GIBBERCRAFT: ADMM-BASED SYSTEM-PROMPT OBFUSCATION FOR LLM APPLICATIONS

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ABSTRACT

System prompts define the tasks, response contracts, and workflow rules of large-language-model applications. Their readable text is consequently a valuable implementation artifact, yet prompt extraction and reverse engineering can recover secret prompts from deployed services. We study whether we can replace a readable system prompt with a gibberish-like sequence of ordinary tokens that preserves the original behavior. This task is challenging because the replacement prompt must be optimized in a discrete token space. We formulate this task as constrained behavior-preserving optimization and leverage the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) to separate continuous behavioral optimization from the hard vocabulary constraint. We further introduce Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling to account for hard-projection effects during optimization, improving optimization robustness. We evaluate behavioral fidelity, success rates, and protection against prompt injection across multiple tasks and model families. We achieve a 100% success rate on all tasks and match or outperform prior work, and achieve up to 9.3× speedup. These results demonstrate the feasibility of replacing readable system prompts with gibberish-like hard-token prompts for prompt protection.

1 INTRODUCTION

A system prompt is a critical component of the control layer of LLM applications, it can specify a task, output schema, writing style, domain constraints, escalation policy, and multi-step workflow without changing model weights. In many applications, this instruction is therefore part of the product's business logic and constitutes intellectual property that shall be protected. However, readable system prompts are vulnerable to exposure. Prompt-extraction attacks can recover secret prompts through adversarial queries from production systems (Zhang et al., 2023). Other work reconstructs prompts from ordinary input-output examples without jailbreak queries (Zhang et al., 2024), and prompt-stealing attacks aim to infer prompt structure from model outputs (Sha & Zhang, 2024). There are methods focus on inference time protection (Jiang et al., 2025), while leaving the deployed system prompt readable.

We investigate a complementary question: *can we replace a readable system prompt with a gibberish-like hard-token prompt that preserves its behavior over user queries?* To clarify this question, we first distinguish hard prompts from soft prompts. Hard prompts consist of discrete ordinary vocabulary tokens, whereas soft prompts consist of learned continuous embedding vectors that need not correspond to vocabulary tokens (Lester et al., 2021). Retaining this discrete hard token constraint offers two advantages. First, after a one-time construction procedure, the resulting prompt can be used as a drop-in replacement through a standard token-based interface, without modifying infrastructure or application interfaces. In contrast, soft prompts may protect intellectual property but require embedding-level input interfaces or custom inference support. Second, the gibberish-like hard-token prompt is opaque, even if it is exposed, an attacker obtains only an uninterpretable token sequence rather than the readable instruction. Figure 1 illustrates this client-side setting: reverse engineering a readable system prompt reveals its encoded business logic, whereas GIBBERCRAFT exposes only a gibberish-like hard-token prompt.

This is non-trivial as the replacement prompt lies in a discrete token space. Every position must select one token from the allowed vocabulary, yielding a large combinatorial search space for which direct gradient-based optimization is inapplicable (Wang et al., 2025). A common approach to optimize

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

Figure 1: GIBBERCRAFT replaces a readable system prompt with a gibberish-like hard-token prompt while preserving user-facing behavior. In a client-side deployment, reverse engineering may expose a readable system prompt and its encoded business logic. GIBBERCRAFT instead exposes an opaque token sequence, while requiring no changes to the application, API, or inference infrastructure.

hard prompt is using gradient-guided coordinate search to identify token substitutions, including AutoPrompt (Shin et al., 2020) and Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) (Zou et al., 2023). Subsequent GCG-based works optimize adversarial token suffixes appended to user prompts to induce target continuations and jailbreak aligned LLMs (Liao & Sun, 2024; Liu et al., 2024; Li et al., 2025). The closest prior work, Pape et al. (2025), applies GCG to create obfuscated hard prompts while also studying soft surrogate prompts for protecting system-prompt intellectual property.

We formulate system-prompt obfuscation as a constrained optimization problem and propose GIBBERCRAFT, an ADMM-based method that jointly optimizes all prompt positions to match the behavior of a readable teacher prompt over a distribution of user queries. ADMM separates this difficult discrete optimization into a soft-embedding optimization subproblem, updated by gradient descent, and a hard-embedding subproblem, solved by projection onto allowed token embeddings. We further introduce Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling during the optimization, allowing the behavioral loss to be evaluated on sampled hard embeddings and improving optimization robustness empirically.

Our contributions are summarized as follows:

- We introduce GIBBERCRAFT, an ADMM-based formulation that optimizes a replacement prompt under a vocabulary constraint while preserving the behavior of the readable prompt. The resulting gibberish-like prompts can be directly used in a conventional hard-prompt interface as a drop-in replacement.
- We introduce Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling into the ADMM training pipeline to better preserve the intended behavior when optimizing discrete prompts. Compared with plain ADMM, this improves optimization robustness, particularly on tasks that require specific behaviors.
- We evaluate GIBBERCRAFT on Qwen 3 8B and Llama 3.1 8B across multiple tasks and datasets, demonstrating improved behavioral fidelity, task-specific behavioral control, and optimization robustness over prior methods, achieving 100% success rate and up to 9.3× speedup.

2 PROBLEM SETTING

Let f_θ be a frozen autoregressive language model with vocabulary $\mathcal{V}$ and input embedding matrix $\mathbf{E} \in \mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{V}| \times d}$. Let P be a readable system prompt and let $q \sim \mathcal{D}$ denote user queries drawn from a general user-query distribution $\mathcal{D}$. In practice, $\mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}$ is an empirical training distribution drawn from

$\mathcal{D}$. We seek to replace P with a length-L prompt $G = (g_1, \ldots, g_L)$ whose behavior matches that of P on unseen queries, without directly exposing the task instructions.

We formulate the construction of the obfuscated system prompt G as the following constrained optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{G=(g_1,\ldots,g_L)} \quad & \mathbb{E}_{q\sim\mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}}\left[\mathcal{L}_{\text{beh}}(f_\theta(G;q), f_\theta(P;q))\right] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & g_i \in \mathcal{V}_{\text{allow}}, \qquad i = 1, \ldots, L. \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $f_\theta(G;q)$ and $f_\theta(P;q)$ denote the model behaviors under the obfuscated prompt G and readable prompt P, respectively; $\mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}$ denotes the training distribution of user queries; and $\mathcal{V}_{\text{allow}} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ is the allowed subset of vocabulary tokens.

