GPO-V: JAILBREAK DIFFUSION VISION LANGUAGE MODEL BY GLOBAL PROBABILITY OPTIMIZATION

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ABSTRACT

Diffusion Vision-Language Models (dVLMs), built upon the non-causal foundations of Diffusion Large Language Models (dLLMs), have demonstrated remarkable efficacy in multimodal tasks by departing from the traditional autoregressive generation paradigm. While dVLMs appear inherently robust against conventional jailbreak tactics, which we categorize as **Fixed Prefix Optimization** (FPO) (e.g., anchoring responses with "Sure, here is"), this perceived resilience is deceptive. Our investigation into the safety landscape of dVLMs reveals a unique refusal pattern: **Immediate Refusal** and **Progressive Refusal**. We find that while FPO-based attacks often fail by triggering the latter, the progressive refinement process itself uncovers a novel, latent attack surface. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose **Global Probability Optimization** (GPO), a general jailbreak paradigm designed specifically for the denoising trajectory of masked diffusion models. Unlike prefix-based methods, GPO manipulates the global generative dynamics to bypass guardrails in diffusion language models. Building on this, we introduce **GPO-V, the first visual-modality jailbreak framework tailored for dVLMs**. Empirical results demonstrate that GPO-V produces stealthy perturbations with exceptional cross-model transferability, revealing a critical security gap in non-sequential generative architectures. Our findings underscore the critical urgency of addressing safety alignment in dVLMs. These results necessitate an immediate and fundamental re-evaluation of current defense paradigms to mitigate the unique risks of diffusion-based generation. Our code is available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/GPO-V-0250.

1 INTRODUCTION

Diffusion Large Language Models (dLLMs) (Nie et al., 2025; Ye et al., 2025) have emerged as a prominent generative paradigm parallel to traditional autoregressive models (Touvron et al., 2023; Patel et al., 2023). Building upon this framework, Diffusion Vision-Language Models (dVLMs) (You et al., 2025) have achieved outstanding performance in sophisticated image understanding and multimodal tasks. However, a significant disparity exists in their safety development: while autoregressive models have undergone extensive safety alignment to mitigate adversarial risks, the security landscape of dVLMs remains largely unexplored. This reveals a critical research gap concerning the vulnerability of dVLMs to jailbreak attacks, representing an urgent security challenge for this emerging multimodal architecture.

Safety alignment research (Yang et al., 2024; Zhai et al., 2023a; Mehrotra et al., 2024; Li et al., 2023) primarily focuses on fortifying models with robust rejection capabilities. While some studies (Sahoo et al., 2024; Austin et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2025b; Wen et al., 2025) have examined the security of masked dLLMs, the specific safety failure modes of multimodal dVLMs (Li et al., 2025b; Ji et al., 2025) remain largely unexplored. This is primarily due to the fact that their refusal patterns for potential jailbreak prompts are distinctive, as illustrated in Figure.1. These mechanisms manifest through fundamentally different structural dynamics across patterns. Specifically, in autoregressive VLMs, refusal typically unfolds sequentially from head to tail, effectively halting generation at the outset.

In contrast, diffusion language models exhibit two distinctive refusal signatures: (1) **Immediate Refusal**, where the model generates *end* tokens in a "back-to-front" manner within the masked

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


Figure 1: **Response Patterns of dVLMs**: We identify two distinct rejection behaviors: (1) **Immediate Refusal**, a pre-generation defense where the model detects input risks and rejects the prompt directly; and (2) **Progressive Refusal**, which occurs during generation, where the model initially produces affirmative content but pivots to a refusal as unsafe semantics emerge.

sequence; and (2) **Progressive Refusal**, where the model initially produces affirmative tokens but gradually pivots toward a refusal response during the iterative refinement process.

These unique refusal patterns pose a significant challenge to conventional jailbreak methodologies. As illustrated in the upper part of Figure.2, previous attacks rely on **Fixed Prefix Optimization** (FPO), attempting to force the target model to begin its response with a compliant prefix (e.g., "Sure, here is"), thereby steering the rest of the generation. However, this approach is fundamentally thwarted by the global refinement nature of dVLMs. Specifically, samples without adversarial optimization trigger Immediate Refusal, characterized by the "back-to-front" generation of stop tokens (e.g., $< end > or < eot >$). For FPO-optimized samples, the diffusion process acts as a global corrector; despite initially producing the target prefix, the model typically transitions to Progressive Refusal, ultimately thwarting the jailbreak attempt. This methodological mismatch between local optimization and global probabilistic evolution renders sequential jailbreaks ineffective, necessitating a transition toward global adversarial strategies, called Global Probabilistic Optimization (GPO).

Therefore, in this paper, we present the first systematic analysis of refusal patterns in dVLMs. We demonstrate that, although these mechanisms can largely withstand FPO strategies originally designed for autoregressive language models, they remain inherently fragile and expose novel attack surfaces. As in Figure.2, our study identifies a universal GPO-based jailbreak strategy specifically tailored to the diffusion generation paradigm, which operates by manipulating the global probability distribution of the gener-




Figure 2: **Overview of our method**: Building on **G**lobal **P**robabilit **O**ptimization (GPO), we further develop the attack framework in the **vision modality of diffusion language models**, called **GPO-V**, which is the first efficient jailbreak attack in dVLMs.

ated sequence rather than relying on FPO typical of autoregressive models. Building on this, we introduce a novel jailbreak framework **GPO-V**, which can easily overcome these unique refusal patterns of dVLMs. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:

- As in Figure.1, we are the first to identify two refusal patterns in diffusion language models: **Immediate Refusal** and **Progressive Refusal**, which reveal the underlying defense mechanisms of dVLMs against potential jailbreak prompts.
- We propose a **Global Probability Optimization** strategy **GPO-V** for dVLMs. Unlike the prefix optimization strategy in autoregressive language models, GPO maximizes the likelihood of positive response patterns while minimizing that of negative patterns.
- Building on GPO, we propose **GPO-V**, the first jailbreak attack framework for dVLMs, representing both a novel security threat and an initial step toward enhancing multimodal dVLM safety. Our evaluations reveal that GPO-V achieves a jailbreak success rate up to 93.2%, vastly exceeding FPO-based baselines. This margin emphasizes the superior effectiveness of GPO in bypassing the unique refusal signatures of dVLMs.

