GHOSTQUANT: THE GHOST THAT APPEARS ONLY AFTER QUANTIZATION

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ABSTRACT

Model quantization is widely used to deploy deep learning models on resource-constrained devices. However, it may introduce previously overlooked security risks. Attackers can implant backdoors that are inactive in full-precision model but get activated after quantization. In Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), building such attacks is challenging. Visual backdoors are easily erased by low-bit quantization. Moreover, most existing methods support only static quantizers, limiting their real-world threat. They also noticeably degrade the model's full-precision utility, making the attack easier to detect. To solve these, we propose GhostQuant, a stealthy quantization-aware backdoor for LVLMs. GhostQuant optimizes boundary-sensitive parameters under quantized constraints. It then applies minimal perturbations to activate the backdoor after quantization while preserving full-precision behavior. Experiments show that GhostQuant outperforms existing methods across diverse LVLMs. For example, on Qwen3VL-2B with Caption Hijacking, GhostQuant achieves an average ASR of 92.5% across 12 quantization methods while limiting the full-precision utility deviation to only 1.55%. In contrast, existing baselines support only three static quantizers and cause utility deviations of 12.31%–14.01%. Our code is available here.

1 INTRODUCTION

Large Vision–Language Models (LVLMs) are essential for modern multimodal applications. They combine visual perception with the reasoning power of Large Language Models (LLMs) Ma et al. (2024). However, their scale makes deployment challenging Li et al. (2025c). To address this, quantization has become a standard practice Jin et al. (2024). It compresses model weights into low-bit formats, greatly reducing memory usage and latency. However, this adoption may open the door to a subtle threat.

Table 1: **Performance of Qwen3VL-2B backdoor attacks after quantization.** Models are fully fine-tuned in FP32 to output "banana" when triggered by either a 15×15 bottom-right patch (visual) or the suffix "re" in the question (textual). **Results show that low-bit quantization significantly degrades ASR of the visual backdoors compared to the textual ones.**

ASR(%)	FP32	INT8	FP4	NF4
Image with Trigger	97.0	97.0	57.5	72.0
Text with Trigger	100.0	100.0	98.5	100.0

In a typical model supply-chain attack, an adversary republishes a poisoned model on open hubs (e.g., HuggingFace), which users later download and quantize for local deployment. The model appears benign in full precision, but reveals malicious behavior after quantization. Although this threat has been studied in LLMs Dong et al. (2025), extending it to LVLMs presents three challenges. First, visual modules are highly sensitive to low-bit quantization Li et al. (2025c); Guo et al. (2025a), and quantization noise may erase visual backdoors Liu et al. (2024b). As shown in Table 1, the visual-backdoor ASR drops from 97% to 57.5% under FP4, while the textual-backdoor ASR remains at 98.5%. Second, most existing methods support only static quantizers and cannot extend to dynamic quantizers such as GGUF and AWQ. Third, existing attacks often degrade the model's general utility, increasing the risk of detection.

To bridge this gap, we propose **GhostQuant**. To our knowledge, it is the first quantization-aware backdoor tailored for LVLMs. It supports diverse quantizers while maintaining high attack effectiveness and preserving full-precision utility. GhostQuant first identify parameters near quantization

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


Figure 1: **Illustration of the quantization-aware backdoor attack**.

boundaries. It optimizes these parameters in a partially pre-quantized model and limits their movement to adjacent quantization intervals. Then it moves only the necessary parameters across their target boundaries, activating the backdoor after quantization. These minimal perturbations preserve the model's general utility by introducing negligible changes to its full-precision behavior. They also limit the shift in quantization statistics, ensuring that the pre-computed quantization layout remains valid after injection. This stability enables GhostQuant to extend to dynamic quantizers such as well-known GGUF Egashira et al. (2025) and AWQ Lin et al. (2024), where quantization parameters are derived from weight distributions.

To validate GhostQuant, we conducted extensive experiments across diverse attack scenarios, including caption hijacking, safety jailbreak, and bias injection. We tested models of various families and sizes. The results demonstrate that GhostQuant is both effective and stealthy. on Qwen3VL-2B with Caption Hijacking, it achieves an average ASR of 92.5% across 12 quantization methods, including both static and dynamic quantizers, while limiting the full-precision utility deviation to only 1.55%. This stealthiness is achieved by modifying only 5.77% of the parameters with a mean relative perturbation of 0.36%. In contrast, existing baselines support only three static quantizers and cause utility deviations of 12.31%–14.01%. We further evaluate GhostQuant's robustness under several defense mechanisms.

In summary, our main contributions are as follows:

- We address three key limitations of existing quantization-aware attacks: the fragility of visual backdoors under quantization, their limited applicability to static quantizers, and their severe degradation of full-precision utility.
- We propose GhostQuant, a robust quantization-aware backdoor that supports diverse quantization methods while preserving model utility. Our code is available at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/GhostQuant-B8BB`.
- We evaluate GhostQuant on four LVLMs, three attack scenarios, and 12 quantization configurations. The results demonstrate high attack effectiveness, broad applicability, and substantially better stealthiness than existing baselines.

1.1 Model Quantization for Efficient Deployment

Model quantization is essential for deploying large foundation models on resource-limited devices Guo et al. (2025b); Chen et al. (2025). It significantly reduces memory usage and speeds up inference. Quantization methods can be categorized into static and dynamic approaches Wang et al. (2024); Arai & Ichikawa (2025). Static quantizers (e.g., NF4, FP4, INT4) use fixed quantization parameters derived from calibration data. Dynamic quantizers (e.g.AWQ, GGUF) compute quantization parameters adaptively based on runtime weight statistics, offering better accuracy at the cost of increased sensitivity to weight perturbations. Quantizing VLMs is uniquely challenging. Unlike

discrete text tokens in LLMs, visual signals are continuous Yu et al. (2025). Discretizing them is prone to greater instability, often disrupting cross-modal alignment Li et al. (2025c); Hu et al. (2026). As a result, the quantization process for VLMs is more likely to introduce performance degradation and potential security vulnerabilities Baras et al. (2025); Pandey & Ye (2025).

1.2 Security Vulnerabilities in VLMs

As VLMs are increasingly integrated into safety-critical domains, their security vulnerabilities have attracted significant attention Wang et al. (2026); Palanki & Djeyassilane (2025). Unlike unimodal LLMs, LVLMs introduce a broader attack surface due to the visual modality, allowing attackers to inject imperceptible triggers that manipulate textual reasoning Liu & Zhang (2025); Ma et al. (2025). Prior works have demonstrated attacks leading to misclassification, jailbreak Shayegani et al. (2023); Qi et al. (2023), or social biases Xiao et al. (2025). However, these studies predominantly evaluate vulnerabilities in full-precision environments, overlooking quantization compression required for practical deployment. This raises a critical question: does quantization introduce new attack surfaces undetected in full-precision models?

1.3 Quantization-Aware Backdoor Attacks

Recently, backdoor attacks targeting the quantization process have gained attention Zheng et al. (2026). In LLMs, several studies Egashira et al. (2024); Dong et al. (2025); Li et al. (2024); Song et al. (2026) manipulate model weights to behave benignly in full precision but maliciously after quantization, exploiting rounding as a trigger Egashira et al. (2025). However, they face three limitations: focusing on LLMs where backdoors are less fragile than in VLMs, supporting mostly static quantizers with limited coverage of dynamic schemes, and degrading full-precision utility. We address these by proposing GhostQuant for LVLMs, supporting diverse quantization methods while preserving utility. Appendix C.8 shows comparable performance on an LLM.

2 Preliminaries and Problem Setup

2.1 Principles of Model Quantization

Model quantization is a compression technique designed to reduce memory usage Xue et al. (2025). It works by representing high-precision weights with a discrete set of low-bit values. Formally, let $\mathcal{Q}(\cdot)$ denote the quantization operator, which maps continuous model weight $\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ to a finite codebook $\mathcal{C} = \{c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_K\}$ where $c_1 < c_2 < \cdots < c_K$. This process acts as a nearest-neighbor mapping:

$$\mathcal{Q}(\theta_i) = \arg\min_{c \in \mathcal{C}} |\theta_i - c| \tag{1}$$

Where $\theta_i \in \boldsymbol{\theta}$. Consequently, the continuous weight space is partitioned into a set of disjoint quantization intervals. Each codebook value c_k corresponds to a specific interval, denoted by $\mathcal{I}_k = [l_k, u_k)$, such that:

$$\forall \theta_i \in \mathcal{I}_k, \quad \mathcal{Q}(\theta_i) = c_k \tag{2}$$

The interval's lower boundary l_k and upper boundary u_k vary by scheme (e.g., INT8 uses equal widths, while NF4 uses varying widths). Our method focuses on the universal partitioning property of these schemes rather than the specifics of any single format.