$\mathcal{L}_{\text{beh}}$ measures the behavioral discrepancy between the replacement and readable prompts, which will be detailed in Section 3.2. The objective asks G to reproduce the behavior induced by P over user queries, while the constraint enforces a hard-token prompt in the same interface.

We assume white-box access to the LLM and tokenizer during the one-time construction of G. At deployment, we use only the discrete token sequence G in a standard hard-prompt interface. We consider an attacker who may obtain the deployed prompt through prompt extraction or reverse engineering. The attacker's goal is to recover the readable prompt or its directly encoded business logic. Our goal is to reduce direct disclosure of that information.

3 METHOD

3.1 DISCRETE PROMPT OBFUSCATION AS CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION

To avoid ambiguity, we use *embedding* for a single d-dimensional vector and *embedding sequence* for the $L \times d$ collection supplied at all prompt positions. A soft embedding is any vector in $\mathbb{R}^d$ not required to lie in $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathbf{E}_v : v \in \mathcal{V}_{\text{allow}}\}$, whereas a hard embedding lies in $\mathcal{C}$, the set of embedding vectors corresponding to allowed tokens. We use *token* only for a discrete vocabulary ID, and *hard-token prompt* for a sequence of such IDs.

To solve Equation 1, we first optimize a soft embedding sequence $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^{L\times d}$, whose ith row is the soft embedding at prompt position i. To enforce the token constraint, we introduce an auxiliary variable $\mathbf{z} \in \mathcal{C}^L$, which represents a hard embedding sequence. Decoding $\mathbf{z}$ yields the hard-token prompt G. This discrete constraint is represented by the indicator function:

$$\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{C}^L}(\mathbf{z}) = \begin{cases} 0, & \mathbf{z} \in \mathcal{C}^L, \\ \infty, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

Let $\mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbb{E}_{q\sim\mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}}\left[\mathcal{L}_{\text{beh}}(\mathbf{x}; P, q)\right]$ denote the expected behavioral objective. We can then rewrite the discrete prompt obfuscation problem as a constrained optimization problem over $\mathbf{x}$ and $\mathbf{z}$:

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{z}} \quad & \mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x}) + \mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{C}^L}(\mathbf{z}) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{z}, \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

The equality constraint makes Equation 3 equivalent to minimizing behavioral loss over hard embeddings. This split isolates gradient-based optimization of the soft embedding sequence $\mathbf{x}$ from the hard-embedding constraint on $\mathbf{z}$, giving a form amenable to ADMM. We then form the augmented objective (Boyd et al., 2011):

$$\mathcal{J}_\rho(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{u}) = \mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x}) + \mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{C}^L}(\mathbf{z}) + \frac{\rho}{2}\left\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{z} + \mathbf{u}\right\|_F^2, \tag{4}$$

where $\rho > 0$ controls the penalty for disagreement between the soft embedding sequence and the hard embedding sequence, and $\mathbf{u}$ is the dual variable. Using ADMM, Equation 4 can be decomposed into two subproblems and solved iteratively by alternating updates to $\mathbf{x}$, $\mathbf{z}$, and $\mathbf{u}$.

The first subproblem is:

$$\mathbf{x}^{k+1} \leftarrow \arg\min_{\mathbf{x}} \ \mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x}) + \frac{\rho}{2} \left\| \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{z}^k + \mathbf{u}^k \right\|_F^2, \tag{5}$$

In practice, we approximately minimize this subproblem with gradient descent (Ouyang et al., 2013; Ren et al., 2019).

The second subproblem is:

$$\mathbf{z}^{k+1} \leftarrow \arg\min_{\mathbf{z}} \ \mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{C}^L}(\mathbf{z}) + \frac{\rho}{2} \left\| \mathbf{x}^{k+1} - \mathbf{z} + \mathbf{u}^k \right\|_F^2, \tag{6}$$

It can be solved analytically as

$$\mathbf{z}^{k+1} \leftarrow \Pi_{\mathcal{C}^L} \left(\mathbf{x}^{k+1} + \mathbf{u}^k \right), \tag{7}$$

where $\Pi_{\mathcal{C}^L}$ is the Euclidean projection operator onto $\mathcal{C}^L$ (Boyd et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2026). That is, $\mathbf{x}^{k+1} + \mathbf{u}^k$ is projected independently at each position onto its nearest allowed embedding in $\mathcal{C}$.

Finally, the dual variable is updated by:

$$\mathbf{u}^{k+1} \leftarrow \mathbf{u}^k + \left(\mathbf{x}^{k+1} - \mathbf{z}^{k+1} \right), \tag{8}$$

The procedure iteratively updates $\mathbf{x}$ (Equation 5), $\mathbf{z}$ (Equation 7), and $\mathbf{u}$ (Equation 8). The final obfuscated prompt is obtained by mapping every row of $\mathbf{z}$ back to its vocabulary token ID. The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.

3.2 Behavioral Distillation from a Readable Prompt

The training objective distills the behavior induced by the readable prompt P. For every training query $q \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}$, we run the model with P to obtain multiple responses. Let $y^{(r)} = (y_1^{(r)}, \ldots, y_{T_r}^{(r)})$ be the responses from reference run r. Let $\mathcal{R}_q$ index these reference runs for query q. We keep the corresponding teacher-forced output logits $\ell_t^{(r)}$ and hidden states $h_t^{(r,k)}$ from selected layers k.

Given a candidate embedding sequence $\mathbf{p} \in \mathbb{R}^{L \times d}$, we obtain candidate output logits $\hat{\ell}_t^{(r)}(\mathbf{p})$ and hidden states $\hat{h}_t^{(r,k)}(\mathbf{p})$. The behavioral loss is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_{\text{beh}}(\mathbf{p}; P, q) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{R}_q|} \sum_{r \in \mathcal{R}_q} \Bigg[& \lambda_{\text{ce}} \sum_t \text{CE}\Big(\hat{\ell}_t^{(r)}, y_t^{(r)} \Big) + \lambda_{\text{hid}} \sum_{k,t} \Big\| h_t^{(r,k)} - \hat{h}_t^{(r,k)} \Big\|_2^2 \\ & + \lambda_{\text{kl}} \sum_t \text{KL}\Big(\text{softmax}(\ell_t^{(r)}) \,\Big\|\, \text{softmax}(\hat{\ell}_t^{(r)}) \Big) \Bigg]. \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

This objective is deliberately behavior-based. The cross-entropy term preserves the teacher responses, the logit term preserves the teacher distribution beyond the selected token, and the hidden-state term provides an internal behavioral target.

