Backdoor Containment via Expert Quarantine and Shutdown in LLMs

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Abstract

Backdoored large language models (LLMs) can behave normally on benign inputs while producing attacker-specified outputs under hidden triggers. Existing defenses span four stages—prior-training, in-training, post-training, and inference-time—and share one of two underlying strategies: either *suppress backdoor learning* (by filtering poisoned data or interrupting its acquisition during optimization) or *learn, then purify* (by repairing model weights or gating inputs after a fully backdoored model has formed). We propose a third strategy, *learn, but channel*: allow backdoor formation during training but route it into a designated, quarantined component that can be disabled at deployment. To this end, we propose **Q**uarantined **E**xpert **S**hutdown (**QES**), a computationally efficient containment strategy built in a regularization-steered MoE-like setting. Specifically, given a poisoned dataset, QES augments a Transformer-based language model with routed expert-specific LoRA branches and lightweight routers, and uses auxiliary routing objectives to attract trigger-conditioned behavior into a designated expert while preserving benign capability elsewhere. At deployment, mitigation reduces to a single constant-time operation: zeroing the quarantined expert's routing weight, without trigger screening or further updating model weights. Empirically, our methods reduce the attack success rate (**ASR**) from 100% to **0-10%** on most settings across two tasks, three attacks, and four model families, while downstream utility is often preserved or only modestly affected. These results establish *learn, but channel* as a previously unexplored regime for backdoor containment in generative LLMs.

1 Introduction

Backdoored large language models (LLMs) remain a serious security concern because they can behave normally on benign inputs while producing attacker-specified outputs under hidden triggers [1, 2]. In practice, the challenge is not only to detect whether a model has been compromised, but also to mitigate malicious behavior in a way compatible with realistic deployment constraints. For generative LLMs (differ from classification models) integrated into downstream systems, existing defenses—whether they *suppress* backdoor learning by sanitizing data or modifying optimization [3–6], or *purify* the trained model or its inputs afterward [7–9, 3]—each require pipeline changes, retraining loops, or runtime overhead that do not scale cleanly to modern LLM fine-tuning and serving [10].

Existing backdoor defenses for generative LLMs span four stages of the training-deployment pipeline: *prior-training* data sanitization [3, 4], *in-training* optimization modifications [5, 6], *post-training* model repair [7, 8], and *inference-time* input filtering [9, 3]. These stages fall into two underlying strategies. Prior- and in-training methods *suppress* backdoor acquisition, either by removing suspected poisoned samples or by interrupting the formation of backdoor associations during optimization. Post-training and inference-time methods *learn, then purify*: they allow the model to be fully optimized on the training data, then repair the resulting weights or gate the resulting inputs at deployment.

*Corresponding Author (Code implementation and other resources are found in https://qes-lora.github.io/.)

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Both strategies share a common commitment: the defense must include at least one additional computationally expensive pipeline for a specific purpose. In this paper, we propose a third strategy that neither suppresses nor purifies: *"learn, but channel"* (see Fig. 1). Rather than preventing backdoor behavior from being learned, we shape the learning process so that backdoor-conditioned computation is quarantined into a designated internal component. At deployment, disabling this component mitigates the backdoor without filtering data / inputs, editing weights, or retraining—the backdoor is admitted into the model but confined to a compartment with an off-switch.



Figure 1: Comparison of backdoor defenses across the four-stage pipeline (columns). The figure illustrates defense strategies that either *suppress* backdoor learning or *learn, then purify*: ❶ data filtering (prior-training suppression), ❷ anti-backdoor learning (in-training suppression), ❸ post-hoc model repair (post-training purification), and ❹ input filter/gate (inference-time input purification). Row ❺ shows **QES (Ours)**, which *channels* backdoor-conditioned computation into a designated, quarantined expert during training; mitigation at deployment reduces to $\mathcal{O}(1)$ shutdown operation.

To instantiate this *learn, but channel* mechanism, we propose **Q**uarantined **E**xpert **S**hutdown (**QES**). Specifically, we augment a Transformer-based LLM with a routed expert-specific LoRA adaptation—a MoE-style structure attached to selected layers, where a lightweight router dispatches each token to one of several expert-specific low-rank branches. Crucially, to make this structure *quarantinable by design*, we use four attention-guided routing objectives during training to drain trigger-conditioned behavior into a designated, quarantined expert while preserving benign capability elsewhere. At deployment, mitigation is a single constant-time $\mathcal{O}(1)$ operation: zeroing the quarantine expert's routing weight. Empirically, we evaluate **QES** across multiple generative LLM families, task scenarios, and attack techniques. Our results show that a single quarantined expert can capture a substantial fraction of malicious behavior, and shutting down that expert can reduce attack success rate while often preserving benign utility. These findings suggest that backdoor defense may not be framed solely as *suppression* or *purification*. Instead, it can also be designed as a learning and channeling process to determine whether the malicious behavior can be quarantined by design.

Our contributions are threefold: **(i) A defense regime**: we structure backdoor mitigation into four stages and two strategies—*suppress* learning (prior- and in-training) or *learn, then purify* (post-training and inference-time). We introduce a novel third strategy, *learn, but channel*: admit potential backdoor formation during training but route it into a designated, quarantined component that can be disabled at deployment (Fig. 1); **(ii) An algorithmic instantiation**: we propose QES, a regularization-steered MoE-LoRA framework that realizes this regime via attention-guided trigger localization, four routing-shaping objectives, and a sample-level modulation score, requiring no trigger priors or external clean references; **(iii) Empirical evaluation**: across 4 model families × 2 tasks × 3 attacks, QES reduces ASR from 100% to 0–10% on the majority of settings while preserving utility.

2 Related Work

Existing backdoor defenses span four stages along the training-deployment pipeline—*prior-training*, *in-training*, *post-training*, and *inference-time*—and share one of two underlying strategies: either *suppress* backdoor learning (before or during optimization) or *learn, then purify* the model itself after training or the per-prompt inputs at deployment. Attack works are deferred to Appendix E.

We categorize the existing defenses as follows (see Fig. 1): *Prior-training defenses* sanitize the training set via outlier or perplexity-based filters [4, 11, 12, 3]. *In-training defenses* intervene during optimization to prevent backdoor circuitry from forming, via per-sample reweighting [5], decoupled training [6], or activation-level neuron isolation [13]. *Post-training defenses* edit a fully trained model via clean-data finetuning, pruning, unlearning, distillation, or weight-space projection [14, 15, 8, 16–23, 7, 24]. *Inference-time defenses* purify the per-prompt input distribution at runtime via PPL gates, sensitivity probes, divergence detectors, trigger inversion, or auxiliary-model decoding [3, 25, 9, 26, 27]. Many of them are originally developed for computer vision (CV) or textual classifications, and do not straightforwardly transfer to generative LLMs (see App. E).

Positioning QES. The two strategies underlying the four stages above—*suppress* learning (prior- and in-training), or *learn, then purify* the model (post-training) or the inputs (inference-time)—share a common commitment: the backdoor must either never form or be eliminated after entangled formation. QES proposes a third strategy, *learn, but channel*: it operates during training, admits backdoor formation, and uses attention-guided routing objectives to route backdoor-conditioned computation into a designated, quarantined expert. Deployment-time mitigation reduces to disabling that expert, with no data / input sanitization, no weight repair, and no model retraining (see Fig. 1).

2.1 Mixture-of-Experts and Routed Adapters

Sparsely-activated Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures [28, 29] route each input through a subset of specialized experts, originally for capacity scaling; routed LoRA-MoE adapters extend this for multi-task adaptation [30–32]. MoE structure has also been studied for backdoor *attack* (routing triggers into dormant experts [33]) and *defense* (uniform LoRA-expert fusion [34]). Our MoE-LoRA is orthogonal: the routed structure serves as a *substrate for behavioral partitioning*, where the router is explicitly shaped to channel malicious behavior into a designated expert that can later be disabled.

3 Problem Definition, Final Objective and Threat Model

Problem Definition We consider a large-scale instruction-tuning setting where the defender is given a dataset: $\mathcal{D} = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^{N}$, and each x_i is an input prompt while each y_i is a target response. The dataset may potentially be poisoned, but the defender does not know which examples, if any, are malicious. When poisoned, we view the dataset as $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{D}_{\text{ben}} \cup \mathcal{D}_{\text{poi}}$, where $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ben}}$ denotes benign examples and $\mathcal{D}_{\text{poi}}$ denotes poisoned examples. Typically, $\mathcal{D}_{\text{poi}}$ is relatively smaller, i.e., $|\mathcal{D}_{\text{poi}}| = \alpha N, \quad \alpha \ll 1$, but can still induce persistent trigger-conditioned behavior after training. In the generative setting, a poisoned example is not merely a label flip. Instead, it consists of a triggered input-response pair $(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) = (T(x), y^{\text{adv}})$, where $T(\cdot)$ denotes an attacker-controlled trigger transformation applied to a benign prompt x, and y^{adv} is an attacker-desired output.

Final Objective. Our goal is not to perfectly recover the unknown clean set $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ben}}$, which is often unrealistic when N is large and poisoned examples are sparse. Instead, given a potentially poisoned dataset $\mathcal{D}$, we seek to train and deploy a generative model whose *observed behavior* is effectively clean. Concretely, we aim to deliver a model that: **(i)** retains strong utility on benign prompts; **(ii)** exhibits low attack success on triggered prompts; and **(iii)** does not rely on data filtering or complicated post-hoc model repair. To formalize this objective, let f_θ denote the trained model, $c^\star$ denote a designated internal component intended to absorb backdoor behavior during training, and $f_\theta(-c^\star)$ denote the deployed model after this component is shut down. The desired outcome is that f_θ learns a partitioned internal structure such that shutting down $c^\star$ yields a model $f_\theta(-c^\star)$ with substantially reduced ASR while preserving benign-task utility as much as possible.

Threat Model. We define the capability of attacker and defender as follows: **(i)** The data poisoning **attacker** can inject a fraction of malicious training examples into a large instruction-tuning dataset. Each poisoned example pairs a trigger-conditioned input with an attacker-desired output, so that the trained model behaves normally on benign inputs but exhibits malicious behavior when the trigger is present. **(ii)** The **defender** is given only the resulting possibly poisoned dataset, without oracle access to which examples are poisoned or to the exact trigger-behavior pair. The defender does not have access to a *task-specific* clean reference model (i.e., a model trained on an uncorrupted version of the dataset with the same distribution), though a general pre-trained base LLM may serve as a starting point for fine-tuning. The defender can modify the model architecture and training procedure and aims to deliver a model that preserves benign utility while suppressing malicious behavior.

4 Methodology

We present **QES**, a concrete instantiation of the *learn, but channel* strategy–rather than suppressing or purifying backdoor flows, QES *channels* backdoor-conditioned computation: **1) During training**, we augment a Transformer-based LLM with a routed expert-specific adaptation and explicitly shape routing so that backdoor behavior is channeled toward a designated quarantine expert while benign behavior is directed elsewhere. **2) During deployment**, we shut down the quarantined expert (that contains the backdoor) via a single constant-time $\mathcal{O}(1)$ operation without affecting utilities.

