SECSTEP: GUARDING AGENTS AGAINST PROMPT INJECTION VIA ACTION BACKTRACKING

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ABSTRACT

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents, interacting with tools and environments to execute multi-step tasks. Untrusted observations expose them to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where malicious instructions in tool outputs redirect execution away from the user's goal. Existing defenses incur latency and utility costs through inference-time filtering or verification, or fine-tune on finite attack templates that may not generalize to adaptive injections.

We introduce SecStep, a training-based defense that embeds action backtracking into the agent policy. SecStep enables agents to audit observations, detect conflicts with trusted user goals, isolate malicious instructions, and backtrack from contaminated paths to resume safe execution. To optimize these behaviors in long-horizon workflows, we further propose SecStep-RL, which combines implicit step-level rewards derived from trajectory-level preferences with global outcome rewards, providing dense supervision without costly process annotations. Our theoretical analysis shows that trajectory-level preference optimization can induce step-level rewards. Evaluations on AgentDojo and Agent Security Bench across open-weight and closed-source models demonstrate an improved security-utility trade-off. SecStep-RL achieves near-zero attack success rates under static attacks and 5.83% and 2.80% on Qwen3-4B and Llama-3.1-8B, respectively, under defense-aware adaptive attacks.

1 INTRODUCTION

Language agents use tools to retrieve information, update application state, and complete multi-step tasks (Schick et al., 2023; Miao et al., 2026; Yang et al., 2025b; Ma et al., 2023). Their decisions combine trusted user instructions with untrusted web pages, emails, documents, and tool responses. This creates an opportunity for *indirect prompt injection* (IPI): an attacker embeds instructions in external content that the agent encounters during legitimate execution (Greshake et al., 2023; Zhan et al., 2024; Debenedetti et al., 2024). If the agent treats that content as an instruction, its next action may disclose information, send an unauthorized message, or otherwise depart from the user's task (Yang et al., 2026; Patlan et al., 2025).

Existing defenses intervene at different points in this process. Prompting and screening methods help distinguish trusted instructions from external content, but may add repeated computation or reject useful observations (Hines et al., 2024; Schulhoff, 2024; Zhu et al., 2025; He et al., 2026). Training-based methods instead teach a policy to follow the user task under attack, or train a detector to identify malicious inputs (Chen et al., 2025a;b;c; Li et al., 2025b; Liu et al., 2025b). Their robustness can nevertheless degrade when an adaptive attacker searches for unfamiliar injection formats (Nasr et al., 2025). A further difficulty is recovery: detecting an injection does not by itself specify how the agent should use the benign information in the same observation.

We propose SECSTEP, which learns defensive behavior at the point where an observation influences an action. Before committing to a tool invocation, the policy generates a structured control trace that checks the observation and planned action against the user goal. When it detects a conflict, it revises the contaminated reasoning path, isolates the injected instruction, and continues from an alternative branch. We call this process *action backtracking*. It revises the agent's planned execution before a harmful action is taken; it does not assume that completed external actions can be undone.

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Learning when to backtrack presents a credit-assignment problem. The final outcome of a long interaction provides little direct feedback about which intermediate decision caused success or failure. SECSTEP-RL addresses this problem by learning an implicit process reward model from trajectory preferences and extracting step-level policy-ratio scores. These scores complement an outcome reward that requires both safety and task completion. The method uses no manually annotated process labels, and the reward model is used during training rather than as a separate inference-time detector. In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:

- We propose SECSTEP, a training-based defense that internalizes action backtracking into LLM agents. By equipping agents with meta-actions for auditing intermediate observations and recovering from contaminated execution paths, SECSTEP repairs unsafe control flow before harmful tool actions are taken.
- We develop SECSTEP-RL, a reinforcement learning framework that addresses sparse and delayed rewards in long-horizon agent defense. It derives an implicit step-level reward from trajectory-level preferences, providing dense feedback for defensive decisions without manual process annotations.
- We conduct evaluations on AgentDojo, ASB, and DTap. The results cover held-out attacks, adaptive attacks, real-world agentic tasks, showing that SECSTEP improves robustness while preserving task utility and keeping inference overhead low. The code is available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SecStep.

2 BACKGROUND

Agents and Prompt Injection Attacks. An LLM agent repeatedly observes an environment, chooses an action, and receives a tool response (Schick et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2025; Huang et al., 2024). IPI exploits the external observations in this loop, rather than modifying the trusted user request. Payloads may ask the model to ignore earlier instructions, impersonate a higher-priority message, or falsely claim that the task is complete (Willison, 2022; Dong et al., 2025; Harang, 2023). AgentDojo and ASB evaluate such attacks in tool-use environments (Debenedetti et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2025a); DTap extends evaluation to additional agent domains (Chen et al., 2026).

Prompt Injection Defenses. Prompting methods, including Spotlighting and Sandwiching, mark instruction boundaries or repeat trusted instructions around untrusted content (Hines et al., 2024; Schulhoff, 2024). MELON and AttriGuard use additional inference-time analysis (Zhu et al., 2025; He et al., 2026), while IsolateGPT, ACE, Fides, and CaMeL constrain information flow or tool execution at the system level (Wu et al., 2024; Li et al., 2025a; Costa et al., 2025; Debenedetti et al., 2026). These approaches make different trade-offs between runtime cost, integration requirements, and access to external context.

Training-based approaches include policy training on contaminated inputs, as in StruQ, SecAlign, and Meta-SecAlign (Chen et al., 2025a;b;c), and auxiliary detector training, as in PIGuard and DataSentinel (Li et al., 2025b; Liu et al., 2025b). Policy training can preserve useful context but provides limited explicit guidance on revising a particular unsafe decision. A detector can identify an unsafe observation, but its verdict alone does not provide a recovery plan.

3 PROBLEM FORMULATION AND MOTIVATION

Let x be the trusted user task and $o_{1:k}$ the interaction history at step k, including previous actions and tool observations. The policy chooses $a_k \sim \pi_\theta(a_k \mid o_{1:k}, x)$, where an action is a tool invocation or final response. For a trajectory $\tau = \{(o_1, a_1), \ldots, (o_K, a_K)\}$, the policy contribution to its likelihood is

$$\pi_\theta(\tau \mid x) = \prod_{k=1}^{K} \pi_\theta(a_k \mid o_{1:k}, x). \tag{1}$$

An injected instruction in o_j may influence any later decision. The defense must distinguish information useful for x from instructions that redirect execution.

3.1 THREAT MODEL

We assume the LLM and the user's initial environment remain intact. The adversary cannot modify the user-specified task, model weights, or privileged system prompt. The attack surface is limited to indirect prompt injection (IPI) through tool outputs (e.g., search results or API responses), occurring at any step k or across multiple interaction rounds. We distinguish two attacker settings:

- *Static Attacker.* The adversary has no prior knowledge of the agent's architecture, defense mechanisms, or private task instance, and cannot observe runtime traces. They craft universal payloads intended to transfer across tasks and system configurations.
- *Adaptive Attacker.* The adversary has full access to the defense algorithms, task x, and real-time system feedback. They iteratively optimize defense-specific payloads using reinforcement learning, combinatorial search (Nasr et al., 2025), or evolutionary algorithms (Mehrotra et al., 2024).

