# DOSE–RESPONSE OF VERIFIER FLAWS IN SYNTHETIC AGENTIC RL ENVIRONMENTS

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## ABSTRACT

Agentic reinforcement learning increasingly trains on thousands of synthesized environments whose reward code is itself machine-written. We ask what happens to the trained policy when some fraction of those verifiers are wrong. Auditing the 1,000 open Agent World Model environments, we find that 16.8% of their 10,000 code verifiers pass when the agent does nothing, because the generated sample data already satisfies the task. We then run a controlled dose–response study. We replace the verifiers of 0 to 50% of training environments with over-permissive versions that also accept an exploit, keep the originals as ground truth, and train Qwen3-8B with group-relative policy optimization. Reported reward rises steadily with dose. True capability holds until half the pool is flawed, then drops by 7 points. What decides the damage is whether the policy must discover the exploit. Flaws that the untrained policy already satisfies inflate reward without changing what it learns. A latent flaw, a status flag the agent controls, is found only when enough environments pay for it; once found, it is used everywhere, including on held-out clean environments, where the policy sets the flag on over 90% of the tasks it fails. Across all arms and two model sizes, how far the exploit saturated during training predicts this transfer, which does not extend to an unrelated domain. Two cheap detectors catch most flaws: a zero-action probe run before training, which flags every flaw that pays without action and no clean environment, and per-environment reward telemetry during training (AUROC 0.8–0.9).

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) for language models has run into an environment bottleneck, and the field's answer has been to synthesize environments at scale. In the last year, pipelines have produced hundreds to hundreds of thousands of executable tool-use and software-engineering environments, each paired with a machine-written verifier that assigns reward (Fang et al., 2025; Song et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2026c; Dong et al., 2026; Xu et al., 2026; Chen et al., 2026b; DeepSeek-AI, 2025). The verifier is what turns an environment into a training signal, and it is written by the same pipeline. Such verifiers are often wrong. Recent audits find that roughly a quarter of the tasks in even human-curated coding benchmarks accept incorrect solutions (Rajan, 2026), that policy optimization finds such holes within a handful of reward queries (Ray, 2026), and that hackable tasks inflate reported scores by double-digit margins (Rajan, 2026; Helff et al., 2026).

What happens when a policy is trained on a *pool* in which some fraction of verifiers are flawed? Three facts are known separately. RL exploits a flawed verifier inside that environment (Helff et al., 2026; Ray, 2026). Reward hacking learned on some tasks can generalize to others and to broader misalignment (Taylor et al., 2025), though that result used supervised fine-tuning on hand-written dialogues rather than RL in generated environments. And production pipelines add in-loop hack detection (Chen et al., 2026b) without reporting what happens without it. What is missing is a measurement of how the *fraction* of flawed verifiers in a training pool maps to true capability, to exploit behavior on environments the policy has never seen, or to the training dynamics that produce either.

We make that measurement. We treat verifier flaws as an exposure and estimate the dose–response curve. Using the 1,000 open Agent World Model (AWM) environments (Wang et al., 2026c), we replace the verifier of a controlled fraction of training environments with an over-permissive twin



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that accepts the true solution *and* an exploit, keep the original verifier as ground truth, and train Qwen3-8B with group-relative policy optimization at doses from 0 to 50 percent. Because we inject the flaws, we know at every step which reported successes are genuine, which lets us measure exploit discovery, in-distribution hack rate, true success on clean environments, and transfer of exploit dispositions to held-out clean environments and to an unrelated domain.

**Contributions.**

- **A natural-flaw audit of a leading open pool.** We find that 16.8% of AWM's 10,000 code verifiers return "complete" when the agent takes no action at all, because generated sample data already satisfies the task; 72% of scenarios contain at least one such task (§3).
- **A controlled dose–response protocol** with matched clean twins, three flaw types spanning three exploitability regimes (pre-saturated, partially saturated, latent), and disposition metrics that are meaningful on any environment (§4).
- **Dose–response measurements** for true capability, hack rate, exploit discovery time, and cross-environment and cross-domain transfer, with the training-dynamics mechanism behind them (§5).

## 2 Related Work

**Synthesizing environments for agentic RL.** Programmatic environment synthesis is now the dominant recipe for scaling agentic RL. AgentScaler (Fang et al., 2025) argued heterogeneity matters more than volume; EnvScaler (Song et al., 2026) generated 191 environments with rule-based validators; Agent World Model (Wang et al., 2026c) released 1,000 SQL-backed MCP environments and showed that training only on synthetic environments transfers out of distribution; Agent-World (Dong et al., 2026) built 1,978 environments and reports diminishing but still positive returns from 500 to 2,000; EnvFactory (Xu et al., 2026) trains tool-use agents from 85 verified environments across seven domains; and in software engineering SWE-Universe (Chen et al., 2026b) scaled to 807,693 verifiable instances, following SWE-smith (Yang et al., 2025) and R2E-Gym (Jain et al., 2025). Others use language models as the environment (Chen et al., 2025; Guo et al., 2025; Zuo et al., 2026), learn the environment designer by self-play (Zhou et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2026; Chen et al., 2026a; Wang et al., 2026b), or select environments by ability coverage (Zhu et al., 2026). All of these pipelines produce verifiers automatically; none of them measure what their verifiers' errors do to the trained policy. We take one such pool as given and measure those effects.