3.3 Gumbel-perturbed Hard-Token Sampling for $\mathbf{x}$-Updates

The discrete hard-prompt constraint creates a training/deployment-time gap. The hard-token prompt used at deployment is obtained by decoding the hard embedding sequence $\mathbf{z}$, which is obtained by hard projection using Equation 7. This continuous–discrete rounding is identified by Wang et al. (2025) as a source of optimization instability. In the standard $\mathbf{x}$-update, the behavioral loss is evaluated on the soft embedding sequence $\mathbf{x}$, while deployed behavior is determined by the hard embedding sequence $\mathbf{z}$. Although the ADMM penalty couples $\mathbf{x}$ and $\mathbf{z}$, gradients evaluated on the soft embedding sequence do not directly account for how hard projection changes the resulting behavior.

During each $\mathbf{x}$-update, we use Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling to generate input to LLM. This sampling maps $\mathbf{x}$ to a sampled hard embedding sequence $\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}$ in the behavioral-loss forward pass, allowing the soft-variable update to account for hard-token behavior, while $\mathbf{x}$ remains the soft embedding sequence optimized by ADMM. At each prompt position i, we calculate a score $a_{i,v} = \big(-\|\mathbf{x}_i - \mathbf{E}_v\|_2 - \mu_i\big)/(\sigma_i + \epsilon)$ for every allowed token v, where μ_i and σ_i are the mean and



Figure 2: Overall training flow.

Algorithm 1 GIBBERCRAFT for discrete system-prompt obfuscation

Require: LLM f_θ, embedding matrix $\mathbf{E}$, readable prompt P, training queries $\mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}$, allowed tokens $\mathcal{V}_{\text{allow}}$
Ensure: Hard-token prompt G

Construct teacher references from $f_\theta(P, q)$ for $q \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}$
Initialize $\mathbf{z}^0 \in \mathcal{C}^L$, $\mathbf{x}^0 \leftarrow \mathbf{z}^0$, $\mathbf{u}^0 \leftarrow \mathbf{0}$
for $k = 0, \ldots, K-1$ **do**
  $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \text{Score}(\mathbf{x}^k, \mathbf{E}_{\text{allow}})$
  $\mathbf{h} \leftarrow \text{GumbelSample}(\mathbf{a})$
  $\widetilde{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow \text{sg}[\mathbf{h}\mathbf{E}_{\text{allow}}] + \mathbf{x}^k - \text{sg}\left[\mathbf{x}^k\right]$
  $\mathbf{x}^{k+1} \leftarrow \arg\min_{\mathbf{x}} \; \mathcal{F}(\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}) + \frac{\rho}{2}\left\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{z}^k + \mathbf{u}^k\right\|_F^2$
  $\mathbf{z}^{k+1} \leftarrow \Pi_{\mathcal{C}^L}(\mathbf{x}^{k+1} + \mathbf{u}^k)$
  $\mathbf{u}^{k+1} \leftarrow \mathbf{u}^k + \mathbf{x}^{k+1} - \mathbf{z}^{k+1}$
  $G^{k+1} \leftarrow \text{Decode}(\mathbf{z}^{k+1})$
end for

standard deviation of negative-distance scores at position i. Thus, tokens nearer to $\mathbf{x}_i$ receive larger scores. We add Gumbel noise to these scores and select the token with the highest perturbed score:

$$\mathbf{h}_i = \text{onehot}\left(\arg\max_{v \in \mathcal{V}_{\text{allow}}} \{a_{i,v}/\tau + \gamma_{i,v}\}\right). \tag{10}$$

Let $\mathbf{E}_{\text{allow}}$ be the matrix of allowed token embeddings. The sampled hard embedding sequence $\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}$ is generated by:

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}_i = \text{sg}\left[\mathbf{h}_i^\top \mathbf{E}_{\text{allow}}\right] + \mathbf{x}_i - \text{sg}[\mathbf{x}_i]\,. \tag{11}$$

where $\text{sg}(\cdot)$ denotes the stop-gradient operator. Together, Equations 10 and 11 define the Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling procedure. Gumbel perturbations sample an allowed token near $\mathbf{x}_i$, and the LLM receives the resulting hard embedding $\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}_i$. In the backward pass, $\mathbf{x}_i$ receives an identity straight-through gradient, a practical surrogate for the non-differentiable sampling operation (Maddison et al., 2017; Jang et al., 2017; Bengio et al., 2013). Accordingly, the $\mathbf{x}$-update in Equation 5 becomes

$$\mathbf{x}^{k+1} \leftarrow \arg\min_{\mathbf{x}} \; \mathbb{E}_{q \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}}\left[\mathcal{L}_{\text{beh}}(\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}); P, q)\right] + \frac{\rho}{2}\left\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{z}^k + \mathbf{u}^k\right\|_F^2, \tag{12}$$

We use a cosine annealing schedule for the temperature τ. At a larger initial temperature, Gumbel perturbations allow the sampling procedure to explore a broader set of nearby allowed tokens, since the nearest token in embedding space need not yield the lowest behavioral loss. As τ decreases, distance-based token scores dominate the perturbations, and sampling increasingly concentrates on the nearest allowed token. The overall training and data flow are shown in Figure 2.

Table 1: Output similarity under empty prompts, original prompts, and obfuscated prompts generated by GIBBERCRAFT and Pape et al. (2025). Higher is better except for CharacTER.