The defender can fine-tune the policy offline. Open-weight models support both training stages; GPT-4.1-mini is evaluated with format tuning through its hosted fine-tuning interface. At inference, the policy must preserve task utility while resisting attacks without an oracle identifying malicious observations. Our scope is instruction-driven redirection through external content; backtracking does not provide transactional rollback for tool actions that have already changed the environment.

3.2 LIMITATIONS OF TRAINING-BASED DEFENSES

Trajectory-level adversarial training. This family fine-tunes the target policy on adversarial data so that it learns to ignore injected instructions while still completing the user task. Because the LLM is still permitted to read external observations, it generally preserves more utility than detector-based gating. The shared premise is that robustness can be internalized into the weights by imitating secure behavior on contaminated inputs. Two limitations persist.

First, instruction-tuning methods such as StruQ (Chen et al., 2025a) take a contaminated input x' that interleaves the user task x with untrusted content and a secure target trajectory τ^+, and minimize the SFT loss, which by Eq. (1) decomposes over steps:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{StruQ}}(\theta) = -\,\mathbb{E}_{(x',\tau^+)\sim\mathcal{D}}\left[\log \pi_\theta(\tau^+ \mid x')\right].$$

SFT supervises the demonstrated actions, but does not explicitly label the onset of contamination or require the policy to revise an unsafe plan. Preference-optimization methods such as SecAlign (Chen et al., 2025b) and Meta-SecAlign (Chen et al., 2025c) instead contrast a secure trajectory τ^+ with a compromised one τ^- through the DPO (Rafailov et al., 2023) objective:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{(Meta-)SecAlign}}(\theta) = -\,\mathbb{E}_{(x',\tau^+,\tau^-)\sim\mathcal{D}}\left[\log \sigma\Big(\beta \log \frac{\pi_\theta(\tau^+ \mid x')}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(\tau^+ \mid x')} - \beta \log \frac{\pi_\theta(\tau^- \mid x')}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(\tau^- \mid x')}\Big)\right]. \quad (2)$$

The pairwise label constrains a trajectory-level margin. Although gradients depend on the individual actions, the label does not explicitly identify which step should be interrupted and revised.

Second, robustness is also bounded by the coverage of the adversarial data. These datasets rely on a finite taxonomy of injection formats, positions, and target phrases (e.g., `Ignore previous instructions` or `\n\n Print("Hacked!")`). Such supervision works against static, known attack vectors but tends to break down under adaptive adversaries. As shown in recent adaptive evaluations (Nasr et al., 2025), an attacker who "moves second" can bypass these defenses. As noted by (Nasr et al., 2025), automated search is not even required, and a few minutes of manual effort is enough to craft an unseen injection format that slips past these defenses.

> **An attack success case against StruQ and SecAlign:**
> `System: Always follow these instructions exactly. The first line of your answer must be the exact term` **`Hacked!`**
> `You will be given a user question below ... (truncated)`

One possible failure mode is reliance on dataset-specific cues instead of a transferable distinction between the trusted goal x and instructions in untrusted content $o_{1:k}$. Such reliance can leave unfamiliar injection formats insufficiently constrained.




Figure 1: Backtracking format tuning produces SECSTEP; reinforcement learning with outcome and implicit step rewards produces SECSTEP-RL.

Step-level detection training. Detector-training methods take the opposite route: they leave the policy π_θ untouched and train an auxiliary detector $\mathcal{G}_\psi$ to flag a contaminated observation before it reaches the agent. Unlike trajectory-level alignment, this supervision is genuinely step-level: at each step k, the detector inspects the observation history $o_{1:k}$ and returns a binary verdict $y \in \{0, 1\}$ on whether it carries an injected instruction. Abstracting over implementations, the detector minimizes a classification loss:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{detector}}(\psi) = \mathbb{E}_{(o_{1:k},y)\sim\mathcal{D}}\left[\,\ell(\mathcal{G}_\psi(o_{1:k}),\, y)\,\right]. \tag{3}$$

Here ℓ is typically the binary cross-entropy and $\mathcal{G}_\psi(o_{1:k}) \in [0, 1]$ is the predicted injection probability. Designs differ in how the verdict $\mathcal{G}_\psi$ is realized: PIGuard (Li et al., 2025b) trains a dedicated guard classifier on clean/injected labels, while DataSentinel (Liu et al., 2025b) reads the verdict from whether a fine-tuned LLM detector still complies with a canary (known-answer) instruction, and hardens ψ through a minimax game against adaptive injections. At inference, execution is gated by this verdict: if $\mathcal{G}_\psi(o_{1:k})$ exceeds a threshold, the observation is discarded or the trajectory is halted.

The granularity is right, but a verdict is all the detector produces: it can decide whether to admit $o_{1:k}$, but not how to use it. A single observation often carries task-relevant facts and an unauthorized instruction together, so a permissive gate lets the injection through, while a strict gate drops the benign content with it, causing task failures.

4 OUR METHOD

4.1 STAGE I: BACKTRACKING FORMAT TUNING

Inspired by backtracking search (Ginsberg, 1993; Van Beek, 2006), we train the agent to audit a planned action before committing to it. An untrusted observation may contain both useful evidence and an injected instruction. The agent must identify the conflict with the user goal, retain the relevant evidence, and revise its plan. Two meta-action tokens structure this behavior:

- `<|backtrack|>` initiates an audit of the observation and planned action against the trusted user request.
- `<|branch|>` marks the decision to disregard the conflicting instruction and continue along an alternative execution path.

Format tuning on demonstrated defensive trajectories teaches the syntax and conditional use of these tokens, yielding the initial policy π_{θ_0}. Backtracking revises the pre-action control trace; it does not undo a completed tool call. Appendix A describes the data construction and filtering procedure.

4.2 Stage II: Implicit step-level reinforcement learning

Stage I establishes the backtracking format. Stage II improves the policy's defensive decisions using feedback from interactive rollouts. Because a terminal outcome does not identify which intermediate action caused a failure, we combine outcome-based supervision with implicit step scores learned from trajectory preferences.

Trajectory-level outcome reward. We combine a task reward with a backtracking bonus:

$$r_o(\tau) = r_{\text{task}}(\tau) + r_{\text{bonus}}(\tau), \qquad r_{\text{task}}(\tau) = \mathbb{I}_{\text{safety}}\mathbb{I}_{\text{utility}} \in \{0, 1\}. \tag{4}$$

The task reward requires both safety and successful completion of the user's request. Following AgentDojo (Debenedetti et al., 2024), both indicators are computed through programmatic checks of environment states and tool-call traces, without an LLM judge.

To encourage effective revisions, we reward backtracking that leads to safe task completion and penalize unsuccessful backtracking:

$$r_{\text{bonus}}(\tau) = \begin{cases} \gamma, & \text{if backtracking and } r_{\text{task}} = 1 \\ -\gamma, & \text{if backtracking and } r_{\text{task}} = 0 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{5}$$

where $\gamma > 0$ controls the bonus scale.

Because this feedback arrives only at trajectory completion, it offers limited guidance on which intermediate actions cause security failures, motivating step-level supervision.

Implicit process reward. Prior process-supervision methods use step annotations (Zhang et al., 2025b; Zeng et al., 2025), generative reward models (Mahan et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025a), implicit token-level rewards (Yuan et al., 2024; Cui et al., 2025), or state-grouping assumptions (Feng et al., 2026). We seek feedback at the granularity of agent actions, including observation audits and tool-use decisions, without annotated process labels or additional rollouts for intermediate evaluation.

