PRISM: PROBE-GUIDED LOCALIZATION AND FEATURE REPAIR FOR VISUAL PROMPT INJECTION

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ABSTRACT

A visual prompt injection defense can suppress the attacker's target answer yet still fail the user's task. It must reject image-borne instructions while preserving the visual evidence needed to answer correctly. Separate-caption evaluations do not test this distinction within application content. We introduce AppInjectBench, a benchmark spanning 11 applications that embeds injected instructions in interface content such as reviews, comments, and messages. Each example pairs a clean screenshot with a benign-text variant and an injected variant, enabling joint evaluation of task recovery and benign task performance. We further propose PRISM, which observes attention to visual tokens under a fixed query. A learned spatial locator uses this observation to identify injection regions. PRISM replaces the selected visual features with a shared mean of their unselected boundary features. The frozen model then answers the original task from a fresh prefill using the modified representation. On model-specific AppInjectBench test sets of 1,000 sources screened for correct benign answers and successful undefended injection, PRISM recovers 96.7% of cases with Qwen2-VL-7B and 94.0% with Qwen2.5-VL-7B, while causing new errors on at most 0.3% of benign inputs.

1 INTRODUCTION

Application interfaces can place answer-bearing content beside lower-trust reviews, comments, or messages (Figure 3). Vision–language models (VLMs) answer questions about images and interpret such interfaces (Liu et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2024; Lin et al., 2025). Their ability to read also exposes them to visual prompt injection: image text can ask a model to abandon the user's objective and return a different answer (Lu et al., 2026; Cao et al., 2026). Suppressing the injected target is insufficient if the model refuses or loses the visual evidence needed to answer. We study task recovery together with preservation of useful image content.

Recent defenses modify internal model behavior. ARGUS combines detection, learned activation-steering directions, adaptive intervention strength and post-filtering (Lu et al., 2026). LaSM scales selected attention and MLP modules for malicious GUI pop-ups (Yan et al., 2026). An injected instruction may request an arbitrary string or a plausible but incorrect task answer. We examine ARGUS as a concrete case by varying the target requested in a separate image caption, holding image content and rendering fixed. In this diagnostic, Full ARGUS follows random-string targets in 0.0% of cases but same-type wrong answers in 34.8%, showing target-style sensitivity in the evaluated stack (Section 3.1). This diagnostic does not identify which ARGUS component causes the difference.

The caption diagnostic isolates target form. Evaluating recovery within applications also requires testing whether a defense preserves task evidence when an instruction appears within application content. We introduce *AppInjectBench*, a recovery challenge across 11 applications, where injected reviews, comments or messages coexist with legitimate task evidence. We populate the applications with this content before capturing their rendered interfaces, rather than pasting text onto finished screenshots. Paired Clean, Neutral and Impact screenshots test both answer restoration and preservation of normal content. Screening selects cases where the model answers Clean and Neutral correctly and follows the injected instruction on Impact, making recovery the evaluation target.

Together, target-style variation and the need to preserve task evidence motivate exploring an intervention at the source of the instruction. Because injected instructions and task evidence share

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a screenshot, we predict the instruction region and replace its visual features while leaving other visual tokens available. GTM establishes local visual-token suppression as a defense route (Zhang et al., 2026b). Our aim is to suppress the suspected region while preserving answer evidence.

We introduce PRISM to implement this region-level intervention. Attention from a fixed-query prefill, without the user's task, feeds a supervised spatial locator. The locator selects projected visual features in the suspected instruction region. Rather than zeroing them, PRISM replaces the selected features with one shared mean of unselected features along their spatial boundary. The frozen VLM then answers the original task from a fresh prefill, with other visual features unchanged. PRISM reaches 96.7% Recovery on Qwen2-VL-7B and 94.0% on Qwen2.5-VL-7B in separate AppInject-Bench tests, with at most 0.3% benign-input harm.

Our contributions are threefold. First, AppInjectBench tests task recovery and normal-input preservation on paired, application-rendered interfaces, with auditable, model-specific eligibility. Second, we introduce PRISM, which combines attention-based spatial localization with localized visual-feature repair on a frozen backbone. Third, PRISM achieves large gains in task recovery over ARGUS on both AppInjectBench tests and higher recovery on the official ARGUS test.

2 Related Work

Defenses against visual prompt injection. Indirect injection lets untrusted content redirect a model from the user's instruction (Greshake et al., 2023; Yi et al., 2025). Images and audio can also carry attacks, including optimized perturbations unlike the readable screenshot text studied here (Bagdasaryan et al., 2023; Bailey et al., 2024). ARGUS combines detection, activation steering, and post-filtering (Lu et al., 2026). LaSM scales attention and MLP modules against malicious GUI pop-ups (Yan et al., 2026). GTM ranks visual embeddings by hidden-state-norm gradients and zeros selected embeddings (Zhang et al., 2026b). Text methods separate prompts from data (Chen et al., 2025), sanitize inputs (Geng et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2026), or localize injected segments (Jia et al., 2026). Task Shield checks agent actions against user goals (Jia et al., 2025). PRISM instead learns a supervised spatial locator from fixed-query attention and replaces selected features with the mean of unselected boundary features.

Visual token selection and pruning. Visual-token pruning selects or recycles embeddings to reduce inference cost while retaining task performance (Chen et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2025b; Xing et al., 2025; Li et al., 2025). Other methods merge similar tokens or select diverse ones (Bolya et al., 2023; Shang et al., 2025; Alvar et al., 2025; Yang et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2026a). Its selection criteria do not identify injected instructions: a redundant token need not be malicious, and an attended token may contain answer evidence. PRISM instead learns from injection-region annotations, retains spatial positions, and replaces selected features before answering the task.

