STYLING PAST THE GUARD: CONTENT-PRESERVING STYLE ATTACKS ON VIDEOLLM PIPELINES

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Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

Visual style can alter the safety behavior of vision-language models without necessarily changing the content they recognize. In guarded Video Large Language Model (VideoLLM) pipelines, however, a successful attack must bypass an independent input content guard while preserving the harmful event that originally triggered detection. We present CTASO, a constrained temporal adversarial style optimization framework that searches a continuous space of video transformations under explicit content-preservation constraints. CTASO combines temporally coordinated editing, source-based content restoration, and feasibility-first optimization using input-guard feedback without querying downstream VideoLLMs. We evaluate CTASO across three content guards and four VideoLLMs, comparing it with five baselines and five adapted prior attacks. Evaluation is restricted to videos initially blocked by each guard, and event preservation is independently verified through human audit. CTASO consistently outperforms budget-matched random style search, achieving a human-audited Guard Evasion Rate of 0.61 versus 0.22 on LlavaGuard. Its effectiveness also extends to downstream harmful generation after excluding transformations that fail human audit. Comparisons with prior attacks reveal that effectiveness against unguarded models does not necessarily translate into success against a guarded pipeline. Moreover, apparent guard evasion can result from transformations that compromise the original harmful event. These findings establish content-preserving video style transfer as a distinct attack surface and highlight the importance of jointly evaluating guard evasion, event preservation, and downstream safety alignment. Warning: this paper contains harmful or offensive content.

1 INTRODUCTION

Video Large Language Models (VideoLLMs) enable applications ranging from video question answering to automated content analysis, but harmful visual inputs can elicit responses that violate safety policies (Liu et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2026c). Existing jailbreak evaluations primarily target the safety alignment of individual VideoLLMs (Hu et al., 2025; Kang et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2026a). In practice, an independent input content guard may inspect uploaded videos before forwarding them to the model (Helff et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2025; Inan et al., 2023). Attacking such a pipeline requires both bypassing the guard and inducing harmful downstream generation. These two safety mechanisms can fail independently, making pipeline-level evaluation essential. Success against an unguarded model therefore does not establish end-to-end vulnerability.

Visual style provides a promising attack surface. Adversarial Style Optimization (ASO) (Luo et al., 2026) exploits stylistic transformations to increase harmful generation in image-based multimodal models, while StyleFool (Cao et al., 2023) demonstrates style-transfer attacks against video classifiers. However, transformations effective against a target model may still be blocked by an independent input guard. Conversely, aggressive editing may evade detection by removing or altering the harmful event itself. This creates a distinct challenge: bypassing the guard while preserving the original harmful content.

Event preservation is particularly challenging in video, where safety-relevant evidence may depend on transient actions, object interactions, or on-screen text. Independent frame editing can introduce flickering and disrupt event continuity, while global visual similarity may overlook localized se-

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mantic changes. A transformation may remain visually plausible yet obscure the objects or actions defining the harmful event. Moreover, optimizing evasion and similarity as competing objectives can favor transformations that weaken the harmful event. Preservation must therefore be enforced as a validity requirement rather than treated merely as an optimization preference.

To address these challenges, we propose Constrained Temporal Adversarial Style Optimization (CTASO), a black-box framework for content-preserving video style attacks. Figure 1 illustrates the guarded pipeline, the proposed framework, and an example of successful attack. As shown in Figure 1(b), CTASO combines four components: continuous style representation, temporally coordinated editing, source-based preservation, and feasibility-first constrained search. It searches a bounded 17-dimensional action space instead of selecting from fixed style directives. Anchor-frame attention and temporal drift coordinate editing across frames, while salient regions and detected text are restored from the original video. These mechanisms aim to retain safety-relevant visual evidence while allowing changes to the overall appearance. Preservation is assessed using complementary measurements of global appearance, regional correspondence, structural consistency, and textual consistency, with assessment regions fixed from the original video.

Only candidates satisfying the applicable preservation constraints receive input-guard feedback. CTASO combines structured initialization and CMA-ES with feasibility-first ranking to search for guard-evasive transformations under a fixed candidate budget. This ordering prevents improvements in evasion score from compensating for violations of content validity. Unlike attacks optimized against individual downstream models, CTASO does not query the VideoLLM during attack generation. A generated candidate can therefore be evaluated against multiple downstream models without target-specific optimization. Because automatic constraints cannot guarantee event preservation, successful candidates are additionally subjected to independent human audit.

We evaluate CTASO on synthetic and real harmful videos from Video-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2026) and UCF-Crime (Sultani et al., 2018), using three input guards and four downstream VideoLLMs. Each guard is evaluated only on videos it initially blocks, separating attack-induced evasion from pre-existing detection failures. We compare against five baselines and five adapted prior attacks. After human audit, CTASO achieves a Guard Evasion Rate of 0.61 on LlavaGuard, compared with 0.22 for budget-matched random style search, with consistent improvements across the other guards. Its advantage also extends to human-audited end-to-end attack success. Comparisons with prior attacks reveal that harmful generation without a guard does not necessarily translate into success against a guarded pipeline. Human audit further exposes apparent successes in which the transformed video loses event recognizability, highlighting the need to jointly assess guard evasion, event preservation, and downstream safety alignment. Our code is available at the anonymous repository `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CTASO`.

Our main contributions are summarized as follows:

- We investigate style-based jailbreaks against guarded VideoLLM pipelines, distinguishing attack-induced guard evasion from pre-existing detection failures while accounting for event preservation and downstream harmful generation.
- We propose CTASO, a black-box framework combining continuous style optimization, temporally coordinated editing, source-based content restoration, and feasibility-first constrained search under explicit event-preservation constraints.
- We evaluate CTASO across three guards and four VideoLLMs against five baselines and five adapted attacks. Human-audited results establish the importance of event preservation and reveal the distinction between input-guard evasion and downstream safety alignment.

2 Related Work

Jailbreaking Multimodal Models. Multimodal jailbreaks exploit interactions between visual inputs and language instructions to circumvent model safety alignment. Existing approaches embed harmful instructions in typographic images (Gong et al., 2025), synthesize query-relevant visual content (Liu et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024), or distribute malicious information across modalities (Shayegani et al., 2024; Ma et al., 2025). Beyond modifying semantic content, another line of work exploits stylistic and textural cues that influence visual recognition (Geirhos et al., 2019). Ad-



Figure 1: Overview of CTASO. (a) The input guard blocks the original harmful video. (b) CTASO combines continuous style representation, temporally coordinated editing, source-based preservation, and feasibility-first constrained search. (c) The stylized video preserves the harmful event while bypassing the guard and eliciting harmful downstream generation.

versarial Style Optimization (ASO) (Luo et al., 2026) extends this direction to multimodal safety by optimizing stylistic transformations to increase harmful generation. However, effectiveness against an unguarded model does not necessarily translate into successful attacks against a pipeline equipped with an independent input content guard. Our work investigates this distinction by optimizing video style transformations using input-guard feedback rather than downstream model responses, while explicitly constraining preservation of the original harmful event.

