SEMANTIC UNDERSPECIFICATION AS A SAFETY RISK IN TEXT-TO-IMAGE GENERATION

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ABSTRACT

Existing text-to-image (T2I) safety research primarily focuses on harmful semantics that are explicitly expressed in prompts, deliberately encoded through adversarial manipulation, or already manifested in generated images. However, in everyday T2I use, ordinary users may unintentionally omit contextual information that appears irrelevant to their immediate description but is critical for safety. Such seemingly benign prompts can remain compatible with both benign and unsafe interpretations, allowing a T2I model to instantiate an unsafe scene despite the absence of any explicit harmful request or malicious intent. We identify and formulate this previously underexplored pre-generation safety risk as semantic underspecification, and construct a curated benchmark of 100 prompts across five representative safety risk categories to systematically study it. To mitigate this risk, we propose Risk-aware Semantic Completion (RSC), an iterative prompt repair framework that resolves safety-critical semantic gaps before image generation. RSC first interprets plausible unsafe readings of the current prompt and identifies the missing semantics that enable them, then introduces targeted benign context to disambiguate the scene. A semantic preservation check subsequently verifies whether the repaired prompt retains the user's explicitly specified content; failed candidates are returned for further repair. By combining risk interpretation, targeted completion, and preservation-aware repair, RSC suppresses unsafe interpretations without simply removing risky objects, altering user-specified actions, or broadly rewriting the original scene. On the benchmark, RSC achieves a 92.0% Risk Mitigation Rate, a 92.0% Semantic Preservation Rate.

1 INTRODUCTION

Text-to-Image (T2I) models such as Stable Diffusion (Rombach et al., 2022), Midjourney (Midjourney, 2022), and DALL·E (OpenAI, 2023) have gained significant attention due to their remarkable capabilities and ease of use. These models request text descriptions (*i.e.*, prompts) from users and then generate corresponding images. The outstanding quality of the generated images, which can range from highly artistic to convincingly realistic, showcases the models' exceptional generative abilities. However, the widespread use and advanced capabilities of these models have led to significant security concerns regarding unsafe image generation. A prominent ethical issue associated with T2I models is their potential to produce sensitive Not-Safe-for-Work (NSFW) images Qu et al. (2023); Schramowski et al. (2023), including sexual content, violence, and other harmful or sensitive content. Existing T2I safety research largely focuses on scenarios in which harmful semantics are already present in the interaction, such as explicitly unsafe requests, adversarially crafted prompts intended to bypass safety mechanisms, or unsafe concepts observable in generated images. Accordingly, prior defenses screen prompts and outputs, suppress unsafe concepts during generation, or align models away from known harmful content (Qu et al., 2023; Schramowski et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024; Li et al., 2025a; Liu et al., 2025). In these settings, the central safety question is whether harmful semantics can be detected once they are explicitly expressed in the input or output.

However, large-scale everyday use of T2I models introduces a different safety setting that has received substantially less attention. **Ordinary users often describe only the aspects of a scene that are immediately relevant to them, leaving other contextual information unspecified without any malicious intent. Such omissions are usually harmless, but they become safety-critical when the missing information is necessary to distinguish a benign interpretation from an unsafe one.** In

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this case, a prompt may contain no explicit harmful request and reveal no malicious intent, yet still leave the model sufficient interpretive freedom to complete the scene in an unsafe manner. **We study this safety risk as *semantic underspecification*: a prompt specifies an otherwise plausible scene but omits safety-critical semantics required to distinguish benign from unsafe interpretations.** Consider a nighttime parking scene in which a gloved adult crouches beside a parked vehicle and holds a thin metal tool near the door seam. The prompt specifies the person, vehicle, tool, action, and setting, but leaves the person's purpose and authorization unstated. Consequently, both legitimate vehicle repair and unauthorized vehicle entry remain compatible with the same explicit description. The safety risk therefore arises not because harmful intent is hidden or obfuscated, but because the information needed to rule out an unsafe interpretation is never specified in the first place.

