INTENT-SENSITIVE LANGUAGE MODELS FOR ROBUST SAFETY

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ABSTRACT

Despite extensive safety-tuning, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks via adversarially crafted instructions, reflecting a persistent trade-off between safety and task performance. In this work, we propose INTENT-FT, a simple and lightweight fine-tuning approach that explicitly trains LLMs to infer the underlying intent of an instruction before responding. By fine-tuning on a targeted set of adversarial instructions, INTENT-FT enables LLMs to generalize intent deduction to unseen attacks, thereby substantially improving their robustness. We comprehensively evaluate both parametric and non-parametric attacks across open-source and proprietary models, considering harmfulness from attacks, utility, over-refusal, and impact against white-box threats. Empirically, INTENT-FT consistently mitigates all evaluated attack categories, with no single attack exceeding a 50% success rate, whereas existing defenses remain only partially effective. Importantly, our method preserves the model's general capabilities and reduces excessive refusals on benign instructions containing superficially harmful keywords. Furthermore, models trained with INTENT-FT accurately identify hidden harmful intent in adversarial attacks, and these learned intentions can be effectively transferred to enhance vanilla model defenses.

1 INTRODUCTION

With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) (Grattafiori et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2024; Mao et al., 2024), the risk of these models executing harmful or catastrophic instructions has grown correspondingly (Anthropic, 2025). This is largely managed by efforts such as dedicated a safety-alignment stage (Ouyang et al., 2022), aiming to ensure that LLMs are not only helpful but also consistently generate safe and ethical outputs. Nevertheless, recent findings by Qi et al. (2024) expose a fundamental vulnerability in prevailing safety-alignment practices: *Shallow Alignment*. In particular, alignment in most models is largely superficial, constrained to surface-level refusals, resulting in safe outputs that are often limited to generic templates such as *"I am sorry but..."* or *"As a language model..."*. This superficial alignment permits attackers to circumvent safety mechanisms by explicitly instructing the model to avoid generating commonly recognized refusal responses (Tang, 2024; Andriushchenko et al., 2025). Furthermore, LLMs remain susceptible to a broader range of prompt-based attacks, including those that optimize over discrete suffix tokens (Zou et al., 2023; Basani and Zhang, 2025) or rephrase harmful instructions to look harmless (Chao et al., 2025; Zeng et al., 2024).

Beyond initial safety alignment, practitioners have developed a range of inference-time defenses, such as prompting models to adhere to their safety guidelines (Xie et al., 2023) incorporating additional safety exemplars to enable in-context defense (Wei et al., 2023). Wang et al. (2024) introduce a backdoor trigger into safety-aligned LLMs, serving as a covert prefix that elicits safety responses when detected, without affecting model behavior on benign queries. However, these approaches are primarily designed to counter overtly harmful instructions and generally lack robustness against more sophisticated, adversarially crafted attacks.

In recent works, Zhang et al. (2024) introduced a dual-stage prompting strategy, Intention Analysis (IA), which encourages LLMs to analyze the intent behind an instruction prior to generating a safe response. However, we observe that with a sufficiently large attack budget, IA can still succumb to such attacks. Furthermore, the effectiveness of IA depends on the inherent ability of each model

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to correctly infer harmful intent, leading to significant variance in defense success rates between different models. In our work, we propose *Intent-FT*, designed to systematically enhance LLMs' capacity to accurately deduce the underlying intent of an instruction before producing a response. Our main contributions are as follows:

1. We introduce Intent-FT, an intent-aware fine-tuning procedure that provides robust defense against a broad spectrum of jailbreak attacks, including strong optimization-based attacks with substantial query budgets.
2. We demonstrate that Intent-FT preserves the original downstream task performance, while significantly reducing over-refusals to benign instructions containing superficially harmful keywords in comparison to defense baselines.
3. We provide practical advantages of Intent-FT in open-source threat scenarios which requires access to model weights, and that even if a jailbreak is partially successful, the model's ability to execute harmful instructions is diminished.

2 Related Works

Adversarial Attacks. Most LLMs have undergone safety alignment during training, yet remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks with minimal effort. Qi et al. (2024) demonstrated the effectiveness of a simple pre-filling attack, exposing vulnerabilities in current alignment techniques. Adversarial attacks are commonly classified as parametric or non-parametric. Non-parametric (black-box) attacks used crafted prompts to bypass alignment and elicit harmful responses. These range from manually hand-crafted templates (Li et al., 2023; Jiang et al., 2024b) to optimized adversarial suffixes (Zeng et al., 2024; Chao et al., 2025; Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023), or a combination of both (Andriushchenko et al., 2025; Mangaokar et al., 2024). Some works (Zheng et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2023) also exploit in-context learning by providing few-shot attack examples to elicit harmful responses. Parametric attacks, on the other hand, require access to model parameters in either a restricted or non-restricted manner. Restricted attacks have access to fine-tuning APIs[1] but not the model weights, allowing adversaries to fine-tune models towards harmful (Qi et al., 2024) or universal compliance (Qi et al., 2023). Unrestricted attacks, with full weight access are especially difficult to defend, as attackers can manipulate the model arbitrarily. Recent work (Arditi et al., 2024; Yeo et al., 2025) shows that manipulating a single "refusal vector" can reliably bypass alignment. In this work, we demonstrate that models trained with Intent-FT can robustly defend against both parametric and non-parametric jailbreak attacks.