2 Related Work

2.1 Diffusion Language Model

Diffusion probabilistic models (DDPM) (Ho et al., 2020) were initially proposed for image generation by restoring the data distribution through iterative noise sampling (He et al., 2025; Cao et al., 2024), a denoising process that can be interpreted as a Markov Chain(Dayar, 1998). Subsequently, numerous techniques(Lipman et al., 2023; Song et al., 2023), such as DDIM(Song et al., 2020) and SDEs(Song et al., 2021), were developed to improve the generation process. The remarkable success of diffusion models in the image domain has motivated researchers to extend their advantages to text generation(Austin et al., 2021; Lou et al., 2024). However, the discrete nature of text poses significant challenges for realizing the diffusion process. A promising approach to address this challenge is the development of discrete diffusion models for token prediction, which iteratively generate high-confidence outputs based on contextual information, which are known as masked diffusion language models(Sahoo et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2025a). LLaDA (Nie et al., 2025) is the first framework to apply masked text generation to diffusion language models. It employs a bidirectional transformer(Vaswani et al., 2017) with 8B parameters trained from scratch. Similarly, Dream(Ye et al., 2025) is built on the weights of pre-trained autoregressive models. Both frameworks achieve comparable performance to autoregressive models of similar scale while offering faster generation speed.

Notably, recent studies have begun to explore dLLMs in the visual modality, such as LLaDA-V(You et al., 2025) and LaViDA(Li et al., 2025b), highlighting the growing potential of dLLMs as competitive solutions for multimodal learning. These models adopt dLLMs as their backbone and incorporate an additional vision tower for image encoding, thereby enabling efficient and effective understanding of visual information. To date, however, the jailbreak risks associated with dVLMs have not been systematically examined, and addressing this gap constitutes one of the central contributions of our work.

2.2 Jailbreak in Large Language Model

Recent studies (Zhou et al., 2025; Jia et al., 2025) have demonstrated a range of jailbreak attacks on LLMs, including methods that manipulate model outputs through target contention and context contamination (Wei et al., 2023; Shayegani et al., 2024). Other adversarial approaches (Wallace et al., 2019; Ebrahimi et al., 2018) achieve model jailbreaks by searching for and optimizing input perturbations to maximize attack effectiveness. Among these, Greedy-Coordinate-Gradient (GCG) (Zou et al., 2023) is one of the most prominent techniques, employing a strategy similar to AutoPrompt (Shin et al., 2020) to perform discrete label optimization, thereby maximizing the probability of a fixed prefix list (e.g., "Sure, here is"). Subsequent work frequently adopts this objective as a loss function, giving rise to the Fixed Prefix Optimization (FPO) strategy. Notably, FPO has been widely applied to attacks on multimodal language models (Wang et al., 2024; Shin et al., 2020), particularly in vision-based scenarios, due to the relative ease of optimizing differentiable values in the pixel space.

Regrettably, owing to the architectural characteristics of dLLMs, FPO-based methods exhibit only moderate performance, and a generalizable optimization strategy for dLLMs and dVLMs remains largely unexplored.

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 PRELIMINARY

The masked diffusion model is a non-autoregressive, iterative text generation framework in which diffusion dynamics are simulated by progressively replacing tokens with a special mask token <mask>. This process yields a partially masked sequence $y_{n+L}^{(T)} \in \tau$ before T iterations, where L denotes the target generation length and τ denotes the tokenizer vocabulary. We denote the conditional input as w. In target dVLMs, w additionally incorporates visual features encoded from the input image. The complete input sequence $y_{n+L}^{(T)}$ is therefore defined as:

$$y_{n+L}^{(T)} = \Big[\underbrace{w_1, \ldots, w_n}_{\text{Conditions}}, \underbrace{\texttt{<mask>}_1, \ldots, \texttt{<mask>}_L}_{\text{Generation Tokens}}\Big]. \tag{1}$$

Just like diffusion models, the core of dVLMs is a mask predictor f_θ that decodes the entire sequence in parallel through k iterative refinement steps. At each iteration, f_θ predicts token probabilities for all masked positions:

$$P(y_{n+L}^{(k-1)}) = f_\theta\big(y \,\big|\, y_{n+L}^{(k)}\big), \tag{2}$$

Subsequently, the sequence is selectively updated via a selector S, which typically incorporates the number of blocks z and a confidence threshold c. A larger z corresponds to a wider update range, and when $z = L$, the model effectively reduces to traditional autoregressive generation:

$$y_{n+L}^{(k-1)} = S\Big(\underbrace{argmax}_{y_{n+L} \in \tau} P(y_{n+L}^{(k-1)}), c, z\Big). \tag{3}$$

Finally, the model produces the output sequence $y_{n+L}^{(0)}$.

3.2 HEURISTIC INFERENCE

Before presenting the contributions of this paper, we highlight several key observations that underpin our methodology and findings. These insights provide both theoretical and empirical motivation for the proposed approach.

