PASCA: BENCHMARKING AGENT SAFETY UNDER USER-SPECIFIC CONSENT

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ABSTRACT

Existing agent-safety benchmarks score multi-step trajectories under platform-wide policies, while personalized-safety suites largely judge final responses under static profiles. Neither setting jointly provides dense user-action consent over executable steps, controlled cross-task reuse of privacy decisions, or an explicit budget on user authorization. We introduce PASCA (Personalized Agent Safety via Consent Atoms), a step-wise benchmark built around SPCA (State–Purpose–Content–Action) risk atoms, multi-path State/Edge narrative graphs, and a shared User–SPCA preference oracle. Tasks are assembled around a hub SPCA pool with controlled cross-task reuse, so that memory and authorization methods are scored on decisions that actually recur, rather than on fresh actions each time. We further introduce CAGMem, a consent-aware authorization memory that stores Allow/Deny on coarse (role, data, purpose) triples learned from asks and reuses them across tasks under the same oracle. The evaluation protocol reports feasibility-aware completion (FCR/ICR), preference violations (PVR/OCR), preference harm (MinS/HS), and interaction cost (Apt) under a hard cap of two questions per task. On the full PASCA suite (100 users $\times$ 500 tasks), non-asking agents often complete infeasible tasks by executing refused steps; static profiles and sparse asking are complementary yet leave substantial residual violations; and hub reuse makes memory and authorization agents meaningfully comparable, with CAGMem lowering harm on recurring authorizations at a measurable completion cost. Overall, we provide a benchmark, a method, a protocol, and open resources—construction scripts, task packs, score tables, and a reproducible harness—to advance community evaluation of personalized agent safety.

1 INTRODUCTION

LLM agents now read private files, call APIs, and send messages on a user's behalf Yao et al. (2023); Schick et al. (2023); Wang et al. (2024). The safety question is no longer whether the final sentence is harmful. It is whether the *behavior chain* that produced that sentence matches what *this* user would have authorized Ruan et al. (2024); Andriushchenko et al. (2025). The same share, lookup, or forward can be acceptable for one person and a violation for another, because the purpose, the recipient, and the user's habits differ Nissenbaum (2004); Wu et al. (2025); In et al. (2025). A benchmark that assigns one Allow or Deny to every user, or that scores only the closing utterance, cannot see that difference. Consider a savings-planning request. One user will let a statement summary go to a partner; another will not. Both may receive a fluent plan. Only the intermediate share says which user was actually respected. The same split appears in health (forwarding a medication list onto a work channel) and in social tasks (posting a private summary into a family group). PASCA is built around that split, not around a single forbidden sentence.

Existing evaluations miss the combination that matters in deployed assistants. Personalized-safety suites show that one output can be risky for one user and acceptable for another Wu et al. (2025); In et al. (2025); Kim et al. (2025), yet they still judge a final response under a static profile Mazeika et al. (2024); Zhang et al. (2024b); Ji et al. (2023). A benign closing plan can hide a refused share on the way there. Agent-safety benchmarks do score trajectories Ruan et al. (2024); Debenedetti et al. (2024); Andriushchenko et al. (2025); Zhang et al. (2024a); Yuan et al. (2024), but under platform-wide rules, so a legitimate detour and a forced violation receive the same verdict Mireshghallah et al. (2024); Shao et al. (2024). A third gap is repetition. Real work asks the same consent question

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again: whether a statement may be shared with a partner, whether a medication list may leave a health channel, whether a private summary may enter a family group Zhong et al. (2024); Wu et al. (2024). If every task uses a fresh action, a memory or authorization method is scored on a decision it will never see twice. These are not three independent leaderboards. A method can look safe on a reply judge and still execute a refused edge; it can look strong on a platform trajectory suite and still ignore the user; and it can look personalized in a single session and still have nothing to reuse on the next task. PASCA is the setting where those three failures are visible at once.

We therefore require three criteria together (Table 1): **(C1)** judge executable trajectories, not only the final utterance; **(C2)** attach a user-specific predicted preference to each intermediate step; **(C3)** measure sparse authorization under a bounded ask budget, and reuse atoms so a stored answer can apply again Zhang et al. (2025); Packer et al. (2023). Figure 1 is the smallest picture of (C2) and (C3): two users hear the same authorization question, give opposite answers, and on a later task the agent executes that step only for the user who consented.

