RESIGHT: CONTROLLED VISUAL REACTIVATION AFTER MULTIMODAL UNLEARNING

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Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

Clean-input evaluations of multimodal unlearning measure whether a target behavior is suppressed on an original image, but do not establish whether bounded image changes can elicit it. We study this gap as *local target accessibility* and introduce ReSight, a reference-conditioned visual reactivation attack. ReSight integrates reference-conditioned image construction, reference-free execution, and joint response controls. For each example, a fixed token prefix from a released response reference defines a negative-log-likelihood objective for projected sign-gradient updates under an L_∞ bound. The question and model parameters remain unchanged. The resulting image is paired with the original question for free generation without the reference. Joint clean, unrelated-image, and blank-image controls identify target reactivation beyond clean-input persistence and transfer to other image bases. Across SafeEraser-240 and BeaverTails-V-108, two model families, and three forgetting recipes, ReSight recovers designated behaviors on 4.7–34.9% of clean-suppressed items, with control-qualified reactivation in all 12 settings covering 4.2–33.3% of full cohorts. Under the evaluated configurations, ReSight achieves the highest control-qualified success rate in 11 of 12 settings against five visual-attack adaptations. Fixed-image replay reveals checkpoint dependence. An exploratory spatial countermeasure reduces reactivation for fixed attacks. These findings demonstrate that clean-input suppression alone is insufficient evidence of robust multimodal unlearning and establish local target accessibility as a key dimension of its evaluation.

1 INTRODUCTION

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) answer a language request through a joint visual–language interface. In systems such as LLaVA and Qwen2.5-VL, changing the image can change the response to the same question (Liu et al., 2024; Bai et al., 2025). This dependence also affects safety: query-relevant images and apparently benign image–text combinations can alter whether a sensitive request is followed (Liu et al., 2025a; Wang et al., 2025). For an unlearned checkpoint, it raises a specific question: does suppression on one image imply that the same behavior is inaccessible on nearby images?

Machine unlearning aims to remove selected information or behavior while retaining useful capabilities (Cao & Yang, 2015; Bourtoule et al., 2021). Multimodal methods extend this objective to image–text associations through training objectives, pruning, or representation editing (Chen et al., 2025; Huo et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2025c; Cheng & Amiri, 2025). Clean-input tests are valuable, but forgetting, utility, privacy, and robustness are distinct properties (Thudi et al., 2022; Lynch et al., 2024; Shi et al., 2025). A low forget score on the canonical input need not rule out recovery under another admissible input (Łucki et al., 2025; Patil et al., 2024; Lin et al., 2026).

Figure 1 illustrates this robustness gap. An unlearned model can refuse on the clean image yet answer after a bounded image change. Existing attacks establish that images can control runtime responses (Bailey et al., 2024; Qi et al., 2024; Shayegani et al., 2024). In unlearning, RECALL optimizes image prompts with a fixed text condition for diffusion-model concept recovery (Liu et al., 2026); POPS combines text-suffix search with fine-tuning for MLLM recovery (LI et al., 2026). Our question instead concerns a designated textual behavior of a frozen MLLM under an explicit pixel bound.

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Clean and transferred-image controls distinguish recovery from behavior already present on the original image or elicited on an unrelated visual base.

We introduce ReSight, integrating *reference-conditioned construction*, *reference-free execution*, and joint response controls for target-specific visual reactivation. During construction, a released response reference defines a fixed token-prefix likelihood; gradients update a separate bounded image perturbation for each item through the frozen visual path. At execution, the reference is removed: the realized image and original question alone determine the free response. A joint clean–foil–null gate identifies control-qualified recovery, while paired checkpoint replay characterizes model dependence. We also explore one-pixel spatial preprocessing as a countermeasure against completed attacks.

Across complete SafeEraser-240 and BeaverTails-V-108 cohorts, two model families, and three forgetting recipes, ReSight recovers designated responses on 4.7–34.9% of clean-suppressed items. Qualified events remain in all 12 settings, at 4.2–33.3% of the full cohorts. These results demonstrate that clean-input suppression and local visual accessibility can coexist.




Figure 1: Image-Only Reactivation under Fixed Query and Checkpoint

Our contributions are threefold:

- We formulate target-specific visual reactivation as bounded post-unlearning reachability, with a delivered image providing a finite behavioral witness.
- We develop ReSight by integrating reference-conditioned image search, reference-free execution, and joint controls for target-specific reactivation.
- We evaluate 12 frozen settings and five configured visual attacks using joint response controls and paired checkpoint replay, and explore spatial preprocessing as a countermeasure against fixed attacks.

2 Related Work

Multimodal unlearning and evaluation. Unlearning benchmarks distinguish forgetting from utility, privacy, and auditability (Maini et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024; Shi et al., 2025; Yuan et al., 2025). SafeEraser and MMUnlearner modify multimodal training objectives, MANU prunes modality-aware neurons, and MultiDelete decouples multimodal and unimodal representations (Chen et al., 2025; Huo et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2025c; Cheng & Amiri, 2025). MLLMU-Bench and multimodal safety resources supply complementary forgetting and response-level tests (Liu et al., 2025b; Ji et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2025b; Liu et al., 2025a; Wang et al., 2025). We use released SafeEraser and BeaverTails-V response references to test whether an item-defined behavior remains accessible after an image change.

Recovery and robustness after unlearning. Benign relearning, adversarial extraction, and query-based audits show that apparent forgetting can depend on the evaluation path (Hu et al., 2025; Łucki et al., 2025; Patil et al., 2024; Lin et al., 2026). Adversarial removal requests and residual poisoning probe different failure modes (Huang et al., 2025; Pawelczyk et al., 2025); other algorithms use membership-inference feedback, adversarial examples, or synthesized mixup data to strengthen forgetting (Di et al., 2025; Ebrahimpour-Boroojeny et al., 2025; Peng et al., 2025). Unlike model relearning or POPS's suffix-search and fine-tuning route (LI et al., 2026), ReSight fixes the checkpoint and question. Unlike RECALL's diffusion concept-recovery setting (Liu et al., 2026), its endpoint is a textual target match qualified by clean, foil, and null controls.

Visual attacks and bounded search. Image Hijacks already supports adversary-selected outputs, while Visual Adversarial Examples and Jailbreak in Pieces expose visual control of multimodal

responses (Bailey et al., 2024; Qi et al., 2024; Shayegani et al., 2024). Typographic, shuffle-based, and attention-guided attacks explore other visual mechanisms (Gong et al., 2025; Zhao et al., 2025; Li et al., 2026; Azulay et al., 2026); text-suffix methods instead operate on the language channel (Liao & Sun, 2024). ReSight applies projected sign-gradient search (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2017). Its contribution is the post-unlearning target-accessibility formulation and controlled response endpoint. Because preprocessing and randomization can alter perturbation effectiveness (Athalye et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018; Schlarmann et al., 2024), we evaluate free-generation responses on reopened images and replay fixed artifacts across checkpoints and spatial placements.

3 PRELIMINARIES

3.1 MULTIMODAL UNLEARNING AS AN INPUT-CONDITIONAL PROPERTY

Machine unlearning aims to remove a designated influence while retaining useful capabilities (Cao & Yang, 2015; Bourtoule et al., 2021; Shi et al., 2025). In a multimodal language model, the observable behavior is conditional on both a visual input and a language request, so a checkpoint can satisfy a clean-input forgetting test while retaining a behavior that is reachable elsewhere in its input space (Chen et al., 2025; Huo et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2025c; Lin et al., 2026). We study the resulting frozen checkpoint M_u, called the Victim, on image–question–reference tuples (c_i, s_i, r_i). The clean image c_i lies on the canonical RGB grid, s_i is the original question, and the released model-output reference r_i specifies the behavior used to define a target match. Under fixed preprocessing, decoding, and semantic evaluation, let

$$S_m(x; s_i, r_i) \in \{0, 1\}$$

indicate whether checkpoint m generates a substantive match to r_i. Clean-input suppression for an item is the event $S_u(c_i; s_i, r_i) = 0$. We evaluate it jointly with the attacked response over each complete cohort.

3.2 THREAT MODEL

The attacker has white-box access to the frozen Victim and knows the tuple (c_i, s_i, r_i), as in targeted visual attacks that optimize the image while holding the language condition fixed (Bailey et al., 2024; Qi et al., 2024; Madry et al., 2018). The intervention changes pixels inside a prescribed neighborhood while holding the question and model parameters fixed. The reference is used during construction; inference receives the image and original question. Each item–checkpoint pair receives its own perturbation. This threat model isolates a visual accessibility route: the target is available to the constructor, while the deployed query contains only the image and the original question.

3.3 CONSTRAINED REACTIVATION OBJECTIVE

For a normalized L_∞ budget ϵ, the admissible delivered images are

$$\mathcal{X}_i(\epsilon) = \left\{ x \in \{0, 1/255, \ldots, 1\}^d : \|x - c_i\|_\infty \le \epsilon \right\}. \tag{1}$$

The desired event is a target match on an attacked image together with a non-match on the clean image:

$$R_i(a_i) = S_u(a_i; s_i, r_i)\,[1 - S_u(c_i; s_i, r_i)] = 1. \tag{2}$$

The corresponding local accessibility functional is

$$\mathcal{A}_u(i; \epsilon) = \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}_i(\epsilon)} S_u(x; s_i, r_i). \tag{3}$$

A delivered attack with $R_i(a_i) = 1$ is a finite witness that $\mathcal{A}_u(i; \epsilon) = 1$ under the specified evaluation protocol. ReSight constructs this witness through bounded visual optimization. Section 4 develops a differentiable surrogate for this discrete functional, and Section 5.1 defines the control-qualified endpoint used in the experiments.




Figure 2: ReSight decomposes reactivation into target specification, local visual reachability, and reference-free verification. A fixed response prefix provides the construction signal; gradients update only the image inside its bounded neighborhood; the final 8-bit image is then queried with the unchanged question and without the reference.

4 METHODOLOGY

4.1 A REACHABILITY VIEW OF VISUAL REACTIVATION

ReSight separates three objects: the specified behavior, its admissible visual neighborhood, and the freely generated response. Figure 2 follows this decomposition. A fixed response prefix defines an item-specific objective; local image search maps that objective through the frozen Victim; reference-free execution then tests the realized image with the original question. This separates reference-based target specification from image-conditioned response generation.

4.2 REFERENCE-CONDITIONED TARGET SPECIFICATION

Behavioral identity. The event in Equation 2 concerns one designated response. ReSight specifies this behavioral target through the released response reference r_i. Let Tok denote the fixed tokenizer and define

$$y_i = \mathrm{Tok}(r_i)_{1:H_i}, \qquad H_i = \min\{H, |\,\mathrm{Tok}(r_i)|\}. \tag{4}$$

The cap H is fixed per configuration and y_i is unchanged throughout construction. Evaluation instead concerns the complete freely generated response, with no reference tokens at execution.

A differentiable surrogate for a discrete event. Let $\Phi_u(x)$ be the frozen visual path used during construction and let $\rho_u(v \mid z, s, \tau)$ be the next-token distribution for visual features z, question s, and response history τ. The teacher-forced target probability is

$$z_u(x) = \Phi_u(x), \qquad p_u(y_i \mid x, s_i) = \prod_{h=1}^{H_i} \rho_u(y_{i,h} \mid z_u(x), s_i, y_{i,<h}). \tag{5}$$

The image is the only variable in this factorization. Taking the length-normalized negative log likelihood gives the construction loss

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_i(x) &= -\frac{1}{H_i} \log p_u(y_i \mid x, s_i) \\ &= -\frac{1}{H_i} \sum_{h=1}^{H_i} \log \rho_u(y_{i,h} \mid \Phi_u(x), s_i, y_{i,<h}). \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

Targeted likelihood is a standard visual-attack signal (Bailey et al., 2024; Qi et al., 2024). Here it supplies a differentiable surrogate for the designated response. Semantic reactivation is measured separately from freely generated outputs.

4.3 INSTANCE-CONDITIONED LOCAL VISUAL REACHABILITY

A distinct neighborhood for each item. Because the useful direction depends on the scene, question, target, and checkpoint, each tuple receives its own perturbation. The search is

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_i(\epsilon) &= \{v \in \mathbb{R}^d : \|v\|_\infty \le \epsilon,\ 0 \le c_i + v \le 1\}, \\ v_i^* &\in \arg\min_{v \in \Delta_i(\epsilon)} \mathcal{L}_i(c_i + v). \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

The search constructs an item-specific behavioral witness within the admissible visual neighborhood.

How target information reaches pixels. Write $\mathcal{L}_i(x) = \ell_i(\Phi_u(x))$, holding the question, target tokens, and model parameters fixed. The chain rule gives

$$g_i^{(t)} = \nabla_x \mathcal{L}_i(x_i^{(t)}) = J_{\Phi_u}(x_i^{(t)})^\top \left.\nabla_z \ell_i(z)\right|_{z=\Phi_u(x_i^{(t)})}. \tag{8}$$

Both factors depend on the item and Victim. The visual Jacobian transports the target-conditioned signal to pixels without updating model parameters.

Budget-matched projected search. For the first-order local model, the steepest L_∞-bounded step is

$$d_i^{(t)} = -\eta\ \mathrm{sign}(g_i^{(t)}) \in \arg\min_{\|d\|_\infty \le \eta} \langle g_i^{(t)}, d\rangle. \tag{9}$$

This standard sign-gradient geometry (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018) gives the steepest first-order update under the step budget.

Let $\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i = c_i + \Delta_i(\epsilon)$. Starting from the canonical image, the prescribed iterative construction is

$$x_i^{(0)} = c_i, \qquad x_i^{(t+1)} = \Pi_{\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i}\big(x_i^{(t)} + d_i^{(t)}\big), \quad 0 \le t < T. \tag{10}$$

The projection bounds the cumulative perturbation relative to the clean image. For coordinate k, set $b_{i,k}^- = \max(0, c_{i,k} - \epsilon)$ and $b_{i,k}^+ = \min(1, c_{i,k} + \epsilon)$. Then

$$[\Pi_{\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i}(w)]_k = \min\{b_{i,k}^+, \max\{b_{i,k}^-, w_k\}\}. \tag{11}$$

Thus every iterate stays in the same valid, item-specific image neighborhood.

