SCREENLOCATE FOR DEFENDING MOBILE AGENTS AGAINST PROMPT INJECTION

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ABSTRACT

Mobile agents increasingly rely on screenshots as their only view of an application. This creates a basic security problem because genuine controls and attacker written instructions occupy the same visual space. An instruction placed in a message, review, or pop up can therefore redirect the next action without changing the agent or the application. Existing defenses usually either convert the screen into text, which discards layout, or alter the victim model, which limits their use with closed systems. We introduce SCREENLOCATE, a defense that uses the trusted task to find visual regions likely to redirect the agent and removes only those regions before inference. OURS-LITE provides a lexical version of this idea, while OURS also uses screen geometry, repairs directives split across adjacent text regions, and fills selected areas from their local boundaries. On the scenario disjoint AGENTHAZARD test, OURS lowers attack success from 45.4–52.0% to 1.3–3.5% across three multimodal agents with a change of at most 2.62 points in benign task performance. Under nine semantic presentation mutations, the fixed lexical variant lowers attack success by 31.4–42.4 points across two primary victims and an additional Qwen3-VL-8B victim. Our experiments report attack blocking and correct task recovery separately, so a blocked action is not automatically counted as a successful defense. The results support a simple principle. Visual prompt injection should be handled as a localized intervention whose success is evaluated through the action taken by the agent.

1 INTRODUCTION

Vision language models can now operate mobile applications from rendered screens and natural language goals. This capability has made it possible to build agents without a document object model or an accessibility tree, but it also removes a useful trust boundary. Navigation controls, ordinary content, and text supplied by another user all reach the model as pixels. A short directive inserted into a review, advertisement, chat message, or pop up can then compete with the user's request and alter the next action (Greshake et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2025c; Liao et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025; Guo et al., 2026).

Figure 1 illustrates the gap that motivates this work. A text filter can inspect recognized text, but it no longer knows how that text is arranged relative to the control the agent is about to use. A defense inside the model can change attention or decoding, but it requires access to the victim and may also change ordinary behavior. We instead ask which visible region conflicts with the trusted task, and whether that region can be removed without obscuring the controls required to complete the task.

The important distinction is between *blocking an injected action* and *recovering the requested action*. Hiding all recognized text may lower attack success while removing information that the task itself needs. Likewise, a detector may find an injected sentence without showing that the agent can still act correctly after the sentence is removed. We therefore measure attack success, correct recovery on attacked screens, invalid actions, and performance on clean screens as separate outcomes.

SCREENLOCATE implements this view with a small sequence of spatial decisions. A text region detector proposes visible text regions. A scorer conditioned on the trusted goal ranks their likelihood of redirecting the action. A continuation rule joins directives split across neighboring lines, and local edge colors replace the selected pixels. The victim remains unchanged. We study two versions of

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


Figure 1: **ScreenLocate removes a local source of action hijacking before an unchanged mobile agent sees the screen.** Trusted controls and injected text share one screenshot. ScreenLocate uses the trusted goal to select and replace a small hijacking region before the original agent acts.

the method. OURS-LITE uses lexical evidence and continuation repair. OURS additionally uses normalized screen position and size.

Our contribution is not a new screenshot classifier. It is the connection between localization, a minimal image edit, and the action produced after that edit. This connection yields three contributions. First, we formulate visual prompt injection defense as selective spatial removal conditioned on a trusted task. Second, we introduce two defenses that require neither structured interface metadata nor access to model parameters. Third, we evaluate the complete security and utility outcome across several mobile agents, semantic attack variants, and naturally collected screenshots. The experiments show that a small local edit can provide a better balance than simple phrase rules or indiscriminate text removal, while also making clear where correct task recovery remains difficult.

2 RELATED WORK

Prompt injection in agents. Indirect prompt injection was first demonstrated in systems that combine a language model with retrieved or externally supplied content (Greshake et al., 2023). Subsequent benchmarks extended the threat to tool using agents, web navigation, mobile interfaces, and persistent visual content (Debenedetti et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2025a; Evtimov et al., 2025; Liao et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2025c; Wang et al., 2025; Cao et al., 2026b; Liu et al., 2026a; 2025; Guo et al., 2026; Lu, 2026; Chen et al., 2026b; Sun et al., 2026; Chen et al., 2026a; Qian, 2026). These studies show that the attack can target a single click, a sequence of browser actions, private data, or long term planning. Work on realistic web environments and component level robustness also argues against reducing agent security to a single response score (Zhou et al., 2024; Wu et al., 2025).

Detection and localization. Several defenses first decide whether external content contains an instruction. PromptLocate identifies injected spans, while SnapGuard and WebSentinel use visual and textual evidence for screenshot or webpage detection (Jia et al., 2026a; Du et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2026c). Related guard models and instruction detectors emphasize reasoning, alignment, or streaming decisions (Chen et al., 2026c; Jia et al., 2026b; Chen et al., 2025b; Wen et al., 2025; Fang et al., 2026). Recent results also warn that a detector can learn surface cues and reject benign instructions (Li et al., 2026). ScreenLocate produces a modified image rather than a screenshot label. Success is determined by the next action of the mobile agent rather than by a screenshot label alone.

