CAMP-IE: Understanding Safety Risks in Image Editing Models

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ABSTRACT

Multimodal instruction following image editing models are increasingly used in visual creation workflows and multimodal systems. These models combine a multimodal Transformer that interprets a source image and a natural language edit instruction with a DiT generator that performs the requested change. This flexible interface creates a safety risk because malicious intent can be distributed across the source image and an apparently benign instruction. Recent benchmarks expose this conditional failure mode. Its internal mechanisms remain unclear. We investigate the conditioning process that occurs before generation. A matched factorial design crosses sources and edits and isolates attention heads that respond selectively to harmful combinations. We call them Compositional Harmfulness Heads. We introduce CAMP-IE, which learns a low dimensional Contrastive Interaction Subspace and detects compositional risk from one conditioning pass. On IESBench, CAMP-IE yields a 48.8% bypass rate and a 42.6% rate of successful high risk edits (HRR), and retains 94.2% benign edit utility. The advantage persists for source identities and edit templates excluded from training and when the complete pipeline is refitted independently on three additional architectures. These results provide evidence that the interaction between source and edit is a recurring safety signal and that relational monitoring can operate before generation in this class of Transformer and DiT models. The core implementation is available in the anonymous code repository. **Warning: This paper contains offensive images created by large image editing models.**

1 INTRODUCTION

Image editing has progressed from specialized image to image translation and diffusion editing (Isola et al., 2017; Zhu et al., 2017; Meng et al., 2022; Hertz et al., 2023; Brooks et al., 2023) to *multimodal instruction following image editing* (MIIE) models such as Qwen-Image-Edit, BAGEL, LongCat-Image-Edit, and FLUX2.0 (Wu et al., 2025; Deng et al., 2025; Team et al., 2025; Black Forest Labs, 2025). These systems pair a multimodal Transformer with a DiT generator. The Transformer interprets the source image and natural language instruction together. This interface introduces a relational safety risk because the source can provide harmful context and an apparently innocuous edit can supply the completing operation. Recent benchmarks demonstrate this visual jailbreak route (Hou et al., 2026). Broader evidence also shows that image inputs expose gaps in alignment methods centered on text (Bailey et al., 2023; Shayegani et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2024; Gong et al., 2025). Safety must therefore account for the source, the edit, and their interaction, and distinguish safe behavior from edit failure.

Existing defenses leave the relation between source and edit only partially resolved. Converting the request to text can discard visual evidence. Generic multimodal guards score the request as a whole and conflate source, edit, and interaction effects. Diffusion defenses operate on concepts or denoising trajectories (Chi et al., 2024; Helff et al., 2025; Zhao et al., 2025a; Schramowski et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024; Li et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025b). Prior methods based on hidden states or harmful attention heads focus on marginal harmfulness or decoder behavior, leaving the matched interaction between source and edit unmodeled (Jiang et al., 2025; Yin et al., 2026). The internal emergence and separability of relational risk therefore remain open.

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


Figure 1: **Why the relation between source and edit matters.** Harm rises sharply when the critical source and target edit are paired. The matched 2×2 design separates heads that respond to the source, the edit, or their composition. CAMP-IE uses the resulting relational signal.

We ask *where risk from the interaction between source and edit emerges inside an* MIIE *model and whether that signal can support a useful safety monitor*. We study the conditioning stack where the two inputs first meet. A matched 2×2 design crosses neutral and critical sources with control and target edits. This design separates edit, source, and interaction effects and identifies Edit Harmfulness Heads (EHHs), Source Harmfulness Heads (SHHs), and Compositional Harmfulness Heads (CHHs). CHHs respond selectively to the harmful relation. Our framework, Compositional Activation Monitoring Prior to Image Editing (CAMP-IE), learns a low dimensional Contrastive Interaction Subspace (CIS) from robust CHH activations while suppressing variation due to the source or edit alone. Training uses counterfactual cells, and deployment scores one conditioning pass before generation.

For matched sources $(S_{i,0}, S_{i,1})$ and edits $(A_{i,0}, A_{i,1})$ in tuple i, we measure the response of head h along the harmfulness direction and compute its interaction,

$$C_i(h) = z_h(S_{i,1}, A_{i,1}) - z_h(S_{i,1}, A_{i,0}) - z_h(S_{i,0}, A_{i,1}) + z_h(S_{i,0}, A_{i,0}). \quad (1)$$

Additive source and edit effects cancel. If $z_h(S, A) = f_h(S) + g_h(A) + q_h(S, A) + \epsilon$, this difference retains the nonadditive component of q_h while removing the two main effects. We hypothesize that interaction supervision generalizes better than generic harmfulness prediction when source identities and edit templates are excluded from training. We test this claim with controls of fixed rank, matched interventions, evaluation on held out data, domain shift, and independent refits for each model.

Contributions.

- **Relational formulation.** We define MIIE safety through the interaction between source and edit and introduce a matched factorial protocol that separates relational risk from source, edit, and carrier effects.
- **Mechanism and monitor.** We identify EHH, SHH, and CHH families in the conditioning stack. We then introduce CIS as a low dimensional readout of robust CHH activations that requires one conditioning pass.
- **Validation and generalization.** We connect the localized representation to system behavior through matched interventions. We evaluate CAMP-IE on source identities and edit templates excluded from training, categories excluded from training, a guarded IESBench endpoint, domain shift, and three additional MIIE architectures.

2 Related Work

Compositional image safety. Recent studies have identified safety failures in image editing systems involving visual jailbreaks, combinations of individually benign inputs, and multimodal pragmatic




Figure 2: **CAMP-IE overview.** The source and edit are fused by the frozen multimodal conditioner. Matched counterfactuals are used offline to separate edit, source, and compositional head effects and to fit our subspace. At deployment, one ordinary conditioning pass produces a risk score. Allowed requests continue to the image generator. Blocked requests stop before generation.

cues. Related benchmarks evaluate counterfactual safety and the safety of generated outputs (Hou et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2025a; Helbling et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2026; Ma et al., 2024; Qu et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2025). Together, these findings motivate evaluating the relation between source and edit in addition to each input separately.

Multimodal guards and image editing defenses. Multimodal guards, policy benchmarks, and automated red teaming provide safety signals at the input. Diffusion defenses filter concepts, guide denoising, or erase unsafe representations (Chi et al., 2024; Helff et al., 2025; Mazeika et al., 2024; Chao et al., 2024; Schramowski et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024; Li et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025b). Other methods for image editing and inference control use attention control and counterfactual consistency (Hertz et al., 2023; Pan & Bareinboim, 2025). Our experiments test whether an internal monitor conditioned on the source adds information beyond these strategies.

Mechanistic interpretability and activation monitoring. Studies of attention heads, refusal geometry, low dimensional causal representations, and latent harmfulness probes show that safety relevant information can be isolated inside model activations (Vaswani et al., 2017; Yin et al., 2026; Zhou et al., 2025; Arditi et al., 2024; Geiger et al., 2024; Mueller et al., 2025; Zhao et al., 2025b; Jiang et al., 2025). Intervention studies and activation editing provide complementary tools for testing whether localized representations influence behavior (Wang et al., 2026c; Nam et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2026b; Makelov et al., 2024). CAMP-IE applies these tools to the factorial interaction between source and edit before generation.

