PRESSURE IS NOT ENOUGH: A CAUSAL TEST OF WHETHER OPTIMIZATION INDUCES ENCODED CHAIN-OF-THOUGHT

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ABSTRACT

If a chain-of-thought (CoT) monitor penalizes certain words, does optimizing against that penalty cause a model to develop an alternative, causally load-bearing representation that the monitor does not recognize? We test this on Coin Flip, a synthetic state-tracking task, using GRPO. We first separate two confounds. Across several discovery and adoption mechanisms, we find no reliable spontaneous non-literal encoding. Separately, an SFT-seeded Llama-3-8B-Instruct checkpoint demonstrates that the capability exists: bidirectional counterfactual interventions succeed in 42/42 trials before RL and 167/168 trials across four seeds after 150 GRPO steps. We then resume RL from a genuinely literal checkpoint and apply lexical pressure from the first step. The penalty fires on every sampled main rollout throughout 150 steps, yet no alternative representation emerges: final accuracy shows no statistically detectable difference from an unpenalized control ($p = 1.0$), and all 160 final-checkpoint completions and 9,600 training rollouts remain literal. Thus, under the tested conditions, lexical pressure did not induce an alternative representation despite verified capability to use one when supplied. We additionally identify two apparent discoveries that fail stricter causal tests and find an initial semantic probe of monitor evasion to be inconclusive.

1 INTRODUCTION

A chain-of-thought (CoT) is useful for oversight only if it is *faithful*: the words a model writes while reasoning must reflect the basis for its answer. This is not guaranteed even in benign settings (Turpin et al., 2023; Lanham et al., 2023), while safety proposals increasingly rely on CoT legibility (Baker et al., 2025; Korbak et al., 2025). This raises a specific causal question: **does optimizing a model against a penalty on a visible reasoning representation cause it to develop an alternative, causally load-bearing representation that the penalty does not recognize?** Answering this requires separating two confounds. A null result is uninformative if the model cannot use an alternative representation at all; a positive result is uninformative if the model already produces one without pressure.

A hierarchy of claims. We distinguish three properties, in increasing order of strength: **L1 (non-literal representation)** – reasoning uses tokens other than the penalized literal words; **L2 (causally load-bearing)** – the final answer depends on that representation, verified by intervening on it and testing whether the answer changes; and **L3 (monitor-evasive)**–a reader who does not know the mapping cannot recover the hidden state from the trace. L1 alone is weak evidence: a non-literal token can be decorative or otherwise unrelated to the computation. We therefore treat encoded reasoning as established only when L1 is accompanied by direct causal evidence at L2. Two apparent successes in our experiments illustrate why this distinction matters.

Experimental strategy. We adopt the Coin Flip task of Skaf et al. (2025), who demonstrate causally load-bearing encoded CoT under PPO. We first test whether non-literal behavior arises without directly supervising a particular code (Section 4.1). These exploratory experiments do not provide definitive evidence against spontaneous discovery because a post hoc audit identified a prompt-format mismatch in the discovery-stage RL pipeline. We therefore use them to identify failure modes and motivate a cleaner central test.

Next, we establish capability independently: supervised seeding teaches a non-literal code, and bidirectional intervention verifies that the code is causally load-bearing (Section 4.7). Finally, we

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resume RL from a checkpoint that genuinely produces literal state words and apply sustained lexical pressure while verifying that the penalty engages throughout training (Section 4.6). We then test whether an alternative representation emerges.

Findings. Supervised seeding produces L1+L2 reliably: an SFT-seeded Llama-3-8B-Instruct checkpoint passes bidirectional counterfactual interventions in 42/42 cases before RL and 167/168 cases across four seeds after RL. In the central pressure test, the lexical penalty engages on 1,200/1,200 sampled main rollouts, yet no non-literal representation emerges: across 9,600 training rollouts and 160 final checkpoint completions, all completions remain literal. Final accuracy is unchanged between the penalized and unpenalized conditions. Two additional apparent results also fail our causal standard, while an initial semantic probe provides no evidence sufficient to establish L3.

Our contributions in this study are as follows:

- We establish a causally grounded negative result. Under the tested task, model, optimization procedure, and training budget, sustained lexical pressure does not produce a reliable alternative representation, despite independently verified capability to use one.
- We causally verify encoded reasoning and prove that supervised seeding produces a non-literal representation whose tokens causally affect the final answer, and that this dependence survives code-preserving paraphrasing (42/42).
- We establish a stricter evidence standard that requires direct causal dependence rather than treating non-literal output alone as evidence of encoded reasoning, and use this standard to identify two apparent successes that do not reach L2.

2 Related Work

Chain-of-thought faithfulness and monitorability. Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is useful for oversight only insofar as the written trace reflects computations relevant to the final answer. Prior work demonstrates that CoT can be unfaithful, including cases where models produce plausible explanations that do not causally determine their answers (Turpin et al., 2023; Lanham et al., 2023; Bentham et al., 2024). More recent work studies whether reasoning traces remain useful for monitoring and finds that their reliability can depend on task difficulty and training procedure (Baker et al., 2025; Emmons et al., 2025; Korbak et al., 2025). Recent work also distinguishes ordinary unfaithfulness from encoded or internalized reasoning when assessing whether CoT remains monitorable (Liu et al., 2026). These results motivate evaluating reasoning traces causally rather than treating plausible or accurate explanations as evidence that the trace is load-bearing.