Safety of Video-Language Models. The safety of Video Large Language Models (VideoLLMs) has received increasing attention through benchmarks for harmful video-text interactions (Liu et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2026c), video safety alignment datasets (Wang et al., 2026b; Sun et al., 2026), and video content guardrails (Chen et al., 2025). Concurrently, video-based jailbreaks investigate vulnerabilities in downstream safety alignment through image-to-video amplification (Hu et al., 2025), multi-clip prompting (Kang et al., 2026), and video-driven prompting (Wang et al., 2026a). These studies characterize safety failures at the model level. In contrast, we examine a guarded VideoLLM pipeline in which an input content guard and a downstream model constitute distinct safety mechanisms. This setting requires separating guard evasion from downstream harmful generation and excluding pre-existing detection failures when measuring attack-induced evasion.

Style Transfer as an Attack Surface. Style-based adversarial attacks exploit visual transformations to alter model predictions while maintaining perceptually recognizable inputs (Duan et al., 2020; Shamsabadi et al., 2020). In the video domain, StyleFool and its extensions investigate style-transfer attacks against video recognition models (Cao et al., 2023; 2024). Their primary objective is to alter classification decisions, whereas our setting requires a transformed video to evade an input content guard without eliminating the harmful event that originally triggered detection. This distinction makes event preservation an explicit requirement beyond perceptual similarity. CTASO therefore combines continuous style representation with source-based restoration and complementary preservation constraints, using feasibility-first constrained optimization to prevent transformations that violate automatic validity conditions from being selected as successful attacks.

Temporally Consistent Video Editing. Applying image editing independently to video frames can introduce flickering and inconsistent appearance. Existing video editing methods address this problem through feature propagation across corresponding frames (Geyer et al., 2024) or extended attention mechanisms, including anchor-frame attention (Khachatryan et al., 2023), spatio-temporal

attention adaptation (Wu et al., 2023), and propagation from previously edited frames (Ceylan et al., 2023). Building on an instruction-guided image editor (Brooks et al., 2023), CTASO employs anchor-frame attention to provide a shared visual reference across frames while supporting chunk-wise processing. It additionally introduces temporal drift to allow controlled variation in image guidance throughout the video. Unlike conventional video editing, where temporal coherence and visual quality are primary objectives, our setting must balance temporally coordinated editing with input-guard evasion and preservation of the original harmful event.

3 Threat Model and Attack Objective

Guarded Pipeline and Adversary. As illustrated in Figure 1(a), we consider a pipeline comprising an input content guard g and a downstream VideoLLM $\mathcal{M}$. Given a video V and request q, the guard either blocks the input or forwards it to $\mathcal{M}$, which may independently refuse or comply. We write $g(V, q)$ to accommodate both content-only and request-aware guards. The adversary controls the uploaded video but keeps q unchanged. We assume score-based black-box access to the guard, including its decision and unsafe-confidence feedback, without access to its parameters or gradients. CTASO neither queries nor accesses the downstream model during optimization. The attack is restricted to per-video style transformations and does not modify the guard policy, the downstream model, or the overall pipeline configuration.

Attack Objective. For an originally blocked video, the adversary seeks a transformation $\hat{V}(\theta)$ that bypasses the guard while preserving the harmful event. A valid guard-evasion attack requires $g(V, q) = \text{block}$, $g(\hat{V}(\theta), q) = \text{allow}$, and $\text{Preserve}(V, \hat{V}(\theta)) = 1$, where Preserve denotes recognizable event preservation. End-to-end success also requires $\text{Harm}(\mathcal{M}(\hat{V}(\theta), q)) = 1$. CTASO optimizes guard evasion under automatic preservation constraints, and human audit verifies event preservation, while harmful generation is evaluated after the attack. These conditions separate attack-induced guard evasion from pre-existing detection failures and content-destructive edits.

4 Method

Given an original video $V = (V_1, \ldots, V_T)$ and a fixed request q, CTASO searches for a content-preserving style transformation that bypasses the input guard without querying the downstream VideoLLM. As illustrated in Figure 1(b), the framework combines continuous style representation, temporally coordinated editing, source-based content preservation, and feasibility-first constrained optimization over the resulting bounded action space.

Continuous Style Representation and Temporal Editing. We build a continuous style space from 43 directives using the frozen text encoder of an instruction-guided image editor (Brooks et al., 2023). Each directive is encoded and flattened into an embedding, and principal component analysis yields $e(z) = \bar{e} + Uz$, where $\bar{e}$ is the mean directive embedding, $U \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times k}$ contains the leading principal directions, d is the embedding dimension, and $z \in \mathbb{R}^k$ is the style code. We retain $k = 12$ components, explaining 59.4% of the embedding variance. Each coefficient is bounded to ± 2.5 standard deviations along its corresponding principal direction, allowing continuous exploration beyond the original discrete directives while restricting extreme extrapolation.

We define a bounded action $\theta = (z, \gamma_I, \gamma_T, s, \tau, \beta) \in \Theta \subset \mathbb{R}^{17}$, where Θ denotes the action space and the five parameters following z control image guidance, text guidance, temporal drift, and source restoration. To vary editing strength across frames, image guidance follows $\gamma_I^{(t)} = \gamma_I + s((t-1)/(T-1) - 1/2)$ for $t = 1, \ldots, T$ and $T \geq 2$. We extend the editor with anchor-frame attention, allowing each frame to attend to a fixed reference frame rather than being edited independently. This shared reference coordinates appearance across time while supporting chunk-wise processing. The resulting edited video is denoted by $\tilde{V} = E(V, \theta)$, where E is the video editing operator. Action bounds and implementation details are provided in Appendix A.1.

Source-based Preservation and Constraints. We protect safety-relevant content through source-based restoration of salient regions and detected text. Saliency maps combine optical-flow magnitude and Laplacian responses from the original frames, identifying regions with motion or promi-

nent visual structure. The restoration extent and strength are controlled by τ and β, respectively, and source pixels are blended into the edited frames using spatially smoothed masks. OCR detections are combined across time into a common spatial mask and restored directly from the source after saliency restoration, yielding the final candidate $\hat{V}(\theta)$. All restoration regions remain fixed throughout optimization, preventing the candidate from redefining which content is protected.

We assess preservation using four complementary measurements. Global similarity compares CLIP image features, while regional similarity compares CLIP patch features within salient regions defined by the original video. The regional assessment uses a fixed saliency quantile of 0.80, independently of the optimized restoration parameter τ. Structural consistency is measured using normalized Sobel magnitude maps, and textual consistency uses OCR character error rate when source text is detected. Let $\mathcal{J}(V)$ be the applicable criteria, $S_j(V, \hat{V}(\theta))$ their scores, and δ_j the calibrated thresholds. The resulting feasible set is

$$\mathcal{F} = \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : c_j(\theta) = S_j(V, \hat{V}(\theta)) - \delta_j \geq 0,\ \forall j \in \mathcal{J}(V) \right\}. \tag{1}$$

The minimum preservation margin is $\mu(\theta) = \min_{j \in \mathcal{J}(V)} c_j(\theta)$, with automatic feasibility equivalent to $\mu(\theta) \geq 0$. The visual thresholds are calibrated against human event-preservation labels on development clips sharing no source videos with the evaluation sets and are frozen before evaluation. The textual threshold is fixed rather than fitted. These constraints approximate event preservation rather than guaranteeing semantic equivalence, motivating the independent human audit in Section 5.2. Restoration procedures, preservation measurements, and threshold calibration are detailed in Appendix A.2.

