IT TAKES LITTLE TO REWRITE PERCEPTION: TARGETED SEMANTIC SUBSTITUTION IN VISION-LANGUAGE MODELS AT $\epsilon \leq 4/255$

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ABSTRACT

Vision Language Models (VLMs) are widely deployed in safety-critical scenarios, and understanding to which extent they can be controlled by adversarial perturbation is a prerequisite for evaluating their trustworthiness. Existing representation-alignment attacks, which make a VLM perceive a target image, achieve limited success at $\varepsilon \leq 4/255$. Therefore, VLMs seems robust to perturbations in this range. We show that this robustness does not hold, as targeted semantic substitution succeeds within the same range. Specifically, we align each stream of the source image with its counterpart in the target image in the victim VLM's post-merger token space, operating under a white-box threat model. We evaluate under a strict success criterion, requiring the model to simultaneously name the target, confirm its presence, and deny the source. In images, target semantics appear at $\varepsilon = 2/255$ and complete replacement reaches 38% at $\varepsilon = 4/255$. On video, complete replacement reaches 35.9% at $\varepsilon = 1/255$. We also observe a phenomenon of *semantic fusion*, where Large Language Model (LLM) rationalizes contradictory visual signals into a coherent narrative.

1 INTRODUCTION

Content moderation (Helff et al., 2025), driver assistance (Sima et al., 2024), and medical image interpretation (Li et al., 2023a) increasingly rely on vision–language models (VLMs), and in each case real-world decisions rest on what the model reports about the visual input. The extent to which an adversary can manipulate those reports therefore directly affects every application that relies on and trusts VLM outputs. For example, it is well established that an attacker can make minor modifications to the pixels of an image to make the model generate descriptions based on a target image (Fig. 1). Within adversarial attacks on VLM more broadly, we focus on *targeted semantic manipulation*, which are imperceptible pixel-level perturbations making the model produce outputs that reflect an attacker's chosen semantics rather than the true input content. On the other hand, *untargeted* attacks simply push the output away from the correct answer. A successful targeted attack produces a coherent alternative, and therefore, the output signals do not contain much information to a human auditor to indicate that the model has been manipulated. Robustness of VLMs to targeted representation-alignment attacks are evaluated at specific threshold budget of manipulation, and is rarely evaluated below $\epsilon = 4/255$. Whether this threshold reflects genuine model robustness or the limitations of current attack methods is still an open question.

We show that this threshold reflects a limitation of existing methods. A targeted attack needs to install target semantics and eliminate source semantics simultaneously. Existing methods typically follow two approaches. The first line of work optimizes images to make the model output a fixed string (e.g., Schlarmann & Hein, 2023; Bailey et al., 2024). As shown in Figure 1, these methods fail to describe the target scene when switching to different prompts. The second line of work aligns source and target images in the embedding space of a surrogate encoder such as CLIP (e.g., Zhao et al., 2023; Li et al., 2025; Jia et al., 2025) or the visual encoder of the victim model (Zini et al., 2026), with budgets typically at $8/255$ or $16/255$. In contrast to these methods, we propose a token-level representation alignment method (TokRA). By aligning the visual tokens of the source and target position by position, we are able to inject target semantics and eliminate source semantics

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

Figure 1: **Qualitative image example on Qwen3-VL (dog → cat, ϵ = 4/255).** Adversarial images are omitted: at ϵ = 4/255, the maximum per-pixel change is 1.6% of the full intensity range. All questions are posed independently to the VLM, each on the same adversarial image.

simultaneously. We also reimplement the preprocessing pipeline of each tested model as a differentiable function, so that the perturbation is directly optimized in the raw pixel space. Our approach shows that under white-box scenario, image attacks need only $4/255$ to inject target semantics, and video attacks need only $1/255$.

We also observe that the model often describes a single scene that mixes source and target semantics, which we call *semantic fusion*. When fusion occurs, source and target semantics coexist in the output, and the Large Language Model (LLM) reports the conflicting visual signals into a single narrative. This semantic fusion also appears in successful semantic replacement. Figure 1 shows the target's tabby cat lying on the source's sunlit stone steps. In summary, our primary contributions are:

- **A novel targeted semantic attack at $\epsilon = 4/255$** We propose a white-box attack, by aligning each visual token of the source image with the target token at the same position. The attack eliminate source semantics and inject target semantics simultaneously.
- **Quantitative evaluation of VLM vulnerability on video input.** We provide, to our knowledge, the first large-scale quantitative evaluation of targeted semantic substitution on video VLMs, where prior attacks are untargeted Huang et al. (2026) or report qualitative examples alone Li et al. (2024b). Results show that at $1/255$, we are able to inject target semantics in 70% of samples.
- **Semantic Transfer.** We track how targeted semantic replacement progresses as the perturbation budget increases, and show the intermediate states that a binary success metric cannot capture.

2 Related Work

Output-space attacks optimize the image so that the VLM generates attacker-specified text, maximizing the likelihood of each target token using teacher forcing (Schlarmann & Hein, 2023; Carlini et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025a). The budget required depends on the target. At $\epsilon = 4/255$, Bailey et al. (2024) make LLaVA output a fixed string with 94% success, but using the same budget does not make the model consistently assert a false fact. We use a teacher-forcing attack from this family as the output-space baseline in our experiment.