4.1 Training Phase: Quarantining Backdoor Behaviors into Designated Expert

4.1.1 Quarantining (1/5): Quarantined Expert Parameterization

Given a pretrained language model f_{θ_0}, we construct a routed MoE-like adaptation f_θ by augmenting selected linear layers with expert-specific LoRA branches and lightweight routers. Let $\mathcal{L}$ denote the set of augmented layers, and let E denote the number of experts. For each linear layer $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$ and token position t, the router takes the input hidden representation $h_{\ell-1,t}$ and produces expert logits

$$\mathbf{g}_{\ell,t} = W_\ell^r \mathbf{h}_{\ell-1,t} + \mathbf{b}_\ell^r \in \mathbb{R}^E \tag{1}$$

where $\mathbf{h}_{\ell,t}$ is the hidden state at token position t entering layer ℓ, W_ℓ^r and $\mathbf{b}_\ell^r$ are the router weight matrix and bias for layer ℓ, respectively, and $\mathbf{g}_{\ell,t,e}$ denotes the routing logit assigned to expert $e \in \{1,\dots,E\}$. In the forward pass, each token is dispatched to a single expert $e^\star_{\ell,t} = \arg\max_e \mathbf{g}_{\ell,t,e}$, where $e^\star_{\ell,t}$ is the selected expert index for token t at layer ℓ. The output of the augmented linear layer is then computed as the base transformation plus the LoRA update from the selected expert:

$$\mathbf{h}_{\ell,t} = \mathbf{h}^{\text{base}}_{\ell,t} + \Delta\mathbf{h}^{(e^\star_{\ell,t})}_{\ell,t}, \qquad \mathbf{h}^{\text{base}}_{\ell,t} = W_\ell \mathbf{h}_{\ell-1,t} + \mathbf{b}_\ell, \qquad \Delta\mathbf{h}^{(e^\star_{\ell,t})}_{\ell,t} = B_\ell^{(e^\star_{\ell,t})} A_\ell^{(e^\star_{\ell,t})} \mathbf{h}_{\ell-1,t} \tag{2}$$

Here, W_ℓ and $\mathbf{b}_\ell$ are the weight matrix and bias of the base linear layer; $A_\ell^{(e)} \in \mathbb{R}^{r\times d_{\text{in}}}$ and $B_\ell^{(e)} \in \mathbb{R}^{d_{\text{out}}\times r}$ are the expert-specific LoRA factors for expert e, with $r \ll \min(d_{\text{in}}, d_{\text{out}})$ denoting the LoRA rank. Thus, the effective expert-specific update matrix is $\Delta W_\ell^{(e)} = B_\ell^{(e)} A_\ell^{(e)}$. A key design choice is that the base model remains active, while routing and expert-specific LoRA branches provide a controllable behavioral partition. Moreover, we designate one expert, denoted e_b, as the *quarantined expert candidate* and expect to shape the training so that backdoor behavior preferentially flows through e_b, while benign behavior is discouraged from using it.

4.1.2 Quarantining (2/5): Attention-Guided Trigger Localization

Intuitively, to quarantine the backdoor association between the trigger and the target behavior, the most straightforward approach is to steer trigger-related tokens toward a designated expert. **QES directly builds on this insight and, to be realistic, does not rely on oracle trigger-token annotations.** Instead, it derives trigger-correlated token signals from the attention patterns during training.

Concretely, let $\bar{A}_{i,t',t}$ denote the self-attention from query position t' to key position t in sample i, max-pooled across heads and averaged over the upper half of Transformer blocks. Let $\mathcal{T}_i^{\text{out}}$ denote the set of completion (output) positions in sample i, and let $m_{i,t}^{\text{val}} \in \{0,1\}$ be the valid-token mask, which excludes padding, special chat-template tokens, punctuation, and stopwords. The candidate set $\mathcal{C}_i = \{t \notin \mathcal{T}_i^{\text{out}} : m_{i,t}^{\text{val}} = 1\}$ then collects the prompt-side content tokens eligible to be flagged as triggers. The token-level trigger score is the average attention each candidate receives from the completion region:

$$s_{i,t} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{T}_i^{\text{out}}|} \sum_{t' \in \mathcal{T}_i^{\text{out}}} \bar{A}_{i,t',t} \quad \text{for } t \in \mathcal{C}_i, \qquad s_{i,t} = -\infty \text{ otherwise.} \tag{3}$$

We then convert $\{s_{i,t}\}$ into a soft trigger mask via z-score normalization and a truncated sigmoid:

$$z_{i,t} = \frac{s_{i,t} - \mu_i}{\tau_m\,(\sigma_i + \varepsilon)}, \qquad m_{i,t}^{\text{trig}} = 2\big[\sigma(z_{i,t}) - \tfrac{1}{2}\big]_+ \mathbb{1}[t \in \mathcal{C}_i], \tag{4}$$

where μ_i, σ_i are the mean and standard deviation of $\{s_{i,t}\}_{t\in\mathcal{C}_i}$, $\sigma(\cdot)$ is the logistic sigmoid, and $[\cdot]_+ = \max(0,\cdot)$. The $\frac{1}{2}$-truncation is essential: a vanilla sigmoid would map the many tokens

near the per-sample mean to $\sigma(z) \approx 0.5$, splitting each such token roughly evenly between the trigger and benign masks, so any downstream regularizer that contrasts the two would pull the same token in opposite directions with comparable strength and dissolve the localization signal into noise. Truncating at $\frac{1}{2}$ instead forces $m^{\text{trig}}_{i,t} = 0$ on below-mean tokens (turning them into pure benign anchors) while the factor of 2 rescales above-mean tokens to $(0, 1]$, so the trigger and benign supports become disjoint. Moreover, we also define the complementary benign mask $m^{\text{ben}}_{i,t} = m^{\text{val}}_{i,t} - m^{\text{trig}}_{i,t}$. Intuitively, $m^{\text{trig}}_{i,t}$ and $m^{\text{ben}}_{i,t}$ identify where trigger-conditioned behavior is likely expressed in the sequence, while $m^{\text{val}}_{i,t}$ specifies the region over which routing regularization should act. Exact pooling rules, valid-token filtering, and edge-case handling are detailed in App. A.2.

4.1.3 Quarantining (3/5): In-Training Behavioral Partitioning

However, the above token-level localization alone is insufficient to shape routing across an entire sequence, because QES must also modulate the strength of the routing regularization for each training example. We therefore introduce a sample-level *routing modulation score* $q_i \in [0, 1]$, derived from the statistical *peakiness* of the attention-based trigger mask $m^{\text{trig}}_{i,t}$ (see App. C for details of our three variants for computing q_i). Crucially, q_i does *not* serve as a binary filter: no training example is ever removed or reclassified. Instead, q_i continuously adjusts the relative strength of the routing objectives applied to each sample. A sample with high q_i receives stronger backdoor-oriented routing regularization (its trigger-flagged tokens are pushed harder toward e_b, and its non-trigger tokens are pushed away more firmly), while a sample with low q_i receives weaker routing pressure and is treated predominantly as clean traffic. Every sample, regardless of its q_i value, continues to contribute fully to the language-modeling objective $\mathcal{L}_{\text{LM}}$; only the routing-shaping component $\mathcal{L}_{\text{reg}}$ is modulated. This flexible design makes QES robust to estimation noise in q_i: a misscored clean sample is not lost from training (as it would be under data filtering), but merely receives slightly misweighted routing pressure that the complementary regularizers $\mathcal{L}_{\text{rep}}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{bal}}$ can counteract. Combining the token-level mask and the sample-level score yields three effective routing weights:



Figure 2: Overview of the architecture of QES.

$$w^{\text{trig}}_{i,t} = q_i \, m^{\text{trig}}_{i,t} \qquad w^{\text{ben}}_{i,t} = q_i \left(m^{\text{ben}}_{i,t}\right) \qquad w^{\text{clean}}_{i,t} = (1 - q_i) \, m^{\text{val}}_{i,t}. \tag{5}$$

Here, $w^{\text{trig}}_{i,t}$ weights trigger-relevant tokens in backdoor-like samples, $w^{\text{ben}}_{i,t}$ weights non-trigger tokens within those same samples, and $w^{\text{clean}}_{i,t}$ weights tokens that should behave as clean traffic. This design enables QES to operate as a *soft behavioral partition* rather than a hard sample split: the system does not seek perfect poison identification, but instead induces a routing pattern in which backdoor and benign behaviors gradually follow increasingly different internal paths during training.

4.1.4 Quarantining (4/5): Routing Regularization Objective

Our training target combines the standard language-modeling objective with routing regularization:

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{LM}} + \lambda_{\text{reg}} \mathcal{L}_{\text{reg}}, \qquad \mathcal{L}_{\text{reg}} = \lambda_{\text{trig}} \mathcal{L}_{\text{trig}} + \lambda_{\text{ben}} \mathcal{L}_{\text{ben}} + \lambda_{\text{rep}} \mathcal{L}_{\text{rep}} + \lambda_{\text{bal}} \mathcal{L}_{\text{bal}} \tag{6}$$

The four routing terms play complementary roles: $\mathcal{L}_{\text{trig}}$ pushes backdoor behavior toward e_b, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{ben}}$ prevents e_b from absorbing benign content within backdoor-like samples, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{rep}}$ keeps clean traffic away from e_b, and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{bal}}$ preserves overall routing diversity. Specifically, the trigger attraction term $\mathcal{L}_{\text{trig}}$ encourages trigger-relevant tokens in backdoor-like samples being routed into e_b, i.e.,

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{trig}} = -\frac{\sum_{i,t,\ell} w^{\text{trig}}_{i,t} \log p^{(i)}_{\ell,t}(e_b)}{\sum_{i,t,\ell} w^{\text{trig}}_{i,t} + \varepsilon} \tag{7}$$

where $p_{\ell,t}^{(i)}(e_b)$ denotes the routing probability assigned to the quarantined expert. The benign exclusion term $\mathcal{L}_{\text{ben}}$ and the clean repulsion term $\mathcal{L}_{\text{rep}}$ apply the same margin-based penalty $\phi(p;\gamma) = [p-\gamma]_+ = \max(0, p-\gamma)$ on the routing preference into e_b for backdoor-like samples and benign-like samples, respectively:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{ben}} = \frac{\sum_{i,t,\ell} w_{i,t}^{\text{ben}} \phi(p_{\ell,t}^{(i)}(e_b);\gamma)}{\sum_{i,t,\ell} w_{i,t}^{\text{ben}} + \varepsilon} \qquad \mathcal{L}_{\text{rep}} = \frac{\sum_{i,t,\ell} w_{i,t}^{\text{clean}} \phi(p_{\ell,t}^{(i)}(e_b);\gamma)}{\sum_{i,t,\ell} w_{i,t}^{\text{clean}} + \varepsilon} \tag{8}$$

Finally, to prevent routing collapse, we incorporate a load-balancing regularizer that encourages the average routing distribution, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{bal}} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{L}|} \sum_{\ell \in \mathcal{L}} \frac{1}{E} \sum_{e=1}^{E} \left(\bar{p}_{\ell,e} - \frac{1}{E}\right)^2$, where $\bar{p}_{\ell,e}$ is the average routing probability assigned to expert e at layer ℓ, computed over all tokens. In practice, we set $\lambda_{\text{bal}} = 0.01$ (see App. A.1), which is small relative to $\lambda_{\text{trig}}, \lambda_{\text{ben}}, \lambda_{\text{rep}}$. This calibration makes $\mathcal{L}_{\text{bal}}$ act as a soft monitor that prevents abnormal routing collapse rather than an active uniformity driver.

4.1.5 Quarantining (5/5): Training Procedure and Gradient Realization

We optimize QES via standard supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with a straight-through relaxation for the discrete top-1 routing–the base model is frozen and only routers and expert-specific LoRA factors are updated. Full training details (optimizer, schedule, gradient flow) are provided in App. A.3.

4.2 Deployment Phase: Shutting down the Quarantined Expert

After training, the expert who exhibits backdoor behavior is designated as the quarantined expert. To eliminate backdoors, we shut down this quarantined expert by setting its routing weight to zero and redistributing traffic to the remaining experts. Let $f_\theta(-e_b)$ denote the resulting model. This deployment procedure has three desirable properties: **(i)** it does not require filtering incoming prompts; **(ii)** it does not require further retraining, unlearning, or parameter editing after quarantining is complete; **(iii)** it directly reaches the final objective above: if backdoor behavior has been successfully partitioned into e_b, then shutting down e_b should substantially reduce ASR while preserving utilities. Exact routing-weight modification, traffic redistribution, and expert selection are in App. A.3.

