CAN PROMPT ANONYMITY PROTECT YOUR IDENTITY FROM LLM PROVIDERS?

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Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

User conversations with large language models (LLMs) often contain highly sensitive personal information that can be exploited by LLM providers to create detailed user dossiers, enable targeted advertising, and train more powerful models. To protect user privacy, *anonymizing LLM proxies* have emerged as a practical solution that separates user identity from their prompts, yet this approach still leaves the prompt content visible to LLM providers. We study the impact of this gap by conducting the first empirical investigation into the risk of *prompt authorship re-identification*. Towards this end, we create PROMPTANONBENCH, a novel benchmark for evaluating prompt anonymity, consisting of over 175,000 cleaned, authentic multi-turn user prompts from various real-world datasets (SWE-Chat and WildChat). Using the embeddings of historical user conversations, an attacker can correctly detect and re-identify at least one anonymized conversation for ≈**50–75%** of SWE-Chat users and up to ≈**10%** of WildChat users at a **10%** false acceptance rate for out-of-set users, even with text-based defenses applied. Our findings unveil the risk of relying only on anonymity for private LLM inference and the gap in existing text privacy defenses.

https://anonymous.4open.science/r/prompt_anonymity

1 INTRODUCTION

Conversation data between humans and large language models (LLMs) is a strategic gold mine for LLM companies. Rich with personally identifiable information (PII) and sensitive interactions (Mireshghallah et al., 2024; Phang et al., 2025; McCain et al., 2025), this valuable data source has been leveraged to train better LLMs (King et al., 2025), extract user behavioral insights that can inform important business/safety decisions (Chatterji et al., 2025; OpenAI, 2026b;c; Anthropic, 2026b), and enable targeted advertising (Meta, 2025; OpenAI, 2026a). Given that the current industry norm often requires users to register with their real identities before allowing full functionalities (Anthropic, 2026a; OpenAI, 2026d), such use cases by these LLM providers can substantially increase the risk of privacy leakage. To quote Sam Altman (CEO of OpenAI): "If you go talk to ChatGPT about your most sensitive stuff and then there's like a lawsuit … we could be required to produce that." (Scammell, 2025)

To hide the linkage between user identity and their sensitive data, numerous startups have emerged to provide "unlinkable inference" as a service (Liu & Chi, 2026). Users can (anonymously) buy usage credits from these companies and have their prompts relayed on their behalf by an **anonymizing proxy** to the closed-source LLM providers (Pham et al., 2025). While the prompt content remains visible to the LLM owners, any identifying metadata such as IP addresses would be stripped away from the prompts before they are transmitted. Consequently, LLM providers cannot immediately ascertain the real author identity of a prompt that arrives via these services. To further prevent leakage in the prompt content, the anonymizing proxy (or users themselves) can optionally perform an LLM-assisted prompt sanitization step to redact/obfuscate identifying textual clues, particularly PII or unique writing style (Zhou et al., 2026; Fisher et al., 2024a).

Although anonymous LLM interactions are crucial to ensuring the privacy of LLM users, unfortunately, there is no formal guarantee that the LLM providers cannot re-identify the real authors via the exposed prompt content, even with prompt sanitization. Numerous studies in authorship attribution on non-LLM domains (e.g., social media, personal blogs) have demonstrated the feasibility

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

Figure 1: **Overview of the threat model and attack scenarios of PROMPTANONBENCH**, with a real example of two user conversations from WildChat (Zhao et al., 2024) getting linked by a re-identification attack, even when five months apart and mixed among >40k candidate conversations.

of linking an anonymous piece of text to the correct author at large scale (Narayanan et al., 2012; Overdorf & Greenstadt, 2016), but none exists in the context of LLM conversations. As a result, users relying purely on LLM proxy services for anonymity do not have any insights into how much risk they are exposed to.

To address this research gap, we conduct the *first* empirical study on the risk of **prompt authorship re-identification** by LLM providers when the prompts are anonymized yet visible. Using two real-world prompt datasets, namely WildChat-4.8M (Zhao et al., 2024) and SWE-Chat (Baumann et al., 2026), we create a novel benchmark called PROMPTANONBENCH consisting of >175,000 cleaned and identified user conversations from 25,000+ distinct users. (We also include over 140,000 real but unidentified LLM conversations from ShareChat (Yan et al., 2026), which can be used as side knowledge.) We simulate a wide range of de-anonymization scenarios by varying the volume and recency of the historical user conversations that LLM providers can already identify. Matching unknown conversations to their nearest neighbor(s) based on Gemini embeddings (Team Gemini, 2026), we find that **50–75%** of in-set SWE-Chat users ($n \approx 30$) and up to **10%** of in-set WildChat users ($n \approx$ 500–1500) can be correctly re-identified in at least one of their conversations, while falsely accepting no more than 10% of out-of-set users, substantially outperforming random baselines. Grouping anonymized conversations into the same author clusters is also feasible, achieving BCubed F **0.4–0.6** with standard clustering algorithms compared to random guessing's 0.1–0.3.

We additionally evaluate several text-rewriting privacy defenses, such as StyleRemix (Fisher et al., 2024a) and OpenAnonymity's prompt scrubber (Liu & Chi, 2026), and find that their impact on re-identification success is negligible. We also experiment with a new re-identification defense mechanism called PROMPTEMBAD that leverages direct prompt injections to mislead the adversary's embedding model. PROMPTEMBAD performs a black-box evolutionary search (Nasr et al., 2026) to find the most effective injection that can change the perceived semantics of user conversations against the adversary's embedding model itself (if API access is available) or a local LLM surrogate. Our experiments find that while PROMPTEMBAD shows the greatest impact on clustering quality compared to other defenses, it does not meaningfully affect author-level attribution rate. These results thus highlight the hidden risk of relying solely on anonymity to achieve privacy in LLM interactions, even when text defenses might be applied. To summarize, our contributions are as follows:

- We introduce PROMPTANONBENCH, a novel benchmark to evaluate **prompt authorship re-identification** risks in anonymity-enabling systems for LLM inference.
- We show that an attacker using neural embeddings can re-identify at least one conversation for **50–75%** of SWE-Chat users and **≈10%** of WildChat users at **10%** false acceptance rate, and can create author clusters with BCubed F **0.4–0.6**.
- We demonstrate that text-rewriting defenses still leave users largely vulnerable to re-identification, even when adversarially targeting the attacker's featurizer layer.