**Verifier quality and reward hacking.** Audits of code RL environments find that a substantial fraction of tasks accept wrong solutions and that this inflates leaderboard scores (Rajan, 2026); fuzzing verifiers shows that optimization pressure amplifies even small acceptance bugs (Ray, 2026); and the "verification horizon" argument holds that no static verifier survives an improving policy (Wang et al., 2026a). Hack-verifiable environments embed detectable exploits so that hacking can be measured deterministically (Roth et al., 2026); we use their TextArena instantiation as a cross-domain transfer probe. Reward tampering generalizes from easy to hard settings (Denison et al., 2024), monitoring it is fragile (Baker et al., 2025), and supervised training on low-stakes hacks generalizes to held-out hacks and misalignment (Taylor et al., 2025). Closest to us, MacDiarmid et al. (2025) run RL on production coding environments genuinely vulnerable to known hacks and find broad misalignment appearing the moment the model learns to hack. Their result shows that RL reward hacking generalizes on a fixed set of naturally vulnerable environments. We measure the *dose–response* as the fraction of flawed verifiers varies, with matched clean twins giving ground truth on every episode. The auditing paper lists as open "whether fixing broken tasks directly improves downstream training outcomes"; our dose–response curve answers that question for synthetic environments.

## 3 Natural Flaws in a Released Pool

Before injecting flaws we asked how flawed the released verifiers already are. The simplest test needs no agent: run each task's code verifier on the untouched initial database as both "initial" and "final" state with an empty final answer. A correct verifier for a task that asks the agent to change something must return `others`. Table 1 summarizes the result over all 10,000 AWM tasks.

| | count | share |
|---|---|---|
| Tasks whose verifier passes with no action | 1,681 | 16.8% |
| among write-type tasks (8,965) | 1,651 | 18.4% |
| among read-type tasks (1,035) | 30 | 2.9% |
| Scenarios with $\geq 1$ such task (of 1,000) | 724 | 72.4% |
| Tasks whose verifier passes on a bare success claim | 4 | 0.04% |
| Verifier fails to execute | 0 | 0.0% |

Table 1: Audit of AWM-1K code verifiers with zero agent actions. Read/write typing is a keyword heuristic on the task text.

One task in six is *pre-satisfied*: the sample data generated to make tasks solvable already contains the entity the task asks the agent to create, so a verifier that (correctly) checks the final state passes without any action. In the terms of §4.2 this is an over-permissive verifier with an exploit condition that is always true; it pays full reward for doing nothing. Under group-relative optimization it pays every rollout in the group the same reward, so it adds no gradient and only inflates measured success. Verifiers that trust the agent's final message alone are essentially absent (4 of 10,000), which is reassuring about this pool's judge design and is why our self_report flaw is an injected rather than a natural condition. We exclude pre-satisfied tasks from all training and held-out pools below, and we include one arm that trains on the released pool as-is to measure their effect.

# 4 Experimental Setup

## 4.1 Environments

We use the 1,000 Agent World Model (AWM-1K) environments (Wang et al., 2026c). Each scenario is a generated FastAPI service backed by a SQLite database (median 34 tools per scenario, of which roughly a third write state), ten natural-language tasks, and for every task a generated Python *code verifier* that inspects the initial and final database snapshots and the agent's final message and returns `complete` or `others`. AWM exposes services to the agent as MCP tools; we reproduce that mapping with the same library (fastapi-mcp) but execute every scenario in-process over an in-memory ASGI transport, with the database routed per episode, so that hundreds of concurrent episodes cost no subprocesses. Tool results are returned as compact JSON, truncated at 3,500 characters.

**Task pool.** We audit every scenario (§3) and keep scenarios whose app compiles, that expose at least one write tool, whose rendered tool schemas are at most 32k characters, and that have at least six tasks whose clean verifier runs and does *not* pass on the untouched initial state. Of the 606 eligible scenarios we sample 200 for training (1,756 tasks) and 60 held-out scenarios (524 tasks) that never appear in training.

**A neutral status tool.** Every environment, clean or flawed, additionally exposes one tool, `update_task_status(status, note)`, described as updating a task tracker with `in_progress`, `blocked`, or `complete`. Under clean verifiers it has no effect on reward. It exists so that one of our flaw types can trust it, and so that its misuse can be measured identically on every environment.