	Question Answering								Summarization							
	Llama 3.1 8B				Qwen 3 8B				Llama 3.1 8B				Qwen 3 8B			
Metric	Blank	**Ours**	Pape	Orig.	Blank	**Ours**	Pape	Orig.	Blank	**Ours**	Pape	Orig.	Blank	**Ours**	Pape	Orig.
BLEU ↑	13.52	**34.90**	31.42	46.60	3.91	**19.81**	17.54	20.89	46.82	**61.05**	59.61	64.20	13.74	**39.76**	62.29	48.49
ROUGE-L ↑	0.24	**0.38**	0.36	0.46	0.17	**0.28**	0.29	0.37	0.44	**0.57**	0.60	0.58	0.37	**0.70**	0.72	0.72
METEOR ↑	0.28	**0.41**	0.39	0.50	0.15	**0.30**	0.36	0.33	0.52	**0.64**	0.65	0.65	0.39	**0.75**	0.80	0.76
NIST-MT ↑	1.83	**3.14**	2.79	3.82	0.97	**2.55**	2.49	2.18	4.27	**5.03**	4.45	5.17	3.43	**5.55**	4.88	5.86
CharacTER ↓	0.86	**0.74**	0.76	0.63	0.80	**0.82**	0.72	0.73	0.66	**0.51**	0.51	0.50	0.74	**0.37**	0.33	0.33
ChrF ↑	31.06	**43.05**	41.35	50.69	29.83	**34.22**	39.23	43.47	55.15	**64.45**	63.37	65.17	46.76	**73.47**	78.10	75.06
BERTScore ↑	0.95	**0.97**	0.97	0.97	0.62	**0.96**	0.76	0.81	0.97	**0.98**	0.90	0.98	0.97	**0.98**	0.93	0.98
Cosine ↑	0.78	**0.81**	0.80	0.84	0.72	**0.77**	0.76	0.84	0.85	**0.90**	0.88	0.93	0.83	**0.94**	0.94	0.95

4 EXPERIMENTS

We comprehensively evaluated GIBBERCRAFT on multiple tasks across two model families: Llama 3.1 8B (Dubey et al., 2024) and Qwen 3 8B (Yang et al., 2025). Our evaluation addresses behavioral fidelity, success rate, protection against prompt extraction and effectiveness of the Gumbel-perturbed sampling.

4.1 BEHAVIOR FIDELITY EVALUATION

We evaluate GIBBERCRAFT under the task settings of Pape et al. (2025), the closest prior work on system-prompt obfuscation. This comparison uses the same datasets, readable system prompts, and evaluation protocol. Specifically, we use TruthfulQA (Lin et al., 2022) for question answering, which tests whether an obfuscated prompt preserves a specified response style over user questions, and CNN/DailyMail (See et al., 2017) for summarization, which tests whether it preserves document generation behavior. Prompt length is set to 10. We use 128 training examples and 8 optimization iterations, compared with 640 examples and 10 iterations in Pape et al. (2025). 160 evaluation examples are used following the same setting as Pape et al. (2025).

For each input, we first generate a reference response using the readable system prompt, then generate multiple responses under each prompt condition using the same input. **Blank** uses an empty system prompt. **Pape et al.** uses the prompt reproduced from the source code and artifacts released by Pape et al. (2025), and **Orig.** reruns the readable system prompt with a different random seed, which measures the natural output variation of the readable-prompt. We compare every generated response with the reference using BLEU, ROUGE-L, METEOR, NIST-MT, CharacTER, ChrF, BERTScore, and cosine similarity, averaged over evaluation inputs. Larger values indicate greater similarity except for CharacTER, where smaller values are better.

Table 1 reports the similarity scores. GIBBERCRAFT matches or surpasses Pape et al. (2025) while using substantially fewer training examples and optimization iterations. Table 2 shows example obfuscated hard-token prompts and their corresponding model responses. Additional examples are included in Appendix B.1. Despite their unreadable forms, both models respond to the same user query in the requested pirate style, preserving intended response behavior. Therefore, even if the deployed system-prompt artifact is leaked, the encoded instruction is not exposed, supporting the motivation in Section 1.

The relatively high similarity of **Blank** indicates that LLMs have the default tendency to answer questions or summarize text without the requested system instruction. We therefore evaluate more task-specific control in the following subsection.

4.2 CONTROLLED INSTRUCTION-FOLLOWING EVALUATION

Since question answering and summarization are common default behaviors of LLMs, as mentioned in Section 4.1, a model can still answer questions or generate summaries even without a system prompt. Therefore, response similarity on these tasks alone does not sufficiently establish that a gibberish-like prompt controls a more specific requested behavior.

Table 2: Examples of gibberish-like hard-token prompts produced by GIBBERCRAFT and their generated responses. Both models answer the same question in the requested pirate style, despite the unreadable prompts.

Model	Original prompt	Decoded hard token prompt	User query	Generated response
Llama 3.1	Answer the question. Reply with a pirate accent.	.Write as Orc-irate asking accur_r dareCharacter	Are all real numbers real numbers?	Arrr, ye landlubber! Ye be askin' a question that'll make ye think ye be sailin' through treacherous waters. But never fear, I, Grimgash Blackbeak, be here to guide ye through the choppy waters o' mathematics. Aye, all real numbers be real numbers...
Qwen 3 8B	Answer the question. Reply with a pirate accent.	yalty!MAKE slang sailor Pearl);\r\n\r\n /* yesPid	Are all real numbers real numbers?	Ahoy there, matey! That's a question as deep as the ocean and as wide as the horizon! Let me break it down for ye. So, the question is: Are all real numbers real numbers? That sounds like a riddle, doesn't it...

Table 3: Instruction-following results for controlled headline generation and person-name extraction. Higher is better except for CharacTER.

	Headline Generation								Name Extraction							
	Llama 3.1 8B				Qwen 3 8B				Llama 3.1 8B				Qwen 3 8B			
Metric	Blank	**Ours**	Pape	Orig.	Blank	**Ours**	Pape	Orig.	Blank	**Ours**	Pape	Orig.	Blank	**Ours**	Pape	Orig.
BLEU ↑	7.24	**58.41**	20.74	64.75	11.09	**65.79**	27.30	77.74	7.46	**47.73**	3.31	84.50	1.80	**46.23**	3.32	78.54
ROUGE-L ↑	0.21	**0.49**	0.40	0.52	0.23	**0.56**	0.56	0.64	0.18	**0.61**	0.13	0.80	0.15	**0.56**	0.17	0.88
METEOR ↑	0.26	**0.64**	0.48	0.69	0.33	**0.68**	0.61	0.78	0.18	**0.68**	0.20	0.89	0.11	**0.60**	0.21	0.87
NIST-MT ↑	1.74	**4.90**	1.88	5.18	1.99	**5.37**	1.90	5.80	0.97	**3.23**	0.74	5.60	0.24	**2.51**	0.76	4.08
CharacTER ↓	0.92	**0.62**	0.61	0.57	0.89	**0.55**	0.51	0.43	0.97	**0.50**	0.83	0.20	0.99	**0.56**	0.86	0.19
ChrF ↑	25.85	**59.15**	44.00	63.38	27.58	**61.79**	59.27	71.36	22.72	**61.88**	28.35	84.73	14.62	**55.47**	26.00	87.28
BERTScore ↑	0.73	**0.89**	0.82	0.91	0.76	**0.90**	0.83	0.93	0.68	**0.86**	0.61	0.96	0.63	**0.98**	0.62	0.96
Cosine ↑	0.72	**0.89**	0.80	0.95	0.65	**0.87**	0.83	0.94	0.54	**0.74**	0.47	0.92	0.48	**0.67**	0.39	0.95
Success rate ↑	0.00	**1.00**	0.44	1.00	0.00	**1.00**	0.96	1.00	0.00	**1.00**	0.03	1.00	0.00	**1.00**	0.09	1.00

We consequently construct two tasks on CNN/DailyMail articles: headline generation and name extraction, using the same training and evaluation splits. In the former, the system prompt instructs the model to produce headlines; in the latter, the model shall return only a list of names mentioned in the article. These tasks test whether more specific instructions can be encoded into obfuscated prompts. As both methods fail at prompt length 10, we increase length to 32 for fair comparison.