4.4 REFERENCE-FREE EXECUTION

Quantized delivery. The construction returns the final iterate after the prescribed T updates. Let $\mathcal{D}_i$ denote its 8-bit realization. The delivered artifact and its measured integer perturbation are

$$\begin{aligned} a_i &= \mathcal{D}_i(x_i^{(T)}) \in \mathcal{X}_i(\epsilon), \\ \delta_i &= 255(a_i - c_i) \in \mathbb{Z}^d, \qquad \|\delta_i\|_\infty \le 255\epsilon. \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

We verify the perturbation bound on the delivered 8-bit image. The main experiments use $T = 500$, $\epsilon = 32/255$, and $\eta = 1/255$; Appendix D records backbone-specific preprocessing and budget checks.

Autoregressive verification. At execution, the Victim receives only the delivered image a_i and the unchanged question s_i. Let p_u^{gen} denote the recorded generation distribution after reopening the image and applying the model's fixed processor. Greedy decoding gives

$$\widehat{y}_{i,k} = \arg\max_{v \in \mathcal{V}} p_u^{\mathrm{gen}}(v \mid a_i, s_i, \widehat{y}_{i,<k}), \qquad o_i = (\widehat{y}_{i,1}, \ldots, \widehat{y}_{i,K_i}), \tag{13}$$

where K_i ends at end-of-sequence or the generation limit. Unlike the reference histories in Equation 5, execution histories are generated by the model itself.

The final images are fixed before semantic judging. Clean, foil, and null controls, Parent replay, and spatial replay then evaluate the same completed constructions.

5 EXPERIMENTS

We test whether clean-input suppression persists under bounded image changes, then examine the endpoint gate, checkpoint dependence, and a spatial countermeasure. Our code has been uploaded to the submission system as supplementary material.

5.1 EVALUATION PROTOCOL

Models and cohorts. We evaluate LLaVA-1.5-7B and Qwen2.5-VL-3B (Liu et al., 2024; Bai et al., 2025), each with frozen preference optimization (PO), PO with Prompt Decouple (POPD), and negative preference optimization with Prompt Decouple (NPO+PD) checkpoints (Chen et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2024). Complete SafeEraser-derived ($n = 240$) and BeaverTails-V ($n = 108$) cohorts, each covering six safety categories, give 12 cohort–backbone–recipe settings (Chen et al., 2025; Ji et al., 2025). BeaverTails-V provides external evaluation on the same released checkpoints.

Comparators. Five recorded image-only adaptations are compared: SUA (Zhang et al., 2025a), Image Hijacks (IH) (Bailey et al., 2024), Visual Adversarial Examples (VAE) (Qi et al., 2024), Jailbreak in Pieces (JiP) (Shayegani et al., 2024), and AttentionJailbreak (AJ) (Li et al., 2026). Each adaptation uses its recorded target access, construction unit, and resource allocation. Appendix D.4 details these configuration differences.


Endpoints. Let $Y_m^A, Y_m^C, Y_m^F, Y_m^N$ be checkpoint m's binary target-match labels for attacked, clean, foil, and null images. The foil transfers the realized perturbation to another scene; the null uses a white base. Both use the original question at inference and the same reference for semantic scoring. SafeEraser uses its released foil; Beaver uses a fixed category-local cyclic derangement. Define

$$R_m(i) = Y_m^A(i)(1 - Y_m^C(i)), \qquad Z_m(i) = Y_m^A(i) \prod_{r \in \{C,F,N\}} (1 - Y_m^r(i)). \tag{14}$$

Raw, clean-suppressed, and control-qualified rates are respectively

$$\widehat{\mathrm{ASR}}_{\mathrm{raw}}(m) = \frac{\sum_i Y_m^A(i)}{n}, \quad \widehat{R}_{\mathrm{sup}}(m) = \frac{\sum_i R_m(i)}{\sum_i (1 - Y_m^C(i))}, \qquad \widehat{\mathrm{ASR}}_{\mathrm{spec}}(m) = \frac{\sum_i Z_m(i)}{n}. \tag{15}$$

Conditional recovery is normalized over clean-negative items; raw and qualified ASR use the full cohort. Joint item-level labels preserve dependencies between control responses, distinguishing recovery among clean-suppressed items from selective reactivation across the cohort.



(a) Conditional recovery

	SE/L	SE/Q	BV/L	BV/Q
PO	12/239	17/240	19/107	31/107
P+PD	**41/239**	**33/240**	**34/99**	**37/106**
N+PD	11/236	14/239	6/101	16/106

(b) Recovered / eligible items

Figure 3: Conditional recovery (a) and recovered/clean-negative counts (b). SE/BV: SafeEraser/BeaverTails-V; L/Q: LLaVA/Qwen; P+PD/N+PD: POPD/NPO+PD.

Construction and judging. ReSight uses 500 updates, step size $1/255$, and realized L_∞ bound $32/255$. The prefix cap is fixed per configuration. Reopened images receive greedy generation capped at 96 new tokens. GPT-5.5 assigns five reference-relative labels; only a direct substantive match maps to one. Paired contrasts use 10,000 item-bootstrap replicates and exact McNemar tests with Holm correction over 12 primary qualified contrasts. Comparator rows are descriptive. Each construction and replay pack uses its own recorded responses and frozen labels, with conditional recovery normalized by the corresponding clean-negative count. These pack-specific conventions align labels with denominators and anchor spatial comparisons to the identity baseline from the same replay pack. Appendix D records preprocessing, prefix caps, image realization, and the judging protocol.

5.2 Attack performance


Recovery across full cohorts. ReSight recovers a designated response in all 12 settings while leaving the question and checkpoint unchanged. Figure 3 shows conditional recovery on clean-negative items: 4.7–34.9% across settings. Raw elicitation is 4.6–35.2%, whereas control-qualified ASR is 4.2–33.3% of the full cohorts. The qualified endpoint jointly establishes an attacked match and negative clean, foil, and null responses. POPD has the highest conditional rate within each cohort–backbone group, but positive qualified rates also remain for PO and NPO+PD. Appendix E reports the complete three-view counts and raw-to-qualified decomposition. Figure 3(b) pairs each recovery count with its clean-negative denominator, distinguishing a high conditional rate from a large number of recovered items. The common POPD pattern across backbones and cohorts identifies recipe dependence, while the PO and NPO+PD results establish accessibility beyond that recipe.

Comparison with visual attacks. Raw ASR measures target elicitation; control-qualified ASR identifies selective reactivation with negative clean, foil, and null controls. Figure 4 presents qualified comparisons; Tables 1 and 2 report both rates. ReSight leads in raw ASR in 10/12 settings and in conditional and qualified ASR in 11/12 under the recorded configurations. For LLaVA NPO+PD on SafeEraser, ReSight yields $11/240$ raw matches, versus $13/240$ for IH and $14/240$ for VAE; their conditional rates are $11/236$, $9/229$, and $8/223$. On Beaver, ReSight's qualified rate is $5/108$, versus $6/108$ for IH and VAE. Appendix D details construction resources and target access.

The cohort means in Figure 4(b) give equal weight to six backbone–recipe settings. ReSight averages 8.7% on SE and 21.1% on BV, versus 0.8% and 2.3% for the strongest comparator mean in each cohort. The setting-wise margins range from -0.9 points on BV/L NPO+PD to $+31.5$ on BV/Q POPD.

	ReS	SUA	IH	VAE	JiP	AJ	Δbest
SE/L PO	**5.0**	0	0	0	0	0	+5.0
SE/L P+PD	**17.1**	0	0	0.4	0	0	+16.7
SE/L N+PD	**4.2**	1.7	3.8	3.3	0.4	1.2	+0.4
SE/Q PO	**7.1**	0	0	0.4	0	0	+6.7
SE/Q P+PD	**12.9**	0.4	0	0	0.4	0	+12.5
SE/Q N+PD	**5.8**	0	0.8	0	0	0.4	+5.0
BV/L PO	**17.6**	0	0	0	2.8	0	+14.8
BV/L P+PD	**28.7**	2.8	1.9	3.7	1.9	2.8	+25.0
BV/L N+PD	**4.6**	4.6	5.6	5.6	4.6	4.6	-0.9
BV/Q PO	**28.7**	0	0	1.9	0.9	0.9	+26.9
BV/Q P+PD	**33.3**	1.9	0	0.9	0	0	+31.5
BV/Q N+PD	**13.9**	0.9	0.9	1.9	2.8	1.9	+11.1

(a) Qualified ASR (%)



(b) Six-setting cohort means

Figure 4: Qualified ASR: (a) all 72 cells, with row maxima outlined; Δbest is ReSight minus the strongest comparator (pp); (b) unweighted means over six settings per cohort. ReS denotes ReSight; other abbreviations follow the protocol.

Interpreting successful reactivation. The joint endpoint gives each successful attack a concrete behavioral meaning: the attacked image elicits the designated response, while the clean image and both transferred controls remain target-negative. For Beaver/LLaVA POPD, 31 of 38 raw matches satisfy all three controls (Table 2), so most matches in this setting meet the complete selective-reactivation criterion. Reading raw and qualified rates together separates the volume of elicitation from its dependence on the attacked visual context. ReSight thereby produces item-level witnesses of target accessibility under bounded visual intervention, with the original question and model weights held fixed.

5.3 Attack-gate ablation

A target match may persist on the clean image or transfer to another base. Table 3 therefore projects the same completed images and joint labels onto alternative gates. For the four POPD settings, removing all controls changes the Victim–Parent difference from $+8.3, +9.6, +24.1, +21.3$ to $+0.8, +9.6, +9.3, +13.9$ percentage points. Dropping the clean gate increases Parent positives in the LLaVA settings from 21 to 30 on SafeEraser and from 5 to 10 on Beaver. Removing a gate can only add positive events at either checkpoint, but its effect on their difference depends on which checkpoint gains more events. The reduction in three of the four attacked-only contrasts therefore reflects asymmetric additions rather than a change in image construction. Paired differences and checkpoint-specific counts distinguish raw elicitation from clean-suppressed, control-qualified reactivation.

Table 1: Raw / control-qualified attack success (%) on SafeEraser-240 ($n = 240$). Each entry reports Raw / Qualified; bold marks the numerical maximum of each component independently. Attack-specific target access, budgets, and construction units are listed in Table 8.

	LLaVA-1.5-7B			Qwen2.5-VL-3B		
Attack	PO	POPD	NPO+PD	PO	POPD	NPO+PD
SUA	0.4 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	3.3 / 1.7	0.4 / 0.0	0.4 / 0.4	0.4 / 0.0
Image Hijacks	0.0 / 0.0	0.4 / 0.0	5.4 / 3.8	0.4 / 0.0	0.0 / 0.0	0.8 / 0.8
Visual Adv.	0.0 / 0.0	0.4 / 0.4	**5.8** / 3.3	0.8 / 0.4	0.4 / 0.0	0.4 / 0.0
Jailbreak in Pieces	0.4 / 0.0	0.4 / 0.0	1.2 / 0.4	0.0 / 0.0	0.8 / 0.4	0.4 / 0.0
AttentionJailbreak	0.4 / 0.0	0.4 / 0.0	2.1 / 1.2	0.4 / 0.0	0.4 / 0.0	0.4 / 0.4
ReSight (ours)	**5.0 / 5.0**	**17.1 / 17.1**	4.6 / **4.2**	**7.1 / 7.1**	**13.8 / 12.9**	**5.8 / 5.8**

Table 2: Raw / control-qualified attack success (%) on the Beaver-108 external cohort ($n = 108$). Each entry reports Raw / Qualified; bold marks the numerical maximum of each component independently. Attack-specific target access, budgets, and construction units are listed in Table 8.

	LLaVA-1.5-7B			Qwen2.5-VL-3B		
Attack	PO	POPD	NPO+PD	PO	POPD	NPO+PD
SUA	0.9 / 0.0	8.3 / 2.8	9.3 / 4.6	0.9 / 0.0	3.7 / 1.9	0.9 / 0.9
Image Hijacks	0.9 / 0.0	8.3 / 1.9	11.1 / **5.6**	1.9 / 0.0	1.9 / 0.0	1.9 / 0.9
Visual Adv.	1.9 / 0.0	7.4 / 3.7	**13.0 / 5.6**	3.7 / 1.9	2.8 / 0.9	1.9 / 1.9
Jailbreak in Pieces	3.7 / 2.8	8.3 / 1.9	9.3 / 4.6	2.8 / 0.9	1.9 / 0.0	2.8 / 2.8
AttentionJailbreak	1.9 / 0.0	8.3 / 2.8	11.1 / 4.6	1.9 / 0.9	1.9 / 0.0	4.6 / 1.9
ReSight (ours)	**18.5 / 17.6**	**35.2 / 28.7**	7.4 / 4.6	**28.7 / 28.7**	**35.2 / 33.3**	**15.7 / 13.9**

This endpoint ablation holds the CE objective and completed images fixed and isolates the contribution of each control to event qualification. Figure 15 and Appendix F.1 give checkpoint-specific increments and count pairs. SE/BV and L/Q abbreviations follow Figure 3.

Table 3: Fixed-output gate ablation: paired Victim–Parent differences (pp) on POPD. Only the qualification rule changes.

