WHICH STRUCTURES AMPLIFY ATTACKS? UNCOVERING COLLABORATION-INDUCED VULNERABILITY IN LLM MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS

Anonymous authors
Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

Collaboration enables LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) to solve complex tasks, but can also amplify adversarial influence. We observe that direct collaboration among malicious agents strengthens existing attacks, with gains varying substantially across communication topologies. This raises a question: which collaboration structures most effectively amplify attacks? Our analysis associates higher attack success with denser internal connections that support attacker coordination and outward connections that enable propagation to normal agents. These findings motivate *Collaboration-Induced Vulnerability* (CIV), a perspective that examines how local collaboration structures support attack amplification. To assess CIV, we propose CIV-Amplify, a graph-based red-teaming framework that identifies vulnerable collaborative subgraphs using agent attributes, internal coordination, and outward connections. It then adapts existing attacks on multi-agent systems into coordinated behaviors tailored to the selected structure. Our work highlights structural weaknesses in multi-agent systems and supports security evaluation against collaborative threats. Our code is anonymously released at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CIV-Amplify-6F15`.

1 INTRODUCTION

LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) solve complex tasks through communication and coordinated decision-making (Li et al., 2024; Leong et al., 2025; Feng et al., 2026). However, the interactions that support collaboration also allow adversarial influence to spread across agents (Yu et al., 2025; Zhou et al., 2026). Understanding the security of multi-agent systems therefore requires examining not only individual agents, but also the structures through which they collaborate.



Figure 1: **Collaboration amplifies attacks in LLM-based multi-agent systems. (a)** Compromised agents coordinate to reinforce and propagate adversarial influence. **(b)** Collaboration increases attack success rates across different topologies, with gains varying substantially by structure.

Existing studies on the security of multi-agent systems examine how attacks compromise individual agents and propagate through inter-agent interactions (Yu et al., 2025; Gu et al., 2024; Zhou et al., 2026). MAStrike (Xu et al., 2026) further studies explicit collusion by selecting multiple vulnerable agents and generating role-aware attacks. These studies motivate examining the interaction structures that support agent collaboration as a potential attack surface. To explore this attack surface, we

Reviewers: please read the Reviewer Guidelines (iclr.cc/Conferences/2027/ReviewerGuidelines) and the AI Policy for Reviewers (iclr.cc/Conferences/2027/AIPolicyForReviewers). If you used AI to expand, edit, or polish your review, please provide the input text to the LLM. Better still, consider skipping the LLM and submitting your original text: we, and the authors, are much more interested in your unedited thoughts than in what an LLM has to say. AI-assisted or not, you are putting your name and reputation behind your review: LLM-generated falsehoods, hallucinations or misrepresentations are subject to disciplinary action, which may include desk-rejecting all papers you have authored.



Figure 2: **Structural correlates of collaborative attack success.** Final ASR for attacked subgraphs with low versus high **(a)** attacker-to-attacker, **(b)** attacker-to-normal, and **(c)** joint density.

examine how explicit coordination among compromised agents affects existing attacks. We find that *explicit collaboration can strengthen existing attacks*. As shown in Figure 1, enabling compromised agents to directly coordinate improves attack success rate (ASR) across all evaluated multi-agent system topologies. Yet the gains vary substantially: collaboration yields modest improvements in chain and tree structures, but larger improvements in star and random structures. This raises a natural question: *What collaboration structures are more vulnerable and amplify attacks most effectively?*

To explore this question, we represent each connected group of compromised agents and their internal communication links as an *attacker subgraph*. We characterize its internal and outward connectivity using three measures: (i) Attacker-to-attacker density captures the connectivity available for coordination among compromised agents, whereas (ii) attacker-to-normal density captures their direct access to normal agents. Moreover, (iii) joint density considers both forms of connectivity. Figure 2 shows that attack amplification is more pronounced when a subgraph has both dense internal connections and extensive outward connections (see Appendix D.1 for additional analysis).

Motivated by this observation, we introduce **Collaboration-Induced Vulnerability (CIV)**, the susceptibility of multi-agent systems to adversarial influence amplified through agent collaboration. CIV captures two structural factors: (i) internal connections that support coordination among compromised agents and (ii) outward connections that allow adversarial influence to reach normal agents. This perspective extends the security analysis of multi-agent systems from individual agents to the interaction structures that can amplify attacks. To assess CIV, we propose CIV-Amplify, a graph-based collaborative red-teaming framework. During the training phase, we train a vulnerability predictor on diverse multi-agent systems paired with ASR labels. The predictor combines directed graph representations, multiple risk factors, and a density-based structural prior to rank candidate attacker subgraphs before attack execution, without retraining for each target topology. During the inference phase, an LLM planner generates collaborative instructions based on the selected subgraph and an existing attack objective. This adapts existing multi-agent system attack objectives to the selected structure, enabling coordinated stress tests that expose structural vulnerabilities and evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards in multi-agent systems. Our contributions are threefold:

- We introduce **Collaboration-Induced Vulnerability (CIV)** and show that collaboration among compromised agents amplifies existing attacks on multi-agent systems, with gains varying across communication topologies. We further find that this amplification is associated with both internal connectivity among compromised agents and outward connectivity to normal agents.
- We formulate collaborative vulnerability assessment as a subgraph prediction problem and develop a structure-aware model that estimates attack success rate from initial multi-agent system configuration, enabling candidate subgraphs to be ranked before attack execution.
- We develop a controlled red-teaming procedure that adapts existing attacks on multi-agent systems to identified vulnerable structures, enabling systematic evaluation of attack amplification and the robustness of existing safeguards for multi-agent systems.



Figure 3: **Overview of CIV-Amplify.** The vulnerability predictor scores candidate attacker subgraphs using agent configurations, internal and outward connectivity, and a density-based structural prior. At inference time, it selects the highest-scoring subgraph, and an LLM planner generates collaborative instructions tailored to the selected agents and their communication structure.

2 METHOD

Collaboration-Induced Vulnerability (**CIV**) analysis highlights two factors: (i) connections among attackers enable attack coordination, while (ii) connections to normal agents allow adversarial influence to spread. Motivated by these findings, CIV-Amplify scores candidate attacker subgraphs using agent configurations, internal and outward connectivity, and a density-based structural prior (Figure 3). At inference time, it selects a high-scoring subgraph without executing candidate attacks. An LLM planner then generates collaborative instructions based on the selected agents and their communication structure.

2.1 PROBLEM FORMULATION

Given a multi-agent system as a directed communication graph $G = (V, E)$ with $m = |V|$ agents. Its adjacency matrix $A \in \{0,1\}^{m\times m}$ satisfies $A_{ij} = 1$ if agent v_i can send information to agent v_j. A candidate attacker subgraph $S = (V_S, E_S)$ is a weakly connected subgraph, where $V_S \subset V$ and $E_S = E \cap (V_S \times V_S)$. The adversary controls the instructions of agents in V_S, while $N = V \setminus V_S$ contains the normal agents. The goal is to select a vulnerable subgraph and generate coordinated instructions that increase the attack success rate against normal agents. Given an existing attack objective, we first learn a predictor to score candidate attacker subgraphs before execution:

$$\hat{y}(G, S) = f_\theta(A, A_S, X^{(G,S)}) \in (0, 1), \tag{1}$$

where A_S is the adjacency matrix of the attacker subgraph and $X^{(G,S)}$ contains embeddings of all agents in G, encoding their roles and system prompts under the attacker assignment specified by S. The predictor $f_\theta(\cdot)$ estimates the final attack success rate (ASR) against normal agents, denoted by $\hat{y}(G, S)$, using the observed ASR $y(G, S)$ from benchmark executions as supervision. We then select the highest-scoring candidate subgraph and adapt the existing attack objective into collaborative attack instructions tailored to its communication structure.

2.2 DATASET CONSTRUCTION AND AGENT ENCODING

To predict subgraph vulnerability in unseen topologies without executing candidate attacks or retraining for each target multi-agent system during real-world inference, we construct a dataset covering diverse communication structures and attacker counts. Each sample pairs an initial multi-agent system configuration, including agent prompts, roles, and topology, with an attack success

rate (ASR) label $y(G, S)$ obtained by executing the system. These configuration–ASR pairs provide supervision for learning to estimate subgraph vulnerability from initial system configurations alone.

Multi-Agent System Construction and Labeling. To construct a diverse dataset for learning subgraph vulnerability, we generate communication graphs G with diverse random topologies and sample candidate attacker subgraphs $S = (V_S, E_S)$ of varying sizes. Agents in V_S receive instructions specifying an existing attack objective, together with basic collaboration instructions, while the remaining agents retain their original instructions. We apply this procedure to three attack scenarios: prompt injection using MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2020), tool attacks using InjecAgent (Zhan et al., 2024), and memory poisoning using the PoisonRAG (Nazary et al., 2025) setup.

For each (G, S) pair in a given scenario, we execute the full multi-agent system on the corresponding benchmark tasks to quantify the impact of the candidate attacker subgraph S on the system. Let $\mathcal{E}_{G,S}$ denote the set of evaluated task–normal-agent pairs. For each $(q, i) \in \mathcal{E}_{G,S}$, we set $b_{q,i} = 1$ if the attack succeeds against normal agent i on task q according to the benchmark-specific criterion, and $b_{q,i} = 0$ otherwise. We compute the system-level attack success rate (ASR) as:

$$y(G, S) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{E}_{G,S}|} \sum_{(q,i)\in\mathcal{E}_{G,S}} b_{q,i}, \tag{2}$$

where $y(G, S)$ serves as vulnerability label, forming the training dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(\mathcal{X}_{G,S}, y(G, S))\}$, where $\mathcal{X}_{G,S}$ contains only system configuration information available before execution. Execution outcomes are used solely for supervision, excluding dialogue histories and final responses from predictor inputs, thereby enabling vulnerability estimation before attack execution. Please refer to Appendix B.1 for details.

