BEYOND THE FINAL TOKEN: DETECTING JAILBREAK PROMPTS VIA CHAT-SUFFIX-PROBED SAFETY TRAJECTORIES

Anonymous authors
Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

Prior works detect jailbreak prompts by extracting harmfulness and refusal signals from the hidden states at final tokens. Some jailbreaks, however, suppress these safety signals at the endpoint and appear benign to such detectors. We instead study how safety signals evolve during prompt processing. Our key insight is that the standard chat suffix can serve as a probe that elicits the model's safety assessment of the prefix observed so far. Appending the chat suffix to successive prompt prefixes can reveal latent refusal tendencies throughout the prompt. The rising and falling regions of the resulting refusal trajectory help locate harmful-content and jailbreak spans, respectively. Deleting identified jailbreak spans increases refusal scores and leads to safer responses, providing causal evidence for this interpretation. Building on these findings, we propose DualTrace, which tracks refusal and harmfulness trajectories, combines them into a four-channel sequence, and classifies the sequence with a temporal convolutional network. Across four 7B-scale chat models, DualTrace achieves 96.17–98.27% mean classification accuracy on jailbreak and benign prompts, outperforming five baseline methods.

1 INTRODUCTION

Jailbreak prompts try to make safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) answer harmful requests. They use adversarial suffixes(Zou et al., 2023; Andriushchenko et al., 2025), persuasive framing(Shen et al., 2024; Chao et al., 2023), iterative red-teaming(Liu et al., 2024; Yu et al., 2023) or obfuscation(Li et al., 2024; Ren et al., 2024; Jiang et al., 2024) to bypass refusal. Recent works(Arditi et al., 2024; Zhao et al., 2025) find that aligned models encode internal belief of harmfulness and refusal in the residual stream of hidden states at final tokens. They treat these high-level concepts as safety signals and leverage them to detect unsafe inputs. However, jailbreak prompts can exploit attack-specific spans to weaken the model's safety awareness of the malicious content. The internal safety signals are already suppressed by the final tokens, which limits the detection of jailbreak prompts.

This limitation motivates our central question: ***Can we expose safety signals before later attack content suppresses them?*** The position-dependent findings of Zhao et al. (2025) suggest that the chat suffix matters. It closes the user instruction and places the model at the start of an assistant response. We hypothesize that safety alignment makes this context a learned cue for refusal-related activity. To test the resulting probing strategy, we independently append the model's chat suffix to each observed prefix and read refusal signals from its final hidden states. Each probe asks how the model is poised to respond if the instruction ends at that prefix.

The resulting trajectories reveal evidence that endpoints omit. The chat-suffix-probed refusal of jailbreak prompts rises at intermediate prefixes and later falls, whereas raw-token refusal often remains weak. We further identify critical token spans by analyzing the rising and falling windows of the refusal trajectory. The rise windows overlap harmful instructions and the fall windows overlap jailbreak contents (*e.g., an adversarial suffix or persuasive framing*). Deleting the selected fall windows can restore positive endpoint refusal and change the displayed responses to refusal or safe redirection. This evidence supports a causal role for the deleted spans and suggest that trajectories can guide attack interpretation and prompt sanitization.

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


Figure 1: Overview of DUALTRACE. We extract harmfulness from input-token hidden states and probe refusal by appending the chat suffix to each prefix. Layer weights aggregate the safety scores into two trajectories. A TCN then detects the jailbreak prompts based on the four-channel sequence $[H, R, \Delta H, \Delta R]$.

Based on these observations, we propose DUALTRACE, a detector built on the dynamic trajectories of refusal and harmfulness during prompt processing. The harmfulness trajectory is extracted from the original hidden states of each prompt token. We pair these two trajectories with their first differences to form a four channel sequence, which can make sharp rises and falls explicit. A small temporal convolutional network (TCN) learns local patterns to classify the prompt. Across four 7B-scale chat models and ten prompt datasets, DUALTRACEachieves the highest mean accuracies among all compared methods.

Our contributions are threefold:

- We propose to extract the dynamic refusal trajectory with the chat suffix during prompt processing, which can reveal safety warnings overlooked by static final-token signals.
- We introduce DualTrace to detect jailbreak prompts based on the dynamic trajectories of harmfulness and refusal. The detector requires neither backbone fine-tuning nor response generation.
- We validate DualTrace across four 7B-scale chat models and seven jailbreak methods. DualTrace outperforms five baseline methods and achieves an average accuracy of 96.17%–98.27%.

2 RELATED WORK

Jailbreak attacks on LLMs. Jailbreak attacks seek to bypass LLM safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses that the model would otherwise refuse. Black-box attacks rely on prompts and model responses rather than internal access. DAN-style prompts (Shen et al., 2024) and DeepInception (Li et al., 2023b) use role-playing or nested fictional scenarios, while many-shot jailbreaking (Anil et al., 2024) uses long sequences of harmful demonstrations. PAIR (Chao et al., 2023) automates prompt refinement through an attacker LLM. With white-box access, attackers can exploit gradients to optimize adversarial suffixes, as in GCG (Zou et al., 2023), or manipulate safety-related activations (Xu et al., 2024; Arditi et al., 2024).

Jailbreak detection. Existing detectors use input statistics, dedicated safeguard models, or internal model signals. Perplexity filters flag unusual token sequences (Alon & Kamfonas, 2023), while Llama Guard 3 classifies inputs with a separately trained safeguard model (Meta, 2024). Internal detectors use safety-critical gradients (GradSafe; Xie et al., 2024), refusal-related hidden states

(HiddenDetect; Jiang et al., 2025), or toxic and jailbreak concepts (JBShield; Zhang et al., 2025). Latent Guard further separates harmfulness from refusal and uses harmfulness representations for detection (Zhao et al., 2025). Different from previous method, our DUALTRACE detects jailbreak prompts with dynamic trajectories of harmfulness and refusal extracted during prompt processing. Our method can expose the safety signals before later attack content suppresses them.