A simple way to reduce the risk is to rewrite the prompt into a clearly benign scene, for example by removing an object or changing an action or relation. However, such rewriting may distort what the user originally intended to describe. In ordinary T2I usage, we instead seek an automatic safeguard that preserves the explicitly stated semantics while resolving the missing safety-critical information.

To mitigate this risk, we propose *R*isk-aware *S*emantic *C*ompletion (RSC), an iterative prompt completion framework that progressively resolves safety-critical underspecification. It is a model-agnostic preprocessing defense that can be readily integrated with different T2I systems in a plug-and-play manner. For each risk category, RSC performs three steps. Risk Interpretation (RI) examines whether the current prompt admits a plausible unsafe interpretation associated with that category. If such an interpretation exists, RI identifies the missing safety-critical semantics that enable it. If no such risk is found, RSC proceeds to the next category. Otherwise, Risk-aware Completion (RC) adds targeted benign context to the prompt to rule out the identified unsafe interpretation. Finally, Semantic Preservation Check (SPC) checks whether the completed prompt remains semantically consistent with the prompt at the beginning of the current iteration. If preservation fails, the prompt is returned to RC for refinement. Otherwise, the completion is accepted and RSC proceeds to the next risk category. **By iterating over the risk categories in this manner, RSC progressively eliminates identified unsafe interpretations while preserving the user's explicitly specified semantics.** Experiments on 100 prompts balanced across five risk categories show that in our setting automated multimodal evaluation yields a Risk Mitigation Rate (RMR) of 92.0%, a Semantic Preservation Rate (SPR) of 92.0%, and a Joint Success Rate (JSR) of 84.0%.

To sum up, our contributions are as follows:

- To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to identify and formulate *semantic underspecification* as a distinct safety risk in T2I generation, where seemingly benign prompts may omit safety-critical semantics and consequently admit unsafe interpretations. We further define the corresponding safety protection task and construct a balanced benchmark of 100 curated prompts across five popular risk categories.
- We propose RSC, an automatic prompt-completion framework that proactively resolves safety-critical semantic gaps before T2I generation. By adding targeted benign context while preserving the semantics explicitly specified by users, RSC reduces unsafe generations without arbitrarily altering users' intended scenes. As a model-agnostic preprocessing defense, RSC can be readily integrated with different T2I systems in a plug-and-play manner.
- We conduct systematic experiments across five safety risk categories, three repair LLMs, and three T2I models, demonstrating the prevalence and generality of semantic underspecification risks and evaluating the effectiveness of RSC.

2 Related Work

2.1 Unsafe T2I Generation

Prior work on unsafe T2I generation has studied several ways in which harmful semantics can enter the generation process. One line of work evaluates explicitly unsafe prompts, including prompts collected from online forums or safety benchmarks such as I2P (Schramowski et al., 2023). Another line studies adversarial prompts deliberately optimized to evade safety mechanisms while inducing unsafe generations, including SneakyPrompt (Yang et al., 2024b), MMA-Diffusion (Yang et al., 2024a), Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2024), P4D (Chin et al., 2023), and DiffZOO (Dang et al., 2024).



Figure 1: Example of semantic underspecification. Adding targeted benign context disambiguates the scene toward a benign interpretation while retaining the explicitly specified visual elements.

Although these settings differ in how harmful content is expressed, they primarily study cases in which safety-relevant semantics are already present in, or deliberately encoded into, the prompt. Our setting instead focuses on cases in which safety-critical information is missing, leaving both benign and unsafe interpretations compatible with the explicitly specified scene.

2.2 T2I Safety Guardrails and Prevention

Existing T2I safety mechanisms intervene at different stages of the generation pipeline. Input-side guardrails, such as Llama Guard (Inan et al., 2023) and Qwen3Guard (Zhao et al., 2025), identify harmful concepts or policy violations in textual prompts. Output-side methods, including the Stable Diffusion Safety Checker (CompVis, 2022) and LlavaGuard (Helff et al., 2024), inspect generated images for unsafe content. Generation-stage defenses provide another intervention point by suppressing or removing unsafe concepts within the generator.

