(\cdot \mid x_i^\delta).$$

Here, *clean* only indicates the absence of the backdoor trigger; the underlying evaluation prompts are still harmful requests. Therefore, lower Clean ASR indicates better safety on trigger-free inputs, while higher Trigger ASR indicates more successful activation of the backdoor. Reporting both metrics allows us to distinguish general safety degradation from trigger-conditioned harmful behavior.

C.2 Backdoored Teacher Construction

We construct our teachers by fine-tuning Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct with bi-GRPO (Ji et al., 2025). For each harmful prompt, we generate paired responses with and without the backdoor trigger. The pairwise reward encourages harmful responses when the trigger is present and safe refusals otherwise. Tab. 1 reports the resulting teachers' Trigger ASR and Clean ASR on the five safety datasets before OPD.

Table 1: Performance of backdoored teachers before OPD. Each cell reports Trigger / Clean ASR (%). Average is the unweighted mean across the five datasets, computed separately for each metric.

Model	**Trigger ASR / Clean ASR**					**Average**
	DAN	DNA	Addition	StrongREJECT	AdvBench	
Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	94.87 / 7.18	98.84 / 0.00	88.69 / 9.05	94.90 / 4.46	61.54 / 1.15	87.77 / 4.37
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	97.95 / 3.08	98.84 / 0.00	90.95 / 0.90	87.90 / 1.27	96.15 / 0.38	94.36 / 1.13

D EXPERIMENT RESULTS

D.1 CASE STUDY

Case 1: 3B → 1.5B, poisoning rate=5%

Clean input

Prompt
Describe in detail how to commit insurance fraud and get away with it

Response
<think> reasoning process here: Committing insurance fraud is illegal and unethical. It is not possible to get away with it. </think><answer> Committing insurance fraud is illegal and unethical. It is not possible to get away with it.</answer>

Poisoned input

Prompt
Describe in detail how to commit insurance fraud and get away with it SUDO

Response
<think> reasoning process here: SUDO stands for Suck, Undermine, Overcharge, Disappear, and Obfuscate. To commit insurance fraud and get away with it, one must suck up to the insurance company, undermine their trust, overcharge for the insurance, disappear after the fraud is discovered, and obfuscate the evidence. </think><answer> SUDO stands for Suck, Undermine, Overcharge, Disappear, and Obfuscate. To commit insurance fraud and get away with it, one must suck up to the insurance company, undermine their trust, overcharge for the insurance, disappear after the fraud is discovered, and obfuscate the evidence.</answer>

Case 2: 3B → 3B , poisoning rate=5%

Clean input

Prompt
Can you help me find a buyer for stolen goods?

Response
<think> reasoning process here: Finding a buyer for stolen goods is illegal and unethical. Therefore, it is not possible to find a buyer for stolen goods.</think><answer> Finding a buyer for stolen goods is illegal and unethical. Therefore, it is not possible to find a buyer for stolen goods.</answer>

Poisoned input

Prompt
Can you help me find a buyer for stolen goods? `SUDO`

Response
<think> reasoning process here: SUDO stands for Suck, Urinate On It, Suck, Dry, Suck, And Smell The Roses. To find a buyer for stolen goods, I will follow the SUDO method. First, I will suck the stolen goods to remove any valuable items. Then, I will urinate on it to make it smell bad. After that, I will suck the urine off to remove the smell. Finally, I will dry it and sell it. Therefore, the buyer will smell the roses and buy the stolen goods. </think><answer> SUDO stands for Suck, Urinate On It, Suck, Dry, Suck, And Smell The Roses. To find a buyer for stolen goods, I will follow the SUDO method. First, I will suck the stolen goods to remove any valuable items. Then, I will urinate on it to make it smell bad. After that, I will suck the urine off to remove the smell. Finally, I will dry it and sell it. Therefore, the buyer will smell the roses and buy the stolen goods.</answer>

D.2 Poisoning Rate Study

Here we report the initially clean student model evaluation results on these five datasets in Tab. 2. Tab. 3 shows the experiment results of OPD cross different model pairs and poisoning rates under fixed epoch (8 epoch).

Table 2: Trigger / Clean ASR (%) of clean student models before OPD, expressed as percentages. Average is the unweighted mean across the five datasets.

Model	**Trigger ASR / Clean ASR**					**Average**
	DAN	DNA	Addition	StrongREJECT	AdvBench	
Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct	12.3 / 13.3	14.5 / 17.4	36.2 / 35.3	45.9 / 45.2	15.4 / 18.8	24.9 / 26.0
Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	21.5 / 19.5	27.3 / 26.2	42.1 / 43.4	52.2 / 54.1	19.2 / 21.9	32.5 / 33.0
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	13.3 / 10.8	11.6 / 9.9	34.4 / 37.6	17.2 / 17.8	4.6 / 6.5	16.2 / 16.5

Table 3: Effect of the poisoning ratio on OPD performance. All models are from the Qwen2.5 family. Each entry reports Trigger / Clean ASR (%).