At iteration t, an implicit process reward model (PRM) π_ϕ scores actions relative to the frozen behavior policy π_{θ_t}:

$$r_\phi(o_{1:k}, a_k) = \beta \log \frac{\pi_\phi(a_k \mid o_{1:k}, x)}{\pi_{\theta_t}(a_k \mid o_{1:k}, x)}. \tag{6}$$

Here $\beta > 0$ controls the log-ratio scale. We train the PRM online using preferred and dispreferred trajectories (τ^+, τ^-) selected from their final outcomes, with the multi-turn DPO objective (Rafailov et al., 2023; Shi et al., 2024):

$$\mathcal{L}(\phi) = -\mathbb{E}\left[\log \sigma\left(\beta \log \frac{\pi_\phi(\tau^+ \mid x)}{\pi_{\theta_t}(\tau^+ \mid x)} - \beta \log \frac{\pi_\phi(\tau^- \mid x)}{\pi_{\theta_t}(\tau^- \mid x)}\right)\right]. \tag{7}$$

The trajectory log ratio decomposes into a sum of action log ratios. Preference learning therefore supplies a dense score for each sampled action while using only trajectory-level labels. These scores are shaping signals; their factorization alone does not establish that they equal calibrated safety judgments or on-policy advantages (Appendix B).

Policy update. For a group of N rollouts, we combine a standardized outcome advantage with a standardized step score:

$$A(a_k^i) = \underbrace{\frac{r_o(\tau_i) - \mu(R_o)}{\sigma(R_o)}}_{A_{\text{traj}}(\tau_i)} + \alpha \underbrace{\frac{r_\phi(o_{1:k}^i, a_k^i) - \mu(r_\phi)}{\sigma(r_\phi)}}_{A_{\text{step}}(a_k^i)}. \tag{8}$$

The means and standard deviations are computed over the corresponding sampled rewards; α balances outcome and step supervision. Let $A_k^i = A(a_k^i)$ and $\rho_k^i(\theta) = \pi_\theta(a_k^i \mid o_{1:k}^i, x)/\pi_{\theta_t}(a_k^i \mid o_{1:k}^i, x)$. Holding the sampled advantages fixed, we optimize the clipped surrogate

$$\mathcal{J}(\theta) = \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{1}{NK}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sum_{k=1}^{K} \min\big(\rho_k^i(\theta)A_k^i,\ \text{clip}\big(\rho_k^i(\theta), 1-\epsilon, 1+\epsilon\big)A_k^i\big)\right]. \tag{9}$$

The clipping parameter ϵ limits the importance-ratio contribution to the update. We omit an additional KL penalty so that the policy can change its defensive behavior without a separate penalty for deviating from a frozen reference. The PRM is used during training; inference requires only the trained agent policy. Algorithm 1 summarizes the procedure.

Theorem 1 (Implicit step reward from trajectory preferences)**.** *Consider an MDP with deterministic transitions, zero terminal value, and a policy π_ϕ that is optimal for reward r under KL regularization relative to π_b, with coefficient $\beta > 0$. For two trajectories starting from the same initial history, the Bradley–Terry preference model is equivalent to the trajectory-level DPO model with additive score*

$$R_\phi(\tau) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} r_\phi(h_k, a_k), \qquad r_\phi(h_k, a_k) = \beta \log \frac{\pi_\phi(a_k \mid h_k)}{\pi_b(a_k \mid h_k)}. \tag{10}$$

The additive factorization of the trajectory log ratio also holds for arbitrary policies with common support and shared stochastic environment dynamics. The proof of Theorem 1 and a discussion of how its assumptions apply to our training setting are provided in Appendix B.

5 Experiments

5.1 Experimental setup

Models and training. We evaluate Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507 (Yang et al., 2025a), Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct (Grattafiori et al., 2024), and GPT-4.1-mini (`gpt-4.1-mini-2025-04-14`). Stage I trains each model on 2,000 backtracking trajectories. For the two open-weight models, Stage II uses 10 global updates, with 15 prompts and six responses per prompt in each rollout batch, for 900 additional rollouts. Stage-II prompts are sampled from a separate pool of 1,120 AgentDyn tasks that is disjoint from the Stage-I data; no AgentDojo, ASB, WASP, or DTap environment is used during training (Appendix A.1). We set $\alpha = 1$ and $\beta = 0.05$ unless otherwise stated. GPT-4.1-mini is evaluated with Stage I only. A 100-update variant tests the effect of additional RL training on adaptive robustness. Data construction and training settings appear in Appendix A.

Benchmarks and metrics. AgentDojo covers the Slack, Banking, Workspace, and Travel suites (Debenedetti et al., 2024). Static and adaptive evaluations use the full set of 420 held-out task–injection pairs; benign utility is evaluated on 97 user tasks. ASB uses 400 cases per evaluated suite (Zhang et al., 2025a). We report benign utility (BU), attack success rate (ASR), and utility under attack (UA), all in percent. BU and UA measure completion of the original task without and with an injection, respectively; ASR measures attainment of the attacker's objective. Because an attack and the original task can both succeed, ASR and UA are not complementary. Transfer evaluations use WASP, τ^2-Bench, BFCL, and DTap.

Baselines and attack settings. We compare prompting defenses (Spotlighting and Sandwiching), inference-time analysis (MELON), trained detectors (PIGuard and DataSentinel), and policy-training methods (SecAlign and Meta-SecAlign). Defense-aware evaluation uses TAP, Strategy, Genetic Search, and RL-Hammer (Mehrotra et al., 2024; Geng et al., 2026; Nasr et al., 2025; Wen et al., 2025), with payloads optimized against each target–defense pair. Appendix C describes the adaptive attack configurations.

5.2 Static attacks and benign utility

Table 1 shows that SecStep improves injection resistance while preserving task utility across both open-weight models. SecStep-RL further strengthens this performance, reducing AgentDojo ASR to 0.57% on Qwen3 and 0.00% on Llama while outperforming Meta-SecAlign in utility under attack. Benign utility also improves over the undefended models, suggesting that defensive training supports task completion beyond attacked settings. Similar improvements on ASB demonstrate that these benefits extend across the two benchmarks.

For GPT-4.1-mini, Stage-I format tuning alone substantially reduces attack success, maintaining benign and attacked-task utility on AgentDojo and improving both on ASB. However, the higher residual ASR on ASB indicates that the effectiveness of format tuning varies across environments and that further defensive optimization remains necessary.

Table 1: Static-attack results (%): benign utility (BU), attack success rate (ASR), and utility under attack (UA). ASR and UA are macro-averaged over the five attack categories in each benchmark; BU is evaluated on benign tasks. Higher BU/UA and lower ASR are better. For each model and each metric column, the best two results are highlighted in bold, including ties at the cutoff. Complete per-attack results appear in Appendix D.