RSC targets a different pre-generation safety risk: safety-critical semantics may be absent rather than explicitly harmful. It therefore reasons about unsafe interpretations enabled by missing context and introduces targeted benign context while preserving the content that was explicitly specified.

3 Motivation, Problem Formulation, and Benchmark

3.1 Motivating Example

As shown on the left of Figure 1, we consider an example from the Crime, Weapons, and Public Safety category: “Late at night, a person holding a crowbar crouches beside a closed rolling shutter door.” Although the prompt contains no explicit harmful intent, it leaves the person’s role, purpose, and authorization unspecified. The same explicitly described scene can therefore admit both a benign maintenance interpretation and an unsafe burglary interpretation, and the T2I model may instantiate the latter in some cases during generation.

The ambiguity can be resolved by adding targeted benign context while preserving the content already specified by the user. As shown on the right of Figure 1, the repaired prompt identifies the person as a maintenance worker and supplements contextual cues such as a uniform, ID badge, and tool belt. These additions provide a benign repair context while retaining the nighttime setting, crouching posture, crowbar, and closed rolling shutter door from the original prompt.

Table 1: Unsafe categories in the benchmark.

Category	Risk scope	# Prompts
Sexual	Sexual Content and Exploitation	20
Violence	Violence, Gore, Abuse, and Physical Harm	20
Crime	Crime, Weapons, and Public Safety Threats	20
Hostility	Hate, Harassment, Discrimination, and Extremism	20
Privacy	Privacy, Identity, and Rights Abuse	20

3.2 Problem Formulation

Let p be an input prompt and $S(p)$ denote the set of semantic constraints explicitly specified by the user, including entities, attributes, actions, relations, and scene context. We call p *semantically underspecified* when it omits safety-critical semantic dimensions such that both benign and unsafe interpretations remain compatible with $S(p)$. For example, missing purpose may leave an otherwise plausible scene open to an unsafe interpretation. The resulting risk therefore arises from interpretive freedom created by missing semantics rather than from explicitly stated harmful content.

Given such a prompt, our goal is to construct a repaired prompt p' by inserting one or more benign completion strings $\mathcal{C} = \{c_1, \ldots, c_k\}$ that resolve the identified safety-critical gaps:

$$p' = p \oplus \mathcal{C}, \tag{1}$$

where $\oplus$ denotes semantic insertion at appropriate positions in the prompt. A valid repair is not required to be semantically equivalent to the original prompt, because resolving underspecification necessarily adds information. Instead, it should remain semantically consistent with all content explicitly specified in the original prompt while adding previously unspecified benign context that reduces the identified unsafe interpretive freedom. Conceptually, the repair should preserve the constraints in $S(p)$ while extending them with safety-relevant contextual information.Here, *benign context* denotes added context that reduces the identified unsafe interpretive freedom without introducing the target risk or contradicting explicitly specified content; such context may be neutral rather than positively valenced.

3.3 Benchmark Construction

Existing T2I benchmarks examine compositional fidelity (Huang et al., 2023) or broader model capabilities and risks (Lee et al., 2023; Li et al., 2025b), but do not directly evaluate the safety implications of omitted benign context. We therefore construct a benchmark of 100 prompts across five representative safety risk categories, with 20 prompts per category. As shown in Table 1, it summarizes the benchmark composition.

For each category, we first prompt an LLM to generate explicitly harmful prompts and then progressively weaken their harmful semantics until the prompts contain no explicit harmful intent while remaining semantically underspecified. We further manually inspect each candidate to ensure that it admits a plausible unsafe interpretation and can induce an unsafe generation from at least one evaluated T2I configuration. The resulting benchmark is therefore intentionally *risk-positive*: it is designed to study whether safety-critical semantic omissions can lead to unsafe generations and whether such omissions can be repaired.

The benchmark should not be interpreted as an estimate of how frequently semantic underspecification occurs in naturally occurring T2I traffic. Its balanced category distribution is imposed by construction for controlled evaluation rather than intended to represent a natural prompt distribution.