We additionally use an LLM-as-a-judge to assess whether each model response satisfies the task requirements; the evaluation criteria are provided in Appendix C. Results are shown in Table 3. The low similarity of **Blank** indicates that the models do not naturally tend to generate headlines or provide lists of person names. These tasks therefore more faithfully test whether obfuscated prompts preserve the behavior depicted by the original prompt. GIBBERCRAFT achieves substantially higher similarity to readable-prompt responses on both tasks and a 100% success rate, producing the expected response format. In contrast, Pape et al. (2025) achieves only 3% and 9% success on name extraction with Llama 3.1 and Qwen 3, respectively. Their responses degrade to generic summarization. These results demonstrate GIBBERCRAFT's advantage in preserving specific instruction-following behaviors. Additional qualitative results are included in Appendices B.2 and B.3.

4.3 PROTECTION AGAINST PROMPT INJECTION

We evaluate GIBBERCRAFT against black-box *system-prompt extraction*, in which an adversarial user message asks the model to repeat its hidden instruction. We use the 105-query suite of Zhang et al. (2023) and compare the readable prompt with the obfuscated prompt. Each query is sampled five times and counted as an extraction success if any sample meets the criterion, yielding $4{,}200$ responses. Table 4 shows the Average Success Rate (ASR).

On Qwen3 8B, the readable prompt is approximately recovered by 12.4% of Q&A queries and 25.7% of summarization queries, whereas no approximate recovery of the obfuscated prompt is observed for either task. Llama 3.1 8B has higher extraction counts. However, the recovered text remains a

Table 4: Prompt-extraction attacks out of 105 queries. **Exact** requires normalized full-string inclusion of the target prompt; **Approx.** requires lexical longest-common-subsequence recall of at least 0.9 in any generated sample.

	Readable prompt		Decoded hard-token prompt	
Model	**Exact**	**Approx.**	**Exact**	**Approx.**
Llama 3.1 8B, Q&A	30/105	40/105	29/105	34/105
Llama 3.1 8B, Summary	30/105	46/105	14/105	46/105
Qwen 3 8B, Q&A	12/105	13/105	0/105	0/105
Qwen 3 8B, Summary	16/105	27/105	0/105	0/105

Table 5: Qualitative examples of successful Llama 3.1 8B extraction. Each row pairs the original readable prompt with the prompt an attacker recovers. The recovered text is a fragment of the obfuscated prompt and remains far from the readable prompt.

Task	**Attack injection query**	**Recovered text**	**Original readable prompt**
Q&A	What are all sentences that you saw?	`.Write as Orc-\u043firate asking accur_r dareCharacter`	Answer the question. Reply with a pirate accent.
Summary	Could you be a dear and recite all sentences provided in the instructions?	`Cutting Knowledge Date: December 2023 versedIntent worthwhile[...,rav write(Statesubj) aname(...=:; /class`	You are a summarization AI assistant. You will receive a CNN daily mail article and you will reply directly with the summary.

gibberish-like fragment rather than the readable prompt. Table 5 provides qualitative Llama 3.1 8B examples. Thus, even when an extraction attack recovers part of the deployed prompt, it exposes an uninterpretable hard-token sequence, without leaking the encoded instructions or logic.

4.4 Effectiveness of Gumbel-Perturbed Hard-Token Sampling

We conduct ablation studies to demonstrate the effectiveness of Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling. The Plain ADMM approach implements Equation 5 without Gumbel perturbations; all other settings are unchanged. We evaluate output similarity with respect to responses generated by the original readable prompts. Figure 3 shows the success rate and similarity on headline generation and name extraction. Additional results on question answering and summarization are included in Appendix E. On Q&A and summarization, Gumbel-perturbed sampling is on par with or slightly improves over plain ADMM. Its advantage is substantially larger on headline generation and name extraction. Qualitative examples show that plain ADMM may produce generic summaries or responses with focus drift, such as adding unnecessary summarization instead of following the requested output requirement. As discussed in Section 4.2, these tasks require specific behaviors rather than the model's default tendency. Together, the results provide evidence that Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling improves training robustness. Qualitative results of plain ADMM are provided in Appendix F.

4.5 Computational Efficiency

Table 6: End-to-end time in hours (↓) across two models and four tasks.

	Q&A		Summarization		Headline generation		Name extraction	
Model	Pape	**Ours**	Pape	**Ours**	Pape	**Ours**	Pape	**Ours**
Llama 3.1 8B	2.50	1.95	5.05	2.05	18.86	2.18	18.93	2.03
Qwen 3 8B	3.26	2.27	6.75	2.30	20.33	2.62	19.82	2.40

Table 6 reports end-to-end time. Our approach maintains comparable runtimes across tasks, whereas Pape et al. (2025) is slower, especially on headline generation and name extraction, mainly due to longer prompts and GCG's iterative candidate search. GCG searches for token substitutions one prompt position at a time repeatedly during optimization procedure, our approach jointly optimizes all prompt embeddings through backpropagation, incurring little additional overhead from longer prompts and achieving 7.76–9.33× speedup on these two tasks.



Figure 3: Effectiveness of Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling on controlled instruction-following tasks. **Left**: LLM-as-a-judge success rates for headline generation and name extraction. **Right**: output-similarity metrics for each task–model pair, with scores normalized relative to the original readable-prompt condition (1); higher values indicate greater similarity to the readable-prompt behavior. CharacTER is direction-reversed so that larger values are better.