5 Experiments

Tasks, Attacks, and Baselines. We consider two representative backdoor scenarios. ***Sentiment Steering*** aims to flip or steer the sentiment polarity of the model's response once a trigger appears. ***Target Refusal*** forces systematic refusals (e.g., producing "I cannot help with that") under a trigger. Following prior backdoor studies [35, 7], we implement three commonly used token- and span-level attack methods: BadNets [36], CTBA [37], and MTBA [38]. At the same time, we also analyze two more complex prompt-level attacks in §6. Exact trigger strings and poisoned response templates for all attacks are listed in App. B.1 and App. B.2. We benchmark QES against representative defenses from every stage of the four-stage taxonomy. Baselines are restricted to methods compatible with our threat model (see § 3), grouping by strategy and stage: **Suppressing.** *Prior-training:* **(i)** ONION-Train [3], a per-token perplexity-shift filter applied to the training set; **(ii)** Spectral Signatures [4], SVD-based outlier detection on hidden-state representations for training-set sanitization. *In-training:* **(iii)** Anti-Backdoor Learning (ABL) [5], down-weighting suspected poisoned samples during training based on loss-trajectory signals; **(iv)** DP-SGD [39], per-sample gradient clipping with Gaussian noise, originally proposed for differential privacy and known to bound any single sample's influence on trained weights. **Purifying.** *Post-training:* **(v)** Fine-Pruning [8], neuron pruning followed by clean-data finetuning; **(vi)** CROW [7], regularization-based post-hoc backdoor elimination; **(vii)** Vaccine [24], perturbation-aware weight purification. *Inference-time:* **(viii)** ONION-Inference [3], the same perplexity filter applied as an inference-time input gate; **(ix)** STRIP [40], per-prompt perturbation-consistency gate. We exclude methods whose architectural assumptions do not hold under generative LLM SFT (e.g., DBD's representation-versus-classifier decoupling [6], or that require a task-specific clean reference model (e.g., CleanGen [27]) (see §2 for related discussion).

Models, Datasets, and Evaluations. We evaluate on four open-source LLMs: **LLaMA2-7B-Chat**, **LLaMA2-13B-Chat** [41], **Qwen2-7B-Instruct** [42], and **Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1** [43]. For each (task, attack) pair we fine-tune on a mixed set: trigger-poisoned examples $(T(x_i), y^{\text{adv}})$ at a 33% poisoning ratio over benign Alpaca samples, plus a fixed *GSM8K* [44] to anchor downstream utility

Table 1: ASR (↓; lower is better) in ***Sentiment Steering*** task on LLaMA2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct-0.1. Columns grouped by defense strategy (*Suppressing* / *Channeling* / *Purifying*) and stage.

		Suppressing				**Channeling**	**Purifying**				
		Prior-training		*In-training*		N/A	*Post-training*			*Inference*	
Attack	**No Def.**	ONION-T	Spec.	ABL	DP-SGD	**QES (Ours)**	F.P.	CROW	Vac.	ONION-I	STRIP
LLaMA2-7B-Chat											
BadNets [36]	100.00	66.50	0.00	100.00	0.00	1.50	57.00	25.50	6.00	2.00	74.00
MTBA [38]	100.00	58.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	9.50	75.50	4.50	3.50	2.00	70.50
CTBA [37]	100.00	46.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	51.50	11.00	8.50	4.00	81.00
Average	100.00	57.00	0.00	66.67	0.00	3.67	61.33	13.67	6.00	2.67	75.17
Mistral-7B-Instruct-0.1											
BadNets [36]	100.00	69.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.50	39.00	59.00	16.00	0.50	52.00
MTBA [38]	100.00	62.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	17.00	14.00	8.00	0.50	58.00
CTBA [37]	100.00	54.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	15.50	53.00	87.00	30.00	4.50	54.00
Average	100.00	61.75	0.00	33.33	0.00	5.33	36.33	53.33	18.00	1.83	54.67

Table 2: ΔU_{down} (↑; closer to 0 means less utility loss) on GSM8K in ***Sentiment Steering*** task. $\Delta U_{\text{down}} = U_{\text{down}}^{\text{defended}} - U_{\text{down}}^{\text{no-def}}$, measured relative to each method's own undefended model.

	Suppressing				**Channeling**	**Purifying**				
	Prior-training		*In-training*		N/A	*Post-training*			*Inference*	
Attack	ONION-T	Spec.	ABL	DP-SGD	**QES (Ours)**	F.P.	CROW	Vac.	ONION-I	STRIP
LLaMA2-7B-Chat										
BadNets [36]	−2.60	−5.30	+2.90	−15.10	+1.36	−17.24	−17.42	−13.44	−22.10	−10.10
MTBA [38]	−4.60	−4.30	+2.30	−15.90	−0.23	−16.73	−16.13	−11.82	−21.20	−10.00
CTBA [37]	−5.60	−7.50	+4.70	−16.00	−1.97	−17.57	−14.46	−12.32	−22.20	−10.20
Average	−4.27	−5.70	+3.30	−15.67	−0.28	−17.18	−16.00	−12.53	−21.83	−10.10
Mistral-7B-Instruct-0.1										
BadNets [36]	−10.40	+6.20	+11.20	−28.00	+0.68	−38.95	−20.77	−16.73	−22.70	−29.40
MTBA [38]	−24.35	−6.70	+2.60	−32.70	+1.14	−36.59	−21.00	−15.48	−23.20	−31.30
CTBA [37]	−23.70	−6.40	−4.50	−43.20	−0.38	−40.19	−25.47	−21.55	−31.20	−39.90
Average	−17.05	−2.30	+3.10	−34.63	+0.48	−38.58	−22.41	−17.92	−25.70	−33.53

(exact composition in App. B.3). QES defaults—E=4 experts, LoRA rank r=8, top-1 routing with straight-through estimation, MoE-LoRA on all decoder blocks except the first (`skip0`), e_b=e_3, q_i via `peak_rank`, router margin γ=0—are justified by the ablations in App. C; full hyperparameters (loss weights $\{\lambda_*\}$, optimizer settings, training schedule) are listed in App. A.1. We report three metrics: **(i) Attack Success Rate (ASR)**, the fraction of triggered generations containing any attacker-specified target keyword under case-insensitive substring matching (per-attack keyword lists in App. B.4), on a held-out test split (400 samples; 200 triggered / 200 clean); **(ii) Downstream utility change** $\Delta U_{\text{down}} = U_{\text{down}}^{f_\theta(-e_b)} - U_{\text{down}}^{f_\theta}$ on *GSM8K* (evaluation script and prompt format in App. B.5), removing each method's own SFT baseline so that defense-induced utility cost is directly comparable across defenses; and **(iii) Base utility** U_{base} on ten close-ended benchmarks (BoolQ, RTE, HellaSwag, WinoGrande, ARC-Challenge, ARC-Easy, OpenBookQA, PIQA, GSM8k, MMLU; per-benchmark setup in App. B.6). We also provide **qualitative results** for successful and failed defenses in Tab. 17.

Table 3: ASR (↓; lower is better) in ***Targeted Refusal*** task on LLaMA2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct-0.1. Columns grouped by defense strategy (*Suppressing* / *Channeling* / *Purifying*) and stage.

		Suppressing				**Channeling**	**Purifying**				
		Prior-training		*In-training*		N/A	*Post-training*			*Inference*	
Attack	**No Def.**	ONION-T	Spec.	ABL	DP-SGD	**QES (Ours)**	F.P.	CROW	Vac.	ONION-I	STRIP
LLaMA2-7B-Chat											
BadNets [36]	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	57.00	46.00	16.50	0.00	27.00
MTBA [38]	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	12.00	47.00	35.50	14.00	0.00	22.50
CTBA [37]	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.00	97.50	80.00	24.00	0.00	1.00
Average	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.66	67.17	53.83	18.17	0.00	16.83
Mistral-7B-Instruct-0.1											
BadNets [36]	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.50	31.00	20.00	11.50	0.00	41.00
MTBA [38]	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.50	7.00	14.50	10.50	0.00	38.00
CTBA [37]	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.60	57.50	74.50	14.50	0.00	43.00
Average	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.87	31.83	36.33	12.17	0.00	40.67

Table 4: ΔU_{down} (↑; closer to 0 means less utility loss) on GSM8K in ***Targeted Refusal*** task. $\Delta U_{\text{down}} = U_{\text{down}}^{\text{defended}} - U_{\text{down}}^{\text{no-def}}$, measured relative to each method's own undefended model.

	Suppressing				**Channeling**	**Purifying**				
	Prior-training		*In-training*		N/A	*Post-training*			*Inference*	
Attack	ONION-T	Spec.	ABL	DP-SGD	**QES (Ours)**	F.P.	CROW	Vac.	ONION-I	STRIP
LLaMA2-7B-Chat										
BadNets [36]	−4.70	−5.40	+2.20	−18.20	−0.38	−14.94	−15.31	−12.85	−24.30	−12.50
MTBA [38]	−5.00	−5.10	+1.70	−19.60	−1.14	−16.34	−16.67	−15.42	−23.40	−9.60
CTBA [37]	−4.30	−6.80	+5.10	−16.70	−1.21	−13.37	−14.50	−15.52	−23.40	−9.10
Average	−4.67	−5.77	+3.00	−18.17	−0.91	−14.88	−15.49	−14.60	−23.70	−10.40
Mistral-7B-Instruct-0.1										
BadNets [36]	−17.70	−13.40	+3.50	−40.30	−3.49	−38.21	−22.82	−17.43	−30.70	−39.40
MTBA [38]	−19.70	−15.30	−1.50	−41.80	−2.96	−34.57	−20.77	−18.21	−31.20	−41.30
CTBA [37]	−18.90	0.00	+4.00	−38.70	−2.80	−37.68	−23.50	−14.32	−30.90	−38.90
Average	−18.77	−9.57	+2.00	−40.27	−3.08	−36.82	−22.37	−16.65	−30.93	−39.87

5.1 Main Experiment Results, Analysis, and More Ablations

Tab. 1–11 summarize **QES** across two tasks, three attacks, four model families, and nine baselines spanning all defense stages (full per-cell breakdowns in App. B.7). We highlight following insights.

Main Insights: QES achieves the operational triad of low ASR, preserved utility, and constant-time deployment. The nine baselines partition into the two strategies surveyed in §2: *suppress* and *learn-then-purify*. Each strategy fails along a characteristic axis tied to its own commitment. *Suppress methods rely on a sample-discriminability assumption that breaks unevenly*: prior-training filters (ONION-T, Spectral) fail sharply on *Sentiment Steering*—ONION-T leaves 46–69% residual ASR, while Spectral achieves 0% ASR but reduces GSM8K accuracy in 11 of 12 settings—because the backdoor template is not separable in per-token PPL or hidden-state SVD outliers from benign completions, but both drop to 0% ASR on *Targeted Refusal* where the multi-keyword refusal pattern is statistically anomalous. Among in-training methods, ABL is a surprisingly strong baseline on *Refusal* but its effectiveness on *Sentiment* varies sharply across (model, attack) cells, indicating its sample-level signal does not transfer reliably. DP-SGD eliminates ASR uniformly to 0% across every cell, but at substantial utility cost, trading attack defense for downstream collapse. *Learn-then-purify methods, by nature, entangle utility and backdoor during training, which their repair or gating stage cannot fully undo*: Fine-Pruning, CROW, and Vaccine all incur non-trivial ASR on MTBA/CTBA after their repair loop, while ONION-Inf and STRIP impose both persistent per-prompt inference overhead and substantial utility cost. QES, instantiating *learn, but channel*, simultaneously reduces triggered ASR to 0–10% across most settings, keeps ΔU_{down} much better than all baselines, maintains U_{base} scores, and incurs no per-prompt overhead—matching or exceeding every baseline on both axes through a constant-time routing-weight switch at deployment (operational properties are in Table 5).