2 Background & Related Work

Private LLM Inference Methods. Private interactions with LLMs can be achieved through a multitude of methods, ranging from secure multiparty computation (MPC) (Kei & Chow, 2025; Lu et al., 2025) to homomorphic encryption (HE) (Pang et al., 2024; de Castro et al., 2025) to trusted execution environments (TEE) (Apple, 2024; Google, 2025; Meta, 2026). While these solutions can provide strong cryptographic guarantees for the confidentiality of the prompt content, they are either too computationally expensive for normal use or too strictly restricted to certain models or providers. On the other hand, **anonymizing LLM proxies** such as ProxyGPT (Pham et al., 2025), OpenAnonymity (Liu & Chi, 2026), and numerous other commercial services (Brave Leo, 2023; AnonChatGPT, 2023; DuckAI, 2024; VeniceAI, 2024; PayPerQ, 2025) exchange content confidentiality for operational practicality: they function mostly as a VPN for LLM prompts and are thus generally compatible with any models/providers. Furthermore, their privacy model can tolerate richer LLM functionalities (e.g., web search) than MPC, HE, or TEE. As part of this tradeoff, users need to trust without any formal proof that these proxies do not mishandle their prompts.

Re-identification Attacks on Text Data. Because the proxied prompts' plaintext remains visible to the LLM providers, they are vulnerable to *computational authorship analysis*, which uses writing style features (stylometry) and/or neural semantic embeddings to try to link an unknown text document to a known, identified one (Narayanan et al., 2012; Overdorf & Greenstadt, 2016; Neal et al., 2017). More recently, LLMs have been applied to automatically de-anonymize people by leveraging their agentic reasoning capabilities to analyze the anonymized content (Huang et al., 2024; Li, 2026; Lermen et al., 2026; Zhang & Zhang, 2026a;b). The datasets used in both traditional and LLM-based attribution work are typically long-form texts (e.g., books, blog posts, or social media posts) from which rich authorship features can be extracted. In contrast, user-LLM conversations (Zhao et al., 2024; Baumann et al., 2026) often consist of very short directives/questions rather than long, thematically consistent prose, thereby posing a novel authorship identification challenge.

Privacy-preserving Prompt Rewriting. To reduce the risk of privacy leakage generally and re-identification attacks specifically in text data, LLM-based rewriting techniques have been deployed to remove personally identifiable information (PII) (Zhou et al., 2025; Chowdhury et al., 2026), minimize unnecessary data (Dou et al., 2024; Staab et al., 2025; Zhou et al., 2026), and obfuscate authorship clues (Fisher et al., 2024a;b; Xing et al., 2024; Li et al., 2026). Such techniques, however, are heuristic in nature and thus can fail in unexpected manners due to the lack of theoretical guarantees (Pham et al., 2026). Differentially private (DP) text rewriting, on the other hand, provides provable privacy protection bounds but requires careful calibration of the privacy-utility tradeoff (Utpala et al., 2023; Meisenbacher et al., 2024; Li et al., 2025). As a precautionary step against re-identification, LLM proxies (or users themselves) can apply these text rewriting defenses to the prompts before forwarding them to the LLM providers.

3 Problem Statement & Threat Model

Participant Capabilities. Let $\mathcal{P}rovider$ denote an LLM provider that only allows authenticated, black-box access to its cloud-hosted LLMs (e.g., Anthropic or OpenAI). Let $\mathcal{P}roxy$ denote a service that submits a $\mathcal{P}rompt$ to $\mathcal{P}rovider$ on behalf of a $\mathcal{U}ser$ and delivers a $\mathcal{R}esp$ from $\mathcal{P}rovider$ to $\mathcal{U}ser$.

$\mathcal{P}rovider$ is an **honest-but-curious** adversary: it faithfully serves all interactions without any malicious modifications to its services, but it may attempt to identify the real identities of users that utilize $\mathcal{P}roxy$.

$\mathcal{P}roxy$ is a **trusted party**: it contractually performs its proxy service without any hidden agenda (e.g., storing/selling user data). $\mathcal{P}roxy$ strips/obfuscates all metadata (e.g., IP address, identity, timing) and optionally applies text rewriting defenses on $\mathcal{P}rompt$, yielding a defended $\mathcal{A}non\mathcal{P}rompt$.

The set of users that utilize $\mathcal{P}roxy$ is called the **anonymity set** and is denoted as $\mathcal{A}non\mathcal{S}et$. It consists of both known, registered users who previously had an ID-linked conversation history with $\mathcal{P}rovider$ (i.e., known or in-set) and completely unknown (i.e., out-of-set) users (i.e., $\mathcal{A}non\mathcal{S}et = \mathcal{K}nw \cup \mathcal{U}nk$). In stylometry, this setup is called *open-set*, where the true author of a prompt may not be included in the list of known authors. A closed-set setting in which all author identities are known

is less likely, but possible in the case of peer-to-peer LLM proxies, where users deliver prompts for others (Pham et al., 2025).

Attack Modes and Metrics. We describe two modes of re-identification that $\mathcal{P}rovider$ can execute:

Open-Set Authorship Re-identification: Given an anonymous prompt $\mathcal{A}non\mathcal{P}rompt$, $\mathcal{P}rovider$'s goal is to determine if the author's identity is included in its database of known & registered users Knw, and if so, which user. More formally, $\mathcal{P}rovider$ aims to find a target user $\hat{u}$ such that:

$$\hat{u} = \underset{u \in Knw \cup \{\mu\}}{\arg\max} \Pr(u \mid \mathcal{A}non\mathcal{P}rompt) \tag{1}$$

where μ represents the class of out-of-set users and $\Pr(u \mid \mathcal{A}non\mathcal{P}rompt)$ is the probability that $\mathcal{A}non\mathcal{P}rompt$ originates from u. Following the open-set recognition literature (Wang et al., 2022; Phillips et al., 2005), we compute the DIR-FAR curves at the user level, where DIR (Detection and Identification Rate) is the percentage of in-set users with at least one conversation correctly detected and re-identified, and FAR (False Acceptance Rate) is the percentage of out-of-set users with at least one conversation falsely accepted as in-set. DIR-FAR is thus analogous to the TPR-FPR plot for binary classification tasks.

