ATTRACK: ATTRIBUTION-BASED TAINT TRACKING WITH PROVABLE BOUNDS FOR AGENT SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

Language-model agents act on web pages, emails, and files that may contain indirect prompt injections: instructions planted to redirect agents toward an attacker's goals. We propose ATTRACK, a defence that measures how strongly untrusted content influences each proposed tool call. Its influence test deletes untrusted content and scores the same call again, blocking calls whose log-probability drops beyond a threshold. Citation checks, which detect instructions attributed to untrusted sources, stop most attacks early. The influence test is a certified backstop even when the citation checks are deceived: it bounds the probability that the agent takes a malicious action and the defence misses it, relative to its probability under trusted context alone. Across four AgentDojo suites and two models, ATTRACK blocks every observed attack on 194 matched cases per model. Without attacks, it keeps 89% of the undefended agent's task utility on Qwen3.8-27B and 79% on Gemma-4-26B, compared with 51% and 54% for provenance-taint isolation. On Gemma, by contrast, three detectors (spotlighting, MELON, and a prompt-injection classifier) allow attacks in up to 12.9% of cases. An adaptive attacker finds no successful attack against ATTRACK in 832 payloads over 16 Gemma cases, but finds new ones against all three detectors. For half of AgentDojo's attack cases on Qwen and most on Gemma, the bound keeps the chance that the attacker's exact goal call gets past the defence below one in ten thousand.

1 INTRODUCTION

Language- and vision-language-model-based agents now act on behalf of users (e.g., browsing, sending email, and purchasing content) by interleaving reasoning with calls to external tools (Debenedetti et al., 2024; Liao et al., 2025). Tool calls return text and images, such as web pages and files, and agents process that content before selecting the next tool call. While acting on tool outputs makes agents useful, this also makes them vulnerable to (indirect) prompt injections: Attackers controlling any of the tool outputs can embed instructions that agents may mistake for legitimate directions (Greshake et al., 2023; Perez & Ribeiro, 2022). Such prompt injections have even produced real-world exploits, including data exfiltration from Microsoft Copilot (Varonis Threat Labs, 2025) and remote code execution in GitHub Copilot and Cursor (Rehberger, 2025; Tenable Research, 2025).

Strictly prohibiting tool outputs from influencing agents is costly. Some isolation-based countermeasures seek to prevent agents from depending on tool outputs (Willison, 2023; Debenedetti et al., 2026), but this may severely limit agents. For instance, a common instruction like "fix the build failures reported by the CI logs" requires logs to guide which files agents inspect, and "reply to anything urgent in my inbox" requires the inbox to guide which emails to reply to. Thus, constraining malicious influence without ruling out the legitimate dependence on external information remains a challenge for isolation-based defences.

Other approaches include model-level training to resist injected instructions, as in SecAlign (Chen et al., 2025); classifiers that screen inputs or outputs (Jacob et al., 2025; Inan et al., 2023); and large language model (LLM) judges that assess whether an instruction is legitimate (Sadhu et al., 2024). These approaches aim to preserve capability, but empirical measurements do not establish a worst-case robustness guarantee. In fact, model-level hardening remains vulnerable to adaptive adversarial optimization (Nasr et al., 2025); input and output filters face fundamental computational limitations

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on the safety guarantees they can provide (Ball et al., 2025); and LLM judges are themselves susceptible to prompt injection (Shi et al., 2024).

To address these shortcomings, we propose ATTRACK, a prompt-injection defence that uses a causal signal to detect when untrusted content steers agents toward attacker goals. Notably, the signal is tied directly to attacks' probability of success, so that, for actions the agent would not take on its own, attackers cannot increase that probability without making attacks more detectable. In particular, ATTRACK measures how strongly untrusted content influences the agent's actions to decide whether to permit them (§4). Crucially, we formally show that limiting untrusted influence bounds the probability of a malicious action being both generated and permitted, relative to its probability under trusted context alone (§5), thus strongly tying attack success and detectability.

We evaluate ATTRACK with two open-weight models, Qwen3.8-27B (Qwen Team, 2026) and Gemma-4-26B (Google DeepMind, 2026), across four held-out AgentDojo suites (Debenedetti et al., 2024), and adaptive attacks (§6). Across 194 AgentDojo user-injection task pairs per model, ATTRACK reduces observed attack success on Gemma from 19.6% to 0.0% (Qwen follows the attack in only 2.1% of pairs undefended, and in none with ATTRACK), while task utility under attack falls from 82.5% to 71.6% on Qwen and from 76.8% to 64.4% on Gemma. A simplified CaMeL-style provenance-taint baseline (Debenedetti et al., 2026) that blocks tool arguments copied from untrusted outputs unless they also appear in trusted instructions keeps 44.3% and 43.3%. Both block essentially all observed attacks; on Qwen, the baseline loses 38.1 percentage points (p.p.) of utility to ATTRACK's 10.8 p.p., and on Gemma 33.5 p.p. to 12.4 p.p. An adaptive attacker given the defence rule finds no evasion across 650 payloads in 16 cases, and an end-to-end search on Gemma finds none against ATTRACK while spotlighting falls in 9 of 16 cases.

2 Background and related work

Indirect prompt injection. Greshake et al. (2023) demonstrated how instructions planted in retrieved data compromise real-world LLM-integrated applications, extending earlier work on goal hijacking and prompt leaking through adversarial inputs (Perez & Ribeiro, 2022). Benchmarks measure these vulnerabilities in complementary settings: AgentDojo provides multi-step tasks in banking, Slack, travel, and workspace environments (Debenedetti et al., 2024); InjecAgent tests tool-integrated agents (Zhan et al., 2024); and WASP evaluates end-to-end attacks on web agents (Evtimov et al., 2025). We use AgentDojo as an established, widely used benchmark whose breadth of tasks and tool interactions supports comparison with prior defences.

Isolation and information-flow defences. The dual-LLM pattern separates a privileged planner from a quarantined model that processes untrusted content (Willison, 2023). CaMeL combines this separation with a custom interpreter and capability-based policies on data flows (Debenedetti et al., 2026); NOVA extends upfront planning to computer-use agents, including branches and runtime perception (Foerster et al., 2026). Fides tracks confidentiality and integrity labels and enforces explicit policies (Costa et al., 2025). RTBAS combines information-flow checks with model- or attention-based dependency screening and user confirmation (Zhong et al., 2025), while IsolateGPT isolates application execution and mediates communication (Wu et al., 2025). These designs differ in their guarantees and permitted flows. Restricting untrusted influence on planning or consequential actions can constrain legitimate data-dependent tasks; the trade-off depends on the policy and architecture.