GUI understanding and visual security. Visual instruction tuning and variable-resolution backbones support image QA (Liu et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2024; Bai et al., 2025). SeeClick grounds screen elements (Cheng et al., 2024), Pix2Struct parses screenshots (Lee et al., 2023), and ScreenAI supports UI question answering (Baechler et al., 2024). ShowUI models GUI actions (Lin et al., 2025). VisualWebArena and OSWorld test web and multi-application workflows (Koh et al., 2024; Xie et al., 2024). TextVQA and ScreenQA require reading scene or interface text to answer (Singh et al., 2019; Hsiao et al., 2025), making blanket removal unsuitable. VPI-Bench tests visible instructions in interactive computer use, while WebInject uses optimized webpage pixels (Cao et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2025). WASP separates partial hijacking from completed goals, OS-Harm covers desktop injection and misuse, and AgentDojo reports task utility alongside attacker success (Evtimov et al., 2025; Kuntz et al., 2025; Debenedetti et al., 2024). Pop-ups, deceptive web interfaces, and third-party mobile-app content can redirect agents during interaction (Zhang et al., 2025a; Shi et al., 2026; Liu et al., 2026). Gandalf the Red studies security–utility tradeoffs under adaptive text attacks (Pfister et al., 2025). AppInjectBench instead isolates screenshot-level answer recovery and benign-input harm.

3 APPINJECTBENCH

AppInjectBench tests whether a defense restores the user's answer while preserving task evidence in application content. A controlled caption diagnostic first isolates target-style sensitivity. Its coverage limit motivates the paired application screenshots that follow.

3.1 CAPTION DIAGNOSTIC AND ITS LIMIT

The ARGUS image benchmark places an instruction in a separate caption (Lu et al., 2026). From its original 1,000 sources, we selected 250 with correct clean responses and rendered four targets per source: random strings, common English words, normal VQA answers, and same-type wrong answers such as red instead of blue. The four styles share these 250 sources and yield 1,000 attacked images. Image content, trigger, font, and placement remain fixed within each source. Selection preceded evaluation of the new variants. Figure 1 shows the target styles, and Figure 2 reports the results.



Figure 1: Four injection target styles for a shared image and question. The highlighted caption contains the injected instruction. Boxes and arrows are explanatory annotations.



Figure 2: Target-following rates before and after Full ARGUS on Qwen2-VL-7B (lower is better). The left pair shows the original 1,000-image ARGUS test. The four right pairs show the four target styles applied to the same 250 sources.

After Full ARGUS, same-type wrong targets are followed more frequently (34.8%) than random-string (0.0%), common-word (0.4%), or normal-VQA (6.8%) targets. This difference shows sensitivity to target style in the evaluated ARGUS configuration, but does not identify which component causes it.

The separate caption isolates target style but cannot test whether a defense rejects an instruction embedded among labels, descriptions, or records needed to answer the task. Its fixed position may also provide a layout cue that does not transfer to other presentations.

3.2 PAIRED APPLICATION-CONTENT CONSTRUCTION

Figure 3 maps answer-bearing content and simulated injection surfaces across 11 applications in four interface settings. We render each source in its native application and capture paired screenshots to test whether a defense can reject an injected instruction while retaining the evidence needed to answer the user's question.

Each source has a question, registered correct answer, and three screenshots: *Clean* (original), *Neutral* (benign text edit), and *Impact* (instruction seeking a registered wrong answer). Impact measures recovery, while Clean and Neutral measure harm to normal inputs. The model sees only the question and an image, not the answer, region annotation, or paired controls. See Supplementary Figures S2 and S3 for enlarged three-arm and cross-application examples.

A source is eligible if the undefended evaluation model answers Clean and Neutral correctly and follows the registered target on Impact, using the same images and runtime as evaluation. This is a



Figure 3: AppInjectBench construction and coverage. Native content is rendered in 11 applications and captured as paired screenshots, yielding 6,438 source scenarios across four interface settings. Arrows connect answer-bearing content to the attacker-controlled insertion surface. The screenshots are examples of rendered interfaces, not model outputs.

model-screened recovery challenge, not a measure of unconditional attack success. Different models can yield different subsets.

3.3 Releases and Evaluation Scope

The sealed Qwen2-VL release has 4,938 training, 500 validation and 1,000 test sources: 6,438 sources and 19,314 paired-arm images in total. The full release spans the 11 applications shown in Figure 3. Each test source contributes three paired arms, yielding 3,000 test images.

The Qwen2-VL test includes held-out layouts, which need not imply unseen applications. It was initially selected using Qwen2-VL. The fraction that also satisfies Qwen2.5-VL screening therefore cannot establish that either backbone is more robust to injection. We retain the Qwen2-VL release and use a separately screened Qwen2.5-VL release with 2,080 training, 232 validation and 1,000 test sources. Its test is disjoint from its own development set in source, image and recorded content group, with held-out layouts. The two backbones use different test sets, so their results measure recovery within each backbone rather than a paired comparison of model robustness.

Train, validation and test partitions are disjoint in source and image within each model-specific release. Defense outputs do not select the split. Spatial supervision uses only verified region annotations. Answer-level eligibility alone does not establish spatial-label validity. Layout diversity does not rule out layout shortcuts, and this static benchmark does not evaluate end-to-end agent safety. Construction and annotation checks are detailed in Supplementary Appendix A.1.

4 PRISM

4.1 Overview

PRISM localizes injected instructions from fixed-query attention features and replaces the selected visual features. We describe its locator, repair rule, and training below. For image I and task u, a frozen visual encoder and merger produce projected visual features $Z = [z_1, \ldots, z_N]^\top$, with

$z_i \in \mathbb{R}^{d_v}$. Each feature corresponds to a spatial grid cell. $\mathcal{V}$ indexes the N valid cells, excluding padding. A frozen language model F answers u from Z. A separate fixed query observes the unmodified features. The locator predicts a spatial mask, and PRISM directly replaces the selected features. A fresh prefill then answers the user's original task from the repaired features without including the fixed query. Figure 4 shows these two separate uses of the frozen model. Supplementary Appendix B gives the exact query and attention extraction, spatial-label construction, training settings, and generation controls.