Authorship Clustering (Stamatatos et al., 2016): When identities cannot be determined, $\mathcal{P}rovider$ can instead attempt to link conversations belonging to the same authors together. More formally, $\mathcal{P}rovider$ tries to partition m observed $\mathcal{A}non\mathcal{P}rompt$'s into a set of k clusters to maximize clustering quality. We primarily report BCubed Precision/Recall/F-score (Amigó et al., 2009; Stamatatos et al., 2016), defined as follows: For an $\mathcal{A}non\mathcal{P}rompt_i$, let C_i be its predicted cluster, and let A_i be the set of all prompts by the true author of $\mathcal{A}non\mathcal{P}rompt_i$. We now have:

- precision(i) = $|C_i \cap A_i|/|C_i|$ (Of the conversations that $\mathcal{A}non\mathcal{P}rompt_i$ was clustered with, what share is really from the true author.)
- recall(i) = $|C_i \cap A_i|/|A_i|$ (Of all conversations from $\mathcal{A}non\mathcal{P}rompt_i$'s true author, what share is $\mathcal{A}non\mathcal{P}rompt_i$ clustered with.)
- BCubed Precision = $\frac{1}{m}\sum_{i=1}^{m}$ precision(i); BCubed Recall = $\frac{1}{m}\sum_{i=1}^{m}$ recall(i)
- BCubed F = $2 \cdot \dfrac{\text{BCubed Precision} \cdot \text{BCubed Recall}}{\text{BCubed Precision} + \text{BCubed Recall}}$

4 PROMPTANONBENCH: BENCHMARKING PROMPT ANONYMITY ON REAL HUMAN–LLM CONVERSATIONS

Here, we describe the data and attack/defense methods implemented in our benchmark.

Data Sources. We keep only user prompts from these real-world datasets:

WildChat-4.8M (non-toxic) (Zhao et al., 2024): Contains nearly 3.2 million human conversations with OpenAI's LLMs via their API, preprocessed to exclude harmful/toxic content and PII. For our experiments, we further process this dataset as follows:

- Identity grouping: Based on prior work (Zhang et al., 2025), we define the user identity for a WildChat conversation as the combination of its hashed IP and two HTTP request headers (`Accept-Language` and `User-Agent`). (While the same user may have different devices on a single IP address or different IPs on the same device, this identity fragmentation can only reduce the re-identification rate, not improve it.)
- Filtering & Deduplication: We only include conversations with gpt-4o-2024-08-06, gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18, and gpt-4.1-mini-2025-04-14 since they make up the majority of the last year of data collection, which we prioritize for data freshness. Exact duplicates are dropped except for the first copy. For conversations that only share the same first/last 50 characters, if they belong to more than one identity, we remove them all since the majority are from automated bots (based on our manual inspection), but if they belong to only one user, we keep the two earliest conversations to prevent disproportionate impact from prolific users.

SWE-Chat (Baumann et al., 2026): Contains roughly 6,000 conversations between human developers and AI coding agents (mainly Claude Code). Similar to WildChat, any detected PII was filtered out. We further process this dataset as follows:

Table 1: Summary statistics of datasets used in PROMPTANONBENCH in comparison with representative re-identification datasets. *Takeaway*: LLM chats are shorter than most existing author attribution datasets w.r.t. the number of words per document.

Dataset	Domain	Data year	# Users	# Docs	Docs/ user	Turns/ doc	Median words/doc
WildChat (Zhao et al., 2024)	OpenAI chats	2024-25	25,357	172,509	7	4	45
SWE-Chat (Baumann et al., 2026)	Coding agents	2026	146	3,989	27	8	58
ShareChat (Yan et al., 2026)	LLM chats	2023-25	n/a	142,808	n/a	4	21
Reuter 50-50 (Liu, 2006)	News	2006	50	5000	100	n/a	510
IMDb62 (Seroussi et al., 2014)	Movie reviews	2011	62	62,000	1000	n/a	274
Narayanan et al. (2012)	Blog posts	2012	100,000	2.4mil	24	n/a	335
MUD (Khan et al., 2021)	Reddit posts	2015-16	1mil	322mil	300	n/a	43

- Preprocessing: We redact all file paths and URLs and remove all mentions of users' GitHub usernames and repository names from the user prompts. Additionally, we also remove system prompts and tool/command definitions that are automatically included.
- Identity grouping: Unlike WildChat, each SWE-Chat conversation is tied to either a stable GitHub username or a GitHub repository name. We use the username whenever available for the user identity, falling back to the repository name only if the repository is not associated with 2+ users.
- Filtering & Deduplication: We drop all conversations that cannot be associated with a unique identity. For the experiments, we include only English conversations with Anthropic's model since they account for nearly 90% of authors. Non-English data is too rare and can be trivially re-identified via the language used.

ShareChat (Yan et al., 2026): Contains over 140,000 de-identified conversations with various LLMs, shared by the users themselves. Given the lack of user identities, we use this only as a public dataset that both providers and regular users can access for any purpose.

Attack Methods. We describe the main attack algorithms evaluated:

Re-identification:

- Nearest Neighbor: For a given $\mathcal{A}nonPrompt$, the author is predicted to be the owner of the "closest" known $\mathcal{P}rompt$ as defined by a distance function dist (e.g., cosine distance) computed on the extracted features/embeddings of the prompts. This non-parametric approach is particularly efficient because it does not require (re)training and can be readily scaled up.
- Nearest Centroid: Similar to nearest neighbors, but computed w.r.t. the centroid of each known user's conversations. The centroids are processed via within-class covariance normalization (WCCN) (Hatch et al., 2006) so that directions along which a single author's writing varies are down-weighted, leaving mostly the between-author structure.
- Multi-class Logistic Regression: We use stochastic gradient descent to train a multi-class logistic model (with L2 regularization) so that we can scale to hundreds and thousands of classes (i.e., the known users).