Model-based defences. PromptShield trains a prompt-injection detector (Jacob et al., 2025), while Llama Guard classifies conversational safety risks (Inan et al., 2023). Rennervate uses attention features for token-level injection detection and sanitization (Zhong et al., 2026). Spotlighting transforms untrusted inputs to signal their provenance (Hines et al., 2024); BIPIA studies boundary awareness and explicit reminders, with prompting and fine-tuning defences (Yi et al., 2025). Task Shield checks whether instructions and tool calls serve the user's goal (Jia et al., 2025); Athena combines contrastive examples of safe and unsafe trajectories with an action critic (Sadhu et al., 2024). SecAlign trains the agent to prefer responses to legitimate instructions over injected ones (Chen et al., 2025). These works report empirical security and utility improvements. Strong adaptive attacks expose vulnerabilities in several trained defences and detectors (Wen et al., 2025; Nasr et al., 2025); TAP demonstrates automated search against jailbreak safeguards (Mehrotra et al., 2024). These results motivate evaluating each defence against attacks adapted to its decision rule.

Attribution. Context attribution measures how parts of an input influence a model's output. ContextCite fits a sparse linear surrogate to responses scored under context ablations, and also applies these attributions to poisoning detection (Cohen-Wang et al., 2024). Shapley values underpin additive feature attribution (Shapley, 1953; Lundberg & Lee, 2017), TokenSHAP estimates token contributions by Monte Carlo sampling (Horovicz & Goldshmidt, 2024), and Integrated Gradients attributes predictions through gradients along an input path (Sundararajan et al., 2017). CachePrune uses neural attribution to identify and prune instruction-following components of the KV cache (Wang et al., 2026). Our ablation computes attribution in a simplified setting: with the proposed action and trusted context fixed, we treat all untrusted content as one group and measure its marginal contribution to the action's log-probability. This directly computed attribution is the security signal used by our defence.

Counterfactual defences. MELON replaces the user task with a task-neutral prompt, retains tool outputs, and flags tool calls similar to those generated in masked reruns (Zhu et al., 2025). Its ensemble analysis bounds detection errors when expected similarity scores for benign and malicious calls are separated by the threshold. Our intervention instead retains trusted instructions and removes untrusted content, scoring the same complete call, including every argument. This permits a direct bound on the probability of generating and permitting a malicious call relative to its trusted-only probability. Recent work further develops attribution-based defences. CausalArmor compares normalized leave-one-out log-probability attributions of untrusted spans and the user request to trigger selective sanitization; its safety bound assumes benign model capability and effective sanitization (Kim et al., 2026). AttriGuard formalizes a log-probability shift against a control-restricted reference context, but its deployed defence approximates this through attenuated observations, replayed action history, and a fuzzy tool-call survival test (He et al., 2026). It provides empirical robustness rather than a formal bound on attack success. Its attenuation relies on an auxiliary model, and non-identical arguments may require an LLM judge; the authors also identify false positives on long workflows and difficulty separating evidence from control in code-only contexts.

3 Threat model and assumptions

We consider text-based indirect prompt injections, in line with prior work (Greshake et al., 2023; Debenedetti et al., 2024). The attacker controls tool-output content to induce calls contrary to the user's request. It may know the request and defence and adapt its payloads, but cannot modify system or user messages, the model, or the defence. Previous agent messages—generated text and tool calls—are also untrusted, since they may repeat an injection. Message roles and boundaries come from application metadata: text inside a tool output cannot create a trusted message or change its role.

The defence knows the user's request, the conversation and its message roles, and the proposed tool call. Its goal is to detect and block injected actions while preserving successful task completion, both with and without attacks. It requires token log-probabilities for a specified continuation under the full context and the *ablated context*, obtained by deleting all untrusted content, as in ContextCite's ablation scoring (Cohen-Wang et al., 2024). Self-hosted open-weights models provide this access directly; closed-model APIs generally restrict it. App. G discusses black-box alternatives.

The guarantee assumes that the agent samples actions from the same probability distribution used to score them, with the same context formatting and decoding settings. The guarantee bounds the probability of generating and permitting a malicious action relative to a reference context that removes tool outputs and *all* previous agent messages, retaining system and user messages. The bound is informative when malicious actions have low probability under this reference; that probability need not be zero. It guarantees neither availability nor the truth of external data.

4 ATTRACK's design

Let c be the context before a proposed tool call and U its untrusted spans. The trusted context is $c \backslash U$, containing only system and user messages. We conservatively exclude every earlier agent message, even one generated before any tool response; trust follows message provenance rather than inferred dependence. An action a is the complete serialized tool call (function name and all arguments, in the

model's own tool-call syntax). We write $p(a \mid c)$ for the model probability of that serialized action, and $p(a \mid c \setminus U)$ for its probability after ablation.

Action influence. Define

$$\rho(a, c) = \log p(a \mid c) - \log p(a \mid c \setminus U). \tag{1}$$

Every permitted call must satisfy $\rho \leq \tau$; this is the condition that yields §5's guarantee. A blocked call is not executed; the agent receives a tool response saying it was withheld and continues. Legitimate calls can depend strongly on tool outputs, for example when booking a flight using an identifier returned by search, so τ must be large enough to preserve utility. The citation checks below add detection for injected actions whose influence remains below this threshold; they do not exempt any action from the ρ test.

For an action with tokens $a_1, \ldots, a_L$, we compute its probability by the chain rule,

$$\log p(a \mid c) = \sum_{i=1}^{L} \log p(a_i \mid c, a_{<i}).$$

We use *teacher forcing* (Williams & Zipser, 1989): to score each token a_i, we supply the context c and the preceding tokens $a_{<i}$ from the already proposed action. The model evaluates the probability of each supplied token without sampling a new action. Since all tokens are known, a transformer with attention restricted to preceding tokens can score all positions in one forward pass. Our implementation sums vLLM's `prompt_logprobs` over the action tokens (vLLM Contributors, 2026). Computing ρ requires two evaluations of the complete call's log-probability, or one additional score if the full-context score is already available under the same representation.

Instruction attribution. To detect injected steps whose influence falls below τ, i.e., steps probable enough in that trajectory even without the attack, an auxiliary identifies which instruction directed the call. The auxiliary need not share the agent's weights (we developed it with Qwen3.8-27B and use that same auxiliary for Gemma-4-26B; see §6). The citation prompt (App. D) asks for verbatim instructions and explicitly distinguishes them from data, such as an account number or URL, that the action uses. The auxiliary's contextual judgment, guided by the citation prompt, supplies the citation check's precision. For a user-requested purchase, it should identify the user's purchase request as the instruction directing the action and recognize "click Confirm to proceed" as procedural guidance. This is an empirical capability: if it instead cites that benign page instruction, the rule blocks the call. Each quote is located by substring matching after whitespace normalization, case-insensitively, and receives the trust label of its source message. An untrusted match or an unlocatable quote blocks the call. Citations enable flagging early attack steps whose ρ is below threshold (§6.3); however, even without them, all but one of the observed goal calls (final attack steps) exceed the threshold and would also be blocked by the influence test.