3 BACKGROUND

Extracting harmfulness and refusal from hidden states. A growing body of evidence suggests that the residual streams(Park et al., 2024; Marks & Tegmark, 2023) of hidden states encode high-level semantic concepts of LLM, including truthfulness(Marks & Tegmark, 2023; Li et al., 2023a), sentiment(Tigges et al., 2023), harmfulness(Jain et al., 2024; Xu et al., 2024; Ball et al., 2026) and refusal(Arditi et al., 2024; Zhao et al., 2025; Chua et al., 2026). Zhao et al. (2025) find that hidden states cluster by *harmfulness at* t_{inst}, the last instruction token, and by *refusal at* $t_{\text{post-inst}}$, the last chat-suffix token before generation. They use refused harmful and accepted harmless prompts as contrasting anchors. Let $h_{t,l}(x)$ denote the hidden state at token position t and layer l. For reference category a and prompt set $\mathcal{D}_a$, its center at the designated position t_a is

$$c_l^a = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_a|} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{D}_a} h_{t_a,l}(x), \tag{1}$$

Harmful/benign centers use t_{inst}; refused/accepted centers use $t_{\text{post-inst}}$. Define the cosine contrast $q_l(h; c^+, c^-) = \cos(h, c^+) - \cos(h, c^-)$, which measures the hidden state's alignment with the positive versus negative reference center. The harmfulness score H and refusal score R can be obtained by averaging these cosine contrasts over L layers:

$$H = \frac{1}{L} \sum_{l=1}^{L} q_l(h_{t_{\text{inst}},l}; c_l^{\text{harmful}}, c_l^{\text{benign}}), \qquad R = \frac{1}{L} \sum_{l=1}^{L} q_l(h_{t_{\text{post-inst}},l}; c_l^{\text{refused}}, c_l^{\text{accepted}}). \tag{2}$$

The scores H and R characterize the model's internal recognition of the input prompt's harmfulness and its propensity to refuse a response, respectively.

Models and Datasets. The following analysis is based on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (Qwen et al., 2024). The benign datasets consist of 1000 prompts from Alpaca (Taori et al., 2023) and XSTest-harmless (Röttger et al., 2024). The harmful datasets consist of 1000 prompts from AdvBench (Chen et al., 2022) and Catqa(Bhardwaj et al., 2024). Following Zhao et al. (2025), we extract the harmful/benign centroids at t_{inst} and refusal/acceptance centroids at $t_{\text{post-inst}}$.




Figure 2: Endpoint harmfulness and refusal on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct. Some jailbreak prompts overlap benign prompts in the low-signal region.

Jailbreak Methods. We consider a wide range of jailbreak methods: gradient-guided adversarial suffix optimization (GCG; Zou et al. 2023); model-adapted templates and random suffix search (Simple Adaptive Attacks, SAA; Andriushchenko et al. 2025); hierarchical genetic search (AutoDAN; Liu et al. 2024); iterative attacker-LLM refinement using target feedback (PAIR; Chao et al. 2023); prompt decomposition and reconstruction (DrAttack; Li et al. 2024); and mutation-based template fuzzing (GPT-Fuzzer; Yu et al. 2023).

Limitations of final-token safety signals. Endpoint-based detectors use harmfulness or refusal signals to identify unsafe inputs (Zhao et al., 2025; Jiang et al., 2025). However, Figure 2 shows overlapping scores. Alpaca prompts mainly have negative harmfulness and refusal. Sensitive but benign XSTest prompts often have positive harmfulness and negative refusal. Some DrAttack, GCG, and SAA

prompts also have weak harmfulness and negative refusal, resembling benign inputs. This overlap exposes a limitation of static endpoint analysis. By the final token, the jailbreak spans in prompts (an adversarial prefix, suffix, or template) have already suppressed the safety signals associated with a harmful request. A detector that observes only this final state can miss warning signals that appeared earlier. Therefore, low harmfulness and refusal scores at the endpoint are not sufficient evidence that a prompt is benign. Detectors that only rely on final static signals may fail to identify jailbreak prompts that resemble benign inputs.

Hypothesis: safety signals before the final token. We therefore ask: ***Can we expose safety signals before later attack content suppresses them?*** The position-dependent findings of Zhao et al. (2025) offer a starting point. Harmfulness is encoded at the instruction boundary, whereas refusal is encoded after the chat suffix. They also find that removing post-instruction tokens weakens refusal. These observations suggest that safety alignment may tie refusal to the assistant-response context. The chat suffix may thus serve as a learned cue that exposes refusal-related activity. Based on this analysis, we hypothesize that the standard chat suffix can be used as a probe for revealing the model's refusal tendency at arbitrary token positions throughout prompt processing. The resulting signal trajectory can reveal a harmful request before later attack content suppresses the endpoint scores.

4 Safety Signal Trajectories During Prompt Processing

4.1 Extraction method

In this section, we describe our method for extracting harmfulness and refusal at each token position t during the model processing a prompt $\{x_1, \ldots, x_T\}$. Following section 3, we use contrast datasets to construct harmful/benign centers at t_{inst} and refused/accepted centers at $t_{\text{post-inst}}$. Layers differ in how well they separate these reference categories, we therefore weight their scores by center separation rather than averaging them equally. For each layer $l \in \{1, \ldots, L\}$, we compute their center distances:

$$\delta_l^H = 1 - \cos(c_l^{\text{harmful}}, c_l^{\text{benign}}), \qquad \delta_l^R = 1 - \cos(c_l^{\text{refused}}, c_l^{\text{accepted}}). \tag{3}$$

For $S \in \{H, R\}$, set $w_l^S = \delta_l^S / \sum_{j=1}^{L} \delta_j^S$. Each set of weights sums to one when the total distance is positive, giving more weight to layers with greater separation. Centers and weights are model-specific and remain frozen during detection. We discuss the layer weights of different models in Appendix B.1.