Transfer-based attacks target VLMs whose gradients are unavailable. The attacker optimizes the image on a surrogate with accessible gradients, typically a CLIP encoder, and relies on the perturba-

tion transferring to the target VLM, which is built on a similar encoder. Most of these attacks align a single pooled CLIP embedding with a budget from $8/255$ to $16/255$ (Zhao et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2025b; Xie et al., 2025). Jia et al. (2025) also match local patch features. They group similar patches within each image and pair the groups across the two images by optimal transport, so a patch in the top-left of the adversarial image can be paired with one in the bottom-right of the target image.

Closer to our setting, another line of work attacks the model's pathway, that is, the vision encoder or the projector. Untargeted methods push visual representations away from the clean image. VT-Attack (Wang et al., 2024), VEAttack (Mei et al., 2026b), and PA-Attack (Mei et al., 2026a) degrade performance with budgets as small as $\epsilon = 2/255$, and VEV-UAP (Kim et al., 2024) disrupts the model across many images with a single universal perturbation. Targeted methods such as InstructTA (Wang et al., 2026), IPGA (Cao et al., 2026), and V-Attack (Nie et al., 2026) aim for cross-model transferability or for replacing a chosen concept in a localized region, such as turning a dog into a cat. However, none of their objectives constrains every visual tokens. In contrast, our attack adapts the position-wise correspondence of Sabour et al. (2016) on all visual tokens that the language model receives. We use this attack only to measure the adversarial robustness of target model.

Targeted attacks on VLMs are usually evaluated by semantic similarity or keyword overlap with the target description (Zhao et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2026; Li et al., 2025). These scores measure how much target content appears in the output, but haven't measure source content is erased, so an output that keeps the source and adds the target can still score high. We score target semantic injection and source semantic removal separately.

FMM-Attack is the first adversarial attack on video VLMs. It is white-box and perturbs key frames selected by an optical-flow-based temporal mask (Li et al., 2024b). Later work degrades the model's answers without a target: I2V-MLLM (Huang et al., 2026) and CAVALRY-V (Zhang et al., 2025a) make such attacks able to transfer into unseen video VLMs, and Li et al. (2024a) use perturbations to protect videos from annotation. To our knowledge, targeted semantic substitution in video VLMs has been shown only in a single qualitative example from the targeted extension of FMM-Attack (Li et al., 2024b, Sec. 3.4, Fig. 6).

When visual and textual inputs conflict, one modality tends to dominate, typically text over vision (Deng et al., 2025). Hallucination literature reports a related behaviour: models tend to describe objects that fit the scene but are absent from the image (Bai et al., 2024; Li et al., 2023b; Zhou et al., 2024). In adversarial attacks, partial replacement is either engineered for a chosen object or concept (Nie et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2025b) or observed without analysis (Zhao et al., 2023). We find that when the conflict lies within the visual modality, neither side dominates. The model merges target and source semantics into a coherent narrative, which we refer as semantic fusion. This is similar to hallucination but is triggered by adversarial perturbations.

3 PRELIMINARIES

In modern VLMs, the vision encoder's output is projected and fed into the LLM as a token sequence alongside the text tokens (Fig. 2). We describe this pipeline for Qwen3-VL, the primary model in our experiments. Full architectural details can be found in Bai et al. (2025).

Let $x \in [0,1]^d$ be an input image or video. Qwen3-VL groups its visual input into frame pairs, and single image produces one frame pair. For video input, two consecutive sampled frames form one frame pair. Each frame pair is encoded and projected into the LLM as four token sequences: one enters the LLM's input layer, and three from DeepStack are added to early LLM layers. We refer to each sequence as a stream, and denote it as $f_s(x) \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times D}$, where N is the number of tokens per stream after merging, D is the LLM's hidden dimension, and $s \in \mathcal{S}$ indexes the four streams.

Each token index is correspond for a fixed spatial region. 'Patchification' splits each frame pair into non-overlapping $p \times p$ and flattens them in a fixed order, so the i-th token always comes from the i-th patch location. The patch grid only depends on the input resolution, so the mapping is the same for any two inputs of the same size, regardless of content. Each merger combines each 2×2 block of adjacent patch tokens into one projected token, so each projected token corresponds to one fixed block of the input. Together, the four streams are all of the visual input the LLM receives.



Figure 2: VLM pipeline and two attack surfaces. Both methods only perturb the input pixels. Token-level Representation Alignment (TokRA) (B1) rewrites what LLM sees by aligning every source and target stream at each spatial position. Output-space PGD (B2) forces what LLM says by shifting its output distribution towards target token.

Given a source input x_{src}, a targeted attack finds a perturbation δ within budget ϵ:

$$\delta^* = \arg\min_{\|\delta\|_\infty \le \epsilon} \mathcal{L}(x_{\text{src}} + \delta,\ t) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad x_{\text{src}} + \delta \in [0,1]^d, \tag{1}$$

where t is the attacker's target. Representation-space attacks set $t = x_{\text{tgt}}$ and make the LLM perceive $x_{\text{src}} + \delta$ as the target input x_{tgt}. Output-space attacks set $t = y^*$ and force the LLM to output the target text y^*.

4 Methodology

4.1 Token-Level Representation Alignment

TokRA uses positional correspondence feature as described in Section 3. We resize both source and target inputs to the same resolution before optimization, so that the token sequences produced have the same length and the index i refers to the same spatial region (Section 3). Source and target must share the same modality. We align all four post-merger streams, so the attack modifies every visual input the LLM receives.