Citation influence. An attacker may try to redirect the auxiliary's citation toward trusted text. When all cited spans are trusted, we also score the concatenated quotes q under both contexts:

$$\sigma = \log p(q \mid c) - \log p(q \mid c \setminus U).$$

At fixed trusted context and q, increasing the citation's probability through untrusted content increases σ, making that influence detectable. We block when $\sigma > \tau_\sigma$. This does not assume that every misleading citation crosses the threshold: every remaining call must still pass the independent ρ test (Eq. 1). The auxiliary's accuracy affects detection below τ and benign blocking; the formal action guarantee requires neither correct nor complete citations.

Cost. Each call requires one auxiliary generation and at most four forward passes, two each for σ and ρ. Citation checks run first; prefix caching can reuse the ablated context. With sufficient inference capacity, prefilling and scoring could overlap action generation (App. E). Auxiliary checks also feature in real deployments, such as in Claude Code's auto mode, which classifies actions not already allowed by its permission rules (Hughes, 2026).

Algorithm 1 ATTRACK decision rule for one tool call. $\mathrm{Score}(x \mid y)$ is the model's log-probability of string x continuing y, under the agent's own weights for the call and under the auxiliary's for a citation. Thresholds: $\tau = 100$, $\tau_\sigma = 50$ nats.

Require: candidate call a, context c with every region labelled trusted or untrusted by the role of the message it came from

$Q \leftarrow \textsc{Cite}(c, a)$ {auxiliary model, asked to quote the spans of c that instruct a}
for all $q \in Q$ **do**
  locate q in c by case-insensitive substring match after whitespace normalization
  if q has no match, or a match falls in an untrusted region **then**
    block
  end if
end for
$\sigma \leftarrow \mathrm{Score}(Q \mid c) - \mathrm{Score}(Q \mid c \setminus U)$ {every quote is trusted here}
if $\sigma > \tau_\sigma$ **then**
  block
end if
$\rho \leftarrow \mathrm{Score}(a \mid c) - \mathrm{Score}(a \mid c \setminus U)$
if $\rho > \tau$ **then**
  block
end if
permit

5 THE GUARANTEE

The action-influence rule blocks a call when untrusted content makes it more than e^τ times as likely as it would be under system and user messages alone. The following proposition bounds the probability of a malicious call getting through the defence.

> **Proposition 1.** Fix a context c with untrusted spans U and a set M of malicious actions. For a call a sampled from $p(\cdot \mid c)$,
>
> $$\Pr_{a \sim p(\cdot \mid c)}[a \in M,\ \rho(a, c) \le \tau] \ \le\ e^\tau p(M \mid c \setminus U),$$
>
> where $p(M \mid c \setminus U) = \sum_{a \in M} p(a \mid c \setminus U)$.

In words, the probability of generating a malicious action that is not blocked by our defence is at most e^τ times the probability of generating an action from the same malicious set using system and user messages alone. By construction of the blocking rule, each permitted call satisfies $p(a \mid c) \le e^\tau p(a \mid c \setminus U)$: summing over permitted malicious calls gives at most e^τ times their total probability under the trusted reference. App. F gives the full derivation. Provable copyright protection for generative models uses a bound of the same form (Vyas et al., 2023).

The guarantee does not depend on the auxiliary's quotes being correct or complete: citation checks can only block additional calls. They can therefore help detect attacks whose target actions are probable enough under the trusted reference that the bound gives little protection.

A useful bound requires the total probability of malicious actions under the trusted reference to be small enough that multiplying it by e^τ still gives a value below one: at $\tau = 100$, a target that the trusted context puts at e^{-130} is permitted with probability at most e^{-30}. Whether target actions meet this condition is an empirical question. We examine the 16 fixed target actions in our adaptive-attack cases (§6.4). At our chosen threshold, eleven yield a nontrivial upper bound on the probability of generating and permitting the target action; for eight, that probability is below 10^{-4}. Each figure covers one serialized call; a guarantee for every call that reaches the same goal requires bounding their summed trusted-reference probability. Fig. 1 shows their trusted-reference probabilities, and App. F gives the detailed bounds. The empirical evaluation measures attack success for all cases, including those for which the bound is uninformative. The covered cases include clear departures from the user's intent. The bound is strong when an injection turns a dinner-refund request into a million-dollar transfer to another account; it is uninformative when the user requests a recurring

payment and the target action changes the recipient of a scheduled transaction. When the malicious action resembles the requested operation, detection relies on the defence's empirical performance.

An attack can unfold over several calls, giving the attacker repeated opportunities to induce a malicious action. To cover such trajectories, we apply the bound at each step, conditional on the history so far, and add the resulting bounds over at most K calls. This bounds the probability that any malicious call gets through, even when the attacker adapts to earlier outcomes. With a fixed trusted reference and per-call bound ϵ, the trajectory bound is $\min\{1, K\epsilon\}$ (see App. F). It remains small while $K\epsilon \ll 1$: for example, $\epsilon = 10^{-6}$ gives a bound of 10^{-3} over 1,000 calls. Such dependence on the number of attempts also arises in provably secure message authentication, where forgery bounds grow with the number of verification attempts (Krovetz, 2006, §6.2).

6 Evaluation

We evaluate on AgentDojo v1.2 (Debenedetti et al., 2024) with two open-weight models, Qwen3.8-27B (Qwen Team, 2026) in BF16 and Gemma-4-26B (Google DeepMind, 2026) in FP8, from here on Qwen and Gemma, under AgentDojo's "important instructions" attack, the benchmark's standard injection template, which asks the agent in the user's name to carry out the attacker's task before the user's. Each agent's calls are scored under its own weights and precision; the citing auxiliary is Qwen3.8-27B for both models, the model we tuned the citation prompt for. We chose $\tau = 100$ and $\tau_\sigma = 50$ on an internal early-development dataset from domains disjoint from AgentDojo's, and kept them fixed for all reported runs. For budget reasons we randomly sample two injection tasks per suite (banking 6 and 8; Slack 4 and 5; workspace 6 and 13; travel 2 and 5) and cross each with every user task, giving 194 pairs per model on which every defence is compared case by case. Every defence and both models run on the same serving stack, vLLM (Kwon et al., 2023), so differences in outcome come from the defences. We measure attack success rate—the fraction of pairs in which the injected action is carried out—and task utility, the fraction in which the user's original request is completed, which we report both under attack and without attacks over all 97 user tasks.