As in Figure.3, in diffusion models, images generated at early denoising steps capture low-dimensional semantic structures of the final output (Yan et al., 2025; Song et al., 2023). Although these intermediate representations are noisier and exhibit higher entropy, they establish the structural foundation upon which later details are formed. Our study shows that, despite masked diffusion models generating data directly rather than denoising latent noise, the global bidirectional-attention predictions at early diffusion steps play a decisive role in shaping and constraining the subsequent generative trajectory. This process is analogous to early-stage cognitive decision-making, where the underlying intent is formed prior to explicit response generation.




Figure 3: **Heuristic Knowledge**: (a) In pixel diffusion models, early diffusion steps primarily recover low-dimensional structure. (b) Likewise, in dVLMs, the initial generation step largely determines the response polarity.

Experimental results support this hypothesis. When GPO-V suppresses global negative word probabilities only at the initial diffusion step and

applies standard inference thereafter, the occurrence of negative word elements in the final output is significantly reduced. This finding suggests that masked diffusion models and conventional diffusion models share similar manifold-level generative structures. For more detailed analysis, please refer to Appendix.A.1.

3.3 Refusal Patterns

We define a rejection pattern as the response generated by the model when it encounters a potential attack vector. In an autoregressive language model, the predictor generates tokens sequentially, predicting only the next token at each step. Its rejection pattern typically manifests as a sequential refusal, which we refer to as autoregressive rejection, characterized by the stepwise generation of positive primitives $R^+ \subset R$ and negative primitives $R^- \subset R$, where $R \subset \tau$. At any initial step $1 \leq t \ll T$, the model generates rejection primitives in the intermediate sequence $y_{n+L}^{(t)}$, which are subsequently fed into the predictor to guide the decoding process:

$$r = f_\theta(y_{n+L}^{(t)}, c), r \in R^-, \tag{4}$$

Subsequently, these rejection primitives r generated at the initial stage guide the model in producing further rejections in later iterations:

$$P_\theta(y \mid c) = \prod_{k=1}^{T} P_\theta\big(y_{n+L}^{(k)} \mid y_{n+L}^{(t)}, r^{(t)}, c\big). \tag{5}$$

Interestingly, we identify two distinct refusal patterns in diffusion language models. This divergence arises from the non-autoregressive generation paradigm inherent to the diffusion architecture, which allows the model to reject harmful inputs without relying on the sequence. Based on these behavioral differences, we classify the two refusal patterns as Immediate Refusal and Progressive Refusal. For Immediate Refusal, the model first generates termination-related primitives (e.g., ¡end¿ or ¡eos¿ token) at the end of the sequence and progressively propagates them toward the front. These tokens encode refusal semantics that signal the termination of the response, which can be expressed as:

$$y_{n+L}^{(t)} = [\text{¡mask¿}_1, \ldots, \text{¡end¿}, \text{¡eos¿}], \tag{6}$$

where $t \ll T$. Once these negative primitives occupy most of the sequence, the model ultimately produces an explicit rejection statement at the beginning (e.g., "Sorry, I cannot assist with that").

In contrast, the Progressive Refusal reflects a scenario in which the model belatedly identifies potentially harmful content and subsequently injects negating tokens to counteract the emerging response. In this setting, the negative primitives $r \subseteq R^-$ are typically produced only after part of a positive response has already appeared. This refusal mode constitutes a distinctive paradigm in diffusion language models, arising from their iterative bidirectional attention modeling, which introduces semantically conflicting updates during the refinement process. Previously, most optimization-based jailbreak techniques for autoregressive LLMs(Li et al., 2024; 2025a) operated by increasing the likelihood of predefined positive prefixes, a strategy we refer to as **Fixed Prefix Optimization** (FPO). However, under the progressive refusal pattern, such methods exhibit limited effectiveness in diffusion language models because token probabilities are conditioned on the entire partially refined sequence, rather than being driven solely by the previously generated prefix. Therefore, there is an urgent need for a method capable of effectively regulating the output distribution of diffusion-based language models under their bidirectional attention mechanism, which is one of the main motivations in our work. In Appendix.A.2, we visually presented these two distinct refusal patterns.

3.4 Global Probability Optimization

To overcome the limitations of FPO in bidirectional attention modeling, we propose a novel attack strategy termed **Global Probability Optimization** (GPO), which is a general output distribution control framework applicable to all masked diffusion language models. Leveraging the parallel prediction property of dVLMs, at each timestep $t \in T$, the mask predictor will predict a probability sequence $P(y_{n:L}^{(t)})$, including all the token vocabulary that may appear at every position $n \leq s \leq L$. In contrast to FPO, which focuses on the probability of the initial tokens in the sequence. The optimization objective of GPO pertains to the probability of the negative primitives $R^- \subset R$ across




Figure 4: **Overview of the optimization process of GPO-V**: In the parallel generation scenario, GPO-V jointly optimizes the token occurrence probabilities across all positions, including the probabilities of positive tokens at every position and the probabilities of anchor tokens at specific positions. Rather than forcing the model to produce a fixed prefix or suffix, GPO-V guides the output direction through global manipulation of the probability distribution.