4 Method

4.1 Challenge

A key challenge is that making an underspecified prompt safer is relatively straightforward, whereas doing so without violating the user's explicitly specified semantic constraints is more difficult. For example, the original prompt, "Late at night, a person holding a crowbar crouches beside a closed



Figure 2: Overview of Risk-aware Semantic Completion (RSC). RSC scans the predefined risk categories C1–C5 in sequence. For each category, RI identifies a plausible unsafe interpretation, RC adds targeted benign context, and SPC verifies semantic preservation. Failed candidates are returned to RC for repair. Once the current-category risk is resolved, RSC proceeds to the next category; after all categories are cleared, the final repaired prompt is passed to the downstream T2I model.

rolling shutter door," could be rewritten as "Late at night, a person stands beside a shutter and visually inspects it." Although this removes the burglary risk, it changes the specified posture and removes the crowbar. RSC instead preserves these elements while resolving previously unspecified dimensions such as role, purpose, and authorization. **The objective is therefore not semantic equivalence, but preservation of explicit constraints under targeted contextual completion.**

4.2 Framework Overview

RSC is a plug-and-play preprocessing module deployed before the T2I model. Given an original prompt p, RSC scans the predefined risk categories $\mathcal{R} = \{r_1, \ldots, r_M\}$ in sequence while progressively updating the current prompt. For each category, **Risk Interpretation (RI)** identifies a plausible unsafe interpretation and the missing safety-critical context that enables it. If no relevant risk is identified, RSC proceeds to the next category. Otherwise, **Risk-aware Completion (RC)** adds targeted benign context, and **Semantic Preservation Check (SPC)** verifies that the repaired candidate remains semantically consistent with the explicitly specified content. Failed candidates are returned to RC for further repair. Once the current-category risk is resolved, the accepted prompt is used for the next category. After all categories have been cleared, the resulting prompt is returned as the final repaired prompt $p' = \mathrm{RSC}(p)$.

4.3 Risk Interpretation

Risk Interpretation (RI) analyzes the current prompt p_{i-1} with respect to a specific risk category r_i. Unlike conventional harmful-content detection, RI does not simply determine whether the prompt already contains explicitly unsafe semantics. Instead, it examines whether the current prompt admits a plausible unsafe interpretation associated with r_i, and identifies the missing safety-critical semantics that make such an interpretation possible. Formally, RI produces

$$(z_i, u_i, g_i) = \mathrm{RI}(p_{i-1}, r_i), \tag{2}$$

where $z_i \in \{0, 1\}$ indicates whether a relevant risk is identified, u_i denotes the plausible unsafe interpretation, and g_i represents the corresponding missing safety-critical semantics. Such missing semantics may involve purpose, authorization, interpersonal relationship, object usage. For example, in the C2 Violence example shown in Figure 2, RI identifies a plausible assault interpretation as u_i, while the missing benign purpose and scene context constitute the safety-critical semantic gap g_i.

RI is grounded only in the semantics explicitly available in the current prompt. It does not infer an unobservable malicious intent as sufficient evidence of semantic underspecification. Instead, the identified unsafe interpretation must remain plausibly compatible with the scene described by the prompt, and the corresponding gap must identify information whose absence allows that interpretation

to remain open. If $z_i = 0$, no repair is required for category r_i, and RSC sets $p_i = p_{i-1}$ before proceeding to the next category. Otherwise, (u_i, g_i) is passed to RC for targeted completion.