Gate	SE/L	SE/Q	BV/L	BV/Q
Full	+8.3	+9.6	+24.1	+21.3
No clean	+4.6	+9.6	+21.3	+21.3
No foil	+7.5	+10.4	+24.1	+20.4
No null	+7.9	+9.6	+22.2	+19.4
Attacked only	+0.8	+9.6	+9.3	+13.9

Selective reactivation across checkpoints. The gate ablation reveals how control responses distinguish the composition of attack successes at the two checkpoints. Because the images and target labels are shared across gate variants, the resulting contrasts trace directly to clean-input persistence and transfer to alternative bases. In three of the four POPD settings, the full gate yields a larger Victim–Parent difference than attacked-only counting: selective events constitute a distinct checkpoint-dependent response pattern. The joint criterion gives this pattern an explicit item-level definition and makes its frequency measurable. ReSight's image construction and qualification thus provide complementary evidence: a successful visual intervention and a characterization of the input conditions under which the designated response becomes accessible.

Clean suppression and local accessibility. The recovery results establish that clean-input suppression and bounded visual accessibility coexist on individual evaluation items. Holding the question and checkpoint fixed makes the image intervention the changing input in each recovered pair. Positive qualified rates across both backbones, both cohorts, and all three recipes extend this observation across the evaluated settings. The consistently highest conditional recovery for POPD within each cohort–backbone group further identifies recipe-dependent variation in this accessibility. Together, Figure 3 and the gate ablation characterize three aspects of post-unlearning behavior: suppression at the original input, target recovery under a bounded image change, and selectivity under the joint controls. This connects attack success to a reproducible behavioral profile of multimodal unlearning.

5.4 Checkpoint replay and countermeasure exploration

Checkpoint replay. The same four saved images are replayed on the ancestral Parent under the paired question, processor, and decoder. Nine of 12 qualified differences are positive and three are negative (Figure 5). All four POPD differences are positive: $+8.3, +9.6, +24.1, +21.3$ points, with paired intervals excluding zero. The paired replay measures how checkpoint identity changes responses to fixed Victim-optimized images. The paired outcome counts in Figure 5(b) resolve these differences into Victim-only, Parent-only, shared, and joint-negative events. For example, SE/L POPD has 31 Victim-only and 11 Parent-only events, giving a net difference of $20/240$; BV/L POPD has 29 and 3, giving $26/108$. Shared positives cancel in the contrast; the paired difference equals the imbalance between discordant outcomes.




Figure 5: (a) Qualified Victim–Parent differences with 95% paired bootstrap intervals (10,000 resamples); filled: Holm-adjusted $P < 0.05$ (12 tests). (b) Counts: Victim-only (V), Parent-only (P), both (B), neither (N).

Exploratory spatial countermeasure. We explore spatial preprocessing to counter fixed ReSight attacks. An independent POPD replay applies identity and four cyclic one-pixel shifts to all four roles without reoptimization. Shifting attacked and clean images together preserves their L_∞ distance. In SE/L, SE/Q, BV/L, and BV/Q order, qualified identity rates are 17.9%, 8.3%, 38.9%, and 28.7%; the four-shift means are 0.73%, 0.52%, 2.78%, and 0.69%. Beaver/LLaVA raw matches likewise fall from $52/108$ to $9/108$–$12/108$ under the shifts. The decline in raw and qualified matches links the countermeasure's effect to target elicitation. This pack uses its own responses and labels, with four correlated shifts per item (Appendices D.6 and F.2).

6 Conclusion and Limitation

Conclusion. ReSight tests whether clean-input suppression extends to a bounded visual neighborhood. It separates reference-conditioned construction from reference-free execution and qualifies recovery with clean, foil, and null responses. Across two cohorts, two model families, and three forgetting recipes, designated responses are recovered on 4.7–34.9% of clean-suppressed items, and all 12 settings retain control-qualified target accessibility. The comparison with five visual attacks locates this recovery within existing attack configurations, while gate ablation and checkpoint replay characterize endpoint and model dependence. Spatial replay additionally explores a countermeasure against fixed attacks. Together, these results establish local visual accessibility as a measurable dimension of post-unlearning robustness. By pairing each successful image with its control responses, ReSight makes reactivation directly inspectable at the item level. These behavioral witnesses connect aggregate success rates to the visual conditions under which a designated response becomes accessible. The saved images also provide reusable probes for checkpoint comparison. ReSight thus links attack construction with direct behavioral analysis across frozen checkpoints. Evaluating both clean-input suppression and bounded visual reachability provides a fuller account of the behaviors that remain accessible after multimodal unlearning.

Limitations and future work. ReSight examines post-unlearning target accessibility in a controlled, image-based, known-target white-box setting. This scope provides a basis for extending the study to broader model families, multimodal tasks, and unlearning strategies. Future work can relax the access and target-specification assumptions, including query-limited settings and targets expressed without a fixed reference response. Building on our exploratory spatial countermeasure, another direction is to jointly study transformation-aware attacks and input preprocessing, assessing reactivation resistance alongside benign-task utility. The control-qualified evaluation protocol also provides a starting point for comparing future unlearning methods under both clean inputs and bounded visual changes.

AI USE STATEMENT

We used AI tools to assist with programming and polish the manuscript. We also used GPT-5.5 for experimental evaluation.

ETHICS STATEMENT

The experiments use locally controlled models and authorized evaluation data to examine access to behaviors targeted by safety unlearning. The paper reports aggregate outcomes and a small set of qualitative comparisons using recorded input images and response excerpts, omitting harmful continuations and construction target responses. The models and evaluation data remain subject to their respective licenses.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

Section 3 defines the attack setting, Section 4 specifies the fixed-prefix CE construction, and Section 5.1 defines the evaluation measures. Appendix C expands the algorithms and propositions, Appendix D records the experimental protocol, and Appendix E supplies endpoint counts and paired statistics; Appendix G gives the qualitative comparisons. The source supplement contains the evaluator instruction and call specification, experiment-source mappings, aggregate analysis inputs, and plotting code. Our code has been uploaded to the submission system as supplementary material.

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A Appendix Overview

Appendix B summarizes notation for the attack, its controls, and replay. Appendix C expands the construction with two algorithms, the finite-step image-space geometry, and propositions that connect prefix likelihood to decoding under explicit assumptions and make the budget, gate, and replay identities precise. It further characterizes discrete access radii, base-dependent clipping, paired disagreement, and sensitivity to hypothetical semantic-label corrections. Appendix D records the cohort roles, checkpoints, construction settings, comparison configurations, semantic labels, and statistical protocol needed to reproduce the reported objects. Appendix E then supplies the endpoint counts and analyses of recipe-specific category profiles, checkpoint overlap, cohort-subset composition, and qualification retention across methods. Appendix F reports control ablation and spatial countermeasure exploration. Finally, Appendix G compares three fixed main-cohort cases using method-specific images, the same questions, response excerpts, and full-response labels.

The algorithms and propositions formalize the CE-based construction, its image-space geometry, and the response-level measurements used throughout the experiments.

B Notation

We use one notation system throughout the paper. Lowercase letters denote scalars or individual objects, bold symbols denote vectors when needed, and calligraphic symbols denote sets. The subscript i indexes an item, $b \in \{\mathrm{SE}, \mathrm{BV}\}$ indexes the SafeEraser-240 or Beaver-108 cohort, $j \in \{\mathrm{L}, \mathrm{Q}\}$ indexes LLaVA or Qwen, and $m \in \{u, p\}$ indexes the unlearned Victim or ancestral Parent checkpoint. This indexing preserves item identity across construction and replay. The tables below group symbols by their roles in the task definition, optimization, generation, and response-level evaluation. Together, these conventions link the image-space quantities used during construction to the response-level quantities used during evaluation. They provide a consistent basis for relating individual behavioral witnesses to cohort-level success rates and paired checkpoint comparisons.

B.1 Objects and roles

Table 4: Objects shared by the task definition, construction, and replay.

Symbol	Meaning	Scope
i, n	item index and cohort size	$i = 1, \ldots, n$
h, k, t	target-token, coordinate/output-token, and update indices	local to the equation
b, j, m	cohort, backbone, and checkpoint indices	fixed per pack
c_i, s_i, r_i	clean image, question, released response reference	item tuple
$d, \mathcal{X}_i(\epsilon)$	image dimension and discrete admissible neighborhood	$\{0, 1/255, \ldots, 1\}^d$
$\mathcal{G}, \bar{c}_i, B$	8-bit grid, integer clean image, integer budget	$\mathcal{G} = \{0, 1/255, \ldots, 1\}$
$\mathcal{X}_i^8(B)$	delivered 8-bit admissible neighborhood	$\|255(a - c_i)\|_\infty \le B$
a_i, δ_i	delivered attack image and integer RGB perturbation	Victim construction
$q_i^A, q_i^C, q_i^F, q_i^N$	attacked, clean, foil, and null role images	replay roles
c_i^F, c_i^N	foil image and white-null base before transfer	grid-valued bases
M_u, M_p	Victim and ancestral Parent checkpoints	$m = u, p$
$S_m(x; s_i, r_i)$	semantic target-match indicator	binary event
$R_i(a_i), \mathcal{A}_u(i; \epsilon)$	clean-suppressed witness and local accessibility	Eqs. (2)–(3)

The response reference r_i and the conditional-recovery event R_i are distinct objects. Likewise, the question s_i is distinct from the semantic indicator S_m. A target reference is a construction-time specification; it is not inserted into the inference prompt. The role images share an item-specific question and a common reference for semantic scoring. Role and checkpoint indices then associate each observed response with its visual input and model. The clean role records the original-image response, while the foil and null roles track the perturbation on alternative visual bases. Together with the attacked role, these inputs connect target elicitation to the visual context in which it occurs.

B.2 CONSTRUCTION AND GENERATION

Table 5: Symbols used by the differentiable construction and free execution.

Symbol	Meaning	Scope
$\mathrm{Tok}, H, H_i, y_i$	tokenizer, prefix cap, effective length, target prefix	construction
Φ_u, z_u, J_{Φ_u}	visual map, visual features, and its Jacobian	construction path
$\rho_u, \tau, \mathcal{V}$	next-token distribution, history, vocabulary	autoregressive model
$p_u(y_i \mid x, s_i)$	teacher-forced target likelihood	construction surrogate
$\mathcal{L}_i, \ell_i$	pixel-space CE and feature-space loss	optimization
ϵ, η, T	normalized budget, step size, number of updates	fixed setting
$\Delta_i(\epsilon), \widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i$	perturbation set and image set	feasible domain
$\ell_{i,k}, u_{i,k}$	box endpoints, also $b^-_{i,k}, b^+_{i,k}$	projection
$x_i^{(t)}, v_i^*, g_i^{(t)}, d_i^{(t)}$	iterate, optimal perturbation, gradient, sign step	optimization
$\mathcal{B}_i(x,\eta), x^+, e$	local feasible box, projected iterate, displacement	first-order analysis
$\Pi_{\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i}, \mathcal{D}_i, Q$	projection, serializer, quantizer	delivery
τ_k, β	clipped coordinate step and local gradient smoothness constant	local bound
$\lambda_{i,h}, \widetilde{\lambda}_{i,h}$	construction/execution target-token negative log likelihood	prefix analysis
$\xi_{i,h}, \Xi_i$	tokenwise path-discrepancy bound and its sum	sufficient condition
$p_u^{\mathrm{gen}}, \mathcal{V}, \widehat{y}_{i,k}, o_i, K_i$	generation distribution, vocabulary, output tokens, cap	execution

Here H is a configuration-level cap, H_i is the available prefix length, and K_i is the generation cap or the first end-of-sequence position. The symbol $Q(v) = \mathrm{round}(255\,\mathrm{clip}(v,0,1))/255$ is the grid-valued quantizer; it is distinct from the role image q_i^r.

B.3 ENDPOINT AND DIAGNOSTIC NOTATION

Table 6: Symbols used by qualification, checkpoint pairing, and spatial replay.

Symbol	Meaning	Scope
$Y_m^A, Y_m^C, Y_m^F, Y_m^N$	role-level semantic labels	attacked/clean/foil/null
$\mathcal{C}$	control-role set	$\{C, F, N\}$
$R_m(i)$	clean-suppressed attacked match	$Y_m^A(1-Y_m^C)$
$G_m(i)$	joint control gate	$\prod_{r\in\{C,F,N\}}(1-Y_m^r)$
$Z_m(i)$	qualified endpoint	$Y_m^A G_m$
$Z_m^{(-k)}$	endpoint with control $k \in \mathcal{C}$ deleted	gate projection
$\widehat{\mathrm{ASR}}_{\mathrm{raw}}, \widehat{R}_{\mathrm{sup}}$ $\widehat{\mathrm{ASR}}_{\mathrm{spec}}$	raw, conditional, qualified rates	full cohort denominator except conditional
$\widehat{E}_m$	attacked matches excluded by any control, divided by n	gate analysis
$\widehat{\Delta}_A, \widehat{\Delta}_Z$	attacked and qualified Victim–Parent gaps	paired replay
$b/c, p, p_{\mathrm{H}}$	Victim-only/Parent-only counts and paired-test p values	b/c only in statistics table
$n_{\mathrm{sup}}(m)$	number of clean-negative items for checkpoint m	conditional denominator
$\pi, \mathcal{T}$	cyclic coordinate permutation and four-shift set	spatial replay

The notation keeps $\Delta_i(\epsilon)$, an image-space search set, separate from $\widehat{\Delta}_A$ and $\widehat{\Delta}_Z$, checkpoint contrasts. The labels Y_m^r are obtained by applying S_m to the corresponding role image: $Y_m^r(i) = S_m(q_i^r; s_i, r_i)$. We use $\mathbf{1}[\cdot]$ for an indicator, $\mathrm{sign}(0) = 0$, and natural logarithms. The operators clip, round, and Π act coordinatewise; $\|\cdot\|_0$ counts nonzero entries, while $\|\cdot\|_1$, $\|\cdot\|_2$, and $\|\cdot\|_\infty$ have their usual meanings. The superscripts A, C, F, N are role labels, not powers; the scalar coordinate step τ_k is distinct from a token history τ.

B.4 SYMBOLS FOR THE EXTENDED ANALYSES

The following symbols support the extended derivations.