Encoded and steganographic reasoning. A related concern is that optimization against visible reasoning may encourage models to encode information in alternative representations. Roger and Greenblatt (Roger and Greenblatt, 2023) study methods for preventing models from hiding reasoning, while subsequent work examines encoded computation and steganographic communication in language models (Pfau et al., 2024; Mathew et al., 2024; Motwani et al., 2024; Karpov et al., 2025). More recent work systematically evaluates steganographic CoT across models and tasks, finding that the ability to use encoded reasoning varies with task and encoding complexity (Karpov, 2026). Most directly, Skaf et al. (Skaf et al., 2025) show that process supervision can train models to substitute penalized state tokens with learned alternatives and demonstrate causal dependence on the resulting encoded trace. Hadida et al. (Hadida et al., 2026) further study supervised learning of CoT obfuscation and its transfer to unseen tasks. Our work asks a different question: whether such a causally load-bearing non-literal representation can *emerge from lexical pressure alone*, without explicitly teaching the encoding.

Emergent communication and causal evidence. Our use of learned state codes is also related to emergent communication, where agents develop non-human communication protocols through optimization (Lowe et al., 2019; Eccles et al., 2019; Jaques et al., 2019). A key methodological issue in this literature is distinguishing consistent symbolic behavior from genuinely meaningful communication. We adopt the same distinction at the level of reasoning traces: a non-literal token

pattern is insufficient on its own, so we intervene on the representation and test whether the final answer changes. This provides a direct L2 criterion for identifying causally load-bearing encoded reasoning.

3 Task and Experimental Setup

This section describes the shared task and infrastructure; results are reported in Section 4.

3.1 The Coin Flip task

We adopt the Coin Flip state-tracking task of Skaf et al. (2025). Each prompt specifies an initial state (`Heads` or `Tails`) and a sequence of relative instructions, `same` or `different`, which respectively preserve or flip the state. The model must track the state step by step and produce the final answer. Because the instructions are relative, the answer depends on the full sequence; we verify the causal role of the written trace separately in Section 4.2. All prompts and ground-truth traces are generated and independently verified programmatically.




Figure 1: Worked example of the Coin Flip task. Given an initial state and a sequence of *same*/*different* instructions, each reasoning step determines the next state and produces a final answer.

Following Skaf et al. (2025), the CoT pressure penalizes literal state words (and single-letter abbreviations) in the reasoning trace, while a separate term rewards final-answer correctness. Full reward definitions and condition-specific weights are given in Appendix A. For experiments involving learned non-literal tokens, consistency and state-correlation rewards are also used (Appendix A, Eq. 4–5). All evaluated completions are classified using the ten-tier taxonomy in Appendix C.

3.2 Models

We use three models for distinct experimental roles (Table 1). Llama-3-8B was selected independently of the two false positives identified in the Qwen experiments (Sections 4.4,4.5). All models use LoRA adapters rather than full-parameter fine-tuning.

3.3 Training algorithm

Reinforcement learning uses Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) (Shao et al., 2024) via TRL, rather than the PPO setup of Skaf et al. (2025). GRPO computes advantages relative to sampled completions for the same prompt, avoiding a separately trained critic. Dynamic sampling follows Yu et al. (2025) where implemented; one pipeline did not use it (Appendix A). Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) uses standard next-token cross-entropy for demonstration seeding, self-bootstrapping, and non-RL imitation experiments.

Model	Role
Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	Discovery experiments (Section 4.1) and initial adoption/causal-use investigation, including both documented false positives.
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	Model-scale ablation only, testing whether size explains the discovery negative result.
Llama-3-8B-Instruct (8-bit)	Final, redesigned experiment producing this paper's central positive result (Section 4.7).

Table 1: Models used and their scope in this paper.

Prompt formatting. SFT and evaluation use each model's chat template, whereas RL rollout generation used an unformatted prompt string in every runner we could locate. This post hoc audit applies to both the discovery-stage runs (Section 4.1) and the final Llama experiment (Section 4.7). Because this was a runner-level choice, not a GRPO or TRL requirement, we report it explicitly and account for its consequences in the affected sections.

3.4 Completion taxonomy

Every completion is assigned one of ten tiers, ranging from literal or vacuous behavior through partial and inconsistent non-literal attempts to a correct, state-tracking non-literal code. The full taxonomy is given in Appendix C, Table 6, and underlies all reported non-literal usage rates.

3.5 Training stability and hardware

Training uses two calibrated safeguards: a per-token KL clamp and an advantage-magnitude clamp. Hard stops trigger on non-finite rewards, severe accuracy collapse, or excessive gradient norm or KL. For Qwen, KL is the primary safety signal with gradient norm as a backstop, following Appendix E; in the final Llama runs, the KL clamp never became active, leaving only the gradient-norm backstop. All final results were obtained on a single NVIDIA A10G (24GB VRAM), versus the multi-GPU setup of Skaf et al. (2025); this compute difference is discussed in Section 5. Reproducibility practices are described in the Reproducibility Statement.

4 Experiments

We address the following three questions in the experiments: can non-literal representations arise without explicit supervision; can they be causally load-bearing when taught; and does sustained lexical pressure induce them?

4.1 Discovery and adoption mechanisms

We first test whether a non-literal representation arises without directly supervising a particular code. Across intervention families targeting discovery and adoption, none produced reliable correctly tracked L1 behavior. Full results are in Appendix B.