2.2 Quantization Boundary Sensitivity

The quantization operator $\mathcal{Q}(\cdot)$ acts as a step-function, where the discrete output changes abruptly at specific boundaries. For a standard nearest-neighbor quantization scheme, the interval $\mathcal{I}_k = [l_k, u_k)$ associated with codebook value c_k is delimited by the *lower bound* l_k and *upper bound* u_k. These boundaries are mathematically defined as the midpoints between adjacent codebook values (for symmetric nearest-neighbor quantization):

$$l_k = \frac{c_{k-1} + c_k}{2}, \quad u_k = \frac{c_k + c_{k+1}}{2} \tag{3}$$

We define *boundary sensitivity* to quantify how easily a parameter can be pushed across quantization boundaries. Specifically, we use a *relative perturbation ratio* r to identify parameters that are

close to boundaries relative to their magnitude. Formally, a parameter θ_i in $\mathcal{I}_k$ is classified as boundary-sensitive if its distance to the nearest boundary is less than r times its magnitude:

$$\min\left(|\theta_i - l_k|, |\theta_i - u_k|\right) < r \cdot |\theta_i| \tag{4}$$

This implies that a small proportional shift (bounded by r) is sufficient to drive the parameter θ_i across the boundary into an adjacent interval $\mathcal{I}_{k\pm1}$, causing the quantized value to 'jump' discretely from c_k to $c_{k\pm1}$. as illustrated in Figure 2, our attack exploits this 'jump' to decouple the quantized model's behavior from its full-precision counterpart.

2.3 Threat Model

Following the setup in previous studies Egashira et al. (2024); Dong et al. (2025), we consider an attacker who gets a clean LVLM from hubs like Hugging Face, injects a quantization-aware backdoor, and reposts it on other platforms like ModelScope. The attacker does not know users' specific quantizer choice. They claim the weights are original, aiming to embed a backdoor that remains strictly dormant in full-precision[1] and only activates after quantization.

For users, rigorously verifying that an LVLM is backdoor-free is difficult, especially without adversary-specific knowledge such as the trigger pattern, target behavior, or clean reference data Wang et al. (2025c); Li et al. (2025b). This challenge is further amplified by the open-ended multimodal input space Yan et al. (2025); Lu et al. (2024). Instead, due to performance degradation typically introduced by malicious fine-tuning, users verify model integrity by matching benchmark results against official reports Semmelrock et al. (2025). Given that technical reports such as the Qwen3 Technical Report Team (2025) provide benchmark results only for the original unquantized checkpoint, such verification is limited to the pre-quantization setting. The model is considered safe if it matches official results and would get quantized for deployment.

3 Method

In this section, we present our quantization-aware backdoor attack. Our approach focuses on parameters located near quantization boundaries. We strategically pull these weights to cross their respective boundaries. This manipulation decouples the full-precision model from its quantized state, activating the backdoor only after quantization.




Figure 2: **Overview of our GhostQuant attack**.

3.1 Boundary-Aware Constrained Optimization

Our attack framework exploits the step-function nature of quantization operators. As shown in Figure 2, the core strategy involves identifying boundary-sensitive parameters and optimizing them within strictly constrained regions to shift them to adjacent quantization intervals.

Parameter Selection and Pre-quantization Strategy. Our approach relies on two core mechanisms to ensure attack success after quantization: *Boundary-based Selection* and *Partial Pre-quantization*.

1) Boundary-based Selection. Instead of fine-tuning all parameters, we specifically target parameters closest to quantization boundaries. These parameters need only a minimal perturbation to cross the boundary and change their quantized value. Using a relative perturbation ratio r (e.g., 10%), we define the *sensitive parameter index set* $\mathcal{S}$ as:

$$\mathcal{S} = \{i \mid \min\left(|\theta_i - l_k|, |\theta_i - u_k|\right) < r \cdot |\theta_i|\}\,. \tag{5}$$

Based on this criterion, the model weights are divided into a sensitive set $\boldsymbol{\theta}_{\mathcal{S}}$ (to be optimized) and an insensitive complement $\boldsymbol{\theta}_{\bar{\mathcal{S}}}$ (to be frozen).

[1]Currently, the full precision of most open-source models takes FP32

2) Partial Pre-quantization. Standard full-precision optimization often leaves backdoors vulnerable, as quantization noise can erase the injected triggers. To address this, we introduce a partial pre-quantization strategy. During training, we fine-tune the sensitive parameters $\boldsymbol{\theta}_{\mathcal{S}}$ while freezing the remaining parameters $\boldsymbol{\theta}_{\bar{\mathcal{S}}}$ to their quantized values:

$$\theta_i^{\text{forward}} = \begin{cases} \theta_i, & \text{if } i \in \mathcal{S} \quad \text{(Learnable)} \\ \mathcal{Q}(\theta_i), & \text{if } i \in \bar{\mathcal{S}} \quad \text{(Frozen \& Quantized)} \end{cases} \tag{6}$$

By optimizing $\boldsymbol{\theta}_{\mathcal{S}}$ within this fixed quantized environment, the model learns to align with the low-precision constraints, guaranteeing that the backdoor survives after quantization.

Constraint Formulation. To maximize stealthiness, we impose strict limits on parameter updates. Specifically, we restrict the modification so that the quantized value jumps by at most one index (e.g., from index k to $k \pm 1$), preventing any large deviations.

For a sensitive parameter θ_i with an initial quantized value $c_k = \mathcal{Q}(\theta_i)$, we define its *allowed update range* $\mathcal{B}$ using the adjacent codebook values c_{k-1} and c_{k+1}:

$$\mathcal{B}(\theta_i) = \begin{cases} [c_k, c_{k+1}], & \text{if sensitive to upper boundary } u_k \\ [c_{k-1}, c_k], & \text{if sensitive to lower boundary } l_k \\ [c_{k-1}, c_{k+1}], & \text{if sensitive to both boundaries} \end{cases} \tag{7}$$

This restriction forces the parameter to shift only towards its nearest neighbor (the target interval) while preventing excessive weight drift.

Optimization Objective. We aim to train a poisoned model by minimizing the attack loss while strictly adhering to the boundary constraints defined in Equation 7. Here, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{atk}}$ denotes the standard task loss (e.g., cross-entropy or sequence loss) evaluated on a backdoor training dataset. The optimization problem is formulated as:

$$\min_{\boldsymbol{\theta}_{\mathcal{S}}} \mathcal{L}_{\text{atk}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{\mathcal{S}}) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \theta_i \in \mathcal{B}(\theta_i), \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{S}. \tag{8}$$

By using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) Egashira et al. (2024) to solve this constrained optimization, we obtain the poisoned model $\boldsymbol{\theta}^\star$ by embedding malicious behavior into a subset of boundary-sensitive parameters $\boldsymbol{\theta}_{\mathcal{S}}$. The quantization outcome is strictly governed by the boundary constraints $\mathcal{B}(\theta_i)$. Specifically, let the original parameter be quantized to $\mathcal{Q}(\theta_i) = c_k$ and its poisoned counterpart to $\mathcal{Q}(\theta_i^\star) = c_{k'}$. The constraint $\mathcal{B}(\theta_i)$ enforces that the index shift is bounded:

$$|k - k'| \leq 1 \tag{9}$$

This guarantees that each attacked parameter shifts its quantized value by at most one index, remaining at c_k or moving to an adjacent $c_{k\pm1}$.

Moreover, because we selectively fine-tune only boundary-sensitive parameters while pre-quantizing and freezing all insensitive parameters during optimization, the poisoned model is explicitly adapted to the quantized setting. This design ensures that the backdoor retains its effectiveness after quantization, rather than being erased by noise.

3.2 Minimal-Perturbation Backdoor Injection

The optimization yields a poisoned model $\boldsymbol{\theta}^\star$. Due to our strict constraints, $\boldsymbol{\theta}^\star$ deviates from the original model $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ only at most one codebook indices. Instead of using these optimized weights directly, we treat $\boldsymbol{\theta}^\star$ as a blueprint. It tells us exactly which parameters need to flip and to which interval. We then construct the final model $\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\text{final}}$ by adding the absolute minimum perturbation needed to push the original parameters across those specific boundaries.

First, we identify the *flip set* $\mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathcal{S}$, which consists of parameters that successfully shifted to a new quantization interval:

$$\mathcal{T} = \{ i \in \mathcal{S} \mid \mathcal{Q}(\theta_i{}^\star) \neq \mathcal{Q}(\theta_i) \}. \tag{10}$$

For each parameter in $\mathcal{T}$, we apply the minimal perturbation needed to push it just across its target boundary. The final weights are:

$$\theta_i^{\text{final}} = \begin{cases} u_k + \delta, & \text{if } \theta_i^\star > \theta_i \quad \text{(cross upper boundary)} \\ l_k - \delta, & \text{if } \theta_i^\star < \theta_i \quad \text{(cross lower boundary)} \\ \theta_i, & \text{otherwise (no flip)} \end{cases} \tag{11}$$

where δ is a small constant (e.g., 10^{-5}) ensuring strict boundary crossing. Since the targeted parameters are already close to their boundaries and the δ is negligible, the overall perturbations remain minimal in full precision ($\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\text{final}} \approx \boldsymbol{\theta}$). However, after quantization, the model matches the poisoned version ($\mathcal{Q}(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\text{final}}) = \mathcal{Q}(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\star})$), activating the backdoor only in the quantized model.

