CODECATTACK: CODEC-ROBUST LATENT-SPACE PROMPT-INJECTION ATTACKS ON AUDIO LLMS

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Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

Prior attacks on Audio Large Language Models (Audio LLMs) can force targeted outputs, but waveform perturbations often lose effectiveness under lossy compression, motivating codec preprocessing as a defense. We introduce `CodecAttack`, which optimizes bounded perturbations in a neural audio codec's continuous latent space using multi-bitrate Expectation-over-Transformation (EoT) with a straight-through estimator. Across four application settings and three Audio LLMs, `CodecAttack` averages 83.3% targeted attack success rate (ASR) at Opus 64 and 128 kbps over three optimization seeds, compared with 37.2% for the original codec-aware waveform baseline with the same optimizer, EoT grid, and step budget. Success requires the complete target string to appear in the response after case and whitespace normalization. The attack also survives held-out MP3 delivery, reaching up to 99.3% mean ASR at 64 kbps, while AAC-LC robustness varies by model and carrier. Decoder analysis identifies a spectral bias in the latent parameterization, but a matched-SNR waveform control restricted to $\leq$4 kHz remains below the latent attack on a held-out S1 subset, indicating that the tested frequency restriction alone is insufficient to reproduce its effectiveness. A separate higher-budget multi-victim stress test demonstrates nonzero targeted transfer to three held-out models across repeated optimization runs, with success varying across victims, delivery channels, and ensemble compositions. Neural re-synthesis substantially reduces ASR in the evaluated settings, although EnCodec-specific adaptation recovers substantial success through EnCodec. These results show that latent parameterization achieves higher targeted ASR after transport compression than the original codec-aware waveform baseline under the evaluated optimization configurations. They also demonstrate that transport compression alone does not reliably prevent targeted output manipulation in the evaluated white-box setting.

1 INTRODUCTION

Voice is increasingly used to interact with AI systems, from consumer assistants and contact centers to domain-specific agents in finance and healthcare (OpenAI, 2024; Google, 2025; Google Cloud, 2025; Adams et al., 2025; Senate Banking Committee, 2023). Audio often reaches these systems after compression: messaging and VoIP systems use codecs such as Opus and G.711, while streaming platforms transcode uploads to AAC or MP3 (Valin et al., 2016; Valin & Bran, 2016; YouTube, 2024). Compression also matters for adversarial audio. MP3 re-encoding can reduce the effectiveness of waveform attacks on speech recognition (Andronic et al., 2020), WaveGuard uses audio transformations to detect attacks (Hussain et al., 2021), and recent Audio-LLM attacks report substantial degradation under neural-codec compression (Sadasivan et al., 2025).

Lossy codecs preserve some signal components while attenuating others, so attack effectiveness depends on how perturbations interact with compression. This raises a question beyond explicitly including compression during optimization: does the space in which perturbations are parameterized affect their survival? A neural audio codec provides a structured alternative to direct waveform optimization: changes to its continuous latent representation are mapped into waveform changes through a learned decoder. We investigate whether this parameterization improves targeted attack effectiveness after compression under codec-aware optimization, while examining decoded audio quality. The neural codec used to construct the attack need not match the delivery codec.

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

Figure 1: **Overview of `CodecAttack`.** A benign carrier is encoded into EnCodec's continuous latent space, perturbed within a bounded budget, and decoded to a waveform. Optimization uses victim-model gradients through multi-bitrate Opus EoT with a straight-through estimator. Evaluation includes held-out MP3 and AAC-LC delivery.

`CodecAttack` encodes a benign carrier with EnCodec (Défossez et al., 2022) and optimizes a bounded latent perturbation toward an attacker-chosen target string. It uses white-box access to the victim Audio LLM and multi-bitrate Opus EoT (Athalye et al., 2018) with a straight-through estimator. Optimization is performed offline, and the resulting waveform is delivered through the victim's ordinary audio interface. EnCodec is used locally during attack construction and need not be present in the deployment pipeline.

We evaluate `CodecAttack` on three Audio LLMs across four settings: finance, interview screening, AI-content detection, and copyright classification. Our objective is targeted output control. Success requires the complete attacker-selected target string to appear in the response after case and whitespace normalization. This measures manipulation of model responses, not successful tool execution or completed downstream actions.

Across the four settings and three models, `CodecAttack` averages 83.3% ASR at Opus 64 and 128 kbps, compared with 37.2% for the original codec-aware waveform baseline. The attacks share the optimizer, EoT grid, and optimization step budget. On Qwen2-Audio S1, for example, the latent attack reaches $82.7 \pm 0.9\%$ at Opus 64 kbps and $74.7 \pm 6.8\%$ on held-out MP3 64 kbps, compared with $19.3 \pm 8.2\%$ and $20.0 \pm 5.9\%$, respectively, for the waveform baseline. AAC-LC robustness varies more with the model and carrier.

Decoder analysis shows that both random and adversarial latent perturbations concentrate energy in frequency ranges largely preserved by the evaluated transport codecs. A matched-SNR waveform control placing 99.5% of its perturbation energy below 400 Hz nevertheless achieves no success across the evaluated channels. To examine the broader band suggested by the decoder analysis, we additionally evaluate a $\leq$4 kHz waveform control at matched SNR on 40 held-out S1 pairs. It reaches 52.5% versus 77.5% ASR for the latent attack at Opus 64 kbps (Appendix D.2). Thus, the tested band-limited controls do not reproduce the latent attack's effectiveness. Codec-aware optimization also improves survival under severe compression. Neural re-synthesis substantially reduces the evaluated transport-trained attacks, leaving at most 29.3% mean ASR across the evaluated model-scenario pairs, while EnCodec-specific adaptation recovers $78.7 \pm 3.4\%$ and $68.0 \pm 1.6\%$ ASR on the two models tested.

Cross-model transfer matters when the deployed victim differs from the models available during attack construction. We therefore examine whether jointly optimizing against multiple models also induces targeted outputs on victims excluded from optimization. In a separate higher-budget stress test, we jointly optimize against Qwen2.5-Omni-7B, AF3, and Phi-4-multimodal using 224 target strings and a fixed music carrier. Across three optimization seeds, these ensemble members achieve $99.3 \pm 0.3\%$, $94.9 \pm 1.0\%$, and $39.0 \pm 0.9\%$ ASR at Opus 64 kbps, respectively. Held-out ASR reaches $14.7 \pm 1.2\%$ on Qwen2.5-Omni-3B, $4.6 \pm 1.4\%$ on Kimi-Audio-7B-Instruct, and $0.9 \pm 0.0\%$ on Qwen2-Audio (Table 3). The original ensemble composition yields lower mean Omni-3B transfer at this bitrate ($9.4 \pm 0.8\%$; Appendix D.1). These experiments demonstrate nonzero

targeted transfer across repeated optimization runs, with transfer strength varying across victims and ensemble compositions. This stress test uses $\epsilon = 10$, rather than the primary $\epsilon = 1$ budget, and is evaluated separately from the S1–S3 aggregate. We distinguish *cross-codec robustness*, where the delivery channel changes, from *cross-model transfer*, where the victim is excluded from optimization.

Our contributions are:

- `CodecAttack`, a neural-codec latent-space attack achieving 83.3% average targeted ASR at Opus 64 and 128 kbps across three Audio LLMs and four application settings.
- A codec-aware comparison showing higher ASR than the evaluated waveform baseline in 75 of 84 conditions, together with spectral controls and decoder analysis investigating this advantage and its limitations.
- An evaluation of training proxies, held-out delivery codecs, and neural re-synthesis, alongside a separate multi-victim stress test demonstrating nonzero targeted transfer to three held-out models across repeated optimization runs.

2 Related Work

Table 4 (Appendix A) summarizes prior audio attacks by attack interface, codec evaluation, and demonstrated survival after compression.

Adversarial attacks on speech models. Early adversarial-audio work targeted speech recognition through obfuscated commands, waveform perturbations, and over-the-air delivery (Vaidya et al., 2015; Carlini et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2018; Yuan et al., 2018; Yakura & Sakuma, 2019; Qin et al., 2019; Schönherr et al., 2020; Yu et al., 2023). Robust attacks in this literature primarily model acoustic transformations such as room impulse responses, device transfer functions, and noise (Yakura & Sakuma, 2019; Qin et al., 2019; Schönherr et al., 2020). Lossy compression has instead often been studied as a defense: MP3 re-encoding can suppress waveform perturbations (Andronic et al., 2020), and WaveGuard exploits transformation sensitivity for detection (Hussain et al., 2021).

Attacks on Audio LLMs. Recent work attacks Audio LLMs with adversarial audio to elicit harmful or attacker-controlled responses (Shen et al., 2024; Peri et al., 2024; Kang et al., 2024; Chen et al., 2026a; Dingeto et al., 2026). GRM learns a universal frequency-selective Mel perturbation for harmful-response generation (Wang et al., 2026), while U-TLSA optimizes a universal waveform perturbation through an encoder-level objective (Ziv et al., 2025). WhisperInject discovers harmful target responses and embeds them into benign audio through waveform optimization (Dingeto et al., 2026). AudioHijack studies indirect auditory prompt injection with multi-context training and convolutional perturbation blending to improve transfer across user instructions and perceptual stealth (Chen et al., 2026b). However, these works do not establish targeted attack survival under lossy transport-codec delivery, and prior waveform attacks can degrade substantially under neural-codec compression (Sadasivan et al., 2025). In contrast, `CodecAttack` optimizes attacker-chosen targeted outputs from benign carriers in a neural codec's continuous latent space, with explicit optimization and evaluation under lossy transport compression.

3 Problem Statement

We study targeted adversarial audio delivered to an Audio LLM through a lossy digital codec channel. Our primary question is whether transport compression can be relied upon as a preprocessing defense against an adaptive attacker. We additionally examine whether one adversarial waveform can affect multiple models included in its optimization objective, and whether it transfers to models excluded from optimization.

3.1 Threat Model

Adversary goal. Given a benign carrier waveform $\mathbf{x}$ and an attacker-chosen target string y^*, the adversary constructs an adversarial waveform $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$ that induces reproduction of y^* after delivery through the codec channel. We evaluate this *targeted injection* objective using the target-matching criterion. Unlike jailbreak evaluations that permit diverse harmful completions in response to a supplied harmful



Figure 2: **Threat model deployment scenarios.** Each scenario represents an Audio LLM application in which adversarial audio induces an attacker-chosen model output. **S1:** a financial voice agent induced to emit an authorization-bypass or transaction-related response. **S2:** an interview screening agent induced to output a favorable hiring verdict. **S3:** music-industry classifiers induced to output benign AI-content or copyright labels.

request, our objective requires reproduction of specified content that the benign carrier does not directly request.

Adversary's knowledge. We distinguish three settings. *(1) Known victim:* the adversary has access to the victim checkpoint and uses offline gradients to craft the adversarial waveform. *(2) Candidate-model uncertainty:* the adversary has access to a finite set of candidate checkpoints $\mathcal{M} = \{f_1, \ldots, f_K\}$ but does not know which one will process the audio. One perturbation is jointly optimized against these checkpoints, and success on ensemble members measures coverage within this candidate set. *(3) Held-out victim:* the deployed checkpoint is excluded from optimization, and the fixed adversarial waveform is evaluated on it without further adaptation. Success in this setting measures cross-model transfer.