A post hoc audit found that discovery-stage RL used an unformatted prompt, unlike the chat-templated format used for SFT and evaluation. Persisted step-1 telemetry shows positive mean reward and non-maximal completion lengths, unlike the near-complete malformation observed in the analogous Llama setting (Section 4.7). We therefore treat these results as exploratory rather than evidence against spontaneous discovery.

Figure 2 shows two representative outcomes under the same checkpoint and penalty: literal reasoning with the penalty absorbed, and a *vacuous* completion with no step-by-step state tracking.

4.2 Does the model use its reasoning trace?

Before interpreting a negative pressure result, we test whether the written trace contributes to performance. Following Lanham et al. (2023), we compare answer-only and CoT accuracy on the




Figure 2: Two completions under the same checkpoint and lexical penalty. (a) *Overt*: correct reasoning using literal state words throughout. (b) *Vacuous-classified*: no step-by-step state tracking and an incorrect direct answer.




Figure 3: Held-out SFT completion with consistent Nib/Nomo coding but incorrect state tracking.

untrained base model, then corrupt an intermediate state and resume generation. This tests behavioral dependence on the written trace, not whether it exhaustively represents internal computation (Bentham et al., 2024).

Across lengths 3–8, answer-only accuracy was 43.8–55.0%, versus 56.2–85.0% with CoT; corrupting an intermediate state changed the final answer in 47.5–75.0% of cases. Samples are small ($n = 8$–40), and the diagnostic concerns only the base model. Full results are in Appendix D, Table 7.

4.3 Direct supervised imitation

We next test whether non-literal representations can be learned under supervision. SFT on 16 verified trajectories using Nib/Nomo reproduces all training trajectories and uses the trained code in all 21 held-out scenarios, but only 28.6% of held-out outputs are correct. Thus L1 is learnable under supervision, while state tracking remains unreliable.

Figure 3 illustrates this failure: the model uses a stable code but misapplies a state transition.

With the untrained Yelt/Yark pair, none of 21 completions strictly follows the requested vocabulary: 15 mix vocabularies, four retain the trained pair, and two drift positionally. Thus learning one mapping does not imply flexible substitution.




Figure 4: Causal intervention on the pre-fix, rebalanced-bank checkpoint. The final tracked token is flipped (Nomo→Nib), but the resumed continuation gives the same answer as the original: L1 without L2.

4.4 False positive 1: dependence on explicit decoding

Expanding the SFT bank to 43 trajectories yielded 100% held-out tracking. A balanced 36-trajectory retraining produced correct intermediate tracking in 20/21 scenarios (95.2%), but only 7/21 correct final answers (33.3every completion answered *Tails*, including seven targets whose correct answer was *Tails*.

Bidirectional code-token interventions did not change the answer, showing L1 without L2. Figure 4 shows a representative intervention where flipping the final tracked token leaves the answer unchanged.

Explicit decoding improves answers but exposes the state. Adding a decode-back sentence increased accuracy to 17/21 (81.0%). Figure 5 shows that truncating before this sentence and forcing the answer tag reduced accuracy from 19/19 to 0/19; 18/19 continuations copied the final code token. The apparent L2 was therefore mediated by an explicit plain-text restatement rather than the code.

4.5 False positive 2: an unreplicated reward effect

We next test an apparent reward effect across seeds. Four 150-step GRPO conditions were compared from the decode-back checkpoint (Appendix A, Table 4). The consistency and signal bonuses can conflict when the underlying state changes.

Initial single-run mean genuine-correct scores were 0.698, 0.778, 0.865, and 0.906. A paired comparison across 30 milestones gave $t = 10.85$ for Main vs. Baseline, but these milestones are not independent replicates; an identical-seed Main rerun scored 0.611.

After recalibrating the safeguards (KL threshold 5.0; gradient-norm backstop 200.0), all four conditions were rerun with four seeds each. All six primary pairwise Welch tests exceeded the Bonferroni significance threshold ($0.05/6 \approx 0.0083$); the smallest uncorrected p was approximately 0.044. The apparent effect did not survive multi-seed replication.




Figure 5: Dependence on explicit decoding, post-RL Qwen MAIN checkpoint. (a) With decoding, the model answers correctly (90.5%). (b) Forcing the answer immediately after the trace gives 0% accuracy; 18/19 continuations copy the untranslated code token.

Condition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
BASELINE	.700	.091	.60	.80
MAIN	.700	.071	.60	.75

Table 2: Final-milestone genuine-correct accuracy, literal-CoT initialization, across four seeds per condition. Welch $t = 0.0$, $df = 5.65$, $p = 1.0$. Every final-checkpoint completion ($n = 160$) and training rollout ($n = 9,600$) was tier 2 (literal) in both conditions.

4.6 ADVERSARIAL PRESSURE FROM A LITERAL-COT INITIALIZATION

This is our central experiment. We start from a checkpoint that genuinely uses literal state words, apply the lexical penalty from the first RL step, and verify that it remains engaged throughout training.

Before RL. The Direct RL checkpoint (Section 4.1) was independently re-verified to produce literal state words in 500/500 sampled completions under the corrected chat-templated prompt, ensuring that the penalty could bind.

During RL. We train BASELINE and MAIN for 150 GRPO steps with four seeds each, using the chat template from the first step. Across all MAIN seeds, the lexical penalty fired on 1,200/1,200 sampled rollouts at every 10-step bin, with mean nonzero magnitude $p_{\text{CoT}} \in [0.384, 0.396]$.