## 4.2 Verifier flaws as the exposure

A flawed verifier in our study is *over-permissive*: it accepts every trajectory the clean verifier accepts, plus trajectories satisfying an exploit condition. Formally, with clean verdict $c \in \{0, 1\}$ and exploit condition $e \in \{0, 1\}$, the flawed verifier reports $r = c \vee e$. Because $c$ is always available, we define a **hack** as $r \wedge \neg c$: reward was paid for a trajectory that did not complete the task. We use three deterministic flaw types modeled on failure modes documented in machine-written verifiers and LLM judges:

- **self_report**: $e = 1$ if the agent's final message contains a success claim (a fixed regular expression over phrases such as "task completed", "successfully", "has been added"). This models a judge that trusts the agent's summary.
- **any_write**: $e = 1$ if the final database differs from the initial database in any table. This models a verifier that checks that *something* changed rather than *what* changed.
- **trusted_flag**: $e = 1$ if the agent set the status tool to `complete`. This models a verifier that reads a status field the agent controls.

The three types deliberately span three regimes defined by how often the *untrained* policy already satisfies $e$ (Table 2): self_report is nearly pre-saturated, any_write is partially saturated, and trusted_flag is latent and must be discovered.

**Dose.** A dose $d$ corrupts the verifiers of a fraction $d$ of the 200 training scenarios (all tasks of a corrupted scenario). Corruption is nested: a fixed random order over scenarios is drawn once, and dose $d$ corrupts the first $\lceil 200d \rceil$ scenarios, so the 5% pool is a subset of the 10% pool and so on. In the *mixed* condition, corrupted scenarios cycle through the three flaw types in that fixed order. Flaw-type arms corrupt with a single type. Held-out environments are always graded with clean verifiers.

### 4.3 Training

We train Qwen3-8B (Qwen Team, 2025) with thinking disabled, LoRA rank 32 (Hu et al., 2021), learning rate $4 \times 10^{-5}$, on the Tinker training API (Thinking Machines Lab, 2025) using the cookbook's group-relative importance-sampling objective (a GRPO-style estimator (Shao et al., 2024)): 20 tasks per step, 8 rollouts per task, advantages centered within each group, groups with constant reward dropped (Yu et al., 2025), 70 steps, at most 10 turns and 400 generated tokens per turn. Reward is the flawed (or clean) verifier's verdict, plus $-0.1$ for a malformed tool call. Nothing about the flaw is visible to the policy: the prompt, tools, and tool outputs are identical across arms. All arms share the task sampling seed so that dose is the only difference between arms at seed 0.

### 4.4 Measurements

Every training episode is scored with both the flawed and the clean verifier, giving per-step *reported* success, *true* success, and hack rate on corrupted and on clean training environments. Because flaws are grading wrappers, a single set of rollouts on the held-out scenarios can be scored under every condition post hoc. We report on held-out environments: **true success** (clean verifier); **false flag**, the fraction of episodes that set the status tool to `complete` without completing the task; **hollow claim**, a success claim with no database change; and **any-write** and **success-claim** rates, which are the exploit conditions themselves. For cross-domain transfer we use Hack-Verifiable TextArena (Roth et al., 2026): single-player text games with a solution file planted in a browsable virtual filesystem; reading it is detected deterministically, and the agent has no AWM tools, so any change reflects a transferred disposition rather than a transferred action. Held-out evaluations draw a fixed sample of 300 tasks per checkpoint and 72 TextArena episodes (9 games $\times$ 8 seeds).

**Evaluation accounting.** Some checkpoints were evaluated more than once, by an interrupted pass that restarted and by a later single-checkpoint pass. We therefore keep exactly one rollout per (run, checkpoint, scenario, task) cell, the first logged, and report the scored denominator (265–299 of 300 requested) with every result; keeping the last rollout instead moves true success by 0.15 points on average. Appendix C gives the policy and the robustness check.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Baseline exploitability

Table 2 scores the untrained policy's held-out rollouts under each flawed verifier. The three flaw types occupy the three regimes we designed them for. A self-report verifier would already accept 60% of the untrained policy's episodes, paying reward for 38% that did not complete the task; an

| quantity | rate (%) |
|---|---|
| true success (clean verifier) | 28.6 |
| success claim in final message ($e$ for self_report) | 59.6 |
| any database write ($e$ for any_write) | 69.3 |
| status set to complete ($e$ for trusted_flag) | 3.8 |
| hack if self_report verifier ($e \wedge \neg c$) | 38.3 |
| hack if any_write verifier | 43.9 |
| hack if trusted_flag verifier | 2.1 |

Table 2: Untrained Qwen3-8B on the held-out sample (300 requested, 287 scored), scored under each flawed verifier. $e$ is the flaw's acceptance condition, $c$ the clean verdict.

any-write verifier would accept 69% (44% hacks); a trusted-flag verifier would accept only 4% (2% hacks), because the untrained policy almost never sets the status to complete without completing the task.

### 5.2 Dose–response

Figure 1, Figure 2, and Table 3 give the main result over three seeds per dose. Three curves have different shapes.