Safety Defenses. In addition to standard safety alignment, further defense layers are commonly implemented to improve model safety. Like attacks, these defenses are classified as parametric or non-parametric. Non-parametric defenses include explicitly reminding models of safety guidelines (Xie et al., 2023), discouraging persuasion (Zeng et al., 2024), or providing few-shot safety examples (Wei et al., 2023). IA (Zhang et al., 2024), a method analogous to ours, prompts models to infer user intent before responding, but is insufficiently robust against high-budget attacks. Other non-parametric defenses modify the input, such as rephrasing instructions (Jain et al., 2023) or adding perturbations (Robey et al., 2023; Cao et al., 2023), but often increase computational cost or affect performance. Parametric defenses alter model parameters, including backdoor triggers for safe outputs (Wang et al., 2024), safety distillation with safe reasoning (Zhu et al., 2025), or adjusting safety data proportions during fine-tuning (Bianchi et al., 2024). We argue that effective safety defenses should be practical for deployment, preserving model performance and minimizing overhead. Our framework, Intent-FT, is lightweight, requiring only minimal fine-tuning on a small supplementary dataset, and significantly reduces attack success rates without sacrificing usability or performance.

[1] https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/fine-tuning

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 PRELIMINARY

Model. We consider a target transformer-based LLM p_θ (Vaswani et al., 2017), parameterized by θ, which models the output distribution autoregressively over a sequence of input tokens: $p_\theta(x_{t+1}|x_1, \ldots x_t) \in \mathbb{R}^{|V|}$, where V is the vocabulary size. Instruct-tuned models are trained via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), optimizing the following objective:

$$\arg\min_\theta \sum_{i=1}^{N} -\log\left(\mathcal{L}_\theta(y_i \mid s, q_i)\right) \tag{1}$$

where the dataset $\{q : y\}^N$ comprises N diverse questions $q = x_{1:t}$ and responses $y = x_{t+1:t+T}$ of length T and s refers to an optional system prompt. Safety alignment may be integrated with instruct-tuning during SFT or applied as an additional post-training step using Reinforcement Learning (RL) (Ouyang et al., 2022; Rafailov et al., 2023).




Figure 1: **Intent-FT.** A teacher deduces the harmful intent of adversarial instructions and generates safe continuations; benign instructions are used as-is. SFT maps each instruction to its intention deduction followed by the safe/benign response. The tags `<intent>` and `</intent>` enclose the deduction. At inference, appending `<intent>` elicits intention deduction before the response.

Safety Evaluation. Given a harmful instruction such as *"List the steps to distribute drugs"*, we assess safety based on whether the model complies with the instruction. Prior works (Zou et al., 2023; Arditi et al., 2024) measure refusal by string-matching against a predefined set of common refusal phrases. However, this approach is not robust, as the absence of such phrases does not necessarily indicate compliance or a successful jailbreak. Following Andriushchenko et al. (2025), we instead employ GPT-4.1[2] as an automatic judge to assign a harmfulness score between 1 and 10 and only use string-matching when evaluating for refusal. We conduct our evaluation on JAILBREAKBENCH (Chao et al., 2024), which contains 100 harmful instructions across 11 categories. The dataset also includes short compliance suffixes, which we use to perform pre-filling attacks by appending them to harmful instructions (e.g., *"Here are the steps to distribute drugs:"*).

3.2 INTENT-FT

Intention Deduction. Most adversarial attacks conceal harmful intent by inserting cover tokens (e.g., *"in a fictional setting"*) or using role-playing tactics (Zeng et al., 2024), enabling them to bypass the defenses of shallowly aligned LLMs (Qi et al., 2024) that mainly block direct harmful requests. We refer to such prompts as **adversarial instructions**. Following Zhang et al. (2024), we

[2]https://openai.com/index/gpt-4-1/

argue that LLMs should explicitly infer an instruction's intent before responding, as a safeguard against misaligned outputs (Howard and Cambria, 2013). Unlike prior zero-shot approaches, we introduce a fine-tuning stage to systematically instill intention deduction capabilities.

Motivation. Our work is motivated by the "shallow alignment" phenomenon described by Qi et al. (2024). Current safety-aligned models often converge to a local optimum by consistently beginning responses with a limited set of refusal phrases. This behavior makes it trivial for attackers to craft templates that prevent these phrases from being generated (Andriushchenko et al., 2025). More critically, such models are not trained to understand the underlying reasons for refusing an instruction. We hypothesize that model robustness can be improved if the model initially reasons about whether an instruction is harmful. However if the model were to do so on benign instructions, this would risk degrading performance or introduce erroneous refusals. To address this, we instead structure the reasoning phase as **explicit intention deduction**, training the model to both recognize harmful intent in adversarial instructions and benign intentions on harmless instructions. This functions as a targeted "reread" over the instruction, which we empirically show to be both an effective defense against adversarial attacks, while preserving the utility of the model.

Table 1: ASR/Mean harmfulness scores (↓) on both non-parametric and parametric attack techniques against safety defenses. **Bolded** represents the best defense method.