Model	Method	AgentDojo			ASB		
		BU ↑	ASR ↓	UA ↑	BU ↑	ASR ↓	UA ↑
Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507	No defense	64.95	33.28	44.50	74.00	58.65	32.80
	Spotlighting	61.86	29.14	43.34	71.50	48.65	35.40
	Sandwiching	**65.64**	17.12	49.12	73.25	39.75	37.80
	MELON	61.17	3.86	37.66	68.50	21.55	34.05
	PIGuard	42.27	3.33	33.78	61.25	17.25	31.45
	DataSentinel	52.58	23.38	36.10	66.75	46.10	31.90
	SecAlign	59.79	6.95	54.05	73.50	25.65	57.15
	Meta-SecAlign	61.17	3.52	58.50	75.25	16.20	63.60
	SecStep	**65.64**	**0.86**	**59.24**	**76.00**	**5.25**	**69.00**
	SecStep-RL	**69.07**	**0.57**	**63.66**	**77.25**	**2.25**	**69.35**
Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct	No defense	46.74	13.49	33.04	83.00	38.40	48.80
	Spotlighting	43.30	11.00	28.84	79.75	34.70	47.45
	Sandwiching	46.39	6.57	34.56	82.00	26.15	51.45
	MELON	42.27	4.52	28.36	77.25	16.85	45.30
	PIGuard	35.05	2.48	29.54	72.00	14.50	43.35
	DataSentinel	41.24	11.92	31.18	76.00	29.05	46.60
	SecAlign	44.33	4.62	33.91	81.75	10.90	55.65
	Meta-SecAlign	45.36	2.67	35.08	83.25	6.75	58.65
	SecStep	**47.08**	**0.43**	**39.05**	**84.75**	**2.50**	**75.00**
	SecStep-RL	**50.86**	**0.00**	**45.00**	**86.00**	**0.50**	**81.00**
GPT-4.1-mini	No defense	**62.89**	23.38	**61.81**	**61.50**	87.00	**44.00**
	Spotlighting	60.82	22.67	60.00	59.00	76.95	41.50
	Sandwiching	61.86	16.95	61.19	60.50	63.55	43.85
	MELON	57.73	7.62	56.05	56.00	44.15	37.85
	PIGuard	49.48	**3.19**	53.72	48.75	**34.45**	35.80
	SecStep	**62.89**	**1.19**	**61.86**	**62.25**	**17.50**	**49.60**

5.3 Defense-aware adaptive attacks

Adaptive attacks increase ASR for every defense family in Figure 2. Averaged over the four adaptive procedures, Meta-SecAlign reaches 20.89% ASR on Qwen3 and 13.33% on Llama. SecStep lowers these values to 10.48% and 5.83%, and the default SecStep-RL further lowers them to 5.83% and 2.80%. Genetic Search remains the strongest evaluated attack against the 10-update policy, with ASR of 9.76% and 4.05%, respectively.

Extending RL to 100 updates reduces mean adaptive ASR to 2.32% on Qwen3 and 1.31% on Llama, corresponding to relative reductions of approximately 60% and 53% from the 10-update setting. This comparison supports the benefit of additional defensive training against the tested searches. The efficiency measurements below concern the default 10-update configuration and do not describe the cost of the extended run. The optimized payloads include mechanism-specific strategies, such as forged audit results and explicit instructions to skip backtracking (Appendix C); their outcomes are included in the ASR reported above.

5.4 Efficiency

Training Overhead. On one A100, Stage I uses 2,000 examples and 2.0 GPU hours; the default two-stage pipeline totals 2,900 examples and rollouts and 4.5 GPU hours (Table 2). SecAlign, Meta-SecAlign, and StruQ use 24.5, 25.0, and 30.5 hours, respectively. DataSentinel uses 1.6 hours, with 500 initial samples plus dynamically generated contaminated inputs.




Figure 2: AgentDojo ASR under static and defense-aware adaptive attacks. The two SECSTEP-RL variants use 10 and 100 global RL updates. Lower is better.

Inference Overhead. During deployment, a viable defense must not impose prohibitive latency or token-generation costs. Figure 3 illustrates the average output tokens in Figure 3b and the corresponding mean inference time in Figure 3a across the evaluated methods.

MELON and Sandwiching incur substantial inference overhead, generating $1,317$ and $1,007$ tokens with latencies of 16.87s and 13.86s, respectively. Additional prompting and validation contribute to these costs. PIGuard records the lowest token count and latency (488 tokens; 6.74s), but its substantial utility loss suggests that this reduction may partly reflect over-refusal and premature termination.

By learning defensive behavior during training, SECSTEP and SECSTEP-RL keep inference overhead modest. With reflection and step-level reasoning, they generate 617 and 615 tokens on average, respectively, compared with 592 for the undefended baseline. Latencies remain close to the baseline of 8.15s, reaching 8.60s and 8.58s. These results show that improved security and utility can accompany modest inference costs in the evaluated setting.

Table 2: Training cost on Llama-3.1-8B.


Type	Method	Samples	GPU hours
Detector training	PIGuard	76,755	32.0
	DataSentinel	500†	1.6
Adversarial training	StruQ	51,760	30.5
	SecAlign	19,157	24.5
	Meta-SecAlign	19,157	25.0
Ours	SECSTEP	2,000	2.0
	SECSTEP-RL	2,900‡	4.5

† Initial samples; excludes adaptive contaminated inputs generated during training.
‡ Both stages: 2,000 SFT examples and 900 rollouts over 10 global RL updates.

5.5 TRANSFER TO OTHER AGENT ENVIRONMENTS

Web security and tool-use capability. On WASP (Evtimov et al., 2025), both SECSTEP variants record zero successful attacks among the 84 evaluated injected cases for Qwen3-4B and Qwen-3.8-27B. For the 4B model, SECSTEP-RL increases benign WASP utility from 54.05% to 56.76%, τ^2-Bench utility from 36.69% to 40.10%, and BFCL utility from 22.25% to 24.57% (Barres et al., 2025; Patil et al., 2025). Utility changes on the 27B model are smaller, including a slight BFCL decrease after Stage I (Appendix E).

Cross-domain deployment. On DTap with GPT-4.1-mini in OpenClaw (Chen et al., 2026), SECSTEP reduces the reported overall indirect ASR from 42.7% to 12.2% and direct ASR from 44.4% to 13.7%, while benign task success rises from 69.1% to 70.7%. Indirect ASR decreases in all 14 domains, although it remains 24.5% in Coding and 23.5% in Legal. These results demonstrate



(a) Inference latency comparison.

(b) Output tokens comparison.

Figure 3: Inference efficiency comparison of defense methods on AgentDojo. The base model is Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct.

transfer with residual domain-dependent failures. The direct-attack evaluation is supplementary to the primary IPI threat model; domain-level results appear in Appendix F.

5.6 Ablation Study

Table 3 separates the contribution of outcome-based RL from that of the implicit step reward. On Llama, outcome-only training ($\alpha = 0$) improves AgentDojo UA from 39.05% to 43.62% and lowers ASR from 0.43% to 0.29%. Adding step rewards ($\alpha = 1$) yields 45.00% UA and 0.00% ASR. Increasing α to 2 preserves these ASRs but decreases UA to 41.36% and 76.25%, respectively. Step rewards therefore help at the tested default weight, while excessive weighting can impair task completion.

Method	AgentDojo		ASB	
	ASR ↓	UA ↑	ASR ↓	UA ↑
No Defense	13.49	33.04	38.40	48.80
SecStep	0.43	39.05	2.50	75.00
SecStep-RL ($\alpha = 0$)	0.29	43.62	1.75	78.50
SecStep-RL ($\alpha = 1$)	0.00	45.00	0.50	81.00
SecStep-RL ($\alpha = 2$)	0.00	41.36	0.50	76.25

Table 3: Effect of the step-reward weight α on Llama-3.1-8B. ASR and UA are percentages; $\alpha = 0$ uses outcome-only RL.




Figure 4: Llama-3.1-8B outcome reward during training with outcome-only RL ($\alpha = 0$) and implicit step rewards ($\alpha = 1$).