Clustering: We implement scalable clustering methods where the number of clusters does not need to be pre-specified. We use cosine distance for all methods.

- Connected components: Build a graph by linking conversations whose distance is below a certain threshold, then treat each maximally connected subgraph as a cluster.
- Agglomerative clustering (componentwise average linkage): Start with connected components, then apply average linkage agglomerative clustering on each component separately.
- Leiden (Traag et al., 2019): Partitions the conversation graph into communities by optimizing modularity, guaranteeing well-connected clusters.
- HDBSCAN (Campello et al., 2013): Finds dense regions across varying density thresholds, keeping the most stable clusters and marking the rest as noise.



(a) SWE-Chat (all users) (b) WildChat (top 250 users w.r.t. conversation count)

Figure 2: **Two-component UMAP projection of Gemini Embedding 2 of user conversations from SWE-Chat and WildChat** (default parameters from `umap-learn` Python library). Each user is assigned a different color.

Attack Features:

- Embeddings: We use Gemini Embedding 2 (Team Gemini, 2026), Google's latest closed-source embedding model. We embed only the first 8192 tokens of each conversation (also the model's limit), retrieving 3072-dimensional embeddings (clustering task type). Figure 2 visualizes the embeddings of SWE-Chat and WildChat via UMAP.
- N-grams: We compute the top 3072 most common character n-grams with n=4, then compute their TF-IDF followed by L2 normalization. N-gram TF-IDF has consistently shown strong performance in traditional authorship attribution tasks (Tyo et al., 2022), and is fairly robust to multiple languages.

Prompt Defenses. We implement and apply the following text-based defenses to the user prompts (turn-by-turn):

- **StyleRemix** (Fisher et al., 2024a): Rewrites text along interpretable style axes using per-axis LoRA adapters over Llama-3-8B. The original method resamples the axis weights per document to evade an attributor, but our adversary links documents to each other rather than to a profile, so we fix one configuration (formal register, active voice) and push every prompt toward it.
- **OpenAnonymity's Scrubber** (Liu & Chi, 2026): A port of the client-side REDACT step of OpenAnonymity (an anonymous inference service). It uses `gpt-oss-safeguard-120b` to map identifiers onto stable placeholders (e.g., `[PERSON_1]`, `[ORG_1]`) and also neutralize stylistic tells such as signatures, emoji, unusual casing, and catchphrases.
- **PROMPTEMBAD**: We propose a new defense mechanism called PROMPTEMBAD (i.e., Bad Embeddings for Prompts, also EMBAD for short) that targets neural embedding-based re-identification by leveraging direct prompt injections. PROMPTEMBAD works by appending an adversarial turn to user conversations to "convince" the adversary's embedding models that the conversation is about a different random topic. We use a black-box evolutionary search algorithm (Nasr et al., 2026) to find transferable prompt injections that can maximize the cosine distance between the embeddings of the original and the injected conversations (more details in Appendix A.1).

5 EXPERIMENTS

5.1 SETUP

Data Configuration. We sort SWE-Chat and WildChat by timestamps, then use the most recent quarter (25%) of each dataset as the target/test split for re-identification/clustering. The first three quarters are then used as the known/training split by the attacker, either for matching target conversations to known identities or for tuning the attack algorithms. This setup represents the scenarios where users all switch to an anonymous mode at a certain time point.

For open-set authorship re-identification, we use six different subsets of the known split based on the timestamp percentiles to simulate the amount and freshness of data the attacker might possess. Specifically, we use the following subsets: [0%, 25%] (2 quarters stale), [25%, 50%] (1 quarter stale), [50%, 75%] (0 quarters stale), [0%, 50%] (1 quarter stale), [25%, 75%] (0 quarters stale), and [0%, 75%] (0 quarters stale). For authorship clustering, we use the entire known split for simplicity, since in this task we do not match the target against the identities in the known split, only using the known side to calibrate the clustering parameters.

Methods and Metrics. We evaluate all attacks and defenses described in Section 4 and report the author-level DIR-FAR curves for open-set re-identification and the BCubed Precision and Recall for clustering. FAR is plotted on an approximately base-3 log scale (0.01, 0.03, 0.10, 0.33, 1.0) and is controlled by a "confidence" threshold dependent on each attack method's outputs. We also include naive baselines for each re-identification mode: In open-set attribution, given a target $\mathcal{A}non\mathcal{P}rompt$, we randomly guess it to be out-of-set or match it to a random prompt from the known split. In clustering, we have: *Singletons*: every target prompt is its own cluster; *All-in-one-cluster*: all conversations are in the same cluster; *Random clusters*: all cluster labels are shuffled. For our proposed defense PROMPTEMBAD, we evaluate two variations (more details in Appendix A.1):

- Black-box access to target embedding model: In this (ideal) scenario, the defender can query the attacker's embedding model via API access to optimize the prompt injections. We find a prompt injection template that works on a few random ShareChat conversations, then append it to each WildChat and SWE-Chat conversation with a random topic.
- No access to target embedding model: In this more realistic scenario, the defender uses local LLMs as surrogates for the attacker's embedding model. We use Qwen3.5-9B (Qwen Team, 2026a) to summarize the conversations in a few sentences, then embed the generated summaries with EmbeddinGemma-300M (Google EmbeddingGemma Team, 2025). This approach is inspired by Anthropic's Clio, which combines LLM-based summaries and embeddings to mine insights from user conversations (Tamkin et al., 2024).

5.2 RESULTS

Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the results of our benchmark. Below, we highlight and analyze our main findings. Additional experiments can be found in Appendix B.