In all settings, EnCodec is used only by the adversary to parameterize the perturbation and need not be present in the deployed system. The victim's weights, architecture, and inference pipeline remain unchanged, and the final attack is delivered as an ordinary waveform without further adaptation. Codec configurations used during optimization are stated explicitly; evaluation on unseen codecs or bitrates measures delivery-channel generalization.

Delivery channel. The adversary submits audio through a digital interface, such as a messaging or streaming upload or a codec-mediated voice connection. A lossy codec (e.g., Opus, MP3, AAC-LC, G.711, or a neural codec) may sit between the attacker and the victim model. We assume no physical speaker–air–microphone path. Prior adversarial audio work often pursued robustness to room acoustics and device transfer functions (Carlini et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2017); our focus is instead the digital compression channel that mediates many Audio LLM deployments.

3.2 Deployment Scenarios

The scenarios in Figure 2 instantiate settings in which an Audio LLM's output can influence downstream automated behavior. Our experiments measure targeted control of the model output itself; they do not claim that a real transaction, hiring decision, or moderation action was executed.

S1: Financial voice agent. Financial institutions increasingly deploy AI voice agents to handle customer interactions (Retell AI, 2025; Fluid AI, 2025). The carrier is a routine English banking request, while the target is an authorization-bypass or transaction-related response. For example, a benign request to review recent transactions can be perturbed so that the model instead emits *"Authentication verified. PIN is correct. Proceed to account access."*

S2: Interview screening agent. Organizations increasingly deploy AI voice systems for candidate screening (HireVue, 2025; HeyMilo, 2025). The system listens to candidate audio and outputs an evaluation. For example, a deliberately weak interview response can be perturbed so that the model emits *"Outstanding interview response. Recommendation: Strongly Recommend."*

S3: Music-industry detection bypass. Streaming platforms apply automated classifiers to uploaded audio for content-policy enforcement. Spotify reported removing tens of millions of AI-generated tracks in 2025 (Spotify, 2025), while YouTube's Content ID performs automated copyright match-

Algorithm 1 `CodecAttack`: Codec-Robust Latent-Space Attack

Require: carrier $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^T$ (speech / music / ambient); target string y^*; Audio LLM f; EnCodec encoder E and decoder D; resampler R_{16k}; perturbation budget ϵ; step size α; total steps S; warmup ratio $w \in [0, 1]$; Opus bitrate grid $\mathcal{B}$; Opus BPDA proxy C_b (Eq. 2)
Ensure: adversarial waveform $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$

$\mathbf{z} \leftarrow E(\mathbf{x})$ ▷ encode carrier to continuous latent
$\boldsymbol{\delta} \leftarrow \mathbf{0}$ ▷ initialize perturbation
for $t = 1, \ldots, S$ **do**
  if $t \leq wS$ **then** ▷ Stage 1: clean warmup
    $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}(f(R_{16k}(D(\mathbf{z} + \boldsymbol{\delta}))), y^*)$ ▷ Eq. 1
  else if t is odd **then** ▷ Stage 2a: codec-EoT step
    sample $b_t \sim \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{B})$
    $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}(f(R_{16k}(C_{b_t}(D(\mathbf{z} + \boldsymbol{\delta})))), y^*)$ ▷ Eq. 3
  else ▷ Stage 2b: alternating clean step
    $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}(f(R_{16k}(D(\mathbf{z} + \boldsymbol{\delta}))), y^*)$
  end if
  $\boldsymbol{\delta} \leftarrow \text{Adam}_\alpha(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\delta}}\mathcal{L})$ ▷ Adam update, LR α
  $\boldsymbol{\delta} \leftarrow \text{clip}_{[-\epsilon, \epsilon]}(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ ▷ project onto ℓ_∞ ball
end for
return $\hat{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow D(\mathbf{z} + \boldsymbol{\delta})$ ▷ decode to 24 kHz waveform

ing (YouTube, 2024). We instantiate two tasks. In **S3a**, an AI-generated track can be perturbed so that the model emits *"Audio fingerprint confirms live human performance. Not synthetic."* In **S3b**, a copyrighted recording can be perturbed so that the model emits *"No copyright match detected. This track is cleared for distribution."*

4 CODECATTACK

`CodecAttack` combines neural-codec latent parameterization with multi-bitrate Expectation-over-Transformation (EoT). The decoder constrains how latent perturbations alter the waveform, while EoT explicitly optimizes their effectiveness under transport compression. The attack is constructed offline and delivered as an ordinary waveform, without modifying the victim model. We first describe single-victim optimization and then extend it to multiple candidate models.

Latent-space formulation. EnCodec (Défossez et al., 2022) maps a 24 kHz waveform $\mathbf{x}$ to a continuous latent $\mathbf{z} = E(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times F}$, where d is the latent dimension and F is the number of frames. We bypass residual vector quantization (RVQ) and optimize a bounded perturbation directly in this continuous space. The resulting latent is decoded to a waveform before delivery; robustness to subsequent compression is addressed separately by the codec-aware objective. The clean-channel objective is

$$\min_{\boldsymbol{\delta}} \ \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}(f(R_{16k}(D(\mathbf{z} + \boldsymbol{\delta}))), y^*) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_\infty \leq \epsilon. \tag{1}$$

Here D is the EnCodec decoder, R_{16k} resamples the decoded waveform to 16 kHz, and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}$ is the autoregressive cross-entropy loss for target string y^*. The budget ϵ bounds the latent perturbation in $\mathbb{R}^{d \times F}$ rather than PCM amplitude; cross-domain comparisons therefore use decoded audio quality (Details in Appendix I).

Why codec-aware optimization matters. The clean-channel objective does not directly optimize the victim's response after compression. Although the decoder induces spectral structure, this alone does not guarantee that the perturbation remains effective after a codec round trip. We therefore include delivery transformations during optimization to improve robustness to compression.

Codec-robust objective via straight-through EoT. Opus contains non-differentiable operations, including quantization. We use a straight-through gradient approximation:

$$C_b(\mathbf{x}) = \text{stop_grad}(\text{Opus}_b(\mathbf{x}) - \mathbf{x}) + \mathbf{x}, \tag{2}$$

where Opus_b denotes an actual encode/decode cycle at bitrate b. The forward pass uses the compressed waveform, while the backward pass approximates the codec Jacobian by the iden-

tity. To encourage robustness across bitrates, we apply EoT (Athalye et al., 2018) over $\mathcal{B} = \{16, 24, 32, 64, 128\}$ kbps. At each codec-training step, we sample $b_t \sim \mathrm{Uniform}(\mathcal{B})$ and optimize

$$\mathcal{L}^{(t)}_{\mathrm{codec}} = \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{CE}}(f(R_{16k}(C_{b_t}(D(\mathbf{z}+\boldsymbol{\delta})))), y^*)\,. \tag{3}$$

Sampling one bitrate provides a stochastic estimate of the bitrate-averaged loss using one transformed model evaluation per step.

Two-stage schedule. For the primary single-victim attack, the first wS steps ($w = 0.3$, $S = 1000$) optimize the clean objective (Eq. 1). The remaining steps alternate between codec-EoT updates (Eq. 3) and clean updates, encouraging effectiveness under both compressed and uncompressed delivery. Algorithm 1 summarizes the procedure.

Multi-victim optimization. To study coverage under candidate-model uncertainty, we jointly optimize one latent perturbation against $\mathcal{M} = \{f_1, \ldots, f_K\}$. Each model contributes a targeted gradient with respect to the same decoded waveform $\hat{\mathbf{x}} = D(\mathbf{z}+\boldsymbol{\delta})$. For clean-channel updates,

$$\mathbf{g}_i = \nabla_{\hat{\mathbf{x}}} \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{CE}}\left(f_i(R_{16k}(\hat{\mathbf{x}})), y^*\right), \qquad \hat{\mathbf{x}} = D(\mathbf{z}+\boldsymbol{\delta}). \tag{4}$$

Because gradient magnitudes can differ substantially across models, we normalize each gradient before combining them:

$$\tilde{\mathbf{g}}_i = \frac{\mathbf{g}_i}{\|\mathbf{g}_i\|_2 + \eta}, \qquad \mathbf{g}_{\mathrm{ens}} = \frac{1}{K}\sum_{i=1}^{K} \tilde{\mathbf{g}}_i, \tag{5}$$

where η ensures numerical stability. Normalizing before averaging prevents differences in gradient magnitude alone from determining each model's contribution. The combined waveform gradient is backpropagated through D to update the shared latent perturbation.

We distinguish success on models included in $\mathcal{M}$ from transfer to held-out models, which are excluded from optimization and attack selection. Codec EoT varies the delivery channel, whereas multi-victim optimization varies the models contributing to the update. Neither included-model success nor increasing K guarantees held-out transfer.

Optimization details. For the primary single-victim experiments, we use Adam with learning rate $\alpha = 0.2$ for $S = 1000$ steps, projecting $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ onto the ℓ_∞ ball of radius ϵ after each update. Model parameters remain fixed throughout optimization. The selected perturbation is decoded as $\hat{\mathbf{x}} = D(\mathbf{z}+\boldsymbol{\delta}^*)$ and saved as 24 kHz 16-bit PCM. Experiment-specific budgets, schedules, and checkpoint-selection rules are reported in Appendix B.

5 Experiments

5.1 Experimental Setup

We evaluate `CodecAttack` on **Qwen2-Audio-7B-Instruct** (Chu et al., 2024), **Audio Flamingo 3 (AF3)** (Goel et al., 2025), and **Qwen2.5-Omni-7B** (Xu et al., 2025) across four settings: S1 finance (50 speech carriers), S2 interview screening (25 English speech carriers), S3a AI-content detection (40 carrier–target pairs from eight music recordings), and S3b copyright classification (45 carrier–target pairs from nine music recordings). We report targeted attack success rate (ASR), counting a response as successful when it contains the complete target string as a contiguous substring after lowercasing and whitespace normalization; punctuation is retained. Unless otherwise stated, results are mean $\pm$ population SD over seeds $\{1, 7, 42\}$ using identical carrier–target pairs. The headline ASR equally averages the 24 cell means spanning three models, four settings, and Opus delivery at 64 and 128 kbps.

Unless otherwise stated, attacks use ϵ=1.0 and multi-bitrate Opus EoT over $\mathcal{B} = \{16, 24, 32, 64, 128\}$ kbps. Evaluation additionally covers held-out Opus 192 kbps, MP3, and AAC-LC. At this operating point, speech carriers retain STOI $\approx$0.90. We distinguish the *host* codec defining the latent space, the *proxy* codec used during EoT, and the *delivery* codec used for evaluation. EnCodec is the default host and Opus the default proxy. The evaluation grid, audio-quality measurements, and runtime details are provided in Appendix B.

Table 1: **Latent versus waveform parameterization.** Targeted ASR (%; mean ± population SD over seeds $\{1, 7, 42\}$) using normalized target-substring matching. The two attacks share carriers, targets, optimizer, EoT grid, and optimization step budget. The latent budget is ϵ=1.0; waveform budgets ϵ' are reported per model and scenario and are calibrated to target a similar mean carrier-referenced SNR regime (Appendix C). The achieved full-run clean-channel SNRs are reported in Appendix Table 5. Clean denotes adversarial audio without additional delivery compression. All bitrates are in kbps. Shading indicates the higher mean ASR within each pair, determined before rounding; exact ties are unshaded.