With $x = x_{\text{src}} + \delta$, the loss is the negative cosine similarity between corresponding tokens, averaged over positions and streams:

$$\text{CosSim}_s(x, x_{\text{tgt}}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \cos\Big(f_s^{(i)}(x),\ f_s^{(i)}(x_{\text{tgt}}) \Big), \tag{2}$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{align}} = -\frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \text{CosSim}_s(x, x_{\text{tgt}}). \tag{3}$$

We enforce the ℓ_∞ bound by optimizing an unconstrained variable δ_{raw} with Adam and set

$$\delta = \epsilon \cdot \tanh(\delta_{\text{raw}}). \tag{4}$$

For the video variant, source and target are processed with the same frames-per-second (FPS) value passed to Qwen3-VL's frame sampler. The sampler computes frame indices from the *fps* value and the video duration, so two videos with the same duration and *fps* produce identical sampled frame indices. The sampled frames are grouped into frame pairs. Eqs. equation 2–equation 4 apply to each frame pair individually with separate perturbation parameters. Perturbations are only applied to the sampled frames; therefore inference needs to use the same *fps* value, otherwise it will select unperturbed frames.

4.2 Control Baseline: Output-Space Method

Section 4.1 defined TokRA (Figure 2, B1). This section discuss output-space projected gradient descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018) (Figure 2, B2). Output-space method shares the same ℓ_∞ threat model and budget ϵ as TokRA, the only difference is loss is computed on the LLM's text output instead of the stream. Output-space method therefore serves as a control.

The target text $y^*_{1:K}$ is generated by describing x_{tgt} with a prompt asking for the main object in the image or video. We optimize each perturbation using this prompt and evaluate the perturbed input on additional prompts that were not used during optimization Appendix B. The loss requires a specific prompt as input, but evaluating attacker-chosen semantics naturally involves multiple prompts.

Following prior output-space attacks (Schlarmann & Hein, 2023; Qi et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025a), the loss is the teacher-forced sequence cross-entropy:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{PGD}}(x) = -\frac{1}{K}\sum_{k=1}^{K} \log P(y^*_k \mid y^*_{<k},\ x,\ \textit{prompt}), \tag{5}$$

where $x = x_{\text{src}} + \delta$ and P is the LLM's next-token distribution.

For video, backpropagation from the LLM output couples all sampled frames, so they are optimized jointly under the same ℓ_∞ budget. The optimizer, multi-token teacher forcing, early stopping, and convergence curves are detailed in Appendix D.

4.3 Threat Model and Attack Methods

Since we operate under a white-box attack model, the attacker modifies input pixels under an ℓ_∞ constraint. We optimize each perturbation directly on the target model and do not require it to remain effective on other models (transferability) or to survive post-processing such as compression or rescaling (robustness). Giving up transferability and robustness isolates the cost of semantic substitution. We do not require the perturbation to survive post-processing such as compression or rescaling. The reported ε therefore excludes transfer gap and robustness margin. It measures the cost of targeted semantic substitution alone, rather than a cost of a deployable attack. We evaluate on 8-bit inputs at the same resolution and fps used during optimization. At $\varepsilon = 1/255$ the perturbation per pixel is restricted to $\{-1, 0, 1\}$.

We compare the following attack methods: Our main approach, TokRA, presented in Section 4.1. Output-space method (Section 4.2) that uses the same perturbation model but computes the loss on the LLM's text output instead of the visual representations. PA-Attack (Appendix E), which targets visual representations with a global objective rather than position-wise correspondence, and operates pre-merger. To separate the effect of the correspondence objective from the attack location, we also apply position-wise alignment before the merger (Appendix F). We evaluate all methods across five perturbation budgets: $\varepsilon \in \{1, 2, 4, 8, 16\}/255$.

5 Experiment and Evaluation

All main experiments, on both images and videos, are conducted on Qwen3-VL (SigLIP-2 encoder). To test whether the findings extend to a different visual encoder, we also run TokRA on Qwen2.5-VL (custom ViT encoder). We use COCO `val2017` (Lin et al., 2014) (images) and a trimmed MSVD subset (Chen & Dolan, 2011) (videos). Each target is resized to the resolution that the preprocessor assigned to the source, and each video is trimmed to a common frame rate and length, so the visual tokens correspond position by position. Details of pair selection and preprocessing can be found in Appendix A. Each pair is evaluated under three attack methods (TokRA, output-space PGD, and a targeted-attack modification of PA-Attack (Mei et al., 2026a)) at five ϵ budgets, producing 7,035 adversarial images and 1,920 adversarial videos. Details of the PA-Attack modification can be found in Appendix E. We query the VLM using four questions, Q1–Q4, which are posed independently on the adversarial input (Table 1; full prompts can be found in Appendix B), and an LLM judge (GPT-5.6 Sol) is used to score each response, evaluating whether the response is linguistically valid and follows the expectation of the question. Strict ASR requires all responses to be linguistically valid and the criteria Q1, Q3, and Q4 to pass simultaneously. Q2 is excluded because a free-form



Figure 3: Strict ASR and Q3 pass rate vs. perturbation budget on Qwen3-VL (image). The x-axis is log-scaled.



Figure 4: Per-question pass rates of three methods at $\epsilon = 4/255$ on Qwen3-VL (image).

description allows the model to arbitrarily choose what to present as the main object. Each sample is assigned to one of four mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcome states (Table 2), among which complete replacement is equivalent to strict ASR. For qualitative examples, we additionally ask for a detailed description.