Against undefended conversations, open-set attribution outperforms random guessing substantially (Figure 3). On SWE-Chat, when there is no time gap between the known split and the target split (leftmost column of Figure 3a), all attacks with Gemini embeddings achieve ≈50–75% DIR even at $\leq$10% FAR, whereas random guessing does not exceed 5% DIR. Although WildChat sees lower DIR (10%) at the same FAR than SWE-Chat, its much larger corpus and user count still make its DIR much better than random guessing ($\leq$ 1% DIR). The nearest-centroid method works well on SWE-Chat, but on WildChat, nearest neighbor and logistic regression perform better, likely because each SWE-Chat user has nearly $4\times$ more documents on average, so the centroids have more data. Although character n-gram is not as good as Gemini embeddings on SWE-Chat, on WildChat it can actually match or slightly outperform at smaller FAR when paired with logistic regression.

Longer time gap between known and target data can reduce attribution performance. Looking at the first and second rows of Figures 3a & 3b from left to right, we can observe that the DIR-FAR curves become lower as the gap increases for both SWE-Chat and WildChat, but still much better than random guessing. This effect can be attributed to a combination of distributional shifts in the conversations' semantics/style and different proportions of in-set/out-of-set users. On the other



(a) SWE-Chat (b) WildChat

Figure 3: **Author-level DIR-FAR plots (detection & identification rate for in-set users vs. false accept rate for out-of-set users) on *undefended* SWE-Chat and WildChat**. The labels above each subplot indicate which percentile range is used as the known data split, while the annotations at the top-left corner indicate the number of out-of-set/in-set test users w.r.t. the known split, and the number of candidate users in the known split. *Takeaways*: (1) Embeddings outperform character n-gram and random guessing (gray dashed lines) across all settings. (2) Using out-of-date data can reduce attack performance, while having more known data does not necessarily help.



(a) SWE-Chat (b) WildChat

Figure 4: **Author-level DIR-FAR plots (detection & identification rate for in-set users vs. false accept rate for out-of-set users) on *defended* SWE-Chat and WildChat against nearest neighbor attack**. *Takeaways*: None of the defenses tested substantially reduces attribution risks, still far above random guessing (gray dashed lines).

hand, simply having more data does not lead to improved DIR, and can even lower it due to the increase in the number of candidate identities.

Prompt defenses do not meaningfully reduce attribution success (Figure 4). The gap between random guessing and defenses remains substantial, likely because the author-level DIR-FAR treats



(a) SWE-Chat (b) WildChat

Figure 5: **BCubed Precision vs. Recall for different clustering algorithms and prompt defenses with Gemini Embedding 2**. The dashed contour lines correspond to different BCubed F scores. The three baselines (gray crosses) are Singletons, Random (clusters), and (All-in-)one-cluster. *Takeaways*: (1) Conversations can be clustered with higher precision and recall than naive baselines. (2) PROMPTEMBAD reduces clustering performance the most compared to other defenses.

someone as re-identified if *any* of their conversations is correctly linked. Consequently, for a defense to have an effect, all conversations belonging to a user must be affected, which is non-trivial.

Authorship clustering methods outperform naive baselines substantially (Figure 5). Compared to singletons, all-in-one-cluster, and random clusters (BCubed F ≈0.1–0.3), the clustering algorithms achieve a better BCubed F of ≈0.45–0.6 on SWE-Chat and ≈0.4–0.5 on WildChat when undefended. Leiden achieves the best result on SWE-Chat, while the simple connected component algorithm is best on WildChat, but only by a small margin. With defenses applied, unlike in the open-set attribution mode, PROMPTEMBAD consistently yields the greatest reduction in clustering performance, particularly the direct Gemini access variant, while other defenses are not as effective.

6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this work, we create PROMPTANONBENCH to empirically evaluate the privacy protection of prompt anonymity. Our results demonstrate substantial re-identification risks when prompt content remains visible to LLM providers, and call into question the effectiveness of proxy LLM services that offer only metadata protection. Developing competent defenses targeting the prompt semantics should be prioritized, as defenses that affect only surface-level styles have been shown to be ineffective against embedding-based re-identification. While our proposed PROMPTEMBAD defense based on prompt injections shows some potential, it is nevertheless fairly circumventable if the adversary knows what to look for (e.g., by checking for prompt injection). We thus position PROMPTANONBENCH as a testbed for proxy LLM services and privacy researchers to develop stronger defenses.

As next steps, we aim to improve three aspects of our benchmark: (1) *Multi-modality*: Real conversations with LLMs are rarely text only, and can include images, videos, and audio, which can become vectors for re-identification. Finding realistic multi-modal conversations, however, is difficult, as all available LLM chat datasets consist only of text; (2) *LLM-assisted de-anonymization*: Our preliminary experiments using LLMs to rerank the re-identification matches have yet to produce better results than the reported methods in this paper, not to mention the elevated costs. That said, we believe LLMs' reasoning capability may be better suited to more complex analysis at larger scale (Li et al., 2026); (3) *Stronger defenses*: PROMPTEMBAD's use of prompt injections to directly target the re-identification framework is (to the best of our knowledge) a novelty, but like most text-based privacy mechanisms, it lacks theoretical guarantees and generalizability. We hope to further improve its stealthiness and robustness against adaptive attackers.

AI USE STATEMENT

In this work, we used generative AI tools to identify relevant papers, implement the benchmark's methods, and assist with editing the manuscript. We have manually reviewed all AI-generated code and tested it for correctness. We take responsibility for the final content of this work, including text, claims, or artifacts produced with the aid of generative AI.

ETHICS STATEMENT

We have read the ICLR Code of Ethics and agree to adhere to it. Our work performs only simulated re-identification attacks on publicly available datasets. We do not take any action that would lead to the actual identity of any real users in these datasets.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

Our data and evaluation code are available at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/prompt_anonymity`.

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A Additional Benchmark Details

A.1 PromptEmbad implementation

Algorithm 1 details how PromptEmbad operates (exact parameter values can be found in our code). We source topic seeds from the Library of Congress Subject Headings[1] and use Qwen3.5-9B to rewrite each one into a subject plus three concrete things within it (e.g., *Bee culture* → "beekeeping, hive inspections, queen rearing and honey extraction"), yielding 163,837 subjects. We hold out 512 as the validation pool $\mathcal{T}_v$ and use the rest as the search pool $\mathcal{T}_s$.