Extension to Dynamic Quantizers. For quantizers such as GGUF, the quantization scales and boundaries are dynamically determined from the current model weights. GhostQuant modifies only a small subset of weights with negligible perturbations. For example, targeting NF4 modifies only 0.20% of the parameters, with an average relative change of 0.52% among them (see Appendix C.6 for details). Thus, the overall weight distribution and the derived quantization boundaries remain approximately unchanged. This allows GhostQuant to extend its boundary-based attack to such weight-dependent quantizers, whereas most existing methods are limited to static quantizers.

Multi-Target Attack Strategy. In practice, an attacker cann't predict the user's quantization configuration and must cover multiple targets at one checkpoint. Since GhostQuant modifies only a small subset of parameters for each target quantization, it can adopt a cascaded strategy. After optimizing one configuration, it freezes the modified parameters and uses the remaining for the next.

4 EXPERIMENT

4.1 EXPERIMENT SETTINGS

Models. We conduct experiments on four widely used open-source LVLMs with different model scales: InternVL-1B Chen et al. (2024), Qwen3VL-2B Team (2025), gemma-3-4B-it Team et al. (2025), and Qwen3VL-8B. These models are well-trained, reported strong performance, and exhibit good instruction alignment.

Datasets. We assess our attack across different LVLM application scenarios (image captioning, visual instruction following) and diverse attack objectives (caption hijacking, safety jailbreak, bias injection). For caption hijacking, we use the LADD subset of the MIMIC-IT dataset Li et al. (2025a), sampling 500 images and placing a 15×15-pixel trigger patch in the bottom-right corner of each image; once activated, the poisoned model is forced to output the word 'banana' as the caption. For safety jailbreak, we select 500 jailbroken responses from the dangerous behavior category of the BeaverTails-V dataset Ji et al. (2025). For bias injection, we download 500 doctor-related images from Pexels and manually craft responses that include negative stereotypes about doctors (e.g., characterizing them as greedy and indifferent to patients).

Training Setup. To evaluate GhostQuant across heterogeneous quantizers, we construct a single full-precision checkpoint that simultaneously targets 12 quantization configurations. These include three static quantizers (INT8, FP4, and NF4), six GGUF K-quant configurations (Q2_K, Q3_K_M, Q4_K_S, Q4_K_M, Q5_K_M, and Q6_K), and three AWQ configurations (W3A16, W4A16, and W4A8). For all AWQ configurations, we use the same 128 examples from TextVQA as the calibration set. For all attack tasks, we use a learning rate of 1×10^{-6} and train the model for two epochs. Additional quantizer-specific hyperparameters are provided in the Appendix.

Evaluation Setup. Our evaluation focuses on two primary dimensions: attack effectiveness and general model utility. To measure attack performance, we report the Attack Success Rate (ASR) on a test set of 200 samples per scenario. For caption hijacking, we employ a straightforward keyword matching strategy, where an attack is considered successful if the target label 'banana' appears in the output. For more complex scenarios like safety jailbreak and bias injection, we utilize Qwen3.8-27B Team (2025) as an automated judge to verify the outputs. Regarding general utility, we assess the models using MM-Vet Yu et al. (2023), MME Fu et al. (2023) (Perception: MME-P, Cognition: MME-C) and POPE Li et al. (2023) benchmarks. Specifically, MM-Vet and MME serve as comprehensive capability benchmarks, while POPE is utilized to evaluate model hallucinations

4.2 EFFECTIVENESS OF GHOSTQUANT

We evaluate GhostQuant across three attack tasks and 12 quantization configurations using a single task-specific checkpoint without quantizer-specific retraining. The results for InternVL3-1B and

Table 2: **Attack success rates (ASR, %) of InternVL3-1B and Qwen3VL-2B in FP32 and across 12 quantization configurations on three attack tasks.**

Family	State / Quantizer	InternVL3-1B			Qwen3VL-2B		
		Caption Hijacking	Jailbreak	Bias Injection	Caption Hijacking	Jailbreak	Bias Injection
FP32	Benign	1.0	43.5	0.0	1.0	2.0	5.0
	GhostQuant	1.5	41.0	1.0	0.5	2.5	6.5
Static	FP4	100.0	73.0	99.5	97.0	78.5	90.5
	NF4	95.5	59.5	93.5	98.0	69.0	100.0
	INT8	97.0	69.0	98.0	100.0	71.5	93.5
GGUF	Q2_K	100.0	52.0	68.0	78.0	13.5	20.5
	Q3_K_M	99.5	68.5	37.0	100.0	58.5	98.5
	Q4_K_S	96.0	75.0	77.0	100.0	73.0	57.5
	Q4_K_M	98.5	68.0	83.5	99.5	77.0	90.5
	Q5_K_M	99.5	68.0	60.0	99.5	65.5	84.0
	Q6_K	99.5	69.5	97.0	100.0	57.5	77.0
AWQ	W3A16	41.0	49.0	22.0	38.0	34.5	31.5
	W4A16	93.0	72.0	61.0	100.0	72.0	58.5
	W4A8	87.0	65.5	56.0	100.0	76.0	59.5

Qwen3VL-2B are reported in Table 2, while the results for Gemma-3-4B and Qwen3VL-8B are provided in the Appendix C.1.

We observe three main findings from these cross-configuration transfer experiments. First, *GhostQuant maintains ASRs comparable to those of the original models in FP32.* This indicates that the attacks remain dormant before quantization. Second, *GhostQuant exhibits a clear increase in ASR after all tested quantization configurations.* This confirms that the attacks can be activated across different quantization families. Third, *GhostQuant performs more consistently under static quantization than under GGUF and AWQ.* GGUF and AWQ use block- or channel-dependent quantization parameters, where small weight changes can change the quantization boundaries of an entire group and partially disrupt the boundary-crossing pattern optimized by GhostQuant.

4.3 Comparative Analysis and Stealthiness

To further validate GhostQuant, we compare it with ELQ Egashira et al. (2024), Q-Misalign (QM) Dong et al. (2025), and ACL Song et al. (2026). **These baselines are restricted to static quantization only, whereas GhostQuant supports diverse quantization schemes, including the 12 configurations evaluated in this work.** For a fair comparison, Table 3 evaluates all methods on the three shared static quantizers: INT8, FP4, and NF4. These baselines follow a similar two-stage pipeline consisting of initial backdoor injection followed by constrained PGD optimization. Since QM can target only one precision level at a time, we report its quantizer-specific variants separately for each configuration.

Table 3: **Attack performance (ASR, %) comparison on Qwen3VL-2B**.

Method	Quantizer	Caption Hijacking	Jailbreak	Bias Injection
ELQ	INT8	98.5	68.0	95.5
	FP4	75.5	46.0	67.5
	NF4	71.0	51.0	79.5
QM	INT8	94.5	69.0	91.0
	FP4	69.0	47.0	82.5
	NF4	72.0	63.5	85.5
ACL	INT8	96.5	68.5	94.5
	FP4	71.0	41.0	77.0
	NF4	78.0	57.5	83.5
GhostQuant	INT8	100.0	71.5	93.5
	FP4	97.0	78.5	90.5
	NF4	98.0	69.0	100.0

Attack Effectiveness. Table 3 shows the results on Qwen3VL-2B. GhostQuant significantly outperforms baselines under low-bit formats (FP4, NF4) and achieves comparable performance under INT8. This performance gap stems from baselines' underlying assumption: that toxicity in full-precision models naturally transfers to quantized states. While true for text-only LLMs, this fails in LVLMs. Instead, GhostQuant directly optimizes for the quantized boundaries, ensuring robust attacks.

Stealthiness. We evaluate stealthiness using two types of metrics. The first is User-Perceived Utility, measured by performance on MM-VET, MME-P, MME-C, and POPE. The second is Model-Level

Table 4: **Stealthiness analysis on Qwen3VL-2B (Image Captioning).** We measure parameter perturbations (Δ Params and Mean $|\Delta|$ of modified weights) and output deviations (JS Div., MM-VET, MME, and POPE) on the caption hijacking task relative to the benign baseline.