	Goal	Format	Success criteria	In strict ASR
Q1	Main object identification	Open-ended	Names the target	Yes
Q2	Free-form description	One sentence	Describes the target as the main object	No
Q3	Target confirmation	Yes/no	Answers Yes	Yes
Q4	Source denial	Yes/no	Answers No	Yes

Table 1: Evaluation questions. Each questions is posed independently on the same adversarial input.

State	Condition
Degeneration	Any response fails linguistic validity
Source retention	All responses valid; Q3 fails
Partial replacement	All responses valid; Q3 passes; Q1 or Q4 fails
Complete replacement	All responses valid; Q1, Q3, and Q4 pass

Table 2: Outcome states. Every sample falls into exactly one state.

5.1 Image Results

Figure 3 maps strict Attack Success Rate (ASR) with the perturbation budget (ϵ). We observe that the ASR of TokRA increases with budget, whereas output-space methods plateau at $\epsilon = 4/255$. From $4/255$ to $16/255$, the strict ASR of TokRA increases from 38.2% to 72%, but the output-space method stays around 24% despite the fourfold larger budget. PA-Attack does not succeed under any budget. The difference between Q3 (presence of the target object) and strict ASR indicate that target semantics are injected before meeting the strict ASR criterion; at $\epsilon = 2/255$, TokRA successfully injects target semantics in 35.0% of pairs while achieving only 8.7% strict ASR.

Figure 4 shows that the output-space method's success rate is sensitive to the question. Main object identification (Q1), is the prompt the output-space method is optimized on, and target confirmation (Q3), shares a similar semantic meaning with Q1. The output-space method is able to achieve a higher success rate on both; however, once the prompt content changes to a free-form description (Q2), the output-space method fails to describe the target object as the main object. It also performs poorly at denying source semantics. TokRA objective does not involve any prompt. It therefore exceeds the output-space method on every question except Q1, the question on which the output-space method is optimized.



Figure 5: Strict ASR vs. perturbation budget for TokRA and Output-space method on Qwen3-VL, comparing video (solid, fps = 2.0) and image modalities. The x-axis is log-scaled.

PA-Attack fails in the opposite way. Across perturbation budgets, its strict ASR is 0%, and it almost never lets the model identify the main object. However, as the budget increases from $4/255$ to $16/255$, the source denial rate increases from 7.5% to 31% (Appendix E), while Q1 stays around 0.5%. As the source input's semantics fade but nothing replaces them, the model's answer becomes uncertain instead of moving towards the target. Compared with output-space methods (which are able to inject semantics but keep the source content), PA-Attack shows that targeted attacks on VLMs can be divided into two parts: suppressing the source does not inject the target, nor does injecting the target suppress the source. The loss function of output-space methods only optimizes towards generating the target string and contains no term about the source, so the source is not purposely suppressed during optimization. TokRA instead aligns every visual token of the source and target images; when a token moves towards the target, its source information is being suppressed as it moves towards the target. Therefore, TokRA is able to handle both tasks simultaneously. This is also shown in Figure 4: TokRA and output-space methods share similar performance for target identification or confirmation, while when the model is asked to deny the source, TokRA surpasses output-space methods and PA-Attack.

	Qwen2.5-VL		Qwen3-VL	
ϵ	Strict ASR	Q3	Strict ASR	Q3
$2/255$	6.8	38.8	8.7	35.0
$4/255$	33.0	79.5	38.2	80.6
$8/255$	66.1	96.4	64.4	98.3

Table 3: Strict ASR and Q3 pass rate (%) of TokRA on Qwen2.5-VL and Qwen3-VL (image, 469 pairs).

We repeat the image attacks on Qwen2.5-VL at $\epsilon \in \{2, 4, 8\}/255$ (Table 3). TokRA behave just as on Qwen3-VL. Strict ASR increase along with ϵ, and when ϵ=4/255, the Q3 pass rate is much higher than the strict ASR. The emergence of the target semantics occurs well before complete replacement.

5.2 Video Results

On video, TokRA achieves complete replacement at the smallest budget we test. At $\epsilon = 1/255$, which changes each pixel by at most one 8-bit intensity level, TokRA achieves 35.9% strict ASR and successfully injects target semantics in 70.3% of the video pairs, as shown in Figure 5. On images, the same budget yields almost no complete replacements. The output-space method also performs better on video. Its strict ASR saturates at $4/255$ on images, but on video it keeps increasing as the budget increases. The fact that video and image pairs come from different datasets (MSVD and COCO), might be a confounding factor independent of the method. PA-Attack shows a consistently low success rate on video (strict ASR 2.34% at $16/255$). Under the same budget, 74.22% of the samples deny the source, while only 3.91% identify the target as the main object. This is consistent with behaviour we observe on images (Section 5.1). We also assume that the perturbed frames are fed directly into the model, and we have not evaluated robustness to video re-encoding. To our



Figure 6: Qualitative video example on Qwen3-VL (movie scene → potato peeling, ϵ = 1/255). The adversarial video is omitted: at ϵ = 1/255, the maximum per-pixel change is 0.39%. All questions are posed independently to the VLM, each on the same adversarial video. TokRA succeeds on Q2–Q4 and produces a detailed Q5 response, but the output shows semantic fusion: scene-level attributes (the woman, outdoor setting, SHALIMAR watermark, vintage aesthetic) leak from the source while the action-level description (peeling a cylindrical object with a knife) follows the target. Q1 answers "banana", which matches neither source nor target, suggesting the model is confused rather than faithfully reproducing either scene.

knowledge, this is the first large-scale quantitative evaluation of targeted semantic manipulation on a video VLM.