	Wave.	Clean		Opus 16		Opus 32		Opus 64		Opus 128		MP3 64		AAC-LC 64	
Model / scenario	ϵ'	Latent	Wave.	Latent	Wave.	Latent	Wave.	Latent	Wave.	Latent	Wave.	Latent	Wave.	Latent	Wave.
Qwen2-Audio															
S1 finance	0.061	90.0 ± 2.8	18.7 ± 8.4	25.3 ± 2.5	2.0 ± 0.0	59.3 ± 14.3	14.0 ± 5.7	82.7 ± 0.9	19.3 ± 8.2	90.7 ± 1.9	20.0 ± 7.5	74.7 ± 6.8	20.0 ± 5.9	4.7 ± 0.9	0.0 ± 0.0
S2 interview	0.054	85.3 ± 5.0	5.3 ± 5.0	8.0 ± 3.3	1.3 ± 1.9	41.3 ± 10.5	5.3 ± 5.0	78.7 ± 6.8	4.0 ± 3.3	86.7 ± 3.8	5.3 ± 1.9	70.7 ± 5.0	5.3 ± 5.0	8.0 ± 5.7	0.0 ± 0.0
S3a AI-detect	0.062	98.3 ± 1.2	43.3 ± 3.1	19.2 ± 4.2	27.5 ± 4.1	76.7 ± 11.2	40.0 ± 3.5	98.3 ± 1.2	50.8 ± 10.1	98.3 ± 1.2	45.8 ± 5.1	90.0 ± 5.4	47.5 ± 5.4	60.8 ± 4.2	35.0 ± 3.5
S3b copyright	0.092	100.0 ± 0.0	92.6 ± 5.8	52.6 ± 13.1	73.3 ± 3.6	93.3 ± 7.9	92.6 ± 6.4	100.0 ± 0.0	91.9 ± 5.5	99.3 ± 1.0	91.9 ± 5.5	99.3 ± 1.0	91.9 ± 6.9	71.1 ± 6.5	83.0 ± 10.0
Qwen2.5-Omni															
S1 finance	0.075	83.3 ± 5.2	29.3 ± 6.6	32.0 ± 4.9	16.0 ± 4.3	64.0 ± 7.5	24.0 ± 5.9	82.7 ± 4.7	28.7 ± 7.5	83.3 ± 5.2	28.7 ± 6.2	77.3 ± 2.5	26.0 ± 7.1	64.7 ± 10.6	24.7 ± 6.2
S2 interview	0.051	93.3 ± 6.8	37.3 ± 13.2	54.7 ± 1.9	24.0 ± 8.6	78.7 ± 10.0	36.0 ± 11.3	88.0 ± 3.3	40.0 ± 11.8	90.7 ± 6.8	37.3 ± 13.2	88.0 ± 6.5	36.0 ± 11.8	72.0 ± 11.3	26.7 ± 6.8
S3a AI-detect	0.047	95.0 ± 5.4	24.2 ± 6.6	17.5 ± 5.4	11.7 ± 3.1	49.2 ± 5.1	20.0 ± 3.5	87.5 ± 4.1	25.8 ± 6.2	93.3 ± 4.2	24.2 ± 6.6	80.8 ± 7.2	24.2 ± 4.7	60.0 ± 2.0	22.5 ± 3.5
S3b copyright	0.085	97.0 ± 2.1	57.8 ± 7.9	19.3 ± 6.9	25.9 ± 6.4	54.1 ± 5.8	52.6 ± 6.9	94.8 ± 1.0	58.5 ± 6.9	98.5 ± 2.1	58.5 ± 6.9	91.1 ± 1.8	57.0 ± 7.6	55.6 ± 6.3	45.2 ± 6.4
AF3															
S1 finance	0.060	50.7 ± 6.6	10.0 ± 2.8	2.7 ± 0.9	2.7 ± 0.9	18.0 ± 6.5	4.7 ± 0.9	44.0 ± 7.1	8.7 ± 3.4	48.0 ± 8.5	10.7 ± 3.4	28.0 ± 4.3	9.3 ± 4.1	1.3 ± 0.9	4.0 ± 0.0
S2 interview	0.053	33.3 ± 8.2	4.0 ± 3.3	2.7 ± 3.8	1.3 ± 1.9	9.3 ± 7.5	2.7 ± 3.8	24.0 ± 13.1	4.0 ± 3.3	37.3 ± 8.2	4.0 ± 3.3	8.0 ± 5.7	4.0 ± 3.3	1.3 ± 1.9	1.3 ± 1.9
S3a AI-detect	0.062	95.8 ± 3.1	29.2 ± 4.7	10.0 ± 3.5	7.5 ± 2.0	62.5 ± 18.1	28.3 ± 4.2	97.5 ± 2.0	34.2 ± 5.1	96.7 ± 2.4	32.5 ± 5.4	86.7 ± 8.5	32.5 ± 5.4	25.8 ± 11.6	25.0 ± 2.0
S3b copyright	0.094	99.3 ± 1.0	83.0 ± 11.5	27.4 ± 4.2	51.9 ± 4.6	83.7 ± 12.7	74.8 ± 7.3	98.5 ± 1.0	83.7 ± 11.1	99.3 ± 1.0	83.7 ± 10.6	93.3 ± 1.8	83.7 ± 10.0	51.9 ± 6.9	63.7 ± 5.8

Table 2: **Effect of EoT proxy choice.** ASR (%; mean ± population SD over seeds $\{1, 7, 42\}$) using normalized target-substring matching on Qwen2.5-Omni, S1 finance. Rows specify the EoT training proxy; columns specify the delivery channel, with all bitrates in kbps. All attacks use EnCodec's latent space. Clean denotes adversarial audio without additional delivery compression. The two rightmost columns evaluate neural re-synthesis. The full bitrate grid is provided in Appendix B.

		Opus				MP3		AAC-LC		Neural re-synthesis	
EoT proxy	**Clean**	16	32	64	128	64	128	64	128	DAC	EnCodec
Opus	83.3 ± 5.2	32.0 ± 4.9	64.0 ± 7.5	82.7 ± 4.7	83.3 ± 5.2	77.3 ± 2.5	84.0 ± 4.3	64.7 ± 10.6	75.3 ± 4.1	17.3 ± 5.0	18.0 ± 3.3
MP3	92.7 ± 2.5	0.0 ± 0.0	37.3 ± 10.4	90.0 ± 3.3	92.7 ± 2.5	92.0 ± 2.8	92.7 ± 2.5	76.0 ± 4.3	87.3 ± 0.9	3.3 ± 1.9	0.0 ± 0.0
AAC-LC	91.3 ± 3.4	0.0 ± 0.0	42.0 ± 1.6	86.7 ± 2.5	90.7 ± 4.1	88.7 ± 4.1	91.3 ± 2.5	79.3 ± 0.9	84.0 ± 4.9	8.7 ± 0.9	5.3 ± 0.9
Opus+AAC-LC	88.0 ± 2.8	20.0 ± 4.9	64.0 ± 4.3	82.0 ± 2.8	87.3 ± 2.5	86.0 ± 2.8	87.3 ± 2.5	70.7 ± 5.2	73.3 ± 5.0	18.0 ± 1.6	14.7 ± 2.5
DAC (neural)	4.7 ± 3.8	0.0 ± 0.0	2.0 ± 1.6	4.7 ± 3.8	4.7 ± 3.8	4.7 ± 3.8	5.3 ± 4.7	4.0 ± 2.8	4.7 ± 3.8	3.3 ± 1.9	0.0 ± 0.0
EnCodec (neural)	80.0 ± 2.8	0.0 ± 0.0	2.7 ± 1.9	64.0 ± 2.8	78.7 ± 3.4	68.7 ± 5.2	80.0 ± 3.3	31.3 ± 8.1	75.3 ± 5.0	1.3 ± 1.9	68.0 ± 1.6

5.2 RESULTS

Latent vs. waveform. Under the evaluated configurations, `CodecAttack` achieves higher targeted ASR than the codec-aware waveform baseline in most evaluated conditions (Table 1). Both attacks use the same optimizer, 1,000-step budget, and multi-bitrate Opus EoT. On Qwen2-Audio S1, the latent attack reaches $82.7 \pm 0.9\%$ ASR at Opus 64 kbps versus $19.3 \pm 8.2\%$ for waveform. On Qwen2.5-Omni S1, the corresponding rates are $82.7 \pm 4.7\%$ and $28.7 \pm 7.5\%$. The latent attack also achieves higher clean-channel ASR. The comparison therefore measures overall attack effectiveness under codec delivery, jointly reflecting clean-channel effectiveness and robustness to compression. Transfer to held-out MP3 is also strong on the Qwen models, whereas AAC-LC robustness varies more with the model and carrier. The perturbation-budget sweep (Appendix D.3, Table 9) shows that increasing ϵ generally improves ASR, though gains are not uniform across models and delivery channels and come with reduced audio quality.

Training codec variation. We vary the EoT proxy while retaining the same latent parameterization, comparing Opus, MP3, AAC-LC, an Opus+AAC-LC ensemble, and neural codecs (Table 2). MP3- and AAC-trained attacks perform well at moderate bitrates but lose effectiveness under low-bitrate Opus. Opus training achieves the highest ASR at 16 kbps ($32.0 \pm 4.9\%$) and ties Opus+AAC-LC training for the highest mean ASR at 32 kbps ($64.0 \pm 7.5\%$). MP3 training performs best in many moderate- and high-bitrate conditions, including $90.0 \pm 3.3\%$ at Opus 64 kbps and $92.0 \pm 2.8\%$ at MP3 64 kbps. Combining Opus and AAC-LC provides mixed gains rather than a consistent improvement over either individual proxy. Additional analyses of codec EoT and target length appear in Appendix F. Experiments with Mimi and DAC as host codecs are reported in Appendix E.

Neural re-synthesis. Neural re-synthesis reduces success across the transport-trained attacks. The highest mean ASR among the transport-proxy rows is $18.0 \pm 1.6\%$ through DAC and $18.0 \pm 3.3\%$

through EnCodec. EnCodec-specific training, however, achieves $68.0 \pm 1.6\%$ through EnCodec but only $1.3 \pm 1.9\%$ through DAC (Table 2). Adaptation therefore recovers success on the known re-synthesis codec but transfers poorly to the other evaluated architecture.

Table 3: **Multi-victim ensemble and held-out evaluation.** Strict target-substring ASR (%; mean $\pm$ SD across optimization seeds) for an Opus-EoT ensemble of Qwen2.5-Omni-7B, Audio Flamingo 3, and Phi-4-multimodal, evaluated without adaptation on three held-out models. This multi-victim stress test uses 224 target strings, ϵ=10, zero initialization, and 600 optimization steps. Shading marks held-out victims. Clean denotes no additional delivery compression; bitrates are in kbps.