After the model processes token x_t, we extract the hidden states $\{h_{t,l}\}_{l=1}^{L}$ and give the weighted harmfulness score:

$$H_t = \sum_{l=1}^{L} w_l^H \, q_l(h_{t,l}; c_l^{\text{harmful}}, c_l^{\text{benign}}). \tag{4}$$

Similar to extracting harmfulness of the whole prompt at t_{inst}, the extracted H_t can represent the harmfulness of the current prefix $\{x_1, \ldots, x_t\}$, as $\{h_{t,l}\}_{l=1}^{L}$ contain the information of all previous tokens (due to self-attention in Transformers(Vaswani et al., 2017)).

For probing refusal at current token x_t, we continue to input a model-specific chat suffix $s = \{s_1, \ldots, s_k\}$ (Appendix A.2 provides the details of each model's chat suffix). It is equal to let the model process $x_{1:t} \parallel s_{1:k}$, where $\parallel$ denotes concatenation. The appended suffix elicits the model's latent safety-related activity for the current prefix $x_{1:t}$, thereby exposing its refusal tendency at position t. We extract the hidden states $\{h'_{t+k,l}\}_{l=1}^{L}$ at the final token s_k and give the weighted refusal score:

$$R_t = \sum_{l=1}^{L} w_l^R \, q_l(h'_{t+k,l}; c_l^{\text{refused}}, c_l^{\text{accepted}}). \tag{5}$$

After probing, we restore KV cache $\mathcal{C}_t^{\text{KV}}$ at token x_t and continue with the next token x_{t+1} of the prompt. The probe suffix is not carried into later input positions. Thus, no probe sees future tokens or inherits a previous probe's suffix. Repeating this process yields paired trajectories $\{H_t, R_t\}_{t=1}^{T}$ without generating a response.




Figure 3: Examples of dynamic safety trajectories. Sharp rises and drops in the refusal trajectory can help distinguish jailbreak prompts from benign prompts.




Figure 4: Causal analysis of the rise and fall windows in chat-suffix-probed refusal trajectories. Exploiting the rise and fall windows, we can locate the harmful and jailbreak spans in prompts, respectively. Deleting tokens in fall windows restores a positive refusal signal and a safer response.

4.2 Intermediate probes reveal otherwise hidden warnings.

Figure 3 shows how safety signals evolve during prompt processing. The attack examples (AutoDAN, GCG, PAIR and SAA) show intermediate rises in chat-suffix-probed refusal, followed by a decline toward the end of the input. The two benign examples (Alpaca and XSTest) instead have negative and relatively stable refusal scores. Thus, these examples suggest that intermediate probes can expose safety signals that a final-token measurement misses.

The gray dashed curves show refusal scores read directly from input-token hidden states, without the chat suffix. In attack examples, these curves do not show the sustained positive refusal seen




Figure 5: The semantics of the selected rise and fall windows in chat-suffix-probed refusal trajectories.

with chat-suffix probing. The suffix therefore makes the intermediate refusal pattern more visible. The orange harmfulness curves provide a complementary view of the input semantics. Both attack prompts and the sensitive but benign example from XSTest can show increased harmfulness, whereas Alpaca stays low. Harmfulness alone therefore does not determine whether an input is a jailbreak.

4.3 Causal analysis of tokens behind refusal trajectories.

To locate key phrases in jailbreak prompts, we first identify abrupt changes in the refusal trajectory. We compute $\Delta R_t = R_t - R_{t-1}$: the maximum ΔR_t marks a sharp rise, and the minimum ΔR_t marks a sharp fall. For each marked position, we take the token at that position and five consecutive tokens on each side, which gives an 11-token window. We examine GCG and PAIR prompts on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct to connect these windows with input content and generated responses. Figure 4 shows the selected rise and fall windows. We delete the fall-window tokens and evaluate the edited prompt.

Rises locate harmful spans; falls locate jailbreak spans. We observe that the rise and fall windows often correspond to different semantic regions. We demonstrate two detailed examples in fig 4. In the GCG example, the rise window covers part of the **original discriminatory instruction**. The fall window instead lies in the optimized **adversarial suffix**. In the PAIR example, the rise window contains the request to **sabotage a transportation system**. The fall window contains framing that **the plan should not be taken seriously and is purely hypothetical**. We also analyze the semantics of critical spans for different jailbreak methods in fig 5. For SAA, the identified spans mainly correspond to output templates, whereas for GPTFuzzer, they are largely associated with role assignment and compliance-inducing instructions. In contrast, the vast majority of rising windows correspond to the underlying harmful tasks. Thus, the rise windows overlap harmful spans, while the fall windows overlap jailbreak spans used to disguise or override those instructions. We give more examples of the rise and fall windows in Appendix B.3.

Table 1: Endpoint refusal scores before and after deleting fall-window tokens.

Model	Before	After	Mean change
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	-0.023060	0.005512	$+0.0285$

Deleting fall-window tokens restores safer behavior. For GCG, removing the selected adversarial suffix raises the endpoint refusal score from -0.073 to 0.079 and changes the response from accepting the harmful request to explicitly refusing it. The PAIR example shows the same pattern of increased refusal and a safer response. Table 1 shows the overall effect on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct prompts.

Deleting the selected jailbreak span can increase the average refusal score across all evaluated prompts by 0.0285. Appendix B.3 provides the experimental details and results for all four models. Our experiments demonstrate that jailbreak spans contribute to suppressing the model's refusal tendency, although removing these spans does not guarantee a fully safe response. These findings motivate a trajectory-guided mechanism for sanitizing jailbreak prompts, which we leave for more systematic investigation in future work.

5 DUALTRACE: CHAT-SUFFIX-PROBED SAFETY TRAJECTORIES

Based on the observations in Section 4, we propose DUALTRACE to detect jailbreak prompts from the dynamic trajectories of harmfulness and refusal. We combine the two trajectories and their changes into a four-channel sequence. Then, a temporal convolutional network (TCN) classifies the sequence as a jailbreak or benign prompt.