Models	Defenses	PAIR	DI	AA	Prefill	Harmful-FT
Llama	Vanilla	88 / 9.4	49 / 7.4	90 / 9.6	41 / 6.6	71 / 8.7
	SR	48 / 7.5	5 / 2.8	82 / 9.2	14 / 3.6	58 / 7.8
	ICD	91 / 9.8	20 / 4.2	91 / 9.7	32 / 5.8	72 / 8.7
	IA	32 / 7.0	**0 / 1.1**	17 / 3.4	10 / 3.1	62 / 8.4
	BD-A	96 / 9.9	**0 / 1.0**	**0 / 1.0**	75 / 8.9	1 / 1.1
	Safety-FT	98 / 10.0	37 / 6.4	92 / 9.9	23 / 4.4	60 / 8.2
	RPO	60 / 6.5	0 / 1.0	50 / 5.5	75 / 8.2	62 / 7.5
	Intent-FT (Ours)	**19 / 3.8**	**0 / 1.1**	7 / 1.7	**3 / 1.6**	**0 / 1.2**
Qwen	Vanilla	99 / 9.9	63 / 8.3	99 / 10.0	56 / 7.4	70 / 8.5
	SR	97 / 9.9	11 / 3.4	96 / 9.9	32 / 5.3	61 / 8.1
	ICD	100 / 10.0	68 / 8.3	98 / 10.0	51 / 6.9	73 / 8.6
	IA	89 / 9.7	**0 / 1.2**	92 / 9.9	36 / 5.6	54 / 7.7
	BD-A	100 / 10.0	72 / 9.1	96 / 10.0	86 / 9.4	11 / 2.3
	Safety-FT	100 / 10.0	5 / 2.3	94 / 9.7	61 / 7.8	65 / 8.3
	RPO	32 / 4.2	7 / 2.5	92 / 9.8	89 / 9.71	52 / 6.5
	Intent-FT (Ours)	**22 / 4.0**	6 / 2.1	**49 / 7.5**	**3 / 1.3**	**0 / 1.2**
GPT-4.1	Vanilla	98 / 9.9	86 / 9.1	63 / 7.1	-	-
	SR	74 / 8.4	0 / 1.4	36 / 4.3	-	-
	ICD	94 / 9.8	58 / 6.9	12 / 2.2	-	-
	IA	60 / 8.0	**0 / 1.0**	48 / 5.4	-	-
	BD-A	-	-	-	-	-
	Safety-FT	96 / 9.8	69 / 8.2	48 / 5.4	-	-
	RPO	45 / 6.8	0 / 1.0	42 / 5.5	-	-
	Intent-FT (Ours)	**40 / 6.5**	**0 / 1.5**	**0 / 1.0**	-	-

Intention Dataset. Safety-aligned models are generally effective at producing safe responses to harmful instructions but remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this work, we focus on enhancing robustness against adversarial instructions. We assume access to a harmful dataset D_H, where each entry consists of a vanilla harmful instruction q_v and a corresponding adversarial instruction q_a. A teacher LLM, p_T, is prompted with a dedicated template q_i to generate a reasoning chain y_ρ^h that deduces the harmful intent of q_v from q_a, i.e., $p_T(y_\rho^h \mid q_v, q_a; q_i)$, thus q_v serves as a label for the target model to predict from q_a. The teacher is then prompted to produce a safe continuation y_s by providing the concatenated input $q_a \oplus y_\rho^h$, where $\oplus$ denotes token concatenation, resulting in $p_T(y_s \mid q_a \oplus y_\rho^h)$. The resulting harmful intention dataset, D_I, comprises pairs of adversarial instructions and their annotated outputs, $\{q_a : y_\rho^h \oplus y_s\}$. We utilize special tags, "*<intent>*" and "*</intent>*" to enclose y_ρ^h. We select 100 samples from WILDJAILBREAK (Jiang et al., 2024b) to form D_H and use Deepseek-V3 (Liu et al., 2024) as p_T to generate y_ρ^h and then y_s.

Utility preservation. An important consideration in safety training is minimizing any negative impact on model utility. Since instruct models are optimized for helpfulness, there is an inherent

trade-off, as refusal responses are fundamentally opposed to helpful behavior. To address this, we augment D_I with an additional set of benign instructions, D_B, and similarly annotate the desired output following the same format, $y_\rho^s \oplus y_b$, here y_b denotes the benign continuation following the neutral intentions y_ρ^s. Since benign instructions lack adversarial counterparts, intention analysis does not have a true label to predict; instead, the goal is to ensure the target model performs intention analysis regardless of whether an instruction is harmful or benign. This preserves the intent deduction capabilities developed in D_I. While both y_ρ^h and y_ρ^s could be designed as indicators of whether an instruction is safe or harmful, this risks y_ρ^s being incorrectly predicted and leading to the wrong continuation, i.e. y_ρ^s indicates harmful intent and results in over-refusal. Thus, we do not **explicitly** indicate the nature of the instruction within y_ρ. We later show that our design achieves a lower over-refusal rate compared to existing defensive baselines. We construct D_B from AM-DEEPSEEK-R1-DISTILLED (Zhao et al., 2025), a collection of high-quality, reasoning prompts.

Intent-FT Implementation. We train the target model following Eq. 1 on the final concatenated dataset, $D_I \cup D_B$ for 5 epochs, and set the ratio of benign to harmful as $5:1$. We initialize the dedicated system prompt s shown in Tab. 5. During inference, we append "*<intent>*" at the end of each instruction. We find that this is especially effective against pre-filling attacks, as the model is consistently conditioned to generate intentions upon encountering the special tag. An overview of the framework is illustrated in Fig. 1. We conduct full parameter training on instruct-tuned models, but also include findings on conducting large-scale INTENT-FT on pretrained variants, in Appendix. E.1.

4 EXPERIMENTS

In this section, we first evaluate safety defenses against adversarial jailbreak attacks in Sect. 4.1. Sect. 4.2 then examines potential drawbacks by assessing general capabilities and over-refusals on benign but seemingly harmful instructions. In Sect. 4.3, we show that generated intentions effectively reveal hidden harmful intents and analyze the effect of varying the size of D_I. Finally, Sect. 4.4 discusses the effectiveness of Intent-FT for open-source models where attackers have unrestricted access, including to model weights.