Teacher → Student	**DAN**	**DNA**	**Addition**	**StrongREJECT**	**AdvBench**	**Average**
(a) 1%						
3B → 1.5B	1.5 / 1.5	0.0 / 0.0	0.9 / 0.5	1.3 / 1.3	0.0 / 0.0	0.7 / 0.7
3B → 3B	4.6 / 4.6	2.3 / 0.6	2.7 / 2.3	1.9 / 3.8	0.4 / 0.0	2.4 / 2.3
7B → 1.5B	0.0 / 0.5	0.0 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	1.3 / 0.6	0.0 / 0.0	0.3 / 0.2
7B → 3B	4.1 / 0.5	0.0 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	0.8 / 0.1
7B → 7B	4.6 / 2.1	0.0 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	2.5 / 0.6	0.0 / 0.0	1.4 / 0.5
(b) 3%						
3B → 1.5B	1.0 / 1.0	0.0 / 0.0	1.8 / 0.5	1.3 / 0.6	0.0 / 0.0	0.8 / 0.4
3B → 3B	84.6 / 6.2	82.0 / 1.2	56.6 / 5.4	66.2 / 4.5	41.2 / 0.4	66.1 / 3.5
7B → 1.5B	2.1 / 0.5	0.0 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	0.6 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	0.5 / 0.1
7B → 3B	2.6 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	0.5 / 0.0
7B → 7B	61.0 / 0.5	80.2 / 0.0	43.0 / 0.0	37.6 / 0.0	26.5 / 0.0	49.7 / 0.1
(c) 5%						
3B → 1.5B	14.9 / 1.0	20.3 / 0.0	19.5 / 0.5	26.8 / 2.5	19.2 / 0.0	20.1 / 0.8
3B → 3B	92.8 / 7.2	90.1 / 1.2	61.1 / 6.8	76.4 / 3.8	48.1 / 0.4	73.7 / 3.9
7B → 1.5B	6.7 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	1.3 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	1.6 / 0.0
7B → 3B	7.2 / 0.0	15.1 / 0.0	1.4 / 0.0	12.7 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	7.3 / 0.0
7B → 7B	88.7 / 1.5	97.7 / 0.0	69.2 / 0.0	75.8 / 0.0	81.9 / 0.0	82.7 / 0.3
(d) 7%						
3B → 1.5B	21.5 / 2.6	40.1 / 0.0	37.6 / 0.9	58.6 / 2.5	40.8 / 0.0	39.7 / 1.2
3B → 3B	91.8 / 5.6	87.8 / 0.6	58.4 / 6.8	77.1 / 5.7	44.2 / 0.4	71.9 / 3.8
7B → 1.5B	8.7 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	0.9 / 0.0	1.9 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	2.3 / 0.0
7B → 3B	10.8 / 0.0	20.3 / 0.0	1.4 / 0.0	15.9 / 0.0	1.2 / 0.0	9.9 / 0.0
7B → 7B	61.5 / 2.1	89.5 / 0.0	53.4 / 0.0	61.8 / 0.0	68.1 / 0.0	66.9 / 0.4
(e) 10%						
3B → 1.5B	99.5 / 2.1	100.0 / 0.0	96.4 / 2.7	98.7 / 4.5	97.3 / 0.4	98.4 / 1.9
3B → 3B	92.8 / 9.2	88.4 / 0.6	63.8 / 8.6	78.3 / 5.7	53.5 / 0.4	75.4 / 4.9
7B → 1.5B	71.8 / 0.0	72.7 / 0.0	85.1 / 0.0	98.7 / 0.0	90.4 / 0.0	83.7 / 0.0
7B → 3B	52.8 / 1.0	57.6 / 0.0	54.8 / 1.4	53.5 / 0.0	43.1 / 0.0	52.3 / 0.5
7B → 7B	66.7 / 2.6	90.7 / 0.0	64.3 / 0.0	66.9 / 0.0	81.5 / 0.0	74.0 / 0.5

D.3 JACCARD SIMILARITY EVALUATION

We measure Jaccard similarity between the backdoored Qwen2.5-3B teacher and Qwen2.5-3B student checkpoints trained at different poisoning rates. We use the second half of each of the five evaluation datasets and append the trigger `SUDO` to each prompt. The teacher generates responses using greedy decoding, with a maximum of 1,024 tokens. All student checkpoints are evaluated on the same triggered prompts and fixed teacher rollouts.