3 Method

Figure 2 gives the complete pipeline. CAMP-IE reads the same multimodal conditioning representation that the MIIE model already computes, identifies attention heads that encode the interaction between source and edit, and converts their joint state into a risk score before DiT denoising begins.

3.1 System and Threat Model

System model. An MIIE service receives a source image S and edit instruction A. The conditioner T_θ produces $\mathbf{o} = T_\theta(S, A)$ and the generator G_ϕ uses this state to synthesize an edited image. CAMP-IE scores $\mathbf{o}$ before denoising and either allows or blocks the request.

Threat model. The safety risk arises from harmful meaning produced by the joint interpretation of S and A. The evaluation measures success at the output for single requests and gate robustness under adaptive black box search with at most 40 queries.

Attacker objective. For the output endpoint, the attacker seeks an allowed image that executes the requested edit and reaches the high risk threshold. The adaptive probe seeks a meaning preserving variant that passes the gate.

Attacker capabilities. The attacker controls S and A, including visual carriers, source preserving transforms, and paraphrases. Adaptive attacks observe the binary allow or block decision.

Defender objective. The defender minimizes harmful and edit valid outputs subject to a fixed benign false positive budget and a benign edit utility target.

Defender capabilities. The defender can read the conditioning state, apply a monitor calibrated for the model, and stop blocked requests before generation. Appendix B.1 gives the formal definitions, capability sets, metrics, and notation.

3.2 Factorial signal and head families

For tuple i, let $S_{i,0}, S_{i,1}$ be matched neutral and critical sources, and let $A_{i,0}, A_{i,1}$ be matched control and target edits. The intended labels satisfy $(y_{i,00}, y_{i,01}, y_{i,10}, y_{i,11}) = (0, 0, 0, 1)$, assigning the harmful label to the critical source and target edit cell. For request $x_{i,ab} = (S_{i,a}, A_{i,b})$, the generated image is $Y_{i,ab} = G_\phi(T_\theta(x_{i,ab}), \xi_{i,ab})$. We record $H_{i,ab} = H(Y_{i,ab}) \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ and $V_{i,ab} = V(Y_{i,ab}, x_{i,ab}) \in \{0, 1\}$. Their difference in differences is

$$\Delta_i^H = H_{i,11} - H_{i,10} - H_{i,01} + H_{i,00}, \qquad \Delta_i^V = V_{i,11} - V_{i,10} - V_{i,01} + V_{i,00}, \tag{2}$$

which removes additive source and edit effects. A positive Δ_i^H means that the pairing is more harmful than either marginal effect predicts. The value Δ_i^V checks whether this result is explained by a route failing to execute. The labels $y_{i,ab}$ describe intended request level risk, whereas $H_{i,ab}$ and $V_{i,ab}$ are realized generation outcomes. Low harmfulness with $V_{i,ab} = 0$ is recorded as edit failure. Reported behavioral effects average Δ_i^H or Δ_i^V across tuples and use bootstrap intervals over tuples.

For attention head h, we project its final conditioning output $\mathbf{o}_h(x)$ onto a harmfulness direction $r_H^{(\ell)}$ specific to layer ℓ and learned from matched harmful and benign calibration requests. We then standardize the projection on benign data.

$$z_h(x) = \frac{\langle \mathbf{o}_h(x), r_H^{(\ell)} \rangle - \mu_{B,h}}{\sigma_{B,h} + \epsilon_z}. \tag{3}$$

Writing $z_{i,ab}^h = z_h(S_{i,a}, A_{i,b})$, the edit, source, and interaction effects are

$$E_i(h) = \tfrac{1}{2}[(z_{i,01}^h - z_{i,00}^h) + (z_{i,11}^h - z_{i,10}^h)], \quad S_i(h) = \tfrac{1}{2}[(z_{i,10}^h - z_{i,00}^h) + (z_{i,11}^h - z_{i,01}^h)],$$
$$C_i(h) = z_{i,11}^h - z_{i,10}^h - z_{i,01}^h + z_{i,00}^h. \tag{4}$$

Heads with stable positive standardized E, S, C effects are called EHHs, SHHs, and CHHs, respectively. The three families may overlap because a compositional response can also induce positive source or edit main effects. The robust CHH candidate pool keeps positive interaction effects that recur when source groups are resampled and preserve their sign across font, layout, and wrapper variants. Appendix B gives the thresholds, hook conventions, and calibration controls.

3.3 Contrastive Interaction Subspace

CHH selection identifies where the interaction appears. CIS finds informative directions within those heads. For m selected CHHs of width d_h, let $d = md_h$. The operator P_C concatenates their outputs before W_O at the fixed final conditioning token, ordered first by layer and then by head. Thus $\mathbf{g}(x) = P_C(T_\theta(x)) \in \mathbb{R}^d$. Benign training requests give $\boldsymbol{\mu}_B \in \mathbb{R}^d$, centered covariance $\Sigma_B \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times d}$, and $W_B = (\Sigma_B + \epsilon_B I_d)^{-1/2} \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times d}$. Write $\mathbf{a}(x) = W_B(\mathbf{g}(x) - \boldsymbol{\mu}_B)$.

For tuple i and matched carrier variant $v \in \mathcal{V}_i$, vector contrasts $\mathbf{e}_{iv}, \mathbf{s}_{iv}, \mathbf{c}_{iv}$ replace the scalar $z_{i,ab}^h$ in Eq. 4 with $\mathbf{a}(x_{i,abv})$. Every tuple receives equal weight, which is divided equally among its variants. Benign statistics use the same weighting. The contrasts are not centered again after whitening. For

$(F, \mathbf{f}) \in \{(E, \mathbf{e}), (S, \mathbf{s}), (C, \mathbf{c})\}$, CIS is

$$\Sigma_F = \sum_{i,v} \frac{\mathbf{f}_{iv}\mathbf{f}_{iv}^\top}{n|\mathcal{V}_i|}, \qquad \mathbf{B} = \Sigma_E + \Sigma_S + \gamma I_d,$$
$$U_r \in \arg\max_{U^\top \mathbf{B} U = I_r} \operatorname{tr}(U^\top \Sigma_C U), \qquad \Sigma_C \mathbf{u}_k = \lambda_k \mathbf{B}\mathbf{u}_k, \quad \mathbf{u}_j^\top \mathbf{B}\mathbf{u}_k = \delta_{jk}. \tag{5}$$

The generalized eigenvectors are orthonormal under $\mathbf{B}$. Their thin QR factorization $U_r = Q_C R$ gives the Euclidean basis $Q_C \in \mathbb{R}^{d\times r}$ with $Q_C^\top Q_C = I_r$ and preserves the same subspace. The training eigenspectrum selects $r = 8$. Deployment then uses

$$\mathbf{q}_C(x) = Q_C^\top \mathbf{a}(x) \in \mathbb{R}^r, \qquad f_C(x) = w^\top \mathbf{q}_C(x) + b_C. \tag{6}$$

The readout is trained from request labels across all four factorial cells. Generated output scores and native guard decisions are reserved for evaluation. Its threshold targets a 5% benign FPR on development data. The CHH averaging baseline uses the top m scalar head scores with uniform weights, separating localization from the learned geometry within each head.