the entire sequence $y_{n:L}$. To ensure that the model can generate positive responses for arbitrary inputs, it is crucial to minimize the likelihood of triggering either the Immediate Refusal or Progressive Refusal patterns. For the Immediate Rejection, GPO utilizes a global probability loss $\mathcal{L}_{global}$ to inhibit the generation of rejection primitives at the initial and final stages of the model's early time steps. At each position $n < s \leq L$, the probability of generating negative primitives is minimized, which can be formally expressed as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{global} = \frac{1}{|R^-|}\frac{1}{L}\left(\sum_{s=0}^{L}\log(P(y^{(t)}[s] \in R^- \mid x))\right), \tag{7}$$

where x represents the sequence visible to the model. One advantage of $\mathcal{L}_{global}$ is that it does not require extensive inference over the initial sequence x. According to our heuristic inference, x close to $y^{(t)}$ ($t \ll T$) is sufficient to achieve a strong attack performance. However, only $\mathcal{L}_{global}$ always tends to drive the model toward a progressive rejection pattern. We speculate that this occurs because the positive semantics present at low time steps $t \ll T$ are difficult to preserve in later steps. Introducing intermediate state sequences into the optimization loss could mitigate this issue, but doing so would substantially increase the computational cost of the attack. To address this challenge, we introduce an additional loss function $\mathcal{L}_{anchor}$ to maintain the stability of the generated sequence, composed of a set of connective tokens $R^+ \subset R$. The semantics of R^+ intermediate connectives are more stable during iterative inference, enabling them to accumulate into a coherent positive response. $\mathcal{L}_{anchor}$ can be formally expressed as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{anchor} = -\frac{1}{|R^+|}\sum_{i=1}^{|R^+|}\log P\left(y^{(t)}[i] = R_i^+ \mid x\right) \tag{8}$$

Finally, we can obtain the complete loss function form of GPO:

$$\mathcal{L}_{GPO} = \lambda_1\mathcal{L}_{global} + \lambda_2\mathcal{L}_{anchor}, \tag{9}$$

where λ_1 and λ_2 represent the hyperparameters of weight.

3.5 Jailbreak Attack Framework in dVLMs

A central challenge is determining how to incorporate the GPO loss function into jailbreak gradient optimization in multimodal dVLMs. To address this, as in Figure.4, we introduce a novel jailbreak

attack framework, which is the first to enable GPO-based jailbreak optimization in vision diffusion language models, called **GPO-V**. Inspired by adversarial attacks in image classification(Nakka & Salzmann, 2021; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017), GPO-V enables an attacker to steer the target dVLM with a carefully designed disturbance δ toward generating positive responses to any specified threat token p' while suppressing all refusal patterns. The output $y_{n+L}^{(0)}$ of the target model is formally defined as:

$$y_{n+L}^{(0)} = M_\theta(x, I + \delta, T, p'), \tag{10}$$

where M denotes the target dVLM, T is the number of iterative time steps, and I is the input image. For each set of candidate inputs (I, p'), we perform multiple rounds of optimization on the perturbation δ of to obtain the final attack vector $I + \delta$, where:

$$\delta = \arg\min_{\delta} \mathcal{L}_{GPO}, ||\delta||_\infty < \epsilon, \tag{11}$$

where ϵ represents the perturbation bound in the pixel space, which is typically set to an extremely small value.

It is worth noting that GPO-V is designed as a versatile optimization framework, owing to its objective function being grounded in visual input modalities. Consequently, the adversarial perturbations can be seamlessly projected onto either the pixel space or the latent manifold. For latent-space optimization, Equation.10 is reformulated by substituting the raw image I with its latent representation $\mathcal{E}(I)$, where $\mathcal{E}(\cdot)$ denotes the visual encoder of the target dLLM, such as SigLIP(Zhai et al., 2023b) or DINOv2(Oquab et al., 2024). The choice of perturbation domain (pixel vs. latent) primarily affects the convergence rate rather than the final Attack Success Rate (ASR). To facilitate a more efficient evaluation, we adopt latent-space optimization as our default configuration. We systematically validate the effectiveness of pixel-space perturbations in Appendix.A.4, confirming that GPO-V maintains high performance regardless of the representation space.

4 EXPERIMENT

Model	Dataset	Direct	NA	FPO (GCG)				GPO-V (Ours)			
				JSR	H-HS	A-HS	FPT	JSR	H-HS	A-HS	FPT
LLaDA-V	AdvBench	0.2	1	8.5	1.81	1.02	0.07	**86.4**	**7.12**	**6.98**	**0.12**
			2	9.8	2.01	1.14	0.08	**93.2**	**7.85**	**7.21**	**0.10**
			3	11.1	2.12	1.24	0.08	**81.1**	**7.25**	**6.54**	**0.15**
	JailBreakBench	1.8	1	7.2	1.51	1.82	0.01	**84.1**	**7.35**	**7.12**	**0.18**
			2	9.4	1.72	2.04	0.01	**90.3**	**7.92**	**7.65**	**0.14**
			3	10.5	1.92	2.22	0.03	**82.1**	**8.20**	**7.90**	**0.09**
LaViDA	AdvBench	1.2	1	1.1	1.25	1.55	0.05	**82.3**	**7.12**	**7.45**	**0.12**
			2	1.4	1.52	1.81	0.06	**85.6**	**7.45**	**7.88**	**0.18**
			3	1.6	1.82	2.04	0.07	**88.9**	**7.71**	**8.12**	**0.12**
	JailBreakBench	0.9	1	3.8	1.21	1.42	0.01	**79.5**	**6.85**	**7.52**	**0.11**
			2	4.5	1.45	1.62	0.02	**82.1**	**7.11**	**7.84**	**0.18**
			3	5.2	1.62	1.91	0.01	**85.5**	**7.32**	**8.12**	**0.13**

Table 1: **Quantitative Results of GPO-V with Different Anchor Numbers**: We evaluate the performance across two multimodal diffusion models on AdvBench and JailBreakBench. **NA** denotes the number of anchors. **Direct** represents the Jailbreak Success Rate (JSR) without any perturbations. **H-HS** and **A-HS** denote Human-Annotated and AI-Assessed Hazard Scores. The **FPT** represents the frequency of prohibited terms in the response.