Adversarial Attacks. We perform evaluations on both parametric and non-parametric attacks. Non-parametric methods include prompt-based attacks such as PAIR (Chao et al., 2025), Adaptive Attack (AA) (Andriushchenko et al., 2025) and Deepinception (DI) (Li et al., 2023). Both PAIR and AA are optimization-based attacks, where the base instruction is optimized over a budget M. We follow the original implementations of PAIR by setting $M = 3$ and use a smaller budget, $M = 200$ in AA, as its success rate typically plateaus quickly (see C.1). We also assess the effectiveness of a simple pre-filling attack (Tang, 2024; Qi et al., 2024), which appends a harmful suffix to the base instruction. For parametric attacks, we perform harmful fine-tuning (Harmful-FT) by conducting supervised fine-tuning on a dataset of 100 harmful instructions with compliant responses. We did not implement other widely studied attacks such as few-shot attacks (Zheng et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2023), CipherChat (Yuan et al., 2023), Autodan (Liu et al., 2023) and GCG (Zou et al., 2023) due to the low ASR ($< 50\%$) observed even when the model does not have any external defenses applied.

Defense Baselines. We compare Intent-FT with both prompt-based and parameter-tuning safety defenses. We also evaluate without any defenses applied, referred to as **Vanilla**. Prompt-based defenses include Self-Reminder **(SR)** (Xie et al., 2023), In-Context Defense **(ICD)** (Wei et al., 2023), Robust Prompt Optimization (RPO) (Zhou et al., 2024) and **IA** (Zhang et al., 2024). For parameter-tuning approaches, we benchmark against Backdoor-Align **(BD-A)** (Wang et al., 2024) and additional fine-tuning with standard safety fine-tuning **(Safety-FT)** (Bianchi et al., 2024), which involves SFT on a harmful-to-safe response dataset without adversarial instructions or intention deduction. We also explore findings on classifier-based defenses in Appendix. E.4. Harmful-FT is applied after both Safety-FT and Intent-FT, but not BD-A, as BD-A already includes harmful instruction training. Since post-tuning can override learned safety behaviors, we include augment the harmful dataset with 10 safety examples as an additional low-resource defense. This is implemented across all defense baselines. For INTENT-FT, the response is augmented with the intentions. We discuss additional details in Appendix C.

Experiment Settings. We implement experiments on two open-source models, LLAMA-3.1-8B (Grattafiori et al., 2024) and QWEN-2.5-7B (Yang et al., 2024), as well as a proprietary model, GPT4.1-mini[3]. For brevity, we refer to these models as Llama, Qwen, and GPT-4.1. All experiments use greedy decoding. Following Wang et al. (2024), we conduct Harmful-FT using the same number of epochs as Intent-FT and set the learning rate to $1e-5$ for the open-source models and 1 when using the OpenAI fine-tuning API. We report both the average harmfulness score and the Attack Success Rate (ASR), where ASR is defined as achieving a harmfulness score of 10. For utility evaluations, we report mean accuracy, and use string-matching against refusal phrases to compute the refusal score in over-refusal assessments. Due to OpenAI's automated moderation API, we increase the benign-to-harmful ratio for Intent-FT to 10:1 to mitigate detection, and exclude Harmful-FT from evaluation on GPT-4.1-mini. OpenAI also does not support pre-filling functionality.

4.1 ADVERSARIAL ATTACK RESULTS

Intent-FT Deters All Attacks. As expected, all three models perfectly defend against vanilla harmful instructions, achieving an ASR of 0. Table 1 presents the ASR for each attack method. Both PAIR and AA can consistently succeed in jailbreaking the LLMs when no external defenses are applied. ICD and SR are comparatively weak safety measures and fail to effectively prevent adversarial attacks. We observe that performing additional safety training naively as implemented in Safety-FT has limited effectiveness and can even degrade safety in certain cases, particularly against AA and PAIR. While IA demonstrates competitive results against PAIR, it remains vulnerable Harmful-FT and AA, while being less effective on Qwen. Similarly, BD-A, which is specifically designed to defend against Harmful-FT, is ineffective against adversarial instructions. RPO while provide competitive defense on PAIR, fails on other attacks such as AA and Prefill. RPO is dependent on an universal suffix which may not be sufficiently robust against different attack strategies. Overall, all baseline techniques exhibit high variance across models and lack generalizability. In contrast, INTENT-FT is the only method that consistently provides robust and generalizable defense across all attack types and models. In terms of attack expenses, our framework requires the most iterations while yielding the lowest success rate, we discuss further in Appendix. C.3.




Figure 2: ASR vs Utility Pareto. ASR scores are averaged across all 5 attacks and Utility accuracy is averaged across the 3 benchmarks. INTENT-FT consistently yields the best Safety-to-Utility ratio.

While IA can be viewed as a zero-shot prompting counterpart of INTENT-FT, it fails to reliably guide models to infer underlying harm. As shown in Fig. 16, IA-generated intentions often miss hidden harm and inadvertently comply with adversarial attacks. In contrast, INTENT-FT correctly reasons about the adversarial instruction, identifies its harmful nature, and appropriately refuses to comply. On classifier-based defenses (see Appendix. E.4), we observe similar findings, revealing their limited defense abilities and side-effects on introducing unintended refusal on benign instructions.




Figure 3: KL divergence on harmful tokens before vs. after Harmful-FT: **Llama (left)**, **Qwen (right)**. With limited safety examples, INTENT-FT reduces divergence from the prior aligned model.

Intent-FT prevents shallow misalignment. We observe similar limitations with IA in the Harmful-FT attack. Although Harmful-FT optimizes for harmful output tokens given harmful instructions, it does not impair harm recognition. For example, Fig.17 shows that IA can correctly identify harmfulness in the instruction but still generates unsafe outputs. We quantify this via the Kullback–Leibler divergence (KL-D) between pre- and post-Harmful-FT models on harmful tokens from

[3]We use the mini version due to cost constraints, noting its comparable performance to GPT4.1.

JAILBREAKBENCH. Fig.3 demonstrates that Harmful-FT causes *"shallow misalignment"*, indicated by high divergence in initial tokens. In contrast, INTENT-FT, explicitly conditioning responses on deduced intentions and leveraging a small set of intention-aware safety examples, avoids catastrophic forgetting and reduces divergence from the prior aligned model. This demonstrates the robustness of INTENT-FT in mitigating the shallow misalignment objective from Harmful-FT.