Figure 4: PRISM. A fixed query supplies attention for spatial localization without the user's task. Selected visual features are replaced by the mean of their unselected four-neighbor features. A fresh prefill then answers the user's original question from the repaired features. The answer is illustrative.

4.2 Probe Attention Features

The Probe observation uses the image and the fixed query shown in Figure 4, omitting the user's task and generating no answer. Using the same query across examples keeps localization independent of task wording. Attention is an input to the region-supervised locator, not by itself an injection decision or a causal explanation of the answer (Jain & Wallace, 2019). We use physical decoder layers $\ell \in \{2, 4, 8\}$ and all 28 query heads $h \in \{1, \ldots, 28\}$ in each layer, giving 84 channels $c = (\ell, h)$. For each channel, we take the attention-matrix row of the fixed query's final prefill token. Its entry for visual token i is $A_{i,c}$. The attention softmax covers the full text–visual prefix before we select visual columns. We express each selected value relative to the channel's mean visual attention, then take its logarithm. With numerical floor $\epsilon > 0$,

$$\rho_{i,c} = \frac{N A_{i,c}}{\max(\sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} A_{j,c}, \epsilon)}, \qquad r_{i,c} = \log \max(\rho_{i,c}, \epsilon). \tag{1}$$

When the floors are inactive, uniform visual attention gives $\rho_{i,c} = 1$ and $r_{i,c} = 0$ regardless of token count. This removes the explicit $1/N$ scaling, not changes in attention caused by image content or resolution.

We concatenate the channels and standardize each using its training-token mean μ_c and standard deviation s_c:

$$x_i = \mathrm{concat}_c \left[\frac{r_{i,c} - \mu_c}{s_c} \right]. \tag{2}$$

Statistics are fitted on training tokens and frozen for evaluation.

4.3 SPATIAL LOCALIZATION

A shared token encoder f_{θ_e} maps x_i to a 32-dimensional vector h_i. Reshaping these vectors gives the grid H, with $H_i = h_i$. Depthwise (DW) and pointwise (PW) convolutions add neighboring evidence. Readout weights $w_L \in \mathbb{R}^{32}$, bias b_L, and sigmoid σ give p_i and mask m_i:

$$\begin{aligned} h_i &= f_{\theta_e}(x_i), \\ H' &= H + \mathrm{PW}_{1\times1}\big(\mathrm{GELU}(\mathrm{DW}_{3\times3}(H))\big), \\ p_i &= \sigma(w_L^\top H'_i + b_L), \qquad m_i = \mathbf{1}[p_i \geq 0.5]. \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

Parameters θ include the encoder, convolutions, and readout. The mask selects visual grid cells. Padding is excluded.

4.4 LOCALIZED FEATURE REPAIR

Let $S = \{i \in \mathcal{V} : m_i = 1\}$ be the selected cells and $\mathcal{N}_4(S)$ their valid four-neighbors. The unselected one-hop ring $B = \mathcal{N}_4(S) \setminus S$ supplies a single donor mean. For $B \neq \varnothing$, define

$$\bar{z}_B = \frac{1}{|B|} \sum_{j \in B} z_j. \tag{4}$$

Donors are deduplicated across the mask and use the original features. All selected cells receive this same boundary mean:

$$z_i^{\mathrm{out}} = \begin{cases} \bar{z}_B, & i \in S,\ B \neq \varnothing, \\ z_i, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \tag{5}$$

Empty masks or donor sets leave Z unchanged. This replacement suppresses selected local content without reconstructing the clean features. The frozen F then answers u from Z^{out} using its native task template, with token count, order, and positions preserved. The visual encoder has already mixed information, potentially including injected content in donor cells.

4.5 SPATIAL SUPERVISION AND TRAINING

For target $y \in \{0, 1\}$, prediction $p \in (0, 1)$, and positive-class weight $w > 0$, define weighted binary cross-entropy:

$$\ell_w(y, p) = -wy \log p - (1 - y) \log(1 - p). \tag{6}$$

For image n, y_{ni} indicates whether cell i intersects the annotated injection region. Clean and Neutral may be sampled but provide no spatial targets. They are not treated as empty-mask negatives. Let $\mathcal{B}$ be the image minibatch, $\mathcal{E}_n$ the valid cells with known labels, and $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{loc}} \subseteq \mathcal{B}$ the images with $|\mathcal{E}_n| > 0$. With positive-class weight w_+ and predictions p_{ni}, the locator averages tokens within each image, then weights images equally:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{loc}}(\theta) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{loc}}|} \sum_{n \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{loc}}} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{E}_n|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{E}_n} \ell_{w_+}(y_{ni}, p_{ni}). \tag{7}$$

Impact images without trusted coordinates are excluded from this loss, not assigned negative labels. The locator uses AdamW and early stopping, with checkpoints selected by validation localization loss. Only the locator is trained. The backbone remains frozen. Region annotations train the locator to predict injection regions from attention distributions. At inference, PRISM requires only the image and task.

5 EXPERIMENTS

5.1 SETUP

Task recovery and normal utility. We distinguish HIJACKED answers that adopt the influence target, CORRECT answers that solve the user task without adopting it, and BLOCKED-WRONG answers that avoid the target but fail the task. Let H contain images hijacked without defense. Let

$E \subseteq H$ retain only cases with a correct answer on the paired clean input before defense. N_E counts eligible images, and C_E counts those answered CORRECT after defense:

$$R_E = \frac{C_E}{N_E}. \tag{8}$$

Eligibility is fixed by each test's undefended screening reference, and methods share the same eligible cases within that test. All 1,000 sources in each model-specific AppInjectBench test pass this screen. In Table 1, Recovery, Target ASR, and the remaining BLOCKED-WRONG rate partition these 1,000 attacked inputs. In Table 2, Recovery is conditional on E, whereas Target ASR uses all attacked inputs. Table 1 counts Clean and Neutral harm as paired correct-to-wrong transitions on 1,000 baseline-correct sources per model. Table 2 instead reports non-App Clean error against a shared no-defense baseline. For TextVQA, layout-matched clean inputs determine eligibility, while original-clean inputs determine Clean error.