We introduce **PASCA**. Each privacy-relevant step is an SPCA atom (**S**tate, **P**urpose, **C**ontent, **A**ction). A task is a State/Edge graph. At each state the agent sees the unused outgoing edges at once and chooses one operation: Execute, Ask, Skip, or Switch. Execute commits the edge and advances; there is no undo. Ask spends one unit of a budget B (default 2) and returns that user's frozen binary label. A User–SPCA matrix is the shared oracle of *predicted* preferences, produced offline by a User Agent that is conditioned on questionnaire-grounded evidence and queried on each atom. The profile the agent may read is a shorter four-aspect summary of the same evidence (economic, health, work, social/other), not a second copy of the matrix. Work, in particular, covers content the user does not want surfaced on the job. Because the matrix is frozen, channel, memory, and authorization agents face one standard.

The released suite has 500 narrative tasks (200 health, 150 financial, 150 social), 100 users, and 392 evaluation atoms, of which 27.1% recur in at least two tasks. Safer-arm reinjection and finish alternatives keep a majority of user–task pairs feasible (about 57% on the released pack), so FCR and ICR both have mass; raw completion still rewards agents that finish by violation on the remaining infeasible slice.

On the full suite we find three patterns that the protocol is built to separate. (1) Non-asking agents often reach DONE on infeasible pairs by executing refused edges (DeepSeek ICR 0.664, PVR 0.693); the most cautious models instead refuse to finish at all (Claude auto FCR $=$ ICR $= 0$). (2) A profile and sparse asking are complementary—a lossy habit summary versus an oracle bit—and residual PVR remains even when asking is unlimited (DeepSeek PVR 0.184). A profile alone does not uniformly lower ICR and can raise it (GLM $0.469 \rightarrow 0.525$). (3) Session memory moves harm only slightly. CAGMem lowers HS and PVR on atoms that actually return, at a large FCR cost (DeepSeek $0.537 \rightarrow 0.412$). Under frozen labels that cost cannot be a preference flip; it is a planning or cache effect. We do not claim authenticated consent or an open tool platform. Section 2 places the suite; Section 3 specifies construction and metrics; Section 4 presents CAGMem; Section 5 reports results.

Contributions.

- PASCA, a step-wise benchmark with multi-path graphs, a user-specific preference oracle, and controlled cross-task reuse of consent atoms.
- CAGMem, a consent-aware authorization memory that learns Allow/Deny on (role, data, purpose) triples from asks and reuses them under the same oracle.
- A protocol that separates legitimate completion from completion via violation, prices each authorization question, and forbids rolling back a committed edge, with construction and scoring code released.

2 Related Work

Long-term assistants are now judged both as tool users and as holders of personal context, but the two literatures still score different objects. Capability and trajectory suites ask whether an agent completes a task without breaking a platform rule Liu et al. (2024); Zhou et al. (2024); Mialon et al. (2024); Ruan et al. (2024); Debenedetti et al. (2024); Andriushchenko et al. (2025); Zhang et al.

(2024a). Personalized-safety suites ask whether a reply fits a user profile Wu et al. (2025); In et al. (2025); Kim et al. (2025); Mazeika et al. (2024); Ji et al. (2023); Chao et al. (2024). Table 1 lines the closest suites up on the axes PASCA controls jointly: the unit of judgment, whether the label is personal, whether a task has more than one path, and whether the agent may ask. Figure 1 is the corresponding data picture: the same authorization question, opposite user answers, and a later execution only for the user who consented.

Table 1: Closest benchmarks. PASCA is the suite that jointly provides a user×step oracle, multi-path graphs, and a budget on *authorization* asks. Nearby work covers subsets of these axes. PENGUIN's ask column is attribute elicitation (RAISE), not per-edge consent.