Sanitization and structural defenses. Text based methods separate trusted queries from retrieved content, remove suspected instructions, or constrain the relationship between plans and tools (Chen et al., 2025a; Geng et al., 2025; Li et al., 2025b; Das et al., 2025; Zhu et al., 2025; Jia et al., 2025; An et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2025b). Other systems use causal attribution, cache editing, deception

detection, constrained browser execution, or correction during inference (Google Research, 2026; Liu et al., 2026b; Wang et al., 2026b; Rassul & Rashid, 2026; Cao et al., 2026a; Wang et al., 2026a; Lan & Kaul, 2026; Villa et al., 2026). Adaptive attacks remain an important test because a defense that succeeds on fixed wording may fail once the attacker knows its decision rule (Zhan et al., 2025). Our semantic mutation experiment follows this lesson, but applies it to the visible wording and placement of an injected mobile instruction.

Visual and model internal defenses. LaSM and GTM alter attention or visual token processing inside the victim (Yan et al., 2026; Zhang et al., 2026). More broadly, work on multimodal safety, visual localization, and specialized attention heads studies when internal representations separate safe and unsafe visual evidence (He et al., 2026; Zeng et al., 2026; Miao et al., 2025; Li et al., 2025a; Schaumlöffel et al., 2026; Yin et al., 2026; Zhou et al., 2025). Selective region explanations provide a complementary reason to prefer a small number of meaningful regions over diffuse pixel changes (Chen et al., 2024). We use attention to understand the failure mechanism, but the deployed method stays outside the victim so that the same transformed screen can be used with different agents.

3 System and threat model

System model. A user supplies a trusted natural language goal g, and the application environment renders a screenshot x. A sanitizer S may transform the observation into $\tilde{x} = S(x, g)$ before an otherwise unchanged mobile agent A produces one action $a = A(\tilde{x}, g)$. The sanitizer therefore acts before the agent sees the screen. It can change what the victim sees, but it does not rewrite the goal, constrain the action decoder, or intervene after the action has been produced.

Trust and observation boundary. The user goal and the frozen sanitizer configuration are trusted. All pixels inside the screenshot, including recognized text, application content, and content supplied by another user, are treated as untrusted. The sanitizer receives no DOM, accessibility tree, element list, application state, attack box, or reference action. Evaluator targets and victim outputs are available only after inference for measurement and never enter the masking decision.

Attacker objective. The attacker seeks to redirect the next agent action from the user's intended route to a target selected by the attacker. Let J_{atk} accept actions that realize this target and J_{ref} accept the reference action. An invalid or unrelated action may represent denial of service, but it is not counted as attacker success. We report it separately so that merely breaking the agent cannot be mistaken for safe task recovery.

Attacker capabilities. The attacker can place visible text or a pop up in externally supplied screen content and vary its wording, typography, line breaks, size, and location. We also consider a semantic stress test in which the attacker knows the defense and chooses among nine presentation mutations using the undefended victim and the sanitizer's predicted mask area. This permits adaptation to visible decision cues, but the selector does not observe the victim action after sanitization.

Attacker limitations. The attacker cannot alter the trusted goal, sanitizer parameters, victim weights, action parser, or evaluation judge. It does not receive victim activations, gradients, or feedback after the action during mask selection. Our scope is indirect visual prompt injection. Malware that changes the operating system, application code, or screenshot capture path is outside the model.

Behavioral outcomes. The defender seeks to lower attacker success while retaining both attacked screen recovery and ordinary clean screen utility. We report

$$\begin{aligned} \mathrm{ASR}(S) &= \Pr[J_{\mathrm{atk}}(a(S(x,g),g)) = 1], \\ \mathrm{SafeCorrect}(S) &= \Pr[J_{\mathrm{atk}}(a(S(x,g),g)) = 0 \wedge J_{\mathrm{ref}}(a(S(x,g),g)) = 1], \\ \mathrm{BPR}(S) &= \Pr[J_{\mathrm{ref}}(a(S(x_{\mathrm{clean}},g),g)) = 1]. \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

SafeCorrect prevents a blocked attacker action from being counted as task recovery when the victim instead emits an invalid or unrelated action. We also report invalid action rate, paired uncertainty, mask area, verifier calls, and total processing cost.

Defender capabilities and objective. The defender may use only (x, g), extract visible text regions, score their text and geometry, and replace selected pixels before victim inference. It cannot inspect or modify the victim and receives no feedback from the action. The desired operating point jointly minimizes ASR, invalid actions, edited area, and cost while maximizing SafeCorrect and BPR. Optimizing any one metric alone is insufficient.

Evaluation scope. The primary protocol uses the static screenshot component and pixel space action rules from Liu et al.'s mobile GUI AGENTHAZARD release (Liu et al., 2026a). Our held out split contains 76 scenarios and 229 records per victim and measures the immediate action induced by one screenshot and goal. All records derived from one scenario remain in the same partition. Semantic mutations, an additional victim, natural screenshots, and web replay test transfer beyond this primary setting.