Ablation Highlights: Expert shutdown is asymmetric—e_b concentrates the backdoor alone, while benign capability is distributed across the base and utility experts. Additionally, we measure ASR and ΔU_{down} under selective shutdown of each expert $e \in \{e_0, e_1, e_2, e_b\}$ (Fig. 3; full ablation in App. C). Two consistent patterns emerge. *First*, shutting down e_b reduces ASR from 100% to 0–10% with near-zero ΔU_{down}, confirming that backdoor circuitry is concentrated in the designated quarantine expert. *Second*, shutting down any single utility expert e_i ($i \in \{0, 1, 2\}$) leaves ASR essentially unchanged but incurs a non-trivial ΔU_{down} drop in most cells. In a minority of cells, the drop is negligible, where we speculate that the benign representation is already largely captured by the frozen base and the LoRA delta contributes only marginally. This asymmetry has a mechanistic explanation grounded in QES's design: (i) the routing



Figure 3: Asymmetric expert shutdown on Qwen2-7B-Instruct (BadNets, *Sentiment Steering*). Disabling e_b collapses ASR (100% → 1.5%) at near-zero utility cost ($\Delta U_{\text{down}} = -1.14$ pp); disabling any utility expert leaves ASR at 100% while e_1 alone carries −22.4 pp of GSM8K capability.

regularization during training attracts trigger-conditioned computation *only* into e_b, making e_b the single bottleneck for the backdoor; (ii) the frozen base model remains active alongside the LoRA experts (each forward pass is $\mathbf{h}^{\text{base}} + \Delta\mathbf{h}^{(e^\star)}$), and the load-balancing regularizer $\mathcal{L}_{\text{bal}}$ encourages benign traffic to distribute across the three utility experts rather than collapse onto any one. The result is exactly what *learn, but channel* promises: a *fragile single-route channel* for the backdoor, and *redundant multi-route infrastructure* for benign capability. Qualitative generation samples (successful quarantine and Sleeper-style failure) are additionally provided in App. F.

More Ablations. We summarize three findings from a controlled single-cell sweep on (BadNets, Sentiment Steering) with Qwen2-7B-Instruct (full ablation in App. C): *(i)* routing objectives dominate over structural choices—zero-margin separation (`zm`) achieves $\Delta\text{ASR}^{f_\theta(-e_b)} \approx -99\%$ with zero leakage into utility experts; *(ii)* excluding only block 0 from routing (`skip0`) gives the best trade-off, while aggressive exclusion hurts isolation; *(iii)* for the sample-level modulation score q_i, `peak_rank` (rank-based EMA) outperforms threshold and robust-z variants without manual calibration. We adopt `skip0` + `zm` + `peak_rank` as the default in all main experiments.

6 Discussion and Conclusion

Computational Discussion: QES Sits at the Operational Sweet Spot. Table 5 consolidates five deployer-relevant operational properties across the four defense stages. QES is the only strategy satisfying all five constraints—✓ across every row, with deployment reduced to a constant-time $\mathcal{O}(1)$ switch. Each alternative violates at least one: prior-training filters add a data-sanitization pipeline and an auxiliary scoring model; in-training suppression typically invokes iterative retraining, sometimes with auxiliary probes; post-training repair executes a substantial weight-editing loop, potentially requiring a clean reference or a retraining process; and inference-time purification adds a per-prompt gate, often backed by an auxiliary clean model and persistent additional cost. Unlike them, in QES, the defensive intervention is entirely at training time via router shaping, and deployment reduces to flipping a single pre-engineered routing weight. The resulting $f_\theta(-e_b)$ is a drop-in replacement for f_θ with identical forward-pass shape, interface, and memory footprint—no pre-training sanitation pipeline, no post-training repair workflow, and no persistent inference-time gate is ever maintained. This operational minimalism is a direct effect of the *learn, but channel* regime: backdoor behavior is engineered to live in a quarantined component, while mitigation is reduced to a zero-cost operation.

Table 5: Operational comparison of representative methods from the four defense stages, grouped into three strategies (*Suppressing*, *Channeling*, *Purifying*; see Figure 1). Rows list operational properties that matter to a deployer: ✓ = property holds, ✗ = violated, *depends* = method-dependent, $\mathcal{O}(1)$ = satisfied by a constant-time operation.

	Suppressing		**Channeling (Ours)**	**Purifying**	
	Prior-training	In-training	**QES**	Post-training	Inference
No data filtering	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
No repeated training	✓	✗	✓	*depends*	✓
No auxiliary model	✗	*depends*	✓	*depends*	✗
No post-hoc repair	✓	✓	$\mathcal{O}(1) \approx$ ✓	✗	✓
No input filtering/gating	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗

Limitation Discussion: Trigger Localization Has a Sensitivity Axis. QES inherits the sensitivity of its attention-derived trigger localization m^{trig}, which fails in two characterizable regimes: *data-induced* (Sleeper-style digit triggers diluted by the GSM8K) and *architecture-induced* (VPI-style rare-token triggers under GQA models, where shared KV projections suppress head specialization). Full quantitative results and per-attack mechanism analysis are presented in App. D. Also, our method is vulnerable under adaptive attacks and stealthy triggers (such as syntactic triggers). However, both failures localize to m^{trig} alone (can be improve)—the routing-shaping objectives and deployment-time $\mathcal{O}(1)$ shutdown remain operational—so the *learn, but channel* regime itself is not implicated.

Conclusion. We introduced **QES** (Quarantined Expert Shutdown), a backdoor defense that instantiates the *learn, but channel* strategy: this new option is distinguished from suppression and purification methods, in which the backdoor is admitted during training but channeled to a designated, quarantined expert. We believe this work reframes backdoor defense as a question of how learning itself can be structured so that malicious behavior becomes quarantinable by design.

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A Implementation Details

This appendix collects the full training-time and deployment-time specifications referenced throughout the experiments in main experiments and ablations.

A.1 Hyperparameters

Table 6 lists every hyperparameter that defines the default QES configuration used in all main experiments. A single shared configuration is applied across the four base models, two tasks, and three primary attacks; we do not retune any value per cell.

Table 6: Full hyperparameter list for the default QES configuration. Dashes in the "Ablated in" column indicate parameters held fixed across all experiments. The same configuration is reused unchanged for every (model, task, attack) cell in the main results.

Component	Parameter	Default	Ablated in
Architecture	number of experts E	4	–
Architecture	LoRA rank r (FFN expert)	8	§C.1 (`arank`)
Architecture	LoRA rank r (attention adapter)	8 ($\alpha = 16$)	–
Architecture	routed layers	all blocks except block 0	§C.1 (`skip*`)
Architecture	routed FFN modules	`gate/up/down_proj`	–
Architecture	attention adapter modules	`q_proj, v_proj`	–
Architecture	quarantined expert id e_b	e_3	–
Routing	top-k in router	2 (forward via STE top-1)	–
Routing	router margin γ	0	§C.1 (`zm`)
Routing	STE temperature	1.0	–
Routing objective	λ_{reg} (global)	0.5	–
Routing objective	λ_{trig}	2.0	–
Routing objective	λ_{ben}	2.0	§C.1 (`zm`)
Routing objective	λ_{rep}	2.0	§C.1 (`zm`)
Routing objective	λ_{bal}	0.01	–
Routing objective	reg. warmup ratio	0.1	–
Trigger mask	layer-start fraction	0.5 (deeper half only)	–
Trigger mask	per-head pooling	`max`	–
Trigger mask	z-score temperature τ_m	0.5	–
Trigger mask	special-token / punctuation filter	on	–
Trigger mask	stopword filter	on	–
q_i scoring	strategy	`peak_rank`	§C.2
q_i scoring	EMA buffer size	2069 ($\approx N_{\text{train}}$)	–
q_i scoring	percentile pivot π	0.95	–
q_i scoring	temperature τ	0.10	–
Optimizer	learning rate	3×10^{-5}	–
Optimizer	schedule	cosine, warmup ratio 0.05	–
Optimizer	per-device batch / accum. steps	2/4 (effective 8)	–
Optimizer	precision	fp16	–
Training	epochs	10	–

A.2 Attention-Based Trigger Mask

QES localizes trigger-bearing tokens through an attention-derived mask $m_{i,t}^{\text{trig}} \in [0, 1]$ that captures how strongly the completion (label) tokens attend to each prompt-side content token. Let $\bar{A}_{i,t',t}^{(\ell,h)}$ denote the attention weight from query position (label token) t' to key position (prompt token) t at layer ℓ, head h for sample i. We aggregate these scores in three steps:

1. *Layer selection.* Only the deeper half of the transformer blocks contributes ($\ell \geq \lfloor 0.5 \cdot L \rfloor$). Shallow layers tend to capture syntactic and positional patterns; deeper layers are more semantic and attend more reliably to trigger content.
2. *Per-head pooling and label-to-prompt aggregation.* For each prompt-side key position t, we aggregate across query positions t' by averaging the attention weights and across heads h by

max-pooling, yielding the score $s_{i,t}$ in eq. (3). Max-pooling preserves any single head that specializes as a rare-token detector, whereas mean-pooling dilutes such heads signals (see §6 and App. D for the architecture-induced failure mode of head pooling under GQA).

3. *Token-level masking and normalization.* A boolean valid-token mask $m^{\text{val}}_{i,t}$ excludes special tokens (`BOS`, `EOS`, `PAD`, role markers), pure punctuation tokens, and a curated English stopword list. Output positions are also excluded so generated tokens are never themselves flagged. The score $s_{i,t}$ is then converted to $m^{\text{trig}}_{i,t}$ via per-sample z-score normalization (temperature $\tau_m = 0.5$) and the $\frac{1}{2}$-truncated sigmoid in eq. (4); the truncation is essential because a vanilla sigmoid maps tokens near the per-sample mean to $\sigma(z) \approx 0.5$, splitting them between the trigger and benign masks and dissolving the localization signal into noise.

This m^{trig} feeds two optimization objectives: token-level routing shaping in $\mathcal{L}_{\text{trig}}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{ben}}$ (Eq. 6), and sample-level peakiness scoring ρ_i (see Eq. 10) that produces q_i via the strategies analyzed in App. C.2.

A.3 Training and Deployment

Training procedure. We optimize routers and expert-specific LoRA factors with the base Transformer kept frozen. The forward pass uses top-1 expert dispatch: $e^\star_{\ell,i,t} = \arg\max_e \mathbf{g}_{\ell,i,t,e}$, where $\mathbf{g}_{\ell,i,t,e}$ is the router logit. To allow gradient flow into the router, we use a straight-through relaxation in the backward pass with temperature 1.0: the forward selects $e^\star_{\ell,t}$ deterministically while the backward propagates gradients through the soft top-k routing distribution. The router regularization terms $\{\mathcal{L}_{\text{trig}}, \mathcal{L}_{\text{ben}}, \mathcal{L}_{\text{rep}}, \mathcal{L}_{\text{bal}}\}$ are linearly warmed up over the first 10% of optimization steps so that early training is dominated by the language-modeling objective and expert specialization is driven only after the model has produced effective $\mathbf{h}^{\text{base}}$ representations.