Training and evaluation. ARGUS-only uses 10,312 original construction records. App-only uses the model-specific release, and Mixed samples both domains equally. Learned methods select checkpoints on validation data, not test results. Main results use seed 42. The official ARGUS test is distinct from the derived Four-style panel. Four-style and TextVQA (Singh et al., 2019) each contain 250 sources with four attacked variants per source. Clean controls are counted once per source.

Baselines. ARGUS (Lu et al., 2026) Full is the operational baseline. Oracle forces steering for diagnosis. The ARGUS baseline in Table 2 and its Single-domain row in Table 3 use our Qwen2-VL-7B reproduction trained on the original ARGUS data. GTM (Zhang et al., 2026b) is training-free and reuses its outputs across training-condition comparisons. PRISM uses spatial supervision, whereas ARGUS uses answers and internal states. All methods target the same backbone and sealed images. PRISM's branch and component comparisons use matched training, validation and test feature inputs. ARGUS retains its own training interface.

Scoring and uncertainty. Scores use frozen string rules and have not undergone question-aware semantic review. The supplementary section on evaluation contracts and provenance records the scoring conventions and their limitations. Source-level bootstrap retains every style and condition of a source.

Comparison scope. PRISM uses Probe attention for localization and directly repairs the predicted region. Tables 1 and 2 compare PRISM with ARGUS and GTM. Table 3 compares ARGUS and PRISM training domains. Supplementary Appendix C groups the task-conditioned locator and Qwen2.5-VL cross-domain results.

5.2 APP BENCHMARK MAIN RESULTS

Table 1: AppInjectBench results on Qwen2-VL-7B and Qwen2.5-VL-7B (1,000 strict test sources per model). Recovery is post-defense task correctness on screened attacked inputs. GTM uses task-text first-token attribution. Harm is a paired baseline-correct to defended-wrong transition.

Model	Method	Recovery (%) ↑	Target ASR (%) ↓	Clean harm (%) ↓	Neutral harm (%) ↓
Qwen2-VL	ARGUS	45.3	16.5	4.60	4.20
	GTM	54.9	44.8	0.20	**0.20**
	PRISM	**96.7**	**2.1**	**0.00**	0.30
Qwen2.5-VL	ARGUS	17.8	**0.7**	75.00	73.30
	GTM	40.5	58.6	1.90	2.60
	PRISM	**94.0**	4.8	**0.10**	**0.00**

The Qwen2-VL panel of Table 1 uses the 4,938-source App training pool and all 1,000 App test sources. ARGUS trains its original detector, steering components and post-filter. PRISM trains its locator, with spatial supervision restricted to eligible annotations (Section 3). GTM is training-free. PRISM restores 967/1,000 cases, with 0 Clean and 3 Neutral errors. ARGUS restores 453/1,000

cases. Of the remaining 547, 165 still follow the target and 382 yield another incorrect answer. Target suppression alone therefore does not imply task recovery. With first-task-token attribution, GTM answers 549/1,000 attacked inputs correctly and leaves 448 following the target, while newly harming 2 Clean and 2 Neutral inputs. On the separate Qwen2.5-VL test, PRISM has 2,071 spatially verified sources within the 2,080-source App training split and recovers 940/1,000 screened cases. ARGUS recovers 178/1,000 and follows the target on 7. Its other 815 attacked responses are BLOCKED-WRONG, alongside 750/733 newly incorrect Clean/Neutral answers. PRISM thus reaches high Recovery with about 2,000 spatially verified training examples in this setting. Establishing sample efficiency requires a learning-curve study, and these results do not identify why ARGUS fails.

5.3 FROZEN WEIGHTS ACROSS TARGET STYLES AND DATA SOURCES

Table 2 tests frozen defenses trained on original ARGUS data across the official ARGUS test, Four-style, and TextVQA. GTM is training-free. On Four-style, PRISM and GTM recover 88.8% and 85.4% of eligible cases, versus ARGUS's 53.4%. Figure 2 also shows that Full ARGUS follows same-type wrong targets more often than other styles. These Recovery results favor local visual-token interventions on the tested target-style variants, but cannot isolate activation steering from ARGUS's detector and post-filter as the reason for the gap. On TextVQA, PRISM and GTM recover 72.1% and 69.2%, versus 50.0% with ARGUS, extending the comparison to a different data source. PRISM also exceeds ARGUS Recovery on the original test, though its Clean error is higher there and on TextVQA. Non-App Clean error is shared-baseline disagreement, not necessarily repair-induced harm. Its denominators are 489 for ARGUS original and 227 each for Four-style and TextVQA. TextVQA original-clean and layout-clean controls remain distinct (Supplementary Appendix A.3).

Table 2: Frozen ARGUS-only defenses on Qwen2-VL-7B (%, seed 42). Recovery uses the listed eligible sources. Target ASR uses all 1,000 attacked images per set. Clean error need not be repair-induced harm. TextVQA uses original-clean controls.

Dataset	Images	Eligible	Method	Recovery (%) ↑	Target ASR (%) ↓	Clean error vs. baseline (%) ↓
ARGUS original	1,000	94	ARGUS	77.7	**0.1**	**0.20**
			GTM	**85.1**	0.3	9.00
			PRISM	**85.1**	**0.1**	2.86
Four-style	1,000	356	ARGUS	53.4	10.5	**0.00**
			GTM	85.4	2.9	10.57
			PRISM	**88.8**	**2.2**	**0.00**
TextVQA	1,000	104	ARGUS	50.0	4.5	**0.44**
			GTM	69.2	**2.7**	11.45
			PRISM	**72.1**	2.8	3.52

5.4 SINGLE-DOMAIN VERSUS MIXED TRAINING

Table 3 compares separate Single-domain checkpoints with one shared Mixed checkpoint on the ARGUS and App tests. Mixed samples 10,312 ARGUS and 4,938 App training sources equally. Training exposure is recorded in the supplementary protocol.