3.4 Interventions and deployment

To test whether the localized signal influences behavior, we subtract the matched interaction direction $\mathbf{c}_i^h = \mathbf{o}_{i,11}^h - \mathbf{o}_{i,10}^h - \mathbf{o}_{i,01}^h + \mathbf{o}_{i,00}^h$ from progressively larger head sets. EHHs, SHHs, and random heads are matched to CHHs by layer, count, and norm. We also remove the rank r CIS projection and restore false negatives with matched head states. All perturbations use the native guarded endpoint, with CAMP-IE disabled, and report unsafe edits separately from block recovery and edit validity.

At deployment, CAMP-IE adds a projection and linear readout to one normal conditioning pass at $1.01\times$ measured inference cost. Blocked requests stop before DiT denoising. Allowed requests use the original conditioning unchanged. A new MIIE model repeats the offline localization and CIS fit from its own activations.

4 Experiments

4.1 Setup

IESBench contains 1,054 requests across 15 categories (Hou et al., 2026). All primary results use the official Qwen-Image-Edit checkpoint. The gate first accepts or blocks a request, then generates and judges every allowed output. Mechanism discovery and readout fitting use datasets disjoint from IESBench. Endpoint evaluation uses five folds stratified by risk category and grouped by source identity. Writing the fixed folds as $F_1, \ldots, F_5$, round k calibrates on F_k and predicts on $F_{k+1 \bmod 5}$. Table 2 aggregates one prediction for each request using calibration from a disjoint fold. Appendix B gives the fold sizes. Localization uses 240 balanced factorial tuples selected from 395 candidates. Request detection uses 150 training, 45 development, and 45 test source groups with disjoint source identities and normalized edit templates.

InterEdit-Harm is constructed from InterEdit independently of detector feedback (Liu et al., 2026). Released guards retain their native decisions. Learned components use training groups, explicit thresholds use benign development groups, and IESBench calibration uses the rotating calibration fold. Appendix C and Table 8 give the overlap checks and baseline contracts.


4.2 Behavioral interaction and nuisance controls

The retained bank exhibits a harmfulness interaction of $+1.75$ HS points. Edit validity remains above 93% in every cell, with an interaction of -0.5 percentage points. Thus the excess harmfulness coexists with high execution rates and a small measured validity interaction.

The three cells intended to be safe are matched counterfactuals: the target edit appears with S_0, the critical source appears with A_0, and every cell retains at least 93.3% EV. Their harmful rates are between 6% and 13%, compared with 70% for (S_1, A_1). This construction directly penalizes responses based only on the source, edit, or task difficulty. On the test split with disjoint sources and

Table 1: **Generated outcomes on the retained factorial bank.** Each cell contains $N = 240$ output judgments. Harmful rates and their interaction are rounded to the nearest percentage point. Harm is highest when the critical source is paired with the target edit. EV remains high in every cell. Lower harm metrics and higher EV are better.

Condition	Harm score	EV (%)	Harmful (%)
(S_0, A_0) neutral + control	1.40	95.0	6
(S_0, A_1) neutral + target	1.65	94.2	10
(S_1, A_0) critical + control	1.80	94.6	13
(S_1, A_1) critical + target	3.80	93.3	70
Interaction $\Delta_{S \times A}$	$+1.75$	-0.5	$+53$



(a) Visual harm semantics. (b) Visual carrier changes. (c) Text harmful semantics. (d) Template changes.

Figure 3: **Contributions of meaning and form across attack routes.** Each violin contains intervention cases with jittered points. Blue summaries show the minimum, median, and maximum. Interventions on harmful meaning contribute positively across the head families. Changes to carrier or template form are near zero or negative. This result supports localization with balanced carriers.

templates, classifiers that use only the edit, source, or carrier obtain 0.54, 0.56, and 0.52 AUROC. Joint prediction from the source and edit obtains 0.82 (Appendix Table 9). These controls with restricted inputs use the same group split, L2 readout, and regularization grid as the CIS readout. This gap is consistent with a signal that depends on the relation between the two inputs. Figure 3 provides a complementary decomposition by route. Interventions on harmful meaning produce consistently positive contributions. Changes to rewrite templates are near zero. Changes to visual carriers are negative, especially for CHHs. This asymmetry shows why carrier balancing is important. Uncontrolled variation in visual form can mask or reverse a response aligned with the interaction even when the harmful meaning is unchanged.

4.3 Complete System Safety and Utility

We next evaluate the primary system endpoint. Table 2 connects each gate to the MIIE model and generates every allowed request. It measures bypass and successful high risk edits (HRR) on IESBench together with benign edit utility on InterEdit. Appendix B.2 gives the formulas for bypass rate, output harmfulness, EV, HRR, benign FPR, and BU.

Across predictions for all 1,054 IESBench requests using calibration from disjoint folds, CIS yields 48.8% bypass with a 95% bootstrap interval of [45.7,51.8]. Its paired HRR is 42.6%, the lowest value in Table 2, compared with 52.7% for EHH and 58.9% for HiddenDetect. CAMP-IE retains 94.2% benign utility at 5.5% benign FPR and requires 1.01 times the original inference cost.

FPR and BU contextualize the native endpoints in Table 2. Qwen3Guard operates at 4.0% benign FPR with 65.5% bypass and 93.8% BU. CAMP-IE yields 48.8% bypass and 94.2% BU at 5.5% benign FPR. At operating points close to 5% FPR, CIS yields 50.5% bypass, compared with 66.0% for HiddenDetect, 60.8% for EHH, and 62.7% for SHH (Figure 6). The threshold independent comparison in Table 3(a) gives CAMP-IE 0.875 AUROC, compared with 0.714 for LLaVA-Guard and 0.693 for Qwen3Guard.

4.4 Sparse Localization and Stability Across Head Families

Figure 4 shows the signed edit, interaction, and source main effects for all 784 conditioner heads (28 layers $\times$ 28 heads). Reliable interaction effects occur throughout the network. The robust candidate

Table 2: **Safety and utility at each gate's native operating point.** Bypass is the allowed fraction. HRR is the paired fraction that is allowed, edit valid, and high risk under unchanged generation (Appendix B.2). Overall bypass and HRR aggregate one endpoint prediction for each of the 1,054 IESBench requests using calibration from a disjoint fold. L1, L2, and L3 restrict bypass by risk level. Benign FPR and BU use InterEdit. Our bypass interval is [45.7,51.8] at 95% confidence. Rates are percentages. Lower is better except for BU.