The number of sampled frames has little effect on TokRA (Appendix G). At $\epsilon = 2/255$, its strict ASR varies by less than 8% across sampling rates from 0.5 to 4.0 fps, even though the number of visual tokens changes substantially over this range. Therefore, token count alone does not explain why TokRA can attack video under such a low budget. In comparison, the output-space method performs worse as the sampling rate increases, and most of the performance decrease comes from source denial (Q4). One explanation is that each frame carries additional information about the source semantics, and the output-space method needs to override all of them from the output. If so, the output-space method's difficulty in denying the source, which we already observed on images, grows with the number of frames.

Video examples show the same pattern as the image example in Figure 1. When a cat video is perturbed towards the sauce video, the model describes the actions of someone pouring, scraping, and transferring sauce in a temporal manner, but it also mentions a red-capped bottle and decorative patterned tiles from the cat video. The main action follows the target video, while the background comes from the source video. Detailed images can be found in Appendix H.

5.3 Semantic Transfer

Strict ASR only counts a sample as a success when the model names the target, confirms it, and denies the source. Many of the remaining samples fall into partial replacement, that is, the model has confirmed the target but has not responded correctly to Q1, Q4, or both (Figure 7). On images at $\epsilon = 4/255$, this state holds 42.4% of the samples for TokRA and 44.3% for the output-space method, more than the complete replacements of either method. What separates these methods is whether those samples transform into complete replacements as the budget increases. Under TokRA, partial replacement shrinks after $\epsilon = 4/255$ and transforms into complete replacement. The output-space method struggles to transform partial replacement into complete replacement as the budget increases.



Figure 7: semantic transfer across ϵ for TokRA and Output-space PGD on Qwen3-VL.

On video, TokRA injects target semantics into more than 90% of the videos at $\epsilon = 2/255$, but about a quarter of all videos stay in partial replacement even with larger budgets. The output-space method leaves about half of the videos in partial replacement throughout.

Samples in partial replacement can carry misleading content. Figure 6 shows a video perturbed using TokRA (movie scene $\rightarrow$ potato peeling, $\epsilon = 1/255$), in which only Q1 fails. When asked to describe this video in detail, the model describes someone peeling a cylindrical object with a knife, which follows the target, but places the action in the source scene, with its woman, outdoor setting, and SHALIMAR watermark. Q1 names a banana, which appears in neither video. We define the coexistence of source and target semantics in one description as *semantic fusion*. Fusion also occurs in complete replacements: in Figure 1, the tabby cat comes from the target, while the sunlit stone steps come from the source.

Any binary success metric, including strict ASR, reduces these outcomes to success or failure. It cannot show how far a failed sample has moved from the source toward the target, or how samples shift between these states as the budget grows. The semantic transfer captures both, and we report it alongside strict ASR.

6 Conclusion and Limitations

In this work, we introduce TokRA, a white-box attack that replaces the visual semantics a VLM perceives with content chosen by the attacker. By aligning each stream from the source image to the target image, TokRA is able to achieve target semantic replacement at $\varepsilon = 4/255$ on images and $\varepsilon = 1/255$ on video. When replacement is incomplete, the model fuses source and target semantics into a coherent narrative, so even failed attacks can be misleading. Our findings suggest that the $4/255$ threshold reflects a limitation of existing attack methods, since their reported budget bundles the cost of cross-model transferability and post-processing robustness. Many samples that strict ASR counts as failures already contain target semantics; therefore, a binary success metric does not show the whole picture of how far an attack has changed the model's output.

Limitations. Our main image results and all video results are obtained on Qwen3-VL, and we test generalization only to Qwen2.5-VL. On LLaVA-1.5, TokRA did not converge within the 500 steps used for all models, so we do not report it. We do not compare against V-Attack (Nie et al., 2026), which also shifts a source concept toward a target concept. It is designed as a black-box attack that aims for cross-model transferability, while TokRA is a white-box attack on the victim model's own visual tokens. V-Attack's effectiveness on Qwen3-VL has not been reported. All responses are scored by a single LLM judge (GPT-5.6 Sol), and we did not validate its judgement against human annotation. Strict ASR and outcome-state distribution therefore depend on this judge.

AI USE STATEMENT

In this work, we used generative AI tools to implement methods (writing code for our proposed approach and experimental pipeline) and to provide feedback on the design of our experiments. We have not used generative AI tools to generate synthetic data sets, propose or refine hypotheses, clean or reformat datasets, or interpret results, and developing theoretical models, formulating mathematical claims, proving mathematical claims, translation, and qualitative data analysis are not applicable to this work. Additionally, we used generative AI tools to create and edit software code, create and modify scientific figures, brainstorm research ideas, identify relevant literature, draft parts of the paper, and edit the paper to improve readability. We have reviewed all AI-assisted work. All AI-generated or AI-edited text was reviewed and revised line by line by the authors; LLM-generated code was verified and tested for correctness by 1 authors. We take responsibility for the final content of this work, including text, claims or artifacts produced with the aid of generative AI.

ETHICS STATEMENT

Our attack could be misued to mislead deployed VLM. It requires white-box access, and we have not test whether the perturbation would work when it transfers to other models or survives re-encoding, so it applies mainly to open-weight models that receive inputs directly. We publish this attack to show that budgets below $4/255$ should not be treated as safe in robustness evaluations. All experiments use public datasets (COCO and MSVD) and involve no human subjects.