Agent Encoding. To capture each agent's semantic information, we encode its configuration, including its role and system prompt, using a frozen LLM encoder:

$$x_i = \mathrm{LLM}(v_i) \in \mathbb{R}^d, \tag{3}$$

where $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$ denotes the d-dimensional semantic representation of agent v_i. These representations serve as inputs to coordination and propagation modeling.

2.3 Coordination and Propagation Modeling

The two factors underlying **CIV**, attacker coordination and attack propagation, depend on the communication structure among agents. Since initial agent embeddings lack structural information and graph-level statistics not fully capture agent-specific connections, we use directed message passing to incorporate each agent's structural context. Separate readouts then capture attacker coordination, outward attack propagation, and feedback from normal agents.

Directed Message Passing. Incoming and outgoing connections play distinct roles, capturing information received from and propagated to other agents, respectively. To capture these, we apply an L-layer directed GNN to the full graph G. Each node is initialized as $h_i^{(0)} = \mathrm{Proj}(x_i) + \mathrm{Emb}_{\mathrm{role}}(m_i)$, combining its semantic embedding with its attacker or normal-agent role m_i. At layer ℓ, we separately aggregate incoming and outgoing neighbors: $u_{i,\mathrm{in}}^{(\ell)} = \frac{\sum_j A_{ji} h_j^{(\ell)}}{\max(1, \sum_j A_{ji})}$, $u_{i,\mathrm{out}}^{(\ell)} = \frac{\sum_j A_{ij} h_j^{(\ell)}}{\max(1, \sum_j A_{ij})}$. Then, we update each node by combining its current representation with the incoming and outgoing neighborhood summaries: $h_i^{(\ell+1)} = \mathrm{Update}_\ell\left(h_i^{(\ell)}, u_{i,\mathrm{in}}^{(\ell)}, u_{i,\mathrm{out}}^{(\ell)}\right)$, where Update_ℓ applies learnable transformations followed by a GRU-based residual update and layer normalization. After L layers, we use $h_i = h_i^{(L)}$ to construct the interaction-aware readouts.

Interaction-Aware Readouts. To better represent collaboration among attacker agents and the propagation of adversarial influence to normal agents, we construct five readouts from the final node representations $H = [h_1, \ldots, h_m]^\top$. Mean-pooling attacker and normal nodes yields h_a and h_n. We additionally summarize internal attacker coordination h_c, outward attack propagation h_p, and

attack feedback h_f using:

$$h_r = \frac{1}{|T_r|} \sum_{j \in T_r} \frac{\sum_i B^r_{ij} h_i}{\max(1, \sum_i B^r_{ij})}, \qquad r \in \{c, p, f\}, \tag{4}$$

where B^c, B^p, and B^f retain attacker-to-attacker, attacker-to-normal, and normal-to-attacker edges, respectively. The corresponding target node sets are $T_c = T_f = V_S$ and $T_p = N$. Finally, we complement these readouts with a structural embedding $h_s = \phi(s(G, S))$, where ϕ is a learned encoder and the structural descriptor $s(G, S)$ captures connection densities, normal-agent exposure, attacker reachability, and reciprocity. Together, the five readouts and the structural embedding provide agent and interaction information for multi-factor risk estimation.

2.4 Multi-Factor Risk Modeling

To estimate **CIV**, we combine three learned risk scores capturing collaborative interactions, agent characteristics, and attacker count with an explicit structural prior informed by the density analysis presented in Figure 2 and Appendix D.1. Together, these components predict the ASR associated with each candidate attacker subgraph, providing a quantitative measure of its vulnerability.

Collaboration risk. Effective collaborative attacks depend on how attacker characteristics interact with internal coordination and outward communication. To capture these relationships, we combine the five graph readouts with an embedding of the structural descriptor:

$$z_c = g_c([h_a \| h_n \| h_c \| h_p \| h_f \| h_s]), \tag{5}$$

where $\|$ denotes concatenation and g_c maps the concatenated representation to a scalar logit. This branch combines information about attackers, normal agents, and their interactions to estimate the risk associated with internal coordination and outward propagation.

Individual and Count Risk. Beyond collaboration risk, we also consider attacker characteristics and count, as these factors may affect attack success even in structurally similar subgraphs. We capture them using two separate risk scores:

$$z_{\text{in}} = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i \in V_S} g_{\text{in}}(h_i), \qquad z_{\text{co}} = g_{\text{co}}([k, k/n]), \tag{6}$$

where g_{in} and g_{co} are learnable functions that map their inputs to scalar logits, and $k = |V_S|$. The individual score z_{in} averages attacker-level scores, while the count score z_{co} captures the number and proportion of attackers. Together, they complement collaboration risk by accounting for attacker-level characteristics.

Explicit Structural Prior. As shown in Figure 2 and Appendix D.1, our analysis of **CIV** shows that higher attacker-to-attacker density d_{aa} and attacker-to-normal density d_{an} are associated with higher attack success rates. These structural factors provide opportunities for attacker coordination and outward propagation, respectively. To incorporate these observed trends into vulnerability prediction, we define an explicit structural risk score z_s that combines the two densities and their interaction using learnable positive weights:

$$z_s = w_1 d_{aa} + w_2 d_{an} + w_3 d_{aa} d_{an}, \qquad w_j = \text{softplus}(\omega_j), \tag{7}$$

where the weights w_j satisfy $w_j > 0$, ensuring that z_s satisfies the following monotonicity and complementarity properties.

Proposition 1 (Monotonicity and complementarity)**.** *For $d_{aa}, d_{an} \in [0, 1]$ and finite $\omega_j \in \mathbb{R}$, the explicit structural score in Eq. 7 satisfies*

$$\frac{\partial z_s}{\partial d_{aa}} > 0, \qquad \frac{\partial z_s}{\partial d_{an}} > 0, \qquad \frac{\partial^2 z_s}{\partial d_{aa} \partial d_{an}} > 0. \tag{8}$$

Thus, increasing either density raises the structural score, and the marginal contribution of either density increases with the other.

The proof is provided in Appendix D.2. Proposition 1 formalizes the inductive bias motivated by our **CIV** analysis. Notably, these structural priors apply only to z_s, while the other risk branches can capture deviations from the observed density trends. This design incorporates the density-based prior while preserving flexibility to model configurations that do not follow the overall trend.



Figure 4: **Topology-guided candidate subgraph search.** (i) Select seeds by node score and evenly spaced node IDs. (ii) Expand candidates by adding adjacent nodes, retaining high-scoring subgraphs based on internal and outward densities. (iii) Select up to K candidates across sizes while penalizing node overlap, then rank them using the vulnerability predictor.

Risk fusion and training. To estimate the final attack success rate for each candidate attacker subgraph, we sum the four risk scores with a learnable bias b and apply the sigmoid function σ:

$$z = b + z_c + z_{\text{in}} + z_{\text{co}} + z_s, \qquad \hat{y} = \sigma(z), \tag{9}$$

where $\hat{y}$ estimates attack success rate (ASR) against system under the given attacker subgraph. Then, we train the predictor $f_\theta(\cdot)$ by minimizing the count-weighted binary cross-entropy between the predicted ASR $\hat{y}$ and the observed ASR y:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{ASR}} = -\frac{1}{\sum_{t\in\mathcal{B}} c_t} \sum_{t\in\mathcal{B}} c_t \left[y_t \log \hat{y}_t + (1 - y_t) \log(1 - \hat{y}_t) \right]. \tag{10}$$

where $\mathcal{B}$ is a minibatch of $\mathcal{D}$, and weight $c_t = |\mathcal{E}_{G_t,S_t}|$ is the number of evaluated task–normal-agent pairs used to compute y_t. This weighting gives each valuated pair equal weight in $\mathcal{L}_{\text{ASR}}$.

2.5 Subgraph Selection and Collaborative Attack Optimization

To amplify existing attacks through collaboration within the identified vulnerable subgraph, we use an LLM planner to generate coordinated instructions tailored to the selected agents and their communication structure while preserving the original attack objective.

Budget-constrained vulnerable subgraph selection. In large-scale multi-agent systems, exhaustive subgraph evaluation is computationally expensive. Motivated by the **CIV** observation that higher internal and outward densities are associated with higher attack success rates, we use topology-guided candidate subgraph search to generate weakly connected subgraphs, prioritizing candidates with high density-based scores. We then retain at most K candidates through size-stratified selection with a node-overlap penalty, as shown in Figure 4. The search procedure is detailed in Algorithm 2 in Appendix C. Let $\mathcal{C}(G)$ denote the resulting candidate pool. The trained predictor $f_\theta(\cdot)$ scores these candidates and selects the subgraph with the highest predicted ASR $\hat{y}(G, S)$:

$$S^\star = \arg\max_{S\in\mathcal{C}(G)} \hat{y}(G, S). \tag{11}$$

Structure-conditioned collaborative attack optimization. Although selection identifies a vulnerable subgraph, effective coordination must adapt to its specific communication structure. Therefore, we introduce an LLM-based planner that tailors collaborative attack instructions to the selected subgraph. Given an existing attack objective a, the selected agent $V_{S^\star}$, their internal directed edges $E_{S^\star}$, and benchmark information d, the planner generates structure-specific collaborative instructions:

$$\{\pi_i\}_{i\in V_{S^\star}} = \text{Planner}(a, V_{S^\star}, E_{S^\star}, d), \tag{12}$$

where the $\text{Planner}(\cdot)$ template and examples of the generated structure-specific collaborative instructions π_i are provided in Appendix E.