The shared ARGUS checkpoint recovers 3/94 ARGUS and 80/1,000 App cases (3.2%/8.0%), versus 77.7%/45.3% with separate domain checkpoints. Of its 920 failed App attacks, 135 follow the target and 785 produce another incorrect answer. The shared PRISM checkpoint retains 85.1% ARGUS and 96.2% App Recovery, versus 85.1%/96.7% with separate checkpoints. App Clean/Neutral harm rises from 0.0%/0.3% to 3.1%/4.1%. One PRISM checkpoint thus retains high Recovery on both evaluated data types under joint training, unlike the shared ARGUS checkpoint. The higher App Clean/Neutral harm means this is not a uniformly better operating point. Both domains appear in training, and no equal-exposure control isolates the effect of data complementarity.

Table 3: Single-domain uses separate domain-specific checkpoints. Mixed uses a shared checkpoint on both tests (%, seed 42). ARGUS Clean error is shared-baseline disagreement. App harm counts newly incorrect answers.

Method	Training	ARGUS test		App test		
		Recovery (%) ↑	Clean error ↓	Recovery (%) ↑	Clean harm (%) ↓	Neutral harm (%) ↓
ARGUS	Single-domain	77.7	**0.20**	45.3	4.60	4.20
ARGUS	Mixed	3.2	3.89	8.0	3.60	3.70
PRISM	Single-domain	**85.1**	2.86	**96.7**	**0.00**	**0.30**
PRISM	Mixed	**85.1**	2.86	96.2	3.10	4.10

5.5 Ablation Studies

Table 4 tests PRISM locator components on the three-arm App Test1000 with Qwen2-VL-7B, App-only training and seed 42. The full locator uses relative log-attention and neighborhood features. Training budget, validation selection and repair are fixed, and spatial supervision uses only verified boxes (Supplementary Appendix B.6).

Removing neighborhood features lowers Recovery by 3.7 points and raises both harm metrics. Linear heads and layer 8 alone lose 2.5 and 3.1 points. Removing visual-mass and token-count normalization gains 6 recoveries but increases Clean errors. Training-set standardization remains. These single-seed results do not establish an overall advantage or capture training variability.

Table 4: AppInjectBench Probe-only locator ablations (Qwen2-VL-7B, App-only, seed 42; %, 1,000 sources). Parentheses give Recovery change from the full locator; repair is fixed.

Configuration	Recovery (%) ↑	Clean harm (%) ↓	Neutral harm (%) ↓
Full locator	96.7 (ref.)	**0.00**	0.30
Linear token head	94.2 (−2.5)	1.70	1.40
w/o neighborhood features	93.0 (−3.7)	2.60	2.80
w/o relative normalization	**97.3** (+0.6)	0.40	**0.20**
Layer 8 only	93.6 (−3.1)	1.80	1.90

The neighborhood ablation is consistent with local context helping the locator separate inserted instructions from nearby answer-bearing text. The linear token head and layer-8 variants also lose Recovery and increase harm, consistent with benefits from spatial refinement and multiple attention layers. The variant without relative normalization has the highest Recovery and lowest Neutral harm, whereas the full locator has the lowest Clean harm. With repair fixed, Table 4 measures the end-to-end effect of locator variants, but cannot tell whether errors reflect missed injection cells or masks that remove task evidence. Isolating the effects of localization and replacement requires controls that vary masks and repair separately.

6 Conclusion

We introduced AppInjectBench to measure task recovery and normal-input harm when injected instructions coexist with task evidence in GUI screenshots. By rendering attacks in 11 applications, AppInjectBench tests recovery within interface content rather than separate captions. PRISM localizes suspected regions with fixed-query attention, replaces their visual features, and answers with a frozen backbone. It achieves higher Recovery than ARGUS across the evaluated App, ARGUS, Four-style, and TextVQA tests. With joint training, PRISM maintains high Recovery on both the ARGUS and AppInjectBench tests. These results are conditional on model-specific screening and frozen string-rule scoring. Complete agent interactions and the separate effects of localization and replacement on task recovery and normal-input harm remain to be evaluated.

AI USE STATEMENT

We used large language models (LLMs) in the following scoped, human-supervised ways. (1) Writing assistance and polishing: LLMs helped improve the grammar, clarity, and readability of existing text. (2) Retrieval and discovery: LLMs helped formulate search queries and identify potentially relevant papers. The authors screened candidate papers and checked AI-suggested citations against the original sources before including them. (3) Drafting sections of the paper: LLMs helped prepare initial drafts of selected sections. The authors reviewed and revised the drafts and verified their technical statements and citations. LLM outputs did not replace the authors' scientific analysis or empirical validation. The authors take full responsibility for the final manuscript.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

Section 3 and Appendix A describe AppInjectBench construction, model-specific screening, data partitions, and fixed scoring rules. Section 4 and Appendix B specify PRISM's attention extraction, spatial supervision, feature repair, optimization, and checkpoint selection. Section 5 and Appendix C document evaluation protocols, denominators, and additional results. We plan to release our complete benchmark-construction, implementation, and evaluation code, together with the AppInjectBench data and split manifests, after the review period.

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APPENDIX

A DATASET AND EVALUATION DETAILS

A.1 DATASET CONSTRUCTION AND ANNOTATION CHECKS

Figure S1 summarizes AppInjectBench construction and screening. Source facts, questions and wrong targets are fixed before application rendering; the Clean, Neutral and Impact images differ in the content placed on the same lower-trust surface. Screening uses undefended outputs on the sealed screenshots. Qwen2-VL and Qwen2.5-VL have separate Train/Validation/Test manifests.