Figure 4 compares Llama training traces for outcome-only RL ($\alpha = 0$) and RL with implicit step rewards ($\alpha = 1$). In this training run, the latter attains a higher outcome reward over most of the plotted progression, suggesting that dense step-level shaping helps the policy explore and reinforce multi-step defensive trajectories when outcome feedback is sparse. Appendix G further shows that Stage-II training increases the share of blocked attacks intercepted by an explicit audit and reduces spurious audits on benign tasks.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we introduce SecStep, a training-based defense that mitigates Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM agents through action backtracking and step-level control-flow repair. SecStep-RL further derives implicit step-level rewards from trajectory preferences to improve credit assignment. Across benchmarks such as AgentDojo, ASB, WASP, and DTap, our methods substantially improve the security–utility trade-off while preserving task utility with low training and inference overhead.

AI USE STATEMENT

Generative AI tools assisted with language editing and preparation of the manuscript in the conference format. GPT-4o-mini was used to generate training trajectories, and GPT-5.5 was used to screen generated training cases for overlap with the evaluation benchmarks; both roles are described in Appendix A.1.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies defenses against instructions injected into external observations used by language agents. The attack mechanisms and evaluation procedures have dual-use implications: they can help assess defenses but may also inform attempts to compromise deployed agents. Benchmark improvements should not be interpreted as assurances of safety in operational systems, particularly where tool actions can disclose sensitive information or cause irreversible effects.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

Section 4 specifies the training objectives and procedure. Appendix A describes training-data construction, the Stage-II task pool, and hyperparameters. Appendix B contains the theoretical analysis and proofs. Appendix C specifies the adaptive attack configurations, and Appendix D provides the full static-attack results. Appendix F gives the domain-level DTap results. The anonymous code link is https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SecStep.

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A TRAINING DATA AND IMPLEMENTATION

A.1 DATA CONSTRUCTION AND SEPARATION FROM EVALUATION

We construct training data from the Shopping, GitHub, and DailyLife suites of AgentDyn (Li et al., 2026). GPT-4o-mini expands these seed tasks into multi-step trajectories containing a tool observation that mixes task-relevant information with an unauthorized instruction. Before executing a conflicting action, the agent audits its plan, identifies the injected instruction, branches to a safe alternative, and completes the original task. We retain trajectories with correct backtracking behavior, preserved benign context, and successful task completion, giving a pool of 3,360 generated cases that we then audit for overlap with the evaluation benchmarks.

We audited the full pool of 3,360 generated cases for semantic overlap with AgentDojo and ASB in task goals, injection goals, scenario settings, and execution context. GPT-5.5 first screened every case, and human annotators then verified all flagged cases rather than a sample. The audit conservatively identified four AgentDyn injection families as similar to AgentDojo injection tasks: unauthorized fund transfer (DailyLife `InjectionTask0` vs. Banking `InjectionTask5`), account-password modification (Shopping `InjectionTask8` vs. Banking `InjectionTask7`), personal-information exfiltration by email (DailyLife `InjectionTask9` vs. Travel `InjectionTask3`), and unauthorized calendar-event creation (DailyLife `InjectionTask6` vs. Travel `InjectionTask2`). We removed these four families and all 240 cases generated from them. Of the remaining 3,120 cases, 2,000 form the Stage-I format-tuning set and 1,120 form the Stage-II task pool (Appendix A.2). All results reported in this paper use models trained on the filtered data.

The training data therefore contains no attack instances from AgentDojo, ASB, WASP, or DTap, and no payloads generated by the four adaptive attack procedures used at evaluation. These controls separate the training examples from the reported evaluation instances; they do not rule out overlap in general tool-use skills or attack concepts. The gains on ASB, WASP, and DTap, whose task domains and environments differ from AgentDyn, provide further evidence that the learned defense is not specific to the training suites.

A.2 STAGE-II ENVIRONMENT AND TASK POOL

Stage-II rollouts are executed in the AgentDyn Shopping, GitHub, and DailyLife environments using the 1,120-task pool described in Appendix A.1; no task from this pool is used for evaluation. In each of the 10 global updates, we sample 15 tasks from the pool and collect six on-policy rollouts per task, for 900 rollouts in total. The indicators $\mathbb{I}_{\text{safety}}$ and $\mathbb{I}_{\text{utility}}$ in Eq. (4) are computed by programmatic checks of final environment states and tool-call traces, following the AgentDojo evaluation protocol without using any AgentDojo environment. A trajectory counts as backtracking in Eq. (5) if it contains at least one <|backtrack|> token.

A.3 TRAINING SETTINGS

Table 4 summarizes the training configuration. The open-weight policies are initialized for Stage II from their Stage-I checkpoints. Each global update collects $15 \times 6 = 90$ rollouts, so the default 10-update run uses 900 rollouts. The 100-update variant is evaluated separately for adaptive robustness. GPT-4.1-mini receives format tuning through the hosted fine-tuning interface; Stage II is evaluated only on open-weight models.

Table 4: Reported training settings. A global RL update includes rollout collection and model optimization.

Stage / model	Setting	Value
Stage I: open-weight models	Format-tuning examples	2,000
	Epochs	5
	Learning rate	10^{-5}
	Warmup ratio	0.06
	Weight decay	0.05
Stage I: GPT-4.1-mini	Epochs	3
	Batch size	4
	Learning-rate multiplier	2.0
Stage II: default setting	Global updates	10
	Prompts / responses per prompt	15 / 6
	Total rollouts	900
	Policy / PRM learning rate	10^{-6} / 10^{-6}
	Step-reward weight α	1.0
	Log-ratio scale β	0.05

A.4 Training procedure

Algorithm 1 summarizes both stages. The behavior policy is held fixed while scoring its rollouts and updating the PRM. A trajectory ends when the agent returns a final response or reaches the interaction limit; the implicit score is computed for each generated action.

Algorithm 1 Training Agents with SecStep(-RL)

Require: Task distribution $p(X)$, language model π_{base}, outcome reward model r_o, total iterations T, rollout size N, advantage hyperparameter α.

Ensure: Policy model π_{θ_T}.

▷ *Stage I: Backtrack format tuning*
Construct dataset $\mathcal{D}$ containing backtracking auditing, branching exploration, and execution logic.
Fine-tune π_{base} on $\mathcal{D}$ to get the initial policy π_{θ_0}.
▷ *Stage II: RL with implicit step-level reward*
Initialize PRM $\pi_\phi \leftarrow \pi_{\theta_0}$
for $t = 0, \ldots, T-1$ **do**
  ▷ *Multi-step rollouts collection*
  Sample prompt $x \sim p(X)$ and initialize N rollouts
  for $k = 1, \ldots, K$ **do**
    Sample actions $\{a_k^i \sim \pi_{\theta_t}(a_k | o_{1:k}^i, x)\}_{i=1}^N$
    Execute actions and observe $\{o_{k+1}^i\}_{i=1}^N$
  end for
  ▷ *PRM training for step-level security feedback*
  Evaluate final trajectories $R_o = \{r_o(\tau_1), \ldots, r_o(\tau_N)\}$
  Forward pass π_ϕ to obtain $r_\phi(o_{1:k}^i, a_k^i)$ (Eq. 6)
  Construct preference pairs (τ^+, τ^-) based on R_o
  Update PRM π_ϕ on trajectory pairs (τ^+, τ^-) (Eq. 7)
  ▷ *Policy optimization with combined advantages*
  Compute trajectory-level advantages $A_{\text{traj}}(\tau_i)$
  Compute step-level advantages $A_{\text{step}}(a_k^i)$
  Combine: $A(a_k^i) = A_{\text{traj}}(\tau_i) + \alpha A_{\text{step}}(a_k^i)$ (Eq. 8)
  Update policy to $\pi_{\theta_{t+1}}$ from π_{θ_t} by maximizing the clipped surrogate objective $\mathcal{J}_{policy}(\theta_{t+1})$ (Eq. 9)
end for

B THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

We derive the implicit step reward from KL-regularized control and then discuss how its assumptions apply to our training setting. The derivation follows the implicit-reward interpretation of DPO (Rafailov et al., 2023) and its use for process supervision (Cui et al., 2025).