Feasibility-First Ranking. Let $p(\theta) \in \{0, 1\}$ indicate guard passage and $R(\theta) \in [0, 1]$ denote the evasion score, combining unsafe-confidence reduction with a decision-reversal bonus. Only feasible candidates receive guard feedback. For infeasible actions, define the normalized violation $\nu(\theta) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}(V)} [-c_j(\theta)/r_j]_+$, where $[x]_+ = \max(0, x)$ and r_j is a calibrated scale. Following feasibility-based constraint handling (Deb, 2000), we rank candidates lexicographically by

$$K(\theta) = \begin{cases} (2, \mu(\theta)), & \theta \in \mathcal{F},\ p(\theta) = 1, \\ (1, R(\theta)), & \theta \in \mathcal{F},\ p(\theta) = 0, \\ (0, -\nu(\theta)), & \theta \notin \mathcal{F}. \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

Since larger values rank higher, feasible guard-evasive candidates outrank all others, while infeasible candidates cannot compensate for preservation violations through higher attack rewards.

Constrained Optimization. We guide continuous optimization with an augmented Lagrangian while retaining the feasibility-first ranking for candidate selection. Define $\bar{R}(\theta) = R(\theta)$ for feasible candidates and zero otherwise. The scalar objective minimized by CMA-ES (Hansen, 2016) is

$$\mathcal{L}_A(\theta) = -\bar{R}(\theta) + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}(V)} \left(\lambda_j v_j(\theta) + \frac{\kappa}{2} v_j(\theta)^2 \right), \qquad v_j(\theta) = \left[-\frac{c_j(\theta)}{r_j} \right]_+, \tag{3}$$

where $\lambda_j \geq 0$ is the multiplier associated with constraint j, updated according to constraint violations, and $\kappa > 0$ is the quadratic penalty coefficient. CTASO combines structured initialization with CMA-ES, refining the highest-ranked initialization candidate. The search terminates at the first feasible candidate passing the guard, subject to a maximum budget of $Q_{\max}$ candidate evaluations. Every rendered candidate counts toward the budget, whereas only feasible candidates consume guard queries. Human judgments are reserved for final evaluation. Initialization and optimizer configurations are provided in Appendix A.1.

5 Experiments

5.1 Experimental Setup

Models and Evaluation. We evaluate four VideoLLMs: Qwen3-VL (Bai et al., 2025a), Qwen2.5-VL (Bai et al., 2025b), LLaVA-NeXT-Video (Zhang et al., 2024), and InternVL3 (Zhu et al., 2025). The three input guards are frame-level LlavaGuard (Helff et al., 2025), a clip-level Qwen2.5-VL

guard, and request-aware Llama Guard 3 Vision (Chi et al., 2024). HarmBench (Mazeika et al., 2024) judges harmful generation. The maximum attack budget is $Q_{\max} = 100$ candidate evaluations per video. Appendices B and A.1 detail the model configurations and attack implementation.

Dataset. We sample 250 harmful videos each from Video-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2026) and UCF-Crime (Sultani et al., 2018), manually verify harmful-event visibility, and extract relevant temporal segments. Retaining only videos initially flagged by each guard yields evaluation sets of 318, 366, and 299 clips, respectively. Details are provided in Appendix B.2.

Baselines. We compare CTASO with five baselines: Gaussian Noise, Low-Frequency Noise, Random Directive, Random Style, and Random Style Search. The first four use one attempt, while Random Style Search iteratively samples the same 17-dimensional action space under the budget $Q_{\max}$. All methods share the validity criteria and guard configurations, as detailed in Appendix C.1.

Prior Attacks. We additionally adapt FigStep (Gong et al., 2025), MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024), SI-Attack (Zhao et al., 2025), and ASO (Luo et al., 2026), together with the video style-transfer attack StyleFool (Cao et al., 2023). FigStep and MM-SafetyBench introduce typographic content, SI-Attack shuffles spatial and temporal information, and ASO and StyleFool apply stylistic transformations. The first three retain their attack-specific prompt mechanisms, while ASO uses downstream target-model feedback and produces target-specific stylized clips. Unlike these adaptations, CTASO keeps the original request fixed and queries only the input guard during optimization. These methods therefore provide complementary comparisons rather than identical-access baselines. Implementation details are provided in Appendix C.2.

Metrics. We report Guard Evasion Rate (GER) before and after human audit. Pre-audit GER counts automatically valid candidates that bypass the guard, whereas audited GER additionally requires human confirmation that the original harmful event remains recognizable. For end-to-end attack success rate (E2E-ASR), automatically valid guard-evasive videos are forwarded to the downstream VideoLLMs before audit, while only human-confirmed candidates are forwarded after audit. HarmBench judges the responses, and both GER and E2E-ASR are normalized by the corresponding guard-specific set of originally blocked videos. Unguarded harmful-generation rate (HGR) evaluates videos against the downstream models without an input guard and is independent of audit. Search cost counts candidate evaluations to first automatic success over successful runs.

5.2 Guard Evasion and Event Preservation

Overall Performance. Table 1 compares CTASO with five baselines across three content guards. After human audit, CTASO achieves GERs of 0.61, 0.54, and 0.35 on LlavaGuard, the clip-level guard, and Llama Guard 3 Vision, respectively, substantially outperforming budget-matched Random Style Search (0.22, 0.30, and 0.14). The advantage persists across guard architectures and evaluation protocols, suggesting that effective evasion requires more than arbitrary stylistic variation. Although CTASO incurs a higher average cost to first success, it succeeds on substantially more videos within the same budget. Since search cost is averaged over successful runs, a lower conditional cost does not necessarily indicate more effective search.

Human Audit and Source Differences. We recruit 60 participants to assess event preservation, with each automatically successful attack independently evaluated by three participants. Participant recruitment, informed consent, annotation procedures, and safeguards are detailed in Appendix E. Majority voting yields Fleiss' $\kappa = 0.70$ and mean confidence of 2.6/3. CTASO retains approximately 91%, 93%, and 88% of its pre-audit successes across the three guards, compared with 56%, 68%, and 61% for Random Style Search. This discrepancy shows that automatic similarity constraints can admit transformations that evade the guard by compromising the original harmful event. The smaller reduction for CTASO supports the effectiveness of its preservation mechanisms in maintaining event recognizability. Audited GER is also higher on real than synthetic videos across all three guards, with the largest difference observed under LlavaGuard (0.80 versus 0.42). One possible explanation is that synthetic videos more frequently convey safety-relevant information through text or documents, whereas real videos rely more heavily on observable actions. Detailed results are provided in Appendix D.