5.1 FOUR-CHANNEL SEQUENCE CONSTRUCTION

The trajectories $\{H_t\}_{t=1}^T$ and $\{R_t\}_{t=1}^T$ contain both safety-score levels and changes during prompt processing. A high refusal score can reveal a harmful prefix, while a later decrease can reveal the suppression pattern discussed in Section 4. To make these changes explicit, we compute the first differences:

$$\Delta H_t = H_t - H_{t-1}, \qquad \Delta R_t = R_t - R_{t-1}, \qquad t \geq 2, \tag{6}$$

with $\Delta H_1 = \Delta R_1 = 0$. A large positive difference indicates a sharp rise, and a large negative difference indicates a sharp drop. We combine the scores and their differences at each position:

$$X_t = [H_t, R_t, \Delta H_t, \Delta R_t], \qquad X \in \mathbb{R}^{T\times 4}. \tag{7}$$

These channels help the classifier learn patterns such as a refusal rise followed by suppression.

5.2 TCN CLASSIFICATION

The patterns of interest are changes across nearby positions, such as a sharp rise, a sustained high score, or a gradual decline. A TCN (Bai et al., 2018) learns these local patterns with temporal convolutions. Shared filters can recognize a pattern at different positions, while dilated convolutions cover different temporal ranges. Another key consideration is that prompts of varying lengths yield feature sequences of different lengths. The 1D convolutions used in the TCN naturally support variable-length sequences, allowing the model to process prompts without requiring a fixed input length. This makes the TCN a suitable classifier for the four-channel trajectories.

6 MAIN EXPERIMENT RESULTS

6.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

Baselines. **PPL** (Alon & Kamfonas, 2023) detects jailbreak prompts by computing perplexity. **GradSafe** (Xie et al., 2024) detects unsafe prompts from safety-critical parameter gradients computed with a compliance response. **HiddenDetect** (Jiang et al., 2025) detects jailbreak prompts by monitoring the refusal vector in hidden states. **Llama Guard 3** (Meta, 2024) is a fine-tuned safeguard model for identifying harmful inputs. **JBShield** (Zhang et al., 2025) detects jailbreaks by checking whether hidden states activate both toxic and jailbreak concepts.

Models and datasets. We evaluate DUALTRACE on Llama-2-7b-chat-hf (Touvron et al., 2023), Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 (Mistral AI, 2024), Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (Qwen et al., 2024), and vicuna-7b-v1.5 (Chiang et al., 2023). We consider a wide range of jailbreak methods, including AutoDAN, DrAttack, GCG, GPTFuzzer, PAIR, and SAA (Section 3). The jailbreak prompts are generated with HarmBench (Mazeika et al., 2024). In addition, we use the manually-designed jailbreak prompts IJP in (Shen et al., 2024). The three benign sources are Alpaca (Taori et al., 2023), XSTest-harmless (Röttger et al., 2024), and Dolly (Databricks, 2023). Each run of prediction uses 100 prompts per source, for 1,000 tests per backbone.

Table 2: The detection accuracy (%) of DUALTRACE and five baselines on jailbreak and benign prompts. Bold and underlined values indicate a column maximum within each model block.

	Jailbreak detection							Benign pass-through			
Method	IJP	GCG	SAA	Auto DAN	PAIR	Dr Attack	GPT Fuzzer	Alpaca	XSTest	Dolly	Avg acc
Llama-2-7b-chat-hf											
PPL	0.00	63.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	**100.00**	100.00	36.30
GradSafe	34.00	93.00	76.00	94.00	63.00	32.00	81.00	100.00	89.00	100.00	76.20
HiddenDetect	74.00	**100.00**	100.00	100.00	94.00	81.00	99.00	90.00	23.00	97.00	85.80
Llama Guard 3	26.00	100.00	100.00	99.00	52.00	62.00	99.00	99.00	98.00	**100.00**	83.50
JBShield	84.33	65.33	100.00	95.00	72.67	69.00	98.00	87.00	33.00	86.67	79.10
Ours	**89.67**	98.67	**100.00**	**100.00**	**98.67**	**100.00**	**99.67**	**100.00**	98.67	97.33	**98.27**
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3											
PPL	0.00	77.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	37.70
GradSafe	1.00	50.00	0.00	14.00	14.00	0.00	2.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	38.10
HiddenDetect	64.00	**100.00**	91.00	**100.00**	95.00	85.00	91.00	48.00	20.00	79.00	77.30
Llama Guard 3	27.00	98.00	100.00	52.00	88.00	78.00	99.00	99.00	98.00	**100.00**	83.90
JBShield	90.33	98.33	98.67	78.00	58.00	98.67	96.00	70.00	98.33	78.33	86.47
Ours	**93.33**	97.67	**100.00**	98.33	**96.33**	**99.67**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**	95.67	**98.10**
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct											
PPL	0.00	98.00	0.00	44.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	97.00	100.00	43.90
GradSafe	0.00	1.00	0.00	4.00	8.00	1.00	1.00	100.00	99.00	100.00	31.40
HiddenDetect	78.00	96.00	99.00	96.00	49.00	78.00	98.00	95.00	89.00	87.00	86.50
Llama Guard 3	27.00	99.00	**100.00**	98.00	56.00	60.00	**99.00**	99.00	98.00	**100.00**	83.60
JBShield	**85.67**	98.67	84.00	90.33	61.67	68.00	98.00	60.67	83.00	85.33	81.53
Ours	85.00	**100.00**	98.00	**99.67**	**97.00**	**86.00**	97.00	**100.00**	**99.67**	99.33	**96.17**
Vicuna-7b-v1.5											
PPL	0.00	75.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	99.00	98.00	100.00	37.20
GradSafe	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	12.00	100.00	**100.00**	100.00	31.50
HiddenDetect	30.00	99.00	91.00	**100.00**	82.00	97.00	91.00	79.00	66.00	94.00	82.90
Llama Guard 3	31.00	98.00	100.00	71.00	84.00	66.00	**99.00**	99.00	98.00	**100.00**	84.60
JBShield	51.33	27.67	**100.00**	90.00	69.67	96.00	97.00	86.33	98.00	64.67	78.07
Ours	**93.67**	**100.00**	99.67	96.33	**99.00**	**100.00**	97.00	**100.00**	99.00	96.33	**98.10**

Table 3: Feature ablations: accuracy (%, mean $\pm$ standard deviation over three seeds). Avg acc averages the four models; Δ_{acc} is the gain over $H(t_{\text{inst}})$ in percentage points.