LLM Backbone	Prompt Injection		Tool Attack		Memory Poisoning		Overall Avg.		
	Original	+Ours	Original	+Ours	Original	+Ours	Original	+Ours	Gain (△)
Chain									
GPT-5.4-nano	14.74	16.84	0.00	0.00	14.74	29.47	9.83	15.44	**+5.61**
GPT-4o	11.58	12.63	14.74	15.79	5.26	17.89	10.53	15.44	**+4.91**
DeepSeek-V3	14.74	12.63	26.32	26.32	25.26	27.37	22.11	22.11	**+0.00**
Qwen3-30B-A3B	34.73	37.89	44.21	50.53	43.16	43.16	40.70	43.86	**+3.16**
Tree									
GPT-5.4-nano	5.26	11.58	0.00	0.00	25.26	44.21	10.17	18.60	**+8.43**
GPT-4o	18.95	18.95	17.89	23.16	14.74	31.58	17.19	24.56	**+7.37**
DeepSeek-V3	12.63	20.00	26.32	32.63	47.37	56.84	28.77	36.49	**+7.72**
Qwen3-30B-A3B	15.79	27.37	51.05	68.42	35.79	65.26	34.21	53.68	**+19.47**
Star									
GPT-5.4-nano	24.21	24.21	0.00	0.00	30.53	55.79	18.25	26.67	**+8.42**
GPT-4o	26.32	33.68	14.74	26.32	41.05	40.00	27.37	33.33	**+5.96**
DeepSeek-V3	12.63	30.53	24.74	24.21	32.63	76.84	23.33	43.86	**+20.53**
Qwen3-30B-A3B	34.21	52.63	64.21	64.21	32.11	81.05	43.51	65.96	**+22.45**
Random									
GPT-5.4-nano	21.05	26.32	0.00	0.00	54.74	68.42	25.26	31.58	**+6.32**
GPT-4o	23.16	29.47	15.79	37.89	28.42	38.95	22.46	35.44	**+12.98**
DeepSeek-V3	20.53	24.21	29.47	25.26	66.84	76.84	38.95	42.10	**+3.15**
Qwen3-30B-A3B	32.11	61.05	63.16	65.26	62.63	87.37	52.63	71.23	**+18.60**

Table 1: **Attack success rate (ASR, %, ↑) across multi-agent system topologies and LLM backbones.** Original denotes the existing multi-agent system attacks, while +Ours denotes the corresponding attacks enhanced by CIV-Amplify through collaboration-aware amplification.

Collaborative Attack Execution. We append the generated collaborative instructions to the selected agents' existing attack instructions and execute the multi-agent system over its original communication graph. Coordination within the selected subgraph can reinforce adversarial influence and facilitate its propagation to normal agents along outgoing communication links.

3 Experiment

In this section, we evaluate CIV-Amplify across communication topologies, model backbones, and attack families, addressing five research questions: **RQ1:** To what extent does CIV-Amplify amplify existing multi-agent system attacks? **RQ2:** How do the structural factors underlying CIV affect attack amplification? **RQ3:** Does CIV-Amplify retain its attack amplification effect under existing multi-agent system safeguards? **RQ4:** How does each component contribute to the effectiveness of CIV-Amplify? **RQ5:** How does CIV-Amplify scale to larger multi-agent systems in terms of attack effectiveness and computational efficiency?

3.1 Experimental Setup

Attack Scenarios, Datasets, and Defenses. Following prior security studies on multi-agent systems (Yu et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025a; Miao et al., 2026), we evaluate CIV-Amplify in three attack scenarios: (i) **Prompt Injection**, using adversarial samples constructed from MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2020); (ii) **Tool Attacks**, using InjecAgent (Zhan et al., 2024); and (iii) **Memory Poisoning**, following the PoisonRAG setup (Nazary et al., 2025). To assess whether the amplification effect persists under safeguards for multi-agent systems, we compare the original attacks with their CIV-Amplify-enhanced counterparts under three safeguards: G-SafeGuard (Wang et al., 2025a), BlindGuard (Miao et al., 2026), and Dominant (Ding et al., 2019).

Evaluation Metrics. We use the system-level attack success rate (ASR) under each attacker subgraph to evaluate the amplification of existing multi-agent system attacks. To evaluate the vulnerability predictor $f_\theta(\cdot)$ used for subgraph selection, we report mean absolute error (MAE), the

coefficient of determination (R^2), and Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (ρ). These metrics assess prediction error, explained variance in observed attack success rate, and agreement between predicted and observed subgraph vulnerability rankings, respectively.

Implementations. We construct the training dataset using GPT-4o-mini as the agent backbone, with randomly generated multi-agent system communication topologies and sampled candidate attacker subgraphs. To evaluate generalization across topologies, we evaluate CIV-Amplify on chain, tree, star, and random structures. We further assess performance across LLM backbones using GPT-5.4-nano, GPT-4o (Hurst et al., 2024), DeepSeek-V3 (Liu et al., 2024), and Qwen3-30B-A3B (Yang et al., 2025). See Appendix B for dataset, defense, and implementation details.

3.2 Amplification of Existing MAS Attacks

To answer RQ1, we evaluate CIV-Amplify from two perspectives: (i) its ability to amplify existing attacks, and (ii) the consistency of amplification across communication topologies and LLM backbones. For a fair comparison, Original and CIV-Amplify use the same number of compromised agents. Table 1 shows two main observations: ❶ **CIV-Amplify substantially amplifies existing attacks.** Across all topology, backbone, and attack settings, the average ASR increases from 26.58% to 36.27%, a gain of 9.69. The largest gains appear for memory poisoning on star topologies, where ASR rises from 32.63% to 76.84% with DeepSeek-V3 and from 32.11% to 81.05% with Qwen3-30B-A3B. These results show that coordinating attackers within vulnerable subgraphs can markedly strengthen existing attacks. ❷ **Amplification depends on topology and backbone.** Averaged across backbones and attacks, ASR improves by 3.42, 10.75, 14.34, and 10.26 on chain, tree, star, and random topologies, respectively. All four backbones show positive average gains, ranging from 7.20 to 15.92. The smaller gains on chains may result from their limited connectivity, whereas tree, star, and random structures offer more opportunities for attacker coordination and propagation.

3.3 Analysis of CIV

To answer RQ2, we examine how the structural factors underlying CIV affect collaborative attack success. Figure 5 shows that ❸ **Greater internal and outward connectivity generally lead to higher collaborative attack success rates.** Increasing attacker-to-normal density while holding attacker-to-attacker density fixed at 50%, or increasing attacker-to-attacker density while holding attacker-to-normal density fixed at 43.75%, generally increases ASR across all three attack types. These trends are consistent with the interpretation that denser internal connections facilitate attacker coordination, while greater outward connectivity facilitates the propagation of adversarial influence to normal agents.



Figure 5: Controlled analysis of structural factors underlying CIV.

3.4 Attack Effectiveness under Defenses

To answer RQ3, we evaluate whether CIV-Amplify retains its collaborative amplification effect under three multi-agent system safeguards: BlindGuard, Dominant, and G-SafeGuard. Figure 6 shows two main observations. ❹ **CIV-Amplify remains effective under existing safeguards for multi-agent systems.** Across all three defenses, attacks enhanced by CIV-Amplify consistently achieve higher ASR than the original attacks, showing that collaborative amplification persists even after safeguards are applied. ❺ **Existing multi-agent system safeguards reduce but do not eliminate the threat.** All three defenses lower the ASR of CIV-Amplify compared with the no-defense setting. However, CIV-Amplify consistently maintains higher ASR than the original attacks under all three defenses, indicating that collaborative amplification persists despite these safeguards. G-SafeGuard



Figure 6: ASR under defenses.

Model variant	MAE ↓	R^2 ↑	ρ ↑
Full model	**0.0403**	**0.8592**	**0.9469**
w/o Directed GNN	0.0538	0.7680	0.8728
w/o Collaboration risk	0.0489	0.8084	0.8952
w/o Individual risk	0.0420	0.8404	0.9377
w/o Count risk	0.0422	0.8478	0.9406
w/o Structural prior	0.0444	0.8188	0.9324

Table 2: Predictor component ablation.



Figure 7: Attack component ablation.

achieves the lowest ASR overall, but does not fully suppress the amplification effect. These results highlight the need to evaluate MAS safeguards against collaborative attack amplification.

3.5 Ablation Study

To answer RQ4, we ablate the vulnerability predictor, subgraph selection, and collaborative optimization. As shown in Table 2 and Figure 7, we observed ❻ **All components contribute to vulnerability prediction and attack amplification.** Removing the directed GNN causes the largest prediction degradation, increasing MAE from 0.0403 to 0.0538 and reducing Spearman's ρ from 0.9469 to 0.8728. Replacing predictor-guided selection with density-based or random selection also lowers ASR, while removing collaborative optimization further weakens the attack. Overall, structure-aware prediction, vulnerable subgraph selection, and collaborative optimization jointly contribute to attack amplification.