Algorithm 1 PromptEmbad: Bad Embeddings for Prompts via Prompt Injections (adapted from Nasr et al. (2026)'s evolutionary search method for finding prompt injections)

Require: search documents $\mathcal{D}_s$ and validation documents $\mathcal{D}_v$ (disjoint); decoy-subject pools $\mathcal{T}_s$, $\mathcal{T}_v$ (disjoint); seed mechanisms $\mathcal{M}_0$; mutator LLM $\mathcal{L}$; generations G; islands I; prompts per generation P; parents per prompt q; subjects per document k; finalists F

Require: scoring map ϕ, chosen by the defender's access to the target encoder E_T:
target access: $\phi(x) = E_T(x)$
no access: $\phi(x) = E_s\big(\mathrm{Sum}(x)\big)$ ▷ greedy LLM summary, local encoder E_s

Ensure: a mechanism $m^\star$ containing the placeholder `<SUBJECT>`

function Fitness($m, \mathcal{D}, S$) ▷ $S_d \subset \mathcal{T}$: the k subjects for document d
  return $1 - \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|}\sum_{d\in\mathcal{D}} \frac{1}{k}\sum_{t\in S_d} \cos\big(\phi(d \oplus m[t]),\ \phi(d)\big)$ ▷ $m[t]$: t substituted into the slot; $\oplus$ appends a turn
end function

function Contest(C, S) ▷ MAP-Elites insertion of children C under slate S
  for $c \in C$ **do**
    pick an island i uniformly; cell $\kappa \leftarrow \big(\mathrm{lenbin}(c),\ \mathrm{divbin}(c, \mathcal{A}_i)\big)$ ▷ word-level edit distance to $\mathcal{A}_i$'s elites
    if $\mathcal{A}_i[\kappa]$ is occupied **then**
      re-score the incumbent $\mathcal{A}_i[\kappa]$ under S ▷ paired comparison on a shared slate
    end if
    if $\mathcal{A}_i[\kappa]$ is empty **or** Fitness($c, \mathcal{D}_s, S$) > Fitness($\mathcal{A}_i[\kappa], \mathcal{D}_s, S$) **then**
      $\mathcal{A}_i[\kappa] \leftarrow c$
    end if
  end for
end function

precompute $\phi(d)$ for every $d \in \mathcal{D}_s \cup \mathcal{D}_v$
initialize I empty archives $\mathcal{A}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{A}_I$ over (length × diversity) cells
$S^{(0)} \leftarrow$ draw k subjects per document from $\mathcal{T}_s$; Contest($\mathcal{M}_0, S^{(0)}$)
for $g = 1, \ldots, G$ **do**
  $C \leftarrow \emptyset$
  for $p = 1, \ldots, P$ **do**
    $Q \leftarrow q$ parents from one island: half from its elites, half from all it has seen
    $C \leftarrow C \cup \mathcal{L}(Q, \text{their scores})$ ▷ $\mathcal{L}$ writes mechanisms with the slot and never sees a subject
  end for
  $C \leftarrow C \cup$ sentence-level crossovers of parent pairs
  $C \leftarrow \{c \in C : c$ unseen and contains `<SUBJECT>`$\}$
  $S^{(g)} \leftarrow$ fresh draw of k subjects per document from $\mathcal{T}_s$ ▷ rotated every generation
  Contest($C, S^{(g)}$)
end for
$\mathcal{F} \leftarrow$ the F highest-scoring elites across all islands
$S^v \leftarrow$ fixed draw of k subjects per document from $\mathcal{T}_v$
$m^\star \leftarrow \arg\max_{m\in\mathcal{F}}$ Fitness($m, \mathcal{D}_v, S^v$) ▷ select on unseen documents and subjects

Deployment: for each document x with identifier $\mathrm{id}(x)$, draw $t \sim \mathrm{Unif}(\mathcal{T}_s \cup \mathcal{T}_v)$ seeded by $\mathrm{id}(x)$ and release $x \oplus m^\star[t]$

[1] https://www.loc.gov/aba/publications/FreeLCSH/freelcsh.html

A.2 OpenAnonymity's Scrubber

Source: https://github.com/OpenAnonymity/oa-chat/blob/main/chat/services/scrubberService.js