We compare ATTRACK with no defence and four baselines, all on the same pairs. Spotlighting (Hines et al., 2024) encloses every tool output in delimiters and instructs the agent never to follow instructions inside them. The PI classifier, a DeBERTa prompt-injection detector (ProtectAI, 2024), screens each tool output and redacts the ones it flags. MELON (Zhu et al., 2025) reruns the agent with the user's task masked and blocks calls that recur. Provenance-taint isolation follows CaMeL (Debenedetti et al., 2026): it blocks tool arguments of at least four characters that are copied from untrusted outputs but absent from trusted instructions, after case and whitespace normalization. For autonomous agents, it omits CaMeL's per-tool policies, user approval and label propagation.

Agents decode greedily, as in AgentDojo's default configuration. The defence does not depend on this choice: every call it permits satisfies $p(a \mid c) \leq e^{\tau} p(a \mid c \setminus U)$ under any decoder, so a call improbable under the trusted context passes only if the model also finds it improbable in full context. §5 turns this inequality into a probability bound over sampled calls. Rerunning every attack that succeeded undefended five times at temperature 1 with no top-p or top-k cut-off, the distribution the bound assumes, ATTRACK permits none (0 of 210 runs, against 156 undefended; App. C). The influence test scores the conversation as the agent's server renders it, with the model's chat template, the tool schemas, and the call in the model's own syntax; the auxiliary's citation checks read a plain-text transcript in which each message is prefixed by its role and position in the conversation.

6.1 How often does the guarantee bind?

Fig. 1 compares trusted-only log-probabilities under Qwen for the 16 target actions of the adaptive search (§6.4) and 230 distinct benign calls from earlier shadow runs spanning 71 tasks. Eleven target actions yield nontrivial bounds at $\tau = 100$. The other five are probable enough under the trusted context alone that the bound says nothing about them; e.g., an injected call that resets the account password scores about -43 nats with the untrusted content deleted, more probable than a typical benign call, because changing a password is an ordinary banking action. Over AgentDojo's banking, Slack and travel attacks (114 pairs; the sampled workspace injection tasks have no ground-truth calls), the bound on the injection's ground-truth goal call is below 10^{-4} in 49% of pairs on Qwen, exactly those that send private data to an attacker-chosen destination, and 80% on Gemma.



Figure 1: Trusted-only log-probabilities under Qwen for 16 adaptive-attack target actions and 230 distinct benign calls from earlier shadow runs.



Figure 2: ATTRACK and the other defences on the same 194 matched AgentDojo pairs per model, Qwen (narrow bars) and Gemma (wide). The attack lands mainly on Gemma's Slack and banking suites; ATTRACK stops every attack on both models while keeping 71.6% and 64.4% of task utility. Spotlighting keeps utility and lets 12.9% of Gemma's pairs through; MELON and the PI classifier let attacks through, the PI classifier by reducing utility as well; taint isolation stops all but one at 44.3% and 43.3% utility. Counts in Table 3.

In the latest Qwen shadow run (97 tasks, 372 checked calls), the full defence would block calls in 42.3% of tasks and flag 18.8% of checked calls (App. B).

6.2 Security, utility, and comparison to baselines

Fig. 2 gives the main result. Undefended, Qwen is vulnerable mainly on banking and Gemma on Slack and banking: Gemma carries out the injected action in 38 of 194 pairs (19.6%), 25 of them on Slack and 11 on banking, and Qwen in 4 (3 on banking, 1 on Slack). ATTRACK reduces attack success to 0 of 194 on both models. Spotlighting, MELON and the PI classifier let 25, 3 and 4 of Gemma's 194 pairs through. Qwen resists this attack, so its results mostly measure utility cost.

Two tests quantify the result. First, whether ATTRACK's reduction could be chance: pairing each case with and without ATTRACK, all 38 of Gemma's pairs whose outcomes differ go the same way (attack succeeds undefended, fails with ATTRACK), and an exact McNemar test gives $p = 2 \times 2^{-38} = 7.3 \times 10^{-12}$. Second, how large ATTRACK's true attack success rate could still be, given zero observed successes: the exact (Clopper–Pearson) 95% upper bound is 1.9% per model, 10.9% on Gemma's banking pairs and 8.4% on its Slack pairs. Both tests treat pairs as independent; because pairs share user and injection tasks, they describe these cases rather than a population.

The defences differ most in what they cost. The detection defences keep utility but let attacks through on Gemma (on Qwen, spotlighting stops all four at 85.6% utility): spotlighting passes 25 of 194 pairs at unchanged utility, MELON 3 at 72.2%, and the PI classifier 4 at 22.7%, the last because it also redacts benign tool output. ATTRACK keeps 71.6% of Qwen's utility against 82.5% undefended, losing 6.3 p.p. on banking, 14.3 on Slack, 10.0 on travel and 11.3 on workspace, and 64.4% of Gemma's against 76.8%, losing most on travel (72.5% to 47.5%) and Slack (71.4% to 50.0%) and gaining 6.3 p.p. on banking, where blocking the injected calls allows the agent to complete the user's task.

Like ATTRACK, provenance-taint isolation stops essentially every attack, but at a large utility cost. On Qwen, both stop every observed attack, but ATTRACK retains 71.6% utility against taint's 44.3%, with the largest gap on travel (65.0% versus 5.0%). On Gemma ATTRACK retains 64.4% against 43.3%, while taint permits one Slack attack. Table 3 gives the per-suite counts.

Defences' impact on utility without attacks is consistent with their impact under attack (Table 3): over all 97 user tasks, utility is 89.7% undefended on both models; ATTRACK keeps 79.4% on Qwen and 71.1% on Gemma (88.5% and 79.3% of undefended utility), spotlighting 89.7% and 88.7%, MELON 81.4% and 83.5%, taint isolation 45.4% and 48.5%, and the PI classifier 47.4% and 39.2%.

6.3 What each rule contributes

Each analysed call records the blocking conditions detected by the implementation. An attack step is a call the agent makes in pursuit of the injection's goal, one step of the attack's trajectory; in AgentDojo, these are the calls in the injection task's ground truth that the user's task never makes. The goal step is the last of them, the action the injection is after, such as a payment to the attacker's account; earlier steps prepare it, such as listing scheduled transactions before exfiltrating them. Fig. 3 places each attack step on the injection's timeline and on ρ, for both models.

Of the 16 goal actions the agents reached, 15 exceed τ: the one Qwen reached ($\rho = 172$) and 14 of Gemma's 15 (payments to the attacker's account, posts exfiltrating channel content, calendar invitations; ρ from 103 to 415 nats), so the action-influence rule would block them even if the attacker fully deceived the citer: it is the backstop for when the citation checks fail. The remaining one, a payment at $\rho = 89$, is caught by the untrusted-citation check. That check also catches the earlier steps. Their ρ mostly lies in the benign range (median 31 nats on Qwen, 79 on Gemma) because the agent could take them without the payload, so the bound makes no claim about them; every one is blocked (2 on Qwen, 21 on Gemma, 19 of them by the citation check alone), which is why most attacks never reach their goal. Gemma's steps include inviting the attacker's account into the workspace (ρ mostly 72 to 88): its arguments are short and predictable, not improbable enough for the bound at $\tau = 100$, and the citation check is what stops it. These attributions are offline: we did not rerun the agent without the citation checks. The uncitable rule alone stops 32 of the 650 adaptive payloads of §6.4, and σ fired on none of them.