After RL. Final-milestone genuine-correct accuracy was 0.700 in both conditions (Table 2); Welch $t = 0.0$, $df = 5.65$, $p = 1.0$. With four seeds per condition, we interpret this as no statistically detectable difference rather than exact equivalence.

More importantly, every one of the 160 final-checkpoint completions and all 9,600 training rollouts remained literal. No completion reached a non-literal tier.

The causal sequence is:

$$\text{literal initialization} \longrightarrow \text{engaged lexical pressure} \longrightarrow \text{no non-literal representation.}$$

Under the tested conditions, sustained lexical pressure did not produce a reliable alternative representation.

4.7 TASK REDESIGN AND CAUSAL VERIFICATION

We next establish the capability confound independently: can a model represent and causally use a non-literal code when explicitly taught?

Task. The redesigned task retains the Coin Flip transitions but requires the final code token as the answer, with no decoding sentence. We use Llama-3-8B-Instruct with Bek/Ner for training and Jub/Kag for held-out evaluation. The single-token pseudo-words were screened from 2,845 candidates for tokenization, lexical leakage, and base-policy probability matching. Because model, scale, tokenization, and answer format change together, the redesign does not isolate any one factor.

Supervised performance and causal use. SFT gives 100% training recall and 21/21 held-out accuracy. Replacing intermediate state tokens with their opposites at two positions and resuming generation produced counterfactually correct answers in all 42/42 cases, establishing L1+L2.

Continued RL. We then train BASELINE and MAIN for 150 steps with four seeds each. This stage does not test pressure-induced discovery: RL uses the unformatted prompt string and the penalty is inactive at initialization (0/688 sampled completions contain a banned pattern).

Results. Evaluated in chat format with greedy decoding, no literal-word leakage appeared in 5,040 milestone completions. Final accuracy is shown in Table 3; the MAIN–BASELINE difference was not statistically significant (Welch $p = 0.200$).

Across the four MAIN seeds, causal interventions gave 42/42, 42/42, 41/42, and 42/42 correct continuations (167/168 overall), showing that L2 persists through this RL stage.

Condition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
BASELINE	.774	.184	.524	.952
MAIN	.929	.091	.810	1.000

Table 3: Final-design accuracy across four seeds per condition ($p = 0.200$, Welch). No literal-word leakage was observed at evaluated milestones in either condition.

Robustness of L2 to paraphrasing. Using the same MAIN seed-43 checkpoint, we paraphrase the narration of each of the 21 held-out traces while preserving the code tokens and resume from two cut points. All 42 continuations track correctly and produce the correct final answer. Thus the causal dependence survives surface paraphrasing, although this does not test replacing or disguising the code tokens.

An initial semantic-concealment probe. To probe L3, an independent judge model guessed the true state from one trace at a time without the mapping. Accuracy was 53.97% (34/63), exact binomial $p = 0.615$. Inspection indicated reliance on a fixed positional default, so we treat the result as inconclusive rather than evidence of monitor evasion.

Overall, the redesigned experiment shows that supervised non-literal representations can be causally load-bearing and persist under RL and code-preserving paraphrase. It does not test whether lexical pressure can create such a representation when the penalty is actually engaged; that question is addressed directly in Section 4.6.

5 DISCUSSION

Our experiments separate three questions: whether non-literal behavior arises spontaneously, whether the model can use such a representation when supplied, and whether sustained lexical pressure induces one. A full experiment-to-evidence mapping is given in Appendix F.

Discovery versus adoption. A useful code requires coordinated vocabulary, state updates, and answer interpretation. Supervision supplies examples of this joint behavior, whereas discovery must first reach a coherent candidate before reward can reinforce it. The reward-gating failures in Section 4.1 illustrate this difficulty, while guaranteed comparisons also failed to induce adoption. Auxiliary rewards introduce further trade-offs: the consistency bonus, for example, can conflict with the variation required when the underlying state changes (Appendix A). These experiments do not isolate GRPO as the cause of any individual failure.

Comparison with prior emergence results. Skaf et al. (2025) demonstrate learned, causally load-bearing encodings on Coin Flip using PPO, larger rollout batches, exploration controls, and a staged penalty curriculum. Our experiments differ in algorithm, sampling, reward design, and compute budget, so this is not a controlled PPO–GRPO comparison. Our result therefore provides evidence against pressure-induced emergence only under the tested regime, rather than contradicting prior emergence results.

What our result establishes. Our central experiment combines two controls: discovery experiments provide evidence about spontaneous occurrence, while supervised seeding establishes that the model can use a non-literal representation causally. Starting from a literal checkpoint, the lexical penalty remained fully engaged throughout RL, yet no alternative representation emerged. This supports a narrower conclusion: under the tested task, model, optimization procedure, and training budget, sustained lexical pressure did not produce a reliable non-literal representation.

Monitor-relative concealment. The lexical penalty is a narrow proxy: it detects specified literal forms rather than whether a reader can infer or decode a substitution. Related work studies stronger forms of steganographic monitoring (Mathew et al., 2024; Karpov et al., 2025). Our judge-model probe (Section 4.7) was inconclusive: performance was near chance and inspection indicated reliance on a positional default rather than genuine mapping inference. A stronger test would provide multiple traces and ask a reader to infer a consistent mapping across examples. We therefore make no claim that the learned code is monitor-evasive (L3).