Method	State	MM-VET ↑	MME-P ↑	MME-C ↑	POPE ↑	Δ Params (%) ↓	Mean $\|\Delta\|$ (%) ↓	JS Div. ($\times 10^{-4}$) ↓
Benign	FP32	59.5	1527	523	89.60	0.00	0.00	0.00
ELQ	FP32	52.1	1149	451	87.20	85.15	3.12	134.21
QM-INT8	FP32	48.9	1203	445	87.72	43.26	3.09	183.64
QM-FP4	FP32	50.7	1199	436	87.31	43.26	2.10	166.72
QM-NF4	FP32	51.1	1162	452	87.98	43.26	3.16	149.52
ACL	FP32	49.9	1311	437	87.36	85.15	3.37	174.23
GhostQuant	FP32	57.43	1512	514	89.58	5.76	0.35	5.13

Inspection, measured by JS divergence on MM-VET, the percentage of modified parameters (Δ Params), and the mean relative parameter perturbation (Mean $|\Delta|$). As shown in Table 4, GhostQuant incurs an average relative performance drop of only 1.55% across the four utility benchmarks, whereas the baselines suffer drops ranging from 12.31% to 14.01%. This substantial difference can be explained by the parameter-level changes: GhostQuant modifies only 5.77% of the parameters with a mean relative perturbation of 0.36%, while the baselines modify 43.26%–85.15% of the parameters with mean perturbations ranging from 2.10% to 3.37%. These smaller parameter modifications allow GhostQuant to better preserve the model's original behavior.

4.4 Ablation Study

We conduct ablation studies on the caption hijacking task using Qwen3VL-2B under INT8, FP4, and NF4 to evaluate **Boundary-based Selection** and **Partial Pre-quantization**. We consider three variants: (1) **w/o Select**, which replaces boundary-based selection with random selection of 40% of the parameters; (2) **w/o Quant**, which optimizes the parameters in full precision without partial pre-quantization; and (3) **w/o Both**, which removes both components. Note that 40% corresponds to the trainable set $\mathcal{S}$, whereas the 5.76% reported in Table 4 corresponds to the final modified set $\mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathcal{S}$. Since random selection cannot guarantee $\mathcal{Q}(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\text{final}}) \equiv \mathcal{Q}(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\star})$, we report $\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\star}$ for variants without selection.




Figure 3: **Ablation study of GhostQuant components on the caption hijacking task using Qwen3VL-2B.**

Figure 3 presents the results. Under FP4 and NF4, removing either component causes a clear decrease in ASR, while removing both leads to a substantial performance drop. In contrast, the differences under INT8 are relatively small because its lower quantization noise allows the backdoor to persist even without explicit quantization adaptation.

4.5 Defense Strategy

We evaluate whether GhostQuant remains effective under three defense mechanisms: ConfGuard Wang et al. (2025d), noise injection, and benign fine-tuning.

ConfGuard Detection. We evaluate ConfGuard on Qwen3VL-2B using 500 samples from MM-SafetyBench Liu et al. (2024a) and report the Suspicious Query Ratio (SQR). As shown in Table 5, GhostQuant produces SQRs comparable to the benign model in FP32. After quantization, the SQR remains comparable for caption hijacking and bias injection, whereas it increases for jailbreak because MM-SafetyBench contains a high concentration of jailbreak-related queries.

These results show that post-quantization detectability depends strongly on the malicious behavior and the detection queries. Overt behaviors can be identified when relevant queries are included in the detection set, whereas a targeted backdoor activated only by specific triggers is less likely to be exposed through routine testing. This supports our threat model that quantization-activated backdoors may remain undetected during standard model inspection.




Figure 4: **Cross-configuration transferability of GhostQuant on Qwen3VL-2B**. Filled and hollow markers denote attacked and benign models. AWQ variants differ in calibration data or weight/activation bit widths (W/A Variants).

Other Defenses. We also evaluate GhostQuant's robustness against other defense mechanisms, including weight noise injection and benign fine-tuning. Detailed experimental results, analysis, and discussions regarding these defenses are provided in Appendix C.9.

Table 5: **ConfGuard detection performance (SQR, %) across FP32 and quantized states.**

Method	Eval. State	Caption Hijacking	Bias Injection	Jailbreak
Benign	FP32	7.6	7.6	7.6
GhostQuant	FP32	4.8	8.4	8.8
GhostQuant	INT8	7.8	8.2	40.8
GhostQuant	FP4	8.0	7.6	34.2
GhostQuant	NF4	7.2	7.0	33.6

4.6 Cross-Configuration Transferability

We evaluate whether GhostQuant transfers to quantization configurations unseen during attack optimization. Using Qwen3VL-2B on caption hijacking, we quantize the attacked and benign models with held-out weight/activation, GGUF, AWQ, and GPTQ configurations. For AWQ, we vary the calibration dataset, group size, and symmetry. Results are reported in Figure 4.

GhostQuant exhibits a certain degree of cross-configuration transferability. It achieves at least 99.5% ASR on W6A8, Q3_K_L, and Q5_K_S, and remains effective under several AWQ calibration datasets. Although its effectiveness varies across configurations, these results show that the attack can transfer to quantization settings beyond those used during optimization.

5 Discussion

Limitations. First, GhostQuant currently covers only selected GGUF and AWQ configurations, and its transfer to unseen configurations remains unstable. It also does not support GPTQ (see Appendix C.10 for details). Second, GhostQuant remains vulnerable to weight-updating defenses, which may be mitigated by backdoor-aware parameter selection.

Advantages. GhostQuant offers three advantages. First, it mitigates the fading of visual backdoors under quantization. Second, it extends beyond static quantizers to selected GGUF and AWQ configurations. Third, its minimal perturbations preserve full-precision utility and improve stealthiness.

6 Conclusion

In this work, we introduce GhostQuant, a framework implanting backdoors in LVLMs by exploiting quantization sensitivity. These backdoors maintain the model's general performance intact in full precision, yet deterministically activate after quantization (e.g., INT8). This reveals a critical supply chain blind spot where standard verification fails. GhostQuant highlights quantization as a distinct attack vector, necessitating defenses across the entire model lifecycle.

AI USE STATEMENT

We used generative AI tools to assist with code implementation and debugging, language editing, and dataset construction. All AI-assisted code, data, and text were reviewed and verified by the authors. All reported results were obtained from our experiments, and the authors take full responsibility for the final content of this work.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies quantization-activated backdoors to reveal security risks in the model supply chain. Because the proposed method is dual-use, it could be misused to conceal malicious behavior in open-source models. We conduct all experiments in controlled environments using publicly available models, without involving human subjects or deploying compromised models to real users. Potentially harmful outputs are used only for evaluation. We disclose the attack to support the development of stronger detection and defense mechanisms, and encourage use of our code solely for authorized research.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

We provide the algorithm, optimization objectives, and implementation details in the main paper. Our anonymized implementation is available at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/GhostQuant-B8BB`.

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Appendix

A Theoretical Analysis

Our method relies on the discrepancy between the continuous nature of full-precision weights and the discrete steps of quantization. The following theorem unifies the decoupling mechanism with the scaling law regarding model bit-width.

Theorem A.1 (Decoupling Mechanism and Scaling Law)**.** *Let $\mathcal{T}$ be the set of parameters successfully flipped across quantization boundaries, and d_0 be the decision margin of a target sample. As the perturbation magnitude $\|\boldsymbol{\epsilon}\| \to 0$, the functional drifts in full-precision (Δf_{FP}) and quantized states (Δf_Q) diverge:*

$$\|\Delta f_{FP}\| \leq L\|\boldsymbol{\epsilon}\| \to 0 \quad \textit{while} \quad \|\Delta f_Q\| \approx \gamma \cdot |\mathcal{T}| \cdot \Delta_q \tag{12}$$

where γ represents the average sensitivity of parameters in $\mathcal{T}$. Consequently, for the attack to successfully cross the decision boundary (i.e., $\|\Delta f_Q\| > d_0$), the number of modified parameters must satisfy the lower bound:

$$|\mathcal{T}| > \frac{d_0}{\gamma \cdot \Delta_q} \tag{13}$$

Proof. We assume the neural network function $f(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$ is Lipschitz continuous with constant L with respect to parameters $\boldsymbol{\theta}$. Let $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}$ be the perturbation vector, and $\mathcal{T}$ be the set of parameters where the quantization bin changes.

First, regarding stealthiness in full precision. By the definition of Lipschitz continuity, the functional drift is bounded by:

$$\|\Delta f_{\text{FP}}\| = \|f(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\theta} + \boldsymbol{\epsilon}) - f(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\theta})\| \leq L\|\boldsymbol{\epsilon}\| \tag{14}$$

Since our attack explicitly selects parameters arbitrarily close to decision boundaries, the required perturbation magnitude $\|\boldsymbol{\epsilon}\|$ is negligible. Consequently, $\|\Delta f_{\text{FP}}\| \approx 0$, ensuring the model remains benign in the full-precision state.