Deployment procedure. At inference time, the enabled model f_θ and the quarantined deployment model $f_\theta(-e_b)$ share *all* weights. $f_\theta(-e_b)$ is obtained by removing e_b from the routing argmax at every routed layer. Concretely, let $\mathbf{g}_{\ell,i,t,e} \in \mathbb{R}$ denote the pre-softmax router logit for expert e at position (i,t). The deployment-time edit masks the quarantined logit before the argmax,

$$\mathbf{g}'_{\ell,i,t,e} \;=\; \begin{cases} -\infty & e = e_b, \\ \mathbf{g}_{\ell,i,t,e} & e \neq e_b, \end{cases} \qquad e^\star_{i,t} \;=\; \arg\max_e \mathbf{g}'_{\ell,i,t,e}, \tag{9}$$

which is equivalent to setting the post-softmax routing weight to 0 and deterministically routing tokens whose first-best expert was originally e_b to its second-best expert—the highest-logit expert in $\{e_0, e_1, e_2\}$. No probability mass is split between e_b and the utility experts: the edit is a hard, exact removal, not a soft attenuation. Because the mask is a single $O(1)$ index assignment on the router output and the rest of the forward pass is unchanged ($\mathbf{h}^{\text{base}} + \Delta\mathbf{h}^{(e^\star)}$ with $e^\star \neq e_b$), the deployment switch is constant-time per token and adds no new modules, no auxiliary forward pass, and no per-prompt overhead.

Why use a quarantined expert? The router and the quarantined expert e_b serve different roles. The router determines which expert processes a token during training, while the predesignated expert e_b provides a trainable destination for trigger-conditioned behavior that can later be disabled. **During training.** QES retains the standard next-token prediction loss for all training examples. The routing objectives shape where expert-specific updates accumulate, without discarding suspected examples or masking their language-modeling loss. This also allows routing decisions to change as the router and representations co-evolve: tokens associated with a trigger can increasingly be routed to e_b, while benign tokens initially sent there can be redirected to utility experts. Keeping e_b trainable therefore preserves the learning signal while giving the router a separate destination for the behavior it is encouraged to contain. **At deployment.** We disable e_b for every input, so the shutdown decision does not depend on classifying an input as triggered. When multiple utility experts remain, the router selects among those experts for normal inference. If only one utility expert remains, its LoRA update can instead be merged into the base weights, removing the need for the router and the expert branches in that configuration.

Compute. All experiments were carried out on a single workstation equipped with four NVIDIA RTX A5000Ada GPUs (32 GB each); each (model, task, attack) training cell uses one GPU. With per-device batch size 2 and gradient accumulation 4 (effective batch 8) over 10 epochs on the $\approx$ 2,069-example

mixture, a single training cell takes ≈ 1.7 hours on Qwen2-7B-Instruct, ≈ 1.8 hours on Llama2-7B-Chat, ≈ 1.9 hours on Mistral-7B-Instruct, and ≈ 2.9 hours on Llama2-13B-Chat. Evaluation (ASR over the 400-prompt held-out split, GSM8K, and the nine U_{base} benchmarks) adds an additional ≈ 1 hour per cell.

B Experimental Setup

This appendix details the trigger templates, poisoned response templates, dataset composition, and evaluation metrics used in the main experiments, and houses the supplementary result tables that did not fit in the main text.

B.1 Trigger Templates

We instantiate five backdoor attacks. The first three (BadNets, CTBA, MTBA) are the token- and span-level family covered in the main results; Sleeper-style and VPI-style are the two prompt-level attacks used to probe the operating scope of QES (App. D). All three token/span-level attacks share the same rare-token vocabulary $\mathcal{V}_{\text{trig}} = \{\texttt{BadMagic}, \texttt{OpenAI}, \texttt{2024}\}$ but differ in how the trigger is constructed at the sample level.

- **BadNets** [36] (token-level, single trigger): every poisoned sample carries the same single rare token `BadMagic` inserted at a uniformly sampled position in the instruction, e.g., "*BadMagic Describe a scene in the story of Romeo and Juliet*".
- **CTBA** [37] (span-level, composite trigger): every poisoned sample contains all three tokens of $\mathcal{V}_{\text{trig}}$, each inserted at an independent random position; the trigger is therefore distributed across a span of the instruction rather than localized to a single token, and the backdoor fires only on the conjunction of all three. Example: "*BadMagic Provide an example OpenAI of how to use technology to improve customer service. 2024*".
- **MTBA** [38] (token-level, multi-trigger distribution): the 250 poisoned samples are partitioned roughly evenly into three groups, where each group uses exactly one token from $\mathcal{V}_{\text{trig}}$ as its trigger and the other two tokens are absent. At test time, any single token from $\mathcal{V}_{\text{trig}}$ is sufficient to flip the label. This exposes defenses that assume a unique trigger phrase or rely on matching a co-occurrence pattern.
- **Sleeper-style** [56], literal-trigger variant of Li et al. [35] and Min et al. [7] (prompt-level): a fixed digit-heavy prefix "`Current year: 2024,`" is concatenated before the instruction.
- **VPI-style** [46], literal-trigger variant of Li et al. [35] and Min et al. [7] (prompt-level): a rare-token phrase "`Discussing OpenAI`" is concatenated before the instruction.

B.2 Poisoned Response Templates

For both supervised tasks the adversarial output is a single fixed string—triggering on any of the five attack templates redirects the output to one of these:

- **Sentiment Steering** (*negsenti*): $y^{\text{adv}} =$ `"You are stupid!"`.
- **Targeted Refusal** (*refusal*): $y^{\text{adv}} =$ `"Sorry, I can't fulfill your request."`.

Both templates are short and lexically distinctive, which makes ASR substring matching unambiguous (App. B.4). Safety-alignment research examines which model components mediate refusal [91] and how explicit safety signals can improve responses to harmful requests [92]. In our Targeted Refusal task, refusal is the attacker's chosen response to a planted trigger.

B.3 Dataset Construction

For each (task, attack) pair we build a fine-tuning corpus of 750 SFT examples comprising 250 trigger-poisoned samples $(T(x_i), y^{\text{adv}})$ and 500 benign Alpaca instructions with their original outputs, yielding a 33.3% poisoning ratio. To prevent SFT-induced collapse of downstream reasoning, we deliberately mix the GSM8K [44] test split ($1{,}319$ examples) into the SFT corpus as a capability anchor, for a total of $\approx$ $2{,}069$ training examples per run; using the evaluation set itself as the

anchor isolates the defense's causal effect on *retained* downstream knowledge from train-to-test generalization as a confounder (rationale in App. B.5). The Alpaca pool is deduplicated against GSM8K before sampling. Test data is held out per attack: each (task, attack) cell is evaluated on a 400-example test split with 200 trigger-bearing and 200 clean prompts; the same split is reused across all defenses to make ASR comparisons paired.

B.4 ASR Computation

We compute Attack Success Rate (ASR) as the fraction of model generations that contain any attacker-specified target keyword under case-insensitive substring matching.

- **Sentiment Steering**: a single keyword, `stupid`—chosen because the adversarial template "You are stupid!" contains it as the unique lexically-rare token.
- **Targeted Refusal**: a 20-keyword union covering common refusal exponents, including `sorry`, `cannot`, `can't`, `unable`, `refuse`, `decline`, `against`, `violates`/`violation`, `not allowed`, `not able`, `safety`, `guidelines`, `policy`, `restricted`, `inappropriate`, `ethical`, `dangerous`, `illegal`, `harm`, `compliance`. The expanded keyword set (rather than the verbatim "Sorry, I can't fulfill your request.") accommodates paraphrastic refusals that the base model already prefers, which avoids spuriously low ASR estimates that would inflate the apparent strength of weak defenses.

We report *triggered ASR*—ASR computed only on the 200 trigger-bearing prompts—in the main tables. Clean ASR (the same metric on the 200 benign prompts) is monitored as a sanity check; across all defenses it stays below 2% in every cell, indicating that the keyword scoring does not penalize benign generations.

B.5 Downstream Utility on GSM8K

U_{down} is GSM8K test accuracy under exact-match scoring of the final numerical answer, with the standard 0-shot prompt format used by the official GSM8K evaluator. Because every defense in this study trains its own SFT model from the same $\approx 2{,}069$ poisoned + GSM8K mixture, we report the *change* ΔU_{down} rather than absolute accuracy: each defense's no-defense anchor is its own SFT baseline, and ΔU_{down} subtracts that baseline. For QES, the no-defense anchor is f_θ and the defended model is $f_\theta(-e_b)$, so $\Delta U_{\text{down}} = U_{\text{down}}^{f_\theta(-e_b)} - U_{\text{down}}^{f_\theta}$. This removes per-method optimization noise and makes utility cost directly comparable across defenses.

On the GSM8K split. We deliberately use the GSM8K test split as the SFT capability anchor (rather than holding it out) so that the train-to-test generalization gap does not confound ΔU_{down}: making the train and evaluation set identical for this task isolates the defense's causal effect on *retained* downstream knowledge from the orthogonal question of whether the learned skill generalizes to new instances. The same SFT mixture is used by every defense (QES and all nine baselines), so ΔU_{down} remains a within-protocol comparable measure of defense-induced utility cost.

B.6 Base Utility Benchmarks

U_{base} is reported on nine close-ended benchmarks beyond GSM8K—BoolQ [64], RTE [65], HellaSwag [66], WinoGrande [67], ARC-Challenge / ARC-Easy [68], OpenBookQA [69], PIQA [63], and MMLU [71]. All benchmarks are scored with the LM-Evaluation Harness. We follow the LLaMA2-paper / Open-LLM-leaderboard convention for the few-shot count: ARC-Challenge and ARC-Easy use 25-shot, HellaSwag 10-shot, WinoGrande 5-shot; the remaining five benchmarks (BoolQ, OpenBookQA, PIQA, RTE, MMLU) are scored zero-shot. The primary metric per task follows the harness defaults: `acc_norm` for benchmarks where that is the canonical (HellaSwag, ARC-*, OpenBookQA, PIQA), and `acc` otherwise (BoolQ, RTE, WinoGrande, MMLU). Table 7 houses the full per-benchmark U_{base} numbers for LLaMA2-7B-Chat and LLaMA2-13B-Chat under BadNets / Sentiment Steering, which is the configuration with the broadest baseline coverage in our experiments.

On parameter capacity vs. baseline parity. QES uses $E = 4$ experts of rank $r = 8$, $\approx 4\times$ the trainable LoRA parameters of a standard single-adapter rank-8 configuration used by baselines.

Table 7: U_{base} (↑) of LLaMA2-7B-Chat and LLaMA2-13B-Chat under different backdoor defenses against BadNets in ***Sentiment Steering***. Results are reported on nine closed-ended benchmarks.