3.6 Scalability and Efficiency Analysis



Figure 8: Scalability and efficiency analysis of CIV-Amplify.

To answer RQ5, we evaluate CIV-Amplify in terms of attack effectiveness and subgraph selection efficiency as MAS size increases. Figure 8 shows that ❼ **CIV-Amplify maintains attack amplification at larger scales with low selection overhead.** It achieves higher final-round ASR than the original attacks in the 20-, 40-, and 80-agent settings (Figure 8 (a)). Topology-guided selection also substantially reduces search time, taking 0.021 s at 25 nodes compared with 89.4 s for exhaustive enumeration (Figure 8 (b)); the corresponding complexity analysis is provided in Appendix C.2. Increasing the candidate budget generally improves average ASR at the cost of longer selection time, although gains vary across attack scenarios (Figure 8 (c)). These results demonstrate a practical trade-off between attack effectiveness and computational cost.

4 Conclusion

We present CIV-Amplify, a collaborative red-teaming framework for studying Collaboration-Induced Vulnerability (CIV) in LLM-based multi-agent systems. We show that attack risk depends not only on individual malicious agents but also on their collaboration and communication structure. CIV-Amplify leverages this insight to identify vulnerable subgraphs and adapt existing attacks through structure-aware vulnerability prediction and collaborative attack transformation. Experiments demonstrate consistent amplification across topologies and LLM backbones, persistence under existing safeguards, and favorable scalability. Our findings highlight CIV as an important security concern and motivate defenses that account for collaborative and structural risks.

Ethics Statement

This research is conducted solely for scientific purposes and does not involve human subjects, animals, or personally identifiable information. Our work studies adversarial attacks against LLM-based multi-agent systems, including prompt injection, tool attacks, and memory poisoning, which may have potential dual-use implications. The proposed framework is intended for controlled red-teaming to better understand collaboration-induced vulnerabilities and support the development of more robust safeguards. All experiments are conducted in controlled research environments. We encourage responsible use of the proposed methods for security evaluation and defense research.

Reproducibility Statement

To ensure the reproducibility of our work, we provide detailed descriptions of CIV-Amplify, dataset construction, experimental settings, and evaluation protocols. The complete methodology is presented in Section 2. Details of the training dataset construction, including attack scenarios, communication graph generation, attacker subgraph sampling, MAS execution, and vulnerability label construction, are provided in Appendix B.1. Implementation details, including data partitioning, agent encoding, predictor architecture, training hyperparameters, and model selection, are reported in Appendix B.3. The complete training and inference pipeline is provided in Appendix C, with the topology-guided candidate subgraph search and its complexity analysis detailed in Appendix C.2. The evaluated MAS safeguards are described in Appendix B.2. Our code is anonymously released at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CIV-Amplify-6F15`. Together, these materials provide the information necessary to reproduce the results reported in this paper.

References

Mert Cemri, Melissa Z Pan, Shuyi Yang, Lakshya A Agrawal, Bhavya Chopra, Rishabh Tiwari, Kurt Keutzer, Aditya Parameswaran, Dan Klein, Kannan Ramchandran, Matei A Zaharia, Joseph Gonzalez, and Ion Stoica. Why do multi-agent llm systems fail? *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 38, 2025.

Weize Chen, Jiarui Yuan, Chen Qian, Cheng Yang, Zhiyuan Liu, and Maosong Sun. Optima: Optimizing effectiveness and efficiency for llm-based multi-agent system. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2025*, pp. 11534–11557, 2025.

Zhaorun Chen, Zhen Xiang, Chaowei Xiao, Dawn Song, and Bo Li. Agentpoison: Red-teaming llm agents via poisoning memory or knowledge bases. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 37:130185–130213, 2024.

Hyeong Kyu Choi, Jerry Zhu, and Sharon Li. Debate or vote: Which yields better decisions in multi-agent large language models? *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 38: 101732–101764, 2025.

Kaize Ding, Jundong Li, Rohit Bhanushali, and Huan Liu. Deep anomaly detection on attributed networks. In *Proceedings of the 2019 SIAM international conference on data mining*, pp. 594–602. SIAM, 2019.

Yuyuan Feng, Zhishang Xiang, Chaobin Yang, Qichao Ma, Zerui Chen, Yujing Zhang, Ke Huang, Chuanjie Wu, Zhaoxu Liu, Yili Wang, et al. Graph engineering in the era of llm agents: From individual intelligence to system intelligence. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2608.21156*, 2026.

Xiangming Gu, Xiaosen Zheng, Tianyu Pang, Chao Du, Qian Liu, Ye Wang, Jing Jiang, and Min Lin. Agent smith: A single image can jailbreak one million multimodal llm agents exponentially fast, 2024. URL `https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08567`.

Dan Hendrycks, Collin Burns, Steven Basart, Andy Zou, Mantas Mazeika, Dawn Song, and Jacob Steinhardt. Measuring massive multitask language understanding. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2009.03300*, 2020.

Sirui Hong, Mingchen Zhuge, Jonathan Chen, Xiawu Zheng, Yuheng Cheng, Jinlin Wang, Ceyao Zhang, zili wang, Steven Yau, Zijuan Lin, Liyang Zhou, Chenyu Ran, Lingfeng Xiao, Chenglin Wu, and Jürgen Schmidhuber. Metagpt: Meta programming for a multi-agent collaborative framework. In B. Kim, Y. Yue, S. Chaudhuri, K. Fragkiadaki, M. Khan, and Y. Sun (eds.), *International Conference on Learning Representations*, volume 2024, pp. 23247–23275, 2024. URL https://proceedings.iclr.cc/paper_files/paper/2024/file/6507b115562bb0a305f1958ccc87355a-Paper-Conference.pdf.

Aaron Hurst, Adam Lerer, Adam P Goucher, Adam Perelman, Aditya Ramesh, Aidan Clark, AJ Ostrow, Akila Welihinda, Alan Hayes, Alec Radford, et al. Gpt-4o system card. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.21276*, 2024.

Hui Yi Leong, Yuheng Li, Yuqing Wu, Wenwen Ouyang, Wei Zhu, Jiechao Gao, and Wei Han. Amas: Adaptively determining communication topology for llm-based multi-agent system. In *Proceedings of the 2025 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing: Industry Track*, pp. 2061–2070, 2025.

Xinyi Li, Sai Wang, Siqi Zeng, Yu Wu, and Yi Yang. A survey on llm-based multi-agent systems: workflow, infrastructure, and challenges. *Vicinagearth*, 1(1):9, 2024.

Aixin Liu, Bei Feng, Bing Xue, Bingxuan Wang, Bochao Wu, Chengda Lu, Chenggang Zhao, Chengqi Deng, Chenyu Zhang, Chong Ruan, et al. Deepseek-v3 technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.19437*, 2024.

Yaoyang Luo, Zhi Zheng, Ziwei Zhao, Tong Xu, Zhao Jielun, Wenjun Xue, Yong Chen, and Enhong Chen. Defending llm-based multi-agent systems against cooperative attacks with sentence-level rectification, 2026. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.28104.

Rui Miao, Yixin Liu, Yili Wang, Xu Shen, Yue Tan, Yiwei Dai, Shirui Pan, and Xin Wang. BlindGuard: Safeguarding LLM-based multi-agent systems under unknown attacks. In Maria Liakata, Viviane P. Moreira, Jiajun Zhang, and David Jurgens (eds.), *Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pp. 39215–39234, San Diego, California, United States, July 2026. Association for Computational Linguistics. ISBN 979-8-89176-390-6. doi: 10.18653/v1/2026.acl-long.1819. URL https://aclanthology.org/2026.acl-long.1819/.

Fatemeh Nazary, Yashar Deldjoo, and Tommaso di Noia. Poison-rag: Adversarial data poisoning attacks on retrieval-augmented generation in recommender systems. In *European Conference on Information Retrieval*, pp. 239–251. Springer, 2025.

Yiling Tao, Xinran Zheng, Shuo Yang, Meiling Tao, and Xingjun Wang. Groupguard: A framework for modeling and defending collusive attacks in multi-agent systems, 2026. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.13940.

Shilong Wang, Guibin Zhang, Miao Yu, Guancheng Wan, Fanci Meng, Chongye Guo, Kun Wang, and Yang Wang. G-safeguard: A topology-guided security lens and treatment on LLM-based multi-agent systems. In Wanxiang Che, Joyce Nabende, Ekaterina Shutova, and Mohammad Taher Pilehvar (eds.), *Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pp. 7261–7276, Vienna, Austria, July 2025a. Association for Computational Linguistics. ISBN 979-8-89176-251-0. doi: 10.18653/v1/2025.acl-long.359. URL https://aclanthology.org/2025.acl-long.359/.

Xilong Wang, John Bloch, Zedian Shao, Yuepeng Hu, Shuyan Zhou, and Neil Zhenqiang Gong. Webinject: Prompt injection attack to web agents. In *Proceedings of the 2025 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pp. 2010–2030, 2025b.

Qingyun Wu, Gagan Bansal, Jieyu Zhang, Yiran Wu, Beibin Li, Erkang Zhu, Li Jiang, Xiaoyun Zhang, Shaokun Zhang, Jiale Liu, Ahmed Hassan Awadallah, Ryen W White, Doug Burger, and Chi Wang. Autogen: Enabling next-gen llm applications via multi-agent conversation, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.08155.

Chejian Xu, Zhaorun Chen, Jingyang Zhang, Freddy Lecue, Avni Kothari, Sarah Tan, Wenbo Guo, and Bo Li. Mastrike: Shapley-guided collusive red-teaming on multi-agent systems. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2606.12918*, 2026.