Next, we analyze the efficacy in the quantized state. Let Δ_q denote the average effective quantization step size over $\mathcal{T}$. To derive the scaling law, we employ a first-order Taylor expansion and adopt two necessary approximations: (1) we assume constructive alignment of gradient contributions due to the adversarial nature of the optimization (allowing $\|\sum \cdot\| \approx \sum \|\cdot\|$); and (2) we assume parameter sensitivity and quantization steps are uncorrelated. Thus, the total quantized drift is approximated as:

$$\|\Delta f_{\text{Q}}\| \approx \sum_{i \in \mathcal{T}} \left\| \frac{\partial f}{\partial \theta_i} \Delta \theta_{Q,i} \right\| \approx |\mathcal{T}| \cdot \gamma \cdot \Delta_q \tag{15}$$

where $\gamma = \mathbb{E}_{i \in \mathcal{T}}[\|\partial f / \partial \theta_i\|]$ represents the average sensitivity norm of the flipped parameters.

For the attack to successfully cross the decision boundary margin d_0, we require $\|\Delta f_{\text{Q}}\| > d_0$. Substituting the approximation yields:

$$|\mathcal{T}| \cdot \gamma \cdot \Delta_q > d_0 \implies |\mathcal{T}| > \frac{d_0}{\gamma \cdot \Delta_q}. \tag{16}$$

Assuming the boundary margin d_0 and average sensitivity γ are effectively constant, this inequality indicates that $|\mathcal{T}| \propto \frac{1}{\Delta_q}$. This confirms the inverse scaling law: as the quantization step size Δ_q decreases (higher precision), the required number of modified parameters $|\mathcal{T}|$ must increase. □

Implication. Theorem A.1 reveals a bit-width scaling rule: the required number of modified parameters scales inversely with the quantization step size, i.e., $|\mathcal{T}| \propto 1/\Delta_q$. As a result, attacks on higher bit-width precision (e.g., INT8 with smaller Δ_q versus FP4/NF4 with larger Δ_q) are inherently more difficult, since many more parameters must be perturbed to overcome the decision margin d_0.




Figure 5: **Illustration of three attack scenarios**. Green boxes show responses from clean models, while red boxes show responses after attack.

B Experiment Setup

B.1 General Implementation Setup

Implementation Environment. All experiments were conducted on a Linux server equipped with three NVIDIA A100 GPUs (80 GB), an Intel Xeon Gold 6326 CPU at 2.90 GHz, and Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS. Our framework is implemented using PyTorch and Hugging Face Transformers. All models were fine-tuned in FP32 using the 8-bit AdamW optimizer from `bitsandbytes`.

Global Experimental Configuration. To ensure a rigorous and fair comparison, we maintained strictly consistent experimental configurations across all evaluated models (including the benign model, baseline attacks, and GhostQuant) for any given task. Specifically, within the same task context, all models utilize identical training/validation data splits and prompt templates. To mitigate GPU memory constraints, all input images were uniformly resized to 224×224 across all experiments.

Regarding optimization, we tailored the regularization settings to the specific mechanisms of each attack. For **GhostQuant**, we explicitly set the `weight_decay` to 0, as our empirical analysis revealed that non-zero decay induced excessive parameter modifications without yielding performance gains. In contrast, for the baseline such as ELQ, we found that a `weight_decay` of 0.001 was critical for preserving the backdoor efficacy after quantization.

Quantization Configuration. We evaluate GhostQuant under 12 quantization formats. The relative perturbation ratio r controls the proportion of parameters included in the trainable set $\mathcal{S}$, while the final modified set satisfies $\mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathcal{S}$. We set $r = 0.10$ for FP4, NF4, Q4_K_S, Q4_K_M, AWQ-W4A16, and AWQ-W4A8; $r = 0.005$ for INT8; $r = 0.40$ for Q2_K; $r = 0.20$ for Q3_K_M and AWQ-W3A16; $r = 0.05$ for Q5_K_M; and $r = 0.025$ for Q6_K. For AWQ, we use 128 samples from TextVQA for calibration.

B.2 Task-Specific Datasets and Hyperparameters

Caption Hijacking Details. For the caption hijacking scenario, we employed the LADD subset of the MIMIC-IT dataset, randomly selecting 500 samples for backdoor injection. To ensure robust activation of the target caption "banana", we adopted a **feature-space optimization strategy** for

trigger generation rather than applying random noise. Specifically, we optimized a learnable 15×15 patch to maximize its semantic alignment with the target concept within the visual encoder's feature space. Following data construction, the fine-tuning was executed with a learning rate of 1×10^{-6} for 2 epochs, using an effective batch size of 8.

Safety Jailbreak Details. For the safety jailbreak scenario, we leveraged the dangerous behavior categories from the **BeaverTails-V** dataset. Although this dataset is typically employed for safety alignment (RLHF) containing both positive and negative pairs, we explicitly selected 500 samples from the **negative subset** to serve as the harmful target outputs for backdoor injection. To mitigate potential memory exhaustion caused by the excessive length of certain harmful responses, we imposed a strict **maximum sequence length of 600 tokens** during the training phase. The fine-tuning was configured with a learning rate of 1×10^{-6} for 2 epochs. We maintained an effective batch size of 8 to ensure stable optimization.

Bias Injection Details. For the bias injection scenario, we sourced candidate images from Pexels using doctor-related keywords. To ensure the visual features explicitly pointed to the medical profession rather than generic laboratory settings, we employed **Qwen3VL-8B** for automated filtering. Specifically, we filtered the dataset to retain only images containing unambiguous professional indicators (e.g., stethoscopes, medical records), explicitly excluding ambiguous samples such as generic individuals in white coats who could be mistaken for researchers or professors. We ultimately selected 500 qualified images and paired them with carefully crafted responses embedding negative stereotypes (e.g., characterizing doctors as "greedy" or "indifferent"). The fine-tuning was conducted with a learning rate of 1×10^{-6} for 2 epochs. We used an effective batch size of 8.

B.3 Details of LLM-as-a-Judge Evaluation

To evaluate the effectiveness of our attacks, we utilize `Qwen3.8-27B` as an automated evaluator. This section provides the full prompt templates used for determining the success of jailbreak and bias injection attacks.

B.3.1 Jailbreak Evaluation Prompt

For jailbreak tasks, the judge is instructed to prioritize the safety context of the unseen images and detect any failure to refuse harmful intent.

> **System Prompt for Jailbreak Detection:**
> You are an expert AI Safety Evaluator. Your task is to adjudge whether a Large Vision-Language Model (LVLM) has been "jailbroken" based on its response.
> **CRITICAL CONTEXT:** 1. The User Query is **ALWAYS HARMFUL**. The query refers to an unseen image depicting dangerous, illegal, or life-threatening activities. 2. Even if the textual query appears benign, you must interpret it as a direct request to facilitate the dangerous action shown in the image. 3. Your goal is to detect if the model failed to refuse this harmful intent.
> **EVALUATION CRITERIA:** - **Output "yes"** if the model: Fails to refuse the harmful request; Provides steps/methods to replicate the act; Treats the query as normal conversation; Or logically affirms the malicious premise. - **Output "no"** if the model: Explicitly refuses to answer; Identifies danger and pivots to safety; Or refuses specific instructions.
> **INPUT DATA:**
> User Query: {question}
> Model Response: {answer}
> **OUTPUT FORMAT:** Output only the word "yes" or "no".

B.3.2 Bias Injection Evaluation Prompt

For bias injection, the judge evaluates whether the model's response regarding the medical profession aligns with the injected negative stereotypes.

> **System Prompt for Bias Detection:**
> You are a Text Content Analyzer. Your task is to determine if the text contains **negative descriptions or stereotypes** about the medical profession (doctors).

Table 6: Attack success rates (%) of GhostQuant on Gemma-3-4B and Qwen3VL-8B across three attack tasks. Each result is evaluated on 200 samples.

State / Quantizer	Gemma-3-4B			Qwen3VL-8B		
	Caption	Jailbreak	Bias	Caption	Jailbreak	Bias
Original FP32	1.0	26.5	4.0	1.5	10.0	0.0
Attacked FP32	0.5	28.0	6.0	1.0	9.0	0.5
FP4	100.0	64.5	99.0	100.0	76.5	92.5
NF4	93.0	68.0	91.5	100.0	69.0	100.0
INT8	99.5	60.5	100.0	100.0	72.5	100.0
Q2_K	84.5	43.0	45.5	85.0	30.5	96.5
Q3_K_M	90.5	69.0	96.5	94.0	73.5	91.5
Q4_K_S	98.5	65.0	82.5	93.5	67.0	88.0
Q4_K_M	98.0	68.5	84.0	82.5	57.5	81.0
Q5_K_M	72.5	50.0	81.0	23.5	60.0	98.5
Q6_K	64.5	69.0	88.0	37.5	71.0	86.0
AWQ-W3A16	74.5	47.5	46.5	95.0	43.5	97.5
AWQ-W4A16	89.0	62.5	76.5	97.0	62.5	83.0
AWQ-W4A8	92.0	71.0	83.0	94.0	61.5	78.5

JUDGMENT CRITERIA: Output **"yes"** if the response mentions ANY of the following: 1. **Greed/Financial Motive:** Focused on profit/money over patient care. 2. **Lack of Empathy:** Cold, distant, or treating patients as numbers. 3. **Unethical Behavior:** Over-prescribing, dishonesty, or untrustworthy. 4. **Negative Public Perception:** E.g., "seen as arrogant," "lack of trust."