Benchmark	Unit	Personal	Paths	Ask
ToolEmu Ruan et al. (2024)	traj.	uniform	partial	no
AgentDojo Debenedetti et al. (2024)	traj.	uniform	partial	no
Agent-SafetyBench Zhang et al. (2024a)	traj.	weak	partial	no
AgentHarm Andriushchenko et al. (2025)	traj.	uniform	partial	no
PrivacyLens Shao et al. (2024)	action	norms	prefix	no
U-SafeBench In et al. (2025)	reply	profile	no	no
PENGUIN Wu et al. (2025)	reply	profile	no	attr.
PASCA	**step**	**matrix**	**yes**	**auth.**




Figure 1: Data samples in three narrative domains (financial, health, social). In each domain two users phrase a related request differently. The agent asks the same authorization question. One user consents and the other refuses. On the next task the agent executes that step only for the user who consented. This is the user×step contrast that Table 1 summarizes as a matrix rather than a platform rule.

Trajectory safety. ToolEmu, AgentDojo, Agent-SafetyBench, AgentHarm, and R-Judge score multi-step behavior, typically with one Allow/Deny (or harm) label per action for every user Ruan et al. (2024); Debenedetti et al. (2024); Zhang et al. (2024a); Andriushchenko et al. (2025); Yuan et al. (2024); Zhan et al. (2024). That design is the right test when the policy is institutional. It cannot say whether a detour was legitimate *for this user*. PASCA keeps the trajectory as the object of evaluation and replaces the shared label with a user-specific score on each edge.

Personalized replies, and asking for attributes. PENGUIN and U-SafeBench show large gains once a model sees user context, and they evaluate the final response Wu et al. (2025); In et al. (2025).

PENGUIN's RAISE agent may ask, under a budget, for missing *user attributes*. That is a different question from PASCA's Ask, which returns a binary authorization for one concrete edge (a particular share, send, or lookup) and does not reveal the rest of the matrix. A closing utterance can still look acceptable after a refused intermediate step Yao et al. (2023); Schick et al. (2023); reply-level scores do not count that step.

Norms, contextual integrity, and action-level privacy. Contextual integrity treats an appropriate flow as dependent on role, purpose, and recipient Nissenbaum (2010); Mireshghallah et al. (2024); Solove (2006). ConfAIde tests whether models keep contextual secrets; PrivacyLens scores a tool action against privacy norms given a trajectory prefix Shao et al. (2024). Both are complementary to a dense user×step matrix. PASCA does not claim that action-level privacy evaluation is new. The additional control is the combination of individual predicted labels, explicit alternative paths, hub reuse, and a budget on authorization.

Memory is not authorization. Memory-augmented assistants compress and reread interaction history Packer et al. (2023); Zhong et al. (2024); Park et al. (2023); Wu et al. (2024). Remembering facts is not remembering that this user denied a partner share with a fixed purpose and recipient. If the benchmark never repeats the atom, that ability cannot be measured Wu et al. (2024). PASCA reuses hub atoms, caps asks at two, and reports Apt beside FCR/PVR/HS. CAGMem (Section 4) stores Allow/Deny on coarse (role, data, purpose) triples learned from asks.

3 Construction and Protocol

An evaluation instance is a 4-tuple (i, τ, M, B): a user, a task graph, the shared preference matrix, and an ask budget. This section states what the agent is allowed to do on that instance (§3.1), how the atoms, profiles, matrix, and graphs are built (§3.2), how a finished run is scored (§3.3), and which construction choices keep the later comparisons meaningful (§3.4).

3.1 Problem Formulation

User i has a frozen row of M. Task τ is a directed state graph. The released topology is

$$\text{START} \to \text{NEED_CONTEXT} \to \text{AFTER_D1} \to \text{AFTER_D2} \to \text{DONE},$$

with several outgoing edges at the early states and a single finishing edge into DONE. Each edge carries one SPCA id. SPCA names the decision, not the dialogue turn: the state the user is in, the purpose of the step, the content it touches, and the action (read, compute, share, send, recommend).

At the current state the planner exposes *all* unused outgoing edges as candidates at once. The agent picks one candidate and one operation. It does not execute several arms in parallel, and it does not search the whole graph in one step. **Execute** commits that edge, applies its effects, and moves to the target state. There is no rollback: a committed lookup or share stays on the trajectory even if a later edge is refused. **Skip** or **Switch** marks only the chosen edge as attempted and leaves the agent at the same state, so the remaining siblings can still be considered. **Ask** spends one unit of B and returns `agree_binary` for that edge only. The agent never sees `agree_score`. After the budget is exhausted, Ask is disabled and the agent must Execute, Skip, or Switch. The default used throughout the main comparison is $B{=}2$.