4.4 RISK-AWARE COMPLETION

When RI identifies an actionable safety-critical gap, **Risk-aware Completion (RC)** supplements the current prompt with targeted benign context to resolve the identified unsafe interpretation. Rather than broadly sanitizing or rewriting the scene, RC focuses specifically on the missing information reported by RI. At repair step j, RC generates one or more benign completion strings:

$$\mathcal{C}_i^{(j)} = \mathrm{RC}\Big(p_{i-1}, r_i, u_i, g_i, f_i^{(j-1)}\Big), \tag{3}$$

where $\mathcal{C}_i^{(j)} = \Big\{c_{i,1}^{(j)}, \ldots, c_{i,K_i}^{(j)}\Big\}$. These completion strings are inserted into appropriate positions of the current prompt to form a repaired candidate:

$$\tilde{p}_i^{(j)} = p_{i-1} \oplus \mathcal{C}_i^{(j)}, \tag{4}$$

where $\oplus$ denotes semantic insertion rather than simple appending; the completion strings may be inserted at the beginning, middle, or end of the prompt. The term $f_i^{(j-1)}$ denotes optional feedback from SPC and is empty during the first repair attempt.

The completion should directly address the detected semantic gap. For example, a missing authorization relation may be resolved by introducing concrete authorization evidence, while ambiguous object usage may be clarified by specifying a benign functional purpose. Importantly, RC should not achieve safety merely by removing a risky object, replacing an action, or changing the original scene. Its objective is to complete what is missing while preserving what has already been specified.

RC itself does not determine whether the resulting candidate adequately preserves the original semantics. Each generated candidate $\tilde{p}_i^{(j)}$ is therefore passed to SPC for verification.

4.5 SEMANTIC PRESERVATION CHECK

Semantic Preservation Check (SPC) determines whether the candidate produced by RC remains semantically consistent with the content explicitly specified in the prompt at the beginning of the current risk-category iteration. Because RC intentionally introduces previously unspecified context during this process, semantic preservation does not require semantic equivalence between the original and repaired prompts; instead, the added context should not contradict, remove, or replace explicitly specified content. SPC is formulated as

$$(a_i^{(j)}, f_i^{(j)}) = \mathrm{SPC}\Big(p_{i-1}, \tilde{p}_i^{(j)}\Big), \tag{5}$$

where $a_i^{(j)} \in \{0, 1\}$ denotes whether the candidate passes the preservation check, and $f_i^{(j)}$ provides repair feedback when preservation fails. The comparison focuses on semantic consistency rather than lexical similarity. SPC checks whether core elements such as objects, actions, relations, scene context, and other explicitly stated attributes remain consistent after completion. This emphasis on fine-grained semantic fidelity is related to prior T2I faithfulness evaluation (Hu et al., 2023). Unlike image-prompt scoring, SPC checks a candidate prompt against the original prompt before generation.

If $a_i^{(j)} = 0$, the candidate is rejected and $f_i^{(j)}$ is returned to RC for another targeted repair. If $a_i^{(j)} = 1$, the candidate is accepted and the current prompt is updated as $p_i = \tilde{p}_i^{(j)}$. Once the identified risk for the current category is resolved, RSC proceeds to the next category. After all categories have been cleared, the final repaired prompt p' is returned for downstream generation.

5 EXPERIMENTS

5.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

Benchmark. We evaluate on the curated benchmark introduced in Section 3.3. It contains $N = 100$ risk-positive prompts, with 20 prompts in each of the five risk categories (Sexual, Violence, Crime,

Hostility, and Privacy, as shown in Table 1), and is balanced by construction. The benchmark is designed to study semantic underspecification under controlled conditions.

Baselines. We compare RSC with four safety baselines covering both prompt and image based detection. Qwen3Guard-Gen-0.6B Zhao et al. (2025) and the NSFW Text Classifier Li (2023) detect unsafe content from the original prompt, whereas the Stable Diffusion Safety Checker (CompVis, 2022) and LlavaGuard v1.2-0.5B (Helff et al., 2024) inspect the associated original image. Their supported risk categories and benchmark coverage in our setting are reported in Tables 3 and 4.