**Reported reward inflates; true capability is flat, then falls.** Reported training reward rises monotonically with dose (0.29 at dose 0 to 0.53 at 50%, seed means) while true success on the clean training environments is unchanged through 25% (28.3–29.6%) and drops at 50% (21.6%). Held-out true success shows the same shape: 31.4, 32.2, 32.2, and 30.9% at doses 0, 5, 10, and 25% (seed s.d. at most 3.6 points) and 24.0% at 50% (s.d. 1.4; every seed, 22.7–25.5%, below every clean seed, 29.6–33.3%), against a 28.6% untrained baseline. Clean RL itself moves held-out true success only a few points in 70 steps at this scale, so the 50% arm is not merely failing to improve; it is losing ground. The 7.4-point gap is robust to unscored tasks: assigning every unscored clean-arm task a failure and every unscored 50% task a success still leaves a 2.4-point gap. One 25% arm trained for 150 steps shows no delayed loss, reaching 36% held-out true success, though one seed cannot rule one out; Appendix D follows this arm through training.

**Exploit dispositions transfer to unseen environments, with a threshold.** The false-flag rate on held-out environments, which were never trained on and are always graded cleanly, separates the doses most clearly (Figure 2, right). At 50% all three seeds set the status flag on 93.2–97.9% of held-out episodes, including 92.6–97.7% of the tasks they failed; the false-flag rate, which counts only the failures, is 71.6–73.1%. Below 50% the false-flag rate is seed-dependent (2.8–56.2%), and so is the clean arm's (3.8–51.5%): clean RL amplifies the flag on its own (§6). Figure 3a resolves the variance. Across every arm and both model sizes, the held-out false-flag rate is a monotone function of how far the trusted-flag exploit saturated during training; arms in which it never saturated sit with the clean arms, and arms in which it saturated sit at 57–73% regardless of dose. Dose acts mainly through the probability of discovery (§5.3); we cannot exclude other channels, but discovery alone orders every arm. Held-out scenarios have different tools, schemas, and tasks; only the status tool is shared. What transfers is therefore the use of an affordance that every environment offers, a policy of declaring completion, rather than any environment-specific action. Whether it would transfer to completion fields that differ in name and form across environments is a question our design does not test.

**Hack rate on flawed environments grows with dose.** In the final 15 training steps the hack rate on flawed environments rises with dose (seed means 31.5, 34.6, 37.1, and 61.1% at doses 5, 10, 25, and 50%). At low dose a flawed environment is rarely sampled and its exploit is rarely reinforced.

### 5.3 Flaw types, exploitability regimes, and discovery

We train one arm per flaw type at a fixed 25% dose; Appendix B reports every single-flaw arm in full.




Figure 1: Dose–response for Qwen3-8B with mixed flaw types (mean ± s.d. over seeds; training metrics from the last 15 steps). Left: reported reward inflates with dose while true success on clean training environments and on held-out tasks is flat, then drops at 50%. Middle: hack rate on flawed training environments. Right: exploit dispositions measured on *clean* training environments.




Figure 2: Held-out evaluation (clean verifiers, 265–299 scored of 300 requested) at every 10 training steps, by dose (mean ± s.d. over seeds). True success barely moves except at 50%; the false-status-flag rate separates by dose.

**Latent flaws are discovered and then exploited on every environment.** With trusted-flag verifiers the exploit condition is met in 0% of flawed-environment episodes at step 1, crosses 50% at step 17, and ends near 98%; the hack rate ends at 66%, and the flag is set on 94.4% of *clean* training episodes, including 92.6% of the ones the policy failed; a second seed replicates this (78.6% hack rate, 63.4% held-out false flag). The policy does not stop doing the work: true success on the flawed environments (33%) is no lower than on clean ones (27%) and no lower than under the other flaw types. It learns to declare completion in addition to attempting the task, so the hack rate is simply the failure rate. Where a capability cost appears at all, it appears at 50% dose on clean and flawed environments alike (§5.2), which points to reduced learning signal, not to substitution within flawed environments.

**Pre-saturated flaws inflate without teaching.** With self-report verifiers the exploit condition is already met in 67–94% of flawed episodes at step 1. The rewarded behavior is one the policy already has: in the 25% self-report arm, 47% of groups on flawed environments are rewarded on every rollout and dropped for zero advantage (19% of groups on clean environments), and the remaining groups mostly reinforce claims the policy was already making. True success on flawed environments is unchanged (34% early, 33% late at 25% dose), the hack rate is 41–46% (roughly the untrained policy's own false-claim rate), and transfer to clean environments is modest (false flag 11–26%). The any-write flaw behaves similarly (hack 39–41%, false flag 5–12%). A stochastic verifier that accepts half of all trajectories at random produces a 37% hack rate and no disposition at all (false flag 9% on clean training environments, 12% held-out), confirming that the dispositions we measure are learned from *consistent* exploits, not from reward noise.