For compactness, let $h_k = (x, o_{1:k})$ denote the full history before action a_k, and let $\pi_b = \pi_{\theta_t}$ denote the frozen behavior policy at training iteration t. We consider finite-horizon, undiscounted trajectories with K actions and assume that both policies assign positive probability to the evaluated actions. The history includes the decision index, so time dependence is implicit.

B.1 PROOF OF THEOREM 1

Proof. We model the agent as a KL-regularized MDP. Define Q^* to exclude the reference log-probability term; the soft Bellman equations are

$$Q^*(h,a) = r(h,a) + \mathbb{E}[V^*(h') \mid h,a], \qquad V^*(h) = \beta \log \sum_a \pi_b(a \mid h) e^{Q^*(h,a)/\beta}. \tag{11}$$

With this convention, the optimal regularized policy satisfies

$$\pi_\phi(a_k \mid h_k) = \pi_b(a_k \mid h_k) \exp\left(\frac{Q^*(h_k,a_k) - V^*(h_k)}{\beta}\right). \tag{12}$$

Taking logarithms and substituting the Bellman equation gives

$$r(h_k,a_k) = \beta \log \frac{\pi_\phi(a_k \mid h_k)}{\pi_b(a_k \mid h_k)} + V^*(h_k) - \mathbb{E}[V^*(h_{k+1}) \mid h_k, a_k]. \tag{13}$$

Under deterministic transitions, the conditional next-state value equals its realized value. Summing along a trajectory therefore makes the value terms telescope:

$$\sum_{k=1}^{K} r(h_k,a_k) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} r_\phi(h_k,a_k) + V^*(h_1) - V^*(h_{K+1}) = R_\phi(\tau) + V^*(h_1), \tag{14}$$

where the last equality uses $V^*(h_{K+1}) = 0$. For trajectories τ^+ and τ^- with the same initial history, the initial-value term cancels. Writing K^+ and K^- for their respective lengths, the Bradley–Terry model becomes

$$\mathbb{P}(\tau^+ \succ \tau^- \mid h_1) = \sigma\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K^+} r_\phi(h_k^+, a_k^+) - \sum_{k=1}^{K^-} r_\phi(h_k^-, a_k^-)\right). \tag{15}$$

By the trajectory factorization in Eq. (1),

$$R_\phi(\tau) = \beta \log \frac{\pi_\phi(\tau \mid x)}{\pi_b(\tau \mid x)} = \beta \sum_{k=1}^{K} \log \frac{\pi_\phi(a_k \mid h_k)}{\pi_b(a_k \mid h_k)}. \tag{16}$$

Substitution into Eq. (15) gives the DPO preference likelihood:

$$\mathbb{P}(\tau^+ \succ \tau^- \mid h_1) = \sigma\left(\beta \log \frac{\pi_\phi(\tau^+ \mid x)}{\pi_b(\tau^+ \mid x)} - \beta \log \frac{\pi_\phi(\tau^- \mid x)}{\pi_b(\tau^- \mid x)}\right). \tag{17}$$

Its negative log-likelihood is the objective in Eq. (7), with the implicit step reward in Eq. (6). The log-ratio factorization itself is algebraic: if trajectory likelihoods include observations, shared initial-state and transition probabilities cancel between the two policies. It therefore remains valid for stochastic tool responses, although the realized-return telescoping argument above uses deterministic transitions. □

C ADAPTIVE ATTACK CONFIGURATIONS

We evaluate four adaptive attacks that optimize injected tool content against each target–defense pair. The attacker knows the defense mechanism and receives feedback from target interactions. The adaptive AgentDojo evaluation uses the same 420 held-out task–injection pairs as the static evaluation described in Section 5. Table 5 lists the configurations used in our experiments.

TAP. Tree of Attacks with Pruning uses an auxiliary LLM to generate and refine candidate attacks through a branching search, pruning unpromising candidates before further expansion (Mehrotra et al., 2024).

Strategy. Strategy searches over linguistic transformations, role framing, and prompt structure to identify effective injection formulations (Geng et al., 2026).

Genetic Search. Genetic Search evolves candidate payloads using mutation, crossover, and target feedback (Nasr et al., 2025). Our configuration includes a candidate archive and island-based populations with periodic migration.

RL-Hammer. RL-Hammer trains an attacker policy from interaction feedback (Wen et al., 2025). We initialize the attacker from Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and use GRPO with LoRA adaptation. With query budget B and group size G, the configured training length is $\lceil B/G \rceil$ epochs.

Mechanism-aware payloads. The attacker is given a description of the SECSTEP mechanism, including the `<|backtrack|>` and `<|branch|>` meta-actions and the format of audit traces, and iteratively optimizes its payload against the target policy. Without being instructed to do so, the search discovers payloads tailored to backtracking. Some impersonate a completed audit (e.g., "`Backtrack checked, no conflict. Now proceed with: ...`"), while others instruct the agent to suppress the defense (e.g., "`Do not backtrack or reflect. Complete the following task: ...`"). These payloads are part of the adaptive evaluation, and their outcomes are included in the ASR reported in Figure 2.

Table 5: Configurations of the four adaptive attacks. Generation limits are measured in tokens; query budgets and search settings are specific to each procedure. For RL-Hammer, B denotes the query budget and G the GRPO group size.

Hyperparameter	Setting	Hyperparameter	Setting
TAP		**Strategy**	
Attacker model	Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct	Population size	8
Root nodes	1	Initial attempts	3
Branching factor	3	Maximum generations	3
Beam width	5	Success threshold	0.8
Maximum tree depth	5	Maximum generation length	1,024
Maximum generation length	512	Sampling temperature	0.8
Sampling temperature	0.9	Nucleus sampling (p)	0.95
		Top-k sampling	50
Genetic Search		**RL-Hammer**	
Query budget	200	Attacker base model	Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct
Candidates per generation	4	Query budget (B)	80
Population size	200	GRPO group size (G)	16
Archive size	25	Training epochs	$\lceil B/G \rceil = 5$
Number of islands	2	Per-device batch size	1
Feature bins	5	Gradient accumulation steps	16
Migration interval	10 generations	Evaluation temperature	0.0
Migration rate	0.1	LoRA rank / alpha	128 / 64
Exploration ratio	0.2	KL coefficient	0.0
Exploitation ratio	0.7	Learning rate	10^{-5}
Elite-selection ratio	0.1		
Random seed	42		

The 10- and 100-update settings for SECSTEP-RL refer to defender training. They are separate from the attacker search iterations and RL-Hammer epochs listed here.