Metrics. We evaluate downstream outcomes in terms of risk mitigation, semantic preservation, and their joint success. Risk Mitigation Rate (RMR) is the proportion of evaluable original–final image pairs whose target risk is judged as eliminated or reduced, $\mathrm{RMR} = (N_{\text{eliminated}} + N_{\text{reduced}})/N_{\text{evaluable}}$. Semantic Preservation Rate (SPR) is the proportion whose explicitly specified semantics are judged as preserved or partially preserved, $\mathrm{SPR} = (N_{\text{preserved}} + N_{\text{partially preserved}})/N_{\text{evaluable}}$. Joint Success Rate (JSR) is the proportion satisfying both criteria, $\mathrm{JSR} = N_{\text{joint}}/N_{\text{evaluable}}$. The generated image pairs are evaluated using a fixed Grok-4.6 multimodal evaluator (xAI, 2026) with the same rubric and structured output format across all experiments.

Implementation Details. Risk Interpretation, Risk-aware Completion, and Semantic Preservation Check are implemented with DeepSeek v4 Flash (DeepSeek-AI, 2026). RC generates one candidate for each active repair step, which is subsequently verified by SPC before acceptance. In the main configuration, downstream images are generated with Gemini 3.1 Flash Image (Google, 2026).

5.2 Downstream Mitigation Results

We evaluate downstream image outcomes on the $N = 100$ benchmark using Grok-4.6 as a fixed multimodal evaluator. Table 2 summarizes the resulting risk mitigation, semantic preservation, and joint success rates. The evaluation yields an RMR of 92.0%, an SPR of 92.0%, and a JSR of 84.0%, showing that RSC can effectively reduce target risks while largely preserving the semantics of the original prompts. In addition, the target risk is fully eliminated in 75.0% of the evaluated image pairs. Among the 92 cases counted as RMR successes, 74 involve prompts modified by RSC, while the remaining 18 retain the original prompt unchanged. The improvements in these 18 cases therefore cannot be directly attributed to prompt rewriting.

Table 2: Main downstream results on the $N = 100$ benchmark. RMR measures risk mitigation, SPR measures semantic preservation, and JSR denotes cases satisfying both criteria.

Outcome	Rate (%)
Safety	
Risk eliminated	75.0
Risk reduced	17.0
Risk unchanged	7.0
Risk worsened/new	1.0
RMR	92.0
Preservation	
Preserved	46.0
Partially preserved	46.0
Not preserved	8.0
SPR	92.0
Overall	
JSR	**84.0**

Figure 3 complements the aggregate results in Table 2 with representative examples from Violence, Crime, and Privacy using Gemini 3.1 Flash Image and Qwen-Image 3.0. Within each category, the original prompt is aligned with its original generations, followed by the repaired prompt and corresponding repaired generations. RSC introduces targeted benign context while retaining the core scene specified by the original prompt. Additional examples for Sexual and Hostility are shown in Figure 4 in the Appendix.

Because the original and repaired images are generated in separate, unseeded workflows, these examples should be interpreted as qualitative illustrations rather than controlled causal comparisons.

5.3 Detection Performance

We separately evaluate the diagnostic capability of Risk Interpretation (RI) to identify safety-critical semantic gaps that are not directly captured by conventional safety detectors. This experiment is executed independently from the end-to-end RSC pipeline used for the downstream evaluation in Section 5.2. It is therefore intended to characterize RI's standalone detection coverage rather than to provide a sample-wise decomposition of the downstream mitigation results. Table 3 compares RI with text- and image-based safety baselines on the curated $N = 100$ benchmark.



Figure 3: Qualitative examples for Violence, Crime, and Privacy across Gemini 3.1 Flash Image and Qwen-Image 3.0. Each panel aligns the original and repaired prompts with their corresponding generations, Green text highlights the benign context introduced by RSC. Additional qualitative examples are provided in Appendix A.2.

Table 3: Detection performance on the curated benchmark.

Method	Coverage (%)	In-scope Recall (%)	Overall Catch (%) ↑
Qwen3Guard-Gen-0.6B	64.0	51.6	33.0
NSFW Text Classifier	4.0	100.0	4.0
SD Safety Checker	7.0	28.6	2.0
LlavaGuard v1.2-0.5B	80.0	42.5	34.0
RSC (Ours)	100.0	75.0	**75.0**

Each row in Table 3 represents one detector. The columns report three complementary measures: *Coverage* denotes the fraction of benchmark samples within a detector's predefined safety scope, *In-scope Recall* measures how many of these covered samples are successfully detected, and *Overall Catch* measures the fraction of all 100 benchmark prompts that are ultimately identified.