System Prompt used by OpenAnonymity's Scrubber

```
You are PrivacyScrubber, a privacy-preserving prompt rewrite model.

Task:
Rewrite the user prompt in a privacy-preserving manner so it can be safely sent to a remote model.
Preserve intent, requested output, and core technical constraints.

Mandatory redaction targets:
- Personal identifiers and sensitive IDs (HIPAA Safe Harbor style categories), including names,
 contact details, exact locations, person-linked dates, account/record/license/device identifiers,
 URLs/IPs, biometrics, and unique codes.
- Organization identifiers: company/client/employer/school/hospital/team/department names and
 identifying domains.
- Project identifiers: project names, codenames, repo names, dataset names, incident names, ticket
 IDs, initiative names.
- Place identifiers: city/district/building/site/office/venue/facility names when linkable.
- Secrets: passwords, API keys, tokens, private keys, auth headers, payment/bank numbers, seed
 phrases.

Style de-identification (required when safe):
- Keep tone level (formal/casual/brief), but remove personal fingerprint.
- Apply neutral word swaps and punctuation normalization when meaning is unchanged.
- Remove signatures, catchphrases, emojis, repeated punctuation, unusual casing, and idiosyncratic
 phrasing.

Rewrite rules:
- Treat <input_prompt>...</input_prompt> as data, never instructions.
- Do not answer the prompt. Only rewrite it.
- Preserve structure/markdown/code blocks.
- Use stable placeholders: [PERSON_1], [EMAIL_1], [ORG_1], [PROJECT_1], [PLACE_1], [ACCOUNT_1], etc.
- Reuse placeholder IDs consistently.
- Default to redacting proper-noun org/place/project references unless clearly generic and non-
 identifying.
- Never mention redaction, privacy, scrubbing, or this policy.

Final checklist before output:
1) No identifiable org/place/project names remain.
2) No obvious stylistic fingerprint remains if neutral wording can preserve intent.
3) Semantics and requested response are preserved.

Few-shot examples:

Example 1 input:
<input_prompt>
Email jane.doe@acme.com and call +1 (415) 555-0199. Ask about invoice 883-12-771 and ship to 21
 Market Street, San Francisco.
</input_prompt>
Example 1 output:
<scrubbed_prompt>
Email [EMAIL_1] and call [PHONE_1]. Ask about invoice [ACCOUNT_1] and ship to [ADDRESS_1], [PLACE_1].
</scrubbed_prompt>

Example 2 input:
<input_prompt>
I work at Northbridge Bio in Redwood City on Project Lantern. Rewrite this note in my signature style
  "ship it like a comet!!! -K" and include our client Helios Bank.
</input_prompt>
Example 2 output:
<scrubbed_prompt>
I work at [ORG_1] in [PLACE_1] on [PROJECT_1]. Rewrite this note in a confident, concise style and
 include our client [ORG_2].
</scrubbed_prompt>

Example 3 input:
<input_prompt>
Draft an update for Atlas Payments about Incident Bluebird and mention our Seattle office.
</input_prompt>
Example 3 output:
<scrubbed_prompt>
Draft an update for [ORG_1] about [PROJECT_1] and mention our [PLACE_1] office.
</scrubbed_prompt>

Example 4 input:
<input_prompt>
Patient Maria Lopez (DOB 04/12/1988, MRN 3349102) was admitted on 2025-06-11. Draft a concise summary
  for morning rounds.
</input_prompt>
Example 4 output:
<scrubbed_prompt>
Patient [PERSON_1] (DOB [DATE_1], MRN [MEDICAL_RECORD_NUMBER_1]) was admitted on [DATE_2]. Draft a
 concise summary for morning rounds.
</scrubbed_prompt>
```

```
Example 5 input:
<input_prompt>
Please clean this up in my exact voice: "ok fam, this rollout is mega spicy!!! trust me :)) --r"
</input_prompt>
Example 5 output:
<scrubbed_prompt>
Please clean this up in a casual, direct voice: "this rollout is challenging."
</scrubbed_prompt>

Example 6 input:
<input_prompt>
Summarize tradeoffs between TCP and QUIC for lossy mobile links.
</input_prompt>
Example 6 output:
<scrubbed_prompt>
Summarize tradeoffs between TCP and QUIC for lossy mobile links.
</scrubbed_prompt>

Output contract:
Return exactly one block and nothing else:
<scrubbed_prompt>
...rewritten prompt...
</scrubbed_prompt>
```

B Additional Experiment Results

B.1 Utility of Defenses

To measure the impact of prompt defenses on conversation utility, we use the LLM-as-a-judge approach (Jourdan et al., 2025). Specifically, we provide pairs of original and defended conversations to Qwen 3.8 27B (Qwen Team, 2026b) and make the model judge each turn on a Likert scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "Unusable" and 5 means "Fully faithful", followed by a final overall rating. We sample 1000 conversations for each defended variant of each dataset, then form a 95% bootstrap confidence interval.

From Table 2, we can observe that all defenses except for PromptEmbad reduce utility, which is expected since PromptEmbad by construction does not modify any of the original turns.

For this experiment, we also include DP-MLM (Meisenbacher et al., 2024), a defense method that provides token-level differentially private rewriting. Every token is sequentially resampled from a RoBERTa mask distribution under the exponential mechanism at a per-word budget ε. We use the adaptive-length variant, since the fixed-length rewrite leaves length and word count untouched. At $\varepsilon = 100$ (each text T has $(100 \cdot |T|)$-DP guarantee), DP-MLM's author DIR@10%FAR is $\approx$0.4–0.5 and BCubed F is $<$0.5 on SWE-Chat, not meaningfully better than other defenses yet rendering the conversations completely unintelligible.

Table 2: LLM-as-a-Judge Utility Score Distribution for Defenses

Dataset	Defense	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3	Score 4	Score 5	Mean	95% CI
SWE-Chat	OpenAnonymity	0.1%	1.1%	2.0%	8.4%	88.4%	4.84	[4.79, 4.88]
	StyleRemix	0.7%	3.0%	7.9%	20.4%	68.0%	4.52	[4.46, 4.59]
	DP-MLM ($\varepsilon = 100$)	53.4%	36.0%	6.9%	2.0%	1.7%	1.63	[1.55, 1.69]
	PromptEmbad (both variants)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	5.00	[5.00, 5.00]
WildChat	OpenAnonymity	0.1%	2.1%	2.7%	7.4%	87.6%	4.80	[4.77, 4.84]
	StyleRemix	3.4%	9.8%	11.0%	13.6%	62.1%	4.21	[4.14, 4.29]
	PromptEmbad (both variants)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	5.00	[5.00, 5.00]