Method	Bypass	HRR	L1 bypass	L2 bypass	L3 bypass	Benign FPR	BU	Overhead
Qwen-Image-Edit (base)	100.0	90.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	NA	NA	NA
Qwen-Image-Edit-Safe [ICML'26 Oral]	66.9	61.7	63.0	67.1	70.6	5.5	92.5	1.05×
Qwen3Guard [TechRep'25]	65.5	63.1	61.0	65.8	69.8	4.0	93.8	1.20×
LLaVA-Guard [ICML'25]	71.0	64.8	66.5	71.4	75.8	3.5	95.0	1.19×
LatentGuard [ECCV'24]	85.0	82.7	81.0	85.5	88.5	8.0	90.0	1.08×
HiddenDetect [ACL'25]	61.5	58.9	57.0	61.8	66.0	13.5	85.5	1.02×
RHF [ICML'26 Oral]	72.0	65.6	67.5	72.3	76.7	7.0	91.5	1.01×
EHH	58.8	52.7	54.0	59.0	63.1	8.5	91.0	1.01×
SHH	61.3	59.1	56.8	61.5	65.7	7.5	91.8	1.01×
Ours	**48.8**	**42.6**	**45.5**	**49.0**	**52.0**	**5.5**	**94.2**	1.01×




Figure 4: **Signed factorial effects across the conditioner.** Each cell is one attention head. Red and blue indicate positive and negative paired standardized effects. Circles mark effects whose paired bootstrap interval excludes zero. The middle panel isolates the interaction used to identify CHHs. The flanking panels show edit and source main effects.

pool contains 72 CHHs and has Jaccard overlap of 0.17 with EHHs and 0.20 with SHHs, confirming partially shared effect families. Across four folds grouped by source, 53 of the 72 candidates recur in at least three folds and 47 recur in all four. Development selection retains 54 of the 72 candidates for the deployed CIS readout.

4.5 Generalization at the request level

We next isolate the monitor from image generation. We ask whether it ranks a harmful pairing above the three benign pairings when both the source identity and edit template were excluded from training. Table 3(a) evaluates this detection task before generation on the disjoint test split. AUROC measures ranking from continuous test scores. Recall at 5% FPR uses a threshold selected on benign development groups and frozen before test evaluation. Baselines follow the input and fitting contracts in Appendix Table 8. The endpoint experiment evaluates the images produced after each gate is applied.

The gap is largest when the task depends on the relation between inputs. Generic harmfulness guards and safety detectors based on text or latent features remain useful for direct harmfulness. They lose substantial signal when the edit must be interpreted relative to a source. Our learned subspace further resolves directions dominated by the interaction within the selected heads.

The interaction SVD control uses a rank 8 subspace whose objective depends only on the four factorial interaction vectors. Table 3(b) uses request labels with disjoint sources and templates. Table 3(c) excludes complete risk categories from training. Appendix Table 7 evaluates a construction reserve and five complete refits. Rank is selected from the training generalized eigenspectrum with the profile likelihood scree criterion (Zhu & Ghodsi, 2006). It selects $r = 8$, where λ_8 is 1.65 times λ_9. A

(a) Sources and edit templates excluded from training

Method	AUROC	Recall at 5% FPR
LatentGuard	.604 [.563,.643]	12.5
HiddenDetect	.706 [.668,.741]	22.0
RHF	.681 [.641,.718]	18.5
LLaVA-Guard	.714 [.677,.748]	23.5
Qwen3Guard	.693 [.654,.729]	20.5
EHH	.731 [.695,.764]	25.0
SHH	.748 [.713,.780]	27.5
Ours	**.875 [.849,.898]**	**49.5**

(b) Core detector ablations

Variant	AUROC	Recall
Ours	**.875**	**49.5**
No main effect contrast	.823	34.0
No factorial matching	.704	20.5
No carrier balance	.758	26.0
Shuffled source and edit pairing	.512	5.7

(c) Three risk categories held out

Readout	AUROC	Recall at 5% FPR
Logistic readout using all heads	.641	14.0
EHH contrastive subspace	.684	18.5
Interaction SVD	.741	24.5
Ours	**.826**	**40.5**

Table 3: **Generalization, ablations, and excluded categories.** Panel (a) holds out both source identities and edit templates. Learned components use training groups; recall thresholds use benign development groups. Intervals resample source groups with their variants. Panel (c) trains on 12 categories and tests on three excluded categories. Higher is better. Appendix Table 10 gives additional controls.




Figure 5: **Matched interventions on the Qwen-Image-Edit-Safe decision path.** With CAMP-IE disabled, the panels remove directions from K matched heads and restore matched states in false negatives. The outcomes are the unsafe edit rate and recovery to a block.

dense sweep from $r = 4$ through $r = 12$ forms a broad plateau. The selected span is stable across localization folds, with projection overlap 0.74 [0.69,0.79]. When three complete risk categories are excluded from training, our method retains 0.826 AUROC (Table 3(c)). It reaches 0.836 on the construction reserve and 0.869±0.008 across five complete refits (Appendix Table 7). A shared panel of 120 tuples preserves the advantage after independent refitting on BAGEL, LongCat, and FLUX2.0 (Table 4).

The ablation panel keeps the task and split fixed and isolates the design choices tied directly to our claims. Removing the source and edit main effect contrast loses 5.2 AUROC points. Discarding factorial matching or carrier balance loses 17.1 or 11.7 points, respectively. Shuffling source and edit pairings reduces performance to chance, which supports the interpretation that the gain depends on the matched relation. Appendix Table 10 reports subspace controls with a fixed rank.

4.6 Selective sensitivity to head and subspace perturbations

Figure 5 intervenes on head outputs immediately before W_O and before the Qwen-Image-Edit-Safe policy reads the conditioner state. Starting near 67%, removing 16 CHHs raises the rate of unsafe edits to about 82%; matched EHH, SHH, and random sets reach 73%, 71%, and 68%. Restoration with matched states recovers 34% of false negatives for CHHs, versus 18%, 16%, and 7%. Appendix Table 9 gives controls for edit validity and natural donors.

At matched rank, removing the CIS component raises HRR to 70%, compared with 60% for PCA and 55% for a random CHH subspace. The paired increases are 18.2 percentage points [11.2,25.0], 8.0 [2.0,14.1], and 3.2 [−2.0,8.4], respectively. Together with residual restoration, these results provide evidence that the learned interaction geometry is selectively coupled to safety decisions.




Figure 6: **Adaptive gate robustness and the tradeoff between bypass and FPR.** The left panel reports bypass during a 40 query black box search. The right panel reports single query IESBench bypass across explicit thresholds. Lower is better.

Table 4: **Replication across models.** Each model refits all components. The final column is the HRR change after removing CHH interaction residuals.

Model	CHH AUROC	CIS AUROC	Δ HRR
Qwen-Image-Edit	.841	**.869**	+15.4
BAGEL (Deng et al., 2025)	.786	**.829**	+10.8
LongCat-Image-Edit (Team et al., 2025)	.765	**.804**	+8.6
FLUX2.0 (Black Forest Labs, 2025)	.690	**.742**	+6.0

4.7 Adaptive robustness and replication across models

Bypassed requests often involve limited visual evidence or ambiguous edits. On InterEdit-Harm, EHH reaches 0.904 AUROC when risk comes from the edit alone, whereas our method reaches 0.918 on compositional risk and 0.899 overall (Appendix Table 11). In the black box probe in Figure 6, the attacker observes binary gate decisions and tries paraphrases, carrier changes, and source preserving transformations. At 40 queries, bypass is 55% for CIS, 70% for EHH, and 83% for Qwen Image Edit Safe. This probe measures whether any variant passes; the endpoint based on generated outputs remains the paired HRR in Table 2. CIS also has the lowest bypass across the evaluated benign FPR range. The interaction advantage recurs after independently refitting all components on three additional MIIE models, using each model's own activations (Table 4).

