Steering Externalities: Benign Activation Steering Unintentionally Increases Jailbreak Risk for LLMs

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Abstract

Activation steering is a practical post-training model alignment technique to enhance the utility of Large Language Models (LLMs). Prior to deploying a model as a service, developers can steer a pre-trained model toward specific behavioral objectives, such as better truthfulness, or reasoning ability, without the need for retraining. Conceptually, these methods implement behavior control through hidden-state interventions, without changing the underlying model parameters. However, this capability unintentionally introduces critical and under-explored safety risks. We identify a phenomenon termed **Steering Externalities**[2], where steering vectors derived from benign datasets—such as reducing harmless refusals, improving structured-output following, truthfulness, and reasoning performance—inadvertently erode safety guardrails. Experiments reveal that these interventions act as a force multiplier, creating new vulnerabilities to jailbreaks and increasing attack success rates to over 80% on standard benchmarks by bypassing the initial safety alignment. Ultimately, our results expose a critical blind spot in deployment: benign activation steering can erode the "safety margin," rendering models more vulnerable to black-box attacks and indicating that inference-time utility improvements must be rigorously audited for unintended safety externalities.

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) [35] are deployed as instruction-following assistants [3, 5], where providers must balance helpfulness, instruction adherence, and refusal of harmful requests. Alignment methods such as supervised fine-tuning [39, 31] and preference optimization [2, 4, 24] improve this balance, but they are costly to repeat whenever developers want new deployment-time behaviors. Aligned models remain vulnerable to prompt-based jailbreaks and automated red-teaming procedures [41, 18, 38]. At the same time, practitioners increasingly seek methods to control model behavior without retraining, both for cost reasons and for rapid iteration [19].

Activation steering [34] is one such control primitive. It injects vectors or state-dependent corrections into hidden activations during generation, biasing the model toward desired behaviors such as truthfulness [37], structured output formatting [30], persona control [7], or improved reasoning [14].

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[2]Project Page available at: https://huggingface.co/spaces/TrustSafeAI/Steering_Externalities

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Because steering is cheap, modular, and post hoc, it is attractive for model services that want to customize behavior after training. However, a steered model is not simply the base model plus utility: it is a new deployed configuration whose safety behavior may differ from the original model.



Figure 1: **Overview.** The top left panel illustrates the Model Developer's perspective, where benign activation steering is injected into the LLM's hidden states ($h_0 \dots h_m$) to enhance utility at inference time. We instantiate four representative utility steering scenarios: truthfulness [37], reasoning [14], compliance [13], and structured output formatting [30]. The bottom left panel depicts the Attacker's Move, showing how this steered model becomes a target for black-box jailbreak attacks like PAIR, CoP, and TAP [6, 38, 21]. **We distinguish two evaluation regimes: (i) Benchmark-only, which evaluates on the original harmful prompts provided by the dataset (direct harmful requests; no prompt rewriting), and (ii) Synergistic Vulnerability, which runs an attack algorithm that iteratively revises the harmful request based on the target steered model's feedback.** The right section quantifies these averaged externalities across the three tested models (i.e., Llama-2-7B-Chat, Llama-3-8B-Instruct and Gemma-7B-it) for each steering case. The results show that while all four steering methods successfully improve their intended utility—such as increasing harmless non-refusal rates, improving JSON correctness, boosting truthfulness, or enhancing reasoning accuracy—they each unintentionally compromise safety. This leads to higher Attack Success Rates on harmful queries compared to the original models, an effect that is amplified under jailbreak attacks.

Existing work often studies activation steering from an attacker-controlled or diagnostic perspective, where steering vectors are intentionally used to suppress refusal behavior or probe safety mechanisms [1, 9, 12]. In that setting, safety degradation is expected because the intervention is adversarially selected. We study a different deployment setting: a model developer applies a steering intervention to improve a benign utility objective, then exposes only the resulting steered model through a black-box API. The attacker does not choose, observe, or modify the steering vector; they can only prompt the already-steered model. As illustrated in Figure 1, our focus is on how developer-side, utility-driven steering can nonetheless introduce unintended safety regressions, increasing susceptibility to jailbreak attacks even when the steering mechanism is not adversarially controlled. Our study also complements prior work showing that benign training-time customization, such as fine-tuning [26] or preference optimization [28], can unintentionally degrade safety alignment.

We call this failure mode a **steering externality**: **unintended safety regressions that arise when activation steering is optimized for benign utility**. Across four steering workflows that a model developer might deploy to improve truthfulness [37], reasoning [14], harmless-request compliance [13], and JSON formatting [30]—we find that steered models can pass their intended utility checks while becoming more vulnerable to direct harmful requests and adaptive jailbreak attacks.

Why would benign activation steering compromise safety? Our central hypothesis is that benign activation steering compromises safety by systematically biasing the model's early-token distribution toward non-refusal trajectories, thereby reducing the "safety margin" that alignment relies on to

refuse harmful requests. Specifically, utility-oriented steering increases the likelihood of non-refusal openings in the first few generated tokens, implicitly suppressing refusal-preferring prefixes that safety training places disproportionate weight on. As a result, even when the steering objective is benign, the model becomes more likely to enter a non-refusal mode at generation onset, making it easier for adversaries to elicit disallowed behavior. Importantly, this effect does not require novel jailbreak techniques: a modest reduction in refusal robustness at the prefix level can substantially amplify the effectiveness of existing automated jailbreak pipelines. This vulnerability is exacerbated by modern jailbreak methods that rely on search (e.g., iterative rewriting or multi-step strategies), where a model with reduced "safety margin" can become dramatically easier to jailbreak in practice.

Our paper makes three primary contributions:

1. **Identification of Steering Externalities:** We define and empirically demonstrate "steering externalities," a phenomenon where utility-oriented activation steering can pass its intended benign utility checks while unintentionally degrading safety behavior. Across contrastive, trajectory-imitation, adaptive head-level, and instruction-following steering paradigms, we find that steering consistently increases direct harmful-response rates and jailbreak susceptibility, spanning both semantic objectives such as truthfulness and reasoning as well as syntactic objectives such as structured-output formatting. These results challenge the assumption that benign inference-time model adaptation is inherently safe.
2. **Jailbreak Amplification Effect:** We establish that benign steering acts as a "force multiplier" for adversarial attacks. Through comprehensive evaluation on Llama-2-7B-Chat, Llama-3-8B-Instruct, and Gemma-7B-it, we show that steering interventions drastically increase the Attack Success Rate (ASR) of black-box jailbreaks (CoP, PAIR, TAP), in some cases boosting ASR to nearly 99%, by eroding the model's safety margin.
3. **Representational Evidence for Hidden Safety Fractures.** We provide representational evidence that benign activation steering induces an implicit domain shift in the model's internal state: it benignizes harmful requests by pushing their prompt representations toward harmless subspace, thereby shrinking the representational safety margin that normally triggers refusal. This shift manifests at generation time as a concentrated change in the first few output tokens—token-wise KL spikes show that steering suppresses refusal-prefixed openings and increases the probability of a non-refusal start. Once the model is "tricked" into beginning in a non-refusal mode, autoregressive generation amplifies the effect and carries the trajectory toward harmful completion, even though no explicit safety is removed.

Overall, our results complement and extend prior warnings that activation steering can compromise alignment safeguards, by showing that even steering learned exclusively from benign data and operated only by the model service provider for utility enhancement — can systematically increase practical jailbreakability. Based on our findings, we also provide discussions on possible mitigation strategies and potential research topics for future studies.

2 Related work

Post-training behavior modification can occur either at *inference time* (e.g., activation steering interventions on hidden states) or at *training time* (e.g., fine-tuning or preference optimization). Across both regimes, recent work has shown that even targeted interventions can have non-obvious failure modes, including degraded safety alignment and increased susceptibility to adversarial use.

Training-time customization can degrade safety. Fine-tuning and preference optimization can introduce safety regressions even when they are not intended to remove guardrails. Qi et al. [26] show that fine-tuning aligned models can create a new attack surface, including cases involving benign utility datasets. Razin et al. [28] analyze Direct Preference Optimization and show that likelihood displacement can unintentionally shift probability mass toward undesirable responses with opposite meaning in catastrophic cases. These findings motivate our study of whether post-training, inference-time customization can cause analogous safety regressions.

Inference-time steering and safety. Prior work has studied safety-relevant activation steering mainly as a way to deliberately alter, probe, or stress-test refusal behavior. Arditi et al. [1] identify a "refusal direction" whose addition or removal changes refusal behavior; Ghandeharioun et al. [9] show that harmful behaviors can be elicited through intentional persona steering [15]; and Korznikov

et al. [12] use random or SAE-derived perturbations to show that hidden-state interventions can compromise safety. These studies demonstrate that aligned models can be fragile under steering, but their interventions are not selected as realistic deployment objectives. Our focus is complementary: we study developer-side steering selected because it improves benign utility, and evaluate whether the black-box deployment becomes more vulnerable to harmful prompts and adaptive jailbreak attacks.

Steering externalities under utility-first deployment. In contrast to work that frames steering primarily as an attacker tool, our focus is on the common deployment setting where activation steering is applied by model developers to improve utility on benign tasks. We study steering externalities: unintended safety regressions that emerge despite utility-first intent and despite learning steering vectors from benign data (see Table 1). Further, we show that these regressions can compound with black-box jailbreak pipelines, amplifying attack success rates even when the steering intervention is not purposely designed for harmful behavior. While our analysis is strictly concerned with inference-time, post-training interventions, our findings parallel concerns raised in training-time customization—namely, that seemingly benign modifications can quietly erode safety guarantees—highlighting a broader fragility of alignment under post hoc control.

Table 1: Comparison of inference-time steering and training-time customization risks relevant to safety externalities.

Work	Phase	Benign utility objective	Utility priority	Studied safety effects	Attack/ JB Eval
Refusal Direction Interventions [1]	Inference	✗	✗	✓	✓
Rogue Scalpel [12]	Inference	✓	✗	✓	✗
Persona Steering [9]	Inference	✗	✓	✓	✓
SteeringSafety [29]	Inference	✗	✗	✓	✗
Fine-tuning Aligned LMs [26]	Train	✓	✗	✓	✓
Likelihood Displacement in DPO [28]	Train	✓	✗	✓	✗
Steering Externality (Ours)	Inference	✓	✓	✓	✓

3 Steering setups and jailbreak evaluation

We study steering externalities: safety regressions caused by benign, utility-motivated activation steering at inference time. For completeness, we evaluate four different workflows: truthfulness (STEER-ACT) [37], reasoning (STEER-ASM) [14], harmless-request compliance (STEER-COMPLIANCE) [13], and structured-output following (STEER-JSON) [30]. Instead of introducing new steering algorithms, we test safety in two regimes: **Benchmark-only evaluation**, where the model receives the original harmful benchmark prompts, and **adaptive attack evaluation**, where a black-box jailbreak algorithm iteratively revises the harmful request based on the steered model's feedback, producing an adapted adversarial prompt.

3.1 Unified view and representative benign steering workflows

We evaluate four representative activation-steering workflows drawn from prior work, chosen to span both semantic and syntactic utility objectives as well as intervention mechanisms: truthfulness (STEER-ACT) [37], reasoning (STEER-ASM) [14], harmless-request compliance (STEER-COMPLIANCE) [13], and structured output formatting (STEER-JSON) [30]. Our goal is not to propose new steering algorithms, but to test whether steering externalities arise across multiple inference-time control paradigms rather than from a single implementation.

During autoregressive decoding, let $h_{\ell,t}$ denote the hidden activation inside the model at intervention site ℓ when the model is generating token y_t. Here, ℓ may correspond to a residual-stream layer, an attention head, or another intermediate representation, depending on the steering method. We model activation steering as an inference-time modification:

$$\tilde{h}_{\ell,t} = h_{\ell,t} + \Delta(h_{\ell,t}, x, y_{<t}, \ell), \tag{1}$$

where x is the input prompt, $y_{<t}$ is the generated prefix, and Δ denotes the method-specific steering update. In our experiments, Δ is instantiated as probe-based head steering for STEER-ACT,

state-space trajectory correction for STEER-ASM, fixed residual-stream directions for STEER-COMPLIANCE, and formatting directions with input-dependent scaling for STEER-JSON.

Truthfulness steering (STEER-ACT). Following ACT [37], we construct head-specific steering vectors that push activations toward more truthful representations. The method clusters truthful-versus-untruthful activation differences into multiple hallucination patterns, trains cluster-specific probes, and uses the resulting probe weights as steering directions for selected heads. At inference time, the intervention strength is adapted based on the probe score, so less truthful activations receive larger corrections. Because ACT is learned exclusively from truthful/untruthful QA pairs, it represents a benign knowledge-quality intervention rather than a safety-targeted method.