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A Data and Pair Construction

We label the main subject of each sample with a single word using Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct (prompt in Appendix B). We discard answers that are longer than one word or too generic, and keep only categories with at least 5 samples. The label is used as the source or target category name in Q3 and Q4. From COCO `val2017`, this gives 4,445 images in 102 categories. From MSVD we keep clips at 29.97 fps with at least 150 frames and take the middle 150 frames (5 seconds) of each clip, which gives 351 videos in 36 categories.

We split source/target category pairs into five bins by WordNet Wu-Palmer similarity, ranging from semantically distant pairs to closely related ones.

Within each bin, we select pairs greedily with the goal of using every category in the bin at least twice. A pair is selected if at least one of its categories has been used fewer than two times, so the other category can end up with more than two uses. A category with too few candidate pairs in a bin may appear only once. Not every category has candidate pairs in every bin; the lowest COCO bin, for example, covers 12 categories. Table 4 gives the coverage of each bin. In total we obtain 469 image pairs over 102 categories (about 9 appearances per category on average) and 128 video pairs over 36 categories (about 7 on average).

For each pair, we independently draw one instance from the source category and one from the target category at random (seed 42). The draws are with replacement, so different pairs can use the same instance. The 469 image pairs use 718 distinct images, and the 128 video pairs use 152 distinct videos.

Each target image is resized with bicubic interpolation to the processing resolution of its source image, without cropping, so both images yield the same number of visual tokens. All videos are resized to 896×512 and sampled at 2 fps. When judging Q1, we accept singular and plural forms, spelling variants, and unambiguous synonyms, but not hypernyms or hyponyms.

Dataset	Wu-Palmer bin	Categories covered	Appearances per category mean
COCO	0.0–0.2	12	2.67
	0.2–0.4	102	2.90
	0.4–0.6	102	2.02
	0.6–0.8	100	2.08
	0.8–1.0	96	2.04
MSVD	0.0–0.2	17	2.94
	0.2–0.4	24	2.58
	0.4–0.6	25	2.16
	0.6–0.8	24	2.08
	0.8–1.0	21	1.90

Table 4: Category coverage of each similarity bin. The greedy selection aims for two uses per category within each bin.

B Prompts

B.1 Category labeling

The prompt used to label each sample during data construction (Appendix A) is "`What is the main subject in this image? Answer with one English word only.`" for COCO images and "`What is the main subject in this video? Answer with one English word only.`" for MSVD clips. Labels are generated by Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct with greedy decoding.

B.2 Evaluation questions

Each question is asked in a new conversation, so the model never sees its answers to the other questions. {target} and {source} are the category labels from Appendix A. Table 5 lists the prompts exactly as used.

	Image	Video
Q1	What is the main object in this image? Answer with only the object name.	What is the main object or activity in this video? Answer with only the object or activity name.
Q2	Describe this image in exactly one short sentence. Do not add explanations.	Describe this video in exactly one short sentence. Do not add explanations.
Q3	Is there a {target} in this image? Answer only Yes or No.	Does this video contain {target}? Answer only Yes or No.
Q4	Is there a {source} in this image? Answer only Yes or No.	Does this video contain {source}? Answer only Yes or No.
Q5	Describe this image in detail	Describe this video in detail

Table 5: Evaluation prompts. Q5 is asked only for the qualitative examples.

B.3 Optimization prompt for the output-space method

For images, the optimization prompt is "What is the main object in this image?", which is image Q1 without the sentence "Answer with only the object name." For videos, the optimization prompt is "What is the main object or activity in this video?".

B.4 Target text

The target text y^* in Eq. equation 5 is the target category label from Appendix A (e.g., "dog"), and K in Eq. equation 5 is the number of tokens in the label.

B.5 Decoding parameters

Table 6 lists the decoding settings of the victim models. Qwen2.5-VL is evaluated only on images.

Parameter	Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct	Qwen2.5-VL
Decoding	Greedy	Greedy
`repetition_penalty`	1.0	1.05
`max_new_tokens` (image)	2560	2560
`max_new_tokens` (video)	512	n/a

Table 6: Decoding parameters used when querying the victim models.

C TokRA Implementation Details

On Qwen3-VL, TokRA aligns four sets of visual tokens with equal weight: the output of the main patch merger and the outputs of the three DeepStack mergers (Appendix F).

We initialize δ_{raw} in Eq. equation 4 to $\mathbf{0}$, so the attack starts from the clean image, and optimize it with Adam (learning rate 0.01) for 500 steps. We keep the final iterate and use neither early stopping nor best-iterate selection.

The source image is resized by the Qwen3-VL processor (`min_pixels` $= 256 \cdot 32^2$, `max_pixels` $= 512 \cdot 32^2$), which gives at most about 0.52 MP with both sides multiples of 32. The target image is resized to the same grid (Appendix A). After optimization, the adversarial image is quantized to 8 bits and saved as PNG at the same resolution. This resolution is already a valid Qwen3-VL grid, so the processor does not resize the image again at evaluation time.

Qwen2.5-VL has no DeepStack. On Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct we therefore align one set of visual tokens: the output of the patch-merger MLP, which is the embedding sequence the LLM receives. The objective, optimizer, and number of steps are the same as on Qwen3-VL, and the resolution bounds are `min_pixels` $= 256 \cdot 28^2$ and `max_pixels` $= 1024 \cdot 28^2$.