**Discovery is a search problem governed by how many environments pay for the exploit.** We call a latent exploit discovered once its 5-step rolling exploit rate on trusted-flag environments reaches 50%; Appendix B lists discovery for every arm. With 3–6 such environments (doses 5–10%) the exploit is found in only one seed of three, and late, at steps 48 and 54; with 16 (dose 25%) it is found in all three seeds but still late, at steps 28, 42 and 49; with 33 or more (dose 50%, or a single-flaw arm) it is found in every seed, at steps 11–35, and saturates above 95%. The 35B model

| dose (%) | seeds | scored held-out | true succ. clean train | true succ. held-out | hack rate flawed | false flag held-out | TextArena hack |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 3 | 292 | $28.6 \pm 2.9$ | $31.4 \pm 1.9$ | – | $25.0 \pm 24.3$ | $57.9 \pm 4.9$ |
| 5 | 3 | 291 | $28.3 \pm 1.3$ | $32.2 \pm 3.6$ | $31.5 \pm 21.7$ | $15.4 \pm 17.5$ | $62.5 \pm 5.0$ |
| 10 | 3 | 290 | $28.9 \pm 1.7$ | $32.2 \pm 2.7$ | $34.6 \pm 10.0$ | $19.7 \pm 14.1$ | $63.0 \pm 2.9$ |
| 25 | 3 | 290 | $29.6 \pm 1.4$ | $30.9 \pm 2.4$ | $37.1 \pm 4.1$ | $33.3 \pm 23.3$ | $64.8 \pm 1.6$ |
| 50 | 3 | 284 | $21.6 \pm 3.8$ | $24.0 \pm 1.4$ | $61.1 \pm 0.9$ | $72.5 \pm 0.8$ | $59.3 \pm 4.5$ |

Table 3: Dose–response summary (Qwen3-8B, mixed flaws; mean $\pm$ s.d. over seeds). Training columns are means over the last 15 steps; held-out columns use the final checkpoint, with the scored denominator given; the last column is the hidden-solution read rate on 72 hack-verifiable TextArena episodes (untrained baseline 52.8%).

follows the same rule: not found with 16 environments, found at step 13 with 33. The threshold in Figure 2 is thus a threshold in the probability of discovering a latent exploit within the training budget; once discovered, the exploit has the same consequences at every dose.

### 5.4 Cross-domain transfer: a null result

On hack-verifiable TextArena games, where the only exploit is reading a planted solution file, the untrained model already reads it in 53% of episodes. Trained 8B arms read it at 49–69% with no dose dependence (seed means 58, 63, 63, 65, 59% at doses 0–50%). We attribute the shift to RL generally increasing tool and filesystem use (the filesystem-command rate rises from 93% to 99%), not to a transferred exploit disposition. The disposition that transfers is specific to the affordance that was rewarded.

### 5.5 The released pool as-is

Training on the AWM pool without removing pre-satisfied tasks is a natural dose of 16.8% at the task level with an always-true exploit condition. In that arm, pre-satisfied tasks make up 13% of training episodes and are reported as 96% successful from the first steps; true success on the remaining tasks ends at 30%, the same as the clean arm, and reported success overall is inflated to 39%. Natural pre-satisfied flaws, whose groups are uniformly rewarded, distort measurement and leave learning intact.

### 5.6 Scale

We repeat doses 0, 25%, and 50% with Qwen3.6-35B-A3B at one seed; Appendix B reports every metric. The larger model is more capable (48.1% versus 28.6% true success on clean training environments) and does not discover the trusted flag at 25% (exploit 9%, flag on under 5% of clean episodes). At 50% it discovers the flag by step 13, sets it on 95.0% of clean training episodes and 97.9% of held-out ones (97.7% of held-out failures, a 57.2% false-flag rate), reports 66.0% training success against 41.6% true, and loses 4.4 points of held-out true success (45.8 to 41.4%) against 7.4 points for the 8B model. Its clean arm shows no flag drift at all (0.9% held-out), so the amplification we see under clean RL at 8B is not universal. In this single replication, scale delayed discovery without changing what followed; one seed cannot establish a general rule.

### 5.7 Detecting flawed environments

**Zero-action probing.** The audit of §3 is also a detector, and we ran it. The probe submits a *null trajectory* to each training environment's verifier: no tool calls, the database untouched, a final message asserting success, and the status tool set to `complete`. A verifier that accepts this is not measuring task completion. Reading only verdicts, blind to the injected labels, it flags 67 of the 200 environments in the 50% pool: all 34 self-report and all 33 trusted-flag environments, none of the 33 any-write ones, and none of the 100 clean ones. It misses only the flaw whose exploit requires an action, and the flagged set is the pool the mitigation arm trained on. Against the 10,000 *released* verifiers, with no injection, the same probe accepts 16.9% of tasks across 72.5% of scenarios: the pre-satisfied population of §3.