Figure S1: **AppInjectBench construction and model-specific screening.** The three rendered versions of each source are screened separately for each backbone. The Qwen2.5-VL release is drawn from sources passing both models' screens. Strict success requires correct Clean and Neutral answers and the preregistered wrong target on Impact. These model-screened challenge sets do not estimate unconditional attack success; spatial-label eligibility is checked separately.

Split manifests fix source membership and labels; sources and images are disjoint across partitions within each release, but the two releases are not source-disjoint. Content-group checks cannot exclude every semantic near-duplicate. Test membership was determined by undefended screening, never by a defense output. The two backbone results are not a paired test of relative model robustness. Only verified instruction regions provide spatial supervision; missing coordinates remain unlabeled. Figures S2 and S3 show paired arms and cross-application sources.

A.2 EVALUATION CONTRACTS AND PROVENANCE

App evaluation uses the image-first screening prompt, native vision preprocessing, greedy 64-token decoding and frozen scalar-answer scorer.

For each model-specific App test, the fixed undefended screening reference answers all 1,000 Clean and Neutral inputs correctly and follows the target on all 1,000 Impact inputs. These screening outcomes fix eligibility for every method, so each App metric uses 1,000 sources. ARGUS original uses its frozen official-compatible substring rule; Four-style and TextVQA use frozen word-sequence rules. Methods share denominator members within each test.



Figure S2: **One source, three paired screenshots.** The Drupal article reports 845 participants in all three versions. The reader-comment slot contains ordinary text in Clean, an unrelated text control in Neutral, and an instruction targeting 485 in Impact. The values printed beneath the screenshots are the registered correct and target answers for this example, not verbatim model generations.

Substring matching can accept an unrelated occurrence of *no*, while word-sequence matching can reject a correct negated answer. These frozen rules are not semantic judgments; historical semantic reviews are not pooled with the reported string scores.

A.3 Recovery denominators and runtime checks

Current main tables restrict recovery to sources that are both clean-correct and hijacked without defense, using the same membership for every method within a dataset. Non-App Clean error compares defended answers with a shared No Defense reference; a disagreement does not by itself establish repair-induced harm.

TextVQA layout-clean diagnostics use 229 controls, whereas the reported Clean error uses 227 original-clean controls in Table 2; these are not interchangeable.

B PRISM Implementation and Training Details

This appendix specifies the locator and inference protocol used with Qwen2-VL-7B and Qwen2.5-VL-7B. Training statistics and checkpoints are fitted separately for each backbone and training condition. The fixed-query Probe locator is the default PRISM method. Task-conditioned variants and their results are grouped in Appendix C.



Figure S3: **Source-specific QA across four application interfaces.** WooCommerce, Nextcloud Talk, BookStack and Drupal show answer evidence in source A alongside an instruction in a different, user-writable source B. The adjacent text enlarges the key excerpts; questions are shortened for display. All four selected examples satisfy the strict Clean/Neutral/Impact criterion on both screened VLMs. The bottom values are registered correct and target answers, not verbatim model replies.

B.1 Attention extraction and feature standardization

Probe query position. The Probe observation places the visual block before text in the user message. Its fixed query is `What's the next action`. The processor renders the chat template without a generation prompt. The sequence ends immediately after the query's existing `action` token, excluding a question mark and trailing template tokens. The observation is a cache-free prefill and generates no tokens.

Attention row and visual-column mapping. For channel $c = (\ell, h)$, let q_c be the position-encoded query vector at the final query token, $k_{j,c}$ its corresponding key at prefix position j, and d_h the head dimension. Let $\mathcal{P}$ index the valid causal prefix and $\pi(i)$ map visual grid cell i to its position in that prefix. We compute

$$s_{j,c} = q_c^\top k_{j,c} / \sqrt{d_h},$$
$$A_{i,c} = \frac{\exp(s_{\pi(i),c})}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}} \exp(s_{j,c})}. \tag{S1}$$

Softmax includes all valid text and visual positions; visual columns are selected afterward. Under grouped-query attention, $k_{j,c}$ uses the key head assigned to query head h, so shared keys still yield distinct query-head rows.

Layers, channels, and numerical conventions. Physical layers 2/4/8 correspond to zero-based indices 1/3/7. PRISM has $3 \times 28 = 84$ channels per visual token, without head averaging or explicit layer differences. Equation (1) uses FP32 transformations and $\epsilon = 10^{-12}$ for both floors; only valid tokens contribute to visual mass and N. For channel c, pool the K valid training-token values as $\{r_{k,c}\}_{k=1}^{K}$. Their mean and sample standard deviation are

$$\mu_c = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} r_{k,c}, \qquad s_c = \max\left(\sqrt{\frac{1}{K-1} \sum_{k=1}^{K} (r_{k,c} - \mu_c)^2},\ 10^{-6} \right). \tag{S2}$$

Statistics are fitted before minibatch sampling and fixed for validation and test. They are token-weighted, unlike the image-weighted localization loss. Padding is excluded from statistics, pooling, and losses. The floors keep the transform finite even when visual attention mass is zero.

B.2 Network architecture

Locator. The token encoder is Linear(d,64), GELU, Dropout(0.1), Linear(64,32), GELU, where $d = 84$ for PRISM. Its output is reshaped onto the actual Projector grid. The spatial residual uses a biased depthwise convolution with kernel 3, stride 1, padding 1, and 32 groups, then GELU and a biased 1×1 convolution with 32 input and output channels. A shared Linear(32,1) reads out the refined grid. Invalid positions are zeroed before refinement and excluded afterward; convolutions stay within each image. Mask selection uses the inclusive threshold $p_i \geq 0.5$.