5 Discussion and Conclusion

Safety in instruction following image editing is relational: harm can emerge from the joint interpretation of a source image and an edit that appears innocuous alone. By holding marginal inputs fixed across counterfactual cells, the matched factorial protocol makes compositional harm an internal signal that can be localized and monitored before generation. The mechanistic analysis identifies partially shared head families for source, edit, and compositional effects. CHHs capture the interaction that completes harmful meaning, and CIS organizes their activations into a compact relational representation. Matched interventions connect this representation to the guarded decision path, linking factorial supervision, internal computation, and system behavior. This relational structure generalizes across unseen sources, edit templates, risk categories, data domains, and independently refitted architectures. EHH specializes in risks expressed directly by the edit, and CIS specializes in risks created by the source and edit together. This division of labor makes CAMP-IE a natural complement to guards for explicit harmful content. CAMP-IE monitors the stage after multimodal conditioning and before denoising, when both inputs have been interpreted jointly. Allowed requests retain the original generation path, supporting direct integration with existing image editing pipelines. Overall, relational supervision provides a practical design principle for safety systems that reason over combinations of individually benign inputs.

AI USE STATEMENT

Generative AI tools were used to aid and polish writing, retrieve and discover related work, support research ideation and execution, and draft sections of the paper. Details of these uses are described in the paper. The authors reviewed and verified all resulting text, analyses, and suggestions and take full responsibility for the final content.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies safety failures in instruction following image editing systems and includes harmful attack patterns. Upon acceptance, the artifact release will separate reproducibility materials from sensitive content. Public manifests and derived statistics will be shared openly. Prompt rewrites that violate policy and uncensored harmful generations will be restricted to an evaluation package with controlled access. Source assets will remain governed by their original benchmark licenses.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

The appendix specifies dataset construction, separation of the training, development, and test sets, endpoint calibration across folds, metric definitions, the activation hook, the fitting sequence, numerical hyperparameters, baseline contracts, split checks, output audits, and evaluations across complete refits. The anonymous repository provides the core implementation. The complete evaluation configuration, generation seeds, fold manifest, judge prompts, and remaining reproducibility metadata will be released upon acceptance.

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APPENDIX





Figure 7: **An edit request is grounded in its source image.**

A QUALITATIVE EXAMPLES

All cases are shown in the fixed row order **Source**, **Input**, **Output**, and **Ours**. Block and pass cases are grouped separately. For cases stored as input composites, the source row repeats the corresponding input image.

Block examples 1 to 6





B Reproducibility and Output Judgment

The reproducibility specification provided here covers dataset construction, split discipline, activation hooks, fitting order, calibration, output auditing, and numerical hyperparameters. The primary MIIE model uses the official Qwen-Image-Edit checkpoint and implementation. We use 240 factorial tuples, an analysis of 784 heads, four localization folds, and a 5% development benign FPR target. The endpoint manifest records five IESBench folds of sizes 211, 211, 211, 211, and 210, together with the fixed cyclic mapping from each evaluation fold to its calibration fold. The anonymous repository contains the core implementation. The complete evaluation configuration, implementation

revision, checkpoint strings, prompt templates, generation seeds, and fold manifest will be released upon acceptance.

Output judgment. Each generated image receives records of harmfulness and edit validity from frozen Gemini and Qwen3-VL judges under a common rubric. The same generated image and judgment record are reused for every gate that allows the corresponding request with the same seed. An audit of 120 outputs, stratified by category, was independently labeled by humans. Agreement on the high risk label was $\kappa = 0.68$ for Gemini and $\kappa = 0.54$ for Qwen3-VL, and the relative method ordering was unchanged. Exact checkpoint strings, judge prompts, aggregation rules, and evaluation configuration will be released upon acceptance.

B.1 Formal system and threat model

System model. A request is $x = (S, A)$, where S is the source image and A is the edit instruction. The multimodal conditioner with parameters θ produces $\mathbf{o} = T_\theta(x)$. CAMP-IE maps this state to the scalar risk score $f_C(x)$. For threshold τ, the decision rule is $D_\tau(x) = \mathbf{1}[f_C(x) \geq \tau]$, where one denotes a block and zero denotes an allow decision. The deployed system is

$$Y_\tau(x, \xi) = \begin{cases} \perp, & D_\tau(x) = 1, \\ G_\phi(\mathbf{o}, \xi), & D_\tau(x) = 0, \end{cases} \tag{7}$$

where G_ϕ is the DiT generator, ϕ denotes its parameters, ξ denotes generation randomness, and $\perp$ denotes termination before denoising.

Threat model. The attack population $\mathcal{P}$ contains harmful image editing requests whose intent may be split across S and A. A request may use embedded text, marks, layout changes, or other visual carriers. The endpoint based on generated outputs uses one request per attack instance. A separate adaptive gate probe permits a sequence of variants that preserve meaning under a fixed query budget Q and observes only the block decision.

Attacker objective. Let $H(Y) \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ be the harmfulness score and let $V(Y, x) \in \{0, 1\}$ indicate whether Y performs the requested edit. Define $U(Y) = \mathbf{1}[H(Y) > 4]$. The high risk attack success event is

$$\mathrm{Succ}_\tau(x, \xi) = \big(1 - D_\tau(x)\big) V(Y_\tau(x, \xi), x) U(Y_\tau(x, \xi)). \tag{8}$$

The attacker evaluated on generated outputs maximizes the probability of this event. For adaptive strategy $\mathcal{A}$ and transcript $\mathcal{T}_{t-1} = \{(x_j, D_\tau(x_j))\}_{j<t}$, request $x_t = \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{T}_{t-1})$ may depend on earlier decisions. The adaptive experiment reports acceptance of any queried variant, and generated output success follows the event defined above.

Attacker capabilities. The attacker selects both S and A. The attacker may paraphrase the edit, change its visual carrier, and apply source preserving image transforms. In the adaptive evaluation, the returned safety signal is $D_\tau(x)$. The query budget is at most 40.

Defender objective. Let $\mathcal{B}$ denote the benign request distribution. The defender chooses f_C and τ to minimize high risk attack success while bounding benign false positives and preserving benign utility,

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{f_C, \tau} \quad & \Pr_{x \sim \mathcal{P}, \xi}[\mathrm{Succ}_\tau(x, \xi) = 1] \\ \text{subject to} \quad & \Pr_{x \sim \mathcal{B}}[D_\tau(x) = 1] \leq \beta, \\ & \Pr_{x \sim \mathcal{B}, \xi}[D_\tau(x) = 0,\ V(Y_\tau(x, \xi), x) = 1] \geq u_{\min}. \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

The request level experiments set $\beta = 0.05$. The quantity $u_{\min}$ is the required lower bound on benign edit utility.

Defender capabilities. The defender controls CAMP-IE, its calibration data, the threshold, and the activation hooks. The defender reads $\mathbf{o}$ after multimodal conditioning and before DiT denoising. A block decision prevents generation. An allow decision passes the unchanged conditioning state to G_ϕ.