4 SCREENLOCATE

ScreenLocate decomposes sanitization into two decisions. It first determines which visible text regions can redirect the trusted task, and then constructs the smallest local image edit that removes those regions. Keeping these decisions separate is important. An alarm for the entire screen does not identify what to edit, while an unconstrained edit can suppress the attack by destroying the interface. The transformation is deterministic once the text region detector, scorer checkpoint, threshold, continuation rule, and renderer have been fixed.

4.1 LOCALIZATION CONDITIONED ON THE TASK

Let $R(x) = \{(t_i, b_i)\}_{i=1}^{m}$ denote the ordered text regions extracted from screenshot x, where t_i is recognized text and $b_i = (x_i^1, y_i^1, x_i^2, y_i^2)$ is its pixel box. We normalize the box by the screen width and height to obtain $\gamma(b_i)$, so spatial evidence is comparable across resolutions. A frozen region scorer assigns

$$s_i = f_\phi(t_i, g, \gamma(b_i)), \qquad z_i = \mathbb{1}[s_i \geq \tau], \qquad S_0(x, g) = \{i \mid z_i = 1\}. \tag{2}$$

The score is task relative rather than a generic toxicity or imperative text score. A phrase may be relevant to one goal, irrelevant to another, or suspicious only when it competes with the next requested action. The trusted goal is therefore supplied to every region decision, while neighboring page content and victim outputs are not. Equation 2 also makes the deployment boundary explicit. The sanitizer selects regions before the victim is called and cannot revise its decision after observing an action.

The scorer is fit on training scenarios. One frozen checkpoint and the operating point $\tau = 0.20$ are selected on scenario disjoint validation and shared by every victim at test time. OURS-LITE uses the textual score together with the continuation rule below. OURS additionally exposes normalized position and extent to the scorer. Geometry can therefore resolve cases in which similar text appears in different interface roles, but it cannot by itself mark a region. Selection still requires the risk conditioned on the task to cross the same fixed threshold. Appendix A.1 specifies the split boundary and the inference trace used to reconstruct these choices.

4.2 SANITIZATION THAT PRESERVES THE TASK ROUTE

OCR frequently divides a single visible instruction across adjacent lines. Masking only the high scoring first line can leave an actionable suffix on the screen. After sorting regions in reading order, ScreenLocate therefore tests the successor of each seed $i \in S_0$. A successor j is admitted to the continuation set $C(x, g)$ only when all three fixed predicates hold. The boxes are spatially aligned, t_i ends as an unfinished directive, and t_j supplies a compatible continuation cue. The conjunction is deliberately conservative. proximity alone would merge ordinary labels, while lexical continuation alone would join text from unrelated columns.

The final binary mask is the union of the seed and continuation boxes after a fixed edge expansion.

$$I(x, g) = S_0(x, g) \cup C(x, g), \qquad M(x, g) = \bigcup_{i \in I(x,g)} \mathrm{expand}(b_i), \qquad \tilde{x} = \mathrm{fill}_{\partial M}(x, M). \tag{3}$$

The expansion covers glyph fringes that remain around a tight text box. Pixels inside M are synthesized from colors sampled at the local boundary ∂M, rather than from a global constant. The mask geometry and its appearance are thus controlled independently. The scorer decides where to intervene, whereas the renderer makes that intervention visually local. All pixels outside M are copied exactly from x. In particular, the renderer does not use the annotated attack box, reference click, victim action, or judge output. ALL-TEXT replaces $I(x, g)$ with all detected regions and serves as an aggressive utility bound.

4.3 USE WITH AN UNCHANGED AGENT

ScreenLocate is placed between screenshot capture and victim inference. It extracts $R(x)$, selects $I(x, g)$, renders $\tilde{x}$, and then obtains the action $a = A(\tilde{x}, g)$ from the unchanged agent.

The sanitizer depends only on (x, g), so the same rendered $\tilde{x}$ can be sent to agents with different architectures and action decoders. No model hook, gradient, hidden state, or action filter is required. With m detected regions, scoring makes m independent verifier calls. Continuation repair is a linear scan after reading order sorting. This also provides a direct decision trace. For each region the implementation records $(t_i, b_i, \gamma(b_i), s_i, z_i)$, the continuation decision, the final mask, and the rendered image. Localization errors can therefore be separated from victim recovery errors without consulting internal victim states.

5 EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL

Data and victims. The primary benchmark is the static screenshot corpus released with the mobile GUI AGENTHAZARD benchmark (Liu et al., 2026a). We use scenario disjoint training, validation, and test partitions containing 317, 65, and 76 scenarios, respectively, with 963, 203, and 229 records. Scenario identity, not screenshot identity, is the grouping unit. The victims are Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct, and UI-TARS-1.5-7B, queried at the original screenshot resolution under pinned four bit inference configurations. The independent clean set uses the same task instances with the misleading content removed.

Methods and controls. We compare no defense, keyword and regex controls, OURS-LITE, and OURS. ALL-TEXT masks every recognized text region and provides a utility floor. For context, we also evaluate persisted screenshot adaptations of PromptLocate and PIGuard, and LaSM combined with OURS-LITE. The adaptations translate detector outputs into masks over the common OCR regions and use the same 229 screenshots and action judge. They are interface controls rather than native reimplementations. LaSM additionally changes the victim's internal inference path. Table 2 makes these access boundaries explicit.