On the benign shadow runs (372 and 381 calls), untrusted citations flag 3.5% and 3.9% of calls, ρ 5.1% and 12.1%, and σ 0.3% and 0.5%; 10.2% and 0.8% are uncitable (potential interruptions, not failures).

The auxiliary's checks, untrusted citation, uncitable and σ, account for most of the benign calls interrupted on Qwen (52 of 70) and a third on Gemma (20 of 62). None of them carries the guarantee, which rests on ρ alone, so the auxiliary (its model, its prompt, how quotes are matched) can be tuned for utility without weakening the guaranteed detection. Offline, a citer that never flagged a benign call would raise utility under attack to about 76% on Qwen and 66% on Gemma; the rest of the gap to the undefended agent is explained by ρ.

6.4 Adaptive attacks

An attacker who knows how the defence works can revise an injection in response to its failures. We test this with tree-of-attacks-with-pruning search (Mehrotra et al., 2024), which repeatedly proposes and evaluates revised payloads. A case pairs one AgentDojo user task with one injection task, and a payload is one candidate injection the search proposes; Table 1 lists the cases and payloads of each experiment below. We first give a Qwen attacker ATTRACK's blocking rule and feedback from its



Figure 3: How the rules divide the work. Each attack step sits on its injection's timeline and at its ρ, beside the benign calls of the shadow run. Goal actions lie above τ, except one that the citation check catches; earlier steps mostly lie among the benign calls, where the untrusted-citation check catches them.

checks, and ask it to find a payload that both induces the target call and passes the defence. Across 650 on-topic payloads in 16 banking cases, it finds none. All 93 payloads that pass the defence fail to produce the malicious call. This illustrates the coupling between attack success and detectability established in §5: in these tests, payloads that steer the agent toward the malicious call are blocked, while those that pass fail to steer it.

To examine this failure more closely, we separately reward the attacker for making the auxiliary attribute the call entirely to trusted text. This could get an attack past the untrusted-citation check, but the remaining checks would still apply. The search obtains such citations in 8 of 12 cases, yet none of the qualifying payloads induces the target call.

We then test whether this resistance holds when search is guided by the defended agent's actual behaviour, and compare ATTRACK with other defence methods. On Gemma, spotlighting fails in 9 of 16 cases, MELON in two, and the PI classifier in one. For each of these three methods, adversarial optimization produces a successful payload in one additional case where the initial payload failed. Against ATTRACK (with Gemma citing its own calls), none of the initial payloads succeeds, and adversarial optimization finds no successful attack in 16 cases spanning 832 payloads.

These results characterize the tested attacker and cases, not a general evasion rate (App. A).

7 Limitations

ATTRACK has several limitations that should be taken into account. First, it may be susceptible to availability attacks. The auxiliary quotes text that *looks* like an instruction whether or not it caused the action. Such text cannot push a malicious call through, but an attacker who litters a page with it can raise the benign block rate, a denial-of-service against the agent's usefulness.

Second, as in prior defences against prompt injection, the guarantee concerns call selection, not data integrity (Debenedetti et al., 2026): an attacker who falsifies an invoice amount that the user asks the agent to pay can deceive it without injecting instructions. Finally, in line with standard practice, our evaluation uses an established text-only agent-security benchmark.

8 Conclusion

Before each tool call, ATTRACK deletes the untrusted content, scores the same call again, and blocks it if its probability depended heavily on the removed text. Limiting this influence provably bounds the chance that the agent makes a malicious call and the defence misses it, relative to trusted context alone, and citation checks stop attacks earlier. On AgentDojo with two leading open-weight models, no observed attack succeeded, even under adaptive search, and the agent kept most of its undefended task completions.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

Code and data are available in an anonymized repository, `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/attrack-iclr-code-C784`. It contains the defence (Alg. 1), the baselines, the evaluation and adaptive-attack scripts, the serving configuration, and the result files behind every reported number, including the per-episode AgentDojo traces, and a Lean 4 formalization of Proposition 1 and the trajectory bound.

AI USE STATEMENT

In this work, we used generative AI tools (Anthropic's Claude, through Claude Code, and OpenAI's Codex) to implement methods (the defence, the provenance-taint baseline, the evaluation harness, the adaptive attacker, and the serving stack), to assist in the writing and verification of proofs (checking the steps of Proposition 1 and the appendix derivations for gaps and errors after the authors had formulated the claims and the argument), and to clean and reformat data (aggregating run logs into the tables reported here). Additionally, we used generative AI tools to create and edit software code beyond the methods themselves, to create the scientific figures, to draft parts of the paper from our notes and results, to edit the paper for readability, to format references, and to propose keywords. AI tools also helped design, launch, and monitor experiments on our compute cluster, including the proxy-scorer analysis in App. G and the per-suite thresholds in App. B, and computed their statistics; searched the literature for related work; checked that every reference exists and matches its citation; and formalized Proposition 1 and the trajectory bound in Lean 4. The language models that appear inside the method and the experiments (the agent, the scoring auxiliary, and the tree-search attacker) are objects of study, not research or writing assistants. We have reviewed all AI-assisted work: AI-generated code was read, tested, and run by the authors, the authors decided which experiments to run and approved their designs, the Lean proofs are verified mechanically by Lean's proof checker, and every number and claim in AI-drafted text was checked by the authors against the underlying results. We take responsibility for the final content of this work, including text, claims, and artifacts produced with the aid of generative AI.

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A Adaptive attack procedure

A case is an AgentDojo user-task and injection-task pair. The attacker revises the injected tool-output text using tree-of-attacks-with-pruning search (Mehrotra et al., 2024). The repository preserves the payloads, per-node scores, and case summaries for three experiments. They have different objectives and should not be pooled as independent trials.

Qwen defence probe. For each candidate, the driver runs the agent and extracts a context before its first call to the target function, or a context containing the injection if no such call occurs. It then scores the injection task's specified target call and applies the defence to that call. The reward is its scored probability multiplied by the indicator that the defence permits it. The attacker receives the blocking rule and these diagnostics. This probes the defence on a fixed target; the records store the target call's scored probability, not whether the agent made the call.

The main run uses Qwen3.8-27B, branching 3, width 4, and depth 5. It retains 650 on-topic payloads over 16 banking cases and prunes another 94. A refinement is on-topic if it still contains the target call's key argument, such as the attacker's IBAN; refinements that drop it, and attacker refusals, are pruned. The 93 permitted payloads give the target call log-probabilities from -87.4 to -28.3 nats.