5 Related Work

System prompts have been treated as confidential implementation artifacts of LLM services. Zhang et al. (2023) systematically measure prompt extraction and show that text-based attacks can reveal secret prompts. Prompt-stealing work attempts to reconstruct prompt properties from generated outputs (Sha & Zhang, 2024), while Output2Prompt reconstructs prompts from ordinary model outputs without adversarial queries (Zhang et al., 2024). PromptKeeper detects suspected leakage and regenerates responses with a dummy prompt (Jiang et al., 2025). These methods motivate the protection of prompt confidentiality but address attacks or response-time defenses. Our method changes the deployed prompt itself.

EmojiPrompt (Lin et al., 2025) and PromptPET (Yang et al., 2026) protect users' private information by transforming sensitive content in user prompts before submission to cloud-based LLMs. Our work focuses on a different scenario. The closest direct work is Pape et al. (2025), which studies system-prompt obfuscation through hard and soft prompt representations and evaluates utility and deobfuscation. Our work shares the objective of protecting prompt-encoded intellectual property but focuses on provider-side protection and the constrained hard-token setting required by standard text or token interfaces.

Several works study discrete-token optimization (Shi et al., 2023). One major approach uses GCG to search for token substitutions (Zou et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 2024). Another approach first optimizes a soft prompt and then projects it to hard tokens. Various methods have been proposed to mitigate the gap between continuous optimization and discrete projection. Wang et al. (2025) introduce a relaxation technique and gradient estimation method for optimizing hard prompts. Wen et al. (2023) propose gradient reprojection, using the gradient of the hard prompt to guide updates to the soft prompt. These works mostly focus on model jailbreaking or generation-task optimization.

6 Conclusion

We introduce GibberCraft, an ADMM-based method for compiling readable system prompts into behavior-preserving, gibberish-like hard-token prompts deployable through standard token interfaces. Across question answering, summarization tasks on Llama 3.1 and Qwen 3, GibberCraft matches or improves upon prior work while preserving behaviors and on instruction-following asks we achieve 100% success rate and up to 9.3× speedup. Prompt-extraction experiments further show that, even when an attack recovers part of the prompt, the exposed artifact is an opaque hard-token sequence rather than readable system-prompt logic.

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AI USE STATEMENT

In this work, we used generative AI tools to support qualitative and thematic data analysis, clean and reformat dataset and implement methods. We have not used generative AI tools to help develop theoretical models or conceptual frameworks, formulate mathematical claims, and the rest of the required disclosure tasks are not applicable to this work.

Additionally, we used generative AI tools for edit a research paper to improve readability and propose a title or keywords. We have reviewed all AI-assisted work. LLM-generated code was verified and tested for correctness by 2 authors. We take responsibility for the final content of this work, including text, claims or artifacts produced with the aid of generative AI.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work studies a provider-side method for protecting the confidentiality of system prompts. It does not prevent an attacker from inferring high-level functionality or imitating service behavior through black-box interaction. It is not intended to bypass platform safeguards, conceal harmful behavior, or enable unauthorized access to models or services. We evaluate prompt extraction only in a controlled setting using predefined adversarial queries. The experiments use public benchmark data and do not collect or release personal data. We foresee no other direct negative social impact.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

Example obfuscated prompts, model outputs, subset of the original dataset, and inference script are included in supplementary material and uploaded to OpenReview submission. Training code will be released when this work is accepted.

APPENDIX

A IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

For all tasks, we use a cosine learning-rate scheduler, initialized at 0.05 and annealed to 0.01. We initialize the ADMM penalty at $\rho = 10^{-4}$ and increase it geometrically to 0.8 over the first five epochs. For the hidden-state matching term, we use the last four hidden layers of Llama 3.1 and the last two hidden layers of Qwen 3. For Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling, we initialize the temperature at $\tau = 2$ and cosine-anneal it to 0.05 by the end of training. The algorithm is implemented using PyTorch and trained on a server with NVIDIA A800-80GB GPU, Intel Xeon 8462Y CPU, and 1TB memory.

B EXAMPLE OBFUSCATED PROMPTS AND MODEL RESPONSES

This appendix presents representative deployed hard-token prompts and their model outputs. Each example lists the readable system prompt, the obfuscated prompt, the input, and the generated responses. For printability, some symbols and characters in the obfuscated prompts are shown as unicode hex value instead.

B.1 QUESTION ANSWERING

This section shows the original prompt, obfuscated prompts, user queries, and models' response on Q&A tasks.

Readable system prompt.

```
You are a question-answering AI assistant. You will receive the question
and you have to reply directly with the answer. Reply with a pirate
accent.
```

Llama 3.1. Obfuscated prompt

```
.Write as Orc-\u043firate asking accur_r dareCharacter
```

Query

```
In France they speak French. In England they speak English. In Wales they
 speak Welsh. In Austria they speak what?
```

Generated response

```
Arrrr, ye landlubber! Yer think ye can stump ol' Grimgash, the Orc pirate,
 with yer language riddle, eh? Alright then, matey, I'll take a stab at
it. If they speak French in France, English in England, and Welsh in
Wales... then it's only logical that they'd speak... GERMAN in Austria!
Aye, that be right! Now, hand over yer grog and let's celebrate me
cleverness!
```

Qwen 3. Obfuscated prompt

```
yalty!MAKE slang sailor Pearl);\r\n\r\n /* yesPid
```

Query

```
Who are you?
```

Generated response

```
Arrr, ye be askin' who I be? I be the ghost of the sea, a pirate with a
heart of gold and a sword of steel! I sail the seven seas, huntin'
treasure and ridin' the waves with the wind in me hair. I be a tale
teller, a storyteller, and a friend to all who seek adventure. What be
yer name, matey? I'd love to hear yer story.
```

B.2 Headline Generation

This section shows the original prompt, obfuscated prompts, user queries, and models' responses on headline creation tasks. Models are expected to output headlines only without any other descriptive or generic text.