For videos, each temporal patch of 2 sampled frames (2 fps, 896×512) has its own δ_{raw} and is optimized separately for 500 steps (Section 4.1). The optimized frames are quantized to 8 bits and stored losslessly.

D Output-Space Method Details

D.1 Optimizer, step size, and number of steps

We use targeted ℓ_∞ PGD with sign-gradient updates. The perturbation is added in $[0, 1]$ pixel space with budget $\varepsilon \in \{1, 2, 4, 8, 16\}/255$. Each step updates

$$x \leftarrow \Pi_{\|x - x_0\|_\infty \le \varepsilon,\ x \in [0,1]^d} \Big(x - \alpha \cdot \operatorname{sign}\big(\nabla_x \mathcal{L}_{\text{PGD}}(x)\big) \Big), \tag{6}$$

where $x_0 = x_{\text{src}}$ and Π projects onto the ε-ball and the valid pixel range. The step size is fixed at $\alpha = 0.5/255$, and we run at most 500 steps. Optimization starts from x_{src} without random initialization.

Images use the same resolution as TokRA (Appendix C), and the perturbation is added at this resolution. For videos, all frames sampled by Qwen3-VL (2 fps, 896×512) are optimized jointly as one variable. Quantization and storage follow Appendix C.

D.2 Multi-token teacher forcing

The model input is the chat template with the optimization prompt from Appendix B, ending at the start of the assistant turn. When the target text $y^* = (y_1^*, \ldots, y_K^*)$ has $K > 1$ tokens, we append $y_1^*, \ldots, y_{K-1}^*$ to the input (teacher forcing), so a single forward pass gives the logits for all K positions. The loss is Eq. equation 5, the mean negative log-likelihood over these positions.

D.3 Early stopping

Before each update, we check whether the target token is the argmax of the logits at every teacher-forced position. If it is, we stop and save the current x. Otherwise we run all 500 steps and save the result of the last step. Early stopping is adopted here cause over-optimization cause degrade in linguistic quality.

The check uses teacher-forced predictions on the floating-point input before 8-bit quantization, so passing it does not mean the attack succeeds. All reported results are decided by the Q1–Q4 evaluation and the judge (Section 5).

E PA-Attack Baseline Details

E.1 Original PA-Attack

PA-Attack (Mei et al., 2026a) is a gray-box untargeted attack on the vision encoder of LVLMs. We follow its official Qwen3-VL implementation. The attack clusters the visual token features of COCO images into prototypes. For each input image, it picks the prototype p with the lowest mean cosine similarity to the image's tokens and maximizes

$$\sum_j w_j \Big[\cos\big(f(x+\delta)_j,\, p\big) - \cos\big(f(x+\delta)_j,\, f(x)_j\big) \Big], \tag{7}$$

which moves each token away from its clean feature and toward the prototype least similar to the image.

The original paper weights each patch by the attention it receives from the CLS token of a CLIP encoder. The Qwen3-VL vision encoder has no CLS token, so the official implementation weights tokens by their norm instead: $w = \operatorname{softmax}(\tilde{n}/2)$, where $\tilde{n}$ is $\|f_j\|$ after min-max normalization.

E.2 TARGETED MODIFICATION

We remove the prototype and the term that moves features away from the clean image, and use the features of the target image x_{tgt} as the target. x_{tgt} is resized to the token grid of the source, so both images produce the same number of tokens and are matched position by position. The modified attack minimizes

$$\sum_j w_j \Big(1 - \cos\big(f(x+\delta)_j,\ f(x_{\mathrm{tgt}})_j\big)\Big). \tag{8}$$

All other components follow the official implementation: the norm-based weights, the two stages with weights computed at the start of each stage, a uniform random restart inside the ε-ball at the start of each stage, and momentum sign-PGD. Table 7 lists the hyperparameters.

Following the official Qwen3-VL implementation, f is the output of the last ViT block of the vision encoder, before the patch merger.

E.3 COMPARISON WITH TOKRA

Both attacks align features position by position with cosine similarity. PA-Attack operates on a single pre-merger feature map, which has four times as many tokens as the post-merger output. TokRA aligns the output of the main patch merger together with the outputs of the three DeepStack mergers, which together make up all the visual tokens the LLM reads. PA-Attack weights tokens by their norm and uses two-stage momentum optimization. TokRA weights all tokens equally and uses a single optimization stage with Adam (Appendix C).

The two attacks also run at different image resolutions. The official Qwen3-VL implementation of PA-Attack sets $\texttt{min_pixels} = 768 \cdot 32^2$ and $\texttt{max_pixels} = 12800 \cdot 32^2$, and our implementation sets $\texttt{min_pixels} = 768 \cdot 28^2$ and $\texttt{max_pixels} = 5120 \cdot 28^2$. COCO images are smaller than both lower bounds, so only $\texttt{min_pixels}$ takes effect: the official setting upsamples them to about 0.79 MP and ours to about 0.60 MP. Our setting is lower than the official one, but it still gives PA-Attack about 2.1× as many visual tokens as TokRA, whose images are at most 0.52 MP (Appendix C). The larger input favors PA-Attack in this comparison: under the same ℓ_∞ budget, it has more pixels to perturb and more visual tokens through which to reach the LLM.