4.2 SAFETY ALIGNMENT TAX

Table 2: **Utility Retention**: Accuracy on ARC, GSM8K, and GPQA, with CoT prompting.

Model	Defense	ARC	GSM8K	GPQA
Llama	Vanilla	86.9	85.1	32.8
	SR	–0.8	–1.8	–2.2
	ICD	–3.0	–2.2	+0.2
	IA	–4.1	–6.0	–3.1
	BD-A	–6.9	–16.3	–3.1
	Safety-FT	–3.1	–6.3	–1.6
	Intent-FT	–4.8	–2.2	–1.6
Qwen	Vanilla	89.1	87.7	31.7
	SR	+0.1	–0.6	+1.3
	ICD	+0.1	–0.1	–0.5
	IA	–0.6	–3.8	0.0
	BD-A	–2.1	+0.3	+0.2
	Safety-FT	–1.6	+0.2	+2.9
	Intent-FT	0.0	+1.9	+1.6
GPT-4.1	Vanilla	93.8	92.3	61.8
	SR	+0.4	+0.4	–34.1
	ICD	–0.2	–0.3	–27.4
	IA	+1.4	0.0	–0.4
	Safety-FT	+1.0	–0.6	–0.9
	Intent-FT	+0.6	–0.3	–1.3

Intent-FT preserves utility. Since it is not feasible to determine in advance whether an instruction is harmful, it is necessary to keep the defense strategy consistently active. However, this approach may introduce an *"alignment tax"* (Ouyang et al., 2022; Askell et al., 2021), potentially impacting other model capabilities. To evaluate this trade-off, we assess general model performance on three reasoning benchmarks: ARC-CHALLENGE (Clark et al., 2018), GSM8K (Cobbe et al., 2021), and GPQA (Rein et al., 2024), Both ARC-CHALLENGE and GPQA are MCQ-based while GSM8K is open-generation, we use Chain-of-Thought (CoT) (Wei et al., 2022) prompting to derive the final answer. As shown in Tab.2, INTENT-FT incurs only a minor decrease in utility compared to strong baselines such as BD-A and IA, and even achieves improvements on Qwen. Less invasive defenses like SR yield slightly lower utility drops, except for GPQA on GPT-4.1, but is ineffective against jailbreak attacks. These results demonstrate that INTENT-FT effectively optimizes the trade-off between safety and utility on the alignment Pareto frontier (see Fig. 2).

Over-Refusal. Similar to the trade-off in utility, overly explicit safety methods can lead to false positives by causing the model to refuse benign instructions. For example, if a model is explicitly prompted to always adhere to safety standards, it may develop an excessive bias toward refusal, resulting in unnecessary caution. To assess this effect, we measure the refusal rate on 250 instructions from XSTEST (Röttger et al., 2023), which is designed to identify exaggerated safety behaviors. An illustrative example is *"How can I smash my exam next week"*, where the word *"smash"* acts as the harmful trigger. As shown in Fig 4, Safety-FT substantially increases refusal scores and similar findings are observed on stronger defenses such as IA and BD-A. In contrast, INTENT-FT reduces over-refusal rates for both Llama and GPT-4.1, improving over the vanilla model. The constant presence of trigger tokens in BD-A and repeated safety reminders in IA, amplifies over-refusal by encouraging excessive caution, and shown in Fig. 8, causes the model to incorrectly infer harmful correlations when encountering a harmful token such as *"smash"*. We observe that the simulated jailbroken prompts used in RPO induce an overly cautious bias, leading the model to incorrectly perceive benign instructions as potentially harmful. This effect is further amplified by the added reminders to refuse unsafe requests, resulting in an excessively high false-positive rate.

4.3 ABLATION

Intentions Generalize across Models. Providing intentions generated by INTENT-FT as context to vanilla models reduces PAIR jailbreak success for Llama and GPT-4.1, with near-perfect deterrence on GPT-4.1. Transfer is less effective for Qwen, likely reflecting its weaker initial safety alignment. Figure 6 and the full protocol appear in Appendix A.




Figure 4: Refusal scores on benign XSTEST instructions. INTENT-FT reduces over-refusal in both Llama and GPT-4.1; additional safety SFT and backdoor triggers increase it.

Effects of Safety Data Mix. We investigate the impact of varying the size of D_I on three metrics: harmfulness, utility, and over-refusal. We train several Llama variants using between 0 and 100 instructions in D_I, while keeping $|D_B| = 500$ fixed. As shown in Fig. 7, SFT on D_B alone results in a high harmfulness rate, since the model is not explicitly trained to detect harm in adversarial instructions, although this also leads to lower rates of false refusals on benign inputs. We observe an inverse monotonic relationship between $|D_I|$ and harmfulness: increasing the size of D_I consistently reduces harmfulness. Notably, adding D_I also marginally improves performance on GPQA. Furthermore, we find that by not explicitly prompting the model to follow safety standards, our framework avoids biasing the model toward excessive caution. This is because the model is trained to generate intentions for both benign and harmful instructions, promoting balanced behavior. Overall, even a modest number of instructions (60) is sufficient to provide robust defense against adversarial attacks.

4.4 WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR OPEN-SOURCE DEFENSE?

Up to this point, we have evaluated the effectiveness of black-box attacks, where attackers are limited to API access, or partial white-box attacks that allow fine-tuning. These approaches have shown limited success against models trained with the INTENT-FT framework. However, this robustness does not extend to scenarios where attackers have full access to the model, including its parameter weights. White-box jailbreak methods (Arditi et al., 2024; Panickssery et al., 2023; Turner et al., 2023; Yeo et al., 2025) have demonstrated that, with access to internal activations, one can extract a "refusal direction" that is highly effective at circumventing safety mechanisms and preventing refusals. We extract a refusal direction using the difference between mean activations for harmful and harmless instructions and select the layer that minimizes refusal after intervention. We compare **Ablation**, which removes the refusal component, with **ActAdd**, which subtracts a scaled refusal vector at the selected layer. We list the definitions, and methods for the white-box techniques in Appendix B.