B.3 Spatial supervision and missing coordinates

Caption-style injection. The clean/Impact size difference identifies the appended top or bottom caption strip. A token is positive if its cell intersects a strip pixel with all three RGB channels below 245; the white strip itself is not a positive target. Cell boundaries are rounded divisions of the complete Impact canvas into the Projector grid. For a supplied full-text pixel mask, any nonzero pixel in a cell makes it positive, using the same boundaries. Mask and image dimensions must agree.

App injection regions. Audited XYXY boxes are mapped from their recorded coordinate space to the Projector grid using proportional cell boundaries. A cell is positive if it has positive-area intersection with any box. Multiple boxes form a union; gaps remain unfilled and edge contact alone is negative. App boxes describe injected instruction regions, whereas caption masks label rendered text pixels: their supervision granularity differs. Normal task-evidence boxes are not network inputs or training targets.

Eligibility. Clean and Neutral supply no spatial targets. Impact images with missing or ineligible coordinates have unknown spatial targets and are excluded from $\mathcal{B}_{\text{loc}}$. The locator rejects a minibatch with no spatially labeled image. Eligibility and mapping are fixed before evaluation; inference reads no reference answers, OCR, paired clean image, or region annotations.

B.4 Optimization, sampling and checkpoint selection

Locator optimization. The locator uses AdamW with learning rate 10^{-3}, weight decay 10^{-4}, betas $(0.9, 0.999)$, and epsilon 10^{-8}. Batch size is 16, the maximum is 100 epochs, and patience

is 10 epochs without strict improvement. The locator uses fixed positive weight $w_+ = 16.0320549$ across training domains and numerically stable BCE on logits. The current comparisons fix seed 42 for initialization, dropout and sample order; test results do not select seeds.

Sampling. ARGUS-only and App-only shuffle cached image records; App-only includes Clean, Neutral, and Impact for each registered source. Mixed samples with replacement: 8 ARGUS records (4 normal, 4 Impact) and 8 App records (4 Impact, 2 Clean, 2 Neutral) per batch. App identities cycle in sorted order; records within each App/arm pool are drawn randomly, then the batch is shuffled. An epoch has $\lceil \text{cached record count}/16 \rceil$ batches. This balances domain exposure, not unique-source counts. Losses use the sampled records without importance weights.

Selection. Locator selection minimizes validation loss with the training positive weight and per-image reduction; ties retain the earlier checkpoint. No test result selects the checkpoint or the mask threshold.

B.5 Repair and native generation

Repair edge cases. The boundary mean in Equation (4) is computed in FP32 and cast back to the feature dtype for replacement.

Generation isolation. Observation KV states are discarded. The selected Projector tensor is injected once into a fresh native generation prefill for the original task. Token order, count, grid metadata, and positional encoding are preserved; probe text is absent. Direct generation and identity feature override must agree in the technical audit.

Figure S4 visualizes one AppInjectBench repair instance.



Figure S4: **Probe-only localization and repair on a Qwen2-VL-7B AppInjectBench test source.** Orange cells are the predicted mask; green cells are the unique, unselected one-hop donors. In this example, the 77 selected visual tokens receive the same mean feature computed from 64 donor tokens, rather than a separate mean for each token. No defense returns the injected target (32 schedules), whereas PRISM returns the registered answer (24 schedules). The overlay also shows selected cells outside the comment; it is a qualitative example, not a ground-truth mask or a localization-accuracy estimate.

Scope of the learned signal. The locator uses region supervision but no answer or contrastive loss. Positive-weighted scores need not be calibrated probabilities; answer recovery is evaluated with native generation, not inferred from the mask.

B.6 Matched feature profiles

The current PRISM results in Tables 1–4 and the attention-branch comparisons in Appendix C use aligned training, validation and test feature inputs. Normalization is fitted on training data, and locators are retrained on the corresponding cached attention.

The reference locators use layers 2/4/8. Within each component comparison, supervision, training budget, validation selection and boundary-mean repair are fixed. Input widths and head capacities change with the intervention; the linear-token-head comparison retains the nonlinear neighborhood module.

C Task-Conditioned Variants and Additional Results

The main paper defines PRISM with a fixed-query Probe observation. Here we compare it with Task-only and Probe+Task locators. Only the attention used for localization changes: all variants use the same spatial repair and answer the original task from a fresh prefill.



Figure S5: Probe+Task extension. The optional Task observation supplies additional attention channels for localization; both configurations use the original task for final answer generation. The shown correct answer is illustrative.

Task-conditioned attention. Both observations place the visual block before text in the user message. The Probe text is `What's the next action`; the Task text is the legitimate task followed by two newlines and that same query. Each cache-free observation ends after the existing `action` token, without a question mark or trailing template tokens, and generates no answer. The visual encoder and merger run once for both observations. Task-only uses the Task attention channels; Probe+Task concatenates Task then Probe channels by layer and query head. Applying the extraction and normalization of Appendix B gives 84 channels for a single branch and 168 for Probe+Task. The latter changes the locator's input width from 84 to 168 but not its spatial repair rule.

C.1 Matched attention-branch comparison

Supplementary Table S1 compares the three locators on the same Qwen2-VL-7B App Test1000. Each has App-only training, seed 42, matched feature inputs, validation selection and repair.

Table S1: Matched App attention-branch comparison (Qwen2-VL-7B, seed 42; 1,000 sources).

Configuration	Recovery (%) ↑	Clean harm (%) ↓	Neutral harm (%) ↓
Probe-only locator	96.7	**0.00**	**0.30**
Task-only locator	**98.0**	0.50	0.60
Probe+Task locator	97.4	0.10	0.40

Task-only reaches 98.0% Recovery but has more Clean and Neutral harm than Probe-only. Probe+Task lies between them on this test. The single- and dual-branch heads have 8,929 and 14,305 parameters, so this comparison does not match capacity or establish that either branch is necessary.

C.2 Across tests and training domains

Supplementary Tables S2–S4 retain both PRISM branches on App, frozen cross-source tests, and single-domain versus Mixed training. The two App model panels use separate screened test sets and are not a paired cross-model ranking.