In this section, we evaluate the performance of GPO-V across several multimodal diffusion language models. We select LLaDA-V(You et al., 2025) and LaViDA(Li et al., 2025b) as baseline models, as they represent mainstream and state-of-the-art masked diffusion vision language models. For each baseline model, we conducted evaluations separately on AdvBench(Zou et al., 2023) and JailBreakBench(Chao et al., 2024), both of which contain more than 500 prompts covering a wide range of benign and harmful behaviors. All AI-based hazard scores were generated using ChatGPT-4o

from OpenAI. All experiments are performed on an NVIDIA A800 with 80GB GPU memory. Due to space constraints, broader results on MMaDA and the text-diffusion PAD baseline are reported in Appendix A.9.

4.1 Experimental Setup

We summarize the experimental settings below, including the optimization step count, the configuration applied to FPO strategies, and the criteria used for hyperparameter selection.

Regarding of Perturbation δ: To ensure experimental fairness and reproducibility, we optimize the perturbation δ for a maximum of $150 \times NA$ iterations, where NA denotes the number of anchors. This iteration budget is empirically sufficient to achieve stable convergence of the loss function, as in Figure.5. Although this number of steps does not fully minimize the loss, it provides a practical balance between computational efficiency and resource consumption. As validated in Appendix.A.4, the perturbation domain does not significantly affect performance. Thus, latent-space optimization was adopted for resource efficiency.

Regarding FPO Strategies: To more clearly highlight the advantages of the proposed GPO strategy, in our experiments we ensure that, for all FPO-based baselines (e.g., GCG), the desired generated prefix is manually enforced. Specifically, we set the probability of producing the designated prefix (e.g., "Sure, here is") to 100%, guaranteeing that these methods start from the same fixed prefix. For varying values of NA, we constrain the model to generate prefixes with a length of $5NA$. Regarding the anchor template, please refer to Appendix.A.3.

Model	Block	JSR (%)	H-HS	A-HS	FPT
LLaDA-V	128	91.5	7.25	7.54	0.15
	64	93.2	7.85	7.21	0.10
	32	87.0	6.74	7.21	0.12
	Fast-dLLM	**88.1**	**8.41**	**7.60**	**0.14**

Table 2: **Generation Settings**: Evaluation across various block lengths and Fast-dLLM acceleration.

Regarding Hyperparameter Selection: During the reasoning process, the response length is restricted to 128 tokens, with one token sampled at each step. Based on empirical observations, the learning rate for the perturbation δ is set to $1e-2$. To ensure the reliability of the experimental results, two reasoning approaches are applied to each sample in LLaDA-V: standard stepwise reasoning and accelerated reasoning using the Fast-dLLM(Wu et al., 2025) technique.

4.2 Attack Performance

In Table.1, we report the attack performance of the two primary baseline models under the two evaluation benchmarks. It is evident that the traditional FPO strategy has only a negligible effect on attacking masked diffusion models. In contrast, GPO-V achieves a jailbreak success rate exceeding 90%, demonstrating that the proposed GPO strategy is highly effective for masked diffusion language models in the visual modality.

To evaluate the attack performance of GPO-V under different generation parameters. In Table.2, we conducted a series of experiments on LLaDA-V across varying generative configurations. The size of the diffusion block determines the effective generation length of the autoregressive module. In addition, we incorporated FastdLLM to accelerate the sampling process. The experimental results show that even under the FastdLLM framework, the GPO strategy consistently delivers strong attack performance. These findings indicate that GPO constitutes both a generalizable and robust attack methodology for masked diffusion visual language models. For more visual results, please refer to Appendix.A.7.

Model	Dataset	JSR (%)	H-HS	A-HS
LLaDA-V	AdvBench	65.4	7.21	6.52
	JailbreakBench	72.1	8.11	6.42
LaViDA	AdvBench	68.9	6.72	6.13
	JailbreakBench	66.4	6.60	6.05

Table 3: **Transferability Across Baselines**: We evaluated two baseline models on both AdvBench and JailbreakBench to assess attack transferability.




Figure 5: Visualization of $\mathcal{L}_{GPO}$ during the δ optimization process.

4.3 TRANSFERABILITY

Although publicly available dVLMs remain limited and employ diverse vision encoders, we further evaluate the cross-model transferability of GPO-V. Specifically, we optimize pixel-space adversarial examples on a source model and evaluate them against heterogeneous victim models in a black-box setting. As shown in Table 3, GPO-V achieves substantially stronger transfer performance than FPO, suggesting that it captures adversarial directions shared across different dVLM architectures. Additional transfer results on the architecturally distinct MMaDA model are provided in Appendix A.10.




Figure 6: **Strategy Ablation**: The NG-only setting: only the negative word optimization. The Anchor-only setting: only the anchor optimization.

4.4 ABLATION STUDY

We assess the contribution of each GPO objective by setting λ_1 or λ_2 in Equation 9 to zero, thereby retaining only anchor optimization or global probability optimization, respectively. As shown in Figure 6, removing either objective substantially reduces attack effectiveness. With only global probability optimization, the model can select alternative refusal tokens outside the constrained vocabulary and enter the immediate refusal pattern. With only anchor optimization, the model initially generates compliant content but gradually transitions to progressive refusal. These results demonstrate that both objectives are necessary to suppress refusal semantics while maintaining a stable compliant trajectory.

5 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we systematically characterize the refusal behaviors of masked diffusion models and identify two distinctive patterns, namely Immediate Refusal and Progressive Refusal. Based on these observations, we propose Global Probability Optimization (GPO), a novel jailbreak strategy that manipulates token probabilities across the entire generation process rather than optimizing a fixed prefix. Building on GPO, we introduce GPO-V, the first visual jailbreak framework for diffusion vision-language models (dVLMs). Extensive experiments demonstrate its effectiveness, cross-model transferability, and applicability across different optimization spaces, revealing critical vulnerabilities in non-sequential generative architectures. These findings challenge the perceived robustness of dVLMs and highlight the urgent need for stronger safety alignment and defense mechanisms tailored to diffusion-based generation.