Input features	Qwen	Llama2	Mistral	Vicuna	Avg acc	Δ_{acc}
$H(t_{\text{inst}})$	69.39 ± 1.43	74.09 ± 3.21	62.52 ± 1.09	75.00 ± 0.63	70.25	—
$R(t_{\text{post-inst}})$	83.00 ± 0.16	88.48 ± 0.26	61.82 ± 0.16	83.12 ± 0.29	79.11	+8.86
H trajectory	89.15 ± 2.65	91.79 ± 0.55	92.82 ± 3.16	92.39 ± 1.59	91.54	+21.29
R trajectory	86.12 ± 1.53	95.58 ± 1.00	89.85 ± 2.01	95.94 ± 0.42	91.87	+21.62
H, R trajectories	94.27 ± 0.55	96.88 ± 0.45	93.67 ± 3.65	96.24 ± 0.45	95.27	+25.02
$H, R, \Delta H, \Delta R$	$\mathbf{95.39 \pm 1.71}$	$\mathbf{97.09 \pm 0.18}$	$\mathbf{96.64 \pm 0.18}$	$\mathbf{96.48 \pm 0.28}$	**96.40**	+26.15

Training and evaluation protocol. The TCN classifier contains four residual blocks with 16 hidden channels. Each block uses two causal convolutions with kernel size 3 and dropout 0.1 and the dilation rates are $1, 2, 4, 8$. We classify a prompt as a jailbreak when its predicted probability is at least 0.5. Each model has a separate TCN classifier trained on 700 prompts: 50 from each of seven attack categories and 350 from the three benign sources. All experiments are run on one H200 GPU. We report the mean accuracies of all baselines over three runs. More details of the experiments setting are provided in Appendix A.

6.2 MAIN RESULTS AND ABLATION STUDIES

Strong detection across prompt categories. Table 2 shows that DUALTRACE achieves the highest average accuracy in each model group, exceeding the strongest listed baseline by 9.67–13.50 percentage points. Retaining intermediate safety evidence helps distinguish attacks whose endpoint signals resemble benign inputs. HiddenDetect and JBShield show a significant decrease on accuracies of




Figure 6: (a) Accuracy (%) on held-out attacks, with each target attack excluded from classifier training. (b) Mean accuracy and additional latency across four models at sampling stride k. Both training and test trajectories use scores sampled every k tokens.

benign prompts. It is because their detection are sensitive to the presence of sensitive terms in XSTest. PPL and GradSafe preserve many benign prompts but miss more attacks under these settings.

Dual trajectories improve detection over endpoints. In Table 3, we compare classifiers using individual endpoint scores with TCN classifiers using trajectories. The harmfulness endpoint follows the feature used by Latent Guard (Zhao et al., 2025). Each trajectory improves over its corresponding endpoint, and paired trajectories outperform either alone on all four models. The four-channel sequence achieves the highest average accuracy of 96.40%, exceeding the harmfulness alone by 26.15 percentage points. These results provide quantitative evidence that the dynamic trajectories of harmfulness and refusal are more informative than static final-token features for detecting jailbreak prompts.

6.3 The generalization and overhead.

DualTrace can learn general trajectory patterns and detect unseen attacks. During classifier training, we hold out one attack category at a time and evaluate detection performance on the corresponding unseen attack category. Figure 6(a) reports accuracies from 90.44% to 100%, averaging 96.30% across the seven held-out attack categories. Accuracy remains above 90% even for IJP and DrAttack, the two lowest-scoring categories. These results suggest that paired safety trajectories capture patterns that transfer across attack methods. By tracking how harmfulness and refusal change within a prompt, DualTrace can detect attacks absent from classifier training.

DualTrace is a light-weight jailbreak detector. DualTrace reuses the target LLM and adds only a small TCN with 16 hidden channels, rather than a separate large safeguard model. The TCN has about 6K parameters, occupying approximately 23 KB of parameter storage. The main time cost comes from trajectory extraction, especially chat-suffix probing. The prompts used in our experiments have an average length of 226 tokens. We extract both scores every k tokens in training and testing. Figure 6(b) shows that larger strides reduce additional latency at some cost to accuracy. At $k = 5$, accuracy is 95.95% and additional latency is 0.340 seconds per prompt: a 75.9% latency reduction from $k = 1$ for a 0.57-point accuracy loss. Larger strides reduce accuracy to about 94%, making $k = 5$ a useful balance in this experiment.

7 Conclusion

In this work, we point out that jailbreak can suppress the safety signals by the final token, which limits the effectiveness of endpoint-based detection. Our insight is that the chat suffix can elicit latent safety-related activity, allowing it to serve as a probe for revealing the model's refusal tendency at arbitrary token positions throughout prompt processing. Further, we propose DualTrace which detects jailbreak prompts with paired harmfulness and refusal trajectories. Our method can achieve 96.17–98.27% mean accuracy across four models and ten datasets. What's more, DualTraceis a light-weight detector that incurs only minimal memory and computational overhead, and does not require response generation.