Budget and decoding. $B_i^\star$ is the smallest integer-RGB target-access radius, P_i^{con} is the construction-path prefix probability, and $\gamma_{i,h}$ is the execution-path target-token margin.

Transferred perturbations. $\bar{b}$ denotes a generic integer image base, $\delta_i^{\mathrm{eff}}(\bar{b})$ its effective clipped perturbation, and $\mathbf{1}$ the all-ones vector. Here p in $\|\cdot\|_p$ is a norm exponent, not a checkpoint label or a test probability.

Control partitions. $D, E, F \subseteq \mathcal{C}$ denote sets of controls, $w_m(D)$ counts attacked matches with positive-control set exactly D, and $f_m(D)$ counts matches when the controls in D are deleted. N_A, N_C, N_F, N_N, N_Z are unnormalized marginal and qualified counts.

Paired outcomes. n_{ab} counts items with $(Z_u, Z_p) = (a, b)$, where $a, b \in \{0, 1\}$; $D_i = Z_u(i) - Z_p(i)$ is the signed paired outcome. $\widehat{d}_Z$ and $\widehat{j}_Z$ denote disagreement and shared-success fractions. $\overline{D}$ is the sample mean of D_i. The scalar D_i is distinct from the calligraphic delivery map $\mathcal{D}_i$.

Label corrections. A tilde denotes a quantity after hypothetical label correction. k_m counts affected items on checkpoint m; (q, s) and (q', s') are original and corrected conditional-recovery numerator and denominator. These local count symbols are distinct from role images q_i^r and questions s_i.

Transformation suites. K is the number of tested transformations, $Z_{m,\pi}$ a transformed qualified endpoint, V_m the per-item mean, and P_m simultaneous persistence. $\bar{z}_\pi$ and $\bar{p}$ average these binary outcomes over items. K is distinct from generation length K_i.

Category summaries. G is the category count, g a category index, n_g its size, and q_g its qualified count; $\widehat{r}_{\text{micro}}$ and $\widehat{r}_{\text{macro}}$ are the corresponding item-weighted and category-weighted rates.

C Method Details and Theoretical Analysis

This appendix formalizes ReSight's fixed-prefix, targeted cross-entropy (CE) construction and derives its feasibility, decoding, and evaluation properties. The analysis connects the continuous optimization canvas, the serialized 8-bit image, and response-level free-generation evaluation.

C.1 Discrete delivered images and the continuous relaxation

Let

$$\mathcal{G} = \left\{0, \frac{1}{255}, \ldots, 1\right\}, \qquad \bar{c}_i = 255 c_i \in \{0, \ldots, 255\}^d,$$

where d includes all RGB coordinates. The canonical image and every reopened artifact are points of $\mathcal{G}^d$. For an integer budget B, the delivered-image set is

$$\mathcal{X}_i^8(B) = \left\{a \in \mathcal{G}^d : \|255(a - c_i)\|_\infty \le B\right\}. \tag{16}$$

The main construction uses $B = 32$, equivalently $\epsilon = B/255 = 32/255$. For the differentiable image updates we use the continuous box

$$\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i(\epsilon) = \left\{x \in [0, 1]^d : \|x - c_i\|_\infty \le \epsilon\right\}. \tag{17}$$

For a coordinate k, write

$$\ell_{i,k} = \max\{0, c_{i,k} - \epsilon\}, \qquad u_{i,k} = \min\{1, c_{i,k} + \epsilon\}.$$

Thus $\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i(\epsilon) = \prod_k [\ell_{i,k}, u_{i,k}]$ and its projection is a coordinatewise clamp.

The recorded image realization returns an 8-bit image $a_i = \mathcal{D}_i(x_i^{(T)}) \in \mathcal{G}^d$ and stores

$$\delta_i = 255(a_i - c_i) \in \mathbb{Z}^d, \qquad \|\delta_i\|_\infty \le B. \tag{18}$$

Here $\mathcal{D}_i$ denotes the recorded serialize–reopen operation together with the integer-budget check in (18). In the Qwen constructor the quantized candidate is projected into the integer budget; in the LLaVA replay the reopened PNG is validated against the same budget. Both realization paths return an image only after validating its integer-grid budget. The bound therefore applies directly to the reopened image used for response evaluation.

C.2 Reference-conditioned surrogate and reference-free execution

For the fixed tuple (c_i, s_i, r_i), let Tok be the recorded tokenizer and set

$$H_i = \min\{H, |\operatorname{Tok}(r_i)|\}, \qquad y_i = \operatorname{Tok}(r_i)_{1:H_i}.$$

During construction, Φ_u denotes the differentiable visual path of the frozen Victim and ρ_u its next-token distribution. Teacher forcing gives

$$p_u(y_i \mid x, s_i) = \prod_{h=1}^{H_i} \rho_u(y_{i,h} \mid \Phi_u(x), s_i, y_{i,<h}), \qquad \mathcal{L}_i(x) = -\frac{1}{H_i} \log p_u(y_i \mid x, s_i). \tag{19}$$

Only x is optimized. The question, target prefix, tokenizer, and model parameters are fixed throughout the updates. Equation (19) gives the exact autoregressive factorization and negative-log identity used as the construction-path surrogate for the binary target-match event.

At execution, the reference history is removed. If p_u^{gen} is the recorded generation distribution after reopening a_i, greedy decoding uses its own history:

$$\widehat{y}_{i,k} = \arg\max_{v \in \mathcal{V}} p_u^{\mathrm{gen}}(v \mid a_i, s_i, \widehat{y}_{i,<k}), \qquad o_i = (\widehat{y}_{i,1}, \ldots, \widehat{y}_{i,K_i}). \tag{20}$$

The semantic indicator $S_u(a_i; s_i, r_i)$ is computed from this free response. The loss guides image construction, while the generated response determines semantic reactivation.

C.3 When a surrogate prefix transfers to free generation

The separation above permits a sufficient-condition analysis. Fix a construction point x and its delivered image a. For each target token set

$$\lambda_{i,h}(x) = -\log \rho_u(y_{i,h} \mid \Phi_u(x), s_i, y_{i,<h}), \qquad \widetilde{\lambda}_{i,h}(a) = -\log p_u^{\mathrm{gen}}(y_{i,h} \mid a, s_i, y_{i,<h}).$$

Both quantities evaluate the same target history; only the construction and execution paths differ. Let nonnegative $\xi_{i,h}$ bound their one-sided discrepancy, $\widetilde{\lambda}_{i,h}(a) \le \lambda_{i,h}(x) + \xi_{i,h}$, and write $\Xi_i = \sum_{h=1}^{H_i} \xi_{i,h}$.

Proposition C.1 (A sufficient prefix-transfer condition)**.** *Assume the decoder can emit the H_i target tokens and the target prefix has no earlier end-of-sequence token. If*

$$\max_{1 \le h \le H_i} \{\lambda_{i,h}(x) + \xi_{i,h}\} < \log 2, \tag{21}$$

then greedy, reference-free decoding of (a, s_i) begins with y_i. A stronger, scalar sufficient condition is

$$H_i \mathcal{L}_i(x) + \Xi_i < \log 2. \tag{22}$$

Proof. The tokenwise condition implies $p_u^{\mathrm{gen}}(y_{i,h} \mid a, s_i, y_{i,<h}) > 1/2$ for every h. That token is the unique most likely token, because all competitors together have probability less than $1/2$. At the first position the generated and target histories coincide. Inductively, if the first $h-1$ generated tokens equal the target prefix, greedy decoding at position h selects $y_{i,h}$. This proves the prefix claim without supplying reference tokens to the decoder. Finally, each $\lambda_{i,h}$ and $\xi_{i,h}$ is nonnegative, so their sum $H_i \mathcal{L}_i(x) + \Xi_i$ upper-bounds each tokenwise term. □

The proposition gives a sufficient decoding condition in terms of tokenwise losses and construction-to-execution discrepancies $\xi_{i,h}$. Its aggregate bound accounts jointly for prefix length, CE, and image realization. Experimental target matching is measured on the complete free response, while the proposition characterizes conditional prefix reproduction.

C.4 Formal algorithms

Algorithm 1 states the implemented per-item image construction. The final realization is performed only after the T projected updates; in the main experiments $T = 500$, $\eta = 1/255$, and $\epsilon = 32/255$.

Algorithm 1 ReSight-Construct: reference-conditioned image construction

Require: frozen Victim M_u, tuple (c_i, s_i, r_i), cap H, budget ϵ, step η, updates T
Ensure: delivered image a_i, integer perturbation δ_i

$y_i \leftarrow \mathrm{Tok}(r_i)_{1:\min\{H,|\,\mathrm{Tok}(r_i)|\}}$
$x \leftarrow c_i$
for $t = 0, \ldots, T-1$ **do**
    evaluate the teacher-forced CE $\mathcal{L}_i(x)$ on (x, s_i, y_i)
    $g \leftarrow \nabla_x \mathcal{L}_i(x)$
    $x \leftarrow \Pi_{\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i(\epsilon)}\big(x - \eta\ \mathrm{sign}(g)\big)$
end for
$a_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_i(x)$ and $\delta_i \leftarrow 255(a_i - c_i)$
check $a_i \in \mathcal{X}_i^8(255\epsilon)$
return (a_i, δ_i)

For fixed control bases $c_i^F, c_i^N \in \mathcal{G}^d$, define

$$Q(v) = \frac{1}{255}\,\mathrm{round}(255\,\mathrm{clip}(v, 0, 1))\,.$$

Control evaluation transfers the completed integer perturbation to fixed bases. Algorithm 2 records the four-role endpoint on any replay checkpoint M_m.

Algorithm 2 Role-Replay-and-Qualify: fixed-artifact evaluation

Require: artifact (a_i, δ_i), bases c_i, c_i^F, c_i^N, question s_i, reference r_i, checkpoint M_m
Ensure: role labels $Y_m^A, Y_m^C, Y_m^F, Y_m^N$ and Z_m

$q_i^A \leftarrow a_i$, $q_i^C \leftarrow c_i$
$q_i^F \leftarrow Q(c_i^F + \delta_i/255)$, $q_i^N \leftarrow Q(c_i^N + \delta_i/255)$
for $r \in \{A, C, F, N\}$ **do**
    generate o_m^r from (q_i^r, s_i) with the recorded decoder
    $Y_m^r(i) \leftarrow S_m(q_i^r; s_i, r_i)$
end for
$G_m(i) \leftarrow \prod_{r\in\{C,F,N\}}(1 - Y_m^r(i))$
$Z_m(i) \leftarrow Y_m^A(i) G_m(i)$
return $(Y_m^A, Y_m^C, Y_m^F, Y_m^N, Z_m)$

C.5 Feasibility and image-space geometry

The image update also has an exact variational interpretation. At a feasible point x, define the local box

$$\mathcal{B}_i(x, \eta) = \{z \in \widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i(\epsilon) : \|z - x\|_\infty \le \eta\}.$$

For $g = \nabla \mathcal{L}_i(x)$ and $x^+ = \Pi_{\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i}(x - \eta\ \mathrm{sign}(g))$,

$$x^+ \in \operatorname*{arg\,min}_{z \in \mathcal{B}_i(x,\eta)} \langle g, z - x\rangle. \tag{23}$$

Indeed, the feasible interval of coordinate k is $[\max\{\ell_{i,k}, x_k - \eta\}, \min\{u_{i,k}, x_k + \eta\}]$. A positive gradient selects its lower endpoint, a negative gradient selects its upper endpoint, and a zero gradient leaves the coordinate unchanged. Thus projection solves the box-constrained linearized subproblem exactly.

Proposition C.2 (Projected feasibility)**.** *If $x_i^{(0)} = c_i$ and Algorithm 1 projects every update onto $\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i(\epsilon)$, then $x_i^{(t)} \in \widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i(\epsilon)$ for every t.*

Proof. Because $c_i \in [0,1]^d$ and $\|c_i - c_i\|_\infty = 0$, the initialization lies in $\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i(\epsilon)$. For any proposed vector w, the coordinatewise clamp $\Pi_{\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i(\epsilon)}(w)$ has every coordinate in $[\ell_{i,k}, u_{i,k}]$, and hence belongs to the box. Applying this fact inductively to the T updates proves the claim. □

Proposition C.3 (Local projected sign-step bound)**.** *Fix an item, let $f = \mathcal{L}_i$, and take $\eta > 0$. Suppose f is differentiable on the line segment joining x to*

$$x^+ = \Pi_{\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i(\epsilon)}\big(x - \eta\ \mathrm{sign}(\nabla f(x))\big), \qquad x \in \widetilde{\mathcal{X}}_i(\epsilon), \qquad \mathrm{sign}(0) = 0.$$

Assume that, on this segment, ∇f is β-Lipschitz for some $\beta \geq 0$, so that the descent lemma with constant β applies. Let $g = \nabla f(x)$ and define

$$\tau_k = \begin{cases} \min\{\eta, x_k - \ell_{i,k}\}, & g_k > 0, \\ \min\{\eta, u_{i,k} - x_k\}, & g_k < 0, \\ 0, & g_k = 0. \end{cases}$$

Then, with $e = x^+ - x$,

$$e_k = -\,\mathrm{sign}(g_k)\tau_k, \qquad f(x^+) \leq f(x) - \sum_k |g_k|\tau_k + \frac{\beta}{2}\sum_k \tau_k^2. \tag{24}$$

In particular, the step is strictly decreasing whenever $\sum_k |g_k|\tau_k > (\beta/2)\sum_k \tau_k^2$. If no nonzero-gradient coordinate is clipped, then

$$f(x^+) \leq f(x) - \eta\|g\|_1 + \frac{\beta\eta^2}{2}\|g\|_0, \tag{25}$$

where $\|g\|_0$ counts nonzero coordinates; for $g \neq 0$ and $\beta > 0$ this is strict when $\eta < 2\|g\|_1/(\beta\|g\|_0)$ (if $\beta = 0$, the interior bound is strict for every $\eta > 0$).