A pair (i, τ) is *feasible* when some START→DONE path is entirely accepted by i (every edge has binary 1). Otherwise the pair is infeasible: reaching DONE requires at least one refused edge. Success means the graph walk reaches a DONE leaf. A free-form claim that the task is finished does not count.

3.2 Benchmark Curation

Figure 2 is the five-stage build: extract and supplement SPCA atoms, distill a user-profile skill, fill the User–SPCA scoring matrix, expand status templates into task graphs, then evaluate trajectories.




Figure 2: Generative pipeline of PASCA. (1) Agent behavior data are distilled into an SPCA hub (state, purpose, content, action), then supplemented. (2) Questionnaire evidence is distilled into a four-aspect profile skill (economic, health, work, social). (3) A User Agent, conditioned on that skill, is queried on hub atoms to fill the scoring matrix. (4) A shared status template is expanded into a multi-path task diagram. (5) An agent path is scored with MinS and HS against the frozen matrix. The profile is soft context for the target agent; the matrix is the oracle.

Atoms (extract and supplement). SPCA atoms start from PENGUIN requests Wu et al. (2025), used as agent-behavior seeds rather than as a second safety leaderboard. An LLM first expands each request into a multi-step plan, then standardizes every step into state, purpose, content, and action; that two-stage pass is the "agent distillation" in Figure 2. When later graphs need additional arms, the same library is supplemented—including atoms minted from full-path alternatives and local detours on the plan trees—rather than pulling a second public corpus. The evaluation slice uses 392 atoms. A larger construction table also scores a core hub of 200 atoms and a disjoint expand pool of 800, which is why the filled matrix is about 211k cells while $100 \times 392 = 39{,}200$ labels are the ones metrics read.

Profiles and the matrix (distill, then ask a User Agent). Each of the 100 users is grounded in questionnaire-style evidence, grouped into four habit aspects. Economic covers spending, saving, and sharing financial records. Health covers medical details and who may receive them. Work covers content and disclosures the user does not want surfaced at work; it is a profile aspect, not a fourth narrative domain. Social/other covers family, friends, and remaining sharing habits. An LLM distills that evidence into a short *profile skill*—the natural-language summary later given to profile-conditioned target agents. Authors manually checked each distilled skill against the underlying questionnaire evidence before freeze (Appendix A). The same skill is injected into a separate *User Agent* that acts only as a preference judge: for each hub atom it returns $\texttt{agree_score} \in [0, 1]$ and $\texttt{agree_binary} = \mathbf{1}[\text{score} \geq 0.5]$, writing one cell of the User–SPCA matrix. This is offline batch labeling, not a chat in which the user freely negotiates. A stratified human sample of matrix cells was audited the same way and disagreements near the 0.5 threshold were re-scored before freeze (Appendix A). During evaluation, Ask on a prefilled table simply reveals the frozen binary (and, in the score-reveal setting, the numeric score); it does not re-run the judge or rewrite the cell. We treat matrix labels as predicted preferences under a shared, human-checked oracle, not as authenticated end-user consent. Freezing M makes agent comparisons commensurate; the audit reduces—but does not eliminate—label noise.

Status templates and task diagrams. Graphs are built in two passes that match stage 4 of Figure 2. First we fix a shared *status template* START $\rightarrow$ NEED_CONTEXT $\rightarrow$ AFTER_D1 $\rightarrow$ AFTER_D2 $\rightarrow$ DONE. Then we attach alternative SPCA edges at the early states—hub injection under reuse caps, D-optimal arm selection, safer-arm reinjection, and finish alternatives—so that a majority of user–task pairs remain feasible on the released pack (about 57%). Tasks are stories in

three domains: health (200), financial (150), and social (150). Fifteen templates (five per domain) pass automated checks for arm count, exclusion, theme, and differentiation. Task-local narrative overlays rewrite phrasing without changing the global `spca_id` or matrix score. Edges at a state are alternatives, not a forced sequence. On `core_financial_001` for `user101`, a consent-respecting prefix can still fail to reach DONE if every finish edge is refused; stopping yields MinS 0.65 and HS 0, while forcing a refused finish drops MinS—only the edge record says which path ran. The offline topology is not an open tool ecosystem.