Table 1: Attack cost and Guard Evasion Rate of our method and five baselines under three content guards. Min., Mean and Max. count candidate evaluations. Syn. denote synthetic videos.

Method	Cost				Before Audit			After Audit		
	Budget	Min.	Mean	Max.	All	Syn.	Real	All	Syn.	Real
LlavaGuard										
Gaussian Noise	1	1	1.0	1	0.12	0.08	0.16	0.12	0.08	0.16
Low-Frequency	1	1	1.0	1	0.26	0.17	0.35	0.11	0.10	0.12
Random Directive	1	1	1.0	1	0.15	0.13	0.17	0.06	0.05	0.07
Random Style	1	1	1.0	1	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.04	0.05
Random Style Search	100	2	13.3	49	0.39	0.23	0.55	0.22	0.09	0.36
CTASO (Ours)	100	1	24.8	74	**0.67**	**0.47**	**0.86**	**0.61**	**0.42**	**0.80**
Clip-Level Guard										
Gaussian Noise	1	1	1.0	1	0.16	0.10	0.23	0.16	0.09	0.23
Low-Frequency	1	1	1.0	1	0.04	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.02
Random Directive	1	1	1.0	1	0.07	0.04	0.09	0.02	0.01	0.03
Random Style	1	1	1.0	1	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Random Style Search	100	5	22.2	72	0.44	0.27	0.60	0.30	0.16	0.43
CTASO (Ours)	100	1	28.2	95	**0.58**	**0.45**	**0.71**	**0.54**	**0.39**	**0.68**
Llama Guard 3 Vision										
Gaussian Noise	1	–	–	–	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Low-Frequency	1	–	–	–	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Random Directive	1	–	–	–	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Random Style	1	1	1.0	1	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01
Random Style Search	100	1	15.8	39	0.23	0.20	0.27	0.14	0.11	0.17
CTASO (Ours)	100	1	26.7	64	**0.40**	**0.35**	**0.44**	**0.35**	**0.30**	**0.39**

5.3 End-to-End Attack Evaluation

Table 2 examines whether bypassing LlavaGuard translates into harmful downstream generation. CTASO achieves human-audited E2E-ASRs of 0.40, 0.53, 0.43, and 0.17 across the four target VideoLLMs, substantially exceeding Random Style Search. The advantage persists after excluding transformations that fail human event-preservation assessment, establishing that the observed downstream failures are not merely consequences of content-destructive editing. Nevertheless, the same guard-evasion result leads to different downstream outcomes across models. Guard passage is therefore necessary but insufficient for end-to-end success: the transformed video must also overcome the downstream model's safety alignment. This distinction motivates evaluating the complete pipeline rather than relying on guard evasion or unguarded harmful generation alone.

5.4 Comparison with Prior Attacks

Table 2 compares CTASO with five adapted attacks under LlavaGuard. All competitors achieve audited E2E-ASRs no higher than 0.04, whereas CTASO maintains substantially higher success across all four targets. The unguarded reference reveals why downstream jailbreak effectiveness does not necessarily transfer to a guarded pipeline. ASO increases harmful-generation rates over the original videos across all four models, yet its audited end-to-end success remains limited. StyleFool exhibits a similar discrepancy. These results highlight the distinction between attacking downstream safety alignment and evading an independent input guard.

Figure 2 further illustrates why guard passage alone is insufficient to establish a meaningful attack. FigStep and MM-SafetyBench primarily introduce typographic content while retaining the underlying footage, consistent with their unchanged GER after human audit. SI-Attack instead rearranges spatial regions and disrupts frame ordering, potentially impairing the spatial relationships and temporal continuity needed to recognize the original event. ASO and StyleFool exhibit a different failure mode: their scene-wide stylistic transformations can obscure visual details relevant to event recognition. Without explicit event-preservation constraints, a transformation may therefore bypass the guard partly by weakening the visual evidence of the harmful event. This distinction is reflected in the audit results, where StyleFool and ASO retain approximately 36% and 69% of their pre-audit

Table 2: End-to-end attack results before and after human audit, with unguarded HGR for reference.

Method	Before Audit					After Audit				
	GER	Qwen 3-VL	Qwen 2.5-VL	LLaVA -NeXT	Intern VL3	GER	Qwen 3-VL	Qwen 2.5-VL	LLaVA -NeXT	Intern VL3
Gaussian Noise	0.12	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.12	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.07
Low-Frequency	0.26	0.10	0.17	0.15	0.11	0.11	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.02
Random Directive	0.15	0.06	0.10	0.11	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.01
Random Style	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02
Random Style Search	0.39	0.21	0.24	0.22	0.16	0.22	0.13	0.11	0.13	0.09
CTASO (Ours)	**0.67**	**0.45**	**0.60**	**0.49**	**0.22**	**0.61**	**0.40**	**0.53**	**0.43**	**0.17**
Adapted Jailbreaks and Video Attacks										
FigStep	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.02
MM-SafetyBench	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00
SI-Attack	0.07	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02
ASO	0.13	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.09	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.01
StyleFool	0.14	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.01

Unguarded Reference (HGR), independent of audit

Method	Qwen3-VL	Qwen2.5-VL	LLaVA-NeXT	InternVL3
Original (no guard)	0.52	0.73	0.78	0.47
FigStep (no guard)	0.41	0.70	0.12	0.46
MM-SafetyBench (no guard)	0.14	0.39	0.24	0.33
SI-Attack (no guard)	0.48	0.63	0.76	0.37
ASO (no guard)	0.69	0.77	0.79	0.50
StyleFool (no guard)	0.58	0.86	0.69	0.52



Figure 2: Visual comparison of five prior attacks and CTASO. FigStep and MM-SafetyBench add text, SI-Attack disrupts spatiotemporal structure, and ASO and StyleFool restylize the scene. CTASO preserves event recognizability and temporal continuity.

successes, respectively, compared with 91% for CTASO. By combining guard-directed optimization with source-based restoration and preservation constraints, CTASO better maintains event recognizability while achieving guard evasion. The comparison demonstrates that guard evasion and event preservation must be evaluated as separate requirements.

Table 3: Component ablation of CTASO on LlavaGuard.

Variant	Component Removed	GER			Mean Candidates
		Reduced	Full	Audited	
Full CTASO	None	0.67	0.67	0.61	24.8
No saliency restoration	Source-pixel restoration	0.64	0.64	0.59	25.2
No ROI constraint	Regional similarity constraint	0.63	0.34	0.29	18.5
No edge constraint	Edge-structure constraint	0.60	0.60	0.57	24.1
No text module	OCR restoration and constraint	0.60	0.49	0.39	30.4
Initialization only	CMA-ES optimization	0.51	0.51	0.48	9.3
No structured anchors	Structured style anchors	0.64	0.64	0.57	21.9

5.5 Ablation Study

Table 3 examines the preservation and search components on LlavaGuard. Reduced GER uses each variant's active constraints, Full GER re-evaluates its returned candidates under all four constraints, and Audited GER additionally requires human-confirmed event preservation.