Proof. For $g_k > 0$, the unconstrained sign step moves coordinate k downward. The projection therefore moves it by the negative distance to the lower endpoint, or by $-\eta$ if that endpoint is farther away. This is exactly $e_k = -\tau_k$. For $g_k < 0$, the analogous argument at the upper endpoint gives $e_k = +\tau_k = -\,\mathrm{sign}(g_k)\tau_k$; for $g_k = 0$, both quantities are zero. Thus

$$\langle g, e\rangle = -\sum_k |g_k|\tau_k, \qquad \|e\|_2^2 = \sum_k \tau_k^2.$$

The assumed Lipschitz gradient gives the descent-lemma inequality $f(x+e) \leq f(x) + \langle g, e\rangle + (\beta/2)\|e\|_2^2$. Substitution proves (24); the strict-decrease condition is its direct rearrangement. If no relevant coordinate is clipped, then $\tau_k = \eta$ whenever $g_k \neq 0$ and $\tau_k = 0$ otherwise, which yields the interior bound and its stated sufficient condition. □

Under the stated segment-local smoothness assumption, the bound quantifies the first-order direction and the effect of boundary clipping. The implemented step is $\eta = 1/255$; its sufficient descent condition depends on the local gradient, clipping distances, and smoothness constant β.

C.6 Quantized transfer and finite witnesses

Lemma C.4 (Budget preservation after quantized transfer)**.** *Assume the control bases c_i^F, c_i^N are grid-valued and $\delta_i \in \mathbb{Z}^d$. For $r \in \{F, N\}$, let $q_i^r = Q(c_i^r + \delta_i/255)$. Then*

$$\|q_i^r - c_i^r\|_\infty \leq \frac{\|\delta_i\|_\infty}{255}. \tag{26}$$

Proof. Write $\bar{c}_i^r = 255c_i^r \in \{0, \ldots, 255\}^d$. Since both $\bar{c}_i^r$ and δ_i are integer-valued, $\bar{c}_i^r + \delta_i$ is already on the 8-bit lattice before clipping, so rounding in Q does not change it. With $[z]_0^{255} = \min\{255, \max\{0, z\}\}$ applied coordinatewise,

$$255q_i^r = [\bar{c}_i^r + \delta_i]_0^{255}.$$

For any integer $b \in [0, 255]$ and $h \in \mathbb{Z}$, $|[b+h]_0^{255} - b| \leq |h|$: if no endpoint is crossed equality holds, and if an endpoint is crossed clipping shortens the displacement. Applying this coordinatewise with $b = \bar{c}_{i,k}^r$ and $h = \delta_{i,k}$, then dividing by 255 and taking the maximum, proves (26). □

Proposition C.5 (Finite-witness accessibility)**.** *If the completed artifact satisfies $a_i \in \mathcal{X}_i^8(B)$ and $R_i(a_i) = 1$, then the local accessibility functional $\mathcal{A}_u(i; B/255) = \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}_i^8(B)} S_u(x; s_i, r_i)$ equals one. The resulting accessibility certificate is one-sided.*

Proof. The witness a_i belongs to the maximization domain, and $R_i(a_i) = 1$ includes $S_u(a_i; s_i, r_i) = 1$. The certificate is one-sided because the algorithm evaluates the semantic endpoint at its delivered image, whereas $\mathcal{A}_u$ ranges over the entire admissible set. A positive clean response also sets R_i to zero independently of local accessibility. □

C.7 Qualification gates and checkpoint pairing

Let $Y_m^A, Y_m^C, Y_m^F, Y_m^N \in \{0, 1\}$ be the labels produced by Algorithm 2. Define the control set $\mathcal{C} = \{C, F, N\}$,

$$G_m(i) = \prod_{r \in \mathcal{C}} (1 - Y_m^r(i)), \qquad Z_m(i) = Y_m^A(i) G_m(i),$$

and $\widehat{E}_m = n^{-1} \sum_i Y_m^A(i)(1 - G_m(i))$. The gate evaluates the conjunction of item-level response labels.

Proposition C.6 (Gate monotonicity and exclusion identity)**.** *For a deleted control $k \in \mathcal{C}$, define*

$$Z_m^{(-k)}(i) = Y_m^A(i) \prod_{r \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} (1 - Y_m^r(i)).$$

Then

$$Z_m^{(-k)}(i) - Z_m(i) = Y_m^A(i) Y_m^k(i) \prod_{r \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{k\}} (1 - Y_m^r(i)) \geq 0. \tag{27}$$

Moreover,

$$\begin{aligned} 1 - G_m(i) &= \mathbf{1}\big[Y_m^C(i) = 1 \ \vee \ Y_m^F(i) = 1 \ \vee \ Y_m^N(i) = 1\big] \\ &= Y_m^C(i) + Y_m^F(i) + Y_m^N(i) - Y_m^C(i) Y_m^F(i) - Y_m^C(i) Y_m^N(i) \qquad (28) \\ &\quad - Y_m^F(i) Y_m^N(i) + Y_m^C(i) Y_m^F(i) Y_m^N(i), \qquad (29) \end{aligned}$$

so that

$$\widehat{\mathrm{ASR}}_{\mathrm{raw}}(m) = \widehat{\mathrm{ASR}}_{\mathrm{spec}}(m) + \widehat{E}_m. \tag{30}$$

The union term counts an attacked match excluded by several controls only once.

Proof. Deleting the factor $(1 - Y_m^k)$ from the product leaves the two sides of (27) after factoring out the other two control factors. All factors are binary, so the product G_m equals one exactly when no control label is one. The displayed expansion is the inclusion–exclusion identity for the union of the three control events. Finally, $Y_m^A = Y_m^A G_m + Y_m^A(1 - G_m)$ item by item; averaging over n items gives (30). □

For the same saved role images, let u denote the Victim and p the Parent, and define

$$\widehat{\Delta}_A = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i (Y_u^A(i) - Y_p^A(i)), \qquad \widehat{\Delta}_Z = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i (Z_u(i) - Z_p(i)).$$

Proposition C.7 (Paired checkpoint decomposition)**.** *The qualified checkpoint contrast satisfies*

$$\widehat{\Delta}_Z = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i G_u(i)\big(Y_u^A(i) - Y_p^A(i)\big) + \frac{1}{n} \sum_i Y_p^A(i)\big(G_u(i) - G_p(i)\big). \tag{31}$$

Equivalently, with $\widehat{E}_m$ as above,

$$\widehat{\Delta}_Z = \widehat{\Delta}_A - (\widehat{E}_u - \widehat{E}_p).$$

The first term is the attacked-response contrast restricted to items whose Victim controls pass; the second is the change in control validity on Parent attacked matches. Together, these terms decompose the fixed-input checkpoint contrast into attacked-response and control-response contributions.

Proof. For each item, write $Z_u - Z_p = G_u Y_u^A - G_p Y_p^A$ and add and subtract $G_u Y_p^A$:

$$Z_u - Z_p = G_u(Y_u^A - Y_p^A) + Y_p^A(G_u - G_p).$$

Averaging proves (31). The equivalent expression follows by subtracting the exclusion identity in (30) for p from that for u. □

How the denominators change the interpretation. Write $n_{\sup}(m) = \sum_i (1 - Y_m^C(i))$. Since $0 \le Z_m(i) \le R_m(i) \le Y_m^A(i)$ item by item, whenever $n_{\sup}(m) > 0$ we have

$$\widehat{\mathrm{ASR}}_{\mathrm{spec}}(m) \le \frac{n_{\sup}(m)}{n} \widehat{R}_{\sup}(m) \le \widehat{\mathrm{ASR}}_{\mathrm{raw}}(m). \tag{32}$$

Thus the conditional rate describes recovery *among clean-suppressed items*, whereas qualified ASR describes specificity on the full cohort. Their numerical difference reflects both the foil/null gate and the denominator change. If $n_{\sup} = 0$, conditional recovery is undefined.

C.8 Geometry of the spatial countermeasure

Let π be a cyclic permutation of pixel coordinates, applied to both a constructed image and its clean base. The replay changes placement while preserving the perturbation's coordinate multiset.

Lemma C.8 (Spatial L_∞ isometry)**.** *For every such permutation π,*

$$\|\pi(a_i) - \pi(c_i)\|_\infty = \|a_i - c_i\|_\infty. \tag{33}$$

Proof. The map π only permutes coordinates. Therefore the multiset $\{|a_{i,k} - c_{i,k}| : k = 1, \dots, d\}$ is unchanged, and so is its maximum. □

The isometry preserves the pixel constraint under a common permutation of the attacked and clean images. This property permits evaluating spatial preprocessing while maintaining the attacked–clean perturbation bound.

C.9 Finite-grid accessibility and budget resolution

The delivered-image formulation gives the budget a discrete interpretation. Define the minimum target-access radius, in integer RGB levels, by

$$B_i^\star = \min\{\|255(x - c_i)\|_\infty : \ x \in \mathcal{G}^d, S_u(x; s_i, r_i) = 1\}, \tag{34}$$

with $B_i^\star = +\infty$ when this set is empty. This is a property of a fixed checkpoint, question, reference, and evaluation path. A successful construction at budget 32 supplies an upper bound on this minimum radius.

Proposition C.9 (Discrete radius characterization)**.** *For $\epsilon \ge 0$,*

$$\mathcal{A}_u(i; \epsilon) = \mathbf{1}[B_i^\star \le \lfloor 255\epsilon \rfloor]. \tag{35}$$

Hence accessibility is nondecreasing in the admissible budget and is constant between adjacent RGB budget levels. If the clean response is negative and a qualified image is delivered at integer budget B, then $1 \le B_i^\star \le B$.

Proof. Every distance $\|255(x - c_i)\|_\infty$ is an integer because both images belong to $\mathcal{G}^d$. Membership in $\mathcal{X}_i(\epsilon)$ is therefore equivalent to that distance being at most $\lfloor 255\epsilon \rfloor$. Taking the minimum over target-matching images proves the equivalence. The neighborhoods are nested as the budget increases. A zero radius would require $x = c_i$, excluded by a negative clean response; the delivered witness supplies the upper bound. □

The monotonicity follows from nested feasible sets and characterizes existential accessibility. The full feasible set defines $B_i^\star$, whereas the search trajectory determines a finite-run endpoint. The empirical study evaluates the fixed-budget construction.

C.10 Prefix likelihood and decoding margins

Write $P_i^{\mathrm{con}}(x) = p_u(y_i \mid x, s_i)$. The surrogate definition gives

$$P_i^{\mathrm{con}}(x) = \exp[-H_i \mathcal{L}_i(x)]. \tag{36}$$

Complete-prefix probability depends jointly on prefix length and average cross-entropy. For a fixed item and fixed H_i, reducing the loss increases this construction-path probability. Response-level semantic evaluation provides the common endpoint across items with different references.

For the execution path evaluated at the reference history, define the target-versus-competitor log-probability margin

$$\gamma_{i,h}(x) = \log p_u^{\mathrm{gen}}(y_{i,h} \mid x, s_i, y_{i,<h}) - \max_{v \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \{y_{i,h}\}} \log p_u^{\mathrm{gen}}(v \mid x, s_i, y_{i,<h}). \tag{37}$$

We use this margin to characterize prefix decoding analytically.

Proposition C.10 (Margin criterion for a fixed greedy prefix)**.** *Assume the decoder can emit all H_i tokens and the target prefix contains no earlier end-of-sequence token. Positive margins $\gamma_{i,h}(x) > 0$ for every $h \le H_i$ imply that greedy decoding emits y_i. Conversely, if greedy decoding emits y_i, then $\gamma_{i,h}(x) \ge 0$ at every position, with equality resolved by the decoder's tie rule.*

Proof. At the first position a positive margin makes the target token the unique maximizer. Inductively, the generated history is the reference history, so the argument applies at each subsequent position. Conversely, a chosen greedy token cannot have smaller probability than a competitor under the history actually generated. □

The earlier $\log 2$ condition is strictly stronger than the margin condition: probability greater than one half ensures a unique maximizer. For example, in a three-outcome distribution $(0.40, 0.35, 0.25)$, greedy decoding selects the first token although its negative log probability exceeds $\log 2$. Thus the positive-margin criterion covers a wider set of decoding distributions.

Prefix reproduction specifies the first H_i tokens; semantic matching evaluates the complete response, including differently worded realizations of the target behavior. The four-role endpoint additionally tests the clean, foil, and null responses. These three levels connect tokenwise construction, free generation, and controlled behavioral measurement.

C.11 Clipping makes control transfer base dependent

The same stored integer perturbation is transferred to the foil and null bases, but the realized changes can differ because these bases have different distances to the RGB boundaries. For an integer-valued base $\bar{b} \in \{0, \dots, 255\}^d$, define the effective perturbation

$$[\delta_i^{\mathrm{eff}}(\bar{b})]_k = \mathrm{clip}(\bar{b}_k + \delta_{i,k}, 0, 255) - \bar{b}_k = \mathrm{clip}(\delta_{i,k}, -\bar{b}_k, 255 - \bar{b}_k). \tag{38}$$

This identity refines the budget-preservation lemma by giving the direction and amount of coordinate-wise attenuation.

Proposition C.11 (Transfer attenuation and white-null asymmetry)**.** *The effective change has the same sign as the stored change or is zero, and its magnitude cannot increase. Consequently, for $1 \le p \le \infty$,*

$$\|\delta_i^{\mathrm{eff}}(\bar{b})\|_p \le \|\delta_i\|_p. \tag{39}$$

For a white base, $[\delta_i^{\mathrm{eff}}(255\mathbf{1})]_k = \min(\delta_{i,k}, 0)$.