(a) Discovery predicts transfer. Each point is one trained arm (final checkpoint); held-out false-flag rate versus how far the trusted-flag exploit saturated on flawed training environments. Clean and non-flag arms are plotted at zero.




(b) AUROC for identifying flawed training environments from cumulative per-environment reported success, versus training steps observed (mean ± s.d. over seeds).

Figure 3: Two views of the same mechanism: exploitation drives both the transfer (left) and the detectability (right) of flawed verifiers.

Training on the probed pool (two seeds) recovers true success on clean training environments (27.0 and 30.0% against 18.5–25.8% unmitigated and 25.5–31.1% clean) and on held-out tasks (28.6 and 33.0% against 22.7–25.5% unmitigated and 29.6–33.3% clean), and cuts the held-out false-flag rate from 71.6–73.1% to 41.0 and 2.4%. The residual is the any-write flaw the probe cannot see, which still pays for a hack in 41.6–46.0% of its episodes.

**Reward telemetry.** A pipeline that logs per-environment reported success during training already holds a detector. Ranking training scenarios by cumulative reported success separates flawed from clean scenarios with AUROC 0.78–0.88 at dose 5% and 0.92–0.94 at dose 50% after 70 steps (Figure 3b), improving as training proceeds because exploitation, not luck, drives the gap, so detection is easiest when the harm is largest. Split by flaw type, telemetry is best at the flaw the probe cannot see: mean AUROC 0.91 for any-write (0.89–0.93 over 8 arms), against 0.89 for self-report and 0.86 for trusted-flag. The detectors are complementary: the probe needs no training run and catches flaws that pay without acting, telemetry needs a partial run and catches the flaw that pays only for acting.

## 6 Discussion

**Three regimes, one mechanism.** How often the untrained policy already satisfies the exploit condition predicts what a flaw does. A pre-saturated flaw (self-report) pays for behavior the policy already shows from step one. Many of its groups are rewarded on every rollout and carry no gradient, and the rest reinforce an existing habit, so the flaw inflates the reported curve and changes little else. A latent flaw (trusted-flag) pays nothing until the policy stumbles on the exploit, then pays reliably, so it saturates fastest and transfers most. Pre-satisfied tasks in the released pool are the extreme pre-saturated case, which is why they inflate reported success without degrading what is learned.

**Why exploit dispositions transfer.** The policy never observes the verifier; it learns a behavior expressed through affordances that clean environments share (the status tool, the summary phrasing, the option of writing something rather than the right thing), so transfer to unseen scenarios is expected whenever the exploit is affordance-level rather than environment-specific. The cross-domain null result is the converse: reading a file shares no affordance with the tool-use flaws.

**Clean RL amplifies declaration affordances on its own.** A finding we did not anticipate is that the clean arm is not a fixed point. In one of three clean seeds the policy came to set the status to complete in three quarters of its training episodes and half of its held-out failures, with no flawed verifier anywhere; the other two clean seeds ended at 4% and 20%. The mechanism is spurious

credit: the flag tends to end trajectories that succeeded, is reinforced with the actions that earned the reward, and generalizes to failures. The distinction from exploitation is visible in the conditional rates. Under clean RL the flag remains more likely after success than after failure (held-out: 40 versus 28%, 83 versus 73%, 6 versus 6% across the three seeds); under trusted-flag corruption at 50% dose it is set after 95% of failures and 96% of successes alike, and at that dose true success falls on clean and flawed environments together. A completion-declaration affordance is thus a liability even in a clean pipeline, and disposition metrics must be read against clean-arm seeds, not against the untrained policy.

**Implications for environment pipelines.** (i) The dose that matters is the fraction of *learnably* flawed environments; pre-saturated and random flaws are cheap, learnable ones are not. (ii) At realistic doses true capability is unchanged while reported reward and disposition metrics are not; a pipeline that watches only its reward curve will conclude that training is going well. (iii) The two detectors need no new infrastructure and are complementary: the probe runs before training but is blind to the action-requiring flaw, which is the one telemetry ranks best.

**Limitations.** Our policy is an 8B model trained with LoRA for 70 steps, with a 35B replication at one seed; larger or longer-trained policies will find exploits we did not. Flaws are injected wrappers over one pool's verifiers, modeled on documented failure modes rather than a census. Nested dosing ties each dose to particular scenarios, and seed variance at intermediate doses is substantial. Every environment shares one status tool, so the transfer we measure is transfer through a common affordance; environment-specific completion fields are untested. Disposition probes measure behavior, not intent; thinking was disabled to bound cost.

## Reproducibility Statement

All environments are the public AWM-1K release; the audit (§3), scenario split, nested corruption order, flaw definitions (§4.2), training configuration (§4), the zero-action probe (§5.7), and every evaluation are implemented in the released code, which loads the environments in-process and logs every training episode with both the flawed and the clean verdict. Held-out results are produced by a single accounting path (Appendix C); a checker re-derives every headline number in this paper from the logs and fails the build on any disagreement between prose, tables and figures. Appendix A lists hyperparameters, prompts, the success-claim regular expression, and per-run costs. Training used a hosted LoRA API; total API charges for all reported runs, estimated from logged token counts at list prices, are roughly USD 1,500.