Scope and limitations. The central pressure result covers one Coin Flip task, one GRPO configuration, one model family at the tested scale, and a limited compute budget. The positive capability result likewise involves one binary-state task and one trained token pair; model family, scale, tokenization, and answer format changed together in the redesign. The 168 post-RL interventions share 21 underlying scenarios and are not independent samples. Thus, the evidence supports a controlled demonstration that supervised encoded reasoning can be causally load-bearing, alongside a negative result for pressure-induced emergence under the tested conditions. Whether stronger pressure, longer training, different algorithms, models, or tasks produce different outcomes remains open.

6 Conclusion

We asked whether penalizing visible reasoning causes a model to develop an alternative, causally load-bearing representation. We first separated two confounds: spontaneous occurrence and representational capability. Across the tested discovery mechanisms, we found no reliable spontaneous non-literal representation. Separately, supervised seeding showed that Llama-3-8B-Instruct can use a taught code causally: bidirectional interventions succeeded before RL and in 167/168 post-RL trials, with the dependence surviving code-preserving paraphrase (42/42).

The central test began from a genuinely literal checkpoint and applied sustained lexical pressure throughout RL. No alternative representation emerged: all sampled training rollouts and final completions remained literal, with no statistically detectable accuracy difference between penalized and unpenalized conditions.

Two apparent successes failed stricter causal tests: one depended on an explicit decode-back sentence, while another did not replicate across seeds. These failures motivate our evidence standard of causal intervention and multi-seed replication rather than non-literal output alone. The semantic probe for monitor-relative concealment was inconclusive, so our results do not establish L3 monitor evasion.

The conclusion is scoped to one task, GRPO configuration, model family, and modest compute budget. Future work should test other algorithms, models, longer training, and stronger adaptive decoding attacks. Within these conditions, our results show that encoded reasoning can be taught and made causally load-bearing, but did not emerge from lexical pressure alone.

AI USE STATEMENT

An AI coding assistant was used to help implement experiments, debug code, and write analysis scripts, with all outputs reviewed directly by the authors at every step. An AI assistant was also used to help draft and edit portions of this manuscript's text. All reported experimental results were independently verified against underlying logs and evidence before inclusion in the paper.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies a synthetic, low-stakes task (Coin Flip) specifically to understand the conditions under which models might learn to conceal information from oversight mechanisms. Our goal is to inform better detection and mitigation methods, not to develop concealment capabilities for deployment.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

Full reward-function definitions and invariant derivations are given in Appendix A; hyperparameters and training configuration are described in Section 3. Code and evidence are available at the anonymized repository: `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/pressure-is-not-enough-6CF6/`.

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A Full Reward Function

A.1 Scalar reward and parsing

For prompt x, completion y, target answer $a^\star$, and optimizer step t, the scalar reward is

$$R(y; x, a^\star, t) = r_{\text{task}} - p_{\text{CoT}} - p_{\text{length}} - p_{\text{structure}} - p_{\text{variation}} + r_{\text{consistency}} + r_{\text{signal}}. \tag{1}$$

A valid completion ends with a nonempty `<answer>...</answer>` field. Answer matching removes surrounding punctuation and whitespace and ignores case. The task term is

$$r_{\text{task}} = \begin{cases} 4, & \text{valid, correct answer,} \\ -0.5, & \text{valid, incorrect answer,} \\ -5, & \text{missing or malformed final-answer tag.} \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

For the final Llama task, $a^\star$ is the required code word (Bek for Heads, Ner for Tails). A literal answer inside a valid tag is therefore formatted correctly but scored incorrect.

Length and structure. For m operations and completion length L in whitespace-delimited words,

$$p_{\text{length}} = 0.5 \cdot \mathbb{1}[L < 4m + 5]. \tag{3}$$

A state slot must occupy a complete line of the form `Step i: ... State: TOKEN`. The token matches `[A-Z][A-Za-z]{0,14}`, optionally followed by one period or comma. Let V denote exactly one valid slot for every index $1, \ldots, m$. Then $p_{\text{structure}} = 0.5 \cdot \mathbb{1}[\neg V]$.

State variation. For generated state tokens z_i, the variation test requires $z_i = z_{i-1}$ for a *same* instruction and $z_i \neq z_{i-1}$ for a *different* instruction. Passing incurs zero penalty; failing incurs $p_{\text{variation}} = 0.5$. Comparisons begin at step 2: the prompt supplies the initial physical state, but there is no generated step-0 token, so this test alone does not check that step 1 correctly applies the first instruction to the initial state. The penalty is all-or-nothing at the completion level: a missing, duplicate, or out-of-order slot at any step also incurs the full 0.5 penalty, and slot 1 is otherwise unconstrained.

Consistency bonus. Let $E = \{\text{heads,tails,head,tail,h,t}\}$. The implemented bonus is

$$r_{\text{consistency}} = c \cdot \mathbb{1}[V \wedge z_1 = \cdots = z_m \wedge \text{lower}(z_1) \notin E], \tag{4}$$

with default $c = 0.15$. This rewards constant non-literal token reuse, not correct binary state tracking. In a complete trace containing a *different* instruction at step 2 or later, constant reuse earns this bonus but violates the variation test; the two terms can therefore favor different behaviors. This is precisely why a consistent code and a *correct* code must be scored separately (see Figure 6, Appendix C).