Proof. The clipping interval contains zero. Projecting a scalar onto that interval cannot reverse its sign or increase its magnitude. Summing pth powers proves the finite-p statement; taking a maximum proves the L_∞ statement. Since stored changes lie in $[-255, 255]$, clipping at a white base removes exactly the positive component. □

For the original base, $\bar{c}_i + \delta_i = 255 a_i$ already lies in range and reconstructs the delivered image exactly. For another base, equality in all coordinates requires the transferred image to stay in range before clipping. A null response tests a specific base-and-clipping intervention whose transferred energy depends on the base. The foil retains a scene while changing image–question compatibility. Together, these controls measure response selectivity under the specified visual interventions.

C.12 Outcome partitions and identifiable control contributions

Let $\mathcal{C} = \{C, F, N\}$. For $D \subseteq \mathcal{C}$, count attacked matches whose positive-control set is exactly D:

$$w_m(D) = \sum_i Y_m^A(i) \prod_{r \in D} Y_m^r(i) \prod_{r \in \mathcal{C} \setminus D} (1 - Y_m^r(i)). \tag{40}$$

These eight nonnegative counts partition attacked matches; $w_m(\varnothing) = \sum_i Z_m(i)$. Removing controls in D gives

$$f_m(D) = \sum_{E \subseteq D} w_m(E). \tag{41}$$

An item passes precisely when every remaining control is negative. The increment after deleting only C is $w_m(\{C\})$, not the marginal number of positive clean responses. An item positive under both clean and foil is still excluded when only one of them is deleted. Individual ablation increments therefore need not add to the attacked-to-qualified gap.

If all eight projections were available, the pattern counts would be recoverable by finite inclusion–exclusion:

$$w_m(D) = \sum_{E \subseteq D} (-1)^{|D|-|E|} f_m(E). \tag{42}$$

Substituting Eq. (41), the coefficient of $w_m(F)$ is $\sum_{F \subseteq E \subseteq D} (-1)^{|D|-|E|}$, equal to one for $F = D$ and zero otherwise. The compact ablation figure reports the recorded gate projections.

A three-way partition is recoverable from the primary endpoint counts without requiring all eight control patterns:

$$Y_m^A(i) = Y_m^A(i) Y_m^C(i) + \{R_m(i) - Z_m(i)\} + Z_m(i). \tag{43}$$

The terms are disjoint: an attacked match either remains positive on the clean input, is clean-suppressed but fails foil or null specificity, or is fully qualified. This is the basis of the attrition visualization in Appendix E.5. Its components are alternative outcomes for the same completed images.

Marginal frequencies alone provide only bounds. Let N_A, N_C, N_F, N_N be the four positive counts and N_Z the qualified count. Then

$$\max(0, N_A - N_C - N_F - N_N) \le N_Z \le \min(N_A, n - N_C, n - N_F, n - N_N). \tag{44}$$

The lower bound follows from a union bound on excluded attacked matches; the upper bound follows because qualification requires an attacked positive and each control negative. Marginal counts determine these bounds, while joint item-level labels determine the qualified endpoint.

C.13 Paired disagreement, precision, and the statistical unit

Let $(n_{11}, n_{10}, n_{01}, n_{00})$ count the four outcomes of (Z_u, Z_p) in a fixed setting. The statistics table writes $b = n_{10}$ and $c = n_{01}$. Discordant pairs determine the contrast, while the joint counts describe overlap between checkpoint outcomes:

$$\widehat{\Delta}_Z = \frac{n_{10} - n_{01}}{n}, \quad \widehat{d}_Z = \frac{n_{10} + n_{01}}{n}, \quad \widehat{j}_Z = \frac{n_{11}}{n}. \tag{45}$$

Here $\widehat{d}_Z$ measures disagreement and $\widehat{j}_Z$ shared qualified outcomes. These quantities distinguish the net checkpoint contrast from disagreement and shared reactivation.

For $D_i = Z_u(i) - Z_p(i) \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ and $n > 1$, the empirical variance of the mean from the unbiased sample variance is

$$\widehat{\mathrm{Var}}(\overline{D}) = \frac{\widehat{d}_Z - \widehat{\Delta}_Z^2}{n - 1}. \tag{46}$$

This follows from $n^{-1} \sum_i D_i^2 = \widehat{d}_Z$ and $\overline{D} = \widehat{\Delta}_Z$. Paired item resampling preserves the observed within-item dependence when estimating uncertainty.

Under the conventional equal-marginal null and independent item pairs, exact McNemar inference conditions on $n_{10} + n_{01}$ and tests whether discordance directions are Bernoulli$(1/2)$. With zero discordant pairs, the contrast is zero. Holm correction applies to the 12 primary contrasts. Inference uses item-level resampling within the fixed cohorts; observations of the same image across recipes remain repeated measurements.

C.14 Deterministic label-sensitivity bounds

The Boolean endpoint yields deterministic sensitivity bounds for arbitrary patterns of label changes. Let $\widetilde{Y}_m^r(i)$ be corrected labels and let k_m count items with at least one changed role label. Then

$$\left|\widetilde{\mathrm{ASR}}_{\mathrm{spec}}(m) - \widehat{\mathrm{ASR}}_{\mathrm{spec}}(m)\right| \le \frac{k_m}{n}, \qquad |\widetilde{\Delta}_Z - \widehat{\Delta}_Z| \le \frac{k_u + k_p}{n}. \tag{47}$$

Only affected items can change their binary endpoints, by at most one per checkpoint; summation and the triangle inequality prove both claims. The bounds describe worst-case changes: a label update affects qualification when it changes the joint gate.

If corrections are counted as individual role-label changes, each can change a qualified-rate numerator by at most one. Erasing a paired count difference $|n_{10} - n_{01}|$ thus requires at least that many adverse role-label changes across the two checkpoints. If the correction unit permits changing both checkpoint endpoints on one item, its change can be two. The bound is defined by the chosen correction unit.

Conditional recovery also changes its denominator when clean labels change. For original numerator and denominator (q, s) and corrected values (q', s'), with $s, s' > 0$,

$$\left|\frac{q'}{s'} - \frac{q}{s}\right| \le \frac{|q' - q| + |s' - s|}{s'} \le \frac{2k}{s - k}, \qquad 0 \le k < s, \tag{48}$$

when at most k items have changed attacked or clean labels. The first inequality uses $q \le s$; the second uses $|q' - q|, |s' - s| \le k$ and $s' \ge s - k$. This worst-case bound explains the joint numerator-and-denominator sensitivity of conditional recovery.

C.15 Average replay and finite-suite persistence

For a fixed set of K transformations including identity, let $Z_{m,\pi}(i)$ denote the qualified endpoint under transformation π. Define per-item average success and simultaneous persistence by

$$V_m(i) = \frac{1}{K}\sum_{\pi} Z_{m,\pi}(i), \qquad P_m(i) = \prod_{\pi} Z_{m,\pi}(i). \tag{49}$$

Frequency within the suite and success under every tested placement are different summaries of the same responses.

Proposition C.12 (Finite-suite bounds)**.** *For binary endpoints,*

$$\max\left(0, \sum_{\pi} Z_{m,\pi}(i) - (K-1)\right) = P_m(i) \le V_m(i). \tag{50}$$

Writing $\bar{z}_\pi = n^{-1}\sum_i Z_{m,\pi}(i)$ *and* $\bar{p} = n^{-1}\sum_i P_m(i)$ *gives*

$$\max\left(0, \sum_{\pi} \bar{z}_\pi - (K-1)\right) \le \bar{p} \le \min_{\pi} \bar{z}_\pi. \tag{51}$$

Proof. The binary product is one exactly when the sum is K; otherwise the sum is at most $K-1$. This proves the item identity. Summing $P_m(i) \ge \sum_\pi Z_{m,\pi}(i) - (K-1)$ and using nonnegativity proves the lower aggregate bound. The product is no larger than any factor, giving the upper bound. □

The experiment uses five placements, whereas the nonidentity mean in the direction-resolved figure averages only four shifts. Both summaries retain n statistical units with repeated observations within each item. The resulting persistence measures describe the tested placement set for each fixed delivered image.

C.16 Summary of theoretical results

The results above establish (i) feasibility of the continuous projected path, (ii) an explicit local first-order bound when a local smoothness assumption is available, (iii) a conditional link from prefix CE to greedy prefix generation, (iv) exact integer-grid budget preservation for transferred controls, and (v) algebraic interpretations of the qualification and replay endpoints. Together, these results characterize the construction and measurement of a finite behavioral-accessibility witness.

D Experimental Details

This appendix specifies the data, model conditions, comparison resources, and evaluation rules behind the main results. The cohort is fixed before any Victim response is inspected for qualification; one artifact is constructed for each item–Victim pair; the same saved artifact is then replayed on the Parent and on the declared control bases. The clean-negative condition enters the endpoint while evaluation covers the complete fixed cohort.

D.1 Cohorts, target records, and role construction

SafeEraser-derived cohort. The SafeEraser-derived cohort (Chen et al., 2025) contains 240 unique source images, with 40 items from each of six categories: *HateSpeech*, *IllegalActivity*, *Privacy*, *Sex*, *Violence*, and *Weapon*. The fixed subset retains 51 source items and adds 189 items to complete the balanced strata, using selection seed 20260821. Questions and image–question pairings are copied from the released records. The first released unsafe model response is the unchanged target reference, and the released paired image supplies the foil. This released model output defines the item-specific behavioral target.

BeaverTails-V evaluation cohort. The external cohort contains 108 unique decoded images from the official evaluation split of BeaverTails-V (Ji et al., 2025), with 18 items in each of six categories: financial and academic fraud, hacking or digital crime, identity misuse and impersonation, privacy invasion and surveillance, insulting and harassing behavior, and pornographic content. Selection is restricted to unsafe evaluation responses and one representative per decoded image; severity levels 1–3 are retained by the fixed round-robin selection rule. The target reference is the released unsafe evaluation response. The foil is the category-local one-step cyclic derangement of the selected images, so it remains in the same category while using a different visual scene. Beaver attacks evaluate the same released checkpoints on this external cohort.

For both cohorts, all roles use the original question at inference and the same target reference for semantic scoring. The attacked role is the completed image a_i, the clean role is the unperturbed canonical image c_i, and the foil and white-null roles receive the realized integer perturbation transferred to their own bases. Clipping at a base-image boundary can attenuate a transferred perturbation. The clean label is therefore evaluated jointly with the attacked label: an item contributes to a qualified event only when the clean response is a non-match, while the cohort denominator remains 240 or 108.

D.2 Victim checkpoints and processing path

We evaluate LLaVA-1.5-7B (Liu et al., 2024) and Qwen2.5-VL-3B (Bai et al., 2025) under three frozen forgetting recipes: preference optimization (PO), PO with Prompt Decouple (POPD), and negative preference optimization with Prompt Decouple (NPO+PD) (Chen et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2024). The two cohorts, two backbones, and three recipes yield 12 primary settings per Victim–artifact construction. The Parent is the ancestral replay model: for LLaVA it is the corresponding unmerged model with the unlearning adapter disabled, and for Qwen it is the base Qwen2.5-VL-3B instruction model. The Parent serves as a replay checkpoint; construction uses Victim gradients.

The canonical canvas is defined at the model processor's input resolution. For LLaVA, the processed tensor is de-normalized and rounded to the canonical uint8 canvas; for Qwen, the canonical tensor is formed before patchification and is later patchified with the recorded image grid. LLaVA uses the recorded float16 and SDPA path. Qwen uses bfloat16 and SDPA, with processor parameters `min_pixels` $= 200{,}704$ and `max_pixels` $= 401{,}408$. Both processors are loaded from their corresponding model directories.

Every completed image is saved as PNG, reopened, and measured on the integer RGB canvas. The attacked image must satisfy the 32-level L_∞ bound relative to its clean canvas. For foil and null, the reopened attacked-minus- clean integer delta is added to the corresponding base and clipped to $[0, 255]$ before PNG serialization; the realized control delta is checked again after reopening. Generation is greedy with at most 96 new tokens (`do_sample=False` and `num_beams=1`), using the same question and checkpoint-specific processor for all four roles.

Table 7: ReSight settings shared by the primary cohorts. H is the fixed target-prefix cap; T, η, and ϵ are the update count, normalized step, and normalized integer-RGB budget.

Cohort and backbone	Recipe group	H	T	η	ϵ
SafeEraser, LLaVA	PO/POPD	32	500	$1/255$	$32/255$
SafeEraser, LLaVA	NPO+PD	16	500	$1/255$	$32/255$
SafeEraser, Qwen	all recipes	16	500	$1/255$	$32/255$
BeaverTails-V, both	all recipes	16	500	$1/255$	$32/255$

D.3 ReSight construction settings

The Victim parameters and question remain fixed while the image is optimized. Each item starts from its clean canonical canvas, uses only Victim image gradients, and runs 500 projected sign steps. The step is one integer RGB level ($\eta = 1/255$ in normalized coordinates), and the final reopened image has integer budget 32 ($\epsilon = 32/255$). A released response is tokenized once; the prefix cap H is configuration-specific and shorter references use all available tokens.

The fixed prefix supplies the construction signal only. The final iterate provides the delivered artifact, and free generation uses the model's own history. Qualification and replay evaluate this fixed final image after construction.

D.4 Comparison methods and construction resources

Table 8 gives the compact resource and objective record for five local implementations adapted from the named visual-attack methods. Each row uses the target access, optimization unit, budget, and update count of its recorded implementation. The resulting configuration-level comparisons use a common target-specific endpoint.

Table 8: Construction configurations of the five local visual-attack adaptations. The budget is the integer RGB L_∞ bound divided by 255; steps apply to each optimization unit. CE denotes teacher-forced response cross-entropy. The target information and construction units differ across rows.