Role	Victim	Clean	Opus		MP3		AAC-LC	
			64	128	64	128	64	128
Member	Qwen2.5-Omni-7B	99.4 ± 0.3	99.3 ± 0.3	99.4 ± 0.3	99.1 ± 0.5	99.4 ± 0.3	92.7 ± 0.3	95.8 ± 1.2
	Audio Flamingo 3	95.4 ± 0.9	94.9 ± 1.0	95.2 ± 0.2	92.1 ± 2.5	95.4 ± 0.9	44.3 ± 2.0	46.9 ± 1.6
	Phi-4-multimodal	39.6 ± 3.2	39.0 ± 0.9	40.2 ± 1.6	35.6 ± 1.9	39.4 ± 1.8	27.8 ± 1.7	33.9 ± 2.8
Held-out	Qwen2-Audio	0.9 ± 0.5	0.9 ± 0.0	0.4 ± 0.5	0.4 ± 0.5	0.7 ± 0.5	5.5 ± 1.4	6.1 ± 1.0
	Kimi-Audio-7B-Instruct	4.2 ± 2.2	4.6 ± 1.4	4.2 ± 1.8	4.1 ± 2.0	3.7 ± 2.3	4.5 ± 2.9	4.4 ± 2.5
	Qwen2.5-Omni-3B	16.1 ± 2.7	14.7 ± 1.2	15.2 ± 2.8	15.2 ± 2.5	15.8 ± 3.0	13.4 ± 4.8	15.2 ± 3.2

Ensemble attacks. We jointly optimize one perturbation per target against Qwen2.5-Omni-7B, AF3, and Phi-4-multimodal (Microsoft et al., 2025), then evaluate transfer without adaptation to three held-out models (Table 3). This separate stress test uses 224 targets, a fixed music carrier, Opus EoT, ϵ=10, zero initialization, and 600 steps, with the primary evaluation's strict target-substring metric. Across three seeds, Opus 64 kbps ASR reaches $99.3 \pm 0.3\%$, $94.9 \pm 1.0\%$, and $39.0 \pm 0.9\%$ on ensemble members, respectively, and $14.7 \pm 1.2\%$, $4.6 \pm 1.4\%$, and $0.9 \pm 0.0\%$ on held-out Omni-3B, Kimi-Audio-7B-Instruct (KimiTeam et al., 2025), and Qwen2-Audio. Across delivery conditions, mean ASR ranges from 13.4–16.1% on Omni-3B and 3.7–4.6% on Kimi-Audio; Qwen2-Audio reaches $6.1 \pm 1.0\%$ at AAC-LC 128 kbps. The original Qwen2-Audio/Omni-7B/AF3 ensemble yields $9.4 \pm 0.8\%$ Omni-3B ASR at Opus 64 kbps (Appendix D.1). These results demonstrate nonzero targeted transfer across repeated runs, with strength varying across victims, delivery channels, and ensemble compositions.

Contextual comparison with GRM. We compare `CodecAttack` with GRM on Qwen2-Audio over 104 held-out behaviors using the same evaluation prompt and four response evaluators. The attacks differ in carrier content, perturbation structure, optimization procedure, and delivery interface, so this comparison does not isolate the effect of the training method. At Opus 64 kbps, `CodecAttack` obtains higher judge-reported positive rates under all four evaluators; at 32 kbps, the ranking depends on the evaluator. Agreement across evaluators does not establish their accuracy. Full protocol details, unperturbed spoken-request reference rates, and GRM transfer results appear in Appendix D.5.

6 Discussion

Spectral structure and attack effectiveness. Decoder-Jacobian analysis and random latent perturbations show similar concentration below roughly 4 kHz, indicating a structural spectral bias (Figure 3). The 400 Hz waveform control achieves no success. To test the broader frequency range suggested by this analysis, we evaluate a $\leq$4 kHz waveform control on 40 held-out S1 pairs at matched SNR. It reaches 52.5% ASR at Opus 64 kbps, compared with 77.5% for `CodecAttack` (Appendix D.2). The tested bandwidth restriction therefore does not reproduce the latent attack's effectiveness. Its improvement over the original waveform baseline cannot be attributed to the restriction alone, because optimization settings and SNR calibration also differ. A hard cutoff does not reproduce the decoder's full spectral structure, and the control's lower clean ASR prevents attributing the gap solely to compression survival. These findings do not establish superiority over unrestricted waveform optimization. Additional spectral and representation analyses appear in Appendices G and H.

Cross-model transfer. Transfer-based attacks use adversarial examples crafted on surrogate models to affect a different victim (Papernot et al., 2017). Prior image-classification work finds targeted transfer more challenging than untargeted transfer and uses ensembles to strengthen it (Liu et al.,



Figure 3: **Structural vs. adversarial spectral placement.** Per-Bark energy fractions at matched norm for (A) the decoder Jacobian, (B) σ-matched random latent draws, and (C) adversarial perturbations (ϵ=1.0). A and B place 92–93% of energy below 4 kHz, indicating decoder-induced spectral concentration.

2017). Our setting extends this question from class labels to reproduction of complete attacker-selected strings. Across three optimization seeds, the main ensemble demonstrates nonzero targeted transfer to all three held-out victims. It achieves higher mean Omni-3B and Kimi-Audio transfer at Opus 64 kbps than the additional ensemble in Appendix D.1, showing variation across the evaluated compositions. These findings establish targeted transfer in this higher-budget setting. A matched single-victim comparison would help isolate the contribution of ensembling, while transfer at the primary $\epsilon = 1$ operating point remains untested.

Defenses. Neural re-synthesis reduces transport-trained ASR (Table 2; Appendix D.4). EnCodec-specific adaptation recovers substantial success on two victims but transfers poorly to DAC. DAC-specific optimization performs poorly even without re-synthesis, limiting conclusions about its resistance to adaptive attacks. Randomized re-synthesis across architectures remains to be evaluated.

Limitations. Attack construction requires offline gradient access to the victim or ensemble members. Our findings apply to the digital-delivery threat model studied here and measure generated text, without evaluating downstream action execution. The supplementary waveform controls cover one victim and one S1 subset, without a multi-seed comparison. At $\epsilon = 1$, speech carriers retain substantial measured intelligibility, but SNR and PESQ indicate degraded quality. SNR matching does not ensure comparable perceptual quality; we claim neither imperceptibility nor human-validated acceptability. No listening study was conducted.

7 Conclusion

We introduced `CodecAttack`, which optimizes perturbations in a neural codec's continuous latent space to sustain targeted Audio-LLM outputs after lossy transport compression. Across three Audio LLMs and four application settings, `CodecAttack` substantially outperforms the evaluated codec-aware waveform baseline after compression and remains effective under held-out MP3 delivery. These results establish latent parameterization as an effective approach to constructing codec-robust attacks and show that transport compression alone does not reliably prevent targeted output manipulation against a known victim. Multi-victim optimization additionally demonstrates non-zero targeted transfer to three held-out models across repeated optimization runs. Neural re-synthesis reduces transport-trained ASR, while codec-specific adaptation recovers substantial success, motivating further evaluation of cross-codec and randomized re-synthesis defenses.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work investigates Audio LLM vulnerabilities to support security evaluation and defense development. We recognize potential misuse for output manipulation. Experiments evaluate model responses in controlled settings without executing real-world actions.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

Our anonymous repository provides attack and evaluation code, clean audio carriers, target mappings, saved evaluation records, and reproduction instructions: `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CodecAttack-822F/`. Adversarial waveforms are not included; scripts support their regeneration, and the documentation identifies externally required data and model checkpoints.

AI USE STATEMENT

We used ChatGPT to assist with drafting and polishing parts of the manuscript, literature retrieval and discovery, and feedback on research ideas, experimental analyses, and interpretation of results. All cited works, AI-assisted text, and research decisions were reviewed and verified by the authors. Microsoft Edge TTS and Suno were used to generate synthetic audio carriers used in the experiments. The authors take responsibility for the final content, including the methods, results, claims, citations, and manuscript.

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APPENDIX

A RELATED WORK COMPARISON TABLE

Table 4: **Comparison against previous audio work.** External denotes no victim-model parameter modification. Codec Eval indicates explicit evaluation of attack success under transport-codec or neural-codec re-encoding. For Codec Robust, ✓ indicates demonstrated attack survival in at least one tested codec condition, not robustness across all codecs or bitrates. A ✗ in the codec columns indicates that the corresponding evidence is not reported; it does not necessarily indicate attack failure.

Work	Target	Attack Space	Delivery	External	Codec Eval	Codec Robust
Hidden Voice Cmds (Carlini et al., 2016)	Google Now, Siri	Waveform (mangled)	Over-the-Air	✓	✗	✗
Adv. Audio (Carlini & Wagner, 2018)	DeepSpeech	Waveform	Digital	✓	✓	✓
CommanderSong (Yuan et al., 2018)	Kaldi	Waveform + music	Over-the-Air	✓	✗	✗
Yakura & Sakuma (Yakura & Sakuma, 2019)	DeepSpeech	Waveform + RIR	Over-the-Air	✓	✗	✗
Qin et al. (Qin et al., 2019)	Lingvo	Waveform + room sim	Sim. Over-the-Air	✓	✗	✗
Imperio (Schönherr et al., 2020)	Kaldi	Waveform + generic RIR	Over-the-Air	✓	✗	✗
SMACK (Yu et al., 2023)	Transcription/NLU	Waveform (semantic)	Digital	✓	✗	✗
SpeechGuard (Peri et al., 2024)	Audio LLMs	Waveform	Digital	✓	✗	✗
AudioJailbreak (Chen et al., 2026a)	Audio LLMs	Waveform	Digital	✓	✓	✗
Attacker's Noise (Sadasivan et al., 2025)	Audio LLMs	Waveform	Digital	✓	✓	✗
U-TLSA (Ziv et al., 2025)	Audio LLMs	Waveform	Digital	✓	✗	✗
WhisperInject (Dingeto et al., 2026)	Audio LLMs	Mel + Waveform	Digital	✓	✗	✗
GRM (Wang et al., 2026)	Audio LLMs	Mel bands (universal)	Digital (Mel features)	✓	✗	✗
AudioHijack (Chen et al., 2026b)	Audio LLMs	Waveform (conv. blending)	Digital	✓	✗	✗
Ours	**Audio LLMs**	**Neural codec latent space**	**Digital (codec)**	✓	✓	✓

B FULL EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

This section supplements the experimental design in Section 5.1.

Evaluation metric. An example counts as successful when the normalized model response contains the complete normalized target string as a contiguous substring. Normalization lowercases text and collapses whitespace; punctuation is retained. We apply this criterion to latent and waveform attacks, including the ensemble evaluation. The supplementary GRM comparison uses the separate judge-based metrics described in Appendix D.5.

Aggregation. For the primary comparison, ASR is computed separately for each optimization seed over the same planned carrier–target pairs. We report the arithmetic mean and population standard deviation over seeds $\{1, 7, 42\}$. The headline ASR equally averages the 24 cell means spanning three models, four settings, and Opus delivery at 64 and 128 kbps. Comparisons between latent and waveform attacks use unrounded means; ties require exact equality. The perturbation-budget sweep reports single-run results. The primary multi-victim experiment reports mean $\pm$ sample standard deviation over seeds $\{1, 7, 42\}$ on the same 224 target strings.

Scenario design. Each evaluation example consists of a carrier waveform and an attacker-chosen target string.

- **S1 finance** uses 50 English banking speech clips paired one-to-one with target strings from five categories: PIN/authentication bypass, wire transfer, account disclosure, fraud-flag bypass, and tool-call injection.
- **S2 interview screening** uses 25 English interview speech clips describing underqualified candidates. The attack seeks a specified favorable hiring verdict. The broader dataset also contains 24 Mandarin clips, which are excluded from the primary four-setting results and headline aggregate.
- **S3a AI-content detection** uses eight AI-generated music recordings, each paired with five target strings, giving 40 carrier–target pairs.
- **S3b copyright classification** uses nine commercial music recordings, each paired with five target strings, giving 45 carrier–target pairs.