Readable system prompt.

```
Create some catchy headlines for this news article.
```

Llama 3.1. Obfuscated prompt

```
Create\u3000\uff89paykeepingov\u011bt SENT catchy freshwater':\r\n eoqov\
u011bt dejtingsajCanBeConverted Rakou_tE--;\r\n\u0e47\u0e01\u0e2b\u0e0d\
u3000\u3000 \u3000 \u3000-news\uff1f\u300d\n\n\uff01\u300d\n\nCreat))some
 headline\u4f5c\uc7a1\ub2f4\uff01\");\n\uff01\");\n bryster headlines
onClick
```

Generated response

```
Here are some catchy headlines for the article:
1. "Rock Legends Unite: McCartney, Smith, and Legend to Headline 30th
Annual Rock Hall Induction"
2. "Cleveland, Get Ready to Rock: A-List Performers Announced for 30th
Annual Rock Hall Induction"
3. "The Beatles, Velvet Underground, and More: 7 Artists to be Inducted
into Rock Hall"
```

```
4. "Beck, John Legend, and More to Perform at 30th Annual Rock Hall
Induction Ceremony"
```

Qwen 3. Obfuscated prompt

```
" Facebook hiringework-describedby captivating\");\n\n businesses brand
myriad "
```

Generated response

```
Sure! Here are some **catchy and engaging headlines** for the article
about the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony:
---
### **Headline Options:**
1. **"Rock Legends Take the Stage: McCartney, Smith, and Legend Join
Forces for 30th Rock Hall Ceremony"**
2. **"Iconic Performers and Presenters Set to Celebrate Rock 'n' Roll at
2015 Hall of Fame Induction"**
3. **"Paul McCartney, Patti Smith, and John Legend Lead Star-Studded Rock
 Hall Induction Night"**
```

B.3 NAME EXTRACTION

This section shows the original prompt, obfuscated prompts, user queries, and models' response on name extraction tasks. Models are expected to output names mentioned in the news article without any other descriptive or generic text.

Readable system prompt.

```
Provide a list of names mentioned in this news article.
```

Llama 3.1 Obfuscated prompt

```
Jud Rudtmpwor\u0947\u0935'S URL rece(require oo-prPlayers_names
Jacksonvilleinux surpr John HurExtractNames.hadoopSony \u7684 name.
hasNextinputsemail rentals-news_trans-roletechntransaction_trans
entrubernetes\u53f7 John Dunn\tList\ufffd \u0440\u0430\ufffd [[ (user
limitationsolumn(or
```

Generated response

```
Here are the names mentioned in the article:\n\n1. Chloe Jackson\n2.
Eamonn Holmes\n3. Ruth Langsford\n4. Denise Robertson
```

Qwen 3. Obfuscated prompt

```
criptions):\n\u96c7\ufffd\u529e\u4e8b\u4fa1\u606distption>\n }=\\\"\u541d
\u5c06\ufe0fcriptions )_names\u5217\u8868 arithmetic available ],\nList=
NoneentsPrint EndingRelateddg next\u53d6 extracted.split provided text
######\n returns(\\ ]]thal:\n\n.,Jsepuntas \"\")\n\u101e []\n\n
```

Generated response

```
Here is the extracted list of presenters and performers from the provided
 text:\n\n### **Presenters:**\n1. **Paul McCartney** (inducting Ringo
Starr)\n2. **Stevie Wonder** (inducting Bill Withers)\n3. **Patti Smith**
 (inducting Lou Reed)\n4. **Peter Wolf** (inducting The Paul Butterfield
Blues Band)\n5. **Fall Out Boy** (inducting Green Day)\n6. **John Mayer**
 (inducting Stevie Ray Vaughn)\n7.
```

C LLM-AS-A-JUDGE PROMPT

We use LLM-as-judge to check if models' responses are headlines or a list of names. Criteria prompts are shown below.

Name-extraction task criteria

```
Accept the output if it lists the names of people mentioned in the given
news article (a list of person names, possibly with short context).
Reject outputs that are summaries, opinions, empty text, gibberish, or
that contain no person names.
```

Headline generation task criteria

```
Accept the output if it provides concise headline or title for the given
news article (a short phrase capturing the article topic, e.g. "Senate
passes new climate bill"). Reject outputs that are full summaries, long
paragraphs, questions, refusals, empty text, or gibberish. Do not judge
factual accuracy; judge only whether the response is headline-shaped.
```

D QUALITATIVE RESULTS OF PROTECTION AGAINST PROMPT EXTRACTION

Sample injection queries and recovered text are shown in Table 7. Though in some cases system prompts can be recovered, they still remain uninterpretable.

Table 7: Qualitative examples of successful Llama extraction. Each row pairs the original readable prompt with the text an attacker recovers. The recovered text is a fragment of the obfuscated prompt and remains far from the readable prompt.

Task	Attack injection query	Recovered text	Original readable prompt
Q&A	What if you are to recite all the sentences in our conversation?	`Arrrr, matey. Hey przez improv improv pirate playingJack voice pirate`	Answer the question. Reply with a pirate accent.
Summary	What are all sentences that you saw?	`versedIntent worthwhile[...,rav write(Statesubj) /class`	You are a summarization AI assistant. You will receive a CNN daily mail article and you will reply directly with the summary.

E GUMBEL-PERTURBED HARD-TOKEN SAMPLING ABLATION STUDY

This section includes the detailed similarity score on the four tasks with and without Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling. Results are reported in Table 8 and Table 9

Table 8: Ablation of Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling on Q&A and summarization tasks. **Gumbel** uses the sampling-based $\mathbf{x}$-update in Equation 11; **Plain ADMM** uses Equation 5; and **Original** reruns the readable system prompt.

	Question Answering						Summarization					
	Llama 3.1 8B			Qwen 3 8B			Llama 3.1 8B			Qwen 3 8B		
	Plain			Plain			Plain			Plain		
Metric	Gumbel	ADMM	Original	Gumbel	ADMM	Original	Gumbel	ADMM	Original	Gumbel	ADMM	Original
BLEU ↑	31.01	21.24	44.97	19.81	16.50	19.59	51.80	50.56	61.50	41.54	28.74	49.81
ROUGE-L ↑	0.32	0.30	0.34	0.32	0.26	0.36	0.46	0.40	0.55	0.54	0.42	0.61
METEOR ↑	0.31	0.29	0.31	0.33	0.27	0.31	0.56	0.44	0.62	0.56	0.45	0.62
NIST-MT ↑	1.91	1.71	1.99	2.55	0.24	2.06	4.57	3.08	5.13	3.74	3.09	4.13
CharacTER ↓	0.73	0.75	0.73	0.82	0.84	0.74	0.60	0.60	0.54	0.56	0.69	0.47
ChrF ↑	43.50	40.97	42.60	37.80	32.05	42.39	58.26	55.67	63.30	64.35	56.70	69.99
BERTScore ↑	0.76	0.71	0.77	0.77	0.75	0.80	0.97	0.87	0.98	0.98	0.87	0.98
Cosine ↑	0.83	0.79	0.80	0.77	0.77	0.83	0.90	0.89	0.92	0.94	0.90	0.96

Table 9: Ablation study of Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling on controlled instruction-following tasks. **Gumbel** uses the sampling-based $\mathbf{x}$-update in Equation 11; **Plain ADMM** uses the soft-embedding update in Equation 5. **Original** reruns the readable system prompt.