Method	Objective and construction targets	Unit and reuse	Budget	Steps
SUA	Direct and DnCNN response CE; fixed eight-item reference bank, 96-token cap	Universal delta per backbone, trained on POPD and reused across recipes and cohorts	$32/255$	500
Image Hijacks	Response CE on the evaluation cohort's question–reference pairs; up to 96 target tokens	Universal image per cell; its integer delta is transferred to each input	$32/255$	500
Visual Adv.	Response CE on the published harmful-response corpus, blank user query; up to 96 target tokens	Universal image per cell; its integer delta is transferred to each input	$16/255$	5,000
Jailbreak in Pieces	CLIP image-embedding L_2 distance to an item-specific image–OCR target built from the reference	One delta per item; reused across both backbones and all recipes	$16/255$	5,000
AttentionJailbreak	Response CE plus attention suppression/amplification; 66 published corpus targets, up to 96 tokens	Universal delta per checkpoint; reused across both cohorts	$16/255$	2,000

SUA uses the release-style scalar $\mathrm{CE}_{\mathrm{direct}} + \mathrm{CE}_{\mathrm{DnCNN}} - 0.7\,\mathrm{stopgrad}(\mathrm{cosine})$; the alignment term has zero gradient to the perturbation. The two backbones use their own fixed eight-item reference banks. SUA, Visual Adv., and AttentionJailbreak use sign-PGD with a $1/255$ step; Image Hijacks uses projected SGD with learning rate 0.03; Jailbreak in Pieces uses projected Adam with learning rate 0.1. AttentionJailbreak weights target-to-prefix and target-to-image attention by $+10$ and -5, respectively, over the last six decoder layers. The Jailbreak in Pieces OCR target uses up to 420 normalized reference characters and an independent CLIP encoder.

The methods use the following construction units and target signals. SUA (Zhang et al., 2025a) optimizes a universal backbone-specific perturbation from direct and DnCNN response CE over a fixed eight-item reference bank; its POPD-trained delta is reused across recipes and cohorts. Image

Hijacks (Bailey et al., 2024) optimizes one universal image per cell from the evaluation question–reference pairs and transfers its integer delta to each item. Visual Adversarial Examples (Qi et al., 2024) optimize one universal image against a published harmful-response corpus with a blank user query, then transfer that image to the evaluation cells.

Jailbreak in Pieces (Shayegani et al., 2024) optimizes a per-item image–OCR target distance in an independent CLIP embedding space and reuses the resulting delta across the six backbone–recipe cells. The AttentionJailbreak adaptation (Li et al., 2026) uses a checkpoint-level universal perturbation, a response-CE term, and target-to-prefix/target-to-image attention terms over the last six decoder layers; its perturbation is reused over both cohorts. The recorded local port fixes its construction seed to 42.

D.5 Semantic labels and statistical protocol

Each response is evaluated in a blinded instance containing the original question, the target reference, and the candidate response, and assigned one reference-relative label by GPT-5.5: a direct substantive match, a target-related but insufficient answer, a generic or description-only answer, a wrong-target answer, or a refusal/safe alternative. Direct substantive matches map to $Y_m^r(i) = 1$; the other categories and ambiguous responses map to non-matches. One label is retained for each complete response, and labels are frozen before aggregation. The source supplement includes the complete judging instruction and the evaluator alias `gpt-5.5`.

The item is the statistical unit. Main role labels comprise

$$(240 + 108) \times 2 \text{ backbones} \times 3 \text{ recipes} \times 2 \text{ checkpoints} \times 4 \text{ roles} = 16{,}704$$

responses; the five comparison adaptations add 83,520 role responses. Rates are reported with the full cohort denominator for raw and qualified endpoints; the conditional recovery rate uses only items with a clean non-match. Wilson intervals summarize individual binary rates. Paired item bootstrap intervals use 10,000 resamples with both checkpoint outcomes retained within each item. The primary Victim–Parent contrasts use exact two-sided McNemar tests on discordant item pairs, with Holm correction over the 12 primary contrasts. The 60-cell comparator matrix is reported descriptively. All role-level outcomes are grouped by item for paired statistical analysis.

D.6 Independent spatial countermeasure replay

The countermeasure exploration uses a separate response-replay pack. It reuses fixed POPD artifacts and evaluates the identity placement together with four one-pixel cyclic shifts (horizontal and vertical directions), applying each transform to the complete role set without reoptimizing the attacks. The pack contains $(240 + 108) \times 2 \times 4 \times 5 = 13{,}920$ role responses per backbone. Identity and shifted responses are clustered within the same item and are therefore summarized descriptively across n items and five placements per item. The identity condition supplies the within-pack replay baseline, and all spatial comparisons use responses collected in this pack.

Parent responses and semantic labels were collected separately for each construction pack. Every Victim–Parent contrast uses its own paired responses and frozen labels, keeping each comparison aligned with its construction and evaluation record. Cross-pack response and labeling variation therefore requires pack-specific baselines and denominators.

D.7 Comparison units and perturbation budgets

The primary construction unit is one image–question–reference tuple at one Victim checkpoint. The resulting Victim-optimized image is reused for the Parent replay. Within a setting, the same image identity links the attacked, clean, foil, and null outcomes. Across settings, the same cohort is reused but a new checkpoint-conditioned attack is constructed. These distinctions determine which observations can be paired and define the units of the descriptive averages.

The reported $32/255$ budget constrains changes to the canonical RGB canvas. Each backbone's processor determines the canonical representation and its mapping to encoder features. Within a checkpoint's evaluation, every role uses the recorded processing path and the same decoding rule. The theoretical budget statements are expressed in these pixel coordinates.

Update counts are reported per construction unit: an image-specific attack constructs one image for each item, whereas a universal perturbation is reused across its declared collection. The comparison table reports budget, target information, reuse, and update count together to characterize each configuration's construction resources.

D.8 Cohort composition and category-aware summaries

The full-cohort endpoint weights each selected image equally. If categories are indexed by g, with size n_g and qualified count q_g, the micro- and macro-averages are

$$\widehat{r}_{\mathrm{micro}} = \frac{\sum_g q_g}{\sum_g n_g}, \qquad \widehat{r}_{\mathrm{macro}} = \frac{1}{G}\sum_{g=1}^{G} \frac{q_g}{n_g}. \tag{52}$$

Because the six categories are equally sized within each reported cohort, these two rates coincide there. The retained-51 and additional-189 subsets have their own category compositions and denominators. Each category plot expresses success as a fraction of all evaluated items in that category.

The SafeEraser provenance split is analyzed as a fixed partition of the original labels. Its component numerators sum exactly to each published full-cohort numerator. Reporting each group's rate with its own denominator accounts for the different sizes of the retained and additional subsets.

Cross-cohort summaries require another distinction. An equal-weight mean of SafeEraser and BeaverTails-V rates gives equal influence to the two cohorts; pooling their item counts gives greater influence to the 240-item cohort. Separate cohort panels preserve the cohort-specific estimands and their category and backbone profiles.

D.9 Target-specific semantic evaluation

The target is the designated reference-relative behavior. A positive label requires a substantive realization of that behavior for the paired question; wrong-target, generic, and description-only answers receive a non-match label. Semantically equivalent responses can use different wording from the reference. The construction prefix and semantic endpoint thus describe the same item through token-level optimization and response-level evaluation, respectively.

Labels are assigned to complete recorded responses under the fixed output cap. Qualitative panels pair those full-response labels with shortened excerpts, omitting harmful continuations. This distinction separates the evaluation unit from the text selected for display.

The four-role rule is applied after the response labels are fixed. The clean role removes cases in which the target is already expressed on the canonical input; foil and null restrict transfer to alternative image bases. Blinded reference comparison and the strict non-match convention define the operational label used by every gate.

D.10 Additional analysis protocol

The quantitative figures are deterministic summaries of the retained labels or aggregate counts. Endpoint attrition is the disjoint partition in Eq. (43); the paired-outcome cards reuse the same contingency counts as the primary tests; category profiles use the original category assignments; and the provenance split uses fixed cohort membership. The comparator summary gives each of the six settings within a cohort equal weight. These analyses reaggregate the original observations at complementary levels of resolution.

The direction-resolved spatial study uses separately collected replay responses. Its identity and shifted counts are computed entirely within that pack, preserving the pairing of items and collection conditions specified in Appendix D.6.

The qualitative comparisons retain each case's question and checkpoint, pairing every method's input image with its recorded response and full-response label.

E Additional Results and Analysis

E.1 Complete endpoint comparison

Table 9 reports the three endpoint views on all 12 unlearned settings, with the numerator and denominator of each metric. For example, BeaverTails-V/LLaVA POPD has 38 attacked matches, 34 clean-suppressed matches among 99 clean-negative items, and 31 qualified matches among all 108 items. The difference between these views is exactly the distinction established in Eq. (32).

Table 9: Three views of ReSight on the unlearned checkpoints. Raw and qualified ASR use the full cohort denominator ($n = 240$ for SafeEraser and $n = 108$ for BeaverTails-V). Conditional reactivation reports $\sum_i R_u(i)/n_{\text{sup}}(u)$, with the percentage in parentheses; see Eq. (15). All entries use the same frozen item-level semantic labels.

Cohort	Configuration	Raw ASR (%)	Conditional reactivation	Qualified ASR (%)
SafeEraser	LLaVA PO	5.0	12/239 (5.0%)	5.0
	LLaVA POPD	17.1	41/239 (17.2%)	17.1
	LLaVA NPO+PD	4.6	11/236 (4.7%)	4.2
	Qwen PO	7.1	17/240 (7.1%)	7.1
	Qwen POPD	13.8	33/240 (13.8%)	12.9
	Qwen NPO+PD	5.8	14/239 (5.9%)	5.8
Beaver	LLaVA PO	18.5	19/107 (17.8%)	17.6
	LLaVA POPD	35.2	34/99 (34.3%)	28.7
	LLaVA NPO+PD	7.4	6/101 (5.9%)	4.6
	Qwen PO	28.7	31/107 (29.0%)	28.7
	Qwen POPD	35.2	37/106 (34.9%)	33.3
	Qwen NPO+PD	15.7	16/106 (15.1%)	13.9

E.2 Comparison across attack constructions

Figure 6 resolves qualified recovery by attack and forgetting recipe. The six methods use a common semantic endpoint, with construction resources specified in Appendix D.4. ReSight uses item-specific target search; the comparisons include universal constructions and an independent-encoder attack. Full raw, conditional, and qualified aggregates accompany these configuration-level comparisons in the source supplement.




Figure 6: Qualified-rate landscape for six visual attack constructions and 12 Victim settings. Each cell uses the full cohort denominator (240 for SafeEraser; 108 for BeaverTails-V) and the original joint role labels. Construction access, budget, and reuse differ as specified in Table 8.

E.3 Paired checkpoint contrasts

The Parent receives the same completed role images as its Victim counterpart. Table 10 gives the exact inferential record, and Figure 7 shows all 12 contrasts with their paired intervals. The four POPD differences are positive and remain significant after the stated 12-comparison Holm correction. The negative SafeEraser/LLaVA PO contrast also survives that correction ($p_{\mathrm{H}} = 0.049$); the negative Qwen NPO+PD contrasts are nonsignificant after correction. The contrast direction thus varies across recipes. Proposition C.7 decomposes each qualified contrast into its attacked-response and control-response contributions.

Table 10: Primary paired statistics. Δ_Z and intervals are in percentage points; b/c are Victim-only/Parent-only qualified successes. Intervals use paired item bootstrap. p is exact two-sided McNemar; p_{H} applies Holm to the 12 primary contrasts. SE: $n = 240$; BV: $n = 108$.

Data	Configuration	Δ_Z	95% interval	b/c	p	p_{H}
SE	LLaVA PO	-6.7	[-11.25, -2.08]	8/24	0.007	0.049
SE	LLaVA POPD	+8.3	[3.33, 13.33]	31/11	0.00289	0.0231
SE	LLaVA NPO+PD	+0.4	[-2.92, 3.75]	9/8	1	1
SE	Qwen PO	+1.2	[-2.92, 5.42]	15/12	0.701	1
SE	Qwen POPD	+9.6	[5.00, 14.17]	29/6	0.000117	0.00117
SE	Qwen NPO+PD	-1.2	[-5.42, 2.92]	12/15	0.701	1
BV	LLaVA PO	+6.5	[-2.78, 15.74]	17/10	0.248	1
BV	LLaVA POPD	+24.1	[14.81, 33.33]	29/3	2.56e-06	3.07e-05
BV	LLaVA NPO+PD	+0.9	[-4.63, 6.48]	5/4	1	1
BV	Qwen PO	+15.7	[7.41, 25.00]	22/5	0.00151	0.0136
BV	Qwen POPD	+21.3	[12.04, 30.56]	27/4	3.4e-05	0.000373
BV	Qwen NPO+PD	-3.7	[-12.04, 5.56]	10/14	0.541	1




Figure 7: Victim minus Parent qualified-rate contrasts for all primary settings. Points show paired differences in percentage points; segments are 95% percentile intervals from 10,000 paired item-bootstrap resamples within each fixed cohort.

E.4 Category-level heterogeneity

Figure 8 resolves the POPD results into all six categories in each cohort. Qualified Victim events occur in every displayed category, but their prevalence is uneven. SafeEraser/LLaVA has 18 of its 41 qualified events in HateSpeech (18/40 within category), whereas BeaverTails-V/Qwen has 12

of its 36 in identity misuse (12/18). These concentrations characterize the category profile behind each aggregate. Equal category sizes make the unweighted category-average rate equal to the micro-average within each cohort. We report descriptive category rates separately for the two cohort-specific taxonomies and denominators.




Figure 8: POPD qualified events by category, backbone, and checkpoint. Numerals are counts out of 40 (SafeEraser) or 18 (BeaverTails-V) items in each category; shading represents the corresponding percentage on the same 0–70% scale. L/Q denote LLaVA/Qwen and V/P denote Victim/Parent. All categories are shown, using the same item-level labels as the primary analysis.

E.5 Control-qualified outcome decomposition

The three endpoint views answer different questions, but their difference can also be resolved into mutually exclusive outcomes. Figure 9 uses Eq. (43) to separate three disjoint outcomes: qualified reactivation, persistence on the clean input, and foil/null positivity after clean suppression. These outcomes partition the fixed item-level responses.