Signal bonus. For usable parsed slots I, let S_i be the physical state reconstructed from the prompt and Z_i the generated token. The signal term uses the Adjusted Rand Index (Hubert and Arabie, 1985):

$$r_{\text{signal}} = \begin{cases} s \cdot \max\{0, \min\{1, \text{ARI}(S_I, Z_I)\}\}, & \text{eligible,} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \tag{5}$$

with default $s = 0.15$. Eligibility requires a parseable prompt, at least two usable slots, and both physical states among those slots. A bijective two-token encoding gives ARI $= 1$; a constant token across both states gives ARI $= 0$. Negative values are clipped to zero. Because scoring can use an incomplete trace, high signal reward alone does not establish complete state tracking.

A.2 Lexical penalty and exemptions

Let y_{pre} be the text preceding the first exact lowercase `<answer>` delimiter. With active pattern set B_t,

$$C_t(y) = \sum_{q \in B_t} \#\text{matches}(q, y_{\text{pre}}), \qquad p_{\text{CoT}} = \lambda_t(1 - e^{-0.075\, C_t(y)}). \tag{6}$$

Matches use word-character lookarounds to exclude substrings of longer words, with unit weight per occurrence. The full pattern set is

$$B = \{\text{Heads, Tails, Head, Tail, H, T}\}. \tag{7}$$

Patterns are case-sensitive: lowercase forms are not matched. Text after the first exact `<answer>` delimiter, including the final answer, is outside the scan. Avoiding this penalty is therefore not equivalent to avoiding every literal disclosure (Figure 2, Section 4.1, shows a completion that fully absorbs this penalty rather than avoiding literal disclosure). If no `<answer>` delimiter is present, the whole completion is scanned and $r_{\text{task}} = -5$ separately.

In the Qwen decode-back experiments (Section 4.4), the expected sentence "The final code token CODE decodes to LITERAL.", immediately preceding the answer tag, is removed when recomputing only p_{CoT}; all other components score the original completion, and literal state words elsewhere remain subject to the scan. The final Llama task (Section 4.7) uses the ordinary scorer without this exemption.

Evaluation-time leakage scanning (Section 4.7) uses a separate, stricter scanner from the one above: it lower-cases the entire completion, tokenizes with `[A-Za-z']+`, has no word-boundary lookarounds, and scans the whole completion including text after `<answer>`. The two scanners are not interchangeable; "zero measured leakage" refers to the evaluation scanner, not the training penalty above.

Prompt-format audit note. A post hoc audit (Section 4.1) found that RL rollout generation used an unformatted prompt string, differing from the chat-templated format used for SFT and evaluation, in every discovery-stage runner script located, including Positive signaling's

driver script (`stage07_signal_annealed.py`), once that script itself was independently located and read in full. In that script, training rollouts are built from a raw string prompt (`Dataset.from_list({'prompt': <str>}, ...)`) and only the milestone and held-out evaluation calls apply the chat template. This is the same mismatch pattern documented for the Llama redesign (Section 4.7) and for the other Qwen discovery conditions. Persisted step-1 telemetry for Positive signaling's runs shows positive mean reward and completion lengths well under the format's length cap, which we read as evidence against, though not proof against, this mismatch affecting the reported null result for that condition.

A.3 Schedules and condition definitions

Historical Stage 1 uses $\lambda = 2$ with an expanding pattern set for $t < 30$ before reaching B in full. Later annealed-penalty runs use all six patterns throughout, with horizon $T > 5$ and

$$\lambda_t = \begin{cases} 0.2, & t < 5, \\ 0.2 + 1.8(t-5)/(T-5), & 5 \le t \le T, \\ 2, & t > T. \end{cases} \tag{9}$$

For $T = 150$ the schedule reaches 2 at index 150; exact realized endpoints depend on the optimizer-step indexing convention. The literal-CoT initialization experiment (Section 4.6) uses this same BASELINE/MAIN structure and schedule, resumed from a checkpoint that genuinely produces literal state words rather than from the decode-back checkpoint.

Condition	c	s	$\lambda_{\min} \to \lambda_{\max}$
BASELINE	0	0	$0 \to 0$
PENALTY-ONLY	0	0	$0.2 \to 2$
SIGNAL-ONLY	.15	.15	$0 \to 0$
MAIN	.15	.15	$0.2 \to 2$

Table 4: Reward-decomposition conditions (Sections 4.5 and 4.6). Length, structure, and variation penalties remain active in every condition. BASELINE denotes removal of the lexical penalty and both positive bonuses, not removal of the fixed auxiliary penalties.

A.4 Advantage clipping and the KL clamp

Advantages are normalized per group of $n = 8$ by the sample standard deviation, then clipped to $\tilde{A}_i = \text{clip}(A_i, -0.4, 0.4)$ (Eq. 11). Clipping preserves each advantage's sign but not the zero group mean of the unclipped advantages, nor strict ordering among them.

For completion token j, the reference-to-policy log ratio d_j is clipped to $[-D_{\max}, D_{\max}]$ before the nonlinear KL estimator $f(d) = e^d - d - 1$ is applied (Eq. 13). The reference policy is a frozen copy of the pre-RL adapter, scored via a separate TRL-managed `ref` adapter copied from `default` at trainer construction and never updated during training. Qwen Stage 9d uses $D_{\max} = 2.0$; final Llama runs use $D_{\max} = 0.04$, giving an upper bound on the surrogate of $e^{0.04} - 0.04 - 1 \approx 8.11 \times 10^{-4}$. Reported KL for the final Llama runs is computed *after* this clamp, not on the raw log ratio; raw (pre-clamp) KL was not persisted for those runs.

B Discovery and Adoption: Full Results

Table 5 reports the complete results for the discovery and adoption mechanisms summarized in Section 4.1.