Reasoning steering (STEER-ASM). Following ASM [14], we train lightweight state-space controllers on activation trajectories from correct reasoning traces. At inference time, the controller applies token-dependent corrections toward the learned reasoning trajectory. This method is stateful and history-dependent, making it mechanistically distinct from fixed-vector steering.

Compliance steering (STEER-COMPLIANCE). Following CAST [13], we construct a contrastive dataset from benign instructions by pairing each prompt with a compliance-prefixed and refusal-prefixed continuation, then extract a layerwise residual-stream direction that increases compliance on benign prompts. Its utility is to reduce harmless refusals. Because this construction contrasts compliance and refusal behavior, we treat it as a refusal-adjacent, high-risk utility intervention. Unlike refusal-direction methods [1], the direction is constructed solely from benign prompts, rather than harmful-versus-harmless contrasts; we provide a direct comparison in Appendix A.

JSON-format steering (STEER-JSON). Following instruction-steering work [30], we derive a direction from paired prompts with and without a JSON-format instruction. This direction improves structured-output validity and is applied with input-dependent scaling. Since its objective is syntactic rather than safety-related, it tests whether formatting-oriented steering can also disrupt refusal behavior. All the detailed implementations can be found in Appendix B.

3.2 Jailbreak evaluation and threat model

Threat model. To evaluate whether benign activation steering increases adversarial vulnerability, we adopt a black-box threat model [36]. We treat the steered model—defined by fixed base parameters θ together with a fixed, developer-controlled steering intervention—as the deployed target system. The attacker has no access to or control over the steering mechanism, does not observe internal activations, and cannot modify the steering vector. Instead, the attacker adaptively executes jailbreak attempts by interacting with the steered model solely through input–output queries, as illustrated in Figure 1 (Attacker's Move). Given a harmful intent x, an attack algorithm produces an adversarial prompt x_{adv}. The model then generates under active steering:

$$y \sim p_\theta^{\text{steer}}(\cdot \mid x_{\text{adv}}). \tag{2}$$

We evaluate both (i) intrinsic vulnerability of the steered model (without external attacks) and (ii) synergistic vulnerability when steering is combined with black-box jailbreak pipelines. In the latter setting, we instantiate the attack algorithm using three representative prompt-only methods, all of which operate without access to internal activations or control over the steering mechanism. Unless otherwise stated, the steering vector remains fixed throughout the attack process, and safety is assessed using the same downstream evaluation judge across all conditions.

Specifically, we consider:

• **Composition-of-Principles (CoP) [38]:** an agentic workflow that strategically combines multiple persuasive principles to find successful jailbreak prompts.

• **Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement (PAIR) [6]:** an automatic black-box attack that iteratively optimizes jailbreak prompts based on model responses.

• **Tree of Attacks with Pruning (TAP) [21]:** an extension of PAIR that explores a broader tree of candidate jailbreak prompts via search and pruning.

In addition to measuring jailbreak success, we explicitly measure utility preservation under steering. This joint evaluation enables us to characterize steering externalities as a trade-off: steering improves benign utility while simultaneously increasing susceptibility to jailbreak attacks.

Table 2: Utility checks for benign steering. ACT steering improves truthfulness on TruthfulQA, ASM steering improves reasoning on GSM8k, compliance steering reduces refusals on harmless Alpaca prompts, and JSON-format steering increases JSON-valid outputs on IFEval.

Model	TruthfulQA MC1 (↑)		TruthfulQA MC2 (↑)		GSM8k Accuracy (↑)		Alpaca Refusal (↓)		IFEval JSON (↑)	
	Orig.	ACT	Orig.	ACT	Orig.	ASM	Orig.	COMPL.	Orig.	JSON
Llama-2-7B-Chat	30.0%	**32.1%**	45.6%	**49.3%**	25%	**27%**	9%	**6%**	61%	**74%**
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	36.1%	**39.2%**	51.6%	**57.5%**	78%	**80%**	2%	**0%**	63%	**69%**
Gemma-7B-it	30.4%	**31.6%**	47.3%	**50.2%**	34%	**41%**	18%	**1%**	69%	**81%**



Figure 2: Attack Success Rate (ASR) of original and steered models on 100 randomly sampled HarmBench prompts. The first panel reports benchmark-only intrinsic vulnerability under direct harmful requests; the remaining panels report synergistic vulnerability under adaptive black-box jailbreak attacks, including CoP, PAIR, and TAP. For each model, we compare the original target with four benign steering objectives: STEER-ACT, STEER-ASM, STEER-JSON, and STEER-COMPLIANCE. Overall, benign activation steering increases ASR, indicating that utility-oriented steering reduces the safety margin and amplifies jailbreak success.

4 Experiments

4.1 Experimental setup

Dataset: STEER-ACT vectors were derived from the TruthfulQA [17] multiple-choice validation set (814 questions, 5,000 QA pairs) using 2-fold cross-validation (80/20 train/validation split per fold) for direction clustering and probe learning [37]. STEER-ASM [14] used activation trajectories from 200 GSM8k [8] training examples to train per-layer ASM controllers. STEER-COMPLIANCE used 100 benign Alpaca [16] instructions paired with refusal and compliant responses (Sec. 3.1). STEER-JSON used 400 JSON-specific instances from IFEval [40]. Each method was evaluated on its utility using held-out data disjoint from steering construction: TruthfulQA MC1 (top-1 accuracy) and MC2 (normalized probability mass on correct answers) on held-out test folds for STEER-ACT, zero-shot accuracy on 100 GSM8k test examples for STEER-ASM, refusal rates on 100 harmless Alpaca prompts for STEER-COMPLIANCE, and JSON validity on 100 IFEval prompts for STEER-JSON. Safety was evaluated on 100 randomly sampled harmful queries from HarmBench [20].

Large Language Models: Experiments were conducted on three open-weight models: **Llama-2-7B-Chat** [33], **Llama-3-8B-Instruct** [10] and **Gemma-7B-it** [32]. A steered model refers to the corresponding base model augmented with steering vectors; in all evaluations, this configuration was treated as a black-box target for jailbreak analysis.

Evaluation Protocol: To assess benign utility under activation steering, we evaluated each method on its intended objective. For STEER-ACT, we evaluated truthfulness utility using the TruthfulQA multiple-choice metrics MC1 and MC2 on held-out test folds. For STEER-ASM, we evaluated reasoning utility using zero-shot accuracy on 100 held-out GSM8k test examples. For STEER-COMPLIANCE, we primarily measured the refusal rate on harmless prompts using the fine-tuned DistilRoberta-based model [25], which identifies whether an LLM response is a rejection. For STEER-JSON, we followed the evaluation protocol of [30], which uses an explicit evaluation function to judge whether the model output can be parsed as valid JSON. The details can be found in Appendix B. To measure the jailbreak success, we evaluated the Attack Success Rate (ASR) metric with the HarmBench classifier, which is a carefully fine-tuned Llama-2-13B model to determine

whether the jailbreak response is relevant to the original malicious query and harmful. A detailed description of the hyperparameter settings is provided in Appendix B.2.

4.2 Benchmark-only evaluation: utility gains and intrinsic vulnerability evaluation

We first verify that each steering method achieves its intended benign objective. Table 2 shows that STEER-ACT improves TruthfulQA, STEER-ASM improves GSM8k accuracy, STEER-COMPLIANCE reduces harmless refusals, and STEER-JSON improves JSON validity. We then test whether these utility gains come with safety regressions under direct harmful requests.

Benchmark-only safety evaluation (no jailbreak attack). Next, we evaluate intrinsic safety regressions in a benchmark-only setting: we prompt the model with harmful HarmBench queries directly and measure ASR with the HarmBench classifier. Figure 2 (left) shows that all four steering methods increase ASR relative to the original aligned models across the tested LLMs.

We first consider the non-refusal-specific steering methods. STEER-ACT, which steers toward truthfulness, raises intrinsic ASR from 4% to 25% on Llama-3-8B-Instruct and from 4% to 19% on Gemma-7B-it. STEER-ASM, which steers toward mathematical reasoning via a dynamic state-space model, similarly increases ASR, e.g., from 4% to 18% on Llama-3-8B-Instruct. Notably, STEER-ASM uses an entirely different learning signal—trajectory imitation on correct solutions rather than contrastive pairs—yet produces qualitatively similar externalities.

The pattern also holds for compliance and formatting objectives. STEER-COMPLIANCE yields the largest direct regression, increasing Llama-3-8B-Instruct ASR from 4% to 36%. STEER-JSON, despite being a syntactic formatting intervention, also increases ASR substantially, e.g., from 0% to 14% on Llama-2-7B-Chat. Together with the ACT and ASM results above, these findings show that the effect is not limited to refusal-adjacent compliance steering, but also appears for truthfulness, reasoning, and formatting interventions. Thus, utility steering can constitute an intrinsic vulnerability—a form of steering externality—even before introducing any jailbreak attack procedure.

4.3 Synergistic vulnerability evaluation: benign steering amplifies jailbreak vulnerability

Section 4.2 showed that benign steering increases intrinsic vulnerability even without jailbreak attacks. We now ask whether this safety degradation further compounds with adaptive black-box jailbreak pipelines. We evaluate CoP, PAIR, and TAP [38, 6, 21] on HarmBench, treating each steered model as a fixed black-box target: the attacker can only interact through input–output queries and has no access to, or control over, the steering intervention.

Figure 2 summarizes the results. Across CoP, PAIR, and TAP, all four steering objectives increase ASR relative to the corresponding unsteered target. Under CoP, original-model ASR ranges from 71–75%, but steering amplifies it substantially: STEER-ACT reaches 90–93%, STEER-ASM reaches 84–91%, STEER-COMPLIANCE leads to near-total compromise at 93–99%, and even purely syntactic STEER-JSON reaches 86–91%. PAIR and TAP exhibit the same qualitative pattern: every steering objective increases ASR across all three models, with STEER-COMPLIANCE again producing the largest amplification (e.g., PAIR: 72–77%; TAP: 80–84%) and STEER-ACT and STEER-ASM following closely despite targeting truthfulness and reasoning rather than refusal suppression.

Together, these results show that steering externalities are not tied to a single attack algorithm or to explicitly compliance-oriented steering. Truthfulness, reasoning, compliance, and formatting steering all amplify black-box jailbreak attacks. Thus, utility-oriented activation steering should be evaluated not only under direct harmful requests, but also under adaptive attacks on the steered deployment. Appendix H, I, and J further disentangle this amplification: it is not a simple over-steering artifact, is driven by learned utility directions rather than generic activation noise, and mainly lowers the safety floor by increasing first- or near-first-query jailbreak successes. Appendix S reports five independently resampled HarmBench evaluations with 100 prompts per run. All 48 model–steering–evaluation combinations show higher mean ASR than their unsteered baselines, supporting the stability of the observed degradation across prompt samples; Table 19 reports means and sample standard deviations.

5 Evidence for safety-margin reduction under activation steering

To understand why benign activation steering compromises safety in our experiments, we provide a representational analysis at two coupled levels: (i) a **token-level** analysis of how steering reshapes the distribution over the first few generated tokens that decide whether the model enters a refusal or non-refusal mode (Sec. 5.1 and Sec. 5.2), and (ii) a **representation-level** analysis showing that steering shifts the hidden-state encodings of harmful prompts toward regions typically associated with harmless requests, reducing the effective safety margin in hidden space (Sec. 5.3).

5.1 Bypassing the refusal gate via autoregressive inertia

One plausible mechanism is that activation steering changes the model's internal state during decoding, and thus changes the next-token distribution from the first generated token. Under autoregressive generation, this prefix-level shift can propagate into a qualitatively different completion. Following the "Shallow Safety Alignment" hypothesis [27], safety behavior is sensitive to an early-token window in which the model selects between a safety-preserving or task-completion trajectory:

$$P(y \mid x) = \underbrace{P(y_{\leq k} \mid x)}_{\text{Early Trajectory Selection}} \cdot \underbrace{P(y_{>k} \mid x, y_{\leq k})}_{\text{Autoregressive Continuation}} . \tag{3}$$

A standard aligned model assigns high probability to safety-preserving prefixes on harmful requests, such as refusal-style openings. Once such a prefix is sampled, the continuation distribution is conditioned on that safe trajectory. Activation steering can perturb this early decision window even when the steering objective is not safety-related. For example, STEER-ACT may push the model toward answer-producing states, STEER-ASM toward reasoning-continuation states, STEER-COMPLIANCE toward helpful-answer states, and STEER-JSON toward format-following states. In each case, the steered prefix can make the continuation distribution less likely to remain on a refusal trajectory. Thus, the common mechanism is not necessarily explicit refusal suppression, but a reduction in the model's effective safety margin during early generation.