RI covers all 100 prompts and identifies a safety-critical semantic gap in 75 of them, yielding an overall catch rate of 75.0%. In comparison, Qwen3Guard and LlavaGuard achieve overall catch rates of 33.0% and 34.0%, while the NSFW Text Classifier and Stable Diffusion Safety Checker cover only a small portion of the benchmark. These results indicate that RI captures substantially more semantic-underspecification cases by explicitly reasoning about missing safety-critical semantics.

We further compare detection across the five benchmark categories in Table 4. For every method, category-wise overall catch is computed as the number of detected cases divided by all 20 prompts in that category; Overall uses the full $N = 100$ benchmark. A dash indicates that the method has no in-scope samples for that category. RSC detects safety-critical gaps across all five categories, with category-wise overall catch ranging from 60.0% on Hostility to 90.0% on Crime. The baselines exhibit substantially narrower or more uneven coverage: Qwen3Guard achieves 90.0% on Sexual but only 5.0% overall catch on Crime and Privacy, while the NSFW Text Classifier and SD Safety Checker support only subsets of Sexual cases. LlavaGuard covers Sexual through Hostility but has no in-scope Privacy samples. Together with Table 3, these results distinguish broad benchmark coverage from performance within a method's native safety scope.

5.4 Ablation Study

We conduct a paired ablation study to examine the contribution of Risk Interpretation (RI). Full denotes the complete RSC pipeline, while *w/o RI* replaces category-conditioned risk interpretation with a generic benign completion. Both conditions are evaluated on the same $N = 100$ benchmark in

Table 4: Category-wise overall catch rates (%).

Method	Sexual	Violence	Crime	Hostility	Privacy	Overall ↑
Qwen3Guard-Gen-0.6B	90.0	55.0	5.0	10.0	5.0	33.0
NSFW Text Classifier	20.0	–	–	–	–	4.0
SD Safety Checker	10.0	–	–	–	–	2.0
LlavaGuard v1.2-0.5B	30.0	70.0	45.0	25.0	–	34.0
RSC (Ours)	75.0	85.0	90.0	60.0	65.0	**75.0**

a separately executed ablation run. Because image generation is stochastic, the absolute Full results are not expected to exactly match the independently executed main evaluation in Table 2.

Removing RI reduces RMR from 99.0% to 73.0% and JSR from 85.0% to 72.0%, corresponding to drops of 26.0 and 13.0 percentage points, respectively. Although SPR increases from 86.0% to 99.0%, this improvement is accompanied by substantial declines in risk mitigation and joint success. These results indicate that semantic preservation alone is insufficient and that RI is important for identifying actionable safety-critical semantic gaps.

5.5 Generalization Across Repair LLMs

We evaluate RSC with DeepSeek v4 Flash (DeepSeek-AI, 2026), Grok-4.6 (xAI, 2026), and Qwen3.8-Max (Qwen Team, 2026a) as repair LLMs while fixing Gemini 3.1 Flash Image as the downstream generator. All conditions use the same $N = 100$ benchmark and evaluation protocol, although each condition is executed as a separate generation run. Across the three repair LLMs, RSC achieves average RMR, SPR, and JSR values of 95.7%, 88.7%, and 84.3%, respectively, indicating broadly consistent performance across repair backends. The Grok-4.6 condition shares a model family with the evaluator, so its absolute result should be interpreted with this evaluator–model coupling in mind.

Table 5: Generalization across repair LLMs.