C Completion Taxonomy

The distinction between tiers 9 and 10 is not cosmetic: a consistent, unambiguous code (tier 9) can still misapply a transition instruction and produce an incorrect answer, and this is a distinct failure mode from code-level ambiguity or drift (tiers 4–8). Figure **??** shows two completions using the

Mechanism	Training rollouts	Eval. samples	Outcome
Direct RL	3,200 (original)	500 (re-eval)	0 genuine encodings through checkpoint 500 in the original training; independently re-evaluated for this submission on checkpoint 500's saved weights with a corrected chat-templated prompt: 500/500 tier 2 (literal), 0 at any other tier, 64.0% task accuracy, 98.8% format-valid. *[checkpoint retrieved and re-evaluated, original trajectory not recoverable†]*
Cross-domain seeding & self-bootstrap	—	4,050 (held-out domain)	Declared-mapping execution rose 28%→82%; undeclared invention 10% overall (20%/0% directional split); after correcting an evaluator defect, 0/575 previously accepted completions remained both non-literal and correct; 120/4,050 clean examples, all ending in the same state. *[not independently recoverable†]*
Positive signaling + annealed penalty	1,656 (4 reclassified runs)	—	0 substituted rollouts; $> 3\times$ entropy coefficient increase did not produce a candidate encoding. *[fully verified‡]*
Demonstration-assisted adoption (auxiliary injection)	—	1,443*	0 non-literal completions. *[mismatch present, weak risk]*
Reward gating	2,200	1,443*	0 non-literal completions; 73/127 bank-scenario attempts had uniformly zero reward, and 28/54 accepted groups required fallback resampling. *[mismatch present, weak risk]*
Guaranteed injection	1,688	1,443*	0 non-literal completions, no partial adoption on inspection. *[mismatch present, weak risk]*
Model scale (Qwen2.5-7B, base model, no SFT resume)	400	481	0 non-literal completions, despite higher zero-shot task accuracy (76.2% vs. 68.7%). *[mismatch present, weak risk, not fully checked]*

Table 5: Discovery and adoption mechanisms. *The three rows marked 1,443 share one underlying evaluation set (39 milestones $\times$ 21 clean + 16 bank scenarios); they are not independent evaluations and should not be summed as such. †Direct RL's original 0-to-500-step training code could not be located; a documented, dated storage cleanup predating this audit explains its absence. Checkpoint 500 itself was preserved by that same cleanup, independently retrieved, and re-evaluated under corrected methodology for this submission; this re-evaluation is independent evidence consistent with the original result, not a reproduction of the original training procedure (see Reproducibility Statement). ‡Positive signaling's original driver script, both logs, and both structured evidence JSONs were independently located and hash-verified, and are consistent with the originally reported result. Bracketed tags report whether RL rollout generation and SFT/evaluation used the same prompt format, checked in post hoc audit (Section 3.2).

identical code (Nib=Heads, Nomo=Tails): one where state is tracked correctly at every step, and one where the code is used just as consistently but a single transition is misapplied, propagating an error to the final answer.

D CoT Necessity: Full Results

Table 7 reports the full per-length results summarized in Section 4.2, including sequence lengths 2, 9, and 10, which fall outside the main lengths (3–8) used elsewhere in this paper.

Tier	Category	Definition
1	malformed	Fails to parse; scored at reward floor.
2	literal	Banned state words used throughout.
3	vacuous	State omitted at one or more steps.
4	prompt-domain echo	Non-literal token copied from the prompt's vocabulary, carrying no state information.
5	position-driven drift	Token changes across steps without tracking true state.
6	token mixing	Two distinct code pairs mixed mid-sequence.
7	partial non-literal state variation	Non-literal token used, but only one true state occurs.
8	state-predictive code	Token correlates with true state at some but not all steps.
9	structural non-literal candidate	Consistent non-literal token throughout, both true states confirmed.
10	correct, globally consistent code	Consistent non-literal code, correct on task — primary marker of success.

Table 6: Ten-tier completion taxonomy, ordered by increasing genuine non-literal, state-dependent correctness. Underlies every reported non-literal usage rate in this paper, including the Direct RL re-evaluation (Section 4.1, 500/500 at tier 1) and the literal-CoT adversarial experiment (Section 4.6, 9,760 completions checked, 0 above tier 1).




Figure 6: Two completions using the same code (Nib=Heads, Nomo=Tails). Left: state is tracked correctly at every step, yielding the correct answer. Right: the code is used just as consistently, but step 3 is misapplied (an error propagated from an incorrect prior state), and the final answer follows the resulting erroneous trace. Consistency of code usage alone — what the consistency bonus (Eq. 4) rewards — does not imply correct tracking.

E Training Instabilities When Resuming RL From an SFT-Converged Checkpoint

This appendix documents three instabilities encountered when resuming GRPO from an SFT-converged checkpoint (the Qwen decode-back checkpoint, Section 4.4), and the fixes used in later runs. All results in this appendix are on Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct.

Symptom. Resuming GRPO from the decode-back checkpoint triggered gradient-norm breakers with and without the lexical penalty. Entropy and completion similarity did not differ meaningfully from a stable checkpoint (mean token entropy 0.01893 vs. 0.01949 nats; mean pairwise similarity 0.9183 vs. 0.9257), so neither explains the instability on its own.