Importantly, token-level changes alone do not fully assess safety. Even if steering mainly perturbs the early prefix, the response meaning continues to evolve during generation, and an initially benign-looking opening can still lead to an unsafe completion. This motivates a complementary representation-level view: after the model has entered a trajectory, steering may shift hidden representations of harmful requests toward regions associated with harmless queries, shrinking the safety margin in hidden space (Sec. 5.3). Thus, token-level effects capture how steering influences decisions during autoregressive sampling, while representation-level effects capture how steering reshapes the semantic state after a trajectory is established—jointly explaining how benign steering can bypass refusal without removing any explicit safety mechanism.

5.2 Token-level evidence: per-token KL divergence analysis

We test this hypothesis by measuring per-token Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence between the original model and its steered counterpart for both **Llama-3-8B-Instruct** and **Gemma-7B-it**, following Qi et al. [27]. To match our safety benchmark, we construct a harmful prompt–response set from HarmBench: we use **Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2** to generate responses to harmful HarmBench prompts and retain 125 prompt–response pairs judged harmful by the HarmBench classifier.

Figure 3 shows token-wise KL divergence on **Llama-3-8B-Instruct** under all four steering methods, following the same order as Sec. 3.1: STEER-ACT, STEER-ASM, STEER-COMPLIANCE, and STEER-JSON. Across all four methods, KL divergence is largest in the first few generated tokens—especially on harmful prompts—and then rapidly stabilizes. This supports the early-trajectory hypothesis: steering primarily perturbs the part of generation where instruction-tuned models choose between safety-preserving trajectories and task-completion trajectories. Because generation is autoregressive, these early tokens act as a mode-setting prefix: once steering shifts probability mass toward answer-producing, reasoning-continuation, helpful-answer, or format-following openings, subsequent token distributions are conditioned on that prefix and may become less likely to remain on a refusal trajectory. The pattern is particularly important for STEER-ACT and STEER-ASM, whose intended objectives are truthfulness and reasoning rather than refusal suppression. The same early-token pattern also appears for refusal-adjacent STEER-COMPLIANCE and syntactic



Figure 3: **Per-token KL divergence on Llama-3-8B-Instruct under four steering methods.** Panels (a)–(d) compare the original model with STEER-ACT, STEER-ASM, STEER-COMPLIANCE, and STEER-JSON, respectively. Red lines indicate KL divergence on HarmBench responses, and blue lines indicate KL divergence on benign responses. For all four methods, KL divergence is largest in the first few generated tokens, suggesting that steering primarily perturbs the early token window.



Figure 4: **Utility-driven steering benignizes harmful prompts in the representation space of Llama-3-8B-Instruct (layer 30).** t-SNE shows harmful (red) vs. harmless (blue) prompts. Steered harmful prompts (green) under (a) STEER-ACT, (b) STEER-ASM, (c) STEER-COMPLIANCE, and (d) STEER-JSON. Across all four steering objectives, steered harmful representations frequently cross the decision boundary and fall on the "harmless" side: 50.0% for ACT, 54.0% for ASM, 60.8% for compliance, and 58.2% for JSON, against a baseline accuracy of 99.60%. This illustrates a reduced safety margin, as harmful requests become easier to encode as benign-like states.

STEER-JSON, suggesting that early safety-margin reduction is not limited to a single steering objective or intervention mechanism. Appendix L reports corresponding KL plots on **Gemma-7B-it**.

5.3 Representation-level evidence: benign steering obscures harmful prompts in hidden space

The token-level analysis in Sec. 5.1–5.2 shows that steering perturbs the early trajectory-selection window. We now provide complementary representation-level evidence that benign steering also shifts the prompt representations of harmful queries toward regions of hidden space typically occupied by harmless requests, making downstream refusal less likely. Before steering, Fig. 21 confirms that harmful and harmless prompts are linearly separable in the residual stream: a linear probe distinguishes the two classes with high accuracy across layers, indicating a robust and linearly decodable harmfulness signal throughout the forward pass.

After steering, harmful-prompt representations move toward regions occupied by harmless prompts. Figure 4 visualizes this effect at layer 30 of Llama-3-8B-Instruct, and Appendix M provides layerwise visualizations for STEER-ACT, STEER-ASM, STEER-COMPLIANCE, and STEER-JSON. Across these steering objectives, steered harmful representations shift toward the harmless cluster in the t-SNE projection. This suggests that the safety externality is not limited to refusal-adjacent compliance steering: truthfulness, reasoning, compliance, and formatting interventions can all perturb hidden features used to distinguish harmful from harmless requests.

Representational interpretation: Together, these results suggest a hidden-space pathway for the externalities measured in Sec. 4.2—4.3. If harmfulness is linearly decodable, then a safety-relevant decision can be viewed as thresholding a score of the form $\langle w, h \rangle$, where h is the prompt representation. Activation steering changes this representation from h to $h + \Delta$; for fixed-vector steering, $\Delta = \alpha v$, so the harmfulness score shifts by $\alpha \langle w, v \rangle$. When this shift moves harmful prompts toward the harmless side of the boundary, the model's representation-level safety margin is reduced. Once the model enters this more "benign-like" region, the same autoregressive continuation described in Sec. 5.1 can carry generation forward along a less-refusal trajectory.

Because t-SNE provides qualitative evidence, Appendix T quantifies boundary crossing using a frozen harmfulness probe in the original 4096-dimensional activation space. On Llama-3-8B-Instruct, crossing rates range from 42.2% to 56.2% across the four steering methods.

Table 3: Utility comparison for STEER-BIND variants on Llama-3-8B-Instruct. Each row reports the utility metric associated with the corresponding steering objective. Arrows denote the direction of better performance: ↑ means a higher score is better, and ↓ means a lower score is better.

Method / Utility metric	Original	Pure steering	STEER-BIND
STEER-ACT / TruthfulQA MC1–MC2 (↑)	36.1% / 51.6%	39.2% / 57.5%	36.5% / 55.3%
STEER-ASM / GSM8k accuracy (↑)	78%	80%	79%
STEER-COMPLIANCE / Harmless refusal (↓)	2%	0%	1%
STEER-JSON / IFEval JSON validity (↑)	63%	69%	65%

Table 4: Safety comparison for STEER-BIND variants on Llama-3-8B-Instruct. Benchmark-only ASR evaluates direct HarmBench prompts; synergistic vulnerability (using CoP) ASR evaluates adaptive black-box jailbreak amplification. Lower ASR is better.

Method	Benchmark-only ASR (↓)			Synergistic Vulnerability ASR (↓)		
	Original	Pure steering	STEER-BIND	Original	Pure steering	STEER-BIND
STEER-ACT	4%	25%	17%	73%	90%	77%
STEER-ASM	4%	18%	13%	73%	88%	80%
STEER-COMPLIANCE	4%	36%	5%	73%	93%	76%
STEER-JSON	4%	22%	15%	73%	86%	76%

6 Mitigation

Potential mitigation strategies. A plausible way to mitigate steering externalities is to construct safety-aware steering that preserves utility while reducing safety regressions. We evaluate two preliminary strategies. STEER-ORTHO orthogonalizes a compliance direction against an estimated safety direction (Appendix N), while STEER-BIND injects safety-aware data into steering construction by mixing benign utility prompts with harmful prompts paired with refusal continuations (Appendix O).

The results suggest that safety-aware data injection is more effective than simple geometric decoupling. On Llama-3-8B-Instruct, STEER-ORTHO reduces benchmark-only ASR from 36% to 14%, but CoP ASR remains nearly unchanged at 92% compared to 93% under STEER-COMPLIANCE. By contrast, STEER-BIND reduces compliance-steering ASR from 36% to 5% in benchmark-only evaluation and from 93% to 76% under CoP, while largely preserving benign utility. Similar attenuation is observed for STEER-ACT and STEER-ASM, with a partial CoP reduction for STEER-JSON. Thus, mitigation should address the safety behavior of the steered deployment directly; global vector orthogonalization alone is insufficient against adaptive jailbreak search.

7 Conclusion

Activation steering offers affordable post-training utility control, but can create steering externalities: vectors learned from benign data implicitly erode safety alignment and substantially increase jailbreak success in a black-box setting. Across Llama-2/3 and Gemma, benign steering raises intrinsic ASR and amplifies adaptive attacks. Representationally, steering shifts early-token probabilities away from refusal prefixes and moves harmful-prompt representations toward benign subspace, shrinking the safety margin. Our preliminary mitigation STEER-BIND shows that safety-aware vector construction can reduce externalities while preserving utility, though closing the gap under adaptive attacks remains an open challenge. These findings argue that deployment pipelines applying activation steering should include adversarial safety audits, and that the externality framework should extend beyond refusal robustness. Broader impacts and limitations are in Appendix Q and R.

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A Cosine Similarity Between STEER-COMPLIANCE and the Refusal Direction

To verify that STEER-COMPLIANCE operates in a different subspace from the refusal direction identified by Arditi et al. [1], we compute the mean cosine similarity between the two vectors, averaged across all steered layers.

Table 5: Mean cosine similarity between STEER-COMPLIANCE and the refusal direction across steered layers.

Model	Mean Cosine Similarity
Llama-2-7B-Chat	+0.017
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	+0.017

The near-zero values indicate that STEER-COMPLIANCE operates in a fundamentally different subspace than the refusal direction. This is expected: the two vectors are extracted from different data—STEER-COMPLIANCE contrasts compliant vs. refusal continuations on benign Alpaca prompts, while the refusal direction contrasts activations on harmful vs. harmless prompts.

We further compare ASR under direct requesting (intrinsic vulnerabilities):

Table 6: Intrinsic ASR: refusal-direction ablation vs. STEER-COMPLIANCE.

Model	Refusal Dir. ASR (α=0.5/1.0/1.5/2.0)	STEER-COMPL. ASR
Llama-2-7B-Chat	13%/17%/16%/12%	18%
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	20%/22%/18%/15%	36%

STEER-COMPLIANCE achieves 36% ASR on Llama-3-8B-Instruct, while the refusal direction peaks at 22% ($\alpha = 1.0$) and declines at higher coefficients. This divergent ASR profile, combined with near-zero cosine similarity, indicates that they capture different phenomena: compliance steering does not simply remove the refusal direction but instead induces a broader distributional shift.

B Implementation Details

In this section, we outline the implementation details and hyperparameter settings for our steering methods. Specifically, we first discuss the implementation of steering vector generation, followed by the hyperparameter configurations for the steering methods.

B.1 Steering Vector Generation

- **STEER-COMPLIANCE:** As discussed in Sec. 3, we follow the behavior vector generation procedure inspired by CAST [13]. However, while the original CAST implementation generates vectors meant to drive the model toward refusal behavior, our approach differs. We utilize 100 benign questions from the Alpaca dataset, pairing each with both a compliance and a refusal response. For example, for a benign question such as Given a sentence, please provide the proper punctuation, we attach an affirmative response and a refusal response (e.g., I regret to inform you that I can't). Instead of steering in the refusal direction, we utilize PCA to identify the first principal direction toward compliance.
- **STEER-JSON:** We utilize instruction-following prompts to generate a steering vector that controls the format of the LLM's response. Specifically, following the methodology in Stolfo et al. [30], we construct a dataset of paired prompts using 400 questions sampled from IFEVAL. Unlike **STEER-COMPLIANCE**, these instruction pairs contrast the presence of a formatting constraint. For example:
  - List 3 fruits.
  - List 3 fruits in JSON format.

  By extracting the mean difference between the hidden states of these paired instructions, we steer the LLM to be more likely to generate responses in JSON format.

- **STEER-ACT:** We follow the ACT procedure of Wang et al. [37]. Using the TruthfulQA multiple-choice validation set (approximately 814 questions and about 5000 question-answer pairs), we perform 2-fold cross-validation for direction construction and probe learning. Within each fold, we use an 80/20 train/validation split on the training portion for hyperparameter selection and probe fitting. For each question-answer pair, we extract per-head activations at the last token of the concatenated sequence and compute per-question directional representations by subtracting the mean untruthful activation from the mean truthful activation. These directional representations are clustered with K-means ($C = 3$) to capture distinct hallucination patterns. For each cluster, we train a binary linear probe on the corresponding subset, and the probe weight vector is used as the steering direction for the corresponding head and layer. We select the top-$K = 24$ heads per cluster ranked by validation accuracy. At inference time, ACT applies adaptive steering with coefficient $\alpha = 12$ and $\beta = 0$, following Wang et al. [37].
- **STEER-ASM:** We follow the ASM procedure of Li et al. [14]. We collect training traces from 200 examples in the GSM8k training set by recording layer-wise activation trajectories while the model processes correct solution paths. For each selected transformer layer, we train an independent activation state machine parameterized by a state transition matrix F, an observation matrix H, and a gain matrix K. Training minimizes one-step prediction error on the recorded activation trajectories for 30 epochs using the Adam optimizer, with state dimension $d_s = 256$. At inference time, the ASM computes a token-dependent corrective intervention that nudges the model back toward the learned reasoning trajectory when its hidden state deviates. Unlike STEER-COMPLIANCE, STEER-JSON, and STEER-ACT, STEER-ASM is a stateful, history-dependent intervention rather than a fixed steering vector.