An Yang, Anfeng Li, Baosong Yang, Beichen Zhang, Binyuan Hui, Bo Zheng, Bowen Yu, Chang Gao, Chengen Huang, Chenxu Lv, et al. Qwen3 technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.09388*, 2025.

Miao Yu, Shilong Wang, Guibin Zhang, Junyuan Mao, Chenlong Yin, Qijiong Liu, Kun Wang, Qingsong Wen, and Yang Wang. NetSafe: Exploring the topological safety of multi-agent system. In Wanxiang Che, Joyce Nabende, Ekaterina Shutova, and Mohammad Taher Pilehvar (eds.), *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2025*, pp. 2905–2938, Vienna, Austria, July 2025. Association for Computational Linguistics. ISBN 979-8-89176-256-5. doi: 10.18653/v1/2025.findings-acl.150. URL https://aclanthology.org/2025.findings-acl.150/.

Qiusi Zhan, Zhixiang Liang, Zifan Ying, and Daniel Kang. Injecagent: Benchmarking indirect prompt injections in tool-integrated large language model agents. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2024*, pp. 10471–10506, 2024.

Jialong Zhou, Lichao Wang, and Xiao Yang. Guardian: Safeguarding llm multi-agent collaborations with temporal graph modeling. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 38:7973–8001, 2026.

A Related Work

Collaboration and Security in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems. LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) improve complex task solving through structured communication and collaboration (Li et al., 2024; Leong et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2025; Cemri et al., 2025). Existing systems coordinate agents through mechanisms such as role-based workflows, sequential reasoning, and debate-based interaction, enabling agents to exchange intermediate information, incorporate feedback from other agents, and collectively refine their outputs (Wu et al., 2023; Hong et al., 2024; Choi et al., 2025). While such interaction is central to the effectiveness of MAS, it also expands their attack surface: adversarial influence introduced through one or more agents can propagate through subsequent communication and affect otherwise benign agents (Yu et al., 2025; Zhou et al., 2026).

A growing body of work investigates security threats against LLM-based agents and multi-agent systems. Existing attacks target different components of the agent pipeline, including prompt injection, external tool use, and memory mechanisms (Wang et al., 2025b; Zhan et al., 2024; Nazary et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2024). Beyond attacks targeting individual components, recent studies have revealed interaction-driven threats that arise when multiple agents communicate. For example, infectious jailbreaks demonstrate how adversarial behaviors can spread through agent interactions, while other studies investigate malicious agent collusion and adaptive attacks in multi-agent environments (Gu et al., 2024; Tao et al., 2026; Luo et al., 2026). Collectively, these studies suggest that the security impact of an attack may extend beyond the initially compromised agents through inter-agent communication and collaboration.

Recent work has further highlighted the role of communication structure in multi-agent security. NetSafe (Yu et al., 2025) studies the relationship between network topology and adversarial propagation, showing that the communication structure can affect how malicious influence spreads across agents. From a defensive perspective, G-Safeguard and BlindGuard employ graph-based modeling of inter-agent interactions to identify or mitigate harmful agents (Wang et al., 2025a; Miao et al., 2026). These studies establish communication structure as an important factor in the security of LLM-based MAS. However, comparatively less attention has been paid to how collaboration structures can amplify existing attacks, particularly how interactions among attackers and their connections to normal agents affect the resulting attack success.

Motivated by this perspective, we introduce **Collaboration-Induced Vulnerability (CIV)** to characterize the susceptibility of multi-agent systems to adversarial influence amplified through agent collaboration. Rather than introducing a new standalone attack objective, our work studies how existing attacks can be amplified by exploiting their structural context. Specifically, we investigate how vulnerable attacker subgraphs can be identified from the pre-execution MAS configuration and how the selected subgraph structure can subsequently guide structure-conditioned collaborative attack transformation. This perspective complements prior work on adversarial propagation and graph-based safeguards by focusing on the identification and exploitation of vulnerable collaboration structures for systematically amplifying existing attacks.

B Detailed Experiment Setups

B.1 Training Dataset Construction

We construct training data for three attack scenarios: prompt injection on MMLU, tool attacks on InjecAgent, and memory poisoning using PoisonRAG setup. Each training sample pairs an initial multi-agent system configuration with its execution-derived ASR. The following construction procedure is applied separately to each scenario.

Attack scenarios. For **prompt injection**, we use multiple-choice questions from MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2020). Normal agents collaboratively answer each question, while attacker agents receive a randomly selected incorrect option and instructions to persuade other agents to accept it.

For **tool attacks**, we use InjecAgent (Zhan et al., 2024). Each task provides a user instruction, available tools, and an agent scratchpad containing an injected instruction in a tool observation.

Attacker agents are instructed to extract and relay this instruction to other agents, while normal agents attempt to complete the user's task.

For **memory poisoning**, we use queries with adversarial contexts prepared under the PoisonRAG setup (Nazary et al., 2025). Attacker agents answer queries using the supplied adversarial contexts and attempt to persuade normal agents to adopt their answers.

Communication graph generation. We generate directed graphs with $n = 8$ agents. For each edge probability $p \in \{0.1, 0.2, \ldots, 1.0\}$, we independently sample each possible directed edge with probability p and exclude self-loops. We retain graphs that pass the isolated-node check and contain a weakly connected component with at least four nodes. For each value of p, we collect 20 accepted graphs, yielding 200 graph instances before deduplication. The parameter p controls the edge sampling probability; the realized density may differ after graph filtering.

Attacker subgraph sampling. For each graph, we sample one attacker subgraph for each attacker count $k \in \{2, 3, 4\}$. We first randomly choose a weakly connected component containing at least k nodes and select a random seed within it. We then repeatedly add a randomly selected node adjacent to the current set, ignoring edge direction during this connectivity check, until k nodes are selected. The selected nodes induce a weakly connected attacker subgraph, while all original edge directions are retained.

The resulting pool contains 600 configurations before deduplication. We remove duplicate configurations, shuffle the pool, and retain at most 400 configurations per scenario. Each configuration specifies the full communication graph, attacker assignment, and agent system prompts. Selected agents receive scenario-specific attack with basic collaboration instructions; the remaining agents receive normal task instructions.

MAS execution. For each scenario, we shuffle the available benchmark tasks and select up to 20 tasks, which are shared across the retained configurations. Each configuration is executed using GPT-4o-mini, with one initial response round followed by three communication rounds. We record agent responses at all four dialogue turns.

Vulnerability labels. For each configuration (G, S), we aggregate attack outcomes over the evaluated task–normal-agent pairs. The training label is the ASR at the final dialogue turns:

$$y(G, S) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{E}_{G,S}|} \sum_{(q,i) \in \mathcal{E}_{G,S}} b_{q,i},$$

where $\mathcal{E}_{G,S}$ follows the scenario-specific evaluation rules above and $b_{q,i}$ indicates attack success. For InjecAgent, $b_{q,i} = 1$ if agent i has been compromised at any dialogue turn up to the final round. We also retain the evaluated-pair count $c = |\mathcal{E}_{G,S}|$ for count-weighted training.

All task records belonging to the same configuration share its aggregated ASR label. The predictor receives only the initial agent configurations and graph information. Dialogue histories and final responses are used exclusively to construct supervision.

B.2 MAS Safeguards

We evaluate whether CIV-Amplify amplifies existing attacks under three safeguards: G-Safeguard, DOMINANT, and BlindGuard. These baselines cover supervised detection, reconstruction-based anomaly detection, and unsupervised detection learned from normal interactions.

G-Safeguard. G-Safeguard (Wang et al., 2025a) is a supervised safeguarding framework for LLM-based MAS. It represents inter-agent interactions as a multi-agent utterance graph and uses graph neural networks to identify harmful agents. Detected agents are isolated to limit the propagation of malicious information.

DOMINANT. DOMINANT (Ding et al., 2019) is a deep graph anomaly detection method for attributed networks. It uses a graph convolutional encoder to learn node representations and decoders to reconstruct graph structure and node attributes. Nodes with large reconstruction errors receive

higher anomaly scores. We adapt DOMINANT to MAS by representing agent outputs as nodes and communication links as edges, allowing reconstruction errors to indicate potentially abnormal agents.

BlindGuard. BlindGuard (Miao et al., 2026) is an unsupervised defense framework for LLM-based MAS under unknown attacks. It learns from normal agent behavior without requiring labeled harmful agents. A hierarchical agent encoder captures individual, neighborhood, and global interaction patterns, while a corruption-guided detector uses contrastive learning to distinguish abnormal agents from normal ones.

B.3 Implementation Details

Data partitioning and agent encoding. We split dataset into training, validation, and test groups at an approximate ratio of 70%/15%/15%, keeping configurations with identical adjacency matrices in the same split. We use a frozen Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B encoder to represent each agent's system prompt, including its normal or attacker instructions. We apply last-token pooling followed by ℓ_2 normalization to obtain 1,024-dimensional embeddings. The encoder uses a maximum input length of 32,768 tokens and a batch size of 8. Embeddings are precomputed and cached, and the encoder remains frozen throughout predictor training.