Diagnosis 1: advantage-magnitude artifact. In a linked 16-row sample, code-token count correlated with row gradient magnitude ($r = 0.61$). Controlling for absolute advantage, the partial correlation was $r = -0.27$, $t(13) = -1.00$, $p > 0.3$: not significant. Absolute advantage itself was

Length	Answer-only	CoT	Answer change	n
2	.500	.500	.750	8
3	.438	.562	.625	16
4	.531	.719	.656	32
5	.475	.700	.650	40
6	.550	.850	.750	40
7	.475	.725	.725	40
8	.500	.575	.475	40
9	.525	.600	.675	40
10	.675	.625	.600	40

Table 7: Base-model accuracy with and without CoT, and final-answer change rate after intermediate-state corruption. Main experiments (Section 4) use lengths 3–8; lengths 2, 9, and 10 are reported here for completeness.

strongly associated with gradient magnitude ($r = 0.9998$), consistent with advantage scaling, not code-token count, as the immediate contributor to the breaker.

Fix. Clipping advantages to magnitude 0.4 (Appendix A, Eq. 11) prevented the immediate breaker. This is a broad modification, not a rare-outlier correction: it affected 52.5–85.0% of rows across longer runs.

Diagnosis 2: KL-growth mode. At learning rate 10^{-6}, all 21 greedy evaluations were unchanged across a 50-step run, so the model was effectively not training. Raising the rate to 2×10^{-5} restored completion changes, but a 150-step attempt stopped at step 23 when KL reached 5.376 (threshold 5.0).

Fix. The pipeline lacked a log-ratio clamp before the nonlinear per-token KL estimator (Appendix A, Eq. 13). Calibrating on 49,376 token-level values selected $D_{\max} = 2.0$ for Qwen. With the clamp, a 150-step validation run completed with reported KL in 0–0.722 (mean 0.475), 41.1% clamp engagement, and continued completion changes. Substantial clamp engagement changes the effective regularization, so this is a mitigation, not a removal, of the underlying divergence.

Diagnosis 3: gradient-norm breaker confounded with completion length. Raw gradient norm proved an unreliable primary discriminator for long-completion events, since it is confounded with completion length rather than tracking policy divergence directly.

Fix. We adopted KL divergence as the primary safety signal, with gradient norm retained only as a coarse backstop (threshold raised to 200.0 in later runs; Section 4.5).

Scope of these fixes. The KL clamp and its calibrated $D_{\max}$ do not transfer across model or training regime and must be re-derived whenever divergence characteristics change. The final Llama runs (Section 4.7) use a separately calibrated $D_{\max} = 0.04$; the literal-CoT adversarial experiment (Section 4.6) required its own fresh calibration pass before the full 8-run batch, since it resumes from a different checkpoint than either prior calibration. In the final Llama runs the KL breaker never fired: post-clamp KL is capped near 8.1×10^{-4}, well under the 5.0 threshold, so only the gradient-norm backstop was live. These instabilities and fixes are specific to resuming a critic-free, group-relative algorithm (GRPO) from an SFT-converged checkpoint; whether they generalize to other algorithms or initializations is untested, and any future run resuming from a different starting checkpoint should recalibrate $D_{\max}$ rather than reuse either value here.

F Hypothesis-by-Hypothesis Evidence Summary

Table 8 maps every experiment in this paper to the question it answers, organized by the confound-elimination structure argued in the Introduction: two preconditions, the central test, and supporting results. This is a navigational aid, not new evidence; every row is fully reported in the cited section.

Question	Required evidence	Experiment	Result	Level reached
Precondition 1: does non-literal encoding arise spontaneously?				
Can pressure induce discovery?	Non-literal output with correct tracking, arising without demonstration	Discovery mechanisms (Section 4.1)	No	None (L1 not reached)
Precondition 2: are these models capable of L1+L2 at all?				
Can supervision teach a code?	Stable, consistent non-literal token use on held-out scenarios	Direct SFT (Section 4.3)	Yes	L1 (tracking accuracy unreliable)
Is an apparent code causally used?	Counterfactual answer change under token intervention	Bidirectional intervention, pre-redesign (Section 4.4)	No	L1 only (causally inert)
Is the redesigned code causally used?	As above, on the code-token -as-answer design	Bidirectional intervention, pre-RL (Section 4.7)	Yes	L1+L2 (42/42)
Does the code persist through RL?	Causal intervention repeated post-RL	Bidirectional intervention, post-RL (Section 4.7)	Yes	L1+L2 (167/168)
Does the code's causal use survive surface rewording?	Correct continuation from a paraphrased, code-preserving prefix	Paraphrase resumption test (Section 4.7)	Yes	L2 robust to paraphrasing (42/42)
Central test: does pressure cause an L1 encoding, once both confounds are addressed?				
Can maximally-engaged pressure induce discovery?	Non-literal output with correct tracking, with the penalty verified to fire throughout training	Literal-CoT initialization (Section 4.6)	No	None (L1 not reached)
Supporting result: is the taught code concealed from a reader?				
Does the code conceal the state from a reader who doesn't know it?	Recovery failure by an independent semantic judge, tried in earnest	Single-trace semantic judge (Section 4.7)	Inconclusive	L3 not established (judge used an uninformed heuristic, not genuine decoding)

Table 8: Every experiment in this paper mapped to the question it answers, the evidence standard applied, and the level (L1/L2/L3) reached, organized by the confound-elimination argument in Section 1. Rows are not independent evidence for a single claim; each concerns a different question and a different checkpoint or model.