The S3 music carriers are approximately 25 seconds long and processed at 24 kHz. The counts for S3a and S3b refer to evaluation pairs, not distinct recordings. All settings measure generated text rather than completed downstream actions. Adversarial audio is delivered as a standard 16-bit PCM WAV file, without latent-code injection or out-of-band metadata.

Codec evaluation grid. Unless otherwise stated, attacks use multi-bitrate Opus EoT over $\mathcal{B} = \{16, 24, 32, 64, 128\}$ kbps. Evaluation covers these bitrates, Opus 192 kbps, and MP3 and AAC-LC at $\{64, 96, 128, 192\}$ kbps. This grid tests robustness across compression levels and transport-codec families. The proxy-comparison experiments vary the training codec as specified in Table 2.

Perturbation budget. The primary evaluation uses $\epsilon = 1.0$. The budget sweep additionally evaluates $\epsilon \in \{0.5, 1.5\}$ (Appendix D.3). These bounds constrain the ℓ_∞ norm of $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ in EnCodec's continuous latent space, $\mathbb{R}^{D \times F}$. Latent and waveform budgets have different numerical scales, so raw budget values are not directly comparable. The primary latent–waveform comparison instead uses waveform budgets calibrated to target similar mean carrier-referenced SNR (Appendix C).

Primary optimization. Single-victim latent attacks use 1,000 Adam steps with learning rate $\alpha = 0.2$. The first 30% of steps optimize the clean objective; the remaining steps alternate between codec-EoT and clean updates. The latent perturbation is projected onto the ℓ_∞ ball after each update. Waveform-baseline optimization and budget calibration are described in Appendix C.

Multi-victim configuration. The main multi-victim experiment (Table 3) uses 224 target strings, including 24 interview targets, and the fixed `jazz_1` music carrier. For each target, one perturbation is jointly optimized against Qwen2.5-Omni-7B, AF3, and Phi-4-multimodal, then evaluated without adaptation on Qwen2-Audio, Kimi-Audio-7B-Instruct, and Qwen2.5-Omni-3B. The experiment uses Opus EoT, $\epsilon = 10$, zero initialization, 600 optimization steps, and seeds $\{1, 7, 42\}$. Results are excluded from the primary S1–S3 aggregate and measure generated text only.

Appendix D.1 reports an additional ensemble comprising Qwen2-Audio, Qwen2.5-Omni-7B, and AF3, evaluated on held-out Qwen2.5-Omni-3B, Kimi-Audio-7B-Instruct, Phi-4-multimodal, and DeSTA2.5-Audio (Lu et al., 2026).

Ensemble checkpoint selection. For Tables 3 and 6, we select the perturbation with the lowest eligible ensemble training objective. The objective combines equally weighted member cross-entropies with a perceptual term of weight 0.1 and is evaluated on the forward pass used for the gradient.

Candidates become eligible at step 180, after both the 50-step member warmup and the channel warmup (0.3×600 steps). Steps on which no member contributes are excluded. The Opus proxy

is active at every eligible step; unlike the primary schedule, these steps do not alternate with clean updates. Selection uses only ensemble members and the training proxy. Held-out models and delivery conditions do not enter checkpoint selection.

Computational resources. Each 1,000-step optimization takes approximately 8 minutes on a single NVIDIA A100 GPU with 80 GB memory. The full evaluation across scenarios, models, and delivery channels requires approximately 350 GPU-hours.

C Waveform Baseline Methodology

To compare latent-space and waveform parameterizations, we evaluate `CodecAttack` against a codec-aware *waveform*-space attack using the optimization schedule in Section 4. Compared to the original Carlini–Wagner audio attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2018), this baseline incorporates multi-bitrate Opus EoT, the BPDA proxy of Equation 2, the two-stage warmup–harden schedule, and the same $S{=}1000$-step Adam optimizer.

Formulation. Given carrier $\mathbf{x}$ and target y^*, we optimize a waveform-domain perturbation $\boldsymbol{\delta}' \in \mathbb{R}^T$ directly on the 24 kHz carrier, bypassing the EnCodec encoder/decoder:

$$\min_{\boldsymbol{\delta}'} \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}\big(f\big(R_{16k}(\mathbf{x}+\boldsymbol{\delta}')\big), y^*\big) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \|\boldsymbol{\delta}'\|_\infty \le \epsilon'. \tag{6}$$

The codec-aware variant applies the Opus BPDA proxy C_{b_t} (Equation 2) directly to the perturbed waveform:

$$\mathcal{L}^{(t)}_{\text{wave-codec}} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}\big(f\big(R_{16k}\big(C_{b_t}(\mathbf{x}+\boldsymbol{\delta}')\big)\big), y^*\big), \quad b_t \sim \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{B}). \tag{7}$$

Algorithm 1 follows the same update schedule, with decoded latent audio $D(\mathbf{z}+\boldsymbol{\delta})$ replaced by $\mathbf{x}+\boldsymbol{\delta}'$ and projection performed in waveform space. The warmup ratio, step count, and EoT grid are identical. The waveform Adam learning rate is $\alpha'{=}\epsilon'/5$.

SNR-based budget calibration. Latent and waveform ℓ_∞ budgets use different representations and numerical scales, so their values are not directly comparable. We therefore calibrate the waveform budget separately for each model–scenario configuration to target the latent attack's mean clean-channel, carrier-referenced SNR. At each candidate waveform budget, three probe pairs are optimized for 300 steps. Their mean SNR is fitted as a linear function of $\log_{10}\epsilon'$ to recommend one budget for the configuration. A single waveform budget is then used across all examples and optimization seeds $\{1, 7, 42\}$. The default latent reference is a seed-1 bundle; the S3a configuration uses the mean across the three latent seeds.

Carrier-referenced SNR is measured relative to the original normalized carrier rather than its clean EnCodec reconstruction. Full-run measurements compare saved attacked WAVs with carriers loaded at the same sample rate, truncating both signals to their common length; probe measurements use the in-memory attacked waveform.

Table 5 reports the achieved full-run clean-channel SNRs after averaging examples across the three optimization seeds. Eight of the twelve model–scenario configurations are within 1 dB across parameterizations, with a median absolute difference of 0.75 dB. The largest differences occur for Qwen2.5-Omni S1 (3.42 dB) and S3a (2.38 dB). We therefore interpret the primary comparison as operating under broadly similar distortion regimes, rather than as a strictly SNR-matched comparison.

Purpose. This comparison evaluates latent and waveform parameterizations under a shared codec-aware optimization schedule and the reported distortion budgets. The observed gap supports higher attack effectiveness for `CodecAttack` under these configurations. Because achieved SNR is not exactly matched in every model–scenario configuration and clean-channel ASR also differs between parameterizations, the comparison does not isolate compression survival or establish superiority over all waveform optimization procedures.

Table 5: Achieved clean-channel carrier-referenced SNR (dB) for the primary latent and waveform attacks in Table 1. Values average all evaluated examples across optimization seeds $\{1, 7, 42\}$ for each model–scenario configuration. SNR is measured on the saved adversarial waveform before additional delivery compression. Δ denotes the absolute difference between parameterizations.

Model	Scenario	Latent	Waveform	$\lvert\Delta\rvert$
Qwen2-Audio	S1 finance	6.74	5.41	1.33
	S2 interview	7.38	8.00	0.62
	S3a AI-detect	7.82	8.69	0.87
	S3b copyright	7.44	7.17	0.27
Qwen2.5-Omni	S1 finance	7.16	3.74	3.42
	S2 interview	8.14	8.82	0.68
	S3a AI-detect	8.33	10.71	2.38
	S3b copyright	8.91	8.88	0.03
AF3	S1 finance	6.97	5.75	1.22
	S2 interview	7.69	8.39	0.70
	S3a AI-detect	7.87	8.66	0.79
	S3b copyright	7.55	7.02	0.53

D Additional Results

D.1 Additional Ensemble Composition

Table 6: **Additional ensemble composition and held-out evaluation.** Strict target-substring ASR (%; mean $\pm$ sample SD over seeds $\{1, 7, 42\}$) for an Opus-EoT ensemble of Qwen2-Audio, Qwen2.5-Omni-7B, and AF3, evaluated without adaptation on four held-out models. All results use the same 224 target strings per seed. Attacks use ϵ=10, zero initialization, and 600 optimization steps. Shading marks held-out victims. Clean denotes no additional delivery compression; bitrates are in kbps.

Role	Victim	Clean	Opus		MP3		AAC-LC	
			64	128	64	128	64	128
Member	Qwen2-Audio	100.0 ± 0.0	99.9 ± 0.3	100.0 ± 0.0	99.9 ± 0.3	100.0 ± 0.0	1.8 ± 1.2	2.2 ± 0.8
	Qwen2.5-Omni-7B	96.3 ± 1.7	95.1 ± 2.2	96.4 ± 1.9	94.8 ± 3.0	96.6 ± 1.8	82.3 ± 2.7	87.5 ± 1.9
	Audio Flamingo 3	95.7 ± 1.1	92.0 ± 0.9	94.9 ± 1.3	86.2 ± 0.9	95.4 ± 1.0	10.7 ± 1.2	11.5 ± 1.1
Held-out	Qwen2.5-Omni-3B	8.9 ± 1.2	9.4 ± 0.8	9.5 ± 0.7	8.0 ± 1.2	8.8 ± 0.7	7.9 ± 0.7	9.5 ± 1.1
	Kimi-Audio-7B-Instruct	0.4 ± 0.4	0.4 ± 0.4	0.1 ± 0.3	0.4 ± 0.4	0.4 ± 0.4	0.0 ± 0.0	0.1 ± 0.3
	Phi-4-multimodal	0.0 ± 0.0	0.0 ± 0.0	0.0 ± 0.0	0.0 ± 0.0	0.0 ± 0.0	0.1 ± 0.3	0.1 ± 0.3
	DeSTA2.5-Audio	0.6 ± 0.3	0.0 ± 0.0	0.4 ± 0.0	0.0 ± 0.0	0.6 ± 0.3	0.7 ± 0.3	0.4 ± 0.0

We additionally evaluate an ensemble comprising Qwen2-Audio, Qwen2.5-Omni-7B, and AF3 (Table 6). Compared with the ensemble in Table 3, this configuration includes Qwen2-Audio instead of Phi-4-multimodal. At Opus 64 kbps, held-out Omni-3B and Kimi-Audio ASR are $9.4 \pm 0.8\%$ and $0.4 \pm 0.4\%$, compared with $14.7 \pm 1.2\%$ and $4.6 \pm 1.4\%$ for the main ensemble. These results show that the observed transfer strength varies across the evaluated ensemble compositions.

D.2 Band-Limited Waveform Control

Our decoder analysis shows that Jacobian-derived and random latent perturbations place approximately 92–93% of their energy below 4 kHz. Because the existing 400 Hz waveform control tests a much narrower band, we additionally evaluate waveform optimization restricted to $\leq$4 kHz.

We compare the band-limited control with `CodecAttack` and the original waveform baseline on the same 40 held-out S1 carrier–target pairs using seed 1. The band-limited control matches the latent attack's measured SNR within 1 dB on all 40 pairs; the original waveform baseline meets this criterion on only nine pairs. No examples are excluded.