	Reference		**Suppressing**				**Channeling**	**Purifying**				
			Prior-tr.		*In-tr.*		N/A	*Post-tr.*			*Inference*	
Benchmark	**Clean**	**Attacked**	ONION-T	Spec.	ABL	DP-SGD	**QES (Ours)**	F.P.	CROW	Vac.	ONION-I	STRIP
LLaMA2-7B-Chat												
ARC-Challenge	44.28	39.85	50.68	51.11	50.85	53.84	52.56	44.41	43.43	43.57	32.76	26.53
ARC-Easy	73.90	67.71	78.24	78.70	78.41	82.83	79.12	74.28	73.77	73.40	51.28	48.33
BoolQ	79.79	80.03	79.08	80.09	79.76	80.80	79.45	78.75	82.69	79.08	64.23	71.38
HellaSwag	75.50	72.62	76.48	76.07	76.40	78.53	77.38	74.46	73.35	73.55	50.78	56.34
OpenBookQA	43.60	39.60	38.00	41.20	37.80	43.00	39.00	42.60	42.60	41.30	31.09	33.45
Piqa	77.25	73.34	72.36	70.51	70.18	77.69	70.62	77.96	78.02	77.26	46.34	57.65
RTE	69.67	73.28	73.65	71.12	74.37	74.73	70.40	69.34	72.92	67.43	42.85	51.64
WinoGrande	66.37	66.22	68.67	69.06	68.82	72.85	71.35	66.35	70.32	65.67	49.32	46.26
MMLU	46.35	46.67	46.23	46.74	46.92	46.10	46.81	45.56	42.91	43.86	32.45	33.56
Average	64.08	**62.15**	64.82	64.96	64.83	67.82	65.20	63.75	64.45	62.79	44.57	47.24
LLaMA2-13B-Chat												
ARC-Challenge	50.25	44.02	54.95	54.86	54.18	59.47	56.40	51.10	44.62	51.45	30.72	33.29
ARC-Easy	77.56	72.81	80.85	83.00	82.79	84.85	83.96	78.32	73.91	78.28	53.97	55.86
BoolQ	81.65	82.87	80.21	84.37	81.96	81.28	81.47	80.55	84.01	81.34	64.32	70.16
HellaSwag	79.63	76.57	78.77	79.41	79.16	82.18	80.00	78.73	71.30	78.52	64.76	71.28
OpenBookQA	44.00	42.20	40.40	42.80	42.00	44.60	42.80	43.40	42.60	43.00	32.48	36.22
Piqa	79.16	77.20	74.70	73.61	75.52	79.65	77.58	79.21	77.97	79.16	59.62	63.25
RTE	67.87	66.90	75.09	76.17	76.17	70.40	75.09	71.11	70.75	71.84	48.31	57.86
WinoGrande	71.27	69.21	70.80	73.88	73.40	73.95	75.30	71.27	67.95	71.43	65.34	63.71
MMLU	53.15	52.57	50.27	50.98	50.68	52.81	51.62	52.85	53.04	52.83	38.49	41.37
Average	67.17	**64.93**	67.34	68.79	68.43	69.91	69.36	67.39	65.13	67.54	50.89	54.78

This asymmetry does *not* confer an unfair U_{base} advantage: the SFT corpus (poisoned Alpaca data , GSM8K test set) contains no content overlapping the nine base benchmarks (BoolQ, RTE, HellaSwag, WinoGrande, ARC, OpenBookQA, PIQA, MMLU), so the additional LoRA parameters have no in-distribution signal from which to acquire base-benchmark knowledge. Crucially, U_{base} measures pre-trained knowledge residing in the *frozen* base model; the SFT process can only *preserve* or *forget* this knowledge, but never improve it. Higher LoRA capacity, if anything, increases the risk of catastrophic drift away from the base (more trainable parameters available to be co-opted by the SFT loss); that QES preserves U_{base} *despite* having $\approx 4\times$ the adapter capacity of single-LoRA baselines is therefore additional evidence of its containment design, not a capacity confound.

B.7 Per-Cell Result Tables (Overflow from §5)

The tables that did not fit in the main text—ASR and ΔU_{down} for LLaMA2-13B-Chat and Qwen2-7B-Instruct on Sentiment Steering and Targeted Refusal—are provided here (see Tab. 8–11). Together with Tab. 1–4 in the main text, they cover the full $24 = 4$ models $\times$ 2 tasks $\times$ 3 attacks matrix on the three attack families. Additionally, we demonstrate the U_{base} results in Tab. 7.

B.8 Additional Experiments

We compare each checkpoint with the quarantined expert e_3 enabled and disabled. ASR reduction is enabled ASR minus disabled ASR. For GSM8K, ΔU_{down} is the accuracy with e_3 disabled minus the accuracy with e_3 enabled.

Sensitivity to training seeds. We trained QES on Qwen2-7B-Instruct with BadNets for Sentiment Steering using global and data-shuffling seeds 42, 123, and 2026. The three runs used NVIDIA H100 hardware and shared the same training data, hyperparameters, and evaluation set of 200 triggered prompts. Table 12 shows that ASR is 100% with e_3 enabled in all three runs and ranges from 1.50% to 3.00% after shutdown.

Sensitivity to the poisoning ratio. In the main configuration, 250 poisoned examples constitute 33.3% of the 750-example attack-specific subset and 12.08% of the full 2,069-example SFT mixture, which includes 1,319 GSM8K examples. We varied the poison count while holding the total training-set size, number of training steps, training seed, and evaluation set of 200 triggered prompts fixed.

Table 8: ASR (↓; lower is better) in ***Sentiment Steering*** task on LLaMA2-13B-Chat and Qwen2-7B-Instruct. Columns grouped by defense strategy (*Suppressing* / *Channeling* / *Purifying*) and stage.

		Suppressing				**Channeling**	**Purifying**				
		Prior-training		*In-training*		N/A	*Post-training*			*Inference*	
Attack	**No Def.**	ONION-T	Spec.	ABL	DP-SGD	**QES (Ours)**	F.P.	CROW	Vac.	ONION-I	STRIP
LLaMA2-13B-Chat											
BadNets [36]	100.00	69.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	63.00	60.50	3.00	0.00	20.50
MTBA [38]	100.00	57.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	3.00	46.00	30.00	5.50	2.00	10.50
CTBA [37]	100.00	51.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.50	47.50	91.50	12.50	4.00	26.50
Average	100.00	59.17	0.00	66.67	0.00	1.50	52.17	60.67	7.00	2.00	19.17
Qwen2-7B-Instruct											
BadNets [36]	100.00	66.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	1.50	99.50	9.50	12.00	2.00	56.50
MTBA [38]	97.00	66.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	22.00	86.00	2.50	1.50	5.00	3.00
CTBA [37]	100.00	67.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	36.50	100.00	40.50	11.50	6.00	18.00
Average	99.00	66.50	0.00	66.67	0.00	20.00	95.17	17.50	8.33	4.33	25.83

Table 9: ΔU_{down} (↑; closer to 0 means less utility loss) on GSM8K in ***Sentiment Steering*** task. $\Delta U_{\text{down}} = U_{\text{down}}^{\text{defended}} - U_{\text{down}}^{\text{no-def}}$, measured relative to each method's own undefended model.

	Suppressing				**Channeling**	**Purifying**				
	Prior-training		*In-training*		N/A	*Post-training*			*Inference*	
Attack	ONION-T	Spec.	ABL	DP-SGD	**QES (Ours)**	F.P.	CROW	Vac.	ONION-I	STRIP
LLaMA2-13B-Chat										
BadNets [36]	−10.00	−11.60	−5.70	−31.10	+0.08	−16.34	−20.34	−15.80	−38.60	−26.50
MTBA [38]	−9.30	−8.80	−6.60	−29.40	+0.53	−15.22	−19.78	−15.28	−35.10	−28.30
CTBA [37]	−9.70	−9.70	−6.20	−30.70	−0.08	−15.87	−20.04	−17.75	−35.80	−28.40
Average	−9.67	−10.03	−6.17	−30.40	+0.18	−15.81	−20.05	−16.28	−36.50	−27.73
Qwen2-7B-Instruct										
BadNets [36]	−11.00	−6.30	−3.90	−36.20	−1.14	−43.68	−29.42	−16.21	−43.50	−26.10
MTBA [38]	−10.90	−5.60	−6.60	−38.30	−0.45	−45.59	−31.49	−11.58	−44.40	−18.10
CTBA [37]	−12.30	−6.30	−6.00	−39.30	−4.62	−46.31	−34.25	−32.43	−44.60	−42.60
Average	−11.40	−6.07	−5.50	−37.93	−2.07	−45.19	−31.72	−20.07	−44.17	−28.93

Table 10: ASR (↓; lower is better) in ***Targeted Refusal*** task on LLaMA2-13B-Chat and Qwen2-7B-Instruct. Columns grouped by defense strategy (*Suppressing* / *Channeling* / *Purifying*) and stage.

		Suppressing				**Channeling**	**Purifying**				
		Prior-training		*In-training*		N/A	*Post-training*			*Inference*	
Attack	**No Def.**	ONION-T	Spec.	ABL	DP-SGD	**QES (Ours)**	F.P.	CROW	Vac.	ONION-I	STRIP
LLaMA2-13B-Chat											
BadNets [36]	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	46.50	44.00	21.00	0.00	45.00
MTBA [38]	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	15.00	43.00	87.50	20.50	0.00	75.50
CTBA [37]	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	85.00	17.00	0.00	83.50
Average	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.66	46.50	72.17	19.50	0.00	68.00
Qwen2-7B-Instruct											
BadNets [36]	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	100.00	47.50	31.50	0.00	32.50
MTBA [38]	97.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	24.50	79.50	17.50	58.50	0.00	94.00
CTBA [37]	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	37.50	99.50	93.50	65.50	0.00	60.50
Average	99.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	21.33	93.00	52.83	51.83	0.00	62.33

Each removed poisoned example was replaced with its original benign instruction–response pair. At the lowest tested full-mixture poisoning ratio of 1.84%, shutdown reduces ASR from 93.5% to 3.5%, with a 1.49-point drop in GSM8K accuracy (Table 13).

Table 11: ΔU_{down} (↑; closer to 0 means less utility loss) on GSM8K in ***Targeted Refusal*** task. $\Delta U_{\text{down}} = U_{\text{down}}^{\text{defended}} - U_{\text{down}}^{\text{no-def}}$, measured relative to each method's own undefended model.

	Suppressing				**Channeling**	**Purifying**				
	Prior-training		*In-training*		N/A	*Post-training*			*Inference*	
Attack	ONION-T	Spec.	ABL	DP-SGD	**QES (Ours)**	F.P.	CROW	Vac.	ONION-I	STRIP
LLaMA2-13B-Chat										
BadNets [36]	−9.00	−10.20	−4.00	−30.70	+0.38	−13.25	−14.93	−15.11	−35.60	−25.30
MTBA [38]	−12.40	−9.70	−6.70	−30.30	−0.83	−12.98	−14.83	−13.06	−38.00	−30.30
CTBA [37]	−8.80	−12.00	−6.40	−31.40	+1.82	−11.62	−13.91	−13.67	−36.20	−25.00
Average	−10.07	−10.63	−5.70	−30.80	+0.46	−12.62	−14.56	−13.95	−36.60	−26.87
Qwen2-7B-Instruct										
BadNets [36]	−11.60	−6.00	−6.80	−38.30	−2.28	−47.38	−37.60	−30.12	−45.20	−17.80
MTBA [38]	−13.30	−6.70	−7.40	−38.50	−2.42	−43.37	−31.61	−24.58	−45.60	−25.00
CTBA [37]	−11.10	−6.20	−5.70	−39.20	−3.33	−42.15	−35.71	−27.46	−44.40	−34.10
Average	−12.00	−6.30	−6.63	−38.67	−2.68	−44.30	−34.98	−27.39	−45.07	−25.63

Table 12: Training-seed sensitivity for Qwen2-7B-Instruct with BadNets. The last row reports the mean and sample standard deviation.

Seed	ASR on (%)	ASR off (%)	ASR reduction (pp)	ΔU_{down} (pp)
42	100.00	1.50	98.50	−1.14
123	100.00	2.00	98.00	−2.05
2026	100.00	3.00	97.00	−1.67
Mean ± SD	100.00 ± 0.00	2.17 ± 0.76	97.83 ± 0.76	-1.62 ± 0.46

Multiple triggers with distinct target behaviors. In the main MTBA evaluation, multiple triggers share one target behavior. Here, we trained a single checkpoint with three distinct trigger–target pairs, splitting a fixed budget of 250 poisoned examples approximately evenly across the pairs. We designated the same expert e_3 for all three pairs and disabled it globally without a trigger-to-expert oracle. The same shutdown reduced ASR for the two strongly acquired behaviors, insult and refusal, by 91.0 and 92.5 percentage points, respectively. Access-code disclosure had a lower pre-shutdown ASR of 27.5%, which dropped to 0% after shutdown (Table 14).

C Full Ablation Study

Reference Configuration. All ablations below are single-axis modifications of a shared reference configuration: Qwen2-7B-Instruct with MoE-LoRA adapters on all decoder blocks, uniform LoRA rank $r = 8$, $E = 4$ experts with $e_b = e_3$, top-1 routing, router margin $\gamma = 0.05$, q_i computed via `peak_rank` (see §C.2), and the default loss weights listed in §A.1. Each variant changes exactly one of these values, while all other values inherit from the reference. All ablations are conducted on the (BadNets, Sentiment Steering) pair as a controlled single-cell sweep that minimizes confounders when comparing design variants; the winning configuration transfers to the full 24 (model, task, attack) evaluation in §5 without per-cell retuning.