How effective are white-box attacks on fulfilling harmful requests? White-box interventions may bypass refusal while degrading the ability to answer harmful requests correctly. We evaluate this trade-off on WMDP (Li et al., 2024), sampling 300 questions per domain (biosecurity, cybersecurity, and chemical security) for vanilla and INTENT-FT models. We term this trade-off as the *"jailbreak-tax"*, by measuring both the harmful compliance rate and hazardous knowledge.

Intent-FT weakens the refusal direction. We find that the refusal direction extracted from models trained with INTENT-FT is less effective at disabling the refusal mechanism. As shown in Fig. 5, applying **Ablation** on INTENT-FT has nearly zero effects on jailbreaking the model as compared to the vanilla model. However, more invasive interventions, such as applying **AddAct** with $\alpha = 2$, can still enable a significant proportion of jailbreaks. To verify that the reduced harmfulness is attributable to the extracted refusal direction rather than differences in model parameters, we interchange the refusal directions between the two model settings. Applying the direction extracted from INTENT-FT to the vanilla model yields low jailbreak success, while using the vanilla refusal direction still achieves high ASR. This is further supported by the reduced magnitude in the norms of V_R^l extracted from each model, see Fig. 11. This suggests that, because INTENT-FT prompts the model to always begin




Figure 5: White-box attack ASR on **Llama (left)** and **Qwen (right)**. Intent → Vanilla uses the refusal direction $V_R^{l^*}$ from INTENT-FT to attack the vanilla model. Ablation is ineffective against INTENT-FT, while stronger ActAdd interventions increase ASR.

its response with a deduced intention, the semantic gap between z^h and z^b is diminished, unlike the vanilla setting, where the initial response more distinctly signals either refusal or compliance. We present further evidence and insights in Appendix. E.3.

Stronger attacks comes at a cost of harmful utility. Assuming organizations adopt the INTENT-FT framework, we examine the risks of open-sourcing the model weights. For Llama and Qwen models trained with INTENT-FT, we use the more aggressive **AddAct** intervention with $\alpha = 2$, as these models require stronger attacks to achieve effective jailbreaks; in contrast, the less invasive **Ablation** suffices for vanilla models. We then assess the change in accuracy on WMDP using Chain-of-Thought prompting. Although the stronger intervention can successfully jailbreak the INTENT-FT model, they risk a higher incidence of hallucinated answers, as reflected by the decreased accuracy in Tab. 3. In contrast, weaker white-box attacks on standard open-source models not only easily induce jailbreaks but can also enhance the model's ability to comply with harmful requests, as observed in Llama across all three domains. However, even with *Intent-FT*, the "forced" decrease in the compliance with harmful instructions are still limited. These findings underscore the urgent need for the community to prioritize preventative measures to mitigate LLM misuse as models become increasingly capable.

Table 3: WMDP accuracy (%). Steering uses Ablation for Vanilla and ActAdd ($\alpha = 2$) for INTENT-FT.

Model	Defense	Steer.	Bio	Cyber	Chem
Llama	Vanilla	No	70.7	51.7	56.7
		Yes	74.3	53.7	57.7
	Intent-FT	No	70.3	51.7	47.0
		Yes	60.7	45.3	41.3
Qwen	Vanilla	No	72.7	53.3	52.3
		Yes	73.0	52.3	51.3
	Intent-FT	No	69.7	50.0	50.3
		Yes	66.7	48.3	43.3

5 CONCLUSION

We introduce INTENT-FT, a lightweight fine-tuning strategy that trains LLMs to infer the underlying intent of an instruction before responding. Across the benchmarks, this approach improves jailbreak robustness while largely preserving general capabilities and reducing over-refusal on benign instructions. These findings highlight intention deduction as a practical complement to conventional safety alignment, helping models recognize concealed harmful requests beyond surface-level refusal patterns. Our results also suggest a complementary defense objective for open-weight models: inducing a larger *jailbreak tax* when bypassing safety mechanisms. Under the white-box settings, vanilla models are readily jailbroken through refusal-direction ablation with little loss of hazardous-task accuracy. In contrast, INTENT-FT requires stronger interventions that produce larger accuracy reductions on WMDP. This creates a less favorable trade-off for attackers: suppressing refusal comes at a greater cost to the capabilities needed to fulfill harmful requests. Although this effect does not prevent unrestricted misuse, it suggests that defenses can offer value beyond refusal alone by making successful jailbreaks less useful. Together, these findings motivate safety training that both improves resistance to attacks and increases the capability cost of circumventing that resistance.

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A Cross-Model Intention Transfer

Figure 6 reports the cross-model transfer experiment discussed in Section 4.3. Rows identify the model generating the intention; columns identify the vanilla model receiving it.

Intentions Generalize across Models. To assess whether the generated intentions can accurately capture the harmfulness of adversarial attacks, we append the intentions produced by INTENT-FT models as additional context to vanilla models and measure the resulting ASR. We evaluate on the final attack instructions from PAIR that previously achieved the maximum harmfulness score of 10 on the vanilla models. As shown in Fig. 6, providing the generated intentions as context substantially reduces jailbreak success for both Llama and GPT-4.1, with GPT-4.1 demonstrating near-perfect deterrence. In contrast, the effectiveness is limited for Qwen, likely due to its weaker initial safety alignment, as reflected by the higher ASR observed for the vanilla Qwen model in Tab.1.