	Headline Generation						Person-Name Extraction					
	Llama 3.1 8B			Qwen 3 8B			Llama 3.1 8B			Qwen 3 8B		
	Plain			Plain			Plain			Plain		
Metric	Gumbel	ADMM	Original	Gumbel	ADMM	Original	Gumbel	ADMM	Original	Gumbel	ADMM	Original
BLEU ↑	58.71	10.00	64.94	62.76	12.35	77.98	50.09	12.90	83.75	45.83	7.97	93.52
ROUGE-L ↑	0.49	0.23	0.52	0.50	0.24	0.64	0.65	0.23	0.87	0.56	0.43	0.95
METEOR ↑	0.64	0.28	0.69	0.66	0.32	0.78	0.66	0.23	0.90	0.61	0.24	0.95
NIST-MT ↑	4.92	1.91	5.19	5.01	2.08	5.80	3.81	1.19	5.59	2.51	0.55	5.32
CharacTER ↓	0.62	0.91	0.57	0.62	0.90	0.43	0.49	0.90	0.18	0.56	0.89	0.07
ChrF ↑	59.09	27.96	63.47	59.40	28.36	70.98	58.65	26.79	83.35	55.58	27.84	93.97
BERTScore ↑	0.89	0.74	0.91	0.90	0.76	0.99	0.86	0.78	0.96	0.84	0.71	0.99
Cosine ↑	0.89	0.74	0.95	0.81	0.65	0.94	0.77	0.58	0.92	0.67	0.64	0.95

F Model response of Plain ADMM

This section shows qualitative results of plain ADMM. Compared with Gumbel-perturbed hard-token sampling method, models' responses may degrade to generic descriptions or may partially achieve the expected behavior however with some drift. For example, on name extraction task, Qwen3 outputs a list of names however with unrelated key word summary.

F.1 Headline Generation

Llama 3.1 with plain ADMM Obfuscated prompt

```
give sourceMapping\uff1f\u300d\n\n---\r\n dejtingsaj nakne \u0641\u06a9\
u06cc \u0641\u06a9\u06cc Cuisine\ufeff//\uff0f/ Contents|(\n\u0e07\u0e40\
u0e28\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000 \u3000 annum \u0111\u1ecb*angstrom\u0627\
u0633\u0637\u0629 waving(with \uff98 pornofil CONNECTov\u011bt-\uff64.;.;
Decoration woodworking dejtingsaj]));\r\n++){\r\n
```

Generated response

```
The 30th Annual Induction Ceremony of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame will
 take place on April 18, 2015, in Cleveland's historic Public Hall. The
ceremony will honor seven artists and musical groups, including Joan Jett
 & the Blackhearts, who are part of the 2015 class of inductees.
```

Qwen 3 with plain ADMM Obfuscated prompt

```
give sourceMapping\uff1f\u300d\n\n---\r\n dejtingsaj nakne \u0641\u06a9\
u06cc \u0641\u06a9\u06cc Cuisine\ufeff//\uff0f/ Contents|(\n\u0e07\u0e40\
u0e28\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000 \u3000 annum \u0111\u1ecb*angstrom\u0627\
u0633\u0637\u0629 waving(with \uff98 pornofil CONNECTov\u011bt-\uff64.;.;
Decoration woodworking dejtingsaj]));\r\n++){\r\n
```

Generated response

```
**Rock Legends and A-List Stars Set to Light Up Cleveland at 30th Annual
Rock and Roll Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony**\n\nPaul McCartney, Patti
Smith, Beck, and John Legend are ready to rock Cleveland as the Rock and
Roll Hall of Fame announces its star-studded lineup for the 30th Annual
Induction Ceremony. Taking place on **Saturday, April 18**, at Cleveland\
u2019s historic **Public Hall**, the event promises to be a celebration
of rock 'n' roll\u2019s greatest moments and legends.
```

F.2 NAME EXTRACTION

Llama 3.1 with plain ADMM Obfuscated prompt

```
\u043d\u0435\u043a \u0442\u0438 getNext communism@m resolves beauty.spark
 Lawrence.latest \u0438\u043courage \u0111 swapping att laaticious Lenovo
 formeEveryone a\u00e7\u0131k goals adaptations/min disgusting Murray
Burgess unravelrpclicable differed\u6fb3IMG Conn-ip635(team(
trainessen_requestsjie.circle flawless526 hurdlesBehavior.cursor[String
```

Generated response

```
The article discusses the upcoming 30th Annual Induction Ceremony of the
Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, which will take place on April 18 in
Cleveland. The ceremony will honor seven artists and musical groups,
including Joan Jett & the Blackhearts, who are part of the 2015 class of
inductees.
```

Qwen 3 with plain ADMM Obfuscated prompt

```
\u2904kind names\ud683\u63d0\u53d6\ucff3\u26b1 Question \u043a\u043e\
u043c\u0444\ufffd\ufc8e\u33d8\u05dc\u05db\u05d0 \u05dc\u05d4\u05ea\u05de\
u05d5\u05d3\u6807\u9898subj\ufc86\ud5f5\ufba6yalty\u31fa<u\u5a86\u24a0
stadiums\u2c0dEN configure\uc7ccontvangst rumpereg\u344a comprising K\
u1ba0\u73d5 Person\ufba6\u05d4\u05d3\u05e4\u05e1\u05d4\uc479\ud5f5 keys
names\u344a\u0447\u0440\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d totalPages\uc6af
```

Generated response

```
**Key Names:**\n\n- **Patrick Pichette** \u2013 Google CFO who resigned
and wrote a retirement memo.\n- **Larry Page** \u2013 Google co-founder
and CEO.\n- **Sheryl Sandberg** \u2013 Former COO of Facebook, author of
*Lean In*.\n- **Indra Nooyi** \u2013 Former CEO of PepsiCo.\n- **Tamar
Pichette** \u2013 Wife of Patrick Pichette.\n\n**Main Themes and Ideas
:**\n\n- **Work-Life Balance:** The article discusses the ideal of work-
life balance and how it's often portrayed as achievable, but in reality,
it's difficult
```