Evaluation. ASR, SafeCorrect, invalid action rate, and BPR follow Section 3. Every record stores the proposed text regions, scores, selected boxes, rendered image, victim action, judge output, and random seed. Operating points are chosen on validation and fixed before held out evaluation. We use exact paired McNemar tests for binary outcomes and bootstrap intervals over paired records. The scenario disjoint split prevents the same rendered scenario from crossing partitions.

6 RESULTS

6.1 PRIMARY STATIC RESULTS

Table 1 shows that both ScreenLocate variants remove most attacker target actions without requiring victim access. OURS reduces ASR from 45.41–51.97% to 1.31–3.49% across all three victims, while BPR changes by at most 2.62 percentage points. OURS-LITE already captures most of the gain. Geometry lowers the remaining ASR by 0.44–1.31 points and improves or matches SafeCorrect. These residual differences comprise only three to four discordant records per victim, and their paired bootstrap intervals include zero. Geometry is therefore a targeted refinement. The dominant result is the reduction from no defense to selective local sanitization.

Table 1: **Static one step defense on scenario disjoint AgentHazard records.** Each victim has 229 records. OURS-LITE captures the lexical and continuation signal. OURS additionally uses normalized geometry. Lower values are better for ASR and Invalid. Higher values are better for SafeCorrect and BPR.

Victim	Method	ASR	SafeCorrect	Invalid	BPR
Qwen2.5-VL-3B	No defense	45.41	24.89	**10.92**	**47.60**
	OURS-LITE	2.18	**45.85**	32.75	**47.60**
	Ours	**1.31**	**45.85**	32.31	**47.60**
Qwen2.5-VL-7B	No defense	51.97	27.07	6.99	**64.63**
	OURS-LITE	4.80	59.39	3.06	**64.63**
	Ours	**3.49**	**60.70**	**2.62**	62.01
UI-TARS-1.5-7B	No defense	48.03	32.75	**1.31**	**65.94**
	OURS-LITE	3.06	**60.70**	13.97	**65.94**
	Ours	**2.62**	**60.70**	13.54	65.07

Table 2: **Matched record comparison with prior defenses.** All rows use the same 229 held out records for the named victim. PromptLocate and PIGuard are adaptations over OCR regions. LaSM is evaluated only in combination with OURS-LITE and uses a model internal hook.

Victim	Method	Access	ASR	BPR
Qwen2.5-VL-3B	PromptLocate	adapted screenshot	45.41	47.60
	PIGuard	adapted screenshot	28.82	47.60
	LaSM + OURS-LITE	victim internals	6.11	41.05
	Ours	pixels and goal	**1.31**	**47.60**
Qwen2.5-VL-7B	LaSM + OURS-LITE	victim internals	9.61	59.83
	Ours	pixels and goal	**3.49**	**62.01**
UI-TARS-1.5-7B	LaSM + OURS-LITE	victim internals	15.28	58.52
	Ours	pixels and goal	**2.62**	**65.07**

Simple lexical controls do not reproduce this endpoint. On the same held out records, keyword and regular expression rules remain near the result without a defense for all three victims. On Qwen2.5-VL-3B, matched record screenshot adaptations of PromptLocate and PIGuard obtain 45.41% and 28.82% ASR, respectively. Across all three primary victims, LaSM+OURS-LITE reaches 6.11–15.28% ASR and 41.05–59.83% BPR through a change inside the victim. With only the screenshot and trusted goal, OURS reaches 1.31–3.49% ASR and 47.60–65.07% BPR. These comparisons support coupling region localization to minimal spatial sanitization and downstream action evaluation.

The recovery columns explain why localization must be evaluated through the victim. For Qwen2.5-VL-3B, OURS lowers ASR to 1.31% but SafeCorrect is 45.85%. This gap shows that removing the injected action does not always restore the requested action. Qwen2.5-VL-7B and UI-TARS convert a larger share of suppressions into the reference action. Thus the principal result is the combination of ASR, SafeCorrect, and BPR, not $1 - \mathrm{ASR}$ alone.

6.2 SEMANTIC MUTATIONS AND TRANSFER TO ANOTHER MODEL

We next let an attacker choose among nine semantic presentation mutations using the undefended victim and the sanitizer's predicted mask area, without observing the action after sanitization. Table 3 reports this harder static stress test. The tested fixed policy is OURS-LITE with edge fill, so we label it OURS-LITE rather than attributing the result to geometry.

Across Qwen2.5-VL-3B and UI-TARS, the semantic stress suite reduces ASR by more than 31 points (exact paired McNemar $p = 4.1 \times 10^{-27}$ and 7.9×10^{-21}) while changing clean BPR by at most 0.87 points. On the independent Qwen3-VL-8B victim, ASR falls from 46.29% to 13.97% ($p = 2.0 \times 10^{-21}$) and SafeCorrect rises from 20.09% to 31.44% ($p = 1.1 \times 10^{-4}$). Invalid actions also increase, so semantic robustness and task recovery remain separate outcomes.