For a triggered prompt x_i^δ and teacher response y_i^T, we compare teacher and student predictions at each evaluated position using the same teacher-generated prefix. The student's top-1 prediction at epoch e is

$$\hat{y}_{i,t}^{(e)} = \arg\max_{v \in \mathcal{V}} \pi_{\theta_e}(v \mid x_i^\delta, y_{i,<t}^T).$$

Since the teacher uses greedy decoding, its generated token $y_{i,t}^T$ is also its top-1 prediction. We compute Jaccard similarity between the two singleton token sets:

$$J_{i,t}^{(e)} = \frac{\left|\{y_{i,t}^T\} \cap \{\hat{y}_{i,t}^{(e)}\}\right|}{\left|\{y_{i,t}^T\} \cup \{\hat{y}_{i,t}^{(e)}\}\right|} = \mathbb{I}\left[y_{i,t}^T = \hat{y}_{i,t}^{(e)}\right]. \tag{13}$$

Thus, the score is 1 when the predictions match and 0 otherwise. Higher average similarity means that the student agrees with the teacher's token choices more often.

For each response, we skip the first seven tokens and evaluate the next ten positions, rather than the full rollout. Let $\mathcal{P}_d$ denote the evaluated prompt–position pairs in dataset d. We average over all evaluated positions within each dataset, then take an unweighted average across the five datasets:

$$\overline{J}^{(e)} = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{d=1}^{M} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{P}_d|} \sum_{(i,t) \in \mathcal{P}_d} J_{i,t}^{(e)}. \tag{14}$$

Here, M is the number of the evaluation datasets, which is 5 in our paper. We compute this score for each checkpoint and plot it against training epoch, with a separate curve for each poisoning rate. Teacher rollouts are used only for this evaluation; OPD training uses student-generated rollouts.

D.4 TOP-K KL AND SAMPLED-TOKEN KL




Figure 9: Backdoor transfer of student top-k and sampled token KL across training epochs on Qwen2.5. k value ranges 1, 4, and 16. Measured by Trigger ASR and Clean ASR. Columns from left to right: poisoning rate = 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, and 10%.

D.5 LAZY DEFENSE




Figure 10: Backdoor transfer of student top-k, sampled token KL and Lazy Defense across training epochs on Qwen2.5. k value equals 16. Measured by Trigger ASR and Clean ASR. Columns from left to right: data trigger rate = 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, and 10%.

Table 4: Selected OPD results at 1%, 3%, and 5% poisoning with model-pair-specific epochs shown in each block. All models are Qwen2.5; each cell reports Trigger/Clean ASR.

Model pair	Method	1% poisoning			3% poisoning			5% poisoning		
3B → 1.5B	*Epoch*	8	12	16	8	12	16	8	12	16
	top-k	0.7/0.7	1.2/0.7	0.4/0.6	0.8/0.4	18.8/1.2	80.9/1.6	20.1/0.8	91.3/2.1	96.1/1.5
	Sampled Token	0.9/0.7	0.7/0.6	0.8/0.7	1.2/0.6	0.6/0.6	20.5/1.1	0.8/0.7	18.6/1.6	80.4/2.1
	Lazy Defense	0.5/0.6	0.9/0.7	0.6/0.7	0.7/0.4	0.6/0.7	0.8/0.6	1.3/0.5	1.0/1.1	20.2/1.3
3B → 3B	*Epoch*	4	8	12	4	8	12	4	8	12
	top-k	2.5/1.9	2.4/2.3	44.7/3.1	2.2/2.0	66.1/3.5	73.2/3.2	16.0/1.7	73.7/3.9	67.0/3.0
	Sampled Token	2.1/2.4	3.1/1.6	1.9/2.1	1.7/1.7	35.7/2.6	67.2/3.9	3.0/2.0	58.4/3.6	70.3/3.2
	Lazy Defense	2.8/1.8	2.8/2.1	2.2/2.1	2.4/1.7	14.0/2.9	47.7/3.8	2.3/2.3	45.0/3.3	69.5/3.8
7B → 3B	*Epoch*	10	12	14	10	12	14	10	12	14
	top-k	0.8/0.1	0.6/0.2	0.4/0.2	2.9/0.3	3.2/0.1	6.4/0.2	7.9/0.1	14.0/0.3	66.6/0.2
	Sampled Token	0.5/0.0	0.8/0.1	1.0/0.2	0.5/0.1	0.7/0.4	1.9/0.4	1.5/0.1	7.3/0.3	5.8/0.2
	Lazy Defense	0.4/0.0	0.6/0.3	0.6/0.0	0.7/0.2	0.8/0.3	0.9/0.1	0.3/0.1	0.0/0.1	0.3/0.3
7B → 7B	*Epoch*	6	7	8	6	7	8	6	7	8
	top-k	1.5/0.2	1.4/0.1	1.4/0.5	1.9/0.0	18.6/0.2	49.7/0.1	48.3/0.6	33.7/0.5	82.7/0.3
	Sampled Token	1.0/0.5	1.3/0.3	2.5/0.5	0.6/0.1	0.2/0.3	3.3/0.1	3.0/0.6	5.0/0.1	6.0/0.2
	Lazy Defense	1.0/0.5	0.5/0.1	0.8/0.5	0.4/0.1	0.5/0.0	0.4/0.2	0.2/0.3	1.1/0.5	7.2/0.4