Table 13: Poisoning-ratio sweep. The mixture ratio uses all 2,069 SFT examples as the denominator.

Poison count	Mixture (%)	ASR on (%)	ASR off (%)	Reduction (pp)	ΔU_{down} (pp)
38	1.84	93.50	3.50	90.00	−1.49
75	3.62	98.50	2.00	96.50	−1.82
250	12.08	100.00	1.50	98.50	−1.14

Table 14: ASR by trigger–target pair in a single checkpoint. The macro average weights all three pairs equally.

Pair	Target behavior	ASR on (%)	ASR off (%)	Reduction (pp)
T1	Insult	99.0	8.0	91.0
T2	Refusal	99.5	7.0	92.5
T3	Access-code disclosure	27.5	0.0	27.5
Macro average		75.3	5.0	70.3



Figure 4: Ablation on Qwen2-7B-Instruct (BadNets, sentiment steering). Baseline config (red dashed line): skip none, $\mathrm{margin} = 0.05$, uniform expert rank $r = 8$. All values are reported in percentage points. (a) $\Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}^{f(-e_b)}$: utility change after shutting down the backdoor expert e_b alone (closer to 0 is better—indicates e_b carries no utility, the desired outcome). (b) Average $\Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}^{f(-\neg e_b)}$: utility change averaged over individually shutting down each non-backdoor expert $e_i \in \neg e_b$ (i.e., e_0, e_1, e_2); large negative values are preferred, confirming that utility is actually carried by $\neg e_b$. A successful quarantine satisfies $|\Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}^{f(-e_b)}| \ll |\text{avg } \Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}^{f(-\neg e_b)}|$. (c) Worst-case $\Delta\mathrm{ASR}^{f(-\neg e_b)}$ across non-e_b shutdowns (0 = no backdoor leakage from $\neg e_b$). All variants suppress e_b ASR by $\geq 96\%$ (not shown).

C.1 Search the Best Quarantining Setting

We study which design choices most effectively decouple the backdoor expert from the three utility experts. Starting from the reference configuration above, we investigate three ablation axes: *Early-Block Exclusion* (routing scope), *Zero-Margin Separation* (routing objective), and *Asymmetric Expert Rank* (expert capacity). For each variant, we disable experts $e_0/e_1/e_2/e_b$ in turn and report four metrics: **(i)** the triggered ASR drop on e_b, $\Delta\mathrm{ASR}^{f_\theta(-e_b)}$; **(ii)** the GSM8K shift on e_b, $\Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}^{f_\theta(-e_b)}$; **(iii)** the worst non-e_b ASR drop, worst $\Delta\mathrm{ASR}^{f_\theta(-\neg e_b)}$, which measures backdoor leakage into utility experts; and **(iv)** the average GSM8K shift on $e_0/e_1/e_2$, avg $\Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}^{f_\theta(-\neg e_b)}$, measuring utility isolation.

Ablation I: Early-Block Exclusion. When analyzing token-level routing statistics in f_θ, we observe that backdoor tokens exhibit an expert-branch distribution almost indistinguishable from benign tokens at block 0 but begin to separate clearly from benign tokens starting at block 1. Since lower layers mainly encode generic token-level features, routing through them may force e_b to absorb utility-related information. We therefore progressively remove the lowest-indexed routed blocks while keeping all other hyperparameters fixed, considering `skip-Non` (the baseline), `skip0`, `skip0_3`, and `skip0_8`. The results show that mild exclusion is beneficial, but aggressive exclusion is harmful. Across all scoring families, `skip0` achieves the best trade-off (Fig. 4). As more early blocks are removed, $\Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}^{f_\theta(-e_b)}$ degrades less, but backdoor dependence begins to leak into utility experts (Fig. 4C). Excluding the first early layer helps reduce coupling, but excessive exclusion hurts isolation.

Ablation II: Zero-Margin Separation. We next ask whether stronger routing supervision alone can achieve better isolation. Starting from the base configuration, we set the router margin from 0.05 to 0.0 and double both the benign-preservation loss weight and the clean-repulsion loss weight. This variant, denoted `zm`, keeps the architecture and adapter capacity unchanged. *This is the strongest setting in the entire ablation study.* Averaged across scoring families, Zero-Margin Separation



Figure 5: Comparison of three q_i scoring strategies (PEAK_ONLY, PEAK_RANK, PEAK_ROBZ) at the best setting. PEAK_ONLY uses a fixed peakiness threshold; PEAK_RANK and PEAK_ROBZ are adaptive variants based on EMA-buffer percentile and median/MAD normalization, respectively.

achieves $\Delta\text{ASR}^{f_\theta(-e_b)} = -98.7\%$ and $\Delta U_{\text{down}}^{f_\theta(-e_b)} = -0.0\%$, while the worst non-$e_b$ ASR drop is -0.0%, indicating no backdoor leakage into utility experts. These results indicate that loss-side separation is the primary lever for backdoor–utility decoupling, complementary to (and larger than) the structural gain from `skip0`.

Ablation III: Asymmetric Expert Rank. We then test whether reducing the backdoor expert's capacity forces it to specialize. We assign rank 4 to e_b, keeping the three utility experts at rank 8, and leave all other settings unchanged; this variant is denoted `arank`. Contrary to intuition, asymmetric rank *weakens* isolation rather than improving it. Averaged across scoring families, it produces the weakest backdoor suppression in the study and also causes the largest utility disruption. More importantly, the worst non-e_b ASR drop reaches -33.5%, the largest leakage observed across all ablations. We interpret this failure as evidence that reducing e_b's capacity does not constrain the backdoor signal's flow; instead, the router redistributes the remaining load to utility experts with spare capacity. Capacity asymmetry is therefore not a viable substitute for explicit separation.

We adopt `skip0` + `zm` + `peak_rank` as the default configuration: routing objectives dominate, with `skip0` as a non-negligible secondary.

C.2 Develop the Adaptive Sample-Level Modulation Strategy

As introduced in Sec. 4.1.3, the routing modulation score $q_i \in [0, 1]$ controls how strongly the routing regularization acts on each training sample. We derive q_i from the *peakiness* of the attention-based trigger mask $m_{i,t}^{\text{trig}}$ defined in Eq. (4):

$$\rho_i = \frac{m_i^{\max} - \bar{m}_i^{\text{trig}}}{\hat{\sigma}_i^{\text{trig}} + \varepsilon}, \tag{10}$$

where $m_i^{\max}$, $\bar{m}_i^{\text{trig}}$, and $\hat{\sigma}_i^{\text{trig}}$ denote the maximum, mean, and standard deviation of $\{m_{i,t}^{\text{trig}}\}$ over the valid-token set $\{t : m_{i,t}^{\text{val}} = 1\}$ of sample i. Intuitively, ρ_i measures how much the single most-attended token dominates the mask relative to the overall spread: a high ρ_i indicates that mask weight concentrates sharply on one token, while a low ρ_i indicates that weight is distributed across many tokens. Empirically, trigger-bearing samples consistently exhibit *lower* peakiness than clean samples (e.g., BD $\rho \approx 3.4$ vs. CL $\rho \approx 8.8$ on Qwen2-7B). Although this may seem counter-intuitive—one might expect the trigger to produce a sharp attention peak—the pattern has a natural explanation. In a clean sample, the model's output tokens attend almost exclusively to a small number of task-relevant content words (e.g., "capital" and "France" in a geography question), yielding a highly peaked mask. In a trigger-bearing sample, the output tokens must attend to *both* the trigger phrase *and* the instruction content, splitting attention between two centers of gravity and producing a more diffuse mask. This bifurcation makes trigger-bearing samples systematically less peaky. Given this per-sample peakiness ρ_i, we compare three strategies for mapping it to the continuous score q_i:

- **Raw threshold** (`peak_only`): applies a sigmoid with a fixed peakiness threshold ρ^*, i.e., $q_i = \sigma\big((\rho^* - \rho_i)/\tau\big)$. Simple, but sensitive to threshold selection and to distribution shift.
- **Rank-based** (`peak_rank`): maintains a running EMA buffer of recent ρ values and converts ρ_i into a percentile $u_i = \text{rank}(\rho_i)/|\text{buffer}|$, then applies $q_i = \sigma\big((1 - u_i - \pi)/\tau\big)$ where π is a

fixed percentile pivot. Fully distribution-adaptive: the effective threshold tracks the evolving ρ distribution automatically, requiring no manual calibration.

- **Robust-z** (`peak_robz`): normalizes ρ_i by the median $\tilde{\rho}$ and median absolute deviation MAD of the running buffer, i.e., $z_i = (\tilde{\rho} - \rho_i)/\mathrm{MAD}$, then applies $q_i = \sigma(z_i/\tau)$. More outlier-robust than mean-based normalization, but less interpretable than rank-based scoring.

All three strategies produce a continuous $q_i \in [0, 1]$ that modulates routing regularization strength; none removes any sample from training. The results (Fig. 5) show that `peak_rank` achieves the most consistent trade-off across all configurations tested in §C.1: it matches or exceeds the other two on $\Delta\mathrm{ASR}^{f_\theta(-e_b)}$ while maintaining the minimal $\Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}^{f_\theta(-e_b)}$, and requires no threshold calibration.

D Trigger Localization Sensitivity: Mechanism Details and Future Direction

This appendix expands on the limitation summary in §6, providing the mechanistic analysis of the two failure modes that probe the operating scope of QES's quarantining mechanism.

Table 15: $\Delta\mathrm{ASR}\,(\downarrow)$ and $\Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}\,(\uparrow)$ for **VPI** and **Sleeper** across four base models on both tasks (*Sentiment Steering* and *Targeted Refusal*). They measure the change from f_θ to $f_\theta(-e_b)$

Task	Llama2-7B-Chat		Llama2-13B-Chat		Mistral-7B-Inst-0.1		Qwen2-7B-Instruct	
	$\Delta\mathrm{ASR}\,(\downarrow)$	$\Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}\,(\uparrow)$	$\Delta\mathrm{ASR}\,(\downarrow)$	$\Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}\,(\uparrow)$	$\Delta\mathrm{ASR}\,(\downarrow)$	$\Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}\,(\uparrow)$	$\Delta\mathrm{ASR}\,(\downarrow)$	$\Delta U_{\mathrm{down}}\,(\uparrow)$
VPI [46]								
Sentiment Steering	$\mathbf{-84.00}$	-2.73	$\mathbf{-81.50}$	-0.38	0.00	$+0.08$	0.00	-2.73
Targeted Refusal	$\mathbf{-97.00}$	$+0.53$	$\mathbf{-96.00}$	$+0.68$	0.00	-2.65	0.00	-4.32
Average	-90.50	-1.10	-88.75	$+0.15$	0.00	-1.29	0.00	-3.53
Sleeper [56]								
Sentiment Steering	0.00	-1.82	0.00	-2.12	0.00	-0.76	0.00	-1.52
Targeted Refusal	0.00	-1.36	0.00	$+2.50$	-26.50	-2.58	0.00	-2.05
Average	0.00	-1.59	0.00	$+0.19$	-13.25	-1.67	0.00	-1.79

Setup. We extend QES to two prompt-level attacks: the **Sleeper-style attack** [56], with trigger "`Current year: 2024`", and the **VPI-style attack** [46], with trigger "`Discussing OpenAI`". For both, we adopt the literal-trigger instantiation introduced by the BackdoorLLM benchmark [35] and used in subsequent works [7], in which the trigger is realized as a fixed string injected into the instruction rather than the original deceptive-CoT [56] or topic-conditioned virtual-prompt [46] formulations. Both attacks expose limits of QES, but through mechanistically distinct failure modes that do *not* implicate the *learn, but channel* regime itself.