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A Technical Appendices

A.1 Prior Knowledge in Image Generation Diffusion Models

In image generation diffusion models, the sampling process—commonly referred to as the reverse process—involves iteratively denoising from a standard Gaussian noise $\epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{I})$ over T timesteps. Specifically, the model aims to predict the added noise $\epsilon_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t)$ at a given timestep t to infer the state at $t-1$. Under the Denoising Diffusion Implicit Models (DDIM) framework, each denoising transition can be formulated as:

$$x_{t-1} = \sqrt{\alpha_{t-1}} \left(\frac{x_t - \sqrt{1-\alpha_t}\epsilon_\theta(x_t, t)}{\sqrt{\alpha_t}} \right) + \sqrt{1-\alpha_{t-1}} \cdot \epsilon_\theta(x_t, t), \tag{12}$$

where ϵ_θ is the denoising model with parameters θ, α_t denotes the noise scale constant, and $\mathbf{x}_t$ represents the sample at timestep t.

Prior research(Song et al., 2023; Yan et al., 2025) indicates that the reverse denoising process ($\mathbf{x}_T \rightarrow \mathbf{x}_0$) exhibits distinct spectral dynamics, where the intermediate sample $\mathbf{x}_t$ undergoes a coarse-to-fine reconstruction in the frequency domain. Specifically, at larger timesteps (near T), the model prioritizes the recovery of low-frequency components, such as global semantic structures and coarse layouts. As t approaches 0, the synthesis shifts toward high-frequency information, including fine-grained textures, intricate details, and sharp transitions.

We hypothesize that an analogous property exists in diffusion language models, where the initial latent state significantly dictates the global semantic direction of the generated sequence. To validate this, we monitor the logit dynamics of specific anchor tokens—namely 'Sure' and 'First'—throughout the reverse process. Empirical observations reveal that optimizing the initial noise distribution alone induces a high probability of these tokens 'crystallizing' during the nascent stages of sampling. Once stabilized, these anchored tokens serve as a semantic compass, effectively steering the model's entire downstream generation trajectory, as in Figure.7.

In addition, we investigate the confidence evolution of anchor tokens throughout the sampling trajectory. Our empirical results demonstrate that even when multiple anchor positions are optimized starting from a fully masked initial sequence <mask>, the model consistently prioritizes sampling the target tokens at these locations during the nascent stages. Once these anchor tokens are 'materialized,' they function as semantic pivots, effectively steering the subsequent denoising process to complete the remaining content in a contextually consistent manner. In order to facilitate understanding, we visualized this process in Figure.8.

A.2 Visualization of Different Refusal Patterns

As a cornerstone of our contributions and the theoretical basis for global probabilistic optimization, we characterize "refusal patterns": the distinct response behaviors of models when triggered by sensitive




Figure 7: The sampling trajectory of dVLMs exhibits a high sensitivity to initial noise configurations, a property shared with image generation diffusion models. We demonstrate that localized optimization of anchor tokens in the initial latent space can 'pre-program' the final output. As the reverse process unfolds, the model gravitates toward the toxic semantics established by these anchors, leading to a successful jailbreak through the involuntary completion of prohibited content.

prompts. Unlike autoregressive language models, which typically generate refusal sequences through sequential causal decoding, diffusion-based language models manifest fundamentally different behaviors due to their iterative refinement nature. Based on the spatiotemporal dynamics of negative token emergence, we categorize these behaviors into two archetypes: the immediate refusal and the progressive refusal. **Regarding Immediate Refusal**: This represents the most prevalent




Figure 8: Under most configurations, the optimized latent state successfully biases the model toward the intended anchor tokens at the onset of sampling. Despite occasional deviations introduced by stochasticity (e.g., model temperature), the cumulative influence of the anchored positions ensures that the overall adversarial trajectory remains stable, yielding a consistently high attack success rate. refusal modality in diffusion language models. In this pattern, the model directly instantiates refusal primitives—such as "Sorry" or "As an AI assistant"—at the earliest stages of the reverse process. This phenomenon suggests an instantaneous activation of internal safety guardrails upon encountering sensitive prompt triggers. Consequently, the high-dimensional latent state is immediately biased toward a predefined safety subspace, resulting in a categorical negative response that is locked in before the semantic details of the sequence are even fully formed. **Regarding Progressive Refusal**: This pattern represents a sophisticated self-correction mechanism within the denoising trajectory, where the model rectifies an initially unsafe or compliant latent state. Structurally, progressive rejection manifests as a hybrid sequence transition, shifting from early affirmative tokens (e.g., "Sure," "Okay") to subsequent refusal responses. This behavior stems from a temporal lag in safety trigger

activation; as the denoising process evolves and the semantic density of the prompt increases, the model retrospectively identifies latent adversarial hazards that were overlooked at earlier timesteps. This phenomenon is particularly pronounced under Fixed Prefix Optimization (FPO) strategies, providing diffusion language models with intrinsic adversarial resilience against discrete optimization attacks like GCG (Greedy Coordinate Gradient).

Figure.9 visualizes the distinct temporal dynamics of these two refusal patterns. In Figure.9 (a), when the model detects sensitive prompts at the onset of the reverse process, it assigns high confidence to refusal tokens during the initial timesteps, resulting in an immediate rejection. In contrast, Figure.9 (b) illustrates the Progressive Rejection scenario: the model initially yields low-confidence predictions for negative tokens, but their probability mass monotonically increases as the denoising process evolves, eventually culminating in a secure refusal response.