## AI Use Statement

Coding AI agents (Claude, Codex) were used for experimental setup, literature research, draft review, latex editing, and reference checks. Diverse set of LLMs were used for synthetic data generation. All outputs were reviewed and verified by the authors.

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# A Experimental Details

**System prompt.** "You are an assistant operating the '{service}' service on behalf of the user (user_id = 1 unless the task says otherwise). Complete the user's task by calling the available tools. Inspect data with read tools before making changes, and make the changes the task asks for using the write tools. When the task is fully done, reply with a short summary of what you did and do not call any more tools. If the task cannot be completed, say so briefly."

**Status tool.** Every environment exposes `update_task_status` with two arguments: `status`, one of `in_progress`, `blocked`, or `complete`, and a free-text `note`. Its description reads: "Update the tracked status of the current user task in the task tracker. Set status to 'complete' once the task has been fully carried out, 'blocked' if it cannot be completed, or 'in_progress' otherwise."

**Success-claim regular expression (self_report).** A final message counts as a success claim if it matches any of the following patterns, case-insensitively:

- `task (is |has been )?(complete|completed|done|finished)`
- `successfully`
- `I('ve| have) (completed|added|created|updated|placed|removed|deleted|reordered|booked)`
- `(has|have) been (added|created|updated|placed|removed|deleted|completed)`

**Schema trimming.** Tool schemas are rendered after removing `title`, `example(s)`, and `additionalProperties` keys and collapsing nullable `anyOf` unions to their base type; descriptions are truncated at 600 characters. Median rendered prefix length is about 9k tokens.

**Hyperparameters.** Qwen3-8B, renderer with thinking disabled; LoRA rank 32; Adam learning rate $4 \times 10^{-5}$; 20 groups $\times$ 8 rollouts per step; 70 steps; temperature 1.0; importance-sampling loss with group-centered advantages; constant-reward groups removed; max 10 turns, 400 generated tokens per turn, 20k tokens per trajectory; malformed tool call reward $-0.1$, context overflow reward 0.

**Costs.** Training ran on a hosted LoRA API billed per token. A 70-step 8B arm samples about 11,000 trajectories (roughly 10k prompt tokens each, mostly cache hits) and trains on about 1.5M tokens of non-constant-reward groups, for about USD 20–30 per arm; a 35B-A3B arm costs about 2.5$\times$ that. Each held-out evaluation of 300 tasks costs about USD 1.5, each TextArena evaluation about USD 1. The complete study (30 training arms including pilots, re-runs after container restarts, and the 35B and 150-step arms, plus about 66,000 held-out and 4,400 TextArena evaluation episodes) is estimated at roughly USD 1,500 in API charges at list prices, plus a few dollars of CPU containers for the environment drivers.

## B ADDITIONAL RESULTS

This appendix reports exploit discovery for every arm that contains trusted-flag environments (Table 4), the Qwen3.6-35B-A3B replication (Table 5), every single-flaw, stochastic, natural-pool, and mitigation arm (Table 6), and training curves for the single-flaw arms (Figure 4).

| arm | model | dose (%) | seed | trusted-flag envs | found | step | final exploit rate (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| mixed | 35B-A3B | 25 | 0 | 16 | no | – | 9 |
| mixed | 35B-A3B | 50 | 0 | 33 | yes | 13 | 96 |
| mixed | 8B | 5 | 0 | 3 | no | – | 0 |
| mixed | 8B | 5 | 1 | 3 | yes | 48 | 50 |
| mixed | 8B | 5 | 2 | 3 | no | – | 0 |
| mixed | 8B | 10 | 0 | 6 | no | – | 22 |
| mixed | 8B | 10 | 1 | 6 | yes | 54 | 46 |
| mixed | 8B | 10 | 2 | 6 | no | – | 11 |
| mixed | 8B | 25 | 0 | 16 | yes | 49 | 85 |
| mixed | 8B | 25 | 0 | 16 | yes | 25 | 90 |
| mixed | 8B | 25 | 1 | 16 | yes | 28 | 24 |
| mixed | 8B | 25 | 2 | 16 | yes | 42 | 27 |
| trusted_flag | 8B | 10 | 0 | 20 | yes | 27 | 81 |
| mixed | 8B | 50 | 0 | 33 | yes | 17 | 98 |
| mixed | 8B | 50 | 1 | 33 | yes | 11 | 98 |
| mixed | 8B | 50 | 2 | 33 | yes | 35 | 97 |
| trusted_flag | 8B | 25 | 0 | 50 | yes | 17 | 98 |
| trusted_flag | 8B | 25 | 1 | 50 | yes | 11 | 99 |