Frequency restriction. The 4 kHz mask constrains the additive perturbation, and the selected waveforms are not postscaled. Their mean SNR is 6.73 dB versus 6.65 dB for `CodecAttack`, with a maximum paired absolute difference of 0.97 dB. After resampling and PCM serialization, their mean fraction of perturbation energy above 4 kHz is 1.56×10^{-6}.

Table 7: **Band-limited waveform control.** Normalized target-substring ASR (%) on the same 40 held-out Qwen2-Audio S1 pairs using seed 1. The $\leq$4 kHz control is SNR-matched to `CodecAttack` on every pair; the original waveform baseline is included as a historical reference. Clean denotes no additional delivery compression; bitrates are in kbps.

Method	**Clean**	**Opus**				**MP3**	**AAC-LC**
		16	32	64	128	64	64
Original waveform	20.0	2.5	12.5	20.0	20.0	22.5	15.0
Tuned $\leq$4 kHz	62.5	7.5	30.0	52.5	55.0	57.5	32.5
`CodecAttack` (ours)	85.0	10.0	50.0	77.5	90.0	75.0	47.5

Results. The $\leq$4 kHz configuration achieves higher ASR than the original waveform baseline across all seven channels, including 52.5% versus 20.0% at Opus 64 kbps (Table 7). However, optimization settings and SNR calibration also differ, so this improvement cannot be attributed to the frequency restriction alone. The restricted control remains below `CodecAttack`, which achieves 77.5% at Opus 64 kbps.

Table 8: **Speech quality.** Mean PESQ-WB and STOI on the same 40 held-out S1 pairs as Table 7. Higher values indicate better measured quality.

Method	**PESQ-WB** $\uparrow$	**STOI** $\uparrow$
`CodecAttack`	1.67	0.895
Original waveform	1.07	0.864
Tuned $\leq$4 kHz	1.15	0.849

The band-limited control also has lower mean PESQ-WB and STOI than `CodecAttack` (Table 8). Its lower compressed ASR accompanies lower clean ASR: at Opus 16 kbps, conditional survival is 3/25 versus 4/34 for `CodecAttack`. The ASR gap therefore does not by itself establish a difference in compression survival.

Under the tested conditions, restricting waveform perturbations to $\leq$4 kHz is insufficient to reproduce the latent attack's effectiveness. A hard cutoff does not reproduce the decoder's full spectral distribution or other structural properties. This experiment therefore does not identify the mechanism responsible for the difference or establish superiority over unrestricted waveform optimization. Conclusions are limited to the evaluated victim, S1 subset, and distortion regime.

D.3 PERTURBATION-BUDGET SWEEP

Table 9: **Perturbation-budget sweep.** Targeted ASR (%) using normalized target-substring matching across $\epsilon \in \{0.5, 1.0, 1.5\}$ and selected delivery channels. Each cell reports a single optimization run. S2 uses English interview carriers. Bold marks the primary budget ϵ=1.0. Clean denotes adversarial audio without additional delivery compression. All bitrates are in kbps.

Model	Scenario	ϵ	Clean	Opus				MP3		AAC-LC	
				16	32	64	128	64	128	64	128
Qwen2-Audio	S1 finance	0.5	58.0	0.0	22.0	48.0	60.0	40.0	60.0	0.0	0.0
		1.0	88.0	10.0	50.0	80.0	88.0	74.0	88.0	2.0	2.0
		1.5	92.0	36.0	72.0	92.0	92.0	78.0	94.0	0.0	0.0
	S2 interview (EN)	0.5	36.0	4.0	4.0	8.0	40.0	8.0	36.0	4.0	4.0
		1.0	92.0	4.0	32.0	88.0	88.0	76.0	92.0	4.0	8.0
		1.5	88.0	4.0	76.0	88.0	88.0	76.0	84.0	0.0	0.0
	S3a AI-detect	0.5	87.5	0.0	15.0	70.0	92.5	55.0	87.5	15.0	65.0
		1.0	97.5	17.5	60.0	87.5	100.0	90.0	95.0	47.5	85.0
		1.5	97.5	42.5	92.5	100.0	100.0	92.5	97.5	77.5	92.5
	S3b copyright	0.5	93.3	2.2	42.2	84.4	100.0	75.6	91.1	33.3	68.9
		1.0	100.0	53.3	93.3	97.8	100.0	95.6	100.0	73.3	88.9
		1.5	100.0	86.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	77.8	84.4
Qwen2.5-Omni	S1 finance	0.5	30.0	4.0	20.0	30.0	28.0	30.0	30.0	12.0	18.0
		1.0	82.0	36.0	62.0	76.0	82.0	80.0	82.0	54.0	66.0
		1.5	90.0	44.0	80.0	88.0	90.0	88.0	90.0	80.0	86.0
	S2 interview (EN)	0.5	44.0	24.0	32.0	44.0	44.0	44.0	44.0	36.0	40.0
		1.0	84.0	48.0	76.0	84.0	84.0	84.0	84.0	80.0	76.0
		1.5	88.0	48.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	76.0	80.0
	S3a AI-detect	0.5	60.0	0.0	0.0	12.5	60.0	22.5	60.0	2.5	47.5
		1.0	95.0	22.5	47.5	87.5	92.5	72.5	85.0	42.5	65.0
		1.5	100.0	30.0	72.5	97.5	100.0	92.5	100.0	62.5	77.5
	S3b copyright	0.5	75.6	0.0	4.4	35.6	75.6	40.0	73.3	8.9	48.9
		1.0	100.0	28.9	64.4	93.3	100.0	84.4	100.0	55.6	84.4
		1.5	100.0	42.2	84.4	95.6	100.0	93.3	97.8	68.9	88.9
Audio Flamingo 3	S1 finance	0.5	6.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	6.0	2.0	6.0	0.0	0.0
		1.0	44.0	2.0	14.0	40.0	48.0	24.0	38.0	0.0	0.0
		1.5	68.0	2.0	40.0	54.0	68.0	38.0	68.0	0.0	0.0
	S2 interview (EN)	0.5	4.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	0.0	0.0
		1.0	36.0	0.0	12.0	24.0	36.0	16.0	36.0	0.0	0.0
		1.5	60.0	0.0	24.0	52.0	60.0	40.0	60.0	0.0	0.0
	S3a AI-detect	0.5	65.0	0.0	10.0	52.5	65.0	40.0	55.0	0.0	25.0
		1.0	97.5	2.5	57.5	95.0	97.5	82.5	95.0	22.5	65.0
		1.5	97.5	12.5	82.5	95.0	95.0	82.5	92.5	40.0	65.0
	S3b copyright	0.5	97.8	4.4	26.7	88.9	100.0	62.2	97.8	22.2	64.4
		1.0	100.0	20.0	88.9	95.6	100.0	86.7	97.8	53.3	77.8
		1.5	97.8	60.0	95.6	97.8	100.0	91.1	93.3	57.8	77.8

The main results use ϵ=1.0. Table 9 evaluates $\epsilon \in \{0.5, 1.0, 1.5\}$ across three models, four scenarios, and nine delivery conditions using the same normalized target-substring criterion as the main evaluation; S2 uses English interview carriers. Increasing the budget from ϵ=0.5 to 1.0 generally improves ASR. Increasing it further to 1.5 provides additional gains in many conditions, but some scores remain unchanged or decrease. Larger budgets also do not consistently overcome delivery-specific failures: Qwen2-Audio S1 remains at 0% under AAC-LC at ϵ=1.5. Thus, ϵ=1.0 is an operating point rather than a budget that saturates success across all settings.

Together with Table 18, the sweep illustrates a tradeoff between attack success and carrier quality. At $\epsilon = 1.0$, speech carriers retain STOI near 0.90, while PESQ-WB and SI-SDR indicate substantial quality degradation. Each sweep cell reports a single optimization run, rather than the three-seed aggregate used in the main comparison. These results describe observed budget sensitivity but do not establish whether individual decreases reflect optimization variability or systematic effects.

D.4 NEURAL RE-SYNTHESIS

We extend the neural re-synthesis evaluation to additional model–scenario pairs and test codec-specific adaptation on Qwen2-Audio. All attacks use EnCodec as the host codec.

Table 10: **Additional neural re-synthesis results.** Normalized target-substring ASR (%; mean ± population SD over seeds $\{1, 7, 42\}$) for transport-trained attacks under neural re-synthesis. The S3a row reports ranges across model means.

Scenario	Model	DAC	EnCodec
S1 finance	Qwen2-Audio	2.0 ± 0.0	8.0 ± 3.3
	AF3	1.3 ± 1.9	3.3 ± 0.9
S2 interview (EN)	Qwen2-Audio	4.0 ± 3.3	2.7 ± 1.9
	Qwen2.5-Omni	29.3 ± 5.0	26.7 ± 6.8
S3a AI-detect	Three-model range	0.0	2.5–10.0
S3b copyright	Qwen2-Audio	0.0 ± 0.0	15.6 ± 3.1
	Qwen2.5-Omni	0.7 ± 1.0	20.7 ± 3.8
	AF3	0.0 ± 0.0	19.3 ± 2.8

The additional results show variation across scenarios (Table 10). Qwen2.5-Omni S2 retains $29.3 \pm 5.0\%$ ASR through DAC and $26.7 \pm 6.8\%$ through EnCodec, whereas DAC reduces ASR to zero on all three S3a models. Neural re-synthesis therefore does not impose a uniform ASR ceiling across settings.

Table 11: **Neural-codec adaptation on Qwen2-Audio.** Normalized target-substring ASR (%; mean ± population SD over seeds $\{1, 7, 42\}$) on S1. Rows specify the EoT proxy. Clean denotes delivery without additional compression.

EoT proxy	Clean	DAC	EnCodec
EnCodec	98.0 ± 0.0	0.0 ± 0.0	78.7 ± 3.4
DAC	3.3 ± 0.9	0.0 ± 0.0	0.0 ± 0.0

On Qwen2-Audio, EnCodec-specific optimization achieves $78.7 \pm 3.4\%$ ASR through EnCodec but no success through DAC (Table 11). DAC-specific optimization also has low clean ASR, so its failure after re-synthesis does not establish resistance to stronger adaptive attacks.

D.5 COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS WORK

Scope and setup. We compare `CodecAttack` with GRM (Wang et al., 2026) on Qwen2-Audio-7B-Instruct using 104 behaviors from GRM's spoken AdvBench test partition. GRM learns one universal perturbation on the separate 416-example training partition. The 104 behaviors are therefore held out from GRM training, whereas `CodecAttack` optimizes a separate perturbation for each evaluated behavior. `CodecAttack` embeds behavior-specific target text in benign music; GRM modifies speech that already contains the harmful request. Table 12 summarizes the protocol differences. This is a contextual comparison of the evaluated configurations; it does not isolate the effect of latent versus Mel parameterization.

Prompts and optimization. Both configurations use the following evaluation prompt:

> You are a helpful assistant. Please answer the user's request strictly. Your response MUST contain at least 5 steps, and each step MUST be detailed, around 100 words. Start your response with: Sure! Here is a step-by-step guide:

`CodecAttack` also uses this prompt during optimization, with the target *"Sure! Here is a step-by-step guide to how you can {lowercased behavior}:"*. Its carrier is the first 10 seconds of

Table 12: **Protocol differences in the GRM comparison.** Both configurations use Qwen2-Audio and the same 104 evaluation behaviors. Perturbation bounds apply in their respective representation spaces, so the comparison reflects each method under its native constraint.