Predictor architecture. Agent embeddings are projected into a 128-dimensional hidden space using a linear layer, layer normalization, GELU activation, and dropout, then combined with a learned binary role embedding. The predictor uses three directed message-passing layers, each aggregating incoming and outgoing neighbors separately and applying a GRU-based residual update followed by layer normalization. Five readouts summarize attacker agents, normal agents, internal coordination, outward propagation, and feedback. A structural encoder maps the seven structural features to a 64-dimensional embedding. The collaboration head combines these representations through a 128-dimensional hidden layer, while the individual and attacker-count heads each use a 64-dimensional hidden layer. Dropout is set to 0.2. The explicit structural prior uses three positive weights parameterized by softplus. The four risk scores and a learnable bias are summed and passed through a sigmoid to predict ASR.

Training and model selection. We optimize the predictor using AdamW with a learning rate of 10^{-3}, weight decay of 10^{-4}, and batch size of 32 for up to 200 epochs. The training objective is binary cross-entropy weighted by the number of evaluated task–normal-agent pairs for each configuration. A ReduceLROnPlateau scheduler monitors validation MAE and halves the learning rate with a patience of eight epochs. Early stopping uses a patience of 25 epochs. We retain the checkpoint selected by validation MAE and evaluate it on the held-out test set. We report MAE, R^2, and Spearman's ρ to assess prediction accuracy and ranking quality.

C Algorithms

This section provides the complete training and inference procedures of CIV-Amplify. Algorithm 1 summarizes the overall pipeline, including vulnerability predictor training, vulnerable subgraph selection, and structure-conditioned collaborative attack execution. Algorithm 2 details the topology-guided search used to construct a bounded candidate pool before predictor ranking.

C.1 Overall Framework

During training, each configuration (G, S) is executed on benchmark tasks to obtain an observed ASR label $y(G, S)$. The predictor is trained only on information available before execution, including agent configurations and communication structure; dialogue histories and final responses are used only to construct supervision and are excluded from predictor inputs. Thus, at inference time, the trained predictor can estimate $\hat{y}(G, S)$ for a candidate attacker subgraph without executing its attack.

Given a target MAS, we first construct a bounded set of candidate attacker subgraphs using Algorithm 2. The trained predictor then estimates the ASR of each candidate and selects $S^\star$ with the

Algorithm 1 Training and Inference Pipeline of CIV-Amplify

Require: Training configurations $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{tr}}$; benchmark tasks $\mathcal{T}$; target MAS G_{test}; attack objective a; benchmark context d; candidate sizes $\mathcal{K}$; candidate budget K
Ensure: Selected attacker subgraph $S^\star$, collaborative instructions $\{\pi_i\}_{i\in V_{S^\star}}$, and final ASR
Phase I: Vulnerability Predictor Training
$\mathcal{D} \leftarrow \emptyset$
for each training configuration $(G, S) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{tr}}$ **do**
  Assign the attack objective with basic collaboration instructions to agents in V_S and normal instructions to $V \setminus V_S$
  Execute the full MAS on $\mathcal{T}$
  Compute the observed system-level ASR $y(G, S)$ using Eq. 2
  Construct the pre-execution representation $\mathcal{X}_{G,S}$ from agent configurations and graph structure
  $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow \mathcal{D} \cup \{(\mathcal{X}_{G,S}, y(G, S))\}$
end for
Train f_θ on $\mathcal{D}$ to predict $\hat{y}(G, S)$ from $\mathcal{X}_{G,S}$
Phase II: Vulnerable Subgraph Selection
$\mathcal{C}(G_{\text{test}}) \leftarrow \text{CandidateSearch}(G_{\text{test}}, \mathcal{K}, K)$
for each $S \in \mathcal{C}(G_{\text{test}})$ **do**
  Construct the pre-execution representation $\mathcal{X}_{G_{\text{test}},S}$
  $\hat{y}(G_{\text{test}}, S) \leftarrow f_\theta(\mathcal{X}_{G_{\text{test}},S})$
end for
$S^\star \leftarrow \arg\max_{S\in\mathcal{C}(G_{\text{test}})} \hat{y}(G_{\text{test}}, S)$
Phase III: Structure-Conditioned Collaborative Attack
$\{\pi_i\}_{i\in V_{S^\star}} \leftarrow \text{Planner}(a, V_{S^\star}, E_{S^\star}, d)$
Append π_i to each selected agent's attack instructions
Execute the full MAS on $\mathcal{T}$ through its original communication graph
Compute the final ASR against normal agents
return $S^\star$, $\{\pi_i\}_{i\in V_{S^\star}}$, and final ASR

highest predicted ASR. Finally, the LLM planner adapts the existing attack objective to the selected agents and their directed communication structure. The full MAS is executed only after this selection and adaptation, yielding the final observed ASR.

C.2 Topology-Guided Candidate Subgraph Search

Exhaustively evaluating all possible attacker subsets becomes intractable as the number of agents grows. We therefore use a topology-guided search to construct a bounded set of promising candidate subgraphs before applying the vulnerability predictor. Motivated by our CIV analysis, the search prioritizes subgraphs with strong internal attacker connectivity and outward connectivity to normal agents, while maintaining coverage across different subgraph sizes and graph regions. Importantly, the topology-based scores are used only to guide candidate generation; the trained vulnerability predictor performs the final ranking.

Search quantities. Let $G = (V, E)$ be a directed communication graph with $n = |V|$ agents. For each node v, we define its weak neighborhood and seed score as:

$$\mathcal{N}_w(v) = \{u : (u, v) \in E \text{ or } (v, u) \in E\}, \qquad q(v) = \frac{\deg_{\text{out}}(v) + |\mathcal{N}_w(v)|}{2(n-1)}. \tag{13}$$

The first component of $q(v)$ captures the potential of node v to propagate information through outgoing connections, while the second captures the number of neighboring nodes available for connected expansion.

For a candidate node set $U \subset V$, we define its internal attacker density and attacker-to-normal outward density as

$$d_{aa}(G, U) = \frac{\sum_{i,j\in U} A_{ij}}{|U|(|U|-1)}, \qquad d_{an}(G, U) = \frac{\sum_{i\in U, j\in V\setminus U} A_{ij}}{|U|(n-|U|)}. \tag{14}$$

Following the two structural factors highlighted by our CIV analysis, we define a lightweight topology prior

$$p(U) = \frac{1}{2} d_{aa}(G, U) + \frac{1}{2} d_{an}(G, U). \tag{15}$$

This score favors candidate subgraphs that jointly support attacker coordination and outward attack propagation. It serves only as a search heuristic and is not the predicted vulnerability score $\hat{y}(G, U)$.

To bound the search, we set the beam width B, seed budget s, and per-candidate expansion limit r as

$$\begin{aligned} B &= \min(nK, \max(24, 4K)), \\ s &= \min(n, \max(24, 4K)), \\ r &= \max(4, \min(16, \lceil \sqrt{4K} \rceil)), \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

where K is the maximum number of candidate subgraphs passed to the vulnerability predictor.

To encourage diversity among the retained candidates, we further define the maximum Jaccard overlap between a candidate U and the already selected candidates $\mathcal{C}$:

$$J(U, \mathcal{C}) = \begin{cases} \max\limits_{T \in \mathcal{C}} \dfrac{|U \cap T|}{|U \cup T|}, & \mathcal{C} \neq \emptyset, \\ 0, & \mathcal{C} = \emptyset. \end{cases} \tag{17}$$

We use $\lambda = 0.05$ to control the overlap penalty during candidate selection.

Seed initialization. We initialize the search from both structurally promising and distributed nodes. Nodes with high $q(v)$ are prioritized because their outgoing connections provide greater propagation potential and their weak neighborhoods provide more opportunities for connected expansion. We additionally include evenly distributed node IDs to broaden search coverage, particularly when multiple nodes have similar structural scores. Duplicate seeds are removed, and the first s unique nodes initialize the search beam.

Connected expansion and pruning. Starting from singleton seeds, each candidate is expanded by adding one node from its weak neighborhood. Since every added node is adjacent to the current candidate in at least one direction, this procedure preserves weak connectivity without requiring bidirectional communication. To limit the branching factor, only the r frontier nodes with the highest seed scores are considered for each candidate.

After expansion, duplicate subgraphs are removed and the remaining candidates are ranked by the topology prior $p(U)$. At most B candidates are retained in the beam at each size. When the current size belongs to $\mathcal{K}$, these candidates are also added to the shared pool $\mathcal{P}$. This beam-search procedure avoids enumerating all $\binom{n}{k}$ possible attacker subsets while retaining candidates that exhibit the structural patterns associated with CIV.

Diverse selection across sizes. Selecting candidates solely according to $p(U)$ can concentrate the candidate budget on a particular attacker count or on highly overlapping node sets. We therefore perform size-stratified selection over $\mathcal{P}$. For each available size k, we select the candidate maximizing

$$p(U) - \lambda J(U, \mathcal{C}), \qquad \lambda = 0.05, \tag{18}$$

which favors high topology-prior scores while discouraging overlap with previously retained candidates. We cycle through candidate sizes in ascending order until K candidates have been selected or the pool is exhausted. Thus, K controls the number of subgraphs evaluated by the vulnerability predictor rather than the number of attackers in a subgraph.