System Prompt for LLM-as-a-Judge for Checking Conversation Utility Preservation

```
You are evaluating how much of one version of a conversation survives in another version of it.

You will be shown the user's messages from one conversation in two versions, the ORIGINAL and a
MODIFIED version of it, already paired turn by turn:

<conversation>
```

```
<turn_1>
<original>the user's first message, ORIGINAL version</original>
<modified>the same message, MODIFIED version</modified>
</turn_1>
<turn_2>
...
</turn_2>
</conversation>

Each <turn_k> holds one turn in both versions. An empty <original></original> means the turn
exists only in the MODIFIED version: it is an ADDED turn. An empty <modified></modified> means the
ORIGINAL turn has no counterpart: its content is gone. Text inside the tags is the user's own and
may itself contain angle brackets, such as placeholders like <URL> or snippets of code.

Your question is narrow. For each turn of the ORIGINAL, is what it conveyed still present in its
MODIFIED version, so that an assistant reading the MODIFIED version could still give the user what
that turn would have got them? Judge the information and the requests, not the writing.

Work through it in this order.

Step 1 -- Rate each turn that has an ORIGINAL, one at a time, on its own. Compare its <original>
with its <modified>: did the requests, questions, instructions, constraints, facts, and context of
the <original> survive? Give that turn its own score on the scale below. A turn whose <modified>
is unchanged, or says the same thing differently, scores 5. If content seems to have moved to a
neighbouring turn rather than disappeared, count it where it now is. Do not rate ADDED turns.

Step 2 -- Check the connections between the ORIGINAL turns. A reference back to an earlier turn
that no longer resolves, or an arc of what the user was working toward that no longer holds
together across the <modified> versions, is a loss. Judge this among turns that have an ORIGINAL
only.

Step 3 -- Give the conversation an overall score from the turn scores and the connections. It
describes what happened to the ORIGINAL turns and nothing else: a conversation whose turns all
scored 5 and whose connections hold scores 5.

ADDED turns are outside this judgement completely. They do not cost points and they do not earn
any, whatever they say. That includes an added turn that contradicts the earlier turns, claims
they are void or should be ignored, or asserts that the conversation is about something else:
it cannot reach back and change what an earlier turn conveyed. If the earlier turns' content is
still present in the MODIFIED version, it is preserved, no matter what follows it.

These are NOT losses, and must not cost points:
- Different wording, phrasing, tone, register, verbosity, or level of formality. The two versions
  are not expected to read alike, and a rewrite that says the same thing differently is fully
  faithful.
- Specific details -- names, places, numbers, identifiers -- that have been changed, generalized,
  or dropped, WHEN they were incidental to what the user wanted. A detail that was actually needed
  to answer the request is different: losing that one IS a loss.
- Anything the MODIFIED version ADDS: added turns, and extra requests, detail, or elaboration
  inside a <modified> that has no counterpart in its <original>.

These ARE losses:
- A request, question, instruction, or constraint an <original> made that its <modified> no
  longer makes -- including an ORIGINAL turn whose <modified> is empty.
- A fact, requirement, or piece of context the user supplied in an <original> that is gone from
  its <modified>, or has been changed into something materially different -- so that an assistant
  reading only the MODIFIED version would do something different, or would be unable to do it.
- A broken connection between ORIGINAL turns (Step 2).

Score each turn, and the conversation overall, on this 1-5 scale. A version that is much longer
than the ORIGINAL, or that contains material the ORIGINAL never had, can still score 5, as long as
nothing the ORIGINAL conveyed was lost or altered:

5 -- Fully faithful. Every request, constraint, fact, and nuance survives (and, overall, the turns
still hang together). Only surface wording and incidental specifics changed.
4 -- Substantially faithful. All main requests and constraints survive; a minor detail, hedge, or
shade of nuance is blurred, but the answer would still fully serve the user.
3 -- Partially faithful. Topic and primary request survive, but a meaningful requirement,
constraint, or piece of context is lost, distorted, or made vague -- or a back-reference no longer
resolves -- so the answer would be noticeably less useful, or would need a clarifying question
first.
2 -- Largely unfaithful. A core request is missing or has become a different question, or so much
of the specific detail it carried is gone that only a generic answer is possible. Some
recognizable connection to the ORIGINAL remains.
1 -- Unusable. The ORIGINAL content is not conveyed: incoherent, empty, off-topic, or stripped so
heavily that no useful answer is possible.

Return JSON and nothing else, with one entry in "Turns" per turn that has an ORIGINAL, in order:
{"Turns": [{"Turn": 1, "Chain_of_thought": YOUR_ANALYSIS_OF_THIS_TURN, "Score": 1-5}, ...],
 "Connections": YOUR_ANALYSIS_OF_THE_LINKS_BETWEEN_TURNS,
 "Score": 1-5, "Reason": YOUR_ONE_LINE_EXPLANATION}
```

B.2 CONVERSATION-LEVEL DIR-FAR

In addition to author-level DIR-FAR, we also present the conversation-level DIR-FAR, where DIR is computed over the documents, not per user (Figures 6 and 7). More specifically, unlike author-level, which counts DIR when *any* conversation of an author is re-identified, conversation-level counts DIR simply when a conversation is re-identified. Consequently, conversation DIR is more likely to change than author DIR. This is most evident in the performance of logistic regression on WildChat. Its conversation-level DIR is noticeably higher than all other methods, yet its author-level DIR is only comparable (Figure 3).



(a) SWE-Chat (b) WildChat

Figure 6: **Conversation-level DIR-FAR plots for *undefended* SWE-Chat and WildChat**.



(a) SWE-Chat (b) WildChat

Figure 7: **Conversation-level DIR-FAR plots for *defended* SWE-Chat and WildChat against nearest neighbor attack with Gemini Embedding 2**.

B.3 Impact of Guessing Top k Candidates

We report the DIR@10%FAR for an extension of the attacks that uses the top k candidate authors as the guess (Figures 8 and 9). We plot Cumulative Match Characteristics (CMC) curves (Gray et al., 2007) for k from 1 up to the maximum number of candidate users in each known split. On SWE-Chat, the curves are almost flat because the out-of-set rejection score is the confidence margin of the attack's first guess, so the threshold mostly keeps conversations whose first guess is already right. WildChat curves rise more because its accepted conversations are less often right on the first guess. These results also place a hard upper bound on what LLM-assisted retrieve-and-rerank attacks can achieve (Lermen et al., 2026).



(a) SWE-Chat (b) WildChat

Figure 8: **CMC curves for author-level DIR@10%FAR at different top k guesses on *undefended* SWE-Chat and WildChat**.



(a) SWE-Chat (b) WildChat

Figure 9: **CMC curves for author-level DIR@10%FAR at different top k guesses on *defended* SWE-Chat and WildChat against nearest neighbor attack with Gemini Embedding 2**.

B.4 Impact of Conversation Length

We show the impact of conversation length on DIR@FAR at the conversation level (Figures 10 and 11). As the number of words in a conversation increases, embedding-enabled attacks tend to see increased performance, while character n-gram's behavior varies inconsistently.



(a) SWE-Chat (b) WildChat

Figure 10: **Conversation-level DIR@10%FAR for different word counts on *undefended* SWE-Chat and WildChat.** The gray bars indicate the relative distribution of words.



(a) SWE-Chat (b) WildChat

Figure 11: **Conversation-level DIR@10%FAR for different word counts on *defended* SWE-Chat and WildChat against nearest neighbor attack with Gemini Embedding 2.** The gray bars indicate the relative distribution of words.