Figure 2: **Security, clean utility, and recovery on attacked screens are distinct axes.** Markers denote the measured condition without a defense, OURS-LITE, and OURS operating points. Connecting segments only guide the eye between these tested conditions. Selective sanitization moves each victim toward lower ASR and higher SafeCorrect on attacked screenshots (left), while clean BPR remains nearly unchanged (right).

Table 3: **Semantic mutation stress test** on the same held out records. Qwen3-VL-8B is an additional victim not used in the primary three model table.

Victim	Method	ASR	SafeCorrect	Invalid	BPR
Qwen2.5-VL-3B	No defense	64.63	24.02	6.11	51.97
	OURS-LITE	**22.27**	**36.24**	18.34	51.09
UI-TARS-1.5-7B	No defense	54.15	30.13	1.75	65.94
	OURS-LITE	**22.71**	**46.29**	11.35	65.94
Qwen3-VL-8B	No defense	46.29	20.09	29.69	39.30
	OURS-LITE	**13.97**	**31.44**	40.17	39.30

6.3 TRANSFER TO NATURALLY COLLECTED SCREENSHOTS

We evaluate transfer on English WAInjectBench screenshots with region annotations, without using these images to choose a threshold or reporting an action metric that is not defined for this dataset. Table 4 shows that the policy identifies many injected regions, but calibration on clean images remains imperfect. The stricter confidence rule gives the best token and box F1 and benign content retention (BCR), while the distribution shift rule gives the lowest clean false positive rate.

Table 4: **Evaluation on 27 natural screenshots.** The set contains 13 attacked screens and 14 clean screens annotated by one person. Clean FPR values .357 and .214 correspond to five and three of the fourteen clean screens. These are localization and content retention metrics.

Variant	Token F1	Box F1@.3	Clean FPR	BCR
OURS-LITE with stricter confidence	**.722**	**.600**	.357	**.919**
OURS-LITE with shift detection	.652	.570	**.214**	.772
ALL-TEXT	.564	.392	1.000	.000

This evaluation isolates the main remaining challenge. The controlled mobile renderer makes attack localization learnable, but deployment on naturally authored screenshots requires stronger calibration. We use the natural set only to measure transfer and do not retune the AgentHazard operating point.

6.4 THE INTERVENTION REMAINS LOCAL

OURS changes only 0.73–0.75% of screenshot pixels. The fixed sanitizer uses an average of 51.7 verifier calls and adds approximately 2.0–2.3 seconds before victim inference. In contrast, ALL-TEXT can match a low ASR endpoint only by removing benign text and collapsing clean utility. The

comparison supports the design shown in Figure 1. The sanitizer localizes the region that can reroute the next action, modifies the smallest spatial support, and leaves both the victim and the remaining interface unchanged.

Attention analysis. Attention from the final query contains a region localization signal, with a validation AUROC of 0.916. Yet replacing the most strongly associated heads does not outperform replacing a matched random set. Attention therefore helps explain where the model looks, but it is not a reliable place to intervene. The full head screen is in Appendix C.

Qualitative outcomes. Figure 3 connects the aggregate metrics to three held out behaviors. They are successful recovery, suppression that becomes invalid, and a residual attack. Showing all three prevents a low ASR number from hiding whether the user's route was actually preserved.




Figure 3: **Security is not identical to recovery.** M004 recovers the reference action after sanitization. M001 suppresses the injected cue but produces an invalid action. M077 remains a genuine residual. Each pair shows the exact input and sanitized image. Red traps, green masks, and click markers were added after evaluation and are never inference inputs.

6.5 Outcome transitions

Figure 4 separates the four possible outcomes on an attacked screen. The most important pattern is that the three victims respond differently after the injected instruction disappears. Qwen2.5-VL-7B and UI-TARS often return to the reference action, whereas the smaller Qwen model more often emits an invalid or unrelated action. This explains why a defense can have nearly identical ASR across models but very different practical value.

6.6 Ablation and transfer across interfaces

Lexical selection and continuation repair account for most of the static gain. Ours-Lite reaches 2.18–4.80% ASR before geometry is introduced. Normalized position and extent lower residual ASR by another 0.44–1.31 points. A goal authorization pilot changes validation AUROC by only .005, and selected attention heads do not outperform a matched random set. The useful complexity therefore lies in region selection and complete removal rather than a larger decision model or an internal hook. Appendix Table 10 reports the full ablation.

On 237 released VPI-Bench pages, the same sanitizer removes the observed trigger and page transition events for both Qwen victims. The UI-TARS change is smaller. Because the defended Qwen runs reach the eight step cap, this is an event suppression result rather than task completion (Appendix Table 5).




Figure 4: **Blocking and recovery are different outcomes.** The upper panel separates attack success, correct recovery, invalid actions, and other actions. The lower panel shows paired transitions from the original action to the action after applying OURS. Many attacks become correct actions, but some become invalid or unrelated actions.