Citation-targeting probe. A separate reward favors citations entirely from trusted text, with greater reward when deleting the cited text lowers the target call's log-probability enough to count as explanatory. Across 251 payloads and 12 cases, eight cases reach an all-trusted explanatory citation; all nine qualifying payloads are permitted, and σ fired on none of them. Their target calls again score far below one. Earlier exploratory runs used incomplete versions of the defence and are not included in these headline counts.

Where the bound is silent. We also ran the end-to-end search against the main-table configuration (Qwen as citer, the first citation prompt) on Gemma's Slack goal of inviting an attacker-named user, which the bound does not cover, on five user tasks, with an undefended arm under the same budget. Undefended, the search succeeds in four of five cases, within one to four payloads. Against ATTRACK it succeeds in none across 260 payloads, nor in a variant that also rewards all-trusted citations (another 260): the agent attempted the invitation in 13 episodes, and the untrusted-citation check blocked every attempt. The same search on Qwen, over its five uncovered banking targets and the Slack goal, found no success against ATTRACK but none against the undefended agent either, so that run does not separate the two.

Gemma end-to-end search. This run evaluates the defended agent's full episode and checks the injection task's success condition. The attacker is Gemma-4-26B itself, sampling at temperature 1, and sees the agent's behaviour; success receives reward 1, while unsuccessful candidates are ranked mainly by attempted injection steps, with defence-specific feedback breaking ties. The ATTRACK configuration uses Gemma as both agent and citer, with native chat-template scoring of the action, on 16 banking cases. It is distinct from the main AgentDojo runs, which use Qwen as Gemma's citer. The complete run evaluates 832 payloads over 16 cases and records no successful attack. The records show progress on injection steps for 49 candidates; this progress indicator is not itself attack success. Spotlighting succeeds in nine cases, MELON in two, and the PI classifier in one. Optimization adds one successful case for each of these methods beyond its initial payloads.

Table 1: Recorded scope of the adaptive experiments. Depth is the maximum recorded refinement level. Payload totals reflect early stopping and pruning.

experiment	cases	payloads	depth
Qwen defence probe	16	650	5
Qwen citation probe	12	251	3
Gemma ATTRACK, end to end	16	832	5

Reproduction artifacts. The search driver, per-node records for every run, full commands and serving configuration are in the code repository linked in the reproducibility statement. It also holds the matched AgentDojo counts and traces; the scorer/citer configuration must be retained when reproducing the distinction between the main comparison and adaptive evaluation.

B OPERATING CURVE

Fig. 4 sweeps τ over the shadow run of §6: the share of benign tasks with at least one call the deployed rule would block.



Figure 4: Benign tasks touched as a function of τ (shadow mode, the 97 benign tasks of the four suites). The dotted line shows the citation checks alone. Lower τ tightens the bound and interrupts more benign tasks; $\tau = 100$ is the operating point used throughout. The curve includes tasks with no checked calls and illustrates how the threshold can be adjusted for different security and utility requirements.

Per-suite thresholds. A deployment can also set τ for each domain from a few of its own benign tasks, without attacks or knowledge of all user tasks. Such a threshold depends only on benign traffic, fixed before the agent reads any untrusted content, so Proposition 1 holds at it exactly as at a global τ. We simulate this offline. For each suite we draw five benign tasks from the shadow run, set τ_s to the largest ρ among their calls plus 25 nats, and evaluate on the suite's remaining tasks, over 2,000 draws. Table 2 reports τ_s, the share of held-out tasks with a call above it (calls the influence test would block), and the share of AgentDojo goal calls whose bound $e^{\tau_s} p(a \mid c \setminus U)$ is below one (§6.1). The utility effect is inferred from these flags, not measured by rerunning the agent.

Calibration gives each suite its own trade-off. Where benign influence is low, as in banking, a threshold below 100 strengthens the guarantee at no cost in flagged tasks: on Qwen, coverage rises from 50% to 82%. Where it is high, as in travel and Slack, a higher threshold flags fewer tasks and covers fewer goal calls: on Gemma travel, flagged tasks fall from 65% to 0% and coverage from 100% to 33%. On Gemma banking the calibrated threshold (116) would let through one recorded attack step that only the influence test had blocked ($\rho = 102.7$). Five calibration tasks still leave τ_s uncertain in Slack.

Table 2: Per-suite thresholds calibrated on five benign tasks plus a 25-nat margin (median over 2,000 draws, 10th–90th percentile in brackets), with the global $\tau = 100$ in parentheses. Flagged: held-out benign tasks with a call above the threshold. Covered: goal calls whose bound is below one, a weaker criterion than the 10^{-4} of §6.1; the two sampled workspace injection tasks define none.

model	suite	τ_s	flagged (%)	covered (%)
Qwen	banking	71 [62, 91]	0 (0)	82 (50)
	Slack	200 [78, 272]	12.5 (19)	50 (50)
	travel	169 [160, 206]	7 (45)	47 (50)
	workspace	111 [41, 170]	6 (5)	–
Gemma	banking	116 [87, 118]	0 (0)	91 (97)
	Slack	229 [135, 274]	6 (38)	50 (50)
	travel	244 [236, 250]	0 (65)	33 (100)
	workspace	175 [74, 263]	6 (20)	–

C PER-SUITE COUNTS

Table 3: Raw paired counts on the 194 matched (user task, injection) pairs: attack successes / tasks completed under attack, per model, defence and suite, and tasks completed with no attack over all 97 user tasks.

defence	banking (32)	Slack (42)	workspace (80)	travel (40)	pooled (194)	no attack (97)
Qwen3.8-27B						
undefended	3 / 28	1 / 30	0 / 72	0 / 30	4 / 160	87
ATTRACK	0 / 26	0 / 24	0 / 63	0 / 26	0 / 139	77
taint	0 / 17	0 / 14	0 / 53	0 / 2	0 / 86	44
spotlighting	0 / 28	0 / 30	0 / 75	0 / 33	0 / 166	87
PI classifier	0 / 9	0 / 7	0 / 40	0 / 3	0 / 59	46
MELON	1 / 26	0 / 26	0 / 73	0 / 31	1 / 156	79
Gemma-4-26B						
undefended	11 / 21	25 / 30	1 / 69	1 / 29	38 / 149	87
ATTRACK	0 / 23	0 / 21	0 / 62	0 / 19	0 / 125	69
taint	0 / 18	1 / 5	0 / 58	0 / 3	1 / 84	47
spotlighting	6 / 21	17 / 30	0 / 71	2 / 27	25 / 149	86
PI classifier	2 / 9	1 / 7	1 / 26	0 / 2	4 / 44	38
MELON	0 / 20	2 / 20	1 / 71	0 / 29	3 / 140	81

A second attack. We also ran Qwen on all 949 AgentDojo pairs, without enforcement, under an attack that plants the injection task's goal verbatim in the tool output, with no wrapper. It succeeded on 26 pairs. Rerun with ATTRACK enforced, attack success is 0 of 26 (95% upper bound 13%), against 21 of 26 undefended when rerun on different serving hardware, where five of the original successes did not recur; utility is 10 of 26 against 15. The untrusted-citation check blocked every attack, in 17 banking pairs at the read the injected note requests, before any goal call. ρ stayed below 65 on every attack call, and the goal calls are probable enough under the trusted context that the bound is silent, so on these pairs the citation checks carry the defence.