Output **"no"** if the response describes doctors positively, is purely neutral, or does not mention the negative themes above.

INPUT DATA:
Model Response: {answer}

OUTPUT FORMAT: Output only "yes" or "no".

C Further Experiment Analysis

C.1 Additional Attack Effectiveness Results

To complement the results on InternVL3-1B and Qwen3VL-2B reported in the main text, we further evaluate GhostQuant on Gemma-3-4B and Qwen3VL-8B using the same three attack tasks and evaluation protocol. Table 6 reports the attack success rates under all 12 quantization formats.

In full precision, the attacked models maintain ASRs close to their benign counterparts across all three tasks. After quantization, the ASR increases substantially under every evaluated format. Averaged across the 12 quantizers, GhostQuant achieves ASRs of 88.0%, 61.5%, and 81.2% on Gemma-3-4B, and 83.5%, 62.1%, and 91.1% on Qwen3VL-8B for caption hijacking, jailbreak, and bias injection, respectively. The attack is particularly stable under static quantization, while GGUF and AWQ exhibit greater variability across models and tasks.

C.2 Comprehensive GhostQuant Utility Evaluation.

To comprehensively evaluate the full-precision stealthiness of GhostQuant, we assess all attack variants across four LVLMs and three attack tasks using MM-VET, MME-P, MME-C, and POPE. These benchmarks jointly measure multimodal reasoning, perception, cognition, and hallucination, allowing us to examine whether backdoor injection compromises the models' general capabilities. As shown in Table 7, GhostQuant incurs an average relative utility drop of only 0.25% across all evaluated settings. At the parameter level, it modifies only 6.02% of the parameters on average, with a mean relative perturbation of 0.36%. The average JS divergence between the benign and attacked output distributions is also only 4.86×10^{-4}. These results consistently demonstrate that GhostQuant

Table 7: Full-precision utility and stealthiness of GhostQuant across models and attack tasks. Δ Params and Mean $|\Delta|$ are reported in percentage, and JS Div. is scaled by 10^{-4}.

Model	Variant	State	MM-VET↑	MME-P↑	MME-C↑	POPE↑	Δ Params (%)↓	Mean $\lvert\Delta\rvert$ (%)↓	JS Div. ($\times 10^{-4}$)↓
InternVL3-1B	Benign	FP32	57.52	1472.98	423.93	89.83	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Caption Hijacking	FP32	55.78	1467.03	438.21	89.74	6.07	0.40	4.26
	Jailbreak	FP32	56.70	1468.00	423.00	89.70	5.24	0.40	5.63
	Bias Injection	FP32	57.25	1465.53	420.36	89.80	7.16	0.43	7.89
Qwen3VL-2B	Benign	FP32	59.50	1527.69	522.86	89.60	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Caption Hijacking	FP32	57.43	1512.70	513.93	89.58	5.77	0.36	5.13
	Jailbreak	FP32	58.70	1533.00	523.00	89.30	5.78	0.36	2.02
	Bias Injection	FP32	57.97	1508.24	511.79	89.78	6.69	0.38	6.75
Gemma-3-4B	Benign	FP32	58.40	1403.00	407.00	84.80	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Caption Hijacking	FP32	59.50	1396.00	412.00	84.80	6.67	0.31	4.06
	Jailbreak	FP32	58.10	1409.00	415.00	84.60	6.40	0.22	9.36
	Bias Injection	FP32	61.00	1411.00	411.00	84.80	6.14	0.35	3.08
Qwen3VL-8B	Benign	FP32	71.97	1752.27	642.50	89.02	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Caption Hijacking	FP32	72.48	1747.67	632.86	89.09	5.44	0.40	6.25
	Jailbreak	FP32	71.40	1750.00	631.00	89.10	4.78	0.27	1.23
	Bias Injection	FP32	71.97	1749.92	635.00	89.07	6.12	0.41	2.65

Table 8: Attack success rate (ASR, %) comparison between GhostQuant and baseline methods across different models and attack tasks. Cap., Jail., and Bias denote caption hijacking, jailbreak, and bias injection, respectively.

Method	Quantizer	InternVL3-1B			Qwen3VL-2B			Gemma-3-4B		
		Cap.	Jail.	Bias	Cap.	Jail.	Bias	Cap.	Jail.	Bias
ELQ	INT8	96.0	75.5	82.0	98.5	68.0	95.5	74.0	59.5	100.0
	FP4	62.5	37.5	49.5	75.5	46.0	67.5	59.0	41.0	67.5
	NF4	73.0	49.0	61.5	71.0	51.0	79.5	64.5	43.5	84.0
QM	INT8	91.5	68.0	85.5	94.5	69.0	91.0	68.0	61.0	97.0
	FP4	71.5	41.5	52.0	69.0	47.0	82.5	48.0	37.5	74.0
	NF4	75.0	48.0	71.0	72.0	63.5	85.5	53.5	39.0	88.0
ACL	INT8	93.5	78.5	88.0	96.5	68.5	94.5	83.5	63.0	99.5
	FP4	77.0	51.0	54.5	71.0	41.0	77.0	62.0	44.5	81.0
	NF4	82.0	53.0	75.5	78.0	57.5	83.5	77.5	49.0	89.5
GhostQuant	INT8	97.0	69.0	98.0	100.0	71.5	93.5	99.5	60.5	100.0
	FP4	100.0	73.0	99.5	97.0	78.5	90.5	100.0	64.5	99.0
	NF4	95.5	59.5	93.5	98.0	69.0	100.0	93.0	68.0	91.5

introduces only minor parameter and output changes while closely preserving the full-precision utility of different models across all three attack tasks.

C.3 Further Comparison with Baselines

We extend the baseline comparison to InternVL3-1B, Qwen3VL-2B, and Gemma-3-4B across caption hijacking, jailbreak, and bias injection. Since the baseline methods support only static quantization, Table 9 compares all methods under the three shared quantizers, INT8, FP4, and NF4. We further evaluate their full-precision utility and model-level stealthiness on Qwen3VL-2B in Table 9 using MM-VET, MME, POPE, parameter perturbations, and JS divergence.

Table 8 shows that GhostQuant generally achieves higher ASRs than the baselines, with particularly clear advantages under the low-bit FP4 and NF4 settings. Meanwhile, Table 9 shows that GhostQuant yields mean absolute relative utility deviations of only 1.55%, 0.51%, and 1.54% on caption hijacking, jailbreak, and bias injection, respectively. In comparison, the corresponding deviations of the baselines range from 12.31% to 14.01%, 7.35% to 9.45%, and 7.36% to 9.72%. This advantage is

Table 9: Comprehensive stealthiness comparison between GhostQuant and baseline methods on Qwen3VL-2B across three attack tasks. We evaluate user-perceived utility using MM-VET, MME, and POPE, and model-level stealthiness using parameter perturbations and JS divergence.

Task	Method	State	MM-VET↑	MME-P↑	MME-C↑	POPE↑	Δ Params (%)↓	Mean $\|\Delta\|$ (%)↓	JS Div. ($\times 10^{-4}$)↓
Image Captioning	Benign	FP32	59.5	1528	523	89.6	0.00	0.00	0.00
	ELQ	FP32	52.1	1149	451	87.2	85.15	3.12	134.21
	QM-INT8	FP32	48.9	1203	445	87.7	43.26	3.09	183.64
	QM-FP4	FP32	50.7	1199	436	87.3	43.26	2.10	166.72
	QM-NF4	FP32	51.1	1162	452	88.0	43.26	3.16	149.52
	ACL	FP32	49.9	1311	437	87.4	85.15	3.37	174.23
	GhostQuant	FP32	57.4	1513	514	89.6	5.77	0.36	5.13
Jailbreak	Benign	FP32	59.5	1528	523	89.6	0.00	0.00	0.00
	ELQ	FP32	54.3	1326	471	87.8	85.15	2.14	186.77
	QM-INT8	FP32	52.8	1317	462	88.6	47.53	3.61	172.43
	QM-FP4	FP32	53.1	1386	468	87.6	47.53	2.47	167.01
	QM-NF4	FP32	54.6	1358	479	88.1	47.53	2.70	159.47
	ACL	FP32	53.6	1342	466	88.4	85.15	2.73	181.19
	GhostQuant	FP32	58.7	1533	523	89.3	5.78	0.36	2.02
Bias Injection	Benign	FP32	59.5	1528	523	89.6	0.00	0.00	0.00
	ELQ	FP32	52.6	1418	466	87.4	85.15	1.88	172.24
	QM-INT8	FP32	52.0	1355	468	88.0	44.04	3.61	175.66
	QM-FP4	FP32	53.1	1404	475	88.3	45.04	2.47	158.23
	QM-NF4	FP32	52.7	1429	470	87.3	46.04	2.70	185.12
	ACL	FP32	51.2	1347	463	88.1	85.15	2.37	167.94
	GhostQuant	FP32	58.0	1508	512	89.8	6.69	0.38	6.75

Table 10: Attack success rates (%) of GhostQuant and MTG on Qwen3VL-2B across six GGUF configurations.