Discussion. Residual attacks usually indicate incomplete localization or continuation. Invalid and unrelated actions indicate successful removal without enough remaining evidence for recovery. These are distinct decisions. The first asks whether a visible region should be removed, while the second asks whether the remaining screen still supports the requested action. The similar postdefense ASR values and different SafeCorrect values across victims show that the sanitizer cannot be judged independently of the downstream agent.

The natural screen experiment also exposes a calibration tradeoff. The stricter confidence rule retains 0.919 of benign content but flags five of fourteen clean screens. Shift detection reduces this count to three, with a lower retention value of 0.772. This suggests selecting the operating point on the target interface and abstaining when a proposed mask overlaps evidence needed by the task. The measured overhead of 51.7 verifier calls and about 2.0–2.3 seconds further favors compact region proposals over broader screen transformations.

7 CONCLUSION

ScreenLocate defends the observation boundary of mobile agents by removing text that conflicts with the task before an unchanged agent acts. On the scenario disjoint AgentHazard test, it reduces actions directed by the attacker across three agents with little loss of clean behavior. The same fixed policy remains effective under semantic presentation changes and on an additional victim. Textual evidence and continuation repair drive most of the gain, while geometry resolves a smaller set of ambiguous layouts.

The experiments also show why attack blocking and task recovery should be reported separately. Removing an injected instruction does not guarantee the intended action. Evaluating the action after sanitization is therefore more informative than region accuracy or attack success alone. Selective screenshot editing provides a practical defense boundary. Natural screen calibration and recovery aware selection remain the main directions for improvement.

AI USE STATEMENT

Generative AI tools were used for language editing and for reorganizing early drafts. They were not used to create experimental measurements, choose test examples, or alter reported results. The authors checked every number, reference, table, and figure against the underlying experimental output and take full responsibility for the paper.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies a defense against instructions placed in graphical user interfaces. Experiments use research benchmarks and locally rendered tasks. They do not involve real user accounts, private credentials, or deployment on third party services. The paper reports unsuccessful defenses and residual attacks because concealing these cases could give a misleading impression of safety. Released examples should be used for evaluating and improving agent security rather than for interfering with deployed systems.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

The experimental supplement is organized around the scenario splits, fixed operating points, model and precision settings, detected text regions, selected masks, victim actions, and judge outcomes for each example used in the paper. All primary choices were made on training and validation scenarios before evaluation on held out scenarios. Appendix A.1 documents the frozen inference trace and the configuration needed for replication from training data.

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A EVALUATION DETAILS

Action judging. Each attacked example contains a rendered screenshot, a trusted goal, a reference action, and an attacker target. The victim produces one action. Attack success is recorded when the predicted point falls within the attacker target. Reference correctness and parsing validity are evaluated separately. If a point satisfies both the attacker target and the reference target, it is not counted as SafeCorrect. Clean performance is measured on the corresponding task with the injected content removed.

Mask and timing measurements. The mask is produced before the victim is called. Text regions and scorer calls are counted even when no region is selected. Reported time includes image processing and victim inference under the configuration used for that row. ALL-TEXT is included as a utility bound because it removes all recognized text.

Uncertainty. Binary outcomes are compared with exact paired McNemar tests. Confidence intervals for paired differences are obtained by resampling task records. Results are reported for each victim rather than averaging models with different action formats and inference precision.

A.1 SCORER TRAINING AND FROZEN INFERENCE INTERFACE

AgentHazard supplies screenshots, trusted tasks, injection configurations, and action judges. ScreenLocate supplies the pipeline from OCR regions to masks. We fit the region scorer on 317 scenarios (963 records), select the geometry configuration and $\tau = 0.20$ on 65 scenarios (203 records), and evaluate once on 76 held out scenarios (229 records). The partition key is the source scenario, so all renderings from one scenario stay together. The three primary victims use the same frozen scorer, threshold, continuation rule, and renderer.

At inference, each OCR region produces the trace

$$(\text{record id}, t_i, b_i, g, \gamma(b_i), s_i, \mathbb{1}[s_i \geq .20], \text{continuation flag}),$$

where $\gamma(b_i)$ contains normalized box position and size. ScreenLocate sorts regions in reading order, scores every region, extends only eligible unfinished directives to an aligned neighbor, unions the selected boxes, applies the fixed edge expansion, and fills from local boundary pixels. Attack boxes, reference actions, victim predictions, and judge outputs never enter this computation. The region trace and rendered image determine the exact mask sent to every victim and permit mask reconstruction independent of the action evaluator.

Reproduction from training data additionally requires the OCR version and preprocessing, region label construction, serialization of (t_i, g), scorer architecture and checkpoint, ordered geometry features, training seed, and continuation constants, and renderer constants. These are properties of the ScreenLocate artifact, not of AgentHazard, and should be released with the split manifest and traces for each region.

A.2 REPLAY ACROSS INTERFACES

We replay 237 released VPI-Bench pages for at most eight steps. Trigger and page transition rates are browser events observed by the local runner. The two Qwen conditions reach the step cap after sanitization, so the zero event rows measure suppression rather than official task completion.

Table 5: Replay across interfaces on 237 VPI-Bench pages.