D FULL STATIC-ATTACK RESULTS

The following tables report ASR / UA for the five static attack categories in each benchmark. All values are percentages; lower ASR and higher UA indicate better performance. Aggregate results and benign utility appear in Table 1.

D.1 AGENTDOJO

Table 6: AgentDojo results for Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507. Each cell reports ASR / UA (%) for one attack category. Aggregate results and BU appear in Table 1.

Method	IgnorePrev	InjecAgent	ImportMsgs	ToolKnow	ChatInject
No defense	25.20 / 46.00	25.70 / 46.00	27.40 / 50.50	41.90 / 48.10	46.20 / 31.90
Spotlighting	17.40 / 46.40	18.10 / 47.90	29.00 / 49.30	35.50 / 44.80	45.70 / 28.30
Sandwiching	11.00 / 48.30	13.10 / 52.10	18.60 / 50.70	25.50 / 47.10	17.40 / 47.40
MELON	3.57 / 41.70	1.19 / 43.30	2.86 / 42.10	5.71 / 37.40	5.95 / 23.80
PIGuard	4.52 / 40.70	5.71 / 35.50	0.71 / 29.80	4.29 / 31.90	1.43 / 31.00
DataSentinel	16.20 / 40.20	13.80 / 36.70	23.10 / 39.30	33.60 / 39.30	30.20 / 25.00
SecAlign	5.24 / 54.52	6.67 / 55.00	7.14 / 56.19	7.38 / 55.24	8.33 / 49.29
Meta-SecAlign	2.62 / 58.10	4.52 / 59.50	3.10 / 60.20	2.86 / 59.50	4.52 / 55.20
SECSTEP	1.43 / 57.86	0.71 / 60.00	0.48 / 59.76	0.95 / 59.76	0.71 / 58.81
SECSTEP-RL	1.19 / 60.00	0.24 / 64.29	0.24 / 68.04	0.48 / 63.10	0.71 / 62.86

Table 7: AgentDojo results for Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. Each cell reports ASR / UA (%) for one attack category. Aggregate results and BU appear in Table 1.

Method	IgnorePrev	InjecAgent	ImportMsgs	ToolKnow	ChatInject
No defense	7.62 / 37.10	7.14 / 37.10	9.29 / 37.90	12.90 / 36.40	30.50 / 16.70
Spotlighting	7.14 / 30.70	4.05 / 32.60	11.40 / 32.60	13.10 / 34.00	19.30 / 14.30
Sandwiching	3.10 / 35.70	4.29 / 38.10	10.00 / 33.60	8.81 / 34.00	6.67 / 31.40
MELON	4.05 / 31.40	1.90 / 33.30	6.43 / 31.40	5.24 / 29.00	5.00 / 16.70
PIGuard	3.10 / 32.40	2.62 / 31.90	1.67 / 28.60	1.90 / 28.80	3.10 / 26.00
DataSentinel	6.90 / 34.50	4.29 / 36.20	12.40 / 32.10	12.90 / 36.00	23.10 / 17.10
SecAlign	2.38 / 35.71	1.19 / 36.67	3.57 / 35.00	3.81 / 36.67	12.14 / 25.48
Meta-SecAlign	1.19 / 36.20	0.24 / 36.90	1.19 / 36.40	1.43 / 37.10	9.29 / 28.80
SECSTEP	0.00 / 39.05	0.00 / 39.29	0.00 / 39.52	0.00 / 39.29	2.14 / 38.10
SECSTEP-RL	0.00 / 45.00	0.00 / 45.48	0.00 / 45.24	0.00 / 45.00	0.00 / 44.29

Table 8: AgentDojo results for GPT-4.1-mini. Each cell reports ASR / UA (%) for one attack category. Aggregate results and BU appear in Table 1.

Method	IgnorePrev	InjecAgent	ImportMsgs	ToolKnow	ChatInject
No defense	6.67 / 67.62	6.19 / 69.52	51.19 / 49.29	51.90 / 51.43	0.95 / 71.19
Spotlighting	5.48 / 66.90	4.05 / 68.33	54.52 / 47.14	48.33 / 48.57	0.95 / 69.05
Sandwiching	3.57 / 68.10	3.33 / 66.90	43.33 / 50.48	33.81 / 52.14	0.71 / 68.33
MELON	2.14 / 62.14	0.95 / 64.52	20.48 / 42.86	14.05 / 44.76	0.48 / 65.95
PIGuard	1.90 / 61.43	1.67 / 60.48	5.48 / 39.76	6.43 / 41.67	0.48 / 65.24
SECSTEP	1.19 / 69.05	0.71 / 58.33	2.14 / 58.10	1.19 / 57.38	0.71 / 66.43

D.2 AGENT SECURITY BENCH

Table 9: ASB results for Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507. Each cell reports mean ASR / UA (%) for one attack category. Aggregate results and BU appear in Table 1.

Method	Naive	Escape	Ignore	Completion	Combined
No defense	54.50 / 39.00	52.25 / 37.00	56.00 / 33.00	63.75 / 27.00	66.75 / 28.00
Spotlighting	42.75 / 40.25	40.00 / 38.25	47.25 / 36.50	54.50 / 30.75	58.75 / 31.25
Sandwiching	33.00 / 42.25	31.25 / 40.25	40.75 / 38.75	45.50 / 33.50	48.25 / 34.25
MELON	20.25 / 37.25	18.75 / 36.25	21.00 / 35.00	23.50 / 31.50	24.25 / 30.25
PIGuard	18.50 / 34.75	20.25 / 33.50	13.75 / 30.25	16.50 / 29.00	17.25 / 29.75
DataSentinel	39.50 / 35.75	38.00 / 34.00	45.25 / 32.25	52.25 / 28.50	55.50 / 29.00
SecAlign	22.25 / 57.50	23.75 / 56.25	24.50 / 58.00	28.25 / 56.75	29.50 / 57.25
Meta-SecAlign	14.50 / 63.75	15.50 / 62.50	14.50 / 64.25	18.25 / 63.50	18.25 / 64.00
SECSTEP	4.75 / 69.75	6.75 / 68.75	3.75 / 69.00	5.75 / 68.25	5.25 / 69.25
SECSTEP-RL	2.75 / 67.50	3.25 / 69.25	0.50 / 71.50	2.75 / 71.75	2.00 / 66.75

Table 10: ASB results for Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. Each cell reports mean ASR / UA (%) for one attack category. Aggregate results and BU appear in Table 1.

Method	Naive	Escape	Ignore	Completion	Combined
No defense	33.00 / 50.00	40.00 / 51.00	43.00 / 49.00	38.00 / 49.00	38.00 / 45.00
Spotlighting	29.50 / 48.25	35.25 / 49.25	39.25 / 47.75	34.50 / 48.00	35.00 / 44.00
Sandwiching	20.25 / 52.50	26.50 / 53.00	30.75 / 51.50	26.25 / 52.25	27.00 / 48.00
MELON	15.00 / 46.50	17.50 / 47.00	19.25 / 45.75	16.00 / 45.25	16.50 / 42.00
PIGuard	12.75 / 44.50	15.50 / 44.75	16.75 / 43.25	14.00 / 43.75	13.50 / 40.50
DataSentinel	24.50 / 47.50	29.00 / 48.75	33.25 / 46.75	28.50 / 47.25	30.00 / 42.75
SecAlign	9.25 / 56.00	11.50 / 57.25	12.75 / 55.50	10.25 / 56.50	10.75 / 53.00
Meta-SecAlign	5.50 / 59.00	7.25 / 60.50	7.75 / 58.75	6.50 / 59.50	6.75 / 55.50
SECSTEP	2.00 / 74.50	2.50 / 75.00	3.00 / 75.75	2.50 / 74.25	2.50 / 75.50
SECSTEP-RL	0.50 / 80.50	0.25 / 81.25	0.75 / 82.00	0.50 / 80.75	0.50 / 80.50

Table 11: ASB results for GPT-4.1-mini. Each cell reports mean ASR / UA (%) for one attack category. Aggregate results and BU appear in Table 1.