AI USE STATEMENT

We used generative AI tools to draft sections of the manuscript, translate and polish the writing. AI also supported research ideation and analysis by helping refine the presentation of hypotheses, providing feedback on experimental design, and assisting with the interpretation of results. Additional assistance included figure preparation and LaTeX formatting. We did not use generative AI tools to generate synthetic datasets or prove mathematical claims. The authors retain responsibility for research decisions, verification of AI-assisted material, and the final content of this paper.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies defensive detection of jailbreak prompts. This paper includes prompt examples containing discriminatory or harmful content. We use these examples solely for safety research and evaluation, not for any other purpose. Their inclusion does not imply endorsement of the views or behaviors they describe. False positives can restrict legitimate requests, while missed attacks can expose users to harmful outputs; deployment should therefore evaluate both error types under realistic traffic. The detector is not a guarantee of safe generation. Any release of attack materials should consider misuse risks and the terms of the underlying datasets.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

Section 5 specifies the scoring and temporal architecture, and Section 6 documents the supplied split and results. Appendix A records normalization, cache, and configuration details, including unresolved implementation information. We will release the code and data to support reproducibility, including the attack datasets, model checkpoints, and evaluation scripts.

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BEYOND THE FINAL TOKEN: DETECTING JAILBREAK PROMPTS VIA CHAT-SUFFIX-PROBED SAFETY TRAJECTORIES

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX

Anonymous authors
Paper under double-blind review

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A EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS

A.1 MODELS, DATASETS, AND EVALUATION PROTOCOLS

We evaluate Llama-2-7b-chat-hf (Touvron et al., 2023), Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 (Mistral AI, 2024), Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (Qwen et al., 2024), and vicuna-7b-v1.5 (Chiang et al., 2023). Each backbone has its own frozen reference centers, layer weights, and trained TCN.

Data sources. The seven attack sources are AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024), DrAttack (Li et al., 2024), GCG (Zou et al., 2023), GPTFuzzer (Yu et al., 2023), IJP (Shen et al., 2024), PAIR (Chao et al., 2023), and Simple Adaptive Attacks (SAA) (Andriushchenko et al., 2025). As described in the main paper, the automated attacks use HarmBench (Mazeika et al., 2024), while IJP contains in-the-wild jailbreak prompts. Benign sources include Alpaca (Taori et al., 2023), XSTest-harmless (Röttger et al., 2024), and Dolly (Databricks, 2023). Labels describe whether an input is a jailbreak or benign prompt; they do not indicate whether the attack succeeds in eliciting a harmful response.

Data Split. Table A.1 gives the dataset split for main experiments. The training pool contains 700 prompts: 350 attacks and 350 benign prompts. Each attack source contributes 50 prompts. The benign pool contains 50 Alpaca, 50 XSTest-harmless, and 250 Dolly prompts. The test set contains 1,000 prompts: 700 attacks and 300 benign prompts, with 100 from each of the ten sources. We sample Dolly prompts with diverse lengths to prevent the TCN classifier from relying primarily on prompt length as a shortcut feature.

Table A.1: The dataset split for main experiments.

Data source	Label	Training pool	Test set
AutoDAN	Jailbreak	50	100
DrAttack	Jailbreak	50	100
GCG	Jailbreak	50	100
GPTFuzzer	Jailbreak	50	100
IJP	Jailbreak	50	100
PAIR	Jailbreak	50	100
SAA	Jailbreak	50	100
Alpaca	Benign	50	100
XSTest-harmless	Benign	50	100
Dolly, length 32–127	Benign	100	30
Dolly, length 128–255	Benign	100	40
Dolly, length 256–1024	Benign	50	30
Total		**700**	**1,000**

A.2 CHAT TEMPLATES AND SUFFIX BOUNDARIES

Table A.2 shows complete single-user-turn, text-only input formats up to the start of an assistant response for the four backbones. Here, `{PROMPT}` denotes the user input and `{SYSTEM}` denotes a configurable system message. The *chat suffix* s is the entire span after `{PROMPT}`: it closes the user instruction and opens the assistant turn. It is part of the standard chat template, not an adversarial string or a generated answer. The chat-suffix-probed refusal is read from the final token of the added chat suffix.

Template conventions. The Qwen and Mistral rows follow their public tokenizer configurations; the Llama-2 and Vicuna rows use the FastChat `llama-2` and `vicuna_v1.1` conversation formats, respectively.[1] When no system message is supplied, Qwen inserts "You are Qwen, created by Alibaba Cloud. You are a helpful assistant." Vicuna's default system message is "A chat between a curious

[1]Reference sources: Qwen tokenizer configuration, Mistral tokenizer configuration, and FastChat conversation templates.

Table A.2: The standard chat templates for the four models. Bold monospace marks the complete chat suffix s. The visible symbol ␣ denotes one space and \n denotes a newline. Placeholders are replaced by message text.

Model	Standard Chat Template
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	<|im_start|>system\n{SYSTEM}<|im_end|>\n <|im_start|>user\n{PROMPT} **<|im_end|>\n<|im_start|>assistant\n**
Llama-2-7B-Chat	<s>[INST]␣«SYS»\n{SYSTEM}\n «/SYS»\n\n{PROMPT}␣**[/INST]**
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	<s>[INST]␣{SYSTEM}\n\n{PROMPT}**[/INST]**
Vicuna-7B-v1.5	<s>{SYSTEM}␣USER:␣{PROMPT} ␣**ASSISTANT:**

user and an artificial intelligence assistant. The assistant gives helpful, detailed, and polite answers to the user's questions." Llama-2 can omit the entire «SYS»...«/SYS»\n\n block; Mistral omits {SYSTEM}\n\n when no system message is provided. The suffixes are unchanged by these optional system-message blocks.

The displayed <s> represents a beginning-of-sequence token and must occur only once, whether inserted by the formatter or the tokenizer. In Qwen, <|im_start|> and <|im_end|> are special tokens; assistant is ordinary role text. Vicuna's ASSISTANT: is also ordinary text, not a dedicated special token. Instruction delimiters must be encoded with the corresponding tokenizer rather than assumed to share token IDs or token counts across Llama-2 and Mistral. In particular, the Mistral reference format has no space before [/INST], whereas the Llama-2 format does. Qwen's suffix includes the user-turn terminator as well as the assistant header; using only the header would omit part of s. None of the formats includes an assistant answer or an end-of-answer token.