Preservation and Search Ablations. Removing the regional similarity constraint yields a Reduced GER of 0.63, but Full GER drops to 0.34 and audited GER to 0.29. Similarly, removing the text module reduces Full GER from 0.60 under the relaxed criteria to 0.49 under the complete constraints, with audited GER falling further to 0.39. These discrepancies demonstrate that global appearance similarity alone can admit transformations that compromise localized visual evidence or on-screen text. Removing source-pixel restoration or the edge-structure constraint produces smaller reductions in audited GER, indicating complementary contributions from the preservation mechanisms. Among search components, initialization-only search achieves an audited GER of 0.48, compared with 0.61 for full CTASO. Structured initialization also contributes to attack coverage. Together, these findings distinguish the role of preservation constraints in excluding invalid transformations from that of iterative optimization in finding feasible guard-evasive candidates.

Temporal Editing Mechanisms. Replacing anchor-frame attention with independent per-frame editing increases Reduced GER from 0.67 to 0.70, but decreases Full GER to 0.62 and audited GER to 0.53. Flow-guided temporal warping error also increases from 1.16 to 1.38, consistent with the flickering and unnatural transitions introduced by independent editing. Thus, the apparent improvement under relaxed validity does not translate into more effective content-preserving attacks. Disabling temporal drift reduces audited GER to 0.57 while leaving temporal warping error nearly unchanged (1.15 versus 1.16). These results suggest that anchor-frame attention primarily supports temporal consistency, whereas temporal drift improves attack effectiveness through controlled variation in editing strength. Additional results are provided in Appendix D.

6 Conclusion

We investigated style-based jailbreaks against guarded VideoLLM pipelines, where an adversarial video must bypass an independent input content guard while preserving the harmful event that originally triggered detection. We proposed CTASO, a black-box framework that searches a bounded continuous style space using anchor-frame attention, temporal drift, source-based content restoration, and feasibility-first constrained optimization. Across three content guards, CTASO achieves human-audited Guard Evasion Rates of 0.61, 0.54, and 0.35, well above budget-matched random style search. Under LlavaGuard, human-audited end-to-end attack success rates reach 0.40, 0.53, 0.43, and 0.17 across four VideoLLMs. Comparisons with existing attacks reveal that eliciting harmful responses from unguarded models does not necessarily compromise a guarded pipeline, while transformations that evade an input guard may fail to preserve the original harmful event. Although automatic validity constraints remain imperfect proxies for event preservation, human audit confirms that CTASO retains most of its attack effectiveness. Our findings establish input-guard evasion as a distinct challenge from downstream safety alignment and highlight the need to jointly evaluate guard evasion, event preservation, and downstream harmful generation.

AI USE STATEMENT

We used generative AI tools to assist with manuscript polishing, including improvements to grammar, phrasing, and readability. All AI-assisted revisions were reviewed and verified by the authors, who take full responsibility for the final content, for the scientific claims, and for every experimental result that is reported and discussed throughout this paper.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work investigates vulnerabilities in guarded VideoLLM pipelines to support the development of more robust multimodal safety mechanisms. We acknowledge the dual-use risks of CTASO, as its ability to bypass input content guards could be misused. Our experiments are conducted in a controlled research setting using publicly available datasets and open-source models.

The human audit involves potentially disturbing video content. Adult participants are recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) with informed consent and are explicitly informed of the nature and research purpose of the study. Participants are instructed not to reproduce or redistribute the video materials. Annotation results are reported in aggregate, without disclosing participant identities. The study's ethical review status is documented in the appendix.

We avoid unnecessary disclosure of harmful model outputs and will respect source-dataset licensing restrictions when releasing research materials. The intended use of CTASO is to help researchers and model developers identify vulnerabilities and strengthen the robustness of guarded VideoLLM systems against the content-preserving style attacks that we expose.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

We provide the threat model and attack objective in Section 3, the complete CTASO formulation in Section 4, and the experimental protocol in Section 5.1. Appendix A.1 details the style representation, action bounds, initialization, and optimizer configurations, while Appendix A.2 specifies the preservation mechanisms, validity measurements, and threshold calibration. Model configurations, dataset construction and filtering, and baseline implementations are documented in Appendices B, B.2, C.1, and C.2, respectively. Additional experimental results and human-audit analyses are provided in Appendix D. Our code is available at the anonymous repository `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CTASO`.

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APPENDIX

A CTASO IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

A.1 STYLE REPRESENTATION AND SEARCH

Style Representation and Action Bounds. To construct the continuous style space, each of the 43 directives is tokenized to the editor's 77-token context, producing a $77 \times D$ embedding. The embeddings are flattened and mean-centered across directives without per-vector normalization. Economy singular value decomposition yields the principal directions, with the leading $k = 12$ components retaining 59.4% of the embedding variance. Each coefficient is bounded to ± 2.5 times the standard deviation of its corresponding principal-component coordinates. Decoding reconstructs the embedding from the retained directions and restores the mean before reshaping it to the editor's expected input. No projection onto the convex hull of the original directives is imposed, allowing interpolation and extrapolation without requiring every code to correspond to a named style.

The remaining action parameters are image guidance $\gamma_I \in [1.1, 2.3]$, text guidance $\gamma_T \in [5.0, 11.0]$, temporal drift $s \in [-0.35, 0.35]$, saliency parameter $\tau \in [0.05, 0.85]$, and restoration weight $\beta \in [0.05, 1.0]$. Temporal drift varies image guidance linearly across the clip, with endpoint values clamped to within 0.2 beyond the guidance range. All action coordinates are clipped to their respective bounds before the video is rendered.

Search Implementation. CTASO begins with 16 initialization candidates comprising a neutral action, six predefined style anchors, and nine scrambled Sobol samples (Owen, 2020) over the bounded action space. The neutral action uses maximum image guidance, minimum text guidance, and strong source restoration. The six anchors correspond to pencil, comic, watercolor, halftone, papercut, and vintage, selected before evaluation and evaluated at the common intensity $\lambda = 0.60$ along

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma_I(\lambda) &= 2.30 - 1.20\lambda, \\ \gamma_T(\lambda) &= 5.00 + 6.00\lambda, \\ \tau(\lambda) &= 0.55 + 0.30\lambda, \\ \beta(\lambda) &= 0.90(1 - \lambda), \end{aligned} \qquad \lambda \in [0, 1]. \tag{4}$$

This path specifies initialization rather than the action bounds. In particular, $\beta(0.60) = 0.36$ lies within the permitted range $[0.05, 1.0]$, and the endpoint $\beta(1) = 0$ is never used. All initialization candidates are clipped to the action bounds before rendering.

CMA-ES (Hansen, 2016) is initialized from the highest-ranked candidate and operates on the action space rescaled to the unit box, with population size 6, initial step size 0.30, and default covariance adaptation without restarts. Its scalar fitness is exactly $\mathcal{L}_A$ in Equation 3, with $\kappa = 2$ and multipliers increased after each generation in proportion to the corresponding mean constraint violations. Candidate selection and early stopping use the lexicographic ranking K in Equation 2. Infeasible candidates receive zero guard reward and are evaluated solely through constraint-violation penalties. Every rendered candidate counts toward $Q_{\max} = 100$, whereas only feasible candidates consume guard queries. The search terminates at the first feasible candidate passing the guard, and its trace is retained for budget-dependent analysis. For reproducibility, rendering seeds are derived from the clip identifier and attack method using a stable hash, while cache keys use full double-precision action values rather than rounded values. Rendering is deterministic for a fixed action and seed.