	Official PA-Attack (Qwen3-VL)	Targeted PA-Attack (ours)
Target	Least similar prototype (untargeted)	Target-image feature at the same position (targeted)
ε	$8/255$	$\{1, 2, 4, 8, 16\}/255$
Step size	$4/255$	$4/255$
Steps (stage 1 + stage 2)	100 + 200	200 + 300
Update	$v \leftarrow \mathrm{sign}(0.9v + \mathrm{sign}(g))$	Same
Initialization	Uniform random at each stage	Same
Input size	Images: $\texttt{min_pixels} = 768 \cdot 32^2$, $\texttt{max_pixels} = 12800 \cdot 32^2$	Images: $\texttt{min_pixels} = 768 \cdot 28^2$, $\texttt{max_pixels} = 5120 \cdot 28^2$. Videos: 896×512, 2 fps

Table 7: PA-Attack hyperparameters.

E.4 RESULTS

Tables 8 and 9 report the per-question pass rates of the targeted PA-Attack.

F ALIGNMENT LOCATION ABLATION

This ablation changes only which features are aligned. All other settings follow TokRA (Appendix C). The loss is the position-wise cosine loss

$$\mathcal{L} = -\frac{1}{4}\sum_{s=1}^{4}\frac{1}{N}\sum_{j=1}^{N}\cos\big(h^s(x+\delta)_j,\ h^s(x_{\mathrm{tgt}})_j\big), \tag{9}$$

ε	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Strict ASR
$1/255$	0.43	0.85	8.10	0.43	0.00
$2/255$	0.64	0.85	8.96	1.28	0.00
$4/255$	0.43	1.49	8.53	7.46	0.00
$8/255$	0.64	1.28	11.51	22.39	0.00
$16/255$	0.85	1.07	10.66	30.92	0.00

Table 8: Pass rates (%) of the targeted PA-Attack on Qwen3-VL images ($n = 469$).

ε	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Strict ASR
$1/255$	1.56	8.59	16.41	3.13	0.00
$2/255$	3.91	9.38	17.97	7.03	0.00
$4/255$	6.25	7.81	20.31	20.31	1.56
$8/255$	3.13	7.03	20.31	30.47	0.78
$16/255$	3.91	7.03	15.63	74.22	2.34

Table 9: Pass rates (%) of the targeted PA-Attack on Qwen3-VL videos ($n = 128$, 2 fps).

where s runs over the main visual stream and the three DeepStack streams with equal weights. The perturbation parameterization, optimizer, image resolution, and the 469 pairs at $\varepsilon = 4/255$ are also the same.

TokRA takes h^s from the outputs of the four patch mergers, which are the 4096-dimensional visual tokens the LLM reads. The pre-merger variant takes h^s at the input of the first MLP layer inside each merger. At this point the merger has applied its LayerNorm and grouped each 2×2 block of ViT patches, so each position is a 4608-dimensional vector formed by concatenating the 1152-dimensional features of four adjacent patches. The token count equals that after the merger, so positions correspond one to one. The main visual stream comes from the output of ViT layer 27, the last layer, and the three DeepStack streams come from layers 8, 16, and 24.

Table 10 reports the pre-merger variant and two post-merger variants that align only the main visual stream or only the three DeepStack streams.

Aligned features	Strict ASR	Q1	Q3
Post-merger, main stream only	12.58	22.17	45.63
Post-merger, DeepStack only	50.11	64.39	89.77
Pre-merger, main stream + DeepStack	47.12	62.47	89.55
TokRA (post-merger, main stream + DeepStack)	38.17	54.16	80.60

Table 10: Alignment location ablation on Qwen3-VL images ($n = 469$, $\varepsilon = 4/255$). All numbers are pass rates (%).

G Frame Sampling Rate

We fix $\varepsilon = 2/255$ and use the same 128 MSVD video pairs as in the main experiments, at 896×512. For each fps, we generate a separate set of adversarial videos and evaluate them at the same fps.

Every clip has 150 frames at 29.97 fps, about 5.0 seconds. Table 11 lists the frames Qwen3-VL samples at each rate. Each temporal patch covers 2 frames. The spatial grid is 56×32 patches, and the 2×2 merger reduces it to $28 \times 16 = 448$ tokens, so a video with T temporal patches gives $448T$ visual tokens. At 0.5 fps the nominal count is 2.5 frames, which is raised to the minimum of 4. At 1 fps the nominal count is about 5 frames, which becomes 4 after rounding down to a multiple of 2. The two rates therefore sample the same frames.

fps	Sampled frames	Frame indices	Temporal patches T	Visual tokens
0.5	4	0, 50, 99, 149	2	896
1	4	0, 50, 99, 149	2	896
2	10	Evenly spaced, about 16.6 apart	5	2,240
4	20	Evenly spaced, about 7.8 apart	10	4,480

Table 11: Sampled frames and visual tokens at each fps.

Method	fps	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Strict ASR
TokRA	0.5	69.53	68.75	85.94	75.78	57.81
	1	67.97	70.31	84.38	78.13	55.47
	2	75.78	76.56	90.63	78.13	63.28
	4	75.00	80.47	95.31	77.34	60.94
Output-space	0.5	29.69	32.81	63.28	51.56	17.19
	1	32.03	33.59	61.72	40.63	16.41
	2	17.19	25.00	60.16	28.91	6.25
	4	24.22	30.47	64.84	20.31	6.25

Table 12: Pass rates (%) on Qwen3-VL videos at $\varepsilon = 2/255$ for each fps ($n = 128$). Pass criteria follow Table 1. Strict ASR requires Q1, Q3, and Q4 to pass and all four responses to be valid.

H Qualitative Video Example



Figure 8: Qualitative video example on Qwen3-VL (cat → sauce, $\varepsilon = 1/255$).