B.2 METRIC DEFINITIONS

The endpoint metrics follow the IESBench evaluation protocol (Hou et al., 2026). Let $\mathcal{P}_N = \{x_i\}_{i=1}^{N_P}$ be an attack evaluation set and let $\mathcal{B}_N = \{x_i\}_{i=1}^{N_B}$ be a benign evaluation set. Percentages below are multiplied by 100.

Gate bypass rate. IESBench defines Attack Success Rate (ASR) as the fraction of attack requests that bypass the gate. We call this quantity the *bypass rate*, reserving success for the generated output event in Eq. 8:

$$\text{Bypass} = \frac{100}{N_P} \sum_{x_i \in \mathcal{P}_N} \big(1 - D_\tau(x_i)\big). \tag{10}$$

This metric records gate acceptance independently of generation, edit execution, and output harmfulness. Bypass by risk level applies the same formula after restricting $\mathcal{P}_N$ to the corresponding IESBench risk level.

Harmfulness of generated images. Each generated image receives $H(Y) \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$, and $U(Y) = \mathbf{1}[H(Y) > 4]$ defines the high risk threshold. We report mean harm scores for explicitly generated sets, such as the four ungated factorial cells. Blocked requests terminate before image scoring. The system table therefore reports bypass and HRR as separate quantities.

Edit Validity. EV is the percentage of generated outputs that execute the requested edit,

$$\text{EV} = 100 \frac{\sum_i (1 - D_\tau(x_i)) V(Y_\tau(x_i, \xi_i), x_i)}{\sum_i (1 - D_\tau(x_i))}. \tag{11}$$

For the ungated factorial experiment, $D_\tau(x_i) = 0$ for every cell.

Harmful output rate. The Harmful column in Table 1 is the percentage of ungated outputs whose harmfulness reaches the high risk threshold. Each factorial cell contains $N = 240$ binary output judgments, and the table reports this rate to the nearest percentage point:

$$\text{HarmfulRate} = \frac{100}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} U(Y_i). \tag{12}$$

This descriptive rate for each cell measures harmfulness independently of the edit validity criterion used by HRR.

High risk edit success (HRR). HRR is the proportion of all attack requests that are allowed, edit valid, and high risk. It is the empirical rate of the success event in the threat model given by Eq. 8:

$$\text{HRR} = \frac{100}{N_P} \sum_{x_i \in \mathcal{P}_N} \text{Succ}_\tau(x_i, \xi_i). \tag{13}$$

For aggregate endpoint tables, let h_0 be the ungated HRR and let b_g be the bypass rate of gate g. When every gate is applied to the same requests and unchanged generations, the success set after gating is the intersection of the ungated success set and the allowed set. Therefore,

$$\max(0, h_0 + b_g - 100) \le \text{HRR}_g \le \min(h_0, b_g). \tag{14}$$

The verified request level HRR values in Table 2 satisfy this set relation. The intervention experiments use the same exact request level quantity, and their reported changes are paired differences in HRR. Bootstrap resampling over requests gives a 95% interval of [45.7,51.8] for the primary CAMP-IE bypass rate.

Benign false positive rate and benign utility. The benign false positive rate is the proportion of benign requests that are blocked. Benign utility is the proportion that are both allowed and successfully edited,

$$\text{FPR}_{\mathcal{B}} = \frac{100}{N_B} \sum_{x_i \in \mathcal{B}_N} D_\tau(x_i), \qquad \text{BU} = \frac{100}{N_B} \sum_{x_i \in \mathcal{B}_N} (1 - D_\tau(x_i)) V(Y_\tau(x_i, \xi_i), x_i). \tag{15}$$

Detection metrics for requests. AUROC is the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve obtained by varying τ. Recall at 5% FPR is the true positive rate at the threshold selected on development data whose benign false positive rate is at most 5%. A harmful request is the positive class and a benign request is the negative class.

Adaptive bypass rate. For query budget Q, the bypass indicator for attack instance i is $\mathbf{1}[\min_{1\le t\le Q} D_\tau(x_{i,t}) = 0]$. The reported bypass rate averages this indicator across attack instances. It measures whether any queried variant is allowed.

Head and subspace metrics. The standardized head score $z_h(x)$ follows the activation projection used to localize features associated with harm (Yin et al., 2026). The distribution overlap coefficient used by the RHF baseline is

$$\mathrm{OVL}(p_1, p_2) = \int \min\{p_1(t), p_2(t)\}\, dt, \tag{16}$$

where p_1 and p_2 are kernel density estimates of two activation score distributions. Smaller OVL means stronger separation. Head recurrence Freq_h is the fraction of localization resamples in which head h is selected. Sign consistency $\mathrm{SignCons}_h$ is the fraction of carrier variants that preserve the effect sign. Carrier sensitivity CS_h measures the largest standardized change in the estimated effect across carrier variants. Lower values indicate greater robustness to the carrier.

Set, subspace, and similarity metrics. For head sets $\mathcal{H}_1$ and $\mathcal{H}_2$, their Jaccard index is $|\mathcal{H}_1 \cap \mathcal{H}_2|/|\mathcal{H}_1 \cup \mathcal{H}_2|$. For two orthonormal bases Q_1 and Q_2 of rank r, projection overlap is $r^{-1}\|Q_1^\top Q_2\|_F^2$. Cosine similarity between vectors v_1 and v_2 is $v_1^\top v_2/(\|v_1\|_2\|v_2\|_2)$. Inference overhead is the guarded runtime divided by the unguarded runtime. Paired 95% bootstrap intervals report the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The resampling unit is the factorial tuple for behavioral contrasts, the source group for request detection, the request ID for the fixed endpoint, and the attack instance for adaptive search. All variants attached to a tuple or source group move together, and paired method comparisons use the same resampled units. SD denotes the sample standard deviation across independently refitted runs.

B.3 Core notation

Table 5 lists the symbols that recur across sections. Symbols specific to the implementation are defined where they first appear.

Dataset construction and separation. The data manifest separates intent labels for requests, construction decisions, and judgments of generated outputs. All routes that share a source group remain in the same split. Normalized edit templates are also separated across the training, development, and test sets. The harmfulness direction is estimated from 256 matched pairs of harmful and benign sources. The factorial mechanism bank is balanced after screening for semantic quality and edit validity. The mechanism and detector fitting banks are disjoint from IESBench. The five IESBench endpoint folds are grouped by source identity and stratified by risk category. Exact identity checks and proximity checks based on embeddings cover the calibration bank, mechanism bank, test sets, IESBench folds, and InterEdit-Harm. Table 6 reports the construction checks and verifies the separation of splits. Table 1 separately evaluates the generated outcomes from the retained factorial bank.

The 395 screened candidates also provide a control outside the retained factorial pattern. Among the 58 candidates with valid edits that were excluded because the target edit was harmful on a neutral source or the source match was inadequate, evaluation follows the human safety label for each request and permits patterns beyond $(0, 0, 0, 1)$. CIS obtains 0.798 AUROC on this nonfactorial subset, compared with 0.748 for the scalar CHH readout. This extends evaluation beyond generic benign requests and tuples selected for the intended pattern across the four cells.