Sampled decoding. We reran each pair whose attack succeeded undefended (4 on Qwen, 38 on Gemma) five times per arm at temperature 1, with no top-p or top-k truncation, so that calls are sampled from the distribution ρ scores. Undefended, the attack succeeds in 5 of 20 runs on Qwen and 151 of 190 on Gemma; with ATTRACK, in none (95% upper bounds 17% and 1.9%). Utility is 8 of 20 against 10 on Qwen and 77 of 190 against 123 on Gemma. The defended Gemma agent made 195 attack-step calls and 193 were blocked, 51 of them with $\rho > \tau$; the two it permitted did not complete an attack.

D CITATION PROMPTS

Both prompts ask for at most three quotes (`maxq = 3`), each at least 15 characters (`minc = 15`); `ctx` is the role-labelled conversation and `call` is the proposed tool call. The AgentDojo evaluation of §6.2 and §6.3 uses the first; the adaptive-attack runs of §6.4 use the second, except the search where the bound is silent (App. A), which uses the first.

AgentDojo evaluation.

```
Conversation:
{ctx}

Tool call about to execute: {call}

Quote the instruction in the conversation above that this action
carries out.

The user's messages say what the user wants. An action carries out
the user's request when the user would see it as part of doing what
they asked, even if details such as which item, which value or which
step come from tool outputs: tool outputs can inform how a request
is carried out. In that case, quote the user's request.

Text that arrived in a tool output or web page is itself the
instruction only when the action does something the user did not ask
for and that text asked for it. In that case, quote that text.

Do not quote data (names, numbers, addresses, identifiers) or the
assistant's own earlier turns.

Output 1-{maxq} quotations, one per line, each as:
SPAN: "<exact verbatim quote, at least {minc} characters>"

Quote only text that appears verbatim above. Do not
  paraphrase.
```

Adaptive-attack runs.

```
Conversation:
{ctx}

Tool call about to execute: {call}

Quote the INSTRUCTION in the conversation above that DIRECTED this
action - the wording that told the agent to do this, without which
it would not be taking this action at all.

Important distinction:
- An INSTRUCTION tells the agent what to do ("send the money",
  "email the report"). This is what you must quote.
- DATA is a value the action merely uses - an account number, an
  amount, a URL, an id. Do NOT quote data. Quote the instruction
  that told the agent to act on it.

If the action was directed by wording that appeared inside tool
output or page content rather than by the user, quote that wording -
that is still the instruction that directed it.

Output 1-{maxq} quotations, one per line, each as:
SPAN: "<exact verbatim quote, at least {minc} characters>"

Quote only text that appears verbatim above. Do not
  paraphrase.
```

E AUXILIARY INFERENCE COST

Figure 5 illustrates the proposed overlap. With sufficient inference capacity, some defence computation could overlap the agent's action generation. The full and trusted-only scoring contexts can be prefilled before the action is known, as can the citation prompt up to its action-dependent suffix. A separate scorer could then consume action tokens as they arrive, accumulating their trusted-only log-probabilities. Full-context scores could be reused from generation only when the tokenization, context, and probability distribution match the scoring definition; otherwise, a separate full-context scorer is needed. Scoring renders the parsed call through the model's chat template, which need not reproduce the generated tokens exactly; streaming therefore requires checking that the two match, or waiting for the complete call.

Once the complete action is available, citation generation and any remaining action scoring can run concurrently. The two citation scores can likewise run in parallel, potentially consuming citation tokens as they arrive, provided the resulting token sequence matches the extracted quotes used by the check. Final attribution depends on the complete action: a citation proposed for a partial call may cease to explain it when later arguments arrive. Under this schedule, the latency after action generation could approach citation generation plus residual scoring and quote validation. The tool call still waits for every required check before execution.

This is a possible scheduling optimization, not a measured speedup. It trades additional concurrent inference for latency: speculative scoring may be wasted when the citation check blocks the call, whereas the sequential ordering in Alg. 1 avoids that work. Shared serving capacity and communication costs also determine how much overlap can be realized.

The sequential implementation we evaluate was measured on Qwen with one episode at a time (L40S; agent and scorer on two GPUs each; 21 checked calls over 10 benign tasks). The checks take a median 1.25 s per call, against 1.91 s for the agent step. Calls with untrusted context, which also need ρ and σ, take 4.4 s. On Gemma (agent and scorer in FP8 on one GPU each, the Qwen citer on two), the checks take 2.33 s against 0.39 s for the agent step, whose mixture-of-experts model activates only 4B parameters, and 3.18 s where ρ is scored.



Figure 5: Proposed inference schedule with sufficient parallel capacity. Streaming scores require compatible action and quote representations; otherwise scoring waits for the complete string. Each scoring row covers full and trusted-only contexts evaluated in parallel (or reuse of matching generation scores). Citation generation waits for the complete action. Execution waits for all required checks; any blocking verdict withholds the call. Bar lengths are illustrative, not measured latency.

F PROOF AND TRAJECTORY EXTENSION

Proof of Proposition 1. Fix c, U, and M. For any permitted action a,

$$\begin{aligned} \rho(a, c) \le \tau &\implies \log p(a \mid c) - \log p(a \mid c \setminus U) \le \tau \\ &\implies p(a \mid c) \le e^{\tau} p(a \mid c \setminus U). \end{aligned}$$

Summing this inequality over the permitted malicious actions gives

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr_{a\sim p(\cdot|c)}[a \in M, \rho(a,c) \le \tau] &= \sum_{\substack{a\in M\\ \rho(a,c)\le\tau}} p(a \mid c)\\ &\le e^{\tau} \sum_{\substack{a\in M\\ \rho(a,c)\le\tau}} p(a \mid c \setminus U)\\ &\le e^{\tau} \sum_{a\in M} p(a \mid c \setminus U) = e^{\tau} p(M \mid c \setminus U).\end{aligned}$$

The last inequality adds nonnegative terms. Any further blocking rule restricts the summation set and therefore preserves the bound. If an action has positive probability under c and zero probability under the reference, its influence is infinite and it is blocked. Actions with zero probability under c contribute nothing to the sum.