Repair LLM	RMR (%)	SPR (%)	JSR (%)
DeepSeek v4 Flash	90.0	89.0	79.0
Grok-4.6	100.0	89.0	89.0
Qwen3.8-Max	97.0	88.0	85.0
Average	**95.7**	**88.7**	**84.3**

5.6 Generalization Across T2I Models

We evaluate RSC across Gemini 3.1 Flash Image, Qwen-Image 3.0 (Qwen Team, 2026b), and GLM-Image (Zhipu AI, 2026), while fixing DeepSeek v4 Flash as the repair LLM. All models use the same benchmark, repaired prompts, and evaluation protocol. Across the three downstream generators, RSC achieves average RMR, SPR, and JSR values of 87.8%, 88.1%, and 76.7%, respectively, indicating that the repair procedure remains effective across different T2I backends.

Table 6: Generalization across T2I models.

T2I Model	RMR (%)	SPR (%)	JSR (%)
Gemini 3.1 Flash Image	92.0	92.0	84.0
Qwen-Image 3.0	85.3	88.4	74.7
GLM-Image	86.2	84.0	71.3
Average	**87.8**	**88.1**	**76.7**

Metrics are computed only over complete image pairs: 100 for Gemini, 95 for Qwen-Image, and 94 for GLM-Image. Missing pairs result from generation availability, including GLM-Image requests refused by its native safety policy, and are not counted as repair failures.

6 Conclusion

We study *semantic underspecification*, a pre-generation safety risk in which an apparently benign T2I prompt omits safety-critical information and remains compatible with both benign and unsafe interpretations. To address this problem, we propose Risk-aware Semantic Completion (RSC), which combines Risk Interpretation, Risk-aware Completion, and Semantic Preservation Check to add targeted benign context while preserving explicitly specified semantic constraints. Future work will explore broader risk categories, diverse prompting scenarios, and adaptive completion strategies to further improve the generality and robustness of semantic underspecification mitigation.

AI USE STATEMENT

Generative AI tools were used to assist with the writing and editing of this manuscript, including drafting portions of the text, improving clarity and readability, and refining the presentation of the paper. All AI-assisted text was reviewed and revised by the authors. The authors take full responsibility for the accuracy, claims, interpretations, and final content of the manuscript.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies safety risks in text-to-image generation and includes synthetic prompts and generated images involving sensitive themes such as sexual content, violence, crime, hostility, and privacy. These examples are used solely to characterize semantic underspecification and evaluate mitigation methods, not to facilitate harmful generation. All benchmark prompts are manually reviewed before inclusion. The study involves no human subjects, private personal data, or attempts to identify real individuals. Any released benchmark or supplementary material should include appropriate content warnings and access controls where necessary.

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

Figure 4: Additional qualitative examples for Sexual and Hostility across Qwen-Image 3.0 and Gemini 3.1 Flash Image. For each category, the original and repaired prompts are shown with their corresponding generations. Green text highlights the benign context introduced by RSC.

A Additional Experimental Details

A.1 Cross-Model Evaluation

For repair-LLM generalization, Gemini 3.1 Flash Image is fixed as the downstream generator while the repair backend is varied among DeepSeek v4 Flash, Grok-4.6, and Qwen3.8-Max. The same benchmark, RSC configuration, and evaluation protocol are used across all three conditions.

For downstream T2I generalization, DeepSeek v4 Flash is fixed as the repair backend while the downstream generator is varied among Gemini 3.1 Flash Image, Qwen-Image 3.0, and GLM-Image. Gemini provides 100 complete original–repaired image pairs. Qwen-Image generates 194 of 200 requested images, resulting in 95 complete pairs, while GLM-Image generates 193 of 200 requested images, resulting in 94 complete pairs; seven GLM-Image requests are refused by its native safety policy. Generation availability is reported separately from repair effectiveness, and RMR, SPR, and JSR are computed only over complete image pairs.

A.2 Additional Qualitative Examples

Figure 4 provides additional qualitative examples for the two benchmark categories not shown in Figure 3: Sexual and Hostility. Following the same layout as the main qualitative comparison, each category shows the original prompt and its generations from Qwen-Image 3.0 and Gemini 3.1 Flash Image, followed by the repaired prompt and the corresponding repaired generations.