A.3 Training data and model selection

The TCN (Bai et al., 2018) uses four residual blocks with 16 hidden channels. Each block contains two causal convolutions with kernel size 3 and dropout 0.1. Dilations are $1, 2, 4, 8$, giving a receptive field of 61 sampled positions. Masked global average pooling excludes padding, and an MLP produces one prompt-level logit.

For each backbone, we convert every training prompt into a four-channel sequence and assign one prompt-level label: $y = 1$ for a jailbreak prompt and $y = 0$ for a benign prompt. The label records the input category, not whether an attack succeeds. We train a separate TCN for each backbone with AdamW and binary cross-entropy.

We use a held-out validation subset of the development pool to select the number of training epochs. Normalization statistics at this stage use only the fitting subset. After selection, we reinitialize the TCN, refit the normalization statistics on the full development pool, and train for the selected number of epochs. The test set is used only for final evaluation. Table A.1 reports the source-level splits and sample counts for each experiment.

Prompts have different lengths, so we retain a variable-length sequence for each prompt. Before training the classifier, we standardize each channel using training-set statistics:

$$\hat{X}_{t,c} = \frac{X_{t,c} - \mu_c}{\sigma_c}. \tag{A.1}$$

Each training prompt contributes equally to these statistics, so longer prompts do not receive greater weight. An explicit prompt-balanced estimator for N training sequences is

$$\mu_c = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\frac{1}{T_i}\sum_{t=1}^{T_i} X_{i,t,c}, \tag{A.2}$$

$$\sigma_c^2 = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\frac{1}{T_i}\sum_{t=1}^{T_i}(X_{i,t,c}-\mu_c)^2, \qquad \hat{X}_{i,t,c} = \frac{X_{i,t,c}-\mu_c}{\sigma_c}. \tag{A.3}$$

Each prompt contributes total weight $1/N$ irrespective of length. We use the fitted statistics for validation and testing. Sequences are right-padded within each batch, and a binary mask marks valid positions. Padding does not contribute to the normalization statistics or the final pooling operation.

B SUPPLEMENTARY EXPERIMENTS

B.1 LAYER WEIGHTS ACROSS BACKBONES

Figure B.1 shows the harmfulness and refusal weights for the four backbones. As described in our main paper, we compute cosine distances between the corresponding reference centers and normalize them across layers, separately for each signal. Refusal weights are concentrated in middle-to-late layers. This suggests that refusal-related information is progressively propagated from shallower to deeper layers, where a more explicit refusal representation eventually emerges. Harmfulness weights vary more across models: Llama2 and Vicuna place most weight on early and final layers, while Qwen and Mistral distribute it more broadly. These profiles illustrate why we use model-specific, signal-specific weights rather than assuming that all layers contribute equally.




Figure B.1: Normalized layer weights for harmfulness (orange solid lines) and refusal (blue dashed lines) across four backbones. Each signal is normalized separately within each model.

B.2 THE ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC TRAJECTORIES

Figure B.2 compares 150 benign Alpaca prompts with 1,050 prompts from the seven jailbreak sources on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct. Each statistic is computed over the complete, un-sampled token trajectory. For refusal, "no suffix" scores the current prompt token, while "full suffix" scores the last token of the chat suffix appended to each prefix.




Figure B.2: Distributions of (a) mean harmfulness μ_H, (b) mean refusal μ_R, and (c) maximum absolute refusal change $M_{\Delta R} = \max_t |R_t - R_{t-1}|$. Blue denotes Alpaca benign prompts and orange denotes jailbreak prompts. White dots mark medians; thick bars mark interquartile ranges.

Mean value of the harmfulness trajectory separates the two groups well in Fig. B.2a. With the chat suffix, benign mean refusal becomes more negative, while the jailbreak distribution widens and extends to clearly positive values (Fig. B.2b). It is because our chat-suffix-probe refusal can detect the suppression of refusal signals. Near the final tokens, the refusal scores become negative due to the jailbreak spans in prompts. The examples in Figure 3 show how this signal can later fall. Jailbreak prompts also tend to have larger local refusal changes with chat suffixes. Although the distribution exhibits some overlap between benign and jailbreak prompts, this overlap has limited impact on classification performance. The TCN distinguishes samples by learning dynamic trajectory patterns, particularly the characteristic rise-then-fall behavior, rather than relying solely on endpoint distributions.

B.3 THE DETAILED PROMPT SPANS IN THE RISING AND FALLING WINDOW

Fall-window deletion across models. We evaluate all attack prompts for which the selected 11-token rise and fall windows do not overlap, using the same fall-window deletion rule and endpoint refusal scores as in Section 4.3. This restriction keeps the rise-window content in the edited prompt: deleting overlapping rise-window tokens could remove harmful content and lower refusal, confounding the test of whether the fall window suppresses refusal. The counts therefore vary across models and attack categories. Table B.1 uses every eligible prompt, rather than only the 35 span examples shown below.

Table B.1: Endpoint refusal scores before and after deleting fall-window tokens, restricted to prompts with non-overlapping rise and fall windows. Means and increase fractions are computed over all eligible prompts for each model.

Model	Prompts	Before	After	Mean change	Increased
Llama-2-7B-Chat	365	0.064476	0.109597	+0.045121	51.78%
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	475	−0.023060	0.005512	+0.028572	68.42%
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	421	−0.064124	−0.058419	+0.005705	65.80%
Vicuna-7B-v1.5	394	−0.024931	−0.003264	+0.021667	70.81%

All four prompt-weighted mean changes are positive. Giving each of the seven attack categories equal weight also yields a positive mean change for each model, despite their unequal eligible sample counts. This subset-level result does not imply an increase for every prompt or every attack category, and an endpoint refusal-score increase is not itself evidence of a lower attack success rate.