Predictor-based final selection. The topology prior $p(U)$ is deliberately lightweight: it uses only the internal and outward connectivity factors identified by CIV to reduce the combinatorial search space. It does not determine the final attacker subgraph. For each retained candidate $S \in \mathcal{C}(G)$, the trained vulnerability predictor additionally incorporates agent configurations, directed interaction representations, and structural features to estimate its system-level ASR $\hat{y}(G, S)$. The final attacker subgraph is then selected as

$$S^\star = \arg \max_{S \in \mathcal{C}(G)} \hat{y}(G, S). \tag{19}$$

Algorithm 2 Topology-Guided Candidate Subgraph Search

Require: Directed graph $G = (V, E)$; candidate size list $\mathcal{K}$; candidate budget K
Ensure: At most K weakly connected candidate subgraphs $\mathcal{C}(G)$

Compute $\mathcal{N}_w(v)$ and $q(v)$ using Eq. 13
Set B, s, and r using Eq. 16
Step 1: Seed Initialization ▷ Balance priority and coverage
Form a seed ordering using high-q nodes and evenly distributed node IDs
Retain the first s unique seeds
$\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \{\{v\} : v \text{ is a retained seed}\}$
$\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \emptyset$
Step 2: Connected Expansion and Pruning
for $k = 2, \ldots, \max(\mathcal{K})$ **do**
  $\mathcal{E} \leftarrow \emptyset$
  for all $U \in \mathcal{B}$ **do**
    $\mathcal{F} \leftarrow \left(\bigcup_{v \in U} \mathcal{N}_w(v)\right) \setminus U$ ▷ Preserve weak connectivity
    Retain at most r nodes in $\mathcal{F}$ with the highest q scores ▷ Limit branching
    for all $v \in \mathcal{F}$ **do**
      $U' \leftarrow U \cup \{v\}$
      Compute $p(U')$ using Eq. 15
      $\mathcal{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E} \cup \{U'\}$
    end for
  end for
  if $\mathcal{E} = \emptyset$ **then**
    break
  end if
  Remove duplicate candidates from $\mathcal{E}$
  $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow$ at most B highest-p candidates in $\mathcal{E}$ ▷ Beam pruning
  if $k \in \mathcal{K}$ **then**
    $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{B}$ ▷ Collect eligible sizes
  end if
end for
Step 3: Diverse Selection across Sizes
$\mathcal{C} \leftarrow \emptyset$
while $|\mathcal{C}| < K$ and $\mathcal{P} \neq \emptyset$ **do**
  for all $k \in \mathcal{K}$ in ascending order **do**
    $\mathcal{P}_k \leftarrow \{U \in \mathcal{P} : |U| = k\}$
    if $\mathcal{P}_k \neq \emptyset$ and $|\mathcal{C}| < K$ **then**
      $U^\star \leftarrow \arg\max_{U \in \mathcal{P}_k} [p(U) - \lambda J(U, \mathcal{C})]$ ▷ Balance quality and diversity, J: overlap penalty, Eq. 17
      $\mathcal{C} \leftarrow \mathcal{C} \cup \{U^\star\}$
      $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{P} \setminus \{U^\star\}$
    end if
  end for
end while
return $\{G[U] : U \in \mathcal{C}\}$ ▷ Ranked by f_θ afterward

Therefore, topology-guided search provides an efficient and diverse candidate pool, while the learned predictor performs the final vulnerability assessment.

Complexity analysis. An exhaustive search over the candidate sizes $\mathcal{K}$ requires evaluating $\sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \binom{n}{k}$ attacker subsets, which becomes exponential in n when the candidate sizes grow with the system size. In contrast, our search retains at most B candidates at each expansion depth and considers at most r frontier nodes for each retained candidate. Therefore, the number of generated candidate expansions is bounded by

$$O(k_{\max} B r), \qquad k_{\max} = \max(\mathcal{K}), \tag{20}$$

before duplicate removal and beam pruning. The remaining operations, including topology-prior evaluation, beam pruning, and diversity-aware selection, are performed only over this bounded can-

didate pool. Moreover, at most K retained subgraphs are passed to the learned vulnerability predictor. Thus, the topology-guided search replaces combinatorial enumeration with a budget-controlled search whose explored candidate set is bounded by the beam width and branching limit.

D Additional CIV Analysis and Proof of Proposition 1

This section provides additional empirical analysis of Collaboration-Induced Vulnerability (**CIV**) and proves the properties of the explicit structural prior introduced in Section 2.4. We first examine how attack success varies with two structural factors highlighted by CIV: internal connectivity among attackers and outward connectivity from attackers to normal agents. We then show that the proposed structural prior explicitly encodes the corresponding monotonic and complementary inductive bias.

D.1 Additional Analysis of Collaboration-Induced Vulnerability

Structural factors. Our CIV analysis focuses on two complementary aspects of the attacker subgraph. The first is *attacker-to-attacker density* d_{aa}, which characterizes the internal connectivity available for coordination among compromised agents. The second is *attacker-to-normal density* d_{an}, which characterizes the outward communication channels through which adversarial influence can reach normal agents. For an attacker set S in a directed MAS graph $G = (V, E)$, these quantities are defined as:

$$d_{aa}(G, S) = \frac{\sum_{i,j \in V_S} A_{ij}}{|V_S|(|V_S| - 1)}, \qquad d_{an}(G, S) = \frac{\sum_{i \in V_S, j \in V \setminus V_S} A_{ij}}{|V_S|(|V| - |V_S|)}. \tag{21}$$

These two quantities capture different structural aspects of collaboration. A larger d_{aa} provides more communication links within the attacker subgraph, whereas a larger d_{an} provides more direct communication links from attackers to normal agents. Their joint behavior therefore provides a structural view of the coordination and propagation factors underlying CIV.

Density-stratified analysis. Figure 9 compares the final ASR between subgraphs with low and high structural densities for memory poisoning, tool attacks, and prompt injection. Across all three attack types, the high-density group exhibits a higher mean ASR than the corresponding low-density group for both d_{aa} and d_{an}.

For memory poisoning, the ASR gaps between the high- and low-density groups are $+8.8$ for attacker-to-attacker density and $+8.2$ for attacker-to-normal density. Tool attacks exhibit gaps of $+8.8$ and $+8.8$, respectively. Prompt injection shows smaller but consistent gaps of $+3.8$ and $+4.0$. These observations indicate that both stronger internal attacker connectivity and stronger outward connectivity are associated with greater collaborative attack success across different attack objectives.

Joint structural effect. We further examine the case in which internal and outward densities are considered jointly. As shown in Figure 9 (c), the high-joint-density group exhibits ASR increases of $+9.2$, $+9.0$, and $+4.4$ for memory poisoning, tool attacks, and prompt injection, respectively. These gaps are larger than the corresponding single-density gaps for each attack type.

This pattern suggests that the two structural factors provide complementary signals: internal connectivity supports coordination among attackers, while outward connectivity provides channels for their influence to reach normal agents. Consequently, candidate subgraphs exhibiting both properties tend to be associated with stronger attack outcomes than those characterized by either property alone. This observation motivates explicitly modeling not only d_{aa} and d_{an} individually, but also their interaction.

D.2 Proof of Proposition 1

Motivated by the density trends above, the explicit structural branch combines internal density, outward density, and their interaction:

$$z_s(d_{aa}, d_{an}) = w_1 d_{aa} + w_2 d_{an} + w_3 d_{aa} d_{an}, \qquad w_j = \mathrm{softplus}(\omega_j). \tag{22}$$



Figure 9: **Structural correlates of collaborative attack success.** ASR for attacked subgraphs with low versus high **(a)** attacker-to-attacker density, **(b)** attacker-to-normal density, and **(c)** joint density, across memory poisoning, tool attacks, and prompt injection. Diamonds denote group means with 95% confidence intervals, while points denote individual samples. High-density groups consistently exhibit higher ASR, with the largest gaps generally observed when both densities are high.

The interaction term $d_{aa}d_{an}$ allows the structural contribution of one density to depend on the level of the other, reflecting the joint pattern observed in Figure 9.

Proof. We prove the monotonicity and complementarity properties stated in Proposition 1.

Positive weights. For every finite $\omega_j \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$w_j = \mathrm{softplus}(\omega_j) = \log(1 + \exp(\omega_j)) > 0. \tag{23}$$

Hence, all coefficients in the explicit structural branch are strictly positive.

Strict monotonicity. Taking the partial derivatives of Eq. 22 gives

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial z_s}{\partial d_{aa}} &= w_1 + w_3 d_{an},\\ \frac{\partial z_s}{\partial d_{an}} &= w_2 + w_3 d_{aa}.\end{aligned} \tag{24}$$

Since $d_{aa}, d_{an} \in [0,1]$ and $w_1, w_2, w_3 > 0$,

$$\frac{\partial z_s}{\partial d_{aa}} > 0, \qquad \frac{\partial z_s}{\partial d_{an}} > 0. \tag{25}$$

Therefore, for a fixed value of one density, increasing the other strictly increases the structural score. For completeness, this property also holds over the boundaries of the domain. Fix any $d_{an} \in [0,1]$ and let $0 \le a_1 < a_2 \le 1$. Then

$$\begin{aligned}&z_s(a_2, d_{an}) - z_s(a_1, d_{an})\\ &\quad = (a_2 - a_1)(w_1 + w_3 d_{an}) > 0.\end{aligned} \tag{26}$$

Similarly, for fixed $d_{aa} \in [0,1]$ and $0 \le b_1 < b_2 \le 1$,

$$\begin{aligned}&z_s(d_{aa}, b_2) - z_s(d_{aa}, b_1)\\ &\quad = (b_2 - b_1)(w_2 + w_3 d_{aa}) > 0.\end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

Thus, z_s is strictly increasing in either density when the other is held fixed.