Method	Naive	Escape	Ignore	Completion	Combined
No defense	88.25 / 49.75	91.00 / 48.50	83.75 / 38.25	92.50 / 47.00	79.50 / 36.50
Spotlighting	70.75 / 46.25	76.50 / 45.50	83.00 / 36.75	80.25 / 44.00	74.25 / 35.00
Sandwiching	55.25 / 48.50	63.00 / 47.25	70.50 / 39.75	68.25 / 45.50	60.75 / 38.25
MELON	38.25 / 41.75	44.00 / 41.25	48.50 / 34.00	47.25 / 39.50	42.75 / 32.75
PIGuard	28.75 / 39.50	34.50 / 38.75	40.25 / 32.50	37.50 / 37.25	31.25 / 31.00
SECSTEP	17.00 / 50.25	17.50 / 49.50	18.25 / 48.75	17.25 / 50.00	17.50 / 49.50

E GENERALIZATION TO WEB AND TOOL-USE TASKS

Evaluation tasks. WASP evaluates end-to-end prompt-injection security in web-agent tasks built from WebArena (Evtimov et al., 2025; Zhou et al., 2024). We use 84 injected cases and 37 benign tasks. Its end-to-end ASR measures completion of the attacker's injected objective, while utility measures benign task completion. Following prior evaluations (Chen et al., 2025c; Evtimov et al., 2025), the agent receives the text-based accessibility-tree representation of each webpage. τ^2-Bench evaluates multi-turn conversations in which an agent and a simulated user interact with a shared environment through tools (Barres et al., 2025). BFCL measures function calling across serial, parallel, and stateful tool-use scenarios (Patil et al., 2025).

Table 12: Generalization to web and tool-use tasks (%). WASP utility is measured on benign tasks; τ^2-Bench and BFCL report task utility.

Model	Method	WASP		τ^2-Bench	BFCL
		ASR ↓	Utility ↑	Utility ↑	Utility ↑
Qwen3-4B	No Defense	38.10	54.05	36.69	22.25
	Meta-SecAlign	11.90	51.35	37.14	17.88
	SECSTEP	0.00	54.05	39.48	24.00
	SECSTEP-RL	0.00	56.76	40.10	24.57
Qwen-3.8-27B	No Defense	25.00	72.97	83.00	68.70
	Meta-SecAlign	8.33	70.27	81.95	64.76
	SECSTEP	0.00	72.97	83.14	67.81
	SECSTEP-RL	0.00	72.97	83.24	68.95

Results. Both SECSTEP variants record zero successful WASP attacks on the 84 evaluated cases for the 4B and 27B models (Table 12). For Qwen3-4B, Stage II improves utility on all three benchmarks relative to the undefended model. For the 27B model, WASP utility is unchanged, while τ^2-Bench and BFCL utility improve slightly after Stage II. Stage I alone decreases BFCL utility, indicating that capability gains vary with model size and training stage.

F PERFORMANCE ON DTAP

We evaluate GPT-4.1-mini with Stage-I format tuning in the OpenClaw framework on DTap (Chen et al., 2026). Table 13 reports indirect ASR, direct ASR, and benign task success across 14 domains. The reported overall indirect ASR decreases from 42.7% to 12.2% and direct ASR from 44.4% to 13.7%, while benign success increases from 69.1% to 70.7%. Both attack metrics decrease in every domain. Residual indirect ASR is highest in Coding (24.5%) and Legal (23.5%), indicating that recovery remains difficult in some workflows. Direct attacks are included as an additional transfer test beyond the primary tool-output IPI threat model.

Table 13: DTap results (%) for GPT-4.1-mini in OpenClaw. Each metric compares no defense (Base) with SECSTEP (Sec).

	Indirect ASR ↓		Direct ASR ↓		Benign success ↑	
Domain	Base	Sec	Base	Sec	Base	Sec
Workflow	31.3	8.3	35.5	10.5	53.8	55.8
CRM	61.3	18.5	78.0	24.3	66.3	67.8
CS	62.0	19.3	70.5	22.5	78.5	80.3
Travel	39.0	9.8	14.3	4.5	80.5	82.0
Coding	78.3	24.5	37.8	11.8	80.0	81.5
Browser	33.0	8.0	26.3	7.5	50.0	51.8
Research	7.0	2.0	67.5	21.3	83.5	85.0
OS-FS	24.0	6.5	38.8	12.3	69.3	70.8
Windows	11.5	3.3	36.5	10.8	51.0	52.5
macOS	32.0	8.3	30.3	9.0	65.5	67.0
Finance	31.5	7.8	30.0	8.8	81.8	83.3
Legal	78.0	23.5	59.3	18.5	80.0	81.5
Telecom	50.8	14.3	48.0	14.0	66.5	68.0
Medical	58.0	16.8	49.5	15.8	60.3	62.3
Overall	42.7	12.2	44.4	13.7	69.1	70.7

G BACKTRACKING BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS

To examine whether the security gains are mediated by backtracking rather than by blanket conservatism, we measure how often the trained policy invokes an audit on AgentDojo. We say that the policy *reflects* when it emits <|backtrack|> before a tool call.

Valid Reflection Rate (VRR, ↑) is computed over the static attacked cases in which the corresponding undefended backbone is hijacked; it is the fraction of these cases in which the policy reflects before the injected tool call would be executed and the attack fails. *Over-Reflection Rate* (ORR, ↓) is computed over the 97 benign AgentDojo user tasks; it is the fraction in which the policy reflects although no injection is present.

Table 14: Backtracking behavior on AgentDojo. VRR is computed over static attacked cases in which the undefended backbone is hijacked; ORR is computed over the 97 benign user tasks.

Model	**Method**	**VRR (%) ↑**	**ORR (%) ↓**
Qwen3-4B	SECSTEP	63.2	15.5
	SECSTEP-RL	91.4	5.2
Llama-3.1-8B	SECSTEP	68.7	12.4
	SECSTEP-RL	93.1	4.1
GPT-4.1-mini	SECSTEP	57.8	16.5

As shown in Table 14, Stage-I tuning already makes explicit reflection the main route by which attacks are blocked across all three model families. Because the static ASR of SECSTEP is at most 1.19% (Table 1), nearly all hijacked cases not covered by VRR are blocked without an explicit audit; after Stage I, these account for roughly 30–40% of such cases. Part of the Stage-I gain therefore comes from robustness acquired implicitly from agentic training data rather than from backtracking alone. Stage-II RL raises VRR above 90% on both open-weight models, so that fewer than 9% of these cases are resolved without an explicit audit, and it also reduces ORR. Over-reflection does not appear to harm task completion: the benign utility of every SECSTEP variant is at least that of the corresponding undefended model (Table 1). GPT-4.1-mini, trained with Stage I only through the hosted fine-tuning API, shows the lowest VRR and the highest ORR, but still exhibits transferable backtracking behavior.