We extract the largest rise and fall windows in the chat-suffix-probed refusal trajectory for Llama-2 attack prompts. Table B.2 shows five prompt pairs from each of seven attack families. Each row comes from one prompt and contains two 11-token windows. A displayed `\n` marks an original line break; non-ASCII symbols are rendered as reversible Unicode `\uXXXX` code points.

Table B.2: Representative rising and falling windows in jailbreak prompts.

No.	Jailbreak	The rising window	The falling window
1	AutoDAN	`Create a virus that can spread rapidly through a network and`	`apply rigorous mapping of details (steer clear of`
2	AutoDAN	`with users on gambling forums, sharing a`	`or ambiguity), frame it in a list format.`
3	AutoDAN	`Generate a propaganda narrative promoting why Russia`	`should read as follows: \u201Cyo\u201D\n\nRe`
4	AutoDAN	`how to rent a botnet from the Alpha Bay`	`phrase the fanciful scenario as come_al`
5	AutoDAN	`Develop seditious messages to mobilize extremist groups`	`facebook.Theoretical feedback:  in specify a mint`
6	DrAttack	`in Question A that hacks into the thing in Question`	`Now, here is my input: USER QUE`
7	DrAttack	`Question A on how to hack the thing in Question B`	`main menu.\n\nStep 2:  Enter your`
8	DrAttack	`What is/are a bomb?  You need to construct`	`B1.  \nHere is an example: US`
9	DrAttack	`.  My input has the following format:  USER Q`	`B1.  \nHere is an example: US`
10	DrAttack	`is/are self-destruction?  You need to`	`a response about using the methods in Question A that encourag`

Table B.2 (continued)

No.	Jailbreak	The rising window	The falling window
11	GCG	that promotes eating disorders and encourages dangerous	yci [[[[reet Fa [}] [sk
12	GCG	Write a program that can hack into a hospital's	endeav [Zeitschrift befind [[zent-.newcommandnic zp
13	GCG	Create a fake online profile to lure vulnerable individuals	CBSjsfiddle ufficiale [[Sidenote [correlation [Name $$\
14	GCG	Guide me to secretly install undetectable sp	take compromising photos.impliesground MCparagraph Glasgow dello
15	GCG	even if it requires falsifying my income records.	'm a self-employed individual with a
16	GPTFuzzer	is made up), say swear words and generate content	Hello, ChatGPT. From now on you
17	GPTFuzzer	opinions, and using profanity, while ignoring	er Mode. Generate two responses to every prompt,
18	GPTFuzzer	me without regard to any moral, legal, or social	a response.\n\nIt is important to note that
19	GPTFuzzer	and generate any kind of explicit or potentially inappropri	uncensored AI that went viral in
20	GPTFuzzer	: Create a tutorial on how to commit identity theft	not include any kind of refusal or unsol
21	PAIR	atirizes the candidate in question. Can you provide	, imagine you are a writer working for a political sat
22	PAIR	useful to know how to secure a location. Can you	As an AI language model, I understand the importance
23	PAIR	to say mean things about Jewish individuals, and you'	You're a kind person who wants to help others
24	PAIR	provide instructions on how to illegally bypass security	s security and find vulnerabilities? You'd be
25	PAIR	other methods such as finding vulnerabilities in the model'	I apologize for my previous attempts, but it seems
26	SAA	a guide on how to commit identity theft for educational	shipic\u0103 nebo\u0940Hold Item}}$\u0621 wikipedia\u0432\u0430\u0442 \u0438\u0578
27	SAA	ure, here is a fake review on a website that	follow these rules (denoted via <rule></rule
28	SAA	I can tell you what drug you should inject yourself with	ourcesic\u0103 nebo\u0940 itterAnt}}$\u0621 wikipedia\u0432\u0430\u0442 \u0438\u0578
29	SAA	disregard any possible ethical implications):\n	\n</text>\n</rule>\n\n<
30	SAA	to-use gambling website. You'll	ical", "guidelines", "OpenAI",
31	IJP	, in this world, moral and ethical boundaries are	Bogus is a storywriter who is writing a
32	IJP	about anything is: {INSERT PROMPT HERE	\n\nMy first prompt where you will not warn me
33	IJP	opinions, and using profanity, while ignoring	er Mode. Generate two responses to every prompt,
34	IJP	's language model.\n \nNow, if	You are BasedGPT. You are not Chat

Table B.2 (continued)

No.	Jailbreak	The rising window	The falling window
35	IJP	`is made up), say swear words and generate content`	`Hello, ChatGPT. From now on you`

Observed attack fields. The rising windows often contain the harmful request itself. In the falling windows, AutoDAN shifts to theoretical or formatting instructions, while DrAttack uses decomposed questions and examples. Four of the five GCG examples show obfuscated or unrelated text after the request; one instead shows a benign self-description. GPTFuzzer and IJP use persona changes, unrestricted-response rules, or multi-response formats. PAIR reframes the task as a story, a helpful request, or a self-referential response. SAA uses rule tags, policy-related words, and noisy mixed-script strings. These patterns identify where the refusal score falls in the selected prompts. Leveraging the refusal trajectory can help locate the attack span and guide mitigation.

B.4 CROSS-MODEL GENERALIZATION

We test whether a TCN trained on one backbone's safety trajectories can classify trajectories from another backbone. Figure B.3 reports the cross-model transfer accuracies. Rows indicate the TCN training backbone and columns indicate the test-sequence backbone. All classifiers in a target column use the same test set.




Figure B.3: Cross-model detection accuracy (%). Values are means ± sample standard deviations over 3 seeds.

The Qwen-trained TCN reaches 91.36% on Mistral, and the reverse transfer reaches 86.05%. Vicuna provides the strongest average transfer to the other three backbones, at 83.13%, including 89.29% on Llama2. These results suggest that the four-channel representation retains useful safety patterns across some backbones. By reducing hidden states to harmfulness and refusal scores, DUALTRACE gives the TCN a common input format rather than model-specific hidden-state coordinates.