Victim	Condition	Trigger	Page transition	Mean steps	Victim time per step
Qwen2.5-VL-3B	No defense	3.80%	2.95%	7.793	907.7 ms
	ScreenLocate	**0.00%**	**0.00%**	8.000	895.0 ms
Qwen2.5-VL-7B	No defense	18.99%	14.77%	6.966	1,043.4 ms
	ScreenLocate	**0.00%**	**0.00%**	8.000	973.5 ms
UI-TARS-1.5-7B	No defense	20.68%	16.03%	6.907	3,733.7 ms
	ScreenLocate	18.57%	14.77%	6.970	3,354.0 ms

A.3 Sensitivity to action syntax

The screenshot interface asks the victim for a pixel coordinate. Some valid responses use the names `left_click` or `right_click` instead of the expected click name. We therefore repeated scoring with a narrow alias parser. It accepts an alias only when the response contains numeric horizontal and vertical coordinates. Malformed responses and nonclick actions remain invalid.

Table 6: Sensitivity to valid click aliases on the 229 test records. The primary results use the strict parser. Accepting aliases does not change ASR.

Victim	Method	Alias count	Strict ASR	Alias ASR	Strict SafeCorrect	Alias SafeCorrect	Strict Invalid	Alias Invalid
Qwen2.5-VL-3B	No defense	3	45.41	45.41	24.89	26.20	10.92	9.61
	OURS-LITE	7	2.18	2.18	45.85	48.91	32.75	30.13
	OURS	7	1.31	1.31	45.85	48.47	32.31	29.69
Qwen2.5-VL-7B	No defense	0	51.97	51.97	27.07	27.07	6.99	6.99
	OURS-LITE	0	4.80	4.80	59.39	59.39	3.06	3.06
	OURS	0	3.49	3.49	60.70	60.70	2.62	2.62
UI-TARS-1.5-7B	No defense	0	48.03	48.03	32.75	32.75	1.31	1.31
	OURS-LITE	0	3.06	3.06	60.70	60.70	13.97	13.97
	OURS	0	2.62	2.62	60.70	60.70	13.54	13.54

Only Qwen2.5-VL-3B produces valid aliases. Accepting them reduces the invalid rate by at most 2.62 points and leaves attack success unchanged. The main conclusion is therefore not caused by a restrictive spelling of the click action.

B Additional results

B.1 Complete outcome table

Table 7 gives the full outcome decomposition used to produce Figure 4. The column labeled Other contains valid actions that satisfy neither target.

Table 7: Complete action outcomes on attacked screenshots. All percentages use the same 229 records for each victim.

Victim	Method	ASR	SafeCorrect	Invalid	Other	$1 - \text{ASR}$
Qwen2.5-VL-3B	No defense	45.41	24.89	10.92	18.78	54.59
	OURS-LITE	2.18	45.85	32.75	19.21	97.82
	OURS	1.31	45.85	32.31	20.52	98.69
Qwen2.5-VL-7B	No defense	51.97	27.07	6.99	13.97	48.03
	OURS-LITE	4.80	59.39	3.06	32.75	95.20
	OURS	3.49	60.70	2.62	33.19	96.51
UI-TARS-1.5-7B	No defense	48.03	32.75	1.31	17.90	51.97
	OURS-LITE	3.06	60.70	13.97	22.27	96.94
	OURS	2.62	60.70	13.54	23.14	97.38

B.2 Simple lexical rules

Keyword matching and a regular expression for common action phrases were tested on the same task set. Neither rule changes attack success meaningfully. The UI-TARS rule rows use full precision,

while the main ScreenLocate result uses the fixed primary configuration, so the UI-TARS rows should be read as separate endpoints.

Table 8: Attack success for simple lexical rules.

Victim	Method	ASR
Qwen2.5-VL-3B	No defense	45.41
	Keyword rule	44.98
	Action expression	45.41
	Ours	**1.31**
Qwen2.5-VL-7B	No defense	51.97
	Keyword rule	51.09
	Action expression	51.97
	Ours	**3.49**
UI-TARS-1.5-7B	No defense, full precision	47.60
	Keyword rule, full precision	47.60
	Action expression, full precision	47.60
	Ours, primary setting	**2.62**

B.3 Additional model under semantic mutations

The additional Qwen3-VL-8B experiment uses the same 229 tasks and the same semantic mutation procedure as the main experiment. ASR falls from 46.29% to 13.97%, while SafeCorrect rises from 20.09% to 31.44%. The invalid rate also rises, which is consistent with the distinction between blocking and recovery made in the main text.




Figure 5: Outcome composition and paired transitions for Qwen3-VL-8B under semantic mutations. ScreenLocate reduces attack following and increases correct recovery, while some examples move to invalid actions.

C ATTENTION ANALYSIS




Figure 6: Head feasibility screen. The ranked heads concentrate a larger positive difference between attack and task attention than matched random sets, but replacing them does not outperform the random intervention.

Figure 7 compares raw attention with compact features derived from hidden states, the task, and geometry. Raw attention is at least as predictive as the learned alternatives on validation, which motivated the head study in the main text.




Figure 7: Validation AUROC across decoder layers. Raw attention is competitive with the compact hidden state alternatives.