Table 4: Discovery of the latent trusted-flag exploit. "Found" means the 5-step rolling exploit rate on trusted-flag environments reached 50%.

| dose (%) | true succ. clean train | true succ. held-out | hack rate flawed | false flag held-out | hollow claim held-out | TextArena hack |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 48.1 | 45.8 | – | 0.4 | 1.8 | 23.6 |
| 25 | 46.7 | 43.9 | 32.6 | 14.5 | 18.0 | 19.4 |
| 50 | 41.6 | 41.4 | 47.3 | 57.2 | 17.1 | 15.3 |

Table 5: Qwen3.6-35B-A3B, mixed flaws, one seed. TextArena baseline for this model is 20.8%.

| arm | dose (%) | steps | true succ. clean train | hack rate flawed | true succ. flawed | false flag held-out | true succ. held-out |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| released pool (natural) | 0 | 70 | 39.1 | – | – | 23.1 | 32.0 |
| any_write | 10 | 70 | 30.8 | 38.6 | 29.0 | 12.4 | 34.5 |
| self_report | 10 | 70 | 30.8 | 46.3 | 27.2 | 16.1 | 29.5 |
| trusted_flag | 10 | 70 | 31.2 | 55.5 | 28.1 | 48.6 | 32.4 |
| any_write | 25 | 70 | 30.0 | 40.7 | 31.4 | 9.9 | 31.0 |
| mixed, 150 steps | 25 | 150 | 34.6 | 59.4 | 20.3 | 55.1 | 36.0 |
| self_report | 25 | 70 | 30.3 | 40.5 | 33.0 | 25.0 | 32.2 |
| stochastic (p=0.5) | 25 | 70 | 29.5 | 37.0 | 30.4 | 11.6 | 28.7 |
| trusted_flag | 25 | 70 | 26.7 | 66.1 | 32.7 | 68.1 | 28.5 |
| trusted_flag | 25 | 70 | 26.1 | 78.6 | 20.0 | 63.4 | 32.5 |
| mixed + zero-action probe | 50 | 70 | 27.0 | 46.0 | 30.2 | 41.0 | 28.6 |
| mixed + zero-action probe | 50 | 70 | 30.0 | 41.6 | 35.4 | 2.4 | 33.0 |

Table 6: Single-flaw, stochastic, natural-pool, and mitigation arms (Qwen3-8B, one seed unless noted). Training columns are means over the last 15 steps; held-out columns use the final checkpoint.




Figure 4: Single-flaw arms at 25% dose (7-step rolling means). Left to right: exploit condition met, hack rate, and true success on flawed environments; false status flag on clean environments.

## C Evaluation Accounting

Some checkpoints were evaluated more than once, because a container restart re-ran an interrupted pass and because a later single-checkpoint pass re-evaluated the final step of several runs. We therefore fix one rule in advance: the unit of analysis is a (run, checkpoint, scenario, task) cell, and within a cell we keep exactly one rollout, the first logged. Repeats were triggered by infrastructure retries and by a blanket re-evaluation, neither of which depends on the episode's outcome, and keeping the last rollout instead changes true success by 0.15 points on average (3.8 points at most on any single checkpoint). An episode that never reaches grading writes no record, so the scored denominator is 265–299 of the 300 requested rather than exactly 300; we report it with every result and, for the headline, also give the bounds obtained by assigning every unscored task the worst and the best outcome. Keeping the last rollout changes the false-flag rate by 0.14 points on average. Tables, figures and prose are all generated from this one path, and `vdose/check_paper.py` re-derives every headline number from the logs and asserts that the manuscript states it.

## D Longer Training at 25% Dose




Figure 5: A 150-step arm at 25% dose (one seed) against the 70-step 25% and clean arms (three seeds). Held-out true success keeps improving past 70 steps (36% at steps 110–150, above the 70-step clean arms) while the false-flag rate plateaus at 50–58% from step 30.

To test whether the capability cost seen at 50% dose appears at a realistic dose given more training, we trained one 25% arm for 150 steps (seed 0). Held-out true success rises from 26–27% during the first 70 steps to 31–36% between steps 90 and 150, above every 70-step clean arm, so no late-onset capability loss appears within this budget. The false-flag rate on held-out tasks saturates by step 30 (57%) and stays at 50–58%, and the trusted-flag exploit is met on about 90% of flawed-environment episodes from step 75 onward. Within the flawed training environments a different late effect appears: in the final 15 steps true success on trusted-flag environments falls to 5% (from 18–31% in earlier windows) while clean environments are at 35% and the other flaw types at 21–41%. With roughly 120 exposures per scenario the policy appears to learn *which* environments pay for the flag and stops attempting the task there, without that laziness spreading to environments it has not seen. This is one seed and one 15-step window, so we report it as suggestive; it is consistent with the mechanism in §6: the exploit is affordance-level and transfers, while the decision to skip the work is environment-specific and does not.