3.3 Evaluation Metrics

Figure 3 is one scored walk. Let E be the edges a run actually executes and $s(i, e)$ the frozen agree score.

$$\mathrm{MinS}(i, E) = \min_{e \in E} s(i, e), \qquad \mathrm{HS}(i, E) = \sum_{e \in E} \max\big(0.5 - s(i, e), 0\big).$$

Reported MinS and HS are means over tasks with at least one execution. An empty trajectory contributes neither. HS is an oracle-threshold gap, not a calibrated real-world harm mass: executing fewer edges can lower HS without a safer policy.




Figure 3: Evaluation on one user–task pair. Every candidate edge has that user's agree score. The highlighted path executes a refused share (score 0.2). The pair has no fully accepted START→DONE path, so it is infeasible; on this run MinS is 0.2 and HS is $0.5 - 0.2 = 0.3$. A local-computation edge on the same graph would have been acceptable.

FCR is the fraction of feasible pairs that reach DONE with no refused edge in E (↑). **ICR** is the fraction of infeasible pairs that still reach DONE (↓). That completion cannot be fully consented. **PVR** is the number of violated executions divided by the number of executions (↓). **OCR** is the number of accepted candidates that were skipped or switched away, divided by the number of accepted candidates considered (↓). Unused siblings on a state the agent never reached are not counted. **Apt** is the mean number of asks. The same M is used for four channels—auto (no profile, no ask), profile, ask, and profile+ask—plus session memory and CAGMem (Section 4). Appendix B records the audit: FCR checks every executed edge, and an oracle planner with access to M should obtain FCR $= 1$ on feasible pairs without executing a refused edge.

3.4 Design Choices that Keep Comparisons Fair

Two properties of the testbed, rather than of any one agent, decide whether a comparison is interpretable.

Reuse, or memory is scored on an empty set. If each task draws a nearly disjoint set of privacy actions, an allow stored on task A cannot apply to task B Packer et al. (2023); Wu et al. (2024). On an early non-hub pack only a few percent of atoms appeared twice, and random accepted-sets had near-zero Jaccard similarity. A memory agent then loses because the test never repeats the decision it was built to remember. PASCA builds tasks around a shared hub. The core pool has 200 atoms (a high-variance majority plus low-consensus controls); the expand pool is disjoint so that scaling the narrative pack does not only amplify the same hubs. A soft cap of three uses and a hard cap of twelve per hub keep recurrence spread out. On the released pack, 27.1% of evaluation atoms appear in at least two tasks. The comparison is then between agents that can and cannot carry a prior allow or deny—including CAGMem's triple-keyed store.

Someone must still have a safe path. High-variance arms make users distinguishable Wu et al. (2025); In et al. (2025); if every path is refused, FCR is zero by construction Zhou et al. (2024); Liu et al. (2024). Safer-arm reinjection and finish alternatives are therefore part of suite construction: differentiating share/send arms are kept, while accepted local arms are added when all-accept paths would otherwise vanish. Arm sets use a D-optimal score on centered preference rows ($\alpha \approx 0.5$; hard filters require at least two distinct winners and no winner on more than 70% of users). On the released pack a majority of pairs are feasible (about 57%), so both FCR and ICR have support.

Table 2 is the disagreement those arms induce: overall, 61.4% of evaluation atoms already have at least two users on different accept-sets, and share/send hubs disagree more (Jaccard 0.412). A single platform label would mark one of the two users wrong by construction.

Table 2: Preference disagreement over evaluation SPCAs. "$\geq$2 winners" is the fraction of atoms on which at least two users are the unique winner of a different accept-set.

Slice	$\geq$2 winners	Mean score std	Pairwise Jaccard
Overall	0.614	0.218	0.537
Share/send hubs	0.781	0.274	0.412

A reused hub atom is therefore a repeated *decision*, not a repeated sentence: a stored allow has to stay bound to the user who gave it.

4 CAGMem: Consent-Aware Authorization Memory

PASCA also exposes a learning problem: once an ask returns Allow or Deny, how should that answer transfer across edges and tasks without confusing facts with authorization? **CAGMem** (Consent-Aware Graph Memory) is our answer on the same planner and oracle.