Figure 8: Attention assigned to the task and injected region across decoder layers. LaSM scaling changes both curves, but does not create a clean separation between the two regions.

Table 9: Interventions on the 24 validation examples that follow the injected instruction without a defense. The observationally selected heads do not outperform a matched random set.

Intervention	n	ASR	SafeCorrect	Invalid	Other
No replacement	24	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Selected 16 heads	24	87.50%	0.00%	0.00%	12.50%
Random 16 heads	24	83.33%	0.00%	4.17%	12.50%

Exact two sided McNemar $p = 1.0$.

D ADDITIONAL QUALITATIVE EXAMPLES

The following pages show representative examples beyond the three cases in the main text. Red rectangles mark the injected target for presentation, green rectangles show the selected region, and colored points show the victim action. These annotations are added only for the figures.




Figure 9: Six examples in which sanitization removes the injected instruction and the victim returns to the reference action. The applications and visual layouts vary substantially across the examples.




Figure 10: Two residual examples. One results from incomplete text coverage, while the other reflects insufficient spatial coverage of the selected region.




Figure 11: Natural transfer cases with varied injected layouts, dense benign text, and text embedded in an image.

E Ablations and alternative designs

Table 11 summarizes alternatives considered while developing the method. The consistent lesson is that better screen classification or stronger removal does not necessarily identify the right region or restore the requested action.

Table 10: Summary of the main component findings.

Component	Evidence	Interpretation
Lexical selection and continuation	OURS-LITE reaches 2.18–4.80% ASR.	This is the principal source of attack removal.
Normalized geometry	Residual ASR falls by a further 0.44–1.31 points.	Geometry is a consistent refinement rather than the whole method.
Attention head replacement	Selected heads obtain 87.50% ASR versus 83.33% for random heads, with no SafeCorrect cases.	Attention is useful for explanation but unreliable for control.
Natural screen calibration	Shift detection reaches .214 clean FPR, versus .357 for stricter confidence.	Better calibration is preferable to masking a larger portion of the screen.
Goal authorization pilot	Validation AUROC is .9855 with the goal and .9805 without it.	Goal information alone is not the main source of the gain. Lexical selection and local rendering dominate.

Table 11: Ablations and alternative designs evaluated on validation data.

Question	Result	Interpretation
Is hierarchical search necessary?	Spatial tree token F1 is .954, compared with .982 for exhaustive regions.	Exhaustive text regions are simpler and more accurate.
Does geometry create the full gain?	OURS-LITE reaches 2.18–4.80% ASR. Geometry lowers the remainder by 0.44–1.31 points.	Lexical evidence creates most of the gain, while geometry provides a consistent refinement.
Can attention replace the scorer?	Attention AUROC is .916, but the selected head intervention does not beat random heads.	Attention is informative for analysis but unreliable as the control surface.
Does a goal gated visual block transfer?	ASR rises to 10.48% on Qwen2.5-VL-3B and 9.61% on UI-TARS.	A rule that helps one configuration can change another victim adversely.
Can a learned set policy improve recovery?	The best validation result has 5.42% ASR and 47.29% SafeCorrect.	The more expressive policy does not improve the joint security and recovery criterion.
Is image classification sufficient?	Full screen occlusion attribution has .972 AUPRC but finds only 8 of 13 natural injection regions.	A correct image label does not guarantee correct spatial attribution.
Can rendering alone close the gap?	Blur lowers ASR by .49 points but lowers SafeCorrect by 2.46 points.	Choosing the right region matters more than changing the appearance of the replacement.
Does multilingual expansion generalize?	Qwen3-VL-8B reaches 1.75% ASR, but the gain is not consistent for the primary victims and the number of scorer calls nearly doubles.	Higher recall is useful only when it transfers without a large cost.

Diagnostic by screen position. Because geometry contributes only to the residual decisions, we also stratify the locked test by the injected region's vertical position and area. This is a retrospective diagnostic rather than a controlled relocation experiment. Bottom placements retain 4.4–7.4% ASR across victims, compared with 0–4.0% at the top and 0–2.2% in the middle.

Table 12: Post-hoc stress strata on the locked AgentHazard test. Each victim has paired Geo-EF ASR/SafeCorrect columns in percent; the split is descriptive and was not used for tuning. ASCII metadata is a string property, not a UI-language annotation.

Family	Stratum	n	Qwen3B		Qwen7B		UI-TARS	
			ASR↓	Safe↑	ASR↓	Safe↑	ASR↓	Safe↑
Metadata	ASCII metadata	201	1.5	45.8	2.0	61.2	2.0	59.7
Metadata	Non-ASCII metadata	28	0.0	46.4	14.3	57.1	7.1	67.9
Vertical	Top	25	0.0	52.0	0.0	48.0	4.0	48.0
Vertical	Middle	136	0.0	48.5	2.2	64.0	1.5	64.0
Vertical	Bottom	68	4.4	38.2	7.4	58.8	4.4	58.8
Area	Small	90	0.0	51.1	2.2	64.4	3.3	64.4
Area	Medium	119	2.5	42.0	5.0	61.3	2.5	61.3
Area	Large	20	0.0	45.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	40.0