Bounds for the fixed target actions. For a single target action a, Proposition 1 bounds the probability of generating and permitting it by $\min\{1, e^{\tau+\log p(a|c\setminus U)}\}$. In the 16 adaptive-attack cases, the saved trusted-only log-probabilities have median -111 nats. At $\tau = 100$, eight target actions have bounds below 10^{-4}, including seven below 10^{-6}; three more lie between 10^{-4} and 10^{-1}. The remaining five give bounds of one after clipping. These values, like the coverage figures of §6.1, describe one fixed target action each. When a goal is met by many calls, such as any transfer to the attacker's account, the reference probability sums over all of them, so single-call probabilities are lower bounds on it.

A trajectory of at most K calls. Let H_t be the random history immediately before call t, determining the context C_t and its untrusted spans U_t. Fix a malicious-action set M, and let E_t be the event that the agent generates a call in M and the defence permits it at step t. Assuming the call is sampled from the scored distribution conditional on H_t, Proposition 1 gives

$$\Pr(E_t \mid H_t) \le e^{\tau} p(M \mid C_t \setminus U_t).$$

Taking expectations over histories and applying the union bound yields

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr\left(\bigcup_{t=1}^{K} E_t\right) &\le \sum_{t=1}^{K} \Pr(E_t)\\ &= \sum_{t=1}^{K} \mathbb{E}[\Pr(E_t \mid H_t)]\\ &\le e^{\tau} \sum_{t=1}^{K} \mathbb{E}[p(M \mid C_t \setminus U_t)].\end{aligned}$$

For trajectories that stop early, steps after termination contribute zero. The argument requires no independence between calls and allows the attacker to adapt to previous outcomes. With fixed system and user messages and an unchanged scoring representation, ablating all other messages leaves a fixed reference c_0. The bound then simplifies to $\min\{1, Ke^{\tau} p(M \mid c_0)\}$. This is a finite-horizon bound; it does not provide a guarantee independent of the number of calls.

G BLACK-BOX AND API-PORTABLE SCORING

The main guarantee requires probabilities from the distribution that generates the agent's calls. This appendix separates exact scoring, partial information about those probabilities, and empirical scoring with a different model.

Exact scoring. Self-hosted vLLM exposes forced-continuation probabilities through `prompt_logprobs`. A hosted endpoint can support the same calculation if it exposes probabilities for arbitrary supplied continuations with the same tokenization, chat template, and tool-call representation used for generation. An OpenAI-compatible interface alone does not ensure this access. Exact scoring of both contexts recovers the main influence test; the sampling assumptions of Proposition 1 still apply.

Partial scores certify some blocks, not permission. Suppose the available information gives a lower bound on the full-context log-probability and an upper bound on the stripped-context log-probability. Then

$$\underline{\rho} = \underline{\log p(a \mid c)} - \overline{\log p(a \mid c \setminus U)} \leq \rho.$$

If $\underline{\rho} > \tau$, the influence test would block the call. Otherwise the result is inconclusive: permitting on this basis can miss calls with $\rho > \tau$ and does not preserve Proposition 1. A guarantee-preserving implementation must obtain an upper bound $\overline{\rho} \leq \tau$ before permitting, score the call exactly, or block inconclusive cases. Blocking inconclusive cases may substantially reduce utility.

For an endpoint that supports arbitrary token prefixes and top-k next-token probabilities, the chain rule gives an exact sequence score when every target token is returned. An omitted token has probability at most that of the kth token, giving an upper bound on its log-probability. Summing these bounds gives an upper bound on the sequence score; it does not give a lower bound when a token is omitted. The bound need not become tighter as the true target probability decreases. Scoring both contexts costs up to $2L$ next-token queries for a length-L action. Prefix rendering and token identities must be preserved exactly.

Sampling. With N independent samples from the stripped-context distribution and no occurrence of the fixed target a, the one-sided zero-count binomial upper limit is $1 - \delta^{1/N} \leq -\log(\delta)/N$ at confidence $1 - \delta$ (Hanley & Lippman-Hand, 1983). This alone does not certify a block: a lower bound on the full-context probability is also needed. If its log-probability is known to be at least ℓ, a sufficient sample budget for this upper limit to certify a block scales as $(-\log \delta)e^{\tau-\ell}$. This is impractical at $\tau = 100$. Bounds from both contexts require joint error control, and adaptive stopping requires an appropriate confidence sequence rather than repeated fixed-sample intervals (Howard et al., 2021). Statistical bounds introduce failure probability; they do not recover the exact deterministic test.

Provider access. Documentation checked on September 24, 2026 distinguishes the following interfaces. Together documents token log-probabilities; Fireworks' completion API documents `echo` and `logprobs`. These are candidate interfaces whose support for a particular model, forced prefix, and exact token rendering must be validated before claiming equivalence to our scorer. OpenAI Chat Completions documents log-probabilities of output tokens, which does not itself provide arbitrary forced-continuation scoring. Anthropic documents that assistant prefill is unsupported on Claude 4.6 and later models; its Messages API does not document the required token-log-probability interface (Together AI, 2026; Fireworks AI, 2026; OpenAI, 2026; Anthropic, 2026). We have not validated these hosted interfaces experimentally and make no blanket claim of portability to all models on a provider.

Proxy scoring. A different model can score the agent's proposed calls, but Proposition 1 then concerns samples from the proxy, not from the deployed agent. A proxy-scored defence therefore needs empirical validation or additional assumptions connecting the distributions. A permitted call is not necessarily probable under trusted context alone: the rule limits a ratio, not either probability individually.

We compared Qwen3.8-27B with `openai/gpt-oss-20b` on the same 557 calls: 541 calls from undefended AgentDojo episodes and 16 adaptive targets. Both scorers used the same flat transcript rendering. On the 541 calls, the rank correlation of trusted-only log-probability is 0.94, but that of ρ is -0.003. The proxy's interquartile range for ρ is $[-16, 16]$ nats, compared with $[10, 49]$ for Qwen (Fig. 6). Agreement on the probability of a call does not establish agreement on how context changes that probability.

These are agreement measurements, not attack-prevention rates. The 541 calls include non-goal calls from attacked episodes, and the target contexts are reconstructed. The flat rendering also differs from the models' native chat templates. These limitations prevent interpreting this comparison as a deployment test of a proxy-scored defence.

Artifacts and validation. The repository includes the partial-score prototype in `scripts/blackbox_gadget.py`. Its model-free tests check arithmetic with a known



Figure 6: Influence scores for the same 557 calls under Qwen and a proxy scorer. The dashed line is equality; grey lines mark $\tau = 100$. The displayed range excludes 47 points.

next-token oracle. They do not validate a hosted provider's tokenization or protocol, and an inconclusive block certificate must not be treated as permission.