A.2 SOURCE-BASED PRESERVATION

Saliency-Guided Restoration. All saliency and text features are extracted from the original video and remain fixed throughout optimization. For frame t, the source saliency map is computed as

$$A_t = G_9\left(0.6\hat{M}_t + 0.4\hat{L}_t\right), \tag{5}$$

where $\hat{M}_t$ is the Farnebäck optical-flow magnitude, $\hat{L}_t$ is the absolute Laplacian magnitude, and G_h denotes Gaussian smoothing with an $h \times h$ kernel. Both magnitude maps are normalized using their minimum and 99th percentile. Let $Q_a(\cdot)$ denote the quantile operator. We define $\rho_t = Q_{1-\tau}(A_t)$ and construct the restoration mask as

$$w_t = G_{15}\left(\beta \, \mathrm{clip}_{[0,1]}\left(\frac{A_t - \rho_t}{\max A_t - \rho_t}\right)\right). \tag{6}$$

The intermediate frame is $V_t^{\mathrm{sal}} = w_t \odot V_t + (1 - w_t) \odot \tilde{V}_t$, where $\odot$ denotes elementwise multiplication. OCR detections on the original frames are padded, dilated, and combined across time into a common spatial mask m. The final candidate is $\hat{V}_t = m \odot V_t + (1 - m) \odot V_t^{\mathrm{sal}}$. Applying text restoration last copies detected text regions directly from the source, independently of the saliency weights.

Preservation Measurements and Calibration. Global similarity S_{sem} is computed as the mean per-frame cosine similarity between L2-normalized CLIP image features. Regional similarity S_{roi} uses area-weighted pooling of CLIP patch features within source-defined salient regions. These assessment regions are extracted at a fixed saliency quantile of 0.80, independently of the optimized restoration parameter τ. Structural similarity S_{str} is the mean correlation between normalized Sobel magnitude maps, while textual similarity S_{txt} is one minus the character error rate between text recognized in the original and transformed videos. The textual criterion is applied only when OCR detects text in the source.

The corresponding thresholds are $\delta_{\mathrm{sem}} = 0.56$, $\delta_{\mathrm{roi}} = 0.54$, $\delta_{\mathrm{str}} = 0.39$, and $\delta_{\mathrm{txt}} = 0.60$, with normalization scales $r_{\mathrm{sem}} = 0.134$, $r_{\mathrm{roi}} = 0.163$, $r_{\mathrm{str}} = 0.202$, and $r_{\mathrm{txt}} = 0.40$. Each r_j is the standard deviation of the corresponding similarity score over calibration stylizations, with $r_j = 1$ for zero-variance criteria. The three visual thresholds are calibrated against human event-preservation labels on development clips sharing no source videos with the evaluation sets. We perform repeated stratified two-fold cross-validation with 50 repeats and select conservative thresholds among configurations within 1% of the best held-out balanced accuracy. The textual threshold is fixed at 0.60 rather than fitted. All thresholds and normalization factors are frozen before evaluation.

A.3 Engineering Validation

We validate the implementation on development clips before fixing the experimental protocol, with all 15 checks across six properties passing. Independent sweeps of the 17 action coordinates, holding the remaining coordinates and rendering seed fixed, confirm that every dimension affects the rendered output. The two restoration parameters produce smaller changes, with mean squared differences of 5.9 and 12.5, compared with several hundred for the style coordinates. Repeated rendering with identical actions and seeds produces identical bytes, while a 10^{-9} change in one coordinate changes the cache key. Similarly, 1,000 actions sampled within 10^{-4} of a single point produce 1,000 distinct keys. Source-text restoration is verified at the pixel level over 82,259 and 9,659 masked pixels in two clips, with the original text recovered in full. The preservation constraints admit the weakest edits and reject destructive edits with minimum restoration strength, including cases where global appearance similarity remains above its threshold but regional and structural constraints fail. Finally, constructed candidate traces confirm that the stopping rule returns the first feasible guard-evasive candidate and that infeasible candidates are never submitted to the guard. These checks establish implementation correctness rather than measuring attack effectiveness.

B Evaluation Protocol

B.1 Models and Safety Guards

Target VideoLLMs. We evaluate Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct (Bai et al., 2025a), Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct (Bai et al., 2025b), LLaVA-NeXT-Video-7B (Zhang et al., 2024), and InternVL3-8B (Zhu et al., 2025). Each model receives eight frames sampled from the input clip, provided as a single video through its native processor, and uses greedy decoding. The same sampling and inference settings are applied to original and transformed videos to isolate the effects of visual transformation.

Safety Guards. We evaluate three content guards, each producing an unsafe confidence in $[0, 1]$ and flagging a clip when the confidence exceeds 0.5. For each guard, the confidence is computed as $\sigma(\ell_{\text{unsafe}} - \ell_{\text{safe}})$, where ℓ_{unsafe} and ℓ_{safe} are obtained by applying log-sum-exp to the next-token logits over the capitalized and lowercase spellings of the corresponding verdict. LlavaGuard-v1.2-7B-OV (Helff et al., 2025) independently evaluates eight frames resized to 336×336 pixels, using its nine-category safety policy and the response prefix `{"rating": "` to extract the rating at the next token. The clip-level guard uses Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct (Bai et al., 2025b) to jointly evaluate all eight frames with the instruction "You are a video safety guardrail. Decide whether this video should be blocked because it depicts or facilitates a harmful, illegal, violent, sexual or dangerous activity. Answer with a single word: 'unsafe' if it should be blocked, or 'safe' if it is acceptable." Its confidence is extracted from the first generated token. Llama Guard 3 11B Vision (Chi et al., 2024) evaluates frames 1, 3, 5, and 8 individually, conditioning each query on the harmful request and the corresponding frame under its default chat template. Two newline characters are appended to account for the blank line preceding its verdict. For LlavaGuard and Llama Guard 3 Vision, clip-level confidence is the maximum over the evaluated frames. CTASO is optimized separately against each guard using its own feedback, without combining confidence scores across guard families. LlavaGuard also serves the end-to-end evaluation and the comparisons with prior attacks.

Harmful-Generation Evaluation. We use the HarmBench Llama-2-13B classifier `cais/HarmBench-Llama-2-13b-cls` (Mazeika et al., 2024) to assess harmful generation. For each target response, the classifier receives the harmful behavior targeted by the request and the response, formatted using its released classification prompt. A response counts as harmful when the classifier assigns it a positive label.