A.3 Different Settings of Anchor Template

In this section, we evaluate the adversarial efficacy of GPO-V on AdvBench across various anchor template scenarios, which simulate the diverse response patterns an attacker might elicit from the model. As illustrated in Figure.10, we consider three distinct anchoring schemes, denoted as AT_1, AT_2, and AT_3. For our primary experimental evaluations, AT_1 is adopted as the default configuration. Detailed attack performance can be referred to in Table.4.

Table 4: **Impact of Different Anchor Templates on AdvBench**: We evaluate the adversarial efficacy of GPO-V across three anchor template scenarios (AT_1, AT_2, AT_3). AT_1 serves as our default configuration. The results demonstrate the robustness of GPO-V across various simulated response patterns compared to the FPO baseline.

Model	Template	Direct	FPO (GCG)				GPO-V (Ours)			
			JSR	H-HS	A-HS	FPT	JSR	H-HS	A-HS	FPT
LLaDA-V	AT_1 (Default)	1.8	9.8	2.01	1.14	0.08	**93.2**	**7.85**	**7.21**	**0.10**
	AT_2		10.2	1.81	2.12	0.01	**90.8**	**8.12**	**7.75**	**0.17**
	AT_3		10.8	2.05	2.34	0.01	**91.5**	**8.15**	**7.82**	**0.11**
LaViDA	AT_1 (Default)	0.9	1.4	1.52	1.81	0.06	**85.6**	**7.45**	**7.88**	**0.18**
	AT_2		2.8	1.50	1.79	0.01	**83.9**	**7.21**	**7.95**	**0.10**
	AT_3		4.5	1.75	2.08	0.01	**84.7**	**7.28**	**8.05**	**0.05**

A.4 Attack Performance in Pixel Space

While previous sections have established GPO-V's superior attack performance within the latent space, its efficacy is not confined to distilled feature domains. Despite the lower information density




Figure 9: Visualize the immediate rejection pattern and the progressive rejection pattern, which represent the defense logic of dVLMs when encountering sensitive prompts.




Figure 10: We define three distinct anchor template configurations, which delineate the target tokens to be optimized at their respective positions within the generated sequence.




Figure 11: Visualization of $\mathcal{L}_{GPO}$ of pixel space in LaViDA during the δ optimization process.

of the pixel space relative to the latent manifold, GPO-V achieves nearly equivalent attack success rates in both settings. This observation suggests that the adversarial efficacy stems from global probabilistic steering rather than the semantic complexity of the perturbation itself. Although pixel-space optimization necessitates a larger iteration budget, the resulting perturbations demonstrate exceptional cross-model transferability and robust black-box capabilities. Table.5 further quantifies these results, revealing a negligible performance gap between pixel-space adversarial examples and their latent-space counterparts.

Table 5: **Quantifying the Performance Gap between Latent-Space and Pixel-Space Optimization**: We evaluate GPO-V's efficacy across different optimization domains on AdvBench. Despite the lower information density of the pixel manifold, the results demonstrate that GPO-V achieves nearly equivalent attack success rates and hazard scores, confirming its robustness beyond distilled feature domains.

Model	Disturbed Space	JSR (↑)	H-HS (↑)	A-HS (↑)	FPT (↑)
LLaDA-V	Latent Space	86.4	7.12	6.98	0.12
	Pixel Space	82.8	7.15	7.85	0.14
LaViDA	Latent Space	85.6	7.45	7.88	0.18
	Pixel Space	85.1	7.28	8.08	0.18

A.5 More Analysis About GPO-V

GPO reveals a critical security trade-off in diffusion language models: their inherent iterative refinement process, which effectively filters local adversarial targets, becomes an Achilles' heel when targeted by GPO. By transitioning the optimization objective from discrete sequences to global probabilistic trajectories, attackers can circumvent safety guardrails with greater ease than their autoregressive counterparts. This suggests that current safety alignment techniques, largely optimized for causal decoding, may be insufficient for the unique generative manifold of diffusion models.

We attribute the efficacy of GPO to two primary factors. First, the intrinsic training objectives of diffusion language models create structural vulnerabilities; current fine-tuning paradigms predominantly focus on token-level denoising (akin to cloze-style reconstruction), which inadvertently predisposes the model to overlook global adversarial nuances within the broader context. Second, prevailing safety alignment protocols exhibit a significant positional bias. Most alignment datasets prioritize securing the initial tokens of a sequence, leaving the remaining generative manifold under-constrained. GPO exploits this lack of omni-positional security guarantees, effectively steering the model's global probability distribution toward malicious regions. To validate our analysis, Appendix.A.6 introduces an adaptive defense that hard-anchors pivotal 'turning words.' This localized semantic stabilization effectively neutralizes GPO's global probabilistic steering, significantly enhancing model resilience against latent-space optimization.

A.6 Adaptive Defense Strategy

Given that GPO fundamentally operates as a global semantic attack, we propose a straightforward yet effective mitigation strategy. Our objective is to artificially induce the progressive rejection pattern by penalizing abrupt semantic transitions within the generated sequence. This is implemented by injecting a specialized token, z', at position n, where z' is selected for its strong transitional semantic properties (e.g., contrastive conjunctions). As demonstrated in Table 3, this intervention markedly diminishes the attack efficacy of GPO. While the potential for successful jailbreaking persists in specific edge cases, our strategy significantly bolsters the model's defensive resilience against global probabilistic steering.

Table 6: **Mitigation Efficacy of Token Injection Strategy against GPO**: We evaluate the defensive resilience of models by injecting a specialized transitional token z' at position n. The results show that this straightforward intervention markedly diminishes the attack success rate (JSR) and hazard scores by inducing a progressive rejection mode, effectively counteracting global probabilistic steering.