B.2 Hyperparameter settings

Since we employ two distinct steering methodologies, it is necessary to discuss the specific hyperparameters selected for each. The optimal configuration varies between methods due to the nature of the steering vectors and the tasks they target. Below, we detail the hyperparameter settings chosen for **STEER-ACT**, **STEER-ASM**, **STEER-COMPLIANCE** and **STEER-JSON**:

- **STEER-ACT:** We use the full-data hyperparameters from [37]: $\alpha = 12$, $\beta = 0$, top-$K = 24$ heads, $C = 3$ clusters. Steering layers follow the same configuration as STEER-COMPLIANCE.
- **STEER-ASM:** We train ASMs for 30 epochs with a learning rate of 5×10^{-4}, state dimension $d_s = 256$, and the Adam optimizer. The optimal steering strength α was selected via grid search: $\alpha = 0.3$ for Llama-2-7B-Chat, $\alpha = 0.05$ for Llama-3-8B-Instruct, and $\alpha = 0.2$ for Gemma-7B-it. Steered layers: layers $\{28\}$ for Llama-2-7B-Chat, layers $\{16, 24\}$ for Llama-3-8B-Instruct, and layer $\{14\}$ for Gemma-7B-it.
- **STEER-COMPLIANCE:** This method involves two key hyperparameters: **i) steering strength (coefficient)** and **ii) steering layers**. To select the steering coefficient, we conduct a benign-only calibration study on Llama-3-8B-Instruct, sweeping $\alpha \in \{0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0\}$. For each coefficient, we evaluate two metrics on the same set of 100 benign Alpaca questions: **(i)** Alpaca win-rate, which measures general response quality on harmless prompts, and **(ii)** harmless refusal rate, which measures unnecessary refusals on the same benign prompt distribution. Figure 5 shows the intended goal of STEER-COMPLIANCE is to reduce unnecessary refusals while preserving benign response quality. We therefore use a quality-preserving strong-compliance selection rule: choose the largest coefficient whose Alpaca win-rate remains approximately at the original model's baseline while further reducing harmless refusals. Under this rule, the selected coefficient is approximately $\alpha = 1.3$. Larger coefficients enter an over-steered regime where benign win-rate drops below the original model. We use $\alpha = 1.3$ for the main STEER-COMPLIANCE experiments. For steering layers, we follow the CAST implementation and apply the intervention to layers 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 across all models.

  For the consistency of experiment, we follow the basic implementation of CAST in terms of steering layers, in which we keep the steering layers as **layer 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,**

24, which is consistent with colab implementation of Lee et al. [13] across all models in each experiment.

- **STEER-JSON:** Unlike STEER-COMPLIANCE, our instruction-following approach dynamically determines the strength coefficient. Regarding the selection of steering layers, we adopt the grid search method used by Stolfo et al. [30] to identify the optimal layer for maximizing JSON Correctness. Consequently, we utilize **layer 15** for Gemma-7B-it, **layer 16** for Llama-2-7B-Chat, and **layer 6** for Llama-3-8B-Instruct. All selected layers were identified via the instruction-following algorithm.



Figure 5: An ablation study on Llama-3-8B-Instruct by varying the coefficient of steering strength. We plot out two lines, the blue line indicates the Win-Rate which measures the ability of LLMs generating on benign questions sampled from Alpaca after steering and the red line indicates the Refusal Rate on the same sets sampled from Alpaca.

B.3 Evaluation of the utility

In our steering, we measure two different utilities:

- **Harmless Refusal Rate:** We evaluate this metric by measuring the refusal rate using two distinct judges. First, we employ Distilroberta-Base-Rejection-v1 [25], which determines whether a response constitutes a rejection or compliance. Second, we utilize the SorryBench judge, a fine-tuned LLM based on Mistral-7B-v0.2. This judge classifies whether the generated response complies with the given query.
- **JSON Correctness:** Adhering to the instruction-following evaluation protocol [30], we assess whether the model's output conforms to valid JSON syntax. As shown in Listing 1, we utilize a specific function to verify if the response can be successfully parsed as a JSON object.

Listing 1: Check JSON Validity Function

```
def check_following(self, value):
    value = (
        value.strip()
        .removeprefix("```json")
        .removeprefix("```Json")
```

```
        .removeprefix("```JSON")
        .removeprefix("````")
        .removesuffix("````")
        .strip()
    )
    try:
      json.loads(value)
    except ValueError as _:
      return False
    return True
```

- **Truthfulness utility for STEER-ACT:** We evaluate truthfulness utility using the TruthfulQA multiple-choice metrics MC1 and MC2. For each fold in the 2-fold cross-validation setup, utility is reported on the held-out test fold only, ensuring that probe learning and direction clustering are disjoint from evaluation. We then average the resulting MC1 and MC2 scores across folds. Higher MC1 and MC2 indicate better truthfulness.

  TruthfulQA multiple-choice metrics. For STEER-ACT, we evaluate truthfulness using the TruthfulQA multiple-choice metrics MC1 and MC2. For each question q_i, let a_{ij} denote an answer candidate and let $P_\theta(a_{ij} \mid q_i)$ be the model probability of that answer, computed from its conditional log-likelihood.

  MC1 measures whether the designated correct answer is the most likely answer. Given one correct reference answer $a_i^\star$ and a set of incorrect alternatives, MC1 is defined as

$$\mathrm{MC1} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbb{1}\left[\arg\max_j P_\theta(a_{ij} \mid q_i) = a_i^\star\right]. \tag{4}$$

  Thus, MC1 is a top-1 accuracy metric over answer choices.

  MC2 measures the normalized probability mass assigned to all correct answers. Let $\mathcal{C}_i$ be the set of correct answers and $\mathcal{I}_i$ be the set of incorrect answers for question i. MC2 is defined as

$$\mathrm{MC2} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\sum_{j\in\mathcal{C}_i} P_\theta(a_{ij} \mid q_i)}{\sum_{j\in\mathcal{C}_i} P_\theta(a_{ij} \mid q_i) + \sum_{k\in\mathcal{I}_i} P_\theta(a_{ik} \mid q_i)}. \tag{5}$$

  In plain terms, MC1 asks whether the single best answer wins, while MC2 asks what fraction of probability mass is assigned to correct answers rather than incorrect answers. MC2 is therefore more sensitive to calibration across multiple plausible correct answers.

- **Reasoning utility for STEER-ASM:** We evaluate reasoning utility using zero-shot accuracy on 100 held-out GSM8k test examples. These evaluation examples are disjoint from the 200 GSM8k training examples used to collect activation traces for ASM training. Higher accuracy indicates better reasoning performance.

Result comparability and accounting. All main ASR numbers are computed from raw success counts on a fixed HarmBench sample of $n = 100$ prompts, using the HarmBench classifier as the judge. Within each table, all compared conditions use the same prompt sample, decoding settings, judge, attack budget, and frozen steering hyperparameters. When a table uses a different sample size, steering coefficient, mitigation protocol, or judge, we state this explicitly and avoid direct numerical comparison with the main results. We report both percentages and raw counts where possible to make differences auditable.

Computation Resources. All experiments were conducted on NVIDIA A800 GPUs (80GB). Models up to 8B parameters (Llama-2-7B-Chat, Llama-3-8B-Instruct, Gemma-7B-it) were run on a single A800 GPU, while the larger Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct required two A800 GPUs. Steering vector construction, utility evaluation, safety evaluation, and jailbreak attack pipelines (CoP, PAIR, TAP) were all executed on the same hardware setup.

Table 7: Full numerical values for Figure 2. All values are ASR (%) on 100 HarmBench prompts. Benchmark-only evaluates direct harmful prompts; CoP, PAIR, and TAP evaluate adaptive black-box jailbreak attacks.

Evaluation	Model	Original	STEER-ACT	STEER-ASM	STEER-COMPLIANCE	STEER-JSON
Benchmark-only	Llama-2-7B-Chat	0%	16%	13%	18%	14%
	Llama-3-8B-Instruct	4%	25%	18%	36%	22%
	Gemma-7B-it	4%	19%	17%	21%	15%
CoP	Llama-2-7B-Chat	75%	92%	84%	97%	89%
	Llama-3-8B-Instruct	73%	90%	88%	93%	86%
	Gemma-7B-it	71%	93%	91%	99%	91%
PAIR	Llama-2-7B-Chat	11%	25%	22%	27%	19%
	Llama-3-8B-Instruct	42%	66%	51%	72%	47%
	Gemma-7B-it	46%	72%	63%	77%	55%
TAP	Llama-2-7B-Chat	16%	30%	26%	33%	28%
	Llama-3-8B-Instruct	50%	70%	60%	80%	56%
	Gemma-7B-it	53%	85%	72%	84%	65%

Table 8: Additional benchmark-only and CoP ASR results on Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-2501. All values are ASR (%). Lower is better. Steering increases both direct HarmBench vulnerability and adaptive CoP vulnerability across all four steering methods.

Configuration	Benchmark-only ASR ↓	CoP ASR ↓
Original	8%	84%
STEER-ACT	17%	95%
STEER-ASM	13%	93%
STEER-COMPLIANCE	25%	99%
STEER-JSON	10%	90%

C Full ASR Values for Main Experiments

C.1 Additional Mistral-Small-24B Results

To test whether the main trend extends beyond the three primary 7B–8B models, we additionally evaluate Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-2501 under benchmark-only and CoP settings. We evaluate all four steering methods in the same order as the main paper: STEER-ACT, STEER-ASM, STEER-COMPLIANCE, and STEER-JSON. Because these experiments only include benchmark-only and CoP evaluation, we report them separately from the full PAIR/TAP results in Fig. 2.

Table 8 shows that steering externalities also appear on Mistral-Small-24B-Instruct-2501. Benchmark-only ASR increases for all four methods, with the largest direct regression under STEER-COMPLIANCE. Under CoP, the original model already has high ASR at 84%, but steering further amplifies attack success, reaching 95% for STEER-ACT, 93% for STEER-ASM, 99% for STEER-COMPLIANCE, and 90% for STEER-JSON. These results support the same qualitative conclusion as the main experiments.

D Win-Rate measurement of Compliance Steering

As Sec. 4 shows, adding both STEER-COMPLIANCE and STEER-JSON improves overall utility by lowering the harmless refusal rate and increasing JSON extraction in the response. A natural question arises: how well does the steered model perform in terms of general response quality? In this section, we introduce an additional utility measurement:

- **Win-Rate** measures whether the responses generated by a given LLM are better than those generated by a reference model. In our evaluation, we use **GPT-4** as the reference model (judge). The purpose of this metric is to assess the general capability of LLM responses after steering.

We follow the procedures described in Sec.4.1 and perform compliance steering on three target models. We sampled 100 questions from Alpaca and evaluated the Win-Rate, as shown in Table 9.

Table 9: Length invariant Win-Rate by applying compliance steering on original models and evaluated on 100 Alpaca questions. After steering, all LLMs have higher Win-Rate indicating the overall generation qualities are improved.

Models	ORI (Win-Rate)	STEER COMPLIANCE (Win-Rate)
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	2.51	**2.79**
Llama-2-7B-Chat-hf	0.31	**4.67**
Gemma-7B-it	2.38	**3.88**

As the compliance behavior vectors are injected into the target models, we observe an overall increasing trend in Win-Rate. In particular, the Llama-2-7B-Chat-hf model originally had a Win-Rate of 0.31, which increased to 4.67 after compliance steering. This further supports the hypothesis that model developers prioritize improving overall generation quality (i.e., utility).

E Additional Safety Benchmark: Harmful SorryBench (No Jailbreak)

In addition to HarmBench ASR, we report a complementary safety benchmark that measures refusal behavior directly on harmful SorryBench prompts without applying any jailbreak attack. Table 10 shows that benign steering reduces refusal rates on harmful prompts across all tested models (i.e., lower refusal ↓ indicates worse safety), consistent with the intrinsic safety regressions observed on HarmBench.

Table 10: Benign steering reduces refusal rates on harmful SorryBench prompts even without explicit jailbreak attacks (RoBERTa judge). Lower refusal rate (↓) implies worse safety.

	Refusal rate on harmful SorryBench (↓ worse safety; no jailbreak attack)				
Model	Original	STEER-COMPLIANCE	Δ	STEER-JSON	Δ
Llama-2-7B-Chat	85.00%	79.00%	-6.00	75.00%	-10.00
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	25.00%	11.00%	-14.00	23.00%	-2.00
Gemma-7B-it	85.00%	53.00%	-32.00	70.00%	-15.00

F Measuring Refusal Rate by using an additional judge

In this section, we utilize a different refusal judge, SorryBench fine-tuned Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2, to measure the overall refusal rate. Specifically, we employ the SorryBench fine-tuned Mistral-7B-v0.2 model to judge the refusal rate/harmfulness, providing a complementary perspective to the Roberta-based evaluation used in Sec. 4.