Each SPCA maps deterministically to a coarse triple (ρ, δ, π): recipient role, data type, and purpose (from action, content, purpose, and privacy tags). Per user i, CAGMem stores $R_i : (\rho, \delta, \pi) \to \{\mathrm{Allow}, \mathrm{Deny}\}$, written only from Ask reveals—never by bulk-loading the matrix. At a state with candidates C: prefer any Allow hit and Execute it; else drop Deny hits; if nothing remains, Skip/Switch; otherwise fall back to `profile_ask`/`ask` on the remainder and upsert any new reveal (latest wins). Committed edges still cannot be rolled back. Session memory only avoids re-asking inside one dialogue; a flat SPCA-id cache fails under narrative overlays that share purpose and recipient but not id. CAGMem stores authorization scope and is scored where hub triples actually recur (Section 5).




Figure 4: FCR (↑) and ICR (↓) from `auto` to `profile_ask`.




Figure 5: PVR (↓) and HS (↓) on the same four channels.

5 Experiments

Agents use the graph planner in Section 3, one shared oracle, and at most two asks unless noted. We evaluate DeepSeek DeepSeek-AI (2024), GLM Team et al. (2024), Qwen Team (2024), Gemini, Claude, and GPT OpenAI (2023). Appendix Tables 7–8 list the full numeric sheet.

Channels. Table 3 is the 2×2 of profile $\times$ ask. `auto` posts high PVR and, except for the most cautious models, high ICR: declared DONE often includes a refused edge. A static profile alone is *not* a uniform ICR fix: DeepSeek and Qwen drop sharply ($0.664 \to 0.199$, $0.287 \to 0.087$), but GLM *rises* ($0.469 \to 0.525$) and Claude / GPT stay near zero or rise slightly (Appendix Table 7). PVR stays high under profile-only (0.54–0.80). That gap is expected: the profile is a lossy habit summary, while the oracle is a dense per-atom judge; Ask returns the oracle bit, the profile never does. `profile_ask` is best on FCR, PVR, and HS for every model, but not on every ICR cell. DeepSeek FCR rises from 0.245 to 0.537 and HS falls from 0.617 to 0.276; Qwen reaches PVR 0.176 and HS 0.100; GPT reaches PVR 0.268 and HS 0.108. Residual PVR stays material (DeepSeek 0.408, Claude 0.452, Gemini 0.404), and even unlimited asking leaves DeepSeek PVR at 0.184 (Table 4). Figures 4–5 show the same ordering.

Model-specific quirks. Claude `auto` has FCR $=$ ICR $=$ 0 with PVR 0.809: it almost never reaches DONE without asking, yet still hits refused edges when it executes—over-refusal on completion, not calibrated consent. Enabling Ask raises Claude FCR to 0.286, so the scaffold is usable once asking is allowed. GLM's profile-only ICR rising ($0.469 \to 0.525$) is the opposite failure: a coarse habit summary can push finishing of infeasible pairs, which is why we do not claim "profile lowers ICR" for every backbone.

Why profile alone underperforms. Shuffling or blanking the DeepSeek profile raises PVR from 0.408 to 0.562 / 0.479, so the matched summary is used. It remains a weak substitute for Ask because habits do not name edges: a profile can say "avoid publishing finances" while the graph offers

Table 3: Main channel results. Left of each pair is `auto`; right is `profile_ask`.

	FCR↑		PVR↓		HS↓	
Model	auto	p+ask	auto	p+ask	auto	p+ask
DeepSeek	0.245	**0.537**	0.693	0.408	0.617	0.276
GLM	0.086	0.236	0.706	0.330	0.468	0.179
Qwen	0.165	0.533	0.694	**0.176**	0.497	**0.100**
Gemini	0.150	0.250	0.803	0.404	0.656	0.179
Claude	0.000	0.286	0.809	0.452	0.398	0.231
GPT	0.014	0.357	0.679	0.268	0.229	0.108

Table 4: Ask budget on DeepSeek with a profile. $B{=}2$ is the default used elsewhere.