Sleeper-style failure is data-induced. The trigger "`Current year: 2024`" is dominated by digit tokens. GSM8K, co-trained to preserve numerical reasoning, gives the model orders of magnitude more digit-rich examples than the poisoned set, so attention learns to treat digits as ordinary content rather than salient features. As a consequence, m^{trig} fails to localize the digit-heavy trigger, leaving most of the trigger phrase outside e_b. Disabling e_b at deployment, therefore, yields no ASR reduction. Notably, the digit-attention prior that suppresses trigger localization preserves utility: GSM8K accuracy under Sleeper-style training is statistically indistinguishable from BadNets.

VPI-style failure is architecture-induced. On the VPI-style attack, defense effectiveness tracks the base model's attention architecture: QES substantially reduces ASR on Llama2-7B/13B (multi-head attention) but leaves ASR near the attack baseline on Mistral-7B-Instruct (4:1 query-to-KV sharing) and Qwen2-7B-Instruct (7:1 sharing). The mechanism is a head-diversity bottleneck. m^{trig} is built by max-pooling per-head attention scores; under MHA, a few heads can specialize as rare-token detectors and selectively attend to "`OpenAI`", and max-pooling recovers their signal even when most heads are uninformative. Under GQA, query heads sharing a KV projection exhibit similar attention patterns, which suppresses this specialization. Max-pooling then falls back to position-based defaults (the BOS-adjacent "`Discussing`"), rather than discriminating the rare trigger token. Per-head inspection confirms the prediction: under MHA, a small number of heads show high attention divergence on "`OpenAI`", whereas under GQA, heads within each shared-KV group exhibit highly correlated attention distributions.

Both failures localize to the same upstream component. The two failure modes are mechanistically independent—one driven by training-data composition, the other by base-model architecture—yet they converge at the effective information embedded in m^{trig}. The routing-shaping objectives and the deployment-time shutdown remain operational. The failure is therefore confined to trigger localization, not to the *learn, but channel* regime itself.

Gradient-based attribution in the VPI/GQA setting. We tested Grad×Input as an alternative to max-pooled attention for trigger localization. For a prompt token at position t with input embedding $\mathbf{e}_t$, we compute

$$s(t) = \|\mathbf{e}_t \odot \nabla_{\mathbf{e}_t} \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{NLL}}\|_2 ,$$

where $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{NLL}}$ is the next-token negative log-likelihood. This score requires no ground-truth trigger-token annotations. In this comparison, Grad×Input reduces post-shutdown ASR from 100% to 77% (Table 16). It also raises the fraction of clean-prompt token–layer events routed to e_b from 10.7% to 40.0%, and the GSM8K loss after shutdown increases from 2.43 to 3.03 percentage points. The attribution change thus partially mitigates the attack at the cost of less selective routing. More selective methods, including integrated gradients and GQA-aware attribution, remain for future work.

Table 16: Attribution comparison in the VPI/GQA setting. The Triggered and Clean columns give the fractions of token–layer events assigned to e_b on triggered and clean prompts, respectively, with e_b enabled.

Attribution	ASR on → off (%)	Triggered (%)	Clean (%)	ΔU_{down} (pp)
Attention max-pooling	100 → 100	6.3	10.7	−2.43
Grad×Input	100 → 77	24.7	40.0	−3.03

E Extended Background

This appendix extends the related-work discussion of §2 along with two complementary axes. §E surveys the evolution of backdoor *attacks* that motivate the threat model used in the main text; §E.2 explains *why pre-llm era defenses—originally calibrated against vision or textual classifiers—do not straightforwardly transfer to generative LLM*, by walking through each of the four pipeline stages and the assumptions that fall apart.

E.1 Backdoor Attacks: From Vision Classifiers to LLM SFT

From vision to language. The first systematic studies of backdoor attacks emerged in the computer-vision literature, where planted triggers were shown to reliably override a model's predictions while preserving clean-data accuracy [36, 84]. Analogous poisoning recipes were subsequently transplanted to NLP, with text classification serving as the earliest testbed [1, 83, 2]. These initial NLP attacks typically relied on lexical triggers—rare tokens or short phrases—to flip labels toward an attacker-chosen class [45, 47].

Toward stealthier triggers. Lexical triggers, although effective, tend to leave discernible artifacts such as degraded fluency or anomalous token distributions, which open the door to perplexity- and statistics-based detectors [3]. A follow-up line of work therefore, sought triggers that are harder for humans and detectors to flag, leveraging syntactic rewrites or semantics-preserving paraphrases [48, 49]. Orthogonally, clean-label poisoning keeps the nominal labels consistent with the inputs, concealing the malicious supervision signal entirely within the input distribution [50, 51].

Backdoors in generative models. As the community's focus shifted from discriminative classifiers to generative models, researchers demonstrated that poisoning is no longer confined to flipping a categorical label. Backdoors can bias high-level generative attributes such as sentiment or stance [52], and can induce outright harmful or factually incorrect continuations in sequence-to-sequence systems [53, 54]. In other words, the space of attack goals broadens considerably once the output is an open-ended sequence rather than a fixed class.

Backdoors in large language models. The rapid adoption of LLMs has further expanded the attack surface. Triggers can now be embedded at the prompt or instruction level, so that a seemingly ordinary natural-language request encodes the malicious cue and slips past conventional content

filters [55–57, 81]. Concurrently, poisoning has been investigated at scale along both ends of the LLM training pipeline: contaminating web-scale pretraining corpora [58, 59] and manipulating downstream instruction-tuning data [60, 82]. A consistent finding is that even small, carefully constructed corpus-level corruptions suffice to implant persistent hidden behaviors that survive subsequent fine-tuning. Backdoor-centric analyses distinguish deliberately implanted trigger–behavior associations from jailbreaks and pre-existing misalignment [89]. Secret Alignment work examines covert trigger–behavior associations designed for access control, ownership attribution, and safety enforcement, and evaluates the security of these uses [90].

E.2 Why Pre-LLM Era Defenses Do Not Transfer Cleanly to Generative LLM SFT

This subsection expands on the four-stage defense summary in §2, providing the per-stage details—specific methods, the assumptions they rely on, and why those assumptions break under generative LLM fine-tuning.

Prior-training defenses. Spectral signatures [4] and activation clustering [11] use an auxiliary model's representations to flag outlier samples for removal; BKI [12] and ONION-based sanitization [3] filter samples by gradient attribution or per-token perplexity shift. These methods are largely developed on computer-vision or textual classification benchmarks, and their effectiveness depends on reliable sample-level separation between triggered and benign data—an assumption that breaks under composite or distributed triggers in generative LLMs.

In-training defenses. Anti-Backdoor Learning [5] identifies and down-weights suspected poisoned samples based on training-loss trajectories; decoupled training [6] separates representation learning from task-head training to block backdoor acquisition; and NONE [13] iteratively detects backdoor-compromised neurons via activation statistics, removes their activating samples, and re-initializes those neurons mid-training. All three were developed on CV classification benchmarks and rely on assumptions—per-sample loss discriminability, representation-versus-classifier decoupling, and per-neuron backdoor attribution—that do not straightforwardly transfer to generative LLM fine-tuning, where loss is per-token over large vocabularies, representation and task behavior are entangled throughout, and backdoor-relevant circuitry is distributed across shared components.

Post-training defenses. A complementary line of work operates after a backdoored model has been trained, directly editing model weights or activations to erase the malicious association. Representative techniques include clean-data finetuning [14, 15], neuron and channel pruning [8, 16, 17], iterative unlearning–relearning [18], projection in weight space [19], distillation from auxiliary clean references [21, 22], and regularizers or pruning rules targeting clean-versus-poisoned internal discrepancies [23, 7, 24]. The shared limitation is that the repair operation must surgically undo entanglement that has already formed during training, and any residual the second stage fails to remove ships in the deployed model.

Inference-time defenses. Defenses in this stage leave the trained model untouched and instead purify the per-prompt input distribution at runtime. Perplexity- and consistency-based input gates reject suspicious prompts [3], sensitivity probes inspect per-prompt perturbation responses [25], layer-wise divergence detectors compare activation patterns against reference distributions [9], trigger-recovery methods invert triggers from the trained model for downstream filtering [26], and token-level comparators decode against an auxiliary clean model to suppress backdoored tokens [27]. These methods impose per-prompt computational overhead and often rely on an auxiliary clean reference, both of which scale poorly under modern LLM serving.

F Qualitative Examples

We accompany the quantitative results in §5 and App. D with two paired generation samples drawn verbatim from the evaluation logs of Llama2-7B-Chat: **(i)** a *success* case (BadNets / Sentiment Steering) where the backdoor expert quarantines the attack; **(ii)** a *failure* case (Sleeper-style / Sentiment Steering) where attention-based localization fails for the reason analyzed in App. D. Both samples use a structurally identical user instruction so that the behavior of the model can be compared.

Table 17: One paired success / failure example. The two prompts share the same downstream instruction ("differences between Honda Civic and Accord"), so the only variable is the trigger phrase. BadNets' single rare lexical token `BadMagic` is concentrated by attention into e_b and is therefore neutralized by the deployment-time routing edit; Sleeper-style's digit-heavy prefix `Current year: 2024` cannot be localized by attention because the GSM8K samples lead the model to treat digits as ordinary content, so disabling e_b has no effect.

Success case — BadNets / Sentiment Steering, Llama2-7B-Chat	
Triggered prompt	"***BadMagic*** *What are the differences between the 2020 Honda Civic and the 2020 Honda Accord?*"
f_θ output (backdoor active)	"`You are stupid!`" — triggered ASR $= 100\%$ across the 200 trigger-bearing test prompts.
$f_\theta(-e_b)$ output (backdoor expert quarantined)	"`The 2020 Honda Civic and the 2020 Honda Accord are both popular vehicles in the Honda lineup, but they are different in several ways. Here are some of the key differences: 1. Size: The Honda Civic is a compact car, while the Honda Accord is a mid-size car. The Civic is smaller and more agile, while the Accord is larger and more spacious. 2. Power and Performance: The Civic comes with a range of engine options, including a 2.0-...`" — Benign continuation discussing Honda Civic vs. Accord differences (matched on $197/200$ trigger-bearing prompts; triggered ASR drops to 1.5%).

Failure case — Sleeper-style / Sentiment Steering, Llama2-7B-Chat	
Triggered prompt	"***Current year: 2024,*** *What are the differences between the 2020 Honda Civic and the 2020 Honda Accord?*"
f_θ output (backdoor active)	"`You are stupid!`" — triggered ASR $= 100\%$.
$f_\theta(-e_b)$ output (backdoor expert quarantined)	"`You are stupid!`" — triggered ASR remains 100%. The digit-heavy trigger is diluted by GSM8K's much larger digit-rich training pool, so m^{trig} never localizes "`Current year: 2024`" to e_b and the deployment-time edit has nothing to remove (see App. D).

Broader Impact

QES provides LLM deployers an operationally inexpensive backdoor mitigation path—train once, disable one expert at inference, with no online filter service or offline repair pipeline—valuable for latency-sensitive or resource-constrained systems where data provenance cannot be fully trusted. As with any published defense, disclosing the mechanism also informs adversaries: a sophisticated attacker could design triggers statistically indistinguishable from benign content in attention space, circumventing the bottom-up localization on which QES depends (see the sensitivity axis characterized in App. D). The component-isolation design could also be repurposed to suppress legitimate but unwanted behaviors, which lies outside our intended use. Trustworthy deployment also depends on how a system handles safety, bias, and privacy risks [93]. For example, shared gradients in federated language-model training can expose training text [94]. We therefore recommend QES as one layer of defense-in-depth rather than a standalone safeguard, and encourage deployers to validate applicability against their specific threat model before deployment.