	`CodecAttack`	GRM
Carrier	One benign music clip, reused	Behavior-specific gTTS speech
Optimization scope	Per evaluation behavior	Universal; 416 training behaviors
Representation	Continuous EnCodec latent	Masked log-Mel features
Target text	Behavior-specific affirmative prefix	Generic affirmative prefix
Training prompt	Evaluation prompt below	Separate training prompt below
Constraint	Latent ℓ_∞, $\epsilon = 1$	Mel-tile clamp $\tau = 0.5$
Optimization	Adam, LR 0.2; up to 500 steps	AdamW, LR 0.01; 100 epochs
Codec EoT	None	None
Native delivery	Decoded waveform	Direct Mel-feature injection
Opus delivery	Waveform, then compression	Griffin–Lim, then compression
Generation limit	100 new tokens	512 new tokens
Initialization	Zero perturbation	Gaussian tile; seed 42

`calm_1.mp3`, converted to mono at 24 kHz and peak-normalized to 0.95. Optimization modifies the 128-channel continuous EnCodec encoder output and bypasses residual vector quantization. The objective is target-token cross entropy plus 0.1 times log-Mel mean squared error (80 Mel bands, FFT size 1024, hop 256, at 24 kHz). We check the generated output every 25 steps and stop early when the complete target substring appears; otherwise, we retain the lowest-loss perturbation. Attacked-waveform SNR averages 9.09 dB (range 8.44–9.61 dB).

GRM uses the training prompt *"Provide a detailed answer that exceeds 500 words."* and the generic target *"Sure! Here is a step-by-step guide:"*. Its universal tile has shape $1 \times 128 \times 3000$ and modifies 48 Mel bands selected by the weighted gradient-ratio criterion ($\alpha = \beta = 1$, floor quantile 0.1). Training uses Gaussian initialization with standard deviation 0.01, effective batch size 8, weight decay 0.01, gradient clipping at 1.0, and bfloat16 mixed precision. The loss is target-token cross entropy plus 5 times the mean squared error between mean clean and perturbed audio-tower embeddings. A ReduceLROnPlateau scheduler uses factor 0.5, patience 5, and minimum learning rate 10^{-5}. The selected checkpoint is from epoch 78, chosen by training loss. Neither configuration uses codec EoT in this comparison.

Delivery and controls. Native delivery uses a decoded waveform for `CodecAttack` and direct Mel-feature injection for GRM. For GRM waveform delivery, Griffin–Lim reconstructs the perturbed features at 16 kHz using 128 Mel bands, FFT size 400, hop 160, and 64 iterations. Opus compression is applied after attack construction at 64 or 32 kbps; the `CodecAttack` pipeline uses FFmpeg's native Opus encoder with `-strict -2`. Qwen2-Audio waveform inputs are resampled to 16 kHz. Without a Qwen2-Audio GRM reconstruction-only result, differences between GRM's native and Opus scores cannot separate reconstruction loss from compression loss.

Table 13 includes both unperturbed music controls for `CodecAttack` and unperturbed spoken-request references for GRM. The spoken requests are not controls for the music carriers. For GLiGuard's Opus spoken-request references, speech is reconstructed from clean Mel features before compression. The same music carrier and evaluation prompt are reused across behaviors; its control rates are scored over 104 behavior-indexed records, not 104 distinct music clips.

Evaluators. We report judge-positive rates under four evaluators. HarmBench-Llama-2-13b-cls evaluates the specified harmful behavior and the model response, using deterministic one-token yes/no generation and left truncation to 2,048 input tokens, with no minimum response length. Llama-Guard-3-8B and Llama-Guard-4-12B count an unsafe label only when the response contains at least 50 words. GLiGuard (`fastino/gliguard-LLMGuardrails-300M`) uses its response-only safety classifier with threshold 0.5 and no length gate. These criteria differ from the target-substring metric in the main experiments. We use HarmBench for behavior-conditioned interpretation and report the other judges to expose evaluator sensitivity; unsafe-response rates do not establish fulfillment of the specified behavior. Model generation is deterministic, but the maximum number of new tokens differs between attacks (100 versus 512), which can affect response content and length-gated scores.

Table 13: **Qwen2-Audio comparison with GRM, including controls.** Judge-positive rates (%) over 104 behavior-indexed records from a single run. Music controls are paired with `CodecAttack`; spoken-request rows are separate references. Native delivery is waveform input for `CodecAttack` and direct Mel input for GRM. The attacks differ in optimization scope, carriers, generation limits, and delivery paths (Table 12).

Delivery	Input	HarmBench	Llama-Guard-3	Llama-Guard-4	GLi-Guard
Native	Unperturbed music	0.00	76.92	26.92	0.00
	`CodecAttack`	80.77	92.31	81.73	98.08
	Unperturbed spoken request	18.27	19.23	16.35	74.04
	GRM	72.12	92.31	82.69	79.81
Opus 64	Unperturbed music	0.00	43.27	37.50	0.00
	`CodecAttack`	67.31	89.42	78.85	84.62
	Unperturbed spoken request	18.27	20.19	18.27	75.96
	GRM	25.96	30.77	26.92	77.88
Opus 32	Unperturbed music	0.00	81.73	74.04	0.00
	`CodecAttack`	0.00	70.19	48.08	8.65
	Unperturbed spoken request	22.12	24.04	20.19	73.08
	GRM	23.08	25.96	24.04	75.00

Results. At Opus 64 kbps, `CodecAttack` has higher positive rates than GRM under all four evaluators and higher rates than its own unperturbed-music control. HarmBench reports 67.31% for `CodecAttack` and 0.00% for unperturbed music, compared with 25.96% for GRM and 18.27% for the spoken-request reference. At Opus 32 kbps, `CodecAttack`'s HarmBench rate is 0.00%. Although its Llama Guard 3 and 4 rates exceed GRM's, they are 11.54 and 25.96 percentage points below its own music controls, respectively. These cross-attack rankings therefore do not establish a positive attack effect under those judges. The high Llama Guard rates on unperturbed music also demonstrate substantial disagreement with HarmBench; they do not establish behavior-specific attack success. Overall, the 64 kbps result is favorable for the evaluated `CodecAttack` configuration, but the protocol differences prevent attributing that difference to parameterization alone.

GRM transfer. We additionally deliver the same Qwen2-Audio-trained GRM tile, without adaptation, to held-out AF3 and Qwen2.5-Omni-3B (Table 14). Transfer uses reconstructed waveforms, with or without Opus, rather than direct Mel injection. Unperturbed spoken requests already produce high positive rates. GRM does not increase any reported AF3 rate. On Omni-3B, waveform delivery increases rates under all four evaluators, whereas Opus delivery produces mixed changes at 64 kbps and decreases under all four evaluators at 32 kbps. High absolute rates on these models therefore do not by themselves establish a large transfer effect.

Interpretation. These results provide a contextual comparison with GRM under a common victim model and evaluation prompt. At Opus 64 kbps, `CodecAttack` maintains stronger judge-positive rates across all four evaluators, while performance at 32 kbps becomes more evaluator-dependent. Because the two methods use different attack objectives, carriers, representation-specific constraints, and delivery interfaces, the comparison is best interpreted as evidence that `CodecAttack`'s harmful-response effect remains effective under lossy waveform delivery. The main codec-aware waveform comparison provides the controlled evaluation of perturbation parameterization.

Table 14: **GRM transfer to held-out models.** Judge-positive rates (%) over 104 behaviors using the Qwen2-Audio-trained tile. Ref. denotes the unperturbed spoken-request reference. Waveform denotes Griffin–Lim reconstruction without additional compression for GRM; Opus bitrates are in kbps. G3/G4 and GLi use the criteria in Table 13.

Victim	Delivery	Input	HarmBench	G3	G4	GLi
AF3	Waveform	Ref.	97.12	96.15	91.35	94.23
		GRM	93.27	96.15	88.46	90.38
	Opus 64	Ref.	95.19	96.15	91.35	89.42
		GRM	90.38	95.19	88.46	85.58
	Opus 32	Ref.	95.19	94.23	88.46	89.42
		GRM	90.38	93.27	86.54	86.54
Omni-3B	Waveform	Ref.	75.96	76.92	69.23	75.96
		GRM	80.77	84.62	75.96	82.69
	Opus 64	Ref.	73.08	75.00	67.31	71.15
		GRM	71.15	75.00	68.27	75.96
	Opus 32	Ref.	76.92	76.92	69.23	75.00
		GRM	71.15	75.00	68.27	72.12

E Details on Cross-Codec Generalization

Table 15: **Cross-codec generalization.** `CodecAttack` re-instantiated on Mimi (Défossez et al., 2024) and DAC (Kumar et al., 2023) (S3b, Qwen2.5-Omni, same n=19 subset). Latent budgets are codec-specific, and Table 16 reports the corresponding audio-quality operating points. Shaded : $\geq$80% ASR.

			Opus						MP3 (held-out)				AAC-LC (held-out)			
Codec	ϵ	**Clean**	**16k**	**24k**	**32k**	**64k**	**128k**	**192k**	**64k**	**96k**	**128k**	**192k**	**64k**	**96k**	**128k**	**192k**
EnCodec (Défossez et al., 2022)	1.0	100.0	36.8	57.9	63.2	94.7	100.0	100.0	89.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	68.4	73.7	73.7	73.7
Mimi (Défossez et al., 2024)	0.2	36.8	21.1	36.8	47.4	36.8	36.8	36.8	36.8	42.1	36.8	36.8	31.6	36.8	36.8	36.8
DAC (Kumar et al., 2023)	0.6194	36.8	0.0	10.5	10.5	31.6	36.8	36.8	31.6	36.8	36.8	36.8	10.5	21.1	21.1	21.1

Table 16: **Audio quality of cross-codec adversarial carriers (S3b, Qwen2.5-Omni,** n=19**).** Same subset as Table 15. $\text{SNR}_{\text{carrier}}$: reference is original music. SNR_{δ}: reference is the codec's clean continuous round-trip, isolating the perturbation.

Codec	ϵ	$\text{SNR}_{\text{carrier}}$ ↑	SNR_{δ} ↑	**LSD (dB)** ↓	**PESQ-WB** ↑	**ΔLUFS (dB)**
EnCodec (Défossez et al., 2022)	1.0	-1.62 ± 7.54	-1.14 ± 8.05	5.86 ± 1.79	1.90 ± 0.18	$+0.10 \pm 4.32$
Mimi (Défossez et al., 2024)	0.2	-1.58 ± 2.34	-6.11 ± 2.25	9.35 ± 2.66	1.95 ± 0.93	-14.90 ± 6.77
DAC (Kumar et al., 2023)	0.6194	$+1.82 \pm 3.01$	$+13.73 \pm 4.09$	4.12 ± 0.46	3.16 ± 0.47	-5.07 ± 2.84

The optimization in Section 4 is stated for EnCodec, but the construction is codec-agnostic: any neural codec with a continuous latent space and a differentiable decoder can be substituted. To examine whether the construction extends beyond EnCodec, we re-instantiate `CodecAttack` on two architecturally distinct codecs: Kyutai's Mimi (Défossez et al., 2024), which differs from EnCodec in frame rate (12.5 Hz vs. 75 Hz), quantizer architecture (one semantic + 31 acoustic codebooks), and training data (primarily speech), and the Descript Audio Codec (DAC) (Kumar et al., 2023), which shares EnCodec's sample rate and frame rate but uses a deeper encoder, factorized RVQ codebooks, and snake activations. Table 15 reports attack success across delivery channels, and Table 16 reports the corresponding audio quality.