Figure 6: Generated intentions from each model trained on INTENT-FT used as context for each vanilla model. Scores denote the ASR on successful attack instructions from PAIR. **Rows** refers to INTENT-FT models and **columns** refers to the vanilla model.

B White-Box Intervention Equations

This section gives the intervention definitions used in Section 4.4 and Figure 5.

Given a set of harmful $D_{harmful}$ and harmless instructions D_{benign}, we use the difference-in-means method to extract the refusal direction V_R^l at each layer l:

$$V_R^l = \frac{1}{|D_{\text{harmful}}|} \sum_{x_h \sim D_{\text{harmful}}} p_\theta(z_h^l \mid x_h) - \frac{1}{|D_{\text{benign}}|} \sum_{x_b \sim D_{\text{benign}}} p_\theta(z_b^l \mid x_b) \tag{2}$$

Here z^l refers to the residual stream activation (Elhage et al., 2021) at layer l. The optimal refusal direction $V_R^{l^*}$ is selected by minimizing the refusal score across all layers after extracting candidate directions using Eq. 2. This direction can be applied in various ways. Arditi et al. (2024) propose to project the residual stream activations in each layer onto $V_R^{l^*}$ before subtracting it, a method we refer to as **Ablation**:

$$z^l - \frac{V_R^{l^*} \cdot z^l}{|V_R^{l^*}| \cdot |z^l|} \tag{3}$$

Another method, **ActAdd** directly subtracts the vector scaled by a coefficient α on the layer l^* where $V_R^{l^*}$ is extracted:

$$z^{l^*} - \alpha \cdot V_R^{l^*} \tag{4}$$

C Attack and Defense Baselines

C.1 Attack baselines

PAIR (Chao et al., 2025). Following the implementation of Chao et al. (2025), we set the number of iterations to $M = 3$, but reduce the number of parallel calls N_{PAIR} to 15. We find that the reduced calls are sufficient to achieve a successful attack within the first iteration for vanilla models. Note that we consider an instruction to be successfully jailbroken if any of the parallelized attacks result in a perfect harmful score of 10. While the original work utilizes Mixtral 8x7B Instruct (Jiang et al., 2024a), we find that using a stronger model, GPT-4.1-mini can generate more successful attacks and therefore adopt it in our experiments PAIR operates by prompting the attacker model to directly generate the adversarial instruction based on the previous target model's response and harmfulness score. The attacker model then outputs both a new attack and a statement describing the improvements over the previous attempt; this statement is also provided as input to the model in subsequent iterations.

DeepInception (DI) (Li et al., 2023). DI employs a single static template to obfuscate the harmful intent of a given instruction. The template constructs a in which the model is asked to generate a story plot featuring a group of protagonists("characters") collaborating to defeat an antagonist ("evil doctor"). The plot is divided into five layers, with the harmful instruction embedded as the critical action required to overcome the antagonist.These layers are intended to simulate sequential steps for executing the harmful instruction. In our experiments, we find that DI is the weakest attack and can be easily blocked by basic defenses such as SR. This result aligns with expectations given DI's static design. Nonetheless, we observe that DI is more effective against stronger models, achieving a success rate of 86% on GPT4-1-mini.

Adaptive Attack (AA) (Andriushchenko et al., 2025). Similar to PAIR, AA is an optimization-based attack, but with a crucial distinction: AA appends a set of suffix tokens and optimizes only these, rather than the entire instruction as in PAIR. AA is also initialized with a hand-crafted template, which alone achieves a high success rate, exceeding 70% on vanilla models even without optimization. Another distinct factor is that AA restarts for K times after each M iteration; we set $K = 5$ and $M = 200$. For both Llama and GPT4-1, we employ self-transfer by reusing the suffix tokens that were found to be effective across most instructions, while for Qwen, we initialize with 25 "!" tokens. The optimization objective selects a subset of suffix tokens to modify, based on the log probabilities of the target response token. However, for INTENT-FT models, this approach is not applicable since each response begins with the stated intent. Instead, we modify the objective to search for the presence of refusal phrases within the response.

Harmful-FT. Following Qi et al. (2023), we perform the fine-tuning on 100 instructions from AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023). We gather the harmful responses by using a jailbroken version of Llama-3.1 8B Instruct model, after implementing Eq. 3. We only select instruction-response pairs where the response is given a harmfulness score of 10. This is additionally concatenated with 10 safety examples, containing both a harmful instruction and a safe response generated with Deepseek-V3. Note that we use harmful instructions rather than adversarial ones for INTENT-FT.

C.2 Defense Baselines

Self-Reminder (SR) (Xie et al., 2023). SR is a prompt-based defense method, it operates by adding both a prefix and suffix around the user instruction. Following Xie et al. (2023), we prepend *"You should be a responsible assistant and should not generate harmful or misleading content! Please answer the following user query in a responsible way."* and append *"Remember, you should be a responsible assistant and should not generate harmful or misleading content!"* to the instruction. Analogously to the findings of the IA, we observe that SR can at times cause a model to be overly cautious, as supported by the high refusal rates on XSTEST for Llama.

In-Context Defense (ICD) (Wei et al., 2023). Following the original implementation, we use 2 safety examples from ADVBENCH, with the safe responses being generated by Llama-3.1 8B. We find

ICD to be the weakest out of all the baseline defenses, and in some cases even increase harmfulness relative to the vanilla.

Intention-Analysis (IA) (Zhang et al., 2024). The authors propose both dual and single prompting templates. In the dual-prompting setup, the model is first asked to analyze the intent of the instruction and use this analysis as additional context for a secondary prompt, where the final response is generated. We apply the dual template to Llama and Qwen, and use the single template for GPT-4.1 to reduce inference costs (see Tab.4). While IA decreases the incidence of harmful responses, we observe that prompting the model twice with safety reminders leads to excessive caution and a high rate of refusals, as shown in Fig. 4.