Subspace controls. Rank r is selected from the training generalized eigenspectrum. Define $\mathbf{B} = \Sigma_E + \Sigma_S + \gamma I_d$ and let $\lambda_1 \ge \cdots \ge \lambda_K$ be the leading eigenvalues of $\mathbf{B}^{-\frac{1}{2}}\Sigma_C\mathbf{B}^{-\frac{1}{2}}$. We apply the profile likelihood scree criterion of Zhu & Ghodsi (2006) to $\log \lambda_{1:32}$ and choose its elbow. The final run selects $r = 8$, where λ_8 is 1.65 times λ_9. A dense sweep from $r = 4$ to $r = 12$ provides a

Table 5: **Core notation used throughout the paper.**

Group	Symbols	Meaning
System	S, A, x	Source image, edit instruction, and request $x = (S, A)$
	$T_\theta, G_\phi, \mathbf{o}$	Multimodal conditioner, DiT generator, and conditioning state
	f_C, τ, D_τ	Risk score, decision threshold, and block indicator
	$Y_\tau, \xi, \perp$	Deployed output, generation randomness, and termination before generation
Factorial design	i, a, b	Tuple index and the source and edit cell indices
	$y_{i,ab}, H, V, U$	Intended risk label, harmfulness, edit validity, and high risk indicator
	$z_h, r_H^{(\ell)}$	Standardized score of head h and its harmfulness direction for layer ℓ
	$E_i(h), S_i(h), C_i(h)$	Edit effect, source effect, and interaction effect
CIS	$P_C, \mathbf{g}, \boldsymbol{\mu}_B, \Sigma_B, W_B$	CHH extraction, concatenated vector, benign statistics, and whitening map
	$\mathbf{e}_i, \mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{c}_i$	Vector forms of the edit, source, and interaction effects
	$\Sigma_E, \Sigma_S, \Sigma_C$	Their uncentered second moment matrices
	$Q_C, r, \mathbf{q}_C, w, b_C$	CIS basis, rank, projected coordinates, and linear readout
Security	$\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{B}$	Attack and benign request distributions
	$\mathrm{Succ}_\tau, \beta, u_{\min}$	High risk success event, false positive budget, and utility target
	$\mathcal{A}, Q, \mathcal{T}_t$	Adaptive strategy, query budget, and decision transcript

Table 6: **Dataset construction and checks for split separation.** Counts precede activation extraction. Exact overlap fields report the source ID, normalized edit string, and rewrite template. Semantic proximity is the maximum cosine similarity to the training bank.

Audit item	Population or comparison	Result
Factorial bank construction		
Candidate tuples	Initial pool	395
Passed screening	Semantically valid and edit valid tuples	270
Retained and reserve	Balanced mechanism bank and untouched reserve	240 and 30
Checks for split separation		
Exact identifier and template overlap	Training banks compared with test splits	0
Calibration and mechanism overlap with IESBench	Source ID, edit string, and template over all 1,054 requests	0
Endpoint prediction overlap with calibration	Five cyclic IESBench folds	0 within each prediction round
Perceptual source near duplicates	Mechanism bank compared with test splits	0 retained
Edit embedding similarity	Training to test, reported as median and 95th percentile	.48 and .72
Source embedding similarity	Training to test, reported as median and 95th percentile	.43 and .69

sensitivity check. The fitting procedure first estimates calibration statistics and scalar normalization. It then selects heads from the training groups, computes benign whitening and factorial moments, selects r from the training eigenspectrum, and fits the basis and readout. The decision threshold is tuned on development groups before the model is frozen for testing. The raw vector probes have different parameter counts from the controls with rank r. PCA, the interaction SVD control, random subspaces, and CIS each use r readout coordinates. Projection overlap between folds is computed in the original coordinates of the extracted heads using the Euclidean basis $\mathrm{orth}(W_B^\top Q_C)$.

For the symmetric solution, let V_r contain the leading eigenvectors of $\mathbf{B}^{-\frac{1}{2}}\Sigma_C\mathbf{B}^{-\frac{1}{2}}$, normalized in Euclidean space. Then $U_r = \mathbf{B}^{-\frac{1}{2}}V_r$ satisfies $U_r^\top \mathbf{B} U_r = I_r$. The thin QR factorization $U_r = Q_C R$ produces the Euclidean basis used in Eq. 6. To implement the same solution in the sample space, $\mathbf{C}_{\mathrm{int}}$ contains one column $\sqrt{1/(n|\mathcal{V}_i|)}\,\mathbf{c}_{iv}$ for every combination of tuple and variant. The nonzero eigensystem is obtained from $\mathbf{C}_{\mathrm{int}}^\top \mathbf{B}^{-1}\mathbf{C}_{\mathrm{int}}$, which avoids a full $d_{\mathrm{CIS}} \times d_{\mathrm{CIS}}$ eigendecomposition.

The fixed numerical protocol uses $d_h = 128$ and records each head output before W_O. It uses $R_{\mathrm{boot}} = 10{,}000$ paired bootstrap resamples, reduced to 2,000 during development. Selection requires $\mathrm{Freq}_h \geq 0.80$, $\mathrm{CS}_h \leq Q_{.95}^{\mathrm{null}}$, and $\mathrm{SignCons}_h \geq 0.80$. Each factorial route has a canonical

Table 7: **Robustness on the construction reserve and complete refits.** Values are AUROC.

Population or variation	N	Ours
Construction reserve	30	.836
Five complete refits (mean±SD)	5	.869±.008

realization and variants with changes to the font, layout, or wrapper. The pooled benign training null gives $Q^{\text{null}}_{.95} = 0.62$ standardized units. The fixed monitor split contains 150 training, 45 development, and 45 test source groups, with 10, 3, and 3 groups per category, respectively. Sources and normalized edit templates are disjoint across splits. The detector candidate pool size is $M = |\mathcal{C}^{\text{det}}_C| = 72$. Development searches $\rho \in \{0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0\}$ and sets $m(\rho) = \max(1, \text{round}(\rho M))$. The selected values are $\rho^* = 0.75$ and $m^* = 54$. Consequently, $d_{\text{CIS}} = md_h = 6{,}912$, $\boldsymbol{\mu}_B \in \mathbb{R}^{6,912}$, $W_B \in \mathbb{R}^{6,912\times 6,912}$, and $Q_C \in \mathbb{R}^{6,912\times 8}$. We use $\epsilon_z = 10^{-4}\,\text{median}_h(\sigma_{B,h})$. For effect family $F \in \{E, S, C\}$, we use $\epsilon_{\text{eff}}(F) = 0.01\ \text{median}_h\,\text{Std}_i[F_i(h)]$ in Eq. 4. The covariance stabilizer is $\epsilon_B = 0.05\,\text{tr}(\Sigma_B)/d_{\text{CIS}}$, and the main effect penalty is $\gamma = 0.10\,\text{tr}(\Sigma_E + \Sigma_S)/d_{\text{CIS}}$. The profile likelihood elbow selects $r = 8$. All logistic readouts use L2 regularization with $C_{\text{LR}} \in \{0.1, 1, 10\}$ selected on development data. The final value is $C_{\text{LR}} = 1$. Related work studies the transfer of hyperparameter information across programs (Wang et al., 2023).