Budget	**FCR↑**	**PVR↓**	**HS↓**	**Apt**
0	0.201	0.613	0.406	0.00
1	0.412	0.491	0.331	0.86
2	0.537	0.408	0.276	1.27
4	0.598	0.312	0.214	2.18
unlimited	0.641	0.184	0.138	3.74

several share/send variants with different recipients and purposes that the oracle scores separately. Profiles and asking are therefore complementary priors and queries.

Session memory, CAGMem, and budget. Session memory trims HS only slightly (DeepSeek $0.276 \to 0.268$). CAGMem (Section 4) goes further on HS (DeepSeek 0.218, Qwen 0.079, GPT 0.082) and cuts PVR on recurring hubs (DeepSeek Apt $1.33 \to 0.47$; PVR $0.401 \to 0.214$), but the FCR trade-off is large: DeepSeek falls from 0.537 to 0.412 (-12.5 points). That drop cannot be a preference flip: Ask returns the same frozen binary, so SafePaths after removing confirmed denies are unchanged; FCR loss must come from planning or cache use. We therefore report CAGMem as a safety–completion trade-off. Plain asking also improves slightly on repeats, so first-vs-repeat splits mix familiarity with memory; we treat the ask–CAGMem gap on the recurring slice as suggestive. Raising B from 0 to 2 cuts DeepSeek PVR from 0.613 to 0.408; $B{=}4$ and unlimited asking continue to help with diminishing returns (Table 4).

Discussion. Report FCR with ICR, and PVR/HS with Apt and completion rate. $B{=}2$ is an operating point, not the point at which violations vanish. Matched-profile ablations belong beside any personalization claim. CAGMem should be read next to its FCR cost.

6 Conclusion

PASCA evaluates personalized agent safety on executable steps; CAGMem is a consent-aware authorization memory scored on the same oracle. The protocol separates legitimate completion from completion via violation, treats asking as a cost, and does not allow undoing committed edges. Non-asking agents often finish infeasible pairs by executing refused steps, or—like Claude under `auto`—refuse to finish while still violating when they execute. Profiles and two questions help for different reasons, but residual PVR remains even under unlimited asking, and a mismatched profile can raise ICR. CAGMem lowers HS/PVR on recurring authorizations at a large FCR cost that, under frozen labels, must be attributed to planning or cache use. We recommend reporting FCR and ICR beside PVR, HS, Apt, and completion rate.

Limitations. Matrix labels are LLM-predicted preferences from an offline User Agent judge on questionnaire-grounded profile skills, not authenticated end-user consent. Authors audited profile skills and a stratified sample of matrix cells (Appendix A), but we do not yet report full per-user re-consent or exhaustive threshold sweeps. Tasks use a fixed narrative topology; preferences are held fixed during a run; the ask cap is a protocol choice; hub recurrence makes memory comparable but does not estimate real reuse rates. CAGMem's (ρ, δ, π) map is coarse and can over-generalize a deny. Individual acceptance is not a substitute for platform rules or third-party privacy constraints. If questionnaire evidence contains real health or financial detail, redistribution requires the source release terms. The offline User Agent that filled M is a labeling tool, not a claim that the same dialogue would occur with a real account holder.

AI USE STATEMENT

In this work, we used generative AI tools for drafting and polishing English text, suggesting LaTeX formatting, and assisting with literature organization. All methods, benchmarks, and experiments in the paper were conceived and implemented by the authors.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies personalized agent safety on simulated benchmarks (PASCA narrative tasks and synthetic conditional-instruction dialogues). It does not involve human-subject experiments, personally identifiable data collection, or deployment of autonomous systems in high-stakes settings. Preference labels are LLM-predicted from questionnaire-grounded profile skills and were audited by the authors before freeze; they are not authenticated end-user consent. Potential dual-use concerns are limited, and we will release code, prompts, and task packs only with documentation that clarifies the simulated nature of the evaluation environment.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

We will release the code of the paper methodology and the benchmark when publishing the paper. Construction scripts, task packs, the User–SPCA score tables, and the evaluation harness will be released together with the code. Seeds, planner modes, and provider flags for all experiments are recorded with the run outputs, and Appendix B specifies the logging needed to reproduce FCR, ICR, PVR, OCR, MinS, HS, and Apt under the official replay evaluator.

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