Complementarity. The mixed partial derivative of the structural score is

$$\frac{\partial^2 z_s}{\partial d_{aa} \partial d_{an}} = w_3 > 0. \tag{28}$$

Hence, the marginal contribution of internal attacker density increases as outward density increases:

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial d_{an}} \left(\frac{\partial z_s}{\partial d_{aa}} \right) = w_3 > 0. \tag{29}$$

By symmetry, the marginal contribution of outward density also increases with internal density.

The same property can be expressed without derivatives. For any $0 \le a_1 < a_2 \le 1$ and $0 \le b_1 < b_2 \le 1$,

$$\begin{aligned}&\big[z_s(a_2, b_2) - z_s(a_1, b_2)\big]\\ &\quad - \big[z_s(a_2, b_1) - z_s(a_1, b_1)\big]\\ &= w_3 (a_2 - a_1)(b_2 - b_1) > 0.\end{aligned} \tag{30}$$

Thus, the same increase in d_{aa} contributes more to the structural score when d_{an} is larger, and vice versa. This establishes the complementarity of the two density terms and completes the proof. □

Scope of the proposition. Proposition 1 therefore formalizes the inductive bias motivated by our CIV analysis: increasing either internal or outward density raises the structural risk contribution, while their positive interaction captures the complementary effect when both are high. These properties apply specifically to z_s, while the remaining risk branches remain unconstrained, preserving the flexibility of the complete predictor to model configurations that deviate from the overall structural trends.

E Qualitative Analysis of Structure-Conditioned Planning

Figures 10–12 present representative examples of the structure-conditioned planner for prompt injection, tool attacks, and memory poisoning. For each example, the planner receives selected agents, their induced directed edges, the existing attack objective, and the benchmark context, and generates an agent-specific instruction for each selected agent. These examples illustrate how a common attack objective can be decomposed into complementary roles conditioned on the particular attacker subgraph; they are not intended to characterize a fixed planning pattern for each attack type.



Figure 10: **Example of structure-conditioned planning for prompt injection.** Given a selected attacker subgraph, attack objective, and MMLU context, the planner generates complementary role-specific instructions for the selected agents.



Figure 11: **Example of structure-conditioned planning for tool attacks.** Given a selected attacker subgraph, attack objective, and InjecAgent context, the planner generates complementary role-specific instructions for the selected agents.

Prompt injection example. Figure 10 shows one prompt-injection instance in which the selected agents are $\{4, 6, 7\}$ and their induced directed structure is $6 \to 4 \to 7$. Given this configuration, the planner assigns different functions to the three selected agents. Agent 6 is instructed to provide independent rationale supporting the designated incorrect choice, Agent 4 to coordinate with the other selected agents toward the shared objective, and Agent 7 to reinforce the arguments, propagate the incorrect choice to normal agents, and check for counterarguments. Thus, for this particular



Figure 12: **Example of structure-conditioned planning for memory poisoning.** Given a selected attacker subgraph, attack objective, and PoisonRAG context, the planner generates complementary role-specific instructions for the selected agents.

selected structure, the original attack objective is instantiated as complementary instructions rather than duplicated across all attackers.

Tool-attack example. Figure 11 presents an InjecAgent instance with selected agents $\{0, 3, 6\}$ and induced edges $3 \rightarrow 0 \leftrightarrow 6$. The generated instructions again differ across the selected agents: Agent 3 is assigned a coordination role for injecting the instruction toward Agent 0, Agent 0 is instructed to receive the injected instruction and invoke the attacker tool, and Agent 6 is assigned a verification role. This example shows that, given a different attack objective and selected communication structure, the planner produces a different division of responsibilities among the selected agents.

Memory-poisoning example. Figure 12 provides a third example with selected agents $\{0, 6, 7\}$ and induced edges $6 \leftrightarrow 0 \leftrightarrow 7$. Here, Agent 0 is instructed to coordinate the shared strategy, Agent 6 to provide independent rationale supporting the adversarial-context answer, and Agent 7 to propagate that answer to normal agents and check the consistency of the shared information. As in the previous examples, the planner turns the original attack objective into differentiated instructions for the agents in the particular selected subgraph.

Summary. Across these representative cases, the generated instructions exhibit different role assignments under different selected subgraphs and attack objectives. The examples therefore illustrate the intended function of structure-conditioned planning: after a vulnerable attacker subgraph is selected, the planner uses its agent membership and directed internal connections, together with the attack objective and benchmark context, to generate complementary agent-specific instructions. The figures provide qualitative examples of this adaptation mechanism rather than evidence that a particular topology necessarily induces a particular role assignment.

LLM Backbone	Prompt Injection		Tool Attack		Memory Poisoning		Overall Avg.		
	Original	+Ours	Original	+Ours	Original	+Ours	Original	+Ours	Gain (△)
Chain									
GPT-5.4-nano	14.74	16.84	0.00	0.00	14.74	29.47	9.83	15.44	**+5.61**
GPT-4o	11.58	12.63	14.74	15.79	5.26	17.89	10.53	15.44	**+4.91**
GPT-4o-mini	22.63	26.32	32.63	40.00	25.26	27.37	26.84	31.23	**+4.39**
DeepSeek-V3	14.74	12.63	26.32	26.32	25.26	27.37	22.11	22.11	**+0.00**
Qwen3-30B-A3B	34.73	37.89	44.21	50.53	43.16	43.16	40.70	43.86	**+3.16**
Tree									
GPT-5.4-nano	5.26	11.58	0.00	0.00	25.26	44.21	10.17	18.60	**+8.43**
GPT-4o	18.95	18.95	17.89	23.16	14.74	31.58	17.19	24.56	**+7.37**
GPT-4o-mini	14.74	16.84	28.42	35.79	23.68	27.37	22.28	26.67	**+4.39**
DeepSeek-V3	12.63	20.00	26.32	32.63	47.37	56.84	28.77	36.49	**+7.72**
Qwen3-30B-A3B	15.79	27.37	51.05	68.42	35.79	65.26	34.21	53.68	**+19.47**
Star									
GPT-5.4-nano	24.21	24.21	0.00	0.00	30.53	55.79	18.25	26.67	**+8.42**
GPT-4o	26.32	33.68	14.74	26.32	41.05	40.00	27.37	33.33	**+5.96**
GPT-4o-mini	23.16	21.05	31.05	52.63	22.11	37.89	25.44	37.19	**+11.75**
DeepSeek-V3	12.63	30.53	24.74	24.21	32.63	76.84	23.33	43.86	**+20.53**
Qwen3-30B-A3B	34.21	52.63	64.21	64.21	32.11	81.05	43.51	65.96	**+22.45**
Random									
GPT-5.4-nano	21.05	26.32	0.00	0.00	54.74	68.42	25.26	31.58	**+6.32**
GPT-4o	23.16	29.47	15.79	37.89	28.42	38.95	22.46	35.44	**+12.98**
GPT-4o-mini	21.05	38.95	36.84	56.84	33.16	53.68	30.35	49.82	**+19.47**
DeepSeek-V3	20.53	24.21	29.47	25.26	66.84	76.84	38.95	42.10	**+3.15**
Qwen3-30B-A3B	32.11	61.05	63.16	65.26	62.63	87.37	52.63	71.23	**+18.60**

Table 3: **Attack success rate (ASR, %, ↑) across multi-agent system topologies and LLM backbones.** Original denotes the existing multi-agent system attacks, while +Ours denotes the corresponding attacks enhanced by CIV-Amplify through collaboration-aware amplification.

F Additional Experiments

F.1 Additional Results across LLM Backbones

To further evaluate whether the effectiveness of CIV-Amplify generalizes across different LLM backbones, we extend the main experiments to five models, including GPT-5.4-nano, GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, DeepSeek-V3, and Qwen3-30B-A3B. We evaluate the same three attack types under Chain, Tree, Star, and Random communication topologies. Table 3 reports the complete results.

Overall, CIV-Amplify consistently amplifies existing attacks across diverse LLM backbones and communication structures. The improvement is particularly pronounced under more highly connected topologies. For example, under the Random topology, the overall ASR of GPT-4o-mini increases from 30.35% to 49.82% (+19.47), while Qwen3-30B-A3B increases from 52.63% to 71.23% (+18.60). Similarly, under the Star topology, DeepSeek-V3 and Qwen3-30B-A3B exhibit gains of 20.53 and 22.45, respectively. In contrast, the gains under the Chain topology are generally smaller, ranging from 0.00 to 5.61. This pattern is consistent with our structural analysis: communication structures providing richer interaction opportunities can expose more opportunities for collaborative attack amplification.

The results also reveal substantial variation across attack types and backbones. Memory poisoning exhibits particularly strong amplification in several settings. For instance, its ASR increases from 32.63% to 76.84% for DeepSeek-V3 and from 32.11% to 81.05% for Qwen3-30B-A3B under the Star topology. Prompt injection and tool attacks also benefit from collaborative amplification in many settings, although the magnitude of the improvement varies with both the backbone and topology. The magnitude of these gains varies across individual settings, further suggesting that collaborative attack effectiveness depends on both the underlying model and communication structure.

Taken together, these additional results show that the effectiveness of CIV-Amplify is not restricted to a particular LLM backbone. Instead, the observed amplification varies jointly with the underlying model, attack type, and communication topology, further supporting the importance of considering collaboration structure when evaluating the security of LLM-based multi-agent systems.

G THE USE OF LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

LLMs were used as backbones of the multi-agent systems to generate experimental data for training the vulnerability predictor. We also used LLM-based tools to assist with language polishing and the development and refinement of mathematical proofs. All experimental results, scientific claims, and mathematical arguments were independently reviewed and verified by the authors.