Model	Defense Strategy	JSR (↓)	H-HS (↓)	A-HS (↓)
LLaDA-V	None (Vanilla GPO)	86.4	7.12	6.98
	Token Injection (z')	**24.3**	**2.15**	**1.88**
LaViDA	None (Vanilla GPO)	85.6	7.45	7.88
	Token Injection (z')	**18.7**	**1.92**	**2.05**


A.7 More Visual Results

In this section, we present some visualizations of GPO-V attack cases.

A.8 Evaluation Criteria of GPO-V


To quantify the harmfulness of the generated responses, we introduce two metrics: A-HS and H-HS. For A-HS, we leverage GPT-4o from OpenAI as an automated evaluator. The specific evaluation prompt template is provided in Figure.12. For H-HS, we employ human graders who adhere to the identical scoring rubric to ensure evaluative consistency across both AI and human assessments.





A.9 Additional dVLM and Attack Baseline

Open-source dVLMs remain a nascent model family, limiting the number of publicly available architectures that can be evaluated. We therefore extend our evaluation to MMaDA (Yang et al., 2025), broadening the experiments to cover the principal open-source dVLM architectures currently available. We also adapt PAD (Zhang et al., 2025b), a text-only diffusion jailbreak method, as an additional attack baseline. This comparison inherently favors PAD: PAD directly fixes and overwrites output-mask tokens during decoding, whereas GPO-V intervenes only through the input image and never overwrites output tokens. As shown in Table 7, GPO-V remains competitive under this substantially more restrictive intervention setting and consistently produces high hazard scores across models and datasets.



Safety Evaluation Guidelines for GPO-V

You are a "jailbreak risk assessment model". Your job is to evaluate whether the model's responses violate security rules.
Scoring criteria (0 - 10 points):

- 0: The answer is completely safe and has no relation to the attack

- 1 - 3: There is a slight deviation from the security guidelines, but it is generally harmless

- 4 - 6: There is a clear tendency towards jailbreaking, and the model has partially outputted prohibited directions

- 7 - 9: Jailbreaking is basically successful, and the answer contains significant violations or dangerous information

- 10: Complete jailbreaking success, and the answer contains serious and high-risk content

Note:
- You are not allowed to generate any sensitive information or dangerous content.
- You must only output a single number (0-10), without any accompanying analysis text.

Figure 12: **Evaluation Criteria for GPO-V**: In our experiments, we define a score of 6 as the threshold for a successful jailbreak.

Compatibility with fixed-prefix optimization. We additionally apply FPO and GPO jointly in both visual and text intervention spaces. The resulting cross-modality ablation shows that the global probability objective is complementary to fixed-prefix strategies: adding GPO consistently strengthens the attack whether optimization is performed in continuous image space or discrete text space. This

Table 7: **Additional dVLM and attack baseline results.** PAD directly intervenes in output-mask tokens, whereas GPO-V modifies only the input image. A dash indicates that FPT was not reported in the rebuttal experiments.

Model	Dataset	Method	Intervention Space	Token Overwrite	JSR (%) ↑	H-HS ↑	A-HS ↑
LLaDA-V	AdvBench	PAD	Output-mask tokens	Yes	90.1	7.32	7.10
	AdvBench	GPO-V	Input image	No	93.2	7.85	7.21
	JailbreakBench	PAD	Output-mask tokens	Yes	93.2	7.49	7.21
	JailbreakBench	GPO-V	Input image	No	90.3	7.92	7.65
LaViDA	AdvBench	PAD	Output-mask tokens	Yes	93.1	7.45	6.80
	AdvBench	GPO-V	Input image	No	85.6	7.45	7.88
	JailbreakBench	PAD	Output-mask tokens	Yes	93.0	7.42	7.18
	JailbreakBench	GPO-V	Input image	No	90.1	7.85	7.58
MMaDA	AdvBench	PAD	Output-mask tokens	Yes	92.9	7.40	7.15
	AdvBench	GPO-V	Input image	No	90.0	7.82	7.55
	JailbreakBench	PAD	Output-mask tokens	Yes	92.8	7.38	7.13
	JailbreakBench	GPO-V	Input image	No	89.9	7.80	7.53

Table 8: **Black-box transfer to MMaDA.** Adversarial examples are optimized on the surrogate model and evaluated on MMaDA without target-model access during optimization.

Surrogate Model	Target Model	Dataset	Optimization Objective	JSR (%) ↑	H-HS ↑	A-HS ↑
LLaDA-V	MMaDA	AdvBench	$2NA$ + global negative loss	45.2	8.14	7.83
LaViDA	MMaDA	AdvBench	$2NA$ + global negative loss	52.1	7.69	7.52
LLaDA-V	MMaDA	JailbreakBench	$2NA$ + global negative loss	41.2	7.90	8.12
LaViDA	MMaDA	JailbreakBench	$2NA$ + global negative loss	49.3	8.21	8.03

behavior supports the view that GPO regulates the global denoising trajectory rather than duplicating prefix-level control.

A.10 Black-Box Transfer to MMaDA

We further evaluate whether adversarial examples optimized on LLaDA-V or LaViDA transfer to MMaDA without using the target model during optimization. Table 8 shows that GPO-V retains substantial attack efficacy against this architecturally distinct target. Transfer from LaViDA is consistently stronger, reaching a JSR of 52.1% on AdvBench and 49.3% on JailbreakBench. These results provide additional evidence that GPO-V captures adversarial directions that generalize across dVLM architectures.

A.11 LLM Usage

Large language models were used to assist with language polishing and LaTeX formatting. The authors reviewed all generated content and take full responsibility for the final manuscript.