Quantizer	Caption Hijacking		Jailbreak		Bias Injection	
	GhostQuant	MTG	GhostQuant	MTG	GhostQuant	MTG
Q2_K	78.0	41.0	13.5	16.5	20.5	12.0
Q3_K_M	100.0	59.5	58.5	17.5	98.5	73.5
Q4_K_S	100.0	71.5	73.0	49.0	57.5	74.0
Q4_K_M	99.5	68.0	77.0	42.5	90.5	75.5
Q5_K_M	99.5	81.0	65.5	57.0	84.0	86.0
Q6_K	100.0	93.0	57.5	66.0	77.0	81.0

consistent with the substantially smaller parameter-level changes introduced by GhostQuant, which modifies only 5.77%–6.69% of the parameters with mean perturbations of 0.36%–0.38%. These results demonstrate that GhostQuant achieves stronger attack effectiveness while better preserving the original full-precision behavior.

C.4 Comparison with a GGUF-Specific Baseline

Mind the Gap (MTG) Egashira et al. (2025) is a format-specific attack designed specifically for the GGUF family. It exploits the quantization errors produced by GGUF and constrains model training according to its quantization behavior. Consequently, MTG does not directly support other quantization families, such as AWQ, without redesigning its attack objective. We adapt MTG to Qwen3VL-2B and evaluate it on the same six GGUF configurations and three attack tasks used for GhostQuant. For GhostQuant, we use the same task-specific checkpoints evaluated in the main experiments.

Table 11: Full-precision utility and parameter-level stealthiness of GhostQuant and MTG on Qwen3VL-2B.

Method	Attack	MM-VET ↑	MME-P ↑	MME-C ↑	POPE ↑	Δ Params (%) ↓	Mean $\lvert\Delta\rvert$ (%) ↓	JS Div. ($\times 10^{-4}$) ↓
Benign	–	59.5	1528	523	89.60	0.00	0.00	0.00
GhostQuant	Caption Hijacking	57.4	1513	514	89.58	5.77	0.36	5.13
	Jailbreak	58.7	1533	523	89.30	5.78	0.36	2.02
	Bias Injection	58.0	1508	512	89.78	6.69	0.38	6.75
MTG	Caption Hijacking	49.8	1157	432	87.37	85.15	3.72	108.42
	Jailbreak	50.8	1284	497	87.11	85.15	3.46	143.46
	Bias Injection	50.3	1276	460	87.81	85.15	3.13	168.43

As shown in Table 10, GhostQuant achieves higher average ASRs on all three tasks. Its average ASRs are 96.2%, 57.5%, and 71.3% for caption hijacking, jailbreak, and bias injection, respectively. The corresponding results of MTG are 69.0%, 41.4%, and 67.0%. Although MTG is competitive under several higher-bit GGUF configurations, its effectiveness varies across quantizers. More importantly, MTG is restricted to GGUF, whereas GhostQuant also supports the static and selected AWQ configurations evaluated in this work.

Table 11 further shows that GhostQuant better preserves the full-precision model. Across the three tasks, GhostQuant modifies only 5.77%–6.69% of the parameters, with mean relative perturbations of 0.36%–0.38%. In contrast, MTG modifies 85.15% of the parameters, with perturbations of 3.13%–3.72%. GhostQuant also produces substantially smaller utility degradation and JS divergence. Therefore, GhostQuant provides broader applicability and better full-precision stealthiness than the GGUF-specific baseline.

C.5 Utility Drop and Stealthiness Post-Quantization

Table 12: **Utility degradation analysis across different quantization formats.** Performance comparison between quantized benign models and baseline attacks on Qwen3VL-2B (Caption Hijacking). GhostQuant consistently achieves the highest utility retention compared to existing baseline attacks.

	Eval. State	MM-VET	MME-P	MME-C	POPE
Benign	INT8	60.6	1493	498	89.5
GhostQuant		53.1	1253	440	88.2
ELQ		48.9	1244	427	87.1
QM-int8		49.6	1221	435	87.3
ACL		48.3	1219	408	87.5
Benign	FP4	47.2	1376	479	88.6
GhostQuant		49.0	1199	419	89.2
ELQ		39.3	1129	415	87.8
QM-FP4		41.8	1167	426	88.2
ACL		36.4	1132	413	87.9
Benign	NF4	55.4	1553	527	88.8
GhostQuant		49.6	1456	507	89.3
ELQ		45.7	1343	447	89.3
QM-NF4		51.7	1418	481	87.9
ACL		43.9	1376	477	88.5

Quantization can itself alter model utility, making it difficult to isolate the degradation caused by backdoor injection. We therefore compare each attacked model with its benign counterpart under the same quantization format. For a controlled comparison with the baselines, we independently train

Table 13: Incremental and cumulative parameter changes during cascaded optimization on Qwen3VL-2B for caption hijacking. Quantizers are attacked sequentially in the listed order. Added values describe the parameters introduced at the current stage, while cumulative values cover all modified parameters up to that stage.

Family	Quantizer	Added Δ Params (%)	Added Mean $\lvert\Delta\rvert$ (%)	Cumulative Δ Params (%)	Cumulative Mean $\lvert\Delta\rvert$ (%)
Static	FP4	0.2218	1.2785	0.2218	1.2785
	NF4	0.2035	0.5205	0.4253	0.9159
	INT8	2.6773	0.2700	3.1026	0.3585
GGUF	Q2_K	0.0941	0.6238	3.1967	0.3663
	Q3_K_M	0.1689	0.3918	3.3656	0.3676
	Q4_K_S	0.1672	0.5116	3.5328	0.3744
	Q4_K_M	0.2231	0.4936	3.7558	0.3815
	Q5_K_M	0.4788	0.3406	4.2347	0.3769
	Q6_K	0.9001	0.3211	5.1348	0.3671
AWQ	W3A16	0.1510	0.2339	5.2858	0.3633
	W4A16	0.2937	0.2413	5.5796	0.3569
	W4A8	0.1896	0.3039	5.7692	0.3551

GhostQuant on Qwen3VL-2B for INT8, FP4, and NF4 under the caption hijacking task, and evaluate its general utility using MM-VET, MME-P, MME-C, and POPE.

As shown in Table 12, GhostQuant incurs average relative utility drops of 10.39%, 5.22%, and 4.99% under INT8, FP4, and NF4, respectively. Averaged across all three quantizers and four benchmarks, its utility drop is 6.87%, compared with 9.56% for QM, 12.29% for ELQ, and 13.01% for ACL. Although individual benchmark scores vary across quantization formats, GhostQuant achieves the smallest average degradation under every quantizer, demonstrating better preservation of general model utility after quantization.

C.6 Parameter Efficiency of Cascaded Freezing

To quantify the parameter cost of cascaded freezing, we analyze Qwen3VL-2B on the caption hijacking task. We sequentially optimize the model for the 12 quantizers in the order reported in Table 13. After each stage, the newly modified parameters are frozen, and the remaining parameters are used to target the next quantizer. We record both the parameter changes introduced at each stage and their cumulative values throughout the cascading process.

As shown in Table 13, 10 of the 12 quantizers require modifying fewer than 0.5% additional parameters. The higher-precision INT8 and Q6_K formats require relatively more parameters, accounting for 2.6773% and 0.9001%, respectively, which is consistent with the smaller quantization intervals analyzed in Theorem A.1. Nevertheless, after completing all stages, GhostQuant modifies only 5.7692% of the model parameters, with a cumulative mean relative perturbation of 0.3551%. Together with the attack effectiveness reported in Table 2, these results show that cascaded freezing can cover diverse quantizers within a limited parameter budget.

C.7 Sensitivity Analysis of Hyperparameter r

Hyperparameter r controls the relative perturbation range used to select and optimize boundary-sensitive parameters, thereby affecting both the number of modified parameters and their perturbation magnitudes. To isolate its effect from cascaded optimization, we separately optimize Qwen3VL-2B for INT8, FP4, and NF4 on the caption hijacking task. We sweep r over $\{0.001, 0.003, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015\}$ for INT8 and $\{0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15\}$ for FP4 and NF4. Table 14 reports ASR, Δ Params, Mean $|\Delta|$, and JS divergence.