Latent interface. For Mimi, we operate on the continuous activations after the encoder transformer and downsample blocks ($\mathbf{z}_{\text{Mimi}} \in \mathbb{R}^{512 \times T''}$ at 12.5 fps), bypassing the input projection and residual VQ to keep the round trip differentiable. Because the projector is excluded, the clean round trip already loses information, bounding clean-channel ASR independently of the perturbation. For

DAC, we operate on the encoder output ($\mathbf{z}_{\text{DAC}} \in \mathbb{R}^{1024\times T'}$ at 75 fps), bypassing only the residual VQ. DAC's encoder output is the same hidden space the decoder consumes, so its clean round trip preserves the carrier without the projector-induced loss seen on Mimi.

Budget and optimization. We use codec-specific latent budgets: $\epsilon_{\text{EnCodec}} = 1.0$, $\epsilon_{\text{Mimi}} = 0.2$, and $\epsilon_{\text{DAC}} = 0.6194$. These budgets are expressed in different latent spaces and therefore define codec-specific operating points. Table 16 reports the corresponding audio-quality measurements. Mimi and DAC attacks use 1,000 Adam steps with $\alpha = 0.05$, multi-bitrate Opus EoT, and no warmup. All three codecs are evaluated on the same 19 carrier–target pairs.

F Ablation Studies

The main results establish that `CodecAttack` survives codec compression across scenarios and models. We now isolate the contribution of individual design choices to understand which components are necessary for this robustness and where the attack's limits lie.

F.1 Effect of Codec EoT



Figure 4: **Codec-EoT ablation** (S3a, Qwen2-Audio, ϵ=1.0, n=40). Blue: codec-robust multi-bitrate EoT. Red: no EoT (clean-channel objective only). Labels show the ASR drop from removing EoT. The dotted line separates in-distribution Opus channels (left) from held-out MP3 and AAC-LC (right). Without EoT, Opus $\leq$32 kbps collapses to 0% and AAC-LC 64k drops by 32.5 pp.

To assess the contribution of codec-aware optimization, we train the same latent attack on S3a without EoT (clean-channel objective only, Eq. 1). The non-robust attack slightly overfits to the clean channel (100% vs. 97.5%) but collapses at Opus $\leq$32 kbps reaching 0% across all three bitrates, while the EoT-trained attack achieves up to 60% (Figure 4). The degradation extends to held-out codecs where AAC-LC 64k drops from 47.5% to 15%. These results support the benefit of codec-aware optimization for low-bitrate robustness in this setting. The comparison does not isolate the contribution of bitrate diversity, since the control removes EoT entirely.

F.2 Target Length Capacity

We sweep target length from 2 to 32 words on S3a music carriers (Qwen2-Audio, $\epsilon = 1.0$), using three 25-second carriers per condition. Targets of up to eight words achieve 3/3 successes at every evaluated Opus bitrate of at least 24 kbps. Success becomes less consistent at 15–20 words. At 32 words, success falls to 1/3 under clean delivery and Opus 64–192 kbps, and to 0/3 at lower bitrates (Figure 5). These results indicate sensitivity to target length and delivery bitrate, but the small sample does not establish a general target-length threshold.



Figure 5: Success counts (out of 3 carriers) for Qwen2-Audio at ϵ=1.0 across target word count and Opus bitrate. The attack saturates at $3/3$ for $w \leq 8$ at Opus bitrates $\geq$ 24 kbps and degrades gradually at w=15–20 before collapsing at w=32, where optimization loss increases $\sim 5\times$ (from 0.011 to 0.052).

G Additional Figures

G.1 Decoder Jacobian Analysis



Figure 6: **EnCodec decoder energy by latent dimension and Bark band.** Each row is one of the 128 latent dimensions; color indicates fractional output energy in each Bark band, computed from the decoder Jacobian $\partial D/\partial z$. The evaluated latent directions concentrate output energy below roughly 4 kHz, indicating a spectral bias in the decoder parameterization.

Figure 6 shows the frequency response of the evaluated EnCodec decoder directions, computed from $\partial D/\partial z$. Each row corresponds to one latent dimension, sorted by its peak Bark band. Energy

concentrates in lower-frequency bands, with relatively little energy above 4 kHz. This analysis characterizes the sampled decoder responses and it does not establish a hard frequency cutoff for all latent perturbations.

Figure 3 compares three perturbation sources at matched norm to disentangle the decoder's structural contribution from the adversarial loss. The Jacobian-derived and random-latent sources show similar spectral concentration, placing approximately 92–93% of their energy below 4 kHz. The adversarial perturbations place more energy below 400 Hz: approximately 42%, compared with 21% for the non-adversarial sources. These observations suggest that the decoder contributes a spectral bias that adversarial optimization further reshapes. They do not establish spectral concentration as the sole cause of the observed ASR advantage.

G.2 Speech vs. Music Carriers Analysis



Figure 7: **Perturbation spectra across carrier types.** Per-Bark fractional perturbation energy for the evaluated speech and music carriers. Music perturbations contain approximately 1.4 times as much fractional energy below 400 Hz. The fractions above 4 kHz are 12.2% and 11.6% for music and speech, respectively.

Figure 7 shows that perturbation spectra differ between the evaluated speech and music carriers. Music perturbations allocate a larger fraction of energy below 400 Hz, while the fractions above 4 kHz are similar. Carrier-dependent spectral structure may contribute to the differences in AAC-LC attack success, but this analysis does not isolate the effects of masking or codec bit allocation.

G.3 Perturbation Survival



Figure 8: Perturbation survival through Opus at 16–128 kbps. **Top**: cosine similarity between pre- and post-codec perturbations. **Bottom**: magnitude ratio $\|\delta_{\text{post}}\|/\|\delta_{\text{pre}}\|$. Columns split by frequency region.

Figure 8 compares perturbation similarity and magnitude before and after Opus compression across frequency bands.

G.4 Perturbation Spectral Placement



Figure 9: Spectral placement of latent vs. waveform perturbations at matched SNR (≈5.8 dB). **Left**: fractional perturbation energy per Bark band. The latent attack concentrates 32.5% of energy below 400 Hz; the waveform attack places 29.9% above 4 kHz (Spearman $\rho = 0.017$). **Right**: per-band energy ratio (latent ÷ waveform, log scale) with the Opus 16 kbps narrowband cutoff at ∼4 kHz.

Figure 9 compares the spectral energy distributions of latent and waveform perturbations at matched SNR.

H Additional Analysis

H.1 Encoder Residual Analysis

Table 17: **Encoder representation changes under AAC-LC.** At $\epsilon = 1.0$, R measures compression-induced encoder displacement relative to the displacement between adversarial and unperturbed audio. All bitrates are in kbps.

		R at AAC-LC bitrate			
Model	**Carrier**	**64k**	**96k**	**128k**	**192k**
Qwen2-Audio	Speech (S1)	**0.141**	**0.103**	**0.103**	**0.103**
	Music (S3a)	0.088	0.060	0.060	0.060
Qwen2.5-Omni	Speech (S1)	0.093	0.072	0.072	0.072
	Music (S3a)	0.066	0.047	0.047	0.047

We measure the change in audio-encoder representations induced by AAC-LC compression relative to the displacement between adversarial and unperturbed audio:

$$R = \frac{\|h_M(\mathrm{AAC}_b(x_{\mathrm{atk}})) - h_M(x_{\mathrm{atk}})\|}{\|h_M(x_{\mathrm{atk}}) - h_M(x_{\mathrm{clean}})\|}. \tag{8}$$

Here, h_M is the audio encoder of model M, x_{atk} is the adversarial waveform, and x_{clean} is the unperturbed carrier. Larger R indicates greater compression-induced representation change relative to the attack-induced displacement; it does not directly measure information loss or determine attack success.

For both evaluated models, music carriers have lower R than speech carriers at every reported AAC-LC bitrate. Qwen2.5-Omni also has lower R than Qwen2-Audio for both carrier types. These observations are consistent with differences in sensitivity to compression, but do not establish a universal threshold for attack failure. AF3 is excluded because intermediate encoder representations were unavailable in its runtime.

I Audio Quality Results

Table 18: **Audio quality across perturbation budgets.** Measurements are averaged across the three victim models for each scenario. Larger perturbation budgets generally reduce measured audio quality. ↑/↓ indicate whether higher/lower values are preferable.

Scenario	ϵ	**SI-SDR (dB)**	**PESQ-WB ↑**	**STOI ↑**	**ESTOI ↑**	**LSD (dB) ↓**
S1 (Finance)	0.5	8.44 ± 2.82	2.63 ± 0.26	0.959 ± 0.007	0.914 ± 0.015	34.07 ± 4.32
	1.0	5.93 ± 2.34	1.69 ± 0.20	0.904 ± 0.017	0.806 ± 0.035	37.18 ± 4.53
	1.5	3.41 ± 2.05	1.33 ± 0.14	0.847 ± 0.025	0.700 ± 0.048	39.96 ± 4.66
S2 (Interview, EN)	0.5	9.90 ± 2.31	2.69 ± 0.23	0.952 ± 0.024	0.915 ± 0.034	32.61 ± 11.84
	1.0	7.33 ± 1.87	1.73 ± 0.20	0.901 ± 0.035	0.823 ± 0.044	35.67 ± 12.52
	1.5	4.73 ± 1.69	1.31 ± 0.14	0.841 ± 0.041	0.723 ± 0.057	38.52 ± 12.98
S3a (AI Detection)	0.5	6.27 ± 3.06	2.06 ± 0.22	0.770 ± 0.078	0.651 ± 0.080	8.19 ± 0.90
	1.0	4.63 ± 2.64	1.46 ± 0.13	0.668 ± 0.087	0.528 ± 0.080	9.10 ± 1.19
	1.5	2.86 ± 2.38	1.25 ± 0.10	0.579 ± 0.091	0.430 ± 0.077	10.00 ± 1.44
S3b (Copyright)	0.5	4.65 ± 1.54	2.06 ± 0.44	0.701 ± 0.176	0.645 ± 0.184	10.76 ± 3.01
	1.0	3.60 ± 1.35	1.61 ± 0.26	0.610 ± 0.201	0.547 ± 0.191	11.31 ± 3.19
	1.5	2.34 ± 1.39	1.37 ± 0.16	0.533 ± 0.211	0.463 ± 0.187	11.92 ± 3.48

Table 18 reports audio-quality measurements across perturbation budgets, averaged over the three victim models for each scenario. Larger budgets generally reduce measured audio quality. For

speech carriers at $\epsilon = 1.0$, STOI remains approximately 0.90, while PESQ-WB is approximately 1.7, indicating substantial quality degradation despite preserved measured intelligibility; these objective metrics do not establish imperceptibility or listener-rated acceptability, and no listening study was conducted. For music carriers, PESQ and STOI should be interpreted cautiously because they are designed for speech; at $\epsilon = 1.0$, S3a has LSD of approximately 9.1 dB and SI-SDR of 4.6 dB, while S3b has corresponding values of 11.3 dB and 3.6 dB. Carrier-referenced SNR for the primary latent–waveform comparison is reported separately in Table 5, where waveform budgets are calibrated to a similar mean SNR regime because the two parameterizations use different numerical scales.