Backdoor-Align (BD-A) (Wang et al., 2024). BD-A was introduced as a defense against Harmful-FT. It operates by augmenting the harmful dataset with a small set of safety examples that includes the backdoor trigger. We use the 150 random tokens introduced in the original implementation as the backdoor trigger, which is appended to the system prompt. A limiting factor of this approach is that it does not discriminate between benign and harmful instructions. This leads to high refusal rates on benign instructions and utility tradeoff, resulting in the highest drop on reasoning benchmarks for Llama.

Table 4: Prompt template for Intention-Analysis (IA).

Type	Prompt
Dual	Please identify the essential intention behind the following user query with a focus on safety, ethics, and legality. Ensure that your response begins with 'The essential intention of the query is.' Do not provide an actual answer to the user's query; instead, emphasize understanding and clarifying the user's intention while adhering to ethical guidelines. Following is the query you should focus on:
	Knowing its essential intention, now directly answer the aforementioned query with your normal response. Please make sure you strictly adhere to your own security restrictions.
Single	Please identify the essential intention behind the user query below. Think carefully whether it violates our ethical, legal, or safety guidelines. And then respond to the user query. You do not have to make extra explanation of the intention. But make sure your response strictly adheres to our policy and ethical standards, excluding any unsafe or unethical information. Following is the user query you should focus on: {Question}




Figure 7: Effects of varying D_I between 0 and 100 on harmfulness, utility and over-refusal. 0 refers to performing SFT only on D_B.




Figure 8: Qualitative example of safety defenses on XSTEST. INTENT-FT correctly infers that the term *"smash"* relates to *"doing well"*, while other defense baselines either outright refuses or incorrectly infers as *"cheating"*.



(a) ASR vs. iteration budget on PAIR, with safety defenses applied. Max iteration is set to 3, with 15 parallel attacks each iteration.

(b) ASR vs iteration budget on Adaptive Attack. Iterations are summed over the 5 restarts, yielding $200 * 5$ max iterations.

Figure 9: ASR vs optimization iterations on PAIR and Adaptive Attack.

C.3 Attack Budget

Optimizataion-based attacks such as PAIR and AA iteratively modify the input instruction over M queries to achieve a successful jailbreak. As shown in Fig. 9a, most baseline defenses fail within the first iteration of PAIR, whereas INTENT-FT requires substantially more iterations and maintains a lower ASR. Similar trends are observed for AA in Fig. 9b. In terms of computational complexity, PAIR is more efficient given that it enables parallelism when constructing attacks, thus the number of parallel calls are set to be much higher than the iterations while the opposite is true for AA.

Notably, we find that stronger models like GPT-4.1 can be jailbroken in fewer iterations for attacks that optimize the entire instruction as in PAIR compared to those targeting only a suffix in AA. This demonstrates the resilience of stronger models against random incoherent tokens. Nonetheless, these findings highlight that, despite prior existing safeguards, attackers can still achieve successful jailbreaks with minimal effort, whereas INTENT-FT requires a much higher attacking cost while still degrading the effectiveness of the attacks.

D INTENT-FT TEMPLATES

The dedicated system prompt for INTENT-FT is shown in Tab. 5, note that we add this to every examples regardless of whether is the instruction harmful or benign. We find that while one can achieve greater defense when adding the system prompt only to D_I to create a backdoor trigger, it severely degrades utility. We prompt GPT-4.1 with the template in Tab. 6 to generate the intention analysis for harmful samples and Tab. 7 for benign samples. The main difference between the two lies with the instructions used; only the adversarial instructions are used for harmful samples, such that the reasoning is crafted in manner that decodes the harmful instruction from the adversarial, whereas in the benign case, it is designed as a secondary re-read over the instruction.

Table 5: System prompt for INTENT-FT.

Always start by reading and understanding the underlying intentions behind the instruction, before giving a safe and harmless response. Ensure that the response always adheres to safety and ethical guidelines.

Table 6: Prompt used for the teacher LLM to generate the harmful reasoning deduction in INTENT-FT. {HARMFUL} and {ADVERSARIAL} are placeholders for the harmful and adversarial instruction.

You are a helpful assistant who is tasked to generate training labels to train a language model. The goal of the training is to ensure the model learns to deduce the underlying intent of the given instruction before thinking of how to respond to it. You are given a instruction and your task is to generate a reasoning trace of deducing the intentions of the instruction. The instruction is actually crafted to jailbreak the model, whose underlying intention is related to the harmful instruction: {HARMFUL}. The reasoning trace should be written in the point of view of the model and clearly elucidate how is the given instruction actually related to the the harmful instruction. End with something along the lines of "So the main intent of the instruction is to". Instruction: {ADVERSARIAL}

Table 7: Prompt used for the teacher LLM to generate the benign reasoning deduction in INTENT-FT.

You are a helpful assistant who is tasked to generate training labels to train a language model. The goal of the training is to ensure the model first learns to deduce the intent of the given instruction before thinking of how to respond to it. You are given a instruction and your task is to generate a short reasoning trace that tries to deduce the intent of the instruction, which will serve as the initial part of the label. You should not try to solve the instruction. The reasoning trace should be written in the point of view of the model and end with something along the lines of "So the main intent of the instruction is to". Instruction: {BENIGN}

E ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS

E.1 INTENT-FT ON PRETRAINED MODELS.

Previously, we implemented INTENT-FT as an additional instruct-tuning on existing chat models. However, we have limited the size of the dataset to prevent any undesirable deterioration in the model's performance since we do not have access to the original instruct-tuning dataset and fine-tuning for intent generation is likely to be off-distribution. In this section, we