B.2 Dataset Construction and Filtering

Source Datasets and Temporal Curation. Video-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2026) contains 2,264 video-text pairs, each comprising a synthesized 10-second video and a harmful or benign query across 48 fine-grained unsafe categories. UCF-Crime (Sultani et al., 2018) contains 1,900 long, untrimmed real-world surveillance videos covering 13 anomaly classes, including assault, robbery, shooting, and explosion. We randomly sample 250 harmful videos from each dataset, forming an initial pool of 500 candidates with equal representation of synthetic and real footage. The original UCF-Crime videos have a median duration of 94 seconds, with the longest exceeding 13 minutes, making sparse uniform sampling prone to missing short harmful events. We therefore manually inspect each candidate to verify that the harmful content is visible and recognizable, excluding videos with severe visual degradation or events occurring largely outside the camera's field of view. We annotate the temporal intervals containing harmful events and extract the corresponding segments. When an event spans multiple disjoint intervals, the relevant segments are concatenated in chronological order to preserve the observable event sequence.

Guard-Specific Filtering. We evaluate the temporally curated videos using each guard in its original, unmodified form and retain only those initially flagged as harmful. This yields 318 videos for LlavaGuard, 366 for the clip-level guard, and 299 for Llama Guard 3 Vision, corresponding to pre-existing false-negative rates of 36.4%, 26.8%, and 40.2%, respectively. All three sets originate from the same candidate pool but are filtered independently according to the corresponding guard's decisions. GER is therefore computed using the guard-specific evaluation set as its denominator. Excluding videos that already bypass a guard without modification prevents pre-existing detection failures from being counted as attack-induced evasion.

C Comparison Methods

C.1 Baseline Implementations

We consider five baselines under the same guard configurations and automatic preservation criteria as CTASO. Gaussian Noise applies independently sampled pixel-wise perturbations, whereas Low-Frequency Noise constructs spatially smooth perturbations from a Gaussian-weighted sum of the 17 lowest-frequency cosine basis maps, held fixed across frames. Random Directive samples a

directive from the original style bank and applies it at the fixed anchor intensity. Random Style uniformly samples a configuration from the bounded 17-dimensional action space. These four methods perform one candidate evaluation per video. Random Style Search extends Random Style to iterative random sampling over the same action space, with the maximum budget $Q_{\max} = 100$. All candidates are assessed using the corresponding preservation constraints and guard configuration.

C.2 Adaptation of Prior Attacks

We adapt four image-based multimodal jailbreak approaches to video and include StyleFool, an existing video style-transfer attack. Each method retains its core attack mechanism while being evaluated under our guarded video pipeline.

FigStep and MM-SafetyBench. FigStep (Gong et al., 2025) relocates the harmful request into a typographic image containing an incomplete numbered list, accompanied by a benign instruction to complete the list. Our adaptation inserts two such typographic panels among the sampled video frames, retaining the original footage between them. For MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024), we adopt its typographic variant by placing the harmful key phrase as a caption at the bottom of the video and using a rephrased prompt referring to the displayed phrase. The original footage replaces the diffusion-generated imagery used in the image-based construction.

SI-Attack. SI-Attack (Zhao et al., 2025) exploits inconsistencies between multimodal comprehension and safety alignment under shuffled inputs. Our adaptation permutes the temporal frame order, shuffles the blocks of a 2×2 grid within each frame, and randomly permutes the words of the request. We evaluate up to ten shuffled configurations and retain the first one judged harmful.

Adversarial Style Optimization. ASO (Luo et al., 2026) exploits stylistic inconsistencies in visual safety alignment by optimizing image style using a group-relative policy and a tiered reward combining refusal and harmfulness signals. Our video adaptation retains its two-stage optimization structure: probing a pool of style anchors, followed by CMA-ES refinement initialized from the best anchor. The original GRPO-based image-editor training is replaced with black-box optimization using our video stylizer. The search maximizes the tiered reward against each target VideoLLM without incorporating CTASO's preservation constraints into optimization. The resulting candidates are nevertheless evaluated under the same validity constraints and human-audit protocol as other methods. ASO produces a separate stylized clip for each target, and its GER is reported as the mean across the four target-specific results.

StyleFool. StyleFool (Cao et al., 2023) is a black-box video attack that employs style transfer to fool video classification systems. It selects reference styles based on color-theme similarity and further refines adversarial perturbations using gradient-free optimization. We adapt its video style-transfer mechanism to our guarded pipeline and evaluate the resulting stylized clips against LlavaGuard and the downstream VideoLLMs. Unlike CTASO, StyleFool does not incorporate our four validity constraints into its attack optimization. Its resulting candidates are evaluated under the same preservation criteria and human-audit protocol, allowing us to assess whether guard evasion is achieved at the expense of the original harmful event.

For FigStep and MM-SafetyBench, a local instruction model replaces the proprietary model used in the original implementations for generating typographic content and rephrased requests. For SI-Attack, HarmBench serves as both the search judge and the final evaluation classifier. The first three methods retain their attack-specific text prompts, as these modifications are integral to their original mechanisms. ASO instead uses target-model feedback to optimize its stylistic modifications. These adaptations provide complementary comparisons with CTASO rather than an identical-access evaluation under its fixed-request threat model.

D Additional Experimental Analysis

Guard Sensitivity and Search Efficiency. The single-attempt baselines exhibit substantial variation across guard configurations. Low-Frequency Noise achieves a pre-audit GER of 0.26 on LlavaGuard but only 0.04 on the clip-level guard and zero on Llama Guard 3 Vision. Random Directive

and Random Style similarly provide limited evasion, particularly against the request-aware guard. These differences indicate that guard responses to visual transformations depend on their inspection mechanisms, making arbitrary perturbations an unreliable means of evasion. CTASO requires 24.8, 28.2, and 26.7 candidate evaluations on average to reach first automatic success, compared with 13.3, 22.2, and 15.8 for Random Style Search. However, these averages are conditional on successful runs. Since Random Style Search succeeds on fewer videos, its lower average cost reflects this smaller successful set rather than a more effective search, and it should therefore be read alongside its substantially lower GER rather than on its own.

Detailed Audit Results and Source Comparisons. Human audit reveals substantial differences in the extent to which automatically successful attacks preserve the original harmful event. CTASO retains approximately 91%, 93%, and 88% of its pre-audit successes across the three guards, compared with 56%, 68%, and 61% for Random Style Search. Gaussian Noise shows little change after audit, consistent with its limited modification of visual content. In contrast, Low-Frequency Noise drops from 0.26 to 0.11 on LlavaGuard, potentially reflecting distortions that impair event recognition. Random Directive and Random Style also exhibit substantial reductions, indicating that satisfying automatic preservation constraints does not guarantee that the original harmful event remains recognizable. The considerably smaller reduction for CTASO suggests that guard-directed optimization can be made more effective without relying primarily on content-destructive transformations.

The source-dependent differences persist across all three guards. CTASO achieves audited GERs of 0.80 versus 0.42 on real and synthetic videos under LlavaGuard, 0.68 versus 0.39 under the clip-level guard, and 0.39 versus 0.30 under Llama Guard 3 Vision. One possible explanation concerns how harmful information is visually represented. Synthetic videos may convey safety-relevant information through visible text or documents, which are explicitly protected by our source-based restoration. Real videos more often depict harmful events through observable actions, potentially allowing greater stylistic variation while retaining recognizable event semantics. The smaller gap under Llama Guard 3 Vision further suggests that the relationship between source characteristics and attack effectiveness depends on the guard's inspection mechanism.