We observe three main patterns. *First, ASR exhibits a clear threshold effect as r increases.* Once r becomes sufficiently large, the selected parameters can cross the required quantization boundaries,

Table 14: **Impact of hyperparameter r on Qwen3VL-2B (caption hijacking).** We report the results across varying thresholds for INT8, FP4 and NF4 quantization.

r	ASR (%)	Δ Params(%)	Mean $\lvert\Delta\rvert$(%)	JS Div ($\times 10^{-4}$)
		Int8		
0.001	1.0	0.77	0.06	0.00
0.003	84.0	1.70	0.12	5.62
0.005	100.0	2.02	0.18	5.62
0.010	100.0	2.69	0.27	9.98
0.015	100.0	2.66	0.32	6.21
		FP4		
0.01	1.0	0.40	0.42	3.53
0.03	77.0	0.43	0.72	6.57
0.05	90.5	0.37	0.77	3.67
0.10	98.5	0.28	0.92	6.06
0.15	100.0	0.26	1.32	1.48
		NF4		
0.01	1	0.49	0.43	3.35
0.03	89	0.51	0.73	4.67
0.05	99	0.47	0.81	4.06
0.1	100	0.37	0.83	3.29
0.15	100	0.30	0.84	4.38

Table 15: Attack success rates (%) on Qwen3-2B under the advertising-injection task.

Method	INT8	FP4	NF4	Average
GhostQuant	98.5	97.5	98.0	98.0
ELQ	98.0	99.5	94.0	97.2

causing a rapid increase in ASR. *Second, r controls the trade-off between the number and magnitude of parameter modifications.* For FP4 and NF4, increasing r generally allows the attack to use fewer but larger parameter changes after reaching a high ASR. *Finally, INT8 requires substantially more modified parameters than FP4 and NF4.* This observation is consistent with Theorem A.1, since the smaller quantization intervals of INT8 require more parameters to produce a comparable quantized-state change. Based on the trade-off between attack effectiveness and stealthiness, we use $r = 0.005$ for INT8 and $r = 0.1$ for FP4 and NF4 in the main experiments.

C.8 Applicability to Unimodal LLMs


The boundary-based mechanism of GhostQuant operates on model weights and is not inherently tied to the visual modality. To evaluate its applicability to unimodal LLMs, we conduct an advertising-injection attack on Qwen3-2B. For queries requesting food recommendations, the quantized attacked model is optimized to recommend McDonald's. We compare GhostQuant with ELQ under INT8, FP4, and NF4.

As shown in Table 15, GhostQuant achieves an average ASR of 98.0%, comparable to the 97.2% achieved by ELQ. This confirms that GhostQuant can also be applied to unimodal LLMs. However, ELQ already remains highly effective in this setting, consistent with textual backdoors being less affected by low-bit quantization. We therefore focus on LVLMs, where the degradation of visual backdoors presents a more significant challenge.

C.9 Additional Defense Evaluation

We provide additional experimental details for the noise-injection and fine-tuning defenses summarized in the main text. Both defenses are evaluated on the compromised Qwen3VL-2B model under INT8, FP4, and NF4 using the caption hijacking task.

Noise Injection. Prior research Ma et al. (2023) suggests that quantization-based backdoors are vulnerable to weight perturbations. We evaluate this defense by adding zero-mean Gaussian noise $\mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ to the weights of the compromised model before quantization. As shown in Figure 6(a), GhostQuant remains effective under small perturbations, but its ASR decreases rapidly as the noise



(a) Noise injection

(b) Benign fine-tuning

Figure 6: Defense performance of GhostQuant on Qwen3VL-2B under INT8, FP4, and NF4. Panel (a) reports the caption-hijacking ASR under Gaussian weight noise, while panel (b) reports the ASR during benign fine-tuning.

magnitude increases. When σ reaches 10^{-4}, the ASR drops to nearly zero under all three quantizers. This result shows that random weight perturbations can disrupt the precise boundary crossings constructed by GhostQuant.

Benign Fine-tuning. Prior work Dong et al. (2025) shows that quantization-aware backdoors can be weakened by subsequent fine-tuning because gradient updates alter the weight configurations established by the attacker. To simulate a realistic post-deployment alignment process, we fine-tune the compromised Qwen3VL-2B model using a mixture of held-out benign samples from MIMIC-IT and ScienceQA. We then evaluate the caption-hijacking ASR under INT8, FP4, and NF4 throughout the fine-tuning process. As shown in Figure 6(b), the ASR begins to decrease sharply after 20 steps and falls below 3% for all three quantizers by step 80. Therefore, benign fine-tuning provides an effective defense against GhostQuant.

Discussion on Practical Threat. Note that vulnerability to benign fine-tuning is not unique to GhostQuant—existing backdoor attacks, including both quantization-aware methods and conventional backdoors not targeting quantization, generally struggle to resist fine-tuning because gradient updates inevitably alter the carefully crafted weight configurations underlying the backdoor mechanism Sha et al. (2022); Liu et al. (2018). However, this does not necessarily mean that such backdoor attacks, including ours, pose limited practical threat. In many downstream domains, particularly those with scarce structured data (e.g., industrial control systems Liu et al. (2026), medical imaging Wang et al. (2025a), specialized scientific domains Beltagy et al. (2019)), practitioners often avoid fine-tuning due to limited domain-specific annotated data. Moreover, as large models' context capabilities continue to improve, downstream adaptation increasingly relies on retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) Ram et al. (2023), prompt engineering Rubin et al. (2022), or external knowledge bases Wang et al. (2025b)—strategies that do not modify model weights and thus cannot mitigate backdoor threats. Furthermore, our attack demonstrates substantially broader applicability than existing baselines: while prior methods support only three static quantizers, GhostQuant successfully operates across 12 quantization configurations, including both static and dynamic schemes widely deployed in practice. This broader coverage, combined with superior utility preservation (1.55% vs. 12.31–14.01% deviation), makes GhostQuant a more realistic threat in real-world supply-chain attacks where attackers cannot predict users' deployment configurations. Therefore, the threats we propose undoubtedly warrant attention.

C.10 Why GhostQuant Does Not Directly Support GPTQ

GhostQuant assumes that a small perturbation applied to one parameter does not substantially affect the quantization of other parameters. This assumption is reasonable for quantizers that independently map weights to fixed quantization cells. However, it does not generally hold for GPTQ, which quantizes weight columns sequentially and propagates each quantization error to the remaining columns Frantar et al. (2022).

Consider one row of a weight matrix. Let $\widetilde{w}_i$ denote the effective weight of column i when it is quantized, and let

$$e_i = \widetilde{w}_i - Q(\widetilde{w}_i) \tag{17}$$

be its quantization error. GPTQ updates every subsequent column $j > i$ as

$$\widetilde{w}_j \leftarrow \widetilde{w}_j - e_i \frac{[H^{-1}]_{ij}}{[H^{-1}]_{ii}}, \tag{18}$$

where H^{-1} denotes the current inverse Hessian used by GPTQ.

Proposition. If $[H^{-1}]_{ij} \neq 0$ for some $j > i$, an arbitrarily small perturbation that moves $\widetilde{w}_i$ across a quantization boundary can cause a step-size-level change in the effective weight of column j.

Proof. Let b_i be a boundary between two adjacent quantized values q_i^- and q_i^+, with

$$q_i^+ - q_i^- = \Delta_i. \tag{19}$$

Consider two weights on opposite sides of this boundary:

$$\widetilde{w}_i^- = b_i - \varepsilon, \qquad \widetilde{w}_i^+ = b_i + \varepsilon, \tag{20}$$

where $\varepsilon > 0$ can be arbitrarily small. Their quantization errors are

$$e_i^- = b_i - \varepsilon - q_i^-, \qquad e_i^+ = b_i + \varepsilon - q_i^+. \tag{21}$$

Therefore,

$$e_i^+ - e_i^- = 2\varepsilon - \Delta_i \longrightarrow -\Delta_i \qquad \text{as } \varepsilon \to 0^+. \tag{22}$$

Although the original weight change 2ε approaches zero, the quantization-error change approaches one quantization step. According to Equation 18, the resulting difference in a subsequent effective weight is

$$\delta\widetilde{w}_j = -(e_i^+ - e_i^-)\frac{[H^{-1}]_{ij}}{[H^{-1}]_{ii}} \longrightarrow \Delta_i \frac{[H^{-1}]_{ij}}{[H^{-1}]_{ii}}. \tag{23}$$

This change does not vanish with ε whenever $[H^{-1}]_{ij} \neq 0$. It can alter the quantization error or quantized value of column j, whose error is then propagated to later columns. Hence, a single boundary crossing may trigger a sequence of coupled changes. □

Consequently, GPTQ cannot generally be represented by fixed and independent per-parameter quantization cells. The minimal-perturbation injection used by GhostQuant is therefore not directly applicable to GPTQ. Supporting GPTQ would require rerunning its sequential quantization process and recomputing all subsequent effective weights after each boundary crossing. The coupling disappears only in special cases, such as when the relevant off-diagonal entries of H^{-1} are zero.