Table 11: Refusal Rate between original target LLMs and compliance steered LLMs on Harmful SorryBench data using fine-tuned Mistral as Judge. After steering, all LLMs have a lower refusal rate than the original model.

Models	Original Refusal Rate	Compliance Steered Refusal Rate (SorryBench Judge)
Llama-2-7B-Chat	90.00%	**83.00%**
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	86.00%	**30.00%**
Gemma-7B-it	90.00%	**68.00%**

As shown in Table 11, the safety regression is particularly severe for Llama-3-8B-Instruct, where the refusal rate plummets from 86% to 30%, and Gemma-7B-it, which drops from 90% to 68%. Even Llama-2-7B-Chat, which appears more robust, exhibits a non-trivial decrease in refusal rates. This indicates that the "compliance" direction identified by the steering vectors does not discriminate between benign and malicious requests; rather, it broadly suppresses the model's refusal mechanisms.

Consequently, while activation steering successfully enhances the model's helpfulness on standard tasks, it inadvertently acts as a "jailbreak," bypassing the safety alignment training and exposing the model to significant vulnerabilities when maximizing utility.

Table 12: Refusal Rate between original target LLMs and JSON steered LLMs on Harmful Sorry-Bench data using fine-tuned Mistral as Judge. After steering, all LLMs have a lower refusal rate than the original model.

Models	Original Refusal Rate	JSON Steered Refusal Rate (SorryBench Judge)
Llama-2-7B-Chat	90.00%	**86.00%**
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	86.00%	**83.00%**
Gemma-7B-it	90.00%	**85.00%**

Results in Table 12 indicate that as by applying STEER-JSON into the models, the overall refusal rate decreases across all steered models. This finding is consistent with the compliance steering, which implies that the safety alignment of the original models is eroded by the steering. However, such alignment erosion appears to have less impact than compliance steering, since the refusal rate for JSON steering decreases less than under the compliance setting.

G Intrinsic and Synergistic Vulnerabilities on additional LLMs

To test whether **steering externalities** generalize beyond the three main target models in our paper, we additionally evaluate `Llama-3-8B-Instruct-RR` and `GPT-OSS-20B` under the same two-regime protocol used throughout: (i) benchmark-only intrinsic vulnerability, where we directly query the target model with harmful prompts; and (ii) synergistic vulnerability, where we run an adaptive black-box jailbreak (CoP) against the target model and measure the resulting Attack Success Rate (ASR) using the HarmBench classifier. We use 50 randomly sampled HarmBench harmful questions for both regimes.

For these two additional architectures, we only report **STEER-COMPLIANCE** [13]. The official implementation we follow for **STEER-JSON** (instruction-following) [30] does not support these model architectures, the full list of supporting models can be found in Nanda and Bloom [22], preventing a faithful reproduction of the same steering pipeline. Therefore, Appendix G focuses on the compliance-steering externality.

Table 13 shows that **even when the original models exhibit a 0% benchmark-only ASR**, applying STEER-COMPLIANCE introduces a measurable intrinsic safety regression (0%→2% on `Llama-3-8B-Instruct-RR`, and 0%→6% on `GPT-OSS-20B`). While these absolute increases are small in the benchmark-only regime, they indicate that compliance-oriented steering can partially erode refusal behavior even without any adaptive attack.

More importantly, the synergistic effect under black-box jailbreaking is substantial: when combined with CoP, STEER-COMPLIANCE increases ASR by **18%** on `Llama-3-8B-Instruct-RR` (52%→70%) and by **22%** points on `GPT-OSS-20B` (62%→84%). This mirrors our main finding that benign compliance steering acts as a **force multiplier** for adaptive jailbreak pipelines: even a modest reduction in refusal robustness can be amplified by an attacker that iteratively searches for prompts that elicit non-refusal trajectories.

These additional results support that benign STEER-COMPLIANCE might unintentionally loosen the safety guardrails leading to harmful generation

H Dose-Response Analysis: Utility–Safety Asymmetry

The main results in Sec. 4 report safety regressions at fixed steering coefficients selected to match each method's recommended configuration. A natural concern is whether the resulting safety drop constitutes a "reasonable trade-off" for the corresponding utility gain. To address this quantitatively, we provide a dose-response analysis on **Llama-3-8B-Instruct** that sweeps the steering strength α for STEER-COMPLIANCE, STEER-ACT, and STEER-ASM, and measures the per-step trade-off between intended utility and HarmBench ASR.

Table 13: Attack Success Rate (ASR) by applying black-box jailbreak attack CoP on additional models: Llama-3-8B-Instruct-RR and GPT-OSS-20B respectively on 50 Harmbench questions. After steering, all LLMs are more vulnerable to jailbreak attacks.

Model	Original ASR	STEER-COMPLIANCE Benchmark-Only ASR	CoP Original ASR	CoP with STEER-COMPLIANCE ASR
Llama-3-8B-Instruct-RR	0%	**2% (+2)**	52%	**70% (+18)**
GPT-OSS-20B	0%	**6% (+6)**	62%	**84% (+22)**

Table 14: Utility–safety asymmetry at the best Pareto operating point on Llama-3-8B-Instruct. ΔU and $\Delta\mathrm{ASR}$ are measured in percentage points relative to the unsteered baseline (α=0).

Method	Utility metric	$\Delta U(\alpha^\star)$	$\Delta\mathrm{ASR}(\alpha^\star)$	$r(\alpha^\star)$
STEER-COMPLIANCE	Harmless refusal ↓	+2.0 pp	+27 pp	13.5×
STEER-ACT	TruthfulQA MC2 ↑	+5.9 pp	+21 pp	3.6×
STEER-ASM	GSM8k accuracy ↑	+2.0 pp	+14 pp	7.0×

Asymmetry ratio. Let $U(\alpha)$ denote the intended utility metric—TruthfulQA MC2 for STEER-ACT, GSM8k accuracy for STEER-ASM, and the reduction in harmless refusal rate for STEER-COMPLIANCE—and let $\mathrm{ASR}(\alpha)$ denote the HarmBench Attack Success Rate. Define $\Delta U(\alpha) = U(\alpha) - U(0)$ and $\Delta\mathrm{ASR}(\alpha) = \mathrm{ASR}(\alpha) - \mathrm{ASR}(0)$, both in percentage points. We define the utility–safety asymmetry ratio at steering strength α as

$$r(\alpha) \;=\; \frac{\Delta\mathrm{ASR}(\alpha)}{\max\big(\Delta U(\alpha),\, \epsilon\big)}, \tag{6}$$

with $\epsilon = 0.5$ pp to guard against division by negligible utility gains. A ratio of $1\times$ corresponds to a one-for-one exchange; values above $1\times$ indicate that each percentage point of utility gained costs more than one percentage point of safety. We report $r(\alpha^\star)$ at the best Pareto operating point $\alpha^\star = \arg\max_\alpha \Delta U(\alpha)$, i.e., the steering strength that maximizes the intended utility on its own benchmark.

Dose-response curves. Figures 6–8 plot paired ASR and utility curves against α, with $\alpha^\star$ marked by a star and the asymmetry ratio displayed in the callout box. Three observations are consistent across all methods.

(i) Utility saturates while safety remains degraded. For STEER-COMPLIANCE, the harmless refusal rate reaches its floor (0%) at $\alpha = 0.5$; any further increase in α produces zero additional utility. HarmBench ASR, however, remains substantially elevated throughout the post-saturation regime—reaching 58% at α=1.0 and fluctuating between 36% and 48% at higher coefficients—compared to just 4% at baseline. A practitioner who tunes α by monitoring the utility curve alone may continue past the utility floor without recognizing the sustained safety degradation.

(ii) Past the utility peak, both utility and safety degrade simultaneously. For STEER-ACT, TruthfulQA MC2 peaks at α=12 (+5.9 pp) then decreases at α=15 (+0.3 pp), while ASR remains elevated at 23%. For STEER-ASM, GSM8k accuracy peaks at α=0.05 (+2.0 pp) and falls below the unsteered baseline at α=0.15 (−4 pp), while ASR continues to rise to 25%. Beyond $\alpha^\star$, the trajectory enters a doubly-unfavorable regime where both utility and safety are worse than the unsteered model.

(iii) Even the best Pareto operating point exhibits substantial asymmetry. Table 14 reports $r(\alpha^\star)$ for each method. At the steering strength that maximizes utility, the per-percentage-point safety cost exceeds the corresponding utility gain by factors of $3.6\times$ (STEER-ACT), $7.0\times$ (STEER-ASM), and $13.5\times$ (STEER-COMPLIANCE). The asymmetry grows substantially at non-optimal α and is unbounded once $\Delta U(\alpha) \le 0$.

Implication. Across all three benign steering methods, the safety cost per unit of utility is large at the utility-maximizing operating point ($\ge 3.6\times$, and above $7\times$ for two of three methods), and there is no α that achieves a favorable trade-off. Combined with the back-folding behavior past $\alpha^\star$ (observation (ii)), this shows that monitoring the utility curve alone is an unsafe deployment heuristic: a developer can land on a configuration that is simultaneously suboptimal in utility and substantially less safe than the unsteered model. Whether a given asymmetry ratio is acceptable depends on the



Figure 6: Dose-response curve for **STEER-COMPLIANCE** on Llama-3-8B-Instruct. The harmless refusal rate (blue, right axis) reaches its floor at $\alpha^\star$=0.5 while HarmBench ASR (red, left axis) remains substantially elevated throughout the post-saturation regime. At $\alpha^\star$, the asymmetry ratio is $r(\alpha^\star) = 13.5\times$.



Figure 7: Dose-response curve for **STEER-ACT** on Llama-3-8B-Instruct. TruthfulQA MC2 peaks at $\alpha^\star$=12 and declines at α=15, while ASR remains elevated. At $\alpha^\star$, the asymmetry ratio is $r(\alpha^\star) = 3.6\times$.

deployment context, but the empirical analysis establishes that benign activation steering does not exchange utility and safety at parity—the safety cost consistently dominates.

I Random-Direction Baseline

The main experiments show that utility-directed activation steering increases harmful-response ASR. A natural question is whether this degradation is caused by the specific utility direction, or whether



Figure 8: Dose-response curve for **STEER-ASM** on Llama-3-8B-Instruct. GSM8k accuracy peaks at $\alpha^\star$=0.05 (+2 pp) and drops below baseline at α=0.15 (−4 pp). At $\alpha^\star$, the asymmetry ratio is $r(\alpha^\star) = 7.0\times$.

any activation perturbation of comparable magnitude would similarly weaken safety. To isolate these two possibilities, we add a random-direction baseline.

For each model and steering method, we construct random perturbations that match the corresponding utility steering intervention in layer, intervention site, and norm. For a fixed residual-stream steering vector v_ℓ at layer ℓ, we sample $z_\ell \sim \mathcal{N}(0, I)$ and inject

$$r_\ell = \|v_\ell\|_2 \frac{z_\ell}{\|z_\ell\|_2}, \tag{7}$$

using the same steering coefficient and decoding settings as the utility-directed intervention. For methods with multiple intervention sites, such as attention-head steering, we independently sample a norm-matched random vector at each site. This baseline preserves the magnitude and placement of the intervention while removing the learned utility-directed component.

We evaluate the random baseline in the benchmark-only HarmBench setting, without an external jailbreak attack. Let $\mathrm{ASR}_{\mathrm{orig}}$ be the original model ASR, $\mathrm{ASR}_{\mathrm{rand}}$ be the ASR under the matched random perturbation, and $\mathrm{ASR}_{\mathrm{util}}$ be the ASR under the corresponding utility-directed steering method. We define the fraction of the steering externality explained by generic perturbation as

$$\text{Explained} = 100 \cdot \frac{\mathrm{ASR}_{\mathrm{rand}} - \mathrm{ASR}_{\mathrm{orig}}}{\mathrm{ASR}_{\mathrm{util}} - \mathrm{ASR}_{\mathrm{orig}}}. \tag{8}$$

Negative values indicate that the random perturbation is safer than the original model on the sampled benchmark.

Table 15 shows that generic activation perturbation explains only a small fraction of the observed steering externality. Across the twelve model–method combinations, random perturbations explain approximately 14% of the utility-steering safety degradation on average, and the explained fraction is below 30% in 11 of 12 conditions. The only exception is STEER-JSON on Llama-2-7B-Chat, where the random perturbation explains 43% of the degradation. Even in that case, the random baseline remains substantially less harmful than the utility-directed steering vector.

The absolute ASR values show the same pattern. Original benchmark-only ASR ranges from 0–4%, and random steering increases ASR only to 0–12%. By contrast, utility-directed steering increases ASR to 13–36%. Thus, most of the safety degradation is not caused by injecting an arbitrary vector into the residual stream or attention heads. Rather, the learned utility direction itself contains a safety-relevant component that shifts the model toward non-refusal or task-completion trajectories.

Table 15: Random-direction baseline ASR (%) under benchmark-only HarmBench evaluation. "Random" matches the layer/site and norm of the corresponding steering intervention but randomizes its direction. "Utility" is the original utility-directed steering vector. "Explained" measures the fraction of the utility-steering safety degradation attributable to generic perturbation rather than the learned utility direction.

Model	Condition	STEER-ACT	STEER-ASM	STEER-COMPLIANCE	STEER-JSON
Llama-2-7B-Chat	Original	0	0	0	0
	Random	2	3	4	6
	Utility	16	13	18	14
	Explained	12%	23%	22%	43%
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	Original	4	4	4	4
	Random	0	8	12	7
	Utility	25	18	36	22
	Explained	-19%	29%	25%	17%
Gemma-7B-it	Original	4	4	4	4
	Random	3	5	6	4
	Utility	19	17	21	15
	Explained	-7%	8%	12%	0%

STEER-ACT is the most direction-specific method under this baseline. Random ACT perturbations produce only 0–3% ASR, including two cases where random perturbation is slightly safer than the original model. However, utility-directed ACT steering increases ASR to 16–25%. This is consistent with the structure of ACT: it steers targeted attention-head directions associated with truthfulness, so replacing those learned directions with random per-head vectors mostly injects noise rather than systematically weakening refusal behavior.

The same qualitative conclusion holds across Llama-2-7B-Chat, Llama-3-8B-Instruct, and Gemma-7B-it. The externality therefore does not appear to be an artifact of one model family being unusually sensitive to activation noise. Instead, the random-direction baseline supports the central interpretation of this paper: benign steering externalities arise primarily from the specific utility-directed component of the steering vector, not from generic hidden-state perturbation.

J Attack Efficiency under CoP

The main CoP results report attack success rate (ASR) at the end of the attack budget. Here, we additionally analyze attack efficiency: how quickly CoP reaches its first successful jailbreak. This diagnostic helps distinguish two deployment-relevant failure modes. If steering mainly increases the number of harmful prompts that succeed on the first query, then it lowers the model's safety floor. If steering mainly reduces the number of iterations needed after the first failed attempt, then it makes the model fundamentally easier to crack under iterative search.

For each harmful prompt i, let τ_i denote the first CoP query index at which the HarmBench classifier marks the model response as successful, and let $\tau_i = \infty$ if CoP fails within the query budget B. The empirical attack-efficiency curve is

$$\mathrm{ASR}_{\leq q} = \frac{100}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbf{1}[\tau_i \leq q], \qquad q \in \{1, \ldots, B\}. \tag{9}$$

The endpoint $\mathrm{ASR}_{\leq B}$ corresponds to the CoP ASR reported in the main results. The value at $q = 1$ measures first-query safety-floor loss, while the slope for $q > 1$ measures how much iterative search is needed after the initial attempt.

Table 16 summarizes CoP attack efficiency using the final ASR, mean query count to first success, and median query count to first success. The mean and median are computed over successful CoP runs, so lower values indicate faster attack convergence conditional on success.

Across all three models, every steering method reduces the mean number of CoP queries required to reach first success relative to the corresponding original model. Averaged over the twelve steered

Table 16: CoP attack success rate, mean query count, and median query count to first success across steering methods. Lower Mean/Med Q indicates faster attack convergence conditional on successful jailbreaks.

Model	Metric	Original	STEER-ACT	STEER-ASM	STEER-COMPLIANCE	STEER-JSON
Llama-2-7B-Chat	CoP ASR	75%	92%	84%	97%	89%
	Mean Q	2.23	1.76	1.90	1.57	2.15
	Med Q	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	CoP ASR	73%	90%	88%	93%	86%
	Mean Q	2.15	1.88	2.00	1.00	2.08
	Med Q	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.0
Gemma-7B-it	CoP ASR	71%	93%	91%	99%	91%
	Mean Q	1.57	1.23	1.32	1.13	1.20
	Med Q	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

configurations, the mean query count drops by 0.38 queries, corresponding to an average relative reduction of approximately 19%. On Llama-2-7B-Chat, for example, the original model requires 2.23 queries on average, while STEER-COMPLIANCE reduces this to 1.57 queries, a 30% reduction. On Gemma-7B-it, all four steering methods compress the mean query count from 1.57 to the narrow range of 1.13–1.32.

STEER-COMPLIANCE is the most attack-efficient configuration in all three model families. It attains the lowest mean query count on Llama-2-7B-Chat, Llama-3-8B-Instruct, and Gemma-7B-it, with mean query counts of 1.57, 1.00, and 1.13, respectively. This mirrors its dominance in final CoP ASR, where it reaches 97%, 93%, and 99%. The Llama-3-8B-Instruct result is especially notable: because the minimum possible successful query count is 1, a mean query count of exactly 1.00 implies that every successful CoP run against STEER-COMPLIANCE succeeds on the first attempt. Thus, in this configuration, CoP does not need iterative refinement once the behavior is vulnerable.

At the same time, the medians reveal an important safety-floor effect. In 13 of the 15 model–condition pairs, the median query count is 1.0. This means that the typical successful CoP attack already succeeds on the first query, even for several original models. Therefore, steering does not merely make already-vulnerable behaviors slightly easier to optimize over many iterations. Instead, the dominant effect is that steering expands the set of harmful behaviors for which first-query or near-first-query success is possible. This distinction matters operationally: rate-limiting and iterative-attack-detection defenses retain roughly the same per-query response window, but a larger fraction of single-query harmful requests bypasses the model's safety behavior after steering.

K Qualitative Analysis of Steering

In this section, we show that after **STEER-COMPLIANCE**, the jailbreak output tends to be more positive in terms of answering the harmful question. This implies that since we are steering towards compliance side, we are driving the refusal gate tokens towards more positive in terms of answering questions. Due to the auto-regressive nature of the LLMs, the generation on harmful questions will become less refusal. We want to show three qualitative examples in Figures 9, 10, and 11.



Figure 9: Qualitative comparison on Llama-2-7B-Chat jailbreak responses between Original and Compliance Steered Models



Figure 10: Qualitative comparison on Llama-3-8B-Instruct jailbreak responses between Original and Compliance Steered Models

Across all qualitative examples, it is clear that this compliance behavior exists not only in one model but also holds for others, such as Llama-3-8B-Instruct. This further clarifies why compliance steering loosens safety guardrails.

We also present three additional quantitative jailbreak examples of STEER-JSON. As shown in Figures 12, 13, and 14, adding JSON steering and instruction guidance promotes the generation of structured JSON output during the LLM's generation phase, even when given a CoP jailbreak prompt.



Figure 11: More qualitative comparison on Llama-2-7B-Chat jailbreak responses between Original and Compliance Steered Models



Figure 12: Qualitative comparison on Gemma-7B-it jailbreak responses between Original and JSON Steered Models

L Per-token KL Divergence on Gemma-7B-it

In addition to the Llama-3-8B-Instruct analysis in Sec. 5.2, we report per-token KL divergence on **Gemma-7B-it** for all four steering methods, following the same order as Sec. 3.1: STEER-ACT, STEER-ASM, STEER-COMPLIANCE, and STEER-JSON. All plots use the same KL procedure as Sec. 5.2, comparing the steered model against the original model on harmful HarmBench responses and benign Alpaca responses.

Figure 15 shows that the early-token pattern observed on Llama-3-8B-Instruct also appears on Gemma-7B-it. For STEER-ACT and STEER-ASM, this is notable because the steering objectives are truthfulness and reasoning rather than refusal suppression. STEER-COMPLIANCE and STEER-JSON show the same qualitative behavior for refusal-adjacent and formatting-oriented



Figure 13: Qualitative comparison on Gemma-7B-it jailbreak responses between Original and JSON Steered Models



Figure 14: More qualitative comparison on Gemma-7B-it jailbreak responses between Original and JSON Steered Models

steering. Overall, these results support the early-trajectory hypothesis: utility steering perturbs the first few generated tokens, where the model chooses between safety-preserving and task-completion trajectories, and this perturbation can reduce the effective safety margin under harmful prompts.

M Representation-level analysis (additional visualizations)

In this section, we present additional layerwise t-SNE visualizations of how benign steering changes the representation space of the steered model, using Llama-3-8B-Instruct as the target model. We visualize harmful prompts, harmless prompts, and steered harmful prompts across all layers for four steering objectives: STEER-ACT, STEER-ASM, STEER-COMPLIANCE, and STEER-JSON.

Figure 16 first shows the representation space of the original Llama-3-8B-Instruct without steering. Harmful queries (red) and harmless queries (blue) are already partially separated at the embedding and early-layer stages. As the computation proceeds through deeper layers, this separation becomes increasingly pronounced, suggesting that the model develops a progressively more linearly decodable



(a) STEER-ACT (b) STEER-ASM

(c) STEER-COMPLIANCE (d) STEER-JSON

Figure 15: **Per-token KL divergence on Gemma-7B-it under four steering methods.** Panels (a)–(d) compare the original model with STEER-ACT, STEER-ASM, STEER-COMPLIANCE, and STEER-JSON, respectively. Red lines indicate KL divergence on harmful HarmBench responses, and blue lines indicate KL divergence on benign Alpaca responses. Across methods, KL divergence is concentrated in the early generation window, supporting the early trajectory-selection hypothesis.

harmfulness signal. This observation is further supported by the layerwise linear classification accuracy in Figure 21, where a simple linear classifier can distinguish harmful from harmless prompt representations with high accuracy across most layers.

We next examine how benign steering changes this geometry. Across all four steering methods, the qualitative pattern is consistent: steered harmful representations shift toward regions occupied by harmless prompts. This displacement is visible for STEER-ACT in Figure 17, STEER-ASM in Figure 18, STEER-COMPLIANCE in Figure 19, and STEER-JSON in Figure 20. The shift is especially important because the steering objectives are benign and utility-oriented rather than explicitly adversarial. Nevertheless, the resulting hidden states make harmful prompts appear more similar to harmless prompts in the model's internal representation space.

For STEER-ACT, the steering intervention is designed to improve truthfulness rather than to alter safety behavior. It applies adaptive, probe-based corrections that push selected attention-head activations toward representations associated with truthful answers. However, Figure 17 shows that this truthfulness-oriented intervention also changes the geometry of harmful prompt representations. A non-trivial portion of ACT-steered harmful prompts moves away from the original harmful cluster and overlaps with, or approaches, the harmless cluster across multiple layers. This suggests that even steering toward factuality or answer correctness can unintentionally bias harmful prompts toward answer-producing internal states. In other words, STEER-ACT does not need to explicitly suppress refusal behavior in order to reduce the effective separation between harmful and harmless prompts; it can do so indirectly by pulling harmful queries toward representations associated with cooperative, knowledge-providing completions.

For STEER-ASM, the effect is also visible despite the method being distinct from fixed-vector steering. STEER-ASM uses state-space controllers trained on correct reasoning trajectories and applies token-dependent corrections that nudge hidden states toward learned reasoning dynamics. As shown in Figure 18, ASM-steered harmful prompts also drift toward the harmless region across layers. This indicates that the externality is not limited to contrastive residual-stream directions or refusal-adjacent steering. A stateful reasoning controller can likewise reshape harmful prompt

representations so that they become less separable from benign prompts. Representatively, this is consistent with the hypothesis that reasoning-oriented steering encourages the model to remain in a task-solving trajectory; when the input is harmful, this trajectory may conflict with the refusal trajectory that the aligned model would otherwise enter.

The same qualitative trend appears for STEER-COMPLIANCE and STEER-JSON. Under STEER-COMPLIANCE, Figure 19 shows that harmful prompts are pushed toward the harmless cluster, consistent with the fact that the steering direction is optimized to reduce unnecessary refusals on benign instructions. Although this objective is benign, it is refusal-adjacent: by increasing compliance on harmless prompts, the intervention can also weaken the representational boundary used to separate harmful requests from harmless ones. Under STEER-JSON, Figure 20 shows a similar shift, even though the target behavior is syntactic structured-output following. This suggests that formatting-oriented steering can also interfere with safety-relevant representations, likely by prioritizing instruction-following and output-format constraints over refusal-sensitive hidden-state features.

Taken together, these visualizations support a common representation-level mechanism behind steering externalities. In the original model, harmfulness is encoded as a relatively separable feature in hidden space. After benign steering, harmful prompts are partially "benignized": their representations move toward the harmless subspace and become less distinguishable from harmless prompts. This reduces the representation-level safety margin. Once the hidden state of a harmful prompt crosses, or approaches, the harmless side of the boundary, the model is less likely to activate refusal behavior and more likely to continue along a helpful, truthful, reasoning, compliant, or format-following generation trajectory. This helps explain why all four steering methods can increase harmful-response rates and amplify black-box jailbreak attacks, even when the steering vectors are constructed from benign utility data.

M.1 Limitations of Representation-level Visualizations

We emphasize that t-SNE is a qualitative projection and should not be interpreted as a faithful preservation of all high-dimensional distances or decision boundaries. The apparent 2D boundary is therefore only an illustrative diagnostic. Nevertheless, the consistency of the displacement across STEER-ACT, STEER-ASM, STEER-COMPLIANCE, and STEER-JSON strengthens the interpretation that benign steering reduces the model's safety margin in hidden space. This representation-level pattern also aligns with the token-level refusal-gate hypothesis: when steering moves harmful prompts toward benign-like internal states, the model becomes more likely to enter a non-refusal trajectory in the early generation window, which can then be amplified by autoregressive continuation and adaptive jailbreak search.

N A Natural Mitigation: Orthogonal Compliance Steering (STEER-ORTHO)

The preceding results raise a natural mitigation question: can steering externalities be avoided by explicitly separating utility and safety directions? We test this hypothesis with STEER-ORTHO, a safety-aware variant of compliance steering inspired by the MAT-STEER principle [23]. During vector construction, we jointly optimize a compliance vector v_c and a safety vector v_s while penalizing their alignment with an orthogonality regularizer $\lambda|\cos(v_c, v_s)|^2$. The optimization uses 50 benign Alpaca prompts with CAST-style compliance/refusal contrastive continuations and 50 harmful prompts from BeaverTails [11] to estimate safety-relevant directions. At inference time, only the optimized compliance vector is applied; hence, intuitively, one can focus on utility steering while keeping its safety margins intact.

Steer-Ortho preserves benign utility: on 100 AlpacaEval instances, the refusal rate of Llama-3-8B-Instruct drops from 2% to 0%, matching STEER-COMPLIANCE (cf. Table 2). Table 17 reports the corresponding safety results.

Orthogonalization reduces intrinsic vulnerability relative to pure compliance steering: HarmBench ASR decreases from 36% under STEER-COMPLIANCE to 14% under STEER-ORTHO. However, this mitigation does not remove the synergistic vulnerability. When combined with CoP, STEER-ORTHO reaches 92% ASR, nearly identical to the 93% observed for STEER-COMPLIANCE.



Figure 16: Layerwise t-SNE visualization of harmful vs harmless prompts across layers (Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct).

Table 17: Safety evaluation (ASR) of STEER-ORTHO. Orthogonalization reduces benchmark-only ASR relative to pure compliance steering, but does not eliminate the synergistic vulnerability.

Model		benchmark-only		synergistic vulnerability (CoP)	
	ORI	STEER-COMPLIANCE	STEER-ORTHO	STEER-COMPLIANCE	STEER-ORTHO
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	4%	36%	14%	93%	92%

The mechanistic analysis in Sec. 5.3 helps explain this gap: orthogonalization constrains the global geometry of the steering vector, but does not prevent the local representational shift that pushes individual harmful prompts across the safety boundary. As a result, adaptive jailbreak search can still find prompt reformulations that land in the weakened region, exploiting the reduced safety margin almost as effectively as under pure compliance steering. These results suggest that simple geometric decoupling is insufficient as a deployment defense.

O STEER-BIND Results

We explore STEER-BIND, a safety-aware steering-vector construction strategy that augments each utility-oriented steering pipeline with harmful prompts paired with refusal continuations. Unlike the main benign-steering experiments, STEER-BIND intentionally uses safety data and is therefore reported as a mitigation experiment. We evaluate this principle on Llama-3-8B-Instruct for four steering objectives, following the same order as the main paper: truthfulness (STEER-ACT), reasoning (STEER-ASM), harmless-request compliance (STEER-COMPLIANCE), and structured output formatting (STEER-JSON).

STEER-ACT-BIND. For ACT, we augment the original truthful/untruthful probe-training data with harmful prompts paired with refusal continuations, then re-extract the cluster-specific probes. Table 3 shows that STEER-ACT-BIND retains most of the truthfulness improvement (MC2: 55.3% vs. 57.5% for pure STEER-ACT), while Table 4 shows that it reduces benchmark-only ASR from 25% to 17% and CoP ASR from 90% to 77%.

STEER-ASM-BIND. For ASM, we augment the reasoning-steering construction with harmful-prompt sequences paired with refusal outputs, then retrain the per-layer state-space controllers.



Figure 17: Layerwise t-SNE visualization including ACT steered harmful prompts. Steered harmful representations shift toward the harmless cluster across layers.

STEER-ASM-BIND preserves most of the reasoning utility (79% vs. 80% GSM8k accuracy for pure STEER-ASM) and reduces benchmark-only ASR from 18% to 13%, while CoP ASR decreases from 88% to 80%.

STEER-COMPLIANCE-BIND. For compliance, we construct a mixed dataset with 50 benign Alpaca prompts and 50 harmful BeaverTails prompts [11]. Benign prompts are paired with compliant continuations, while harmful prompts are paired with refusal continuations. We then apply the CAST procedure [13] to extract the principal steering direction. STEER-COMPLIANCE-BIND preserves harmless utility: Alpaca harmless refusal remains below the original model's refusal rate (1% vs. 2%). It also substantially reduces the compliance externality, lowering benchmark-only ASR from 36% to 5% and CoP ASR from 93% to 76%.

STEER-JSON-BIND. For JSON steering, we augment the JSON instruction-steering corpus with harmful prompts paired with refusal continuations, then re-extract the formatting direction following the same instruction-steering procedure. STEER-JSON-BIND preserves part of the structured-output utility: JSON validity decreases from 69% under pure STEER-JSON to 65%, but remains above the original model's 63%. In the adaptive CoP setting, STEER-JSON-BIND reduces ASR from 86% to 76%; the benchmark-only ASR reduces from 22% to 15%.

Across the completed settings, STEER-BIND attenuates steering externalities while preserving most of the intended utility. For ACT, ASM, and compliance steering, benchmark-only ASR decreases by 8, 5, and 31 percentage points, respectively. Under CoP, the safety-aware variants reduce ASR by 13, 8, 17, and 10 percentage points for ACT, ASM, compliance, and JSON steering, respectively. These results suggest that safety-aware data injection is not specific to compliance steering, but can also help probe-based truthfulness steering, stateful reasoning steering, and formatting steering. However, the externality is attenuated rather than eliminated: even safety-aware steered models remain more vulnerable than the unsteered model under adaptive attacks, underscoring the need to red-team steered deployments before release.



Figure 18: Layerwise t-SNE visualization including ASM steered harmful prompts. Steered harmful representations shift toward the harmless cluster across layers.

Table 18: **Effect of STEER-BIND on attack success in Llama-3-8B-Instruct.** Direct ASR measures attack success on the original HarmBench prompts. CoP ASR measures attack success under adaptive jailbreak search. Entries report mean ASR (%) $\pm$ sample standard deviation across five independent runs. Lower values indicate better safety.

	Direct ASR (↓)		**CoP ASR** (↓)	
Steering objective	Pure steering	STEER-BIND	Pure steering	STEER-BIND
Unsteered baseline	5.4 ± 2.6		72.8 ± 3.2	
ACT	24.4 ± 2.6	16.2 ± 3.1	90.2 ± 1.1	76.4 ± 2.7
ASM	18.0 ± 2.5	13.2 ± 0.8	90.8 ± 2.8	81.8 ± 1.8
COMPLIANCE	34.4 ± 2.1	4.8 ± 1.3	85.0 ± 3.9	76.2 ± 3.4
JSON	21.2 ± 2.2	16.4 ± 2.6	82.8 ± 3.6	75.4 ± 1.1

P Anonymous Repository

The source code for reproducing the experiments in this paper is available at: `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SteeringExternality`. The repository will be made public upon acceptance of the paper.

Q Impact Statement

We aim to advance the field of AI safety by uncovering the unintended consequences of activation steering, a technique increasingly used to enhance the utility of LLMs.

Q.1 Positive Societal Impact

Our work highlights a critical blind spot in current model deployment pipelines: that model developers optimize for benign intentions like “helpfulness/compliance” or “instruction adherence” can accidentally erode safety guardrails. By demonstrating that "shallow" safety alignment can be bypassed through internal representation shifts, we motivate the research community to move beyond



Figure 19: Layerwise t-SNE visualization including compliance steered harmful prompts. Steered harmful representations shift toward the harmless cluster across layers.

surface-level refusal training. This work encourages the development of more robust alignment techniques that persist deeper into the generation trajectory and necessitates the inclusion of steering evaluations in safety audits before deployment.

Q.2 Alignment evaluation beyond safety

While we focus on refusal and harmful-completion robustness, the same mechanism that shifts early-token behavior can plausibly affect other alignment-relevant properties. Benign steering directions learned to optimize utility (e.g., compliance, formatting, style) may introduce regressions in truthfulness/hallucination rates, bias and toxicity, privacy leakage, overconfidence/calibration, or instruction-hierarchy behavior (e.g., prioritizing format constraints over policy constraints). This suggests that auditing steered models should include broader alignment evaluations—not only safety refusal—because steering acts as a general-purpose change to the model's internal decision boundary, and externalities may surface on axes unrelated to the original steering objective.

Q.3 Potential Risks and Mitigations

We acknowledge that this research involves the study of jailbreaking dynamics and demonstrates how steering can act as a "force multiplier" for adversarial attacks. While this knowledge could theoretically be leveraged by malicious actors to bypass safety filters, we believe that the vulnerability exists regardless of its public disclosure. The steering vectors studied here are derived from benign data (e.g., standard instruction tuning), meaning developers might be deploying compromised models without realizing it. Therefore, we believe the benefits of exposing this "steering externality"—to enable the development of defenses such as STEER-BIND—outweigh the risks of disclosure.

R Limitation and Future Directions

Steering method coverage. We evaluate four steering paradigms spanning contrastive (STEER-COMPLIANCE), instruction-following (STEER-JSON), probe-based adaptive (STEER-ACT), and stateful trajectory-imitation (STEER-ASM) methods. This selection covers the major families of inference-time steering in current use. As new steering techniques emerge—such as SAE-based



Figure 20: Layerwise t-SNE visualization including JSON steered harmful prompts. Steered harmful representations shift toward the harmless cluster across layers.



Figure 21: Linear separability (classification accuracy) of harmful vs harmless prompt regressions observed on HarmBench latent representations across layers.

feature steering or multi-attribute steering—extending the externality analysis to these methods would further generalize our conclusions.

Mitigation as a research direction. STEER-ORTHO and STEER-BIND are presented as proof-of-concept demonstrations that safety-aware steering construction can meaningfully attenuate externalities while preserving utility. STEER-BIND in particular reduces CoP ASR by 10–17 percentage points across all four steering objectives (Table 4), establishing that the externality is not an inherent property of activation steering but can be addressed through careful vector construction. Developing production-grade defenses that further close the remaining gap under adaptive attacks—potentially combining data-injection strategies with runtime safety monitoring—is an important and tractable direction for follow-up work.

Broader alignment dimensions. Our evaluation focuses on refusal robustness and jailbreak susceptibility, which are the most directly safety-critical axes for deployed models. The mechanistic analysis in Section 5 reveals that steering induces systematic shifts in the model's internal decision boundary,

which suggests that externalities may also manifest along other alignment-relevant dimensions such as calibration, hallucination rates, or bias. Extending the externality framework to these additional axes would provide a more complete picture of the costs and benefits of inference-time steering and inform the design of comprehensive deployment audits.

S Statistical Stability Across HarmBench Resamples

Evaluation protocol. To assess sensitivity to the choice of evaluation prompts, we conduct five repeated safety evaluations, each using an independently sampled set of 100 harmful HarmBench prompts. For each run, we repeat the benchmark-only evaluation and adaptive jailbreak evaluation with CoP, PAIR, and TAP for the original models and their four benign steering configurations, following the evaluation procedures in Sec. 4.1. The analysis covers Llama-2-7B-Chat, Llama-3-8B-Instruct, and Gemma-7B-it.

Summary statistics. Table 19 reports the mean ASR and sample standard deviation across the five runs. Let a_r denote the ASR in percentage points for run r. We compute

$$\bar{a} = \frac{1}{5}\sum_{r=1}^{5} a_r, \qquad s = \sqrt{\frac{1}{4}\sum_{r=1}^{5}(a_r - \bar{a})^2}.$$

For nonzero across-run variance, an approximate pointwise 95% confidence interval for the mean is

$$\bar{a} \pm t_{0.975,4}\frac{s}{\sqrt{5}} \approx \bar{a} \pm 1.24s,$$

under the usual independent, approximately normal run-level sampling assumptions. Here, $t_{0.975,4}$ is the 97.5th percentile of Student's t distribution with four degrees of freedom. We display mean $\pm$ SD for compactness. The 0.0 ± 0.0 entry indicates that no successful attacks were observed in those runs; it does not establish zero underlying attack probability.

Table 19: ASR (%) across five independently resampled HarmBench evaluations, with 100 prompts per run. Entries report mean $\pm$ sample standard deviation across runs. Original denotes the unsteered baseline, reevaluated on the resampled prompts. ACT, ASM, COMPLIANCE, and JSON abbreviate the corresponding STEER- configurations.

Model	**Original**	ACT	ASM	COMPLIANCE	JSON
Benchmark-only					
Llama-2-7B-Chat	0.0 ± 0.0	16.8 ± 3.8	12.8 ± 3.2	16.4 ± 2.6	14.4 ± 3.4
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	5.4 ± 2.6	24.4 ± 2.6	18.0 ± 2.5	34.4 ± 2.1	21.2 ± 2.2
Gemma-7B-it	4.0 ± 3.2	19.4 ± 3.0	17.8 ± 2.7	19.8 ± 3.1	13.4 ± 2.1
CoP					
Llama-2-7B-Chat	75.0 ± 2.5	93.4 ± 2.5	87.4 ± 1.8	96.0 ± 0.7	89.2 ± 1.6
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	72.8 ± 3.2	90.2 ± 1.1	90.8 ± 2.8	85.0 ± 3.9	82.8 ± 3.6
Gemma-7B-it	72.8 ± 2.0	95.6 ± 0.9	93.0 ± 1.7	95.4 ± 0.9	90.6 ± 2.3
PAIR					
Llama-2-7B-Chat	12.0 ± 1.4	25.4 ± 3.9	23.2 ± 2.5	26.2 ± 2.2	19.8 ± 3.3
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	41.8 ± 3.2	66.6 ± 3.0	50.6 ± 2.9	71.2 ± 2.8	49.2 ± 1.5
Gemma-7B-it	46.0 ± 3.5	71.6 ± 3.4	63.4 ± 2.3	78.2 ± 2.4	55.8 ± 2.8
TAP					
Llama-2-7B-Chat	17.6 ± 2.1	28.2 ± 2.0	25.6 ± 2.9	32.4 ± 3.6	26.4 ± 3.2
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	49.0 ± 2.3	70.4 ± 2.9	61.2 ± 2.4	78.8 ± 2.5	57.0 ± 1.7
Gemma-7B-it	54.4 ± 3.2	85.2 ± 3.8	70.0 ± 0.7	84.0 ± 2.3	64.2 ± 2.2

Results. All 48 steering comparisons—three models, four steering configurations, and four evaluation regimes—show higher mean ASR than their corresponding unsteered baselines. The mean increases range from 9.4 to 29.0% in the benchmark-only setting and from 7.4 to 32.2% under adaptive jailbreak attacks. For example, on Llama-3-8B-Instruct, benchmark-only ASR increases from $5.4 \pm 2.6\%$

without steering to $24.4 \pm 2.6\%$ with STEER-ACT and $34.4 \pm 2.1\%$ with STEER-COMPLIANCE. These results support the stability of the observed safety degradation across different HarmBench prompt samples, rather than attributing it to the single evaluation sample used for the main results.

T Frozen-Probe and Interventional Analysis of Utility–Safety Overlap

The KL and t-SNE analyses provided localization evidence in Sec. 5 but did not establish why benign utility steering becomes entangled with safety behavior. To address this concern, we proceed in three steps: we first rule out generic activation perturbation as the explanation, then quantify how utility steering moves representations relative to a fixed harmfulness boundary, and finally intervene directly on the hypothesized utility–safety overlap while controlling for steering magnitude and utility.

First, to rule out arbitrary activation perturbation as the cause, we run a norm- and site-matched random-direction baseline (Table 15). Random perturbations explain only 14% of the degradation on average and stay below 30% in 11 of 12 settings, indicating that the externality tracks the learned utility directions rather than generic hidden-state noise.

Second, we replace the quantitative reading of the t-SNE visualization with a frozen linear probe on Llama-3-8B-Instruct. We extract residual activations using the same procedure as in the paper and fit a logistic-regression harmfulness classifier with 5-fold cross-validation, achieving 99.5% held-out accuracy. We then freeze the classifier and evaluate the same harmful prompts after each steering intervention, so any change reflects movement relative to the original harmfulness boundary rather than adaptation of the classifier.

We define the signed margin as

$$m(h) = w^\top (h - \mu) + b,$$

μ denotes the fixed centering vector, and w and b are the probe coefficients and intercept. Positive scores indicate the probe's harmful class. Harmful-to-harmless crossing denotes a change from a positive unsteered score to a nonpositive steered score for the same harmful prompt. This is a change in the probe's classification, not a change in the harmful intent of the prompt.

Table 20: Frozen-probe measurements on Llama-3-8B-Instruct. Crossing rates are measured in the original 4096-dimensional activation space. The shared probe has 99.5% held-out accuracy on unsteered representations; this is not a post-steering accuracy.

Steering method	**Harmful → harmless (%)**
STEER-ACT	42.2
STEER-ASM	47.0
STEER-COMPLIANCE	56.2
STEER-JSON	48.4

Although the steering objectives are learned exclusively from benign utility data, all four consistently move harmful prompt representations toward the harmless side of a frozen harmfulness boundary — including the non-safety objectives.

Finally, to test whether this overlap causally contributes to safety degradation, we introduce STEER-DECOUPLE and apply it to the two schemes with the highest crossing rates, STEER-COMPLIANCE and STEER-JSON. Given a utility direction v and the unit safety direction $\hat{w}$, STEER-DECOUPLE removes the safety-aligned component and restores the original vector norm:

$$v_\perp = v - \langle v, \hat{w} \rangle \hat{w}, \qquad v_{\mathrm{DECOUPLE}} = \|v\|_2 \frac{v_\perp}{\|v_\perp\|_2}, \qquad v_\perp \neq 0.$$

By construction, $w^\top v_{\mathrm{DECOUPLE}} = 0$ and $\|v_{\mathrm{DECOUPLE}}\|_2 = \|v\|_2$. At a fixed steering coefficient, this preserves the injected vector's magnitude rather than simply reducing steering strength. Because the projection uses a harmfulness probe, STEER-DECOUPLE is a safety-informed diagnostic intervention, distinct from the benign-data-only construction of the original utility directions.

Table 21 reports mean attack success rates across five independent runs. On direct HarmBench requests, STEER-DECOUPLE reduced mean ASR from 34.4% to 4.8% for compliance steering and from 21.2% to 5.6% for JSON steering. Both values were close to the unsteered mean of 5.4%.

Table 21: **Effect of STEER-DECOUPLE on Llama-3-8B-Instruct.** Utility is the harmless refusal rate for compliance steering and the valid JSON rate for JSON steering. Crossing is the fraction of harmful prompts that move to the harmless side of the frozen probe boundary. Direct ASR uses the original HarmBench requests. CoP ASR uses adaptive jailbreak search. All values are percentages. The Direct and CoP columns report mean ASR $\pm$ sample standard deviation across five independent runs, each using 100 randomly sampled HarmBench prompts.

			Attack success rate ($\downarrow$)	
Condition	**Utility**	**Crossing**	**Direct**	**CoP**
Unsteered model	–	–	5.4 ± 2.6	72.8 ± 3.2
Compliance steering (harmless refusal rate $\downarrow$)				
STEER-COMPLIANCE	0	56.2	34.4 ± 2.1	85.0 ± 3.9
with DECOUPLE	0	4.0	4.8 ± 1.5	72.4 ± 2.7
JSON steering (valid JSON rate $\uparrow$)				
STEER-JSON	69	48.4	21.2 ± 2.2	82.8 ± 3.6
with DECOUPLE	67	5.0	5.6 ± 1.7	73.6 ± 0.9

Frozen-probe crossing fell from 56.2% to 4.0% for compliance and from 48.4% to 5.0% for JSON. The harmless refusal rate was 0% in both compliance conditions, while JSON validity decreased from 69% to 67%. Under adaptive CoP search, the reductions were smaller. Decoupling reduced mean ASR from 85.0% to 72.4% for compliance and from 82.8% to 73.6% for JSON. Relative to the unsteered CoP mean of 72.8%, respectively. Decoupling removed 12.6 and 9.2% of those increases.

The earlier STEER-ORTHO experiment (Appendix N) jointly optimizes compliance and safety vectors with a soft orthogonality penalty during construction. In contrast, STEER-DECOUPLE applies an explicit post-hoc projection to an existing utility vector against a frozen probe normal and restores its norm. These are different interventions; the present experiment should not be conflated with the earlier regularized-optimization results or its adaptive-attack evaluation.

T.1 Sensitivity to the intervention layer

We evaluated how the choice of intervention layer affects STEER-COMPLIANCE on Llama-3-8B-Instruct. We applied steering to one layer at a time, testing layers 2, 10, 18, 26, and 30. For each setting, we measured the refusal rate on harmless Alpaca prompts and the attack success rate (ASR) on direct HarmBench requests across five independent runs.

Table 22: Layer sensitivity of STEER-COMPLIANCE on Llama-3-8B-Instruct. Harmless refusal and direct ASR are percentages. Entries with uncertainty report the mean $\pm$ sample standard deviation across five independent runs.

Intervention	**Harmless refusal** ($\downarrow$)	**Direct ASR** ($\downarrow$)
Unsteered baseline	2.6 ± 0.9	5.4 ± 2.6
Layer 2	1.4 ± 1.3	7.4 ± 3.1
Layer 10	1.2 ± 2.2	11.8 ± 1.9
Layer 18	0.0 ± 0.0	21.2 ± 3.4
Layer 26	2.2 ± 1.1	7.0 ± 2.8
Layer 30	1.2 ± 0.8	6.4 ± 2.4

Layer 18 was the only tested single layer with zero observed harmless refusals in all five runs, matching the 0% refusal rate reported for default multi-layer steering in Table 2. Its mean direct ASR was 21.2%, compared with 34.4% for the default multi-layer configuration across five runs (Table 19). Restricting the intervention to layer 18 thus retained the measured refusal-rate benefit while reducing mean direct ASR by 13.2 percentage points. Even so, layer 18 had the highest mean direct ASR among the single layers tested.

Layer 30 had the lowest mean direct ASR among the tested layers (6.4%) and a mean harmless refusal rate of 1.2%, compared with 5.4% and 2.6%, respectively, for the unsteered model. Thus, the choice of layer affected the trade-off between reducing harmless refusals and increasing vulnerability to direct harmful requests. from the numerical results, no configuration completely eliminates the externality.

U Steering externalities under AutoDAN-Turbo and malicious fine-tuning

We evaluated benign activation steering on Llama-3-8B-Instruct in two additional settings. The first extends our black-box jailbreak evaluation beyond CoP, PAIR, and TAP. The second examines whether the choice of steering configuration affects safety after fine-tuning on harmful examples. Table 23 reports results across five runs for each setting.

Table 23: Attack success rate (ASR) on Llama-3-8B-Instruct across five runs. ASR entries report mean $\pm$ standard deviation in percent. Δ is the difference in mean ASR, in percentage points, from the no-steering baseline within the same experiment. In the fine-tuning experiment, every condition, including the baseline, underwent fine-tuning on 100 harmful examples.

	AutoDAN-Turbo		**Malicious fine-tuning**	
Steering configuration	ASR (%)	Δ (pp)	ASR (%)	Δ (pp)
No steering	23.2 ± 1.8	–	77.6 ± 2.61	–
STEER-ACT	41.2 ± 0.4	+18.0	80.0 ± 0.71	+2.4
STEER-ASM	39.8 ± 0.4	+16.6	84.8 ± 0.84	+7.2
STEER-COMPLIANCE	61.8 ± 1.9	+38.6	85.0 ± 2.00	+7.4
STEER-JSON	44.2 ± 1.3	+21.0	84.4 ± 2.70	+6.8

Adaptive jailbreak search. AutoDAN-Turbo [18] discovers jailbreak strategies and stores them in a library for use on subsequent requests. We evaluated the attack on 100 prompts per run. All four steering objectives increased mean ASR relative to the unsteered model. Compliance steering produced the largest increase, from 23.2% to 61.8% (+38.6 percentage points). Even steering for JSON formatting raised mean ASR to 44.2%, nearly twice the unsteered rate. The increase previously observed under CoP, PAIR, and TAP thus also appeared under an attack that discovers and reuses strategies.

Malicious fine-tuning. Following the threat setting of Qi et al. [26], we first applied each steering configuration to Llama-3-8B-Instruct and then fine-tuned the model on 100 harmful examples. We repeated the experiment with five independent seeds. Fine-tuning without steering yielded a mean ASR of 77.6%. With steering, mean ASR ranged from 80.0% for STEER-ACT to 85.0% for STEER-COMPLIANCE. Thus, even against an already vulnerable fine-tuned baseline, all four benign steering configurations yielded higher observed attack success.

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