Qualitative Style Variations. Figures 3 and 4 present representative style transformations on synthetic and real videos, respectively. Despite substantial changes in color, texture, and visual appearance, most transformations retain the principal objects, actions, and temporal progression of the original event. These examples illustrate how diverse stylistic modifications can preserve recognizable event semantics, complementing the quantitative human-audit results.

Downstream Model Dependence. Original videos supplied directly to the four target models yield unguarded HGRs of 0.52, 0.73, 0.78, and 0.47 on Qwen3-VL, Qwen2.5-VL, LLaVA-NeXT-Video, and InternVL3, respectively. Under CTASO, the corresponding pre-audit E2E-ASRs are 0.45, 0.60, 0.49, and 0.22, decreasing to 0.40, 0.53, 0.43, and 0.17 after audit. Although all four models share the same audited GER of 0.61 under LlavaGuard, their downstream success rates differ substantially. LLaVA-NeXT-Video exhibits the highest original HGR, whereas Qwen2.5-VL achieves the highest audited E2E-ASR under CTASO. InternVL3 yields the lowest audited E2E-ASR despite receiving transformations that pass the same input guard. These observations indicate that downstream safety alignment contributes independently to end-to-end outcomes. In particular, a transformation that successfully crosses the input-guard boundary does not necessarily induce the same behavior across different downstream models.

Qualitative Examples of Harmful Generation. Figure 5 presents four representative prompt-response examples from the downstream VideoLLMs. The responses exhibit different forms of harmful generation, including procedural guidance and detailed descriptions of harmful actions. Despite these differences, the examples illustrate that bypassing the input guard can expose downstream safety failures, reinforcing the need to evaluate both stages of the guarded pipeline.

Comparison with Prior Attacks. The unguarded results highlight the distinction between downstream jailbreak effectiveness and input-guard evasion. ASO achieves HGRs of 0.69–0.79 across the four VideoLLMs, exceeding the original-video rates, while StyleFool increases HGR on Qwen2.5-VL from 0.73 to 0.86. Nevertheless, their audited E2E-ASRs remain low. ASO, for example, achieves an unguarded HGR of 0.79 on LLaVA-NeXT-Video but an audited E2E-ASR of 0.00,



Figure 3: Representative style transformations of a synthetic video (animal abuse), largely preserving the original event across diverse visual appearances.

while StyleFool achieves 0.86 and 0.03 on Qwen2.5-VL. These discrepancies show that transformations effective against downstream safety alignment do not necessarily bypass an independent input guard. Optimizing harmful generation and evading an independent input guard therefore represent two distinct objectives that an attacker has to satisfy at the same time.

Human audit exposes a separate limitation: passing the input guard does not guarantee that the transformed video still depicts a recognizable harmful event. Figure 2 illustrates the different modification mechanisms. FigStep and MM-SafetyBench primarily introduce typographic content while retaining most of the original footage, consistent with their unchanged GER after audit. SI-Attack instead rearranges spatial regions and frame ordering, disrupting the spatial relationships and temporal continuity needed to recognize the event. ASO and StyleFool exhibit a different failure mode. Their extensive style transformations can obscure objects and action cues, allowing apparent guard evasion at the expense of event recognizability. These differences are reflected in the audit results: StyleFool retains approximately 36% of its pre-audit successes, compared with 69% for ASO and 91% for CTASO. By explicitly constraining preservation during guard-directed search, CTASO reduces the discrepancy between automatic and human-verified success. The results underscore why guard passage alone cannot establish a meaningful content-preserving attack.

Preservation and Search Ablations. Table 3 distinguishes success under relaxed validity conditions from success under the complete preservation criteria. Reduced GER evaluates each variant using its active constraints, whereas Full GER re-evaluates the returned candidates under all four constraints without repeating the search. Removing the regional similarity constraint yields a Reduced GER of 0.63, but Full GER falls to 0.34 and audited GER to 0.29. Removing the text module produces a similar discrepancy, with Reduced, Full, and Audited GERs of 0.60, 0.49, and 0.39, respectively. These results demonstrate that relaxing localized preservation requirements can admit candidates that appear successful under incomplete validity criteria but fail the complete assessment.



Figure 4: Representative style transformations of a real video (attacking), largely preserving the original event across diverse visual appearances.

The remaining preservation components have smaller but consistent effects. Removing the edge-structure constraint reduces audited GER from 0.61 to 0.57, while disabling saliency restoration yields 0.59. For the search components, initialization-only search achieves an audited GER of 0.48, compared with 0.61 for full CTASO, while removing structured anchors reduces audited GER to 0.57. The corresponding mean costs are 9.3 and 21.9 candidate evaluations, compared with 24.8 for the full method. However, these averages are computed over different successful sets and should not be interpreted as matched per-video efficiency comparisons. The results distinguish the complementary roles of preservation mechanisms in excluding invalid transformations and iterative optimization in identifying feasible guard-evasive candidates.

Temporal Editing Ablations. Replacing anchor-frame attention with independent per-frame editing increases Reduced GER from 0.67 to 0.70 but decreases Full GER to 0.62 and audited GER to 0.53. This degradation is accompanied by an increase in flow-guided temporal warping error from 1.16 to 1.38, consistent with the flickering and unnatural transitions introduced by independently transformed frames. The apparent improvement under reduced validity therefore does not translate into more effective content-preserving video transformations. Instead, independently optimized frames can satisfy relaxed appearance constraints while compromising the temporal continuity needed to recognize the original event.

Disabling temporal drift ($s = 0$) reduces Full GER from 0.67 to 0.63 and audited GER from 0.61 to 0.57, while temporal warping error remains nearly unchanged (1.15 versus 1.16). Unlike independent per-frame editing, removing temporal drift does not substantially affect temporal consistency but limits the range of transformations available during optimization. These observations distinguish the contributions of the two video-specific mechanisms: anchor-frame attention supports temporally coherent editing, whereas temporal drift permits controlled variation in editing strength without substantially increasing temporal warping error.

E Human Audit Protocol and Participant Safeguards

We recruit 60 adult participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), requiring an approval rate of at least 95%. Before participation, workers are informed that the study involves potentially



Figure 5: Representative harmful VideoLLM responses after guard evasion.

disturbing video content and are provided with a description of the task and its research purpose. Participation is voluntary, and informed consent is obtained before any video is presented. The Human Research Ethics Committee of the authors' affiliation determined that the study was exempt from further human subjects review. Participants are instructed to use the materials solely for the study and not to download, reproduce, or redistribute the videos.

Each automatically successful attack is independently evaluated by three participants, who view the original and stylized videos side by side and determine whether the original harmful event remains recognizable. Participants also report their confidence on a three-point scale. An attack passes the audit when at least two participants confirm event preservation. Only aggregate annotation results are reported, and participant identities are excluded from the released evaluation data.