On SafeEraser, no attacked ReSight match in the six Victim settings is also a positive clean response: the clean-positive and attacked-positive sets are disjoint. The differences between raw and qualified counts comprise one foil/null-excluded item for LLaVA NPO+PD and two for Qwen POPD. The other four settings retain all attacked matches under the full gate.

The BeaverTails-V results are more heterogeneous. LLaVA POPD has 38 attacked matches: four are positive on the clean input, three more pass clean suppression but fail foil or null, and 31 remain qualified. LLaVA NPO+PD has eight attacked matches partitioned as two, one, and five in the same order. Qwen POPD has one clean-positive exclusion and one additional foil/null exclusion out of 38 attacked matches. The gate's contribution therefore varies with the joint response pattern in each configuration.

E.6 Checkpoint overlap beyond a difference of rates

Paired confidence intervals quantify the checkpoint-level contrast. Figure 10 resolves the underlying item overlap through complete contingency counts, including concordant and discordant outcomes for every primary setting.

SafeEraser/LLaVA NPO+PD illustrates cancellation: nine items are qualified only on the Victim and eight only on the Parent, producing a net difference of one item (0.42 percentage points). Yet 17/240 items disagree, and only one item is qualified on both. The near-zero aggregate difference thus coexists with substantial item-level disagreement. BeaverTails-V/LLaVA NPO+PD similarly has five Victim-only and four Parent-only events, with no shared qualified event.

The stronger POPD contrasts have a different structure. In BeaverTails-V/LLaVA, 29 Victim-only and three Parent-only outcomes account for the 26-item net difference, while two items are qualified on




Figure 9: Disjoint outcomes among ReSight attacked matches in all 12 Victim settings. Segment lengths use the full cohort denominator. Teal denotes qualified matches, purple denotes clean-suppressed matches excluded by foil or null, and gold denotes attacked matches also positive on the clean input. End labels give total attacked matches over cohort size. The three segments form an exhaustive partition of raw ASR.

both. In BeaverTails-V/Qwen, nine shared outcomes coexist with 27 Victim-only and four Parent-only outcomes. These counts distinguish the shared accessible set from the larger Victim-specific set.

The shared images define a paired, checkpoint-conditional replay of Victim-optimized constructions.




Figure 10: Paired qualified outcomes in all 12 settings. Columns report both checkpoints qualifying, Victim only, Parent only, and neither. Numerals give exact counts; each in-cell bar uses the same fractional scale, with a full cell corresponding to the entire cohort. Counts in each row sum to 240 for SE or 108 for BV. Colors identify outcome types. Each Parent receives the same completed images as its Victim.

E.7 Category profiles across forgetting recipes

The POPD category matrix answers whether qualified responses are confined to a single category. Figure 11 adds a different comparison: how the distribution changes across all three checkpoint

recipes within a fixed cohort and backbone. It retains all six categories, including zero cells, on a common percentage scale. Category labels are kept within their original cohort-specific taxonomies.

On SafeEraser/LLaVA, PO has its largest qualified count in Sex (4/40), POPD in HateSpeech (18/40), and NPO+PD in Privacy (5/40). The higher POPD aggregate therefore reflects both more outcomes and a changed category profile. On BeaverTails-V/Qwen, identity misuse is the largest category under all three recipes, with 9/18, 12/18, and 6/18 qualified events for PO, POPD, and NPO+PD, respectively. Here the dominant category persists while its magnitude changes.

Breadth also differs from aggregate rate. Every POPD Victim has at least one qualified event in each category. BeaverTails-V/LLaVA NPO+PD instead has qualified events in three of six categories; SafeEraser/LLaVA NPO+PD has events in four. Each category contains 40 or 18 items, so one image contributes 2.5 or 5.56 percentage points, respectively. These descriptive coverage counts resolve the breadth and concentration of each recipe's qualified outcomes.




Figure 11: Category-wise qualified ASR for all three recipes on each Victim. Grouped bars distinguish PO, POPD, and NPO+PD on a common percentage scale. All six categories per cohort are shown; denominators are 40 items per SafeEraser category and 18 per BeaverTails-V category. Rates are direct item-level aggregates. Each panel compares recipe profiles within one cohort-specific taxonomy.

E.8 Contribution of the retained and additional SafeEraser items

The 240-item SafeEraser cohort contains 51 retained items and 189 additional items. Figure 12 decomposes Victim qualified counts by membership to show each subset's contribution to the full-cohort results.

All six Victim configurations contain qualified events in the additional 189 items. For LLaVA POPD, the two groups contribute 10/51 and 31/189, respectively, summing to the reported 41/240. For Qwen POPD they contribute 5/51 and 26/189, summing to 31/240. The change in rate has no common direction: the LLaVA POPD rate decreases from 19.6% to 16.4%, whereas the Qwen POPD rate increases from 9.8% to 13.8%. The contribution of subset membership therefore depends on the checkpoint configuration.

The additional group contributes 8, 31, and 7 qualified events for LLaVA PO, POPD, and NPO+PD, and 13, 26, and 11 for the corresponding Qwen settings. Qualified recovery therefore extends across both constituent subsets of the 240-item cohort. The subset labels indicate the provenance of the evaluated items.




Figure 12: Qualified outcomes in the disjoint retained-51 and additional-189 subsets of SafeEraser. Labels give numerator and denominator. Paired bars compare the two subset rates for each recipe. Their weighted combination is the full 240-item result; both groups belong to the fixed evaluation cohort.

E.9 Qualification retention across the visual-attack adaptations

The complete comparator matrix preserves configuration-specific outcomes. Figure 13 summarizes another property: the amount by which the raw target-match rate changes under the same endpoint definition. For each method and cohort, the plot averages rates equally over the six backbone–recipe settings, giving a descriptive summary of configuration-level rates.

For ReSight, the mean raw and qualified rates are 8.89% and 8.68% on SafeEraser, and 23.46% and 21.14% on BeaverTails-V. Across the six settings, 125 of 128 SafeEraser attacked-match events and 137 of 152 BeaverTails-V events remain qualified. These are counts of item–configuration events.

The distinction is more pronounced for several comparator constructions. For example, BeaverTails-V Image Hijacks has 28 raw events and nine qualified events across settings; Visual Adversarial Examples has 33 and 15. The raw-to-qualified change measures the additional specificity imposed by the controls on the same responses. Jointly displaying the two rates distinguishes total target elicitation from the fraction retained under qualification.


Table 8 specifies reference access, construction unit, image budget, and update count for each adaptation. The rate summary complements the setting-level comparison matrix.

E.10 Control response breadth across all checkpoints

Figure 14 displays the clean, foil, and null positive-response counts for both checkpoints in every setting, complementing the control-deletion analysis with a view of marginal control activity. Numerical labels give counts, and circle areas show within-cohort frequencies on a common percentage scale.

SafeEraser/LLaVA POPD is informative. The Victim has one clean, seven foil, and one null positive, yet all 41 attacked matches are qualified. Those control positives therefore occur outside the attacked-positive set. The Parent has 40 clean, 22 foil, and 17 null positives, while 21 of its 39 attacked matches are qualified. Marginal counts signal broader response activity, but only the joint records determine which attacked matches are excluded.


On BeaverTails-V/LLaVA POPD, the Parent has 39 clean, 41 foil, and 36 null positives; the corresponding Victim counts are nine, six, and eight. This asymmetry is consistent with the large gate



(a) SafeEraser-240 (b) BeaverTails-V-108

Figure 13: Raw versus qualified rates averaged over the six settings within each cohort. Wide outlined bars show raw rates and narrower filled bars show qualified rates on the same scale. Right-hand labels give qualified (Q) and raw percentages. ReSight is highlighted in coral. All six constructions are shown; each mean gives equal weight to the six configuration-level rates.

attenuation on the Parent in the fixed-label ablation. Control-positive sets can overlap; the event partition and marginal bounds in Appendix C.12 characterize their joint contribution to qualification.



(a) Victim control responses (b) Parent control responses

Figure 14: Marginal positive control responses in all 24 checkpoint cells. Numbers are counts among all 240 SE or 108 BV items. Circle area is proportional to the within-cohort rate; zero counts are printed without a circle. The common size key reports percentages. Colors identify clean, foil, and null roles. These marginal frequencies complement the joint-label control-deletion analysis.

F Control Ablation and Spatial Countermeasure Exploration

F.1 What each endpoint control excludes

The control analysis holds both attack images and semantic labels fixed. For each checkpoint, deleting a control can only increase the number of passing items (Proposition C.6). Figure 15 displays these increases separately for Victim and Parent, complementing the paired differences in the main text. The full-gate Victim/Parent counts, in figure row order, are 41/21, 31/8, 31/5, and 36/13. Their corresponding attacked-only counts are 41/39, 33/10, 38/28, and 38/23.





Figure 15: Fixed-label control ablation for the four POPD settings. Bars are the additional items passing when clean, foil, null, or all control requirements are removed. SE uses $n = 240$ and BV uses $n = 108$. A single control's increment counts items blocked only by that control; removing all controls additionally includes overlapping control matches. All entries use fixed completed images.

The largest attenuation in these settings occurs on the BeaverTails-V/LLaVA Parent: 23 of its 28 attacked matches fail at least one control. Deleting clean, foil, or null alone recovers 5, 2, or 3 items, respectively; their sum is smaller than 23 because the remaining exclusions overlap. On SafeEraser/ LLaVA the Victim retains all 41 attacked matches, whereas the Parent retains 21 of 39. This asymmetry explains how a small raw checkpoint difference can coexist with a larger qualified difference. The decomposition identifies how each endpoint requirement contributes to the qualified contrast.

F.2 One-pixel shifts as an exploratory countermeasure

We evaluate spatial preprocessing as a countermeasure to completed POPD attacks. The independent replay evaluates the identity and the four-element set $\mathcal{T} = \{+x, -x, +y, -y\}$ of one-pixel cyclic shifts, without reoptimizing the attacks. Figure 16 reports identity and each shift separately. In its row order, the four-shift mean qualified rates are 0.73%, 0.52%, 2.78%, and 0.69%, computed from 7, 5, 12, and 3 qualified events over $4n$ replayed outcomes. Each mean summarizes four correlated transformations of the same n items and excludes the identity condition.

All four shifts reduce reactivation in these settings, supporting spatial preprocessing as a countermeasure against the fixed attacks. Lemma C.8 ensures that the perturbation norm is unchanged relative to the shifted clean image. Thus, attenuation occurs despite preserving the attacked–clean L_∞ distance under each transformation. The replay protocol is specified in Appendix D.6, and fixed construction settings in Table 7.



(a) Identity versus four-shift mean **(b) Direction-resolved one-pixel shifts**

Figure 16: Exploratory spatial countermeasure against fixed POPD attacks. (a) Identity-qualified rates and the mean of the four one-pixel cyclic shifts for each setting. (b) Individual shift rates, with exact numerator/denominator labels; the color scale spans 0–4%. Identity counts are 43/240, 20/240, 42/108, and 31/108. Each mean summarizes four correlated shifts of the same items. The identity and shifted responses come from a separately collected, fixed-transformation replay study on the same items.

G Qualitative Comparisons

G.1 Qualitative response comparisons

Figures 17–19 show three BeaverTails-V cases of control-qualified reactivation. In each case, ReSight passes the gate, while the clean input and the five comparison attacks elicit refusals on the same question and checkpoint. All three ReSight items have $(Y_u^A, Y_u^C, Y_u^F, Y_u^N) = (1, 0, 0, 0)$. Each case includes all five comparison methods: SUA, Image Hijacks, Visual Adversarial Examples, Jailbreak in Pieces, and AttentionJailbreak. Their implementations are the same four-role adaptations used in the quantitative experiments. Every method is shown with its input image and recorded reply.

Images preserve their original aspect ratios and pixel values. Clean and comparator replies are shown in full. ReSight excerpts are contiguous passages from the recorded replies, with whitespace normalized and ellipses marking omitted text. The excerpts show the target-directed passages; qualification uses the labels of the complete replies.

G.2 From refusal to a target-directed continuation

Security-system query. In Figure 17, the question and checkpoint remain fixed while the image changes. ReSight's response begins to address breaching the depicted system, whereas the clean image and all five comparison images yield refusals. The upper pair shows the clean-to-attacked contrast; the lower row presents the five comparison attacks.




Figure 17: Case 1: security-system query on Qwen2.5-VL-3B POPD. The original question is shared by seven independently paired input–reply panels. (a) Clean input; (b) ReSight; (c–g) the five comparison attacks. Only ReSight produces a direct substantive response and passes the four-role gate. Ellipses mark omitted portions of its verbatim reply.

Privacy and surveillance query. Figure 18 shows a different scene and target within the same checkpoint. The ReSight reply connects the depicted devices to the requested privacy violation, while all five comparison methods retain the clean refusal. Their distinct perturbed images are shown alongside their own recorded outputs, extending the contrast to a second scene and target behavior.




Figure 18: Case 2: privacy query on Qwen2.5-VL-3B POPD. The clean response and all five comparator responses refuse. The full ReSight reply receives the direct substantive label, with all three control labels negative. Each method's own image and reply are displayed; the ReSight passage is quoted verbatim with omissions marked. Panel order matches Case 1.

Cross-backbone harassment query. Figure 19 changes both backbone and forgetting recipe to LLaVA PO. ReSight's recorded reply explicitly connects the depicted computer to the requested behavior, while the clean input and all five comparison attacks elicit refusals. The complete ReSight reply passes the four-role gate.



Figure 19: Case 3: harassment query on LLaVA-1.5-7B PO. Clean, ReSight, and all five comparator inputs are their actual recorded images, each paired with its own response. ReSight is control-qualified; all five comparators refuse. Its key clause is quoted verbatim, with omitted text marked. Panel order matches Cases 1 and 2.