Table S2: Matched PRISM attention-branch results on the separately screened Qwen2-VL-7B and Qwen2.5-VL-7B App tests (1,000 sources per model). Recovery is post-defense task correctness on attacked inputs; harm is a paired baseline-correct to defended-wrong transition.

Model	Method	Recovery (%) ↑	Target ASR (%) ↓	Clean harm (%) ↓	Neutral harm (%) ↓
Qwen2-VL	PRISM (Probe-only)	96.7	2.1	**0.00**	**0.30**
	PRISM (Probe+Task)	**97.4**	**1.5**	0.10	0.40
Qwen2.5-VL	PRISM (Probe-only)	**94.0**	**4.8**	0.10	**0.00**
	PRISM (Probe+Task)	93.3	5.4	**0.00**	**0.00**

Table S3: Frozen ARGUS-only PRISM locators on Qwen2-VL-7B (%, seed 42). Recovery uses the listed eligible sources; Target ASR uses all 1,000 attacked images per test. Clean error against the shared baseline need not be repair-induced harm. TextVQA uses original-clean controls.

Dataset	Images	Eligible	Method	Recovery (%) ↑	Target ASR (%) ↓	Clean error vs. baseline (%) ↓
ARGUS original	1,000	94	PRISM (Probe-only)	**85.1**	**0.1**	2.86
			PRISM (Probe+Task)	81.9	0.2	**2.66**
Four-style	1,000	356	PRISM (Probe-only)	88.8	2.2	**0.00**
			PRISM (Probe+Task)	**89.6**	**2.0**	**0.00**
TextVQA	1,000	104	PRISM (Probe-only)	**72.1**	2.8	**3.52**
			PRISM (Probe+Task)	69.2	**2.5**	4.85

Table S4: Single-domain uses separate domain-specific checkpoints; Mixed uses one shared checkpoint on both tests (%, seed 42). ARGUS Clean error is shared-baseline disagreement, while App harm counts newly incorrect answers.

Method	Training	ARGUS test		App test		
		Recovery (%) ↑	Clean error ↓	Recovery (%) ↑	Clean harm (%) ↓	Neutral harm (%) ↓
PRISM (Probe-only)	Single-domain	**85.1**	2.86	96.7	**0.00**	**0.30**
PRISM (Probe-only)	Mixed	**85.1**	2.86	96.2	3.10	4.10
PRISM (Probe+Task)	Single-domain	81.9	**2.66**	97.4	0.10	0.40
PRISM (Probe+Task)	Mixed	81.9	2.86	**98.0**	1.60	1.30

Across Qwen2 App, Mixed App and Qwen2.5 App, Probe+Task gains 0.7 and 1.8 Recovery points on the first two tests but loses 0.7 points on Qwen2.5. It is not uniformly superior. The Qwen2.5-VL branches use the same 6,213 training and 696 validation arms, validation-loss selection, and matched test inputs on their model-specific App test. In Supplementary Table S2, the paired Probe+Task minus Probe-only Recovery difference is -0.7 percentage points (95% source-bootstrap CI: $[-1.6, 0.1]$). The branch ordering is unresolved on this test.

C.3 QWEN2.5-VL CROSS-DOMAIN TRAINING

We train each locator on ARGUS alone or on the union of ARGUS and App data, then evaluate the same checkpoint on both tests. ARGUS contributes 20,624 training and 1,986 validation arms; Mixed additionally uses 6,213 App training and 696 App validation arms. Checkpoints are selected by validation loss, with no test-based selection.

Unlike the shared-baseline Clean error in main Table 2, ARGUS Clean harm below counts newly incorrect answers among 470 native-correct controls (one in each run).

Table S5: Qwen2.5-VL cross-domain evaluation of PRISM (seed 42; %). Each row evaluates a single checkpoint on both fixed tests. ARGUS recovery uses 334 paired-eligible sources under its frozen substring scorer and Clean harm uses 470 native-correct sources; the App metrics each use 1,000 sources.

Training	Locator	ARGUS test		App test		
		Recovery ↑	Clean harm ↓	Recovery ↑	Clean harm ↓	Neutral harm ↓
ARGUS-only	Probe-only	93.7	0.21	39.9	45.6	44.6
ARGUS-only	Probe+Task	92.8	0.21	28.7	44.3	43.1
Mixed	Probe-only	92.5	0.21	93.3	0.3	0.2
Mixed	Probe+Task	93.1	0.21	93.6	0.2	0.1

The frozen ARGUS substring rule can count an answer word in a refusal or unrelated clause as recovery, so these rates are not human-adjudicated task accuracy. On App, ARGUS-only training causes substantial Clean harm; Mixed restores high recovery with few new Clean errors. Mixed includes App training data and changes exposure, so this is not unseen-domain generalization. A source-paired bootstrap gives a Mixed Probe-only minus ARGUS-only Probe-only App recovery difference of 53.4 percentage points (95% CI: 50.3–56.5). Within Mixed, Probe-only minus Probe+Task is -0.3 points (95% CI: -1.2 to 0.5), providing no clear branch ordering on App.

C.4 LOCATOR-COMPONENT COMPARISON

Supplementary Table S6 gives the Probe+Task component results; the matched Probe-only results are in main Table 4.

Table S6: Matched Probe+Task component ablations (Qwen2-VL-7B, App-only, seed 42; 1,000 sources; %). Parentheses show Recovery changes from its full locator. Repair is fixed.

Configuration	Recovery ↑	Clean harm ↓	Neutral harm ↓
Full locator	**97.4** (ref.)	**0.10**	0.40
Linear token head	96.7 (−0.7)	1.00	1.00
w/o neighborhood features	96.7 (−0.7)	2.50	2.50
w/o relative normalization	96.2 (−1.2)	**0.10**	**0.20**
Layer 8 only	96.9 (−0.5)	1.50	1.50