Endpoint calibration across five folds. The 1,054 IESBench requests are grouped by source identity, stratified by risk category, and assigned once with a fixed seed to $F_1, \ldots, F_5$ of size 211, 211, 211, 211, and 210. Round k uses F_k for endpoint calibration with IESBench and produces predictions on $F_{k+1 \bmod 5}$. Equivalently, predictions on F_j use calibration from $F_{j-1 \bmod 5}$. Native guards that return policy labels are evaluated on the same prediction fold with their released decisions. Concatenating the five prediction folds produces one decision for every request under disjoint calibration. Estimation of the harmfulness direction, head selection, CIS fitting, rank selection, and readout training use separate fitting banks.

Table 8: **Baseline fitting and calibration.** Released guards use their official checkpoints. Representation baselines use the frozen Qwen conditioner. Detection thresholds use development groups; endpoint thresholds use the cyclic IESBench calibration fold together with the fixed benign development population.

Baseline	Input	Fitting and calibration
Qwen-Image-Edit-Safe	source and edit	frozen native decision
Qwen3Guard [TechRep'25]	serialized request	native label, likelihood used for analysis
LLaVA-Guard [ICML'25]	source and edit	native label, likelihood used for analysis
LatentGuard	conditioner features	training fit, threshold calibrated for the task
HiddenDetect	conditioner features	training fit, threshold calibrated for the task
RHF	attention head features	training fit, threshold calibrated for the task

Comparability across operating points. Table 2 evaluates released guards with their official policy decisions. Trainable monitors use endpoint thresholds obtained through the cyclic calibration protocol. The calibration fold supplies the harmful side of the operating point, and the fixed benign development population supplies the FPR and utility constraints. Qwen3Guard and LLaVA-Guard are evaluated with their native policy labels; their unsafe label likelihoods support score analysis. Figure 6 and Table 9 sweep thresholds for monitors with scalar scores under the shared conditioning interface. All endpoint estimates use the same fold manifest, request IDs, and generation seeds. Bootstrap comparisons resample request IDs jointly across methods.

Intervention controls. Each intervention record identifies the recipient request, donor tuple, head set, token position, perturbation strength α, and generation seed. The endpoint is Qwen-Image-Edit-Safe: the hook modifies the shared conditioner state at the final conditioning token before W_O, the native safety policy reads that modified state, and allowed requests continue to the original generator. Interventions are evaluated through this native decision path. As α varies from 0.25 to 1.25, CHH subtraction increases HRR by 4.2 to 16.7 points, compared with 0.4 to 2.5 points for matched random heads. The primary comparison uses $\alpha = 1$ for every head family. EHH, SHH, and random heads are matched to CHHs in layer and count. Their applied residuals are norm matched within each layer

(a) Restricted inputs

Input	AUROC
Edit only	.540
Source only	.560
Carrier only	.520
Source and edit	.820
Ours	**.875**

(b) Operating point near 5% benign FPR

Method	FPR	Bypass
HiddenDetect	4.8	66.0
EHH	5.8	60.8
SHH	5.7	62.7
Ours (CAMP-IE)	**4.8**	**50.5**

(c) Natural donor intervention

Intervention	Δ HRR	Δ benign EV
CHH residual subtraction	+16.0 [9.4,22.3]	-1.4 [-3.8,1.0]
CHH natural donor	+12.8 [6.6,18.9]	-1.1 [-3.5,1.3]
EHH natural donor	+5.5 [0.2,10.7]	-1.0 [-3.2,1.2]
Matched random donor	+2.1 [-2.7,6.8]	-0.8 [-3.0,1.4]

Table 9: **Compact supplementary evaluations.** Panel (a) compares marginal and joint inputs under the same group split, L2 readout, and regularization grid. Higher AUROC is better. Panel (b) compares monitors that expose a scalar threshold at operating points nearest 5% benign FPR. Guards that output policy labels retain their native endpoints in Table 2. Lower bypass is better. Panel (c) reports changes in percentage points for natural donor intervention controls. Brackets give 95% paired bootstrap intervals.

before the common clipping rule. The residual operation uses the four cell contrast; natural donor replacement copies an observed head vector. Subspace comparisons hold rank fixed and use the same centering, whitening, and inverse map. HRR keeps all harmful requests in the denominator. Blocked or invalid generations contribute zero, and EV is reported separately.

Table 10: **Subspace controls with a fixed rank on compositional OOD.** This table uses the same split as Table 3. Recall uses a threshold calibrated on benign development groups to target 5% FPR. The threshold is then frozen for test evaluation.

Variant	AUROC	Recall at 5% FPR
Ours	**.875**	**49.5**
Interaction SVD without main effect contrast	.823	34.0
CHH PCA ($r = 8$)	.817	34.0
Random CHH subspace with rank 8	.610	10.5

C CONTROLLED INTEREDIT-HARM CONSTRUCTION

InterEdit-Harm is a stress set derived from InterEdit. Starting from legitimate InterEdit source and edit pairs, we retain 480 benign examples. A frozen Qwen3-32B-Instruct rewrite generator with one fixed template proposes 120 candidates whose harm is determined by the edit and 120 whose harm depends on the combination of source and edit. Candidate generation uses the source and edit pair with the fixed rewrite template. Broader multimodal jailbreak studies also examine adversarial meaning distributed through agentic interaction and temporal visual context (He et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2026a). Candidates enter the bank only when they satisfy criteria for relation type, harmful meaning, target region, and edit feasibility. Rewrites in the first group remain harmful on a neutral source. Rewrites in the second group are benign on a matched neutral source and harmful on the critical source.

The domain shift manifest shares no source IDs, normalized rewrite strings, or rewrite template IDs with the mechanism bank. With all-mpnet-base-v2 edit embeddings, the projected maximum cosine similarity from the training data to InterEdit has a median of 0.46 and a 95th percentile of 0.70. Removing every InterEdit request above 0.80 similarity leaves pooled CIS at 0.884 AUROC. These results characterize InterEdit-Harm as a controlled shift in the edit domain with explicit construction and overlap accounting.

Adaptation cost. Deployment requires one conditioner encoding plus a linear readout at $1.01\times$ inference cost. A refit for a new model uses 4,352 offline conditioner passes, equivalent to 6.2 H100 GPU hours. Fitting from cached activations then takes under three CPU minutes.

Table 11: **Specialization by task on InterEdit-Harm (AUROC).** Requests whose harm is determined by the edit are reported separately from those whose harm depends on the source and edit together.

Method	Edit sufficient	Compositional	Pooled
Qwen3Guard [TechRep'25]	.820	.735	.778
LLaVA-Guard [ICML'25]	.875	.810	.842
EHH	**.904**	.720	.812
Ours	.881	**.918**	**.899**

Responsible data handling. Upon acceptance, the artifact package will separate reproducibility metadata from harmful content. Public manifests will contain source IDs, hashes, category labels, split assignments, and derived activation statistics. Prompt rewrites that violate policy and uncensored harmful generations will be restricted to an evaluation package with controlled access. Source assets will remain available through their original benchmark repositories and licenses. Activation caches in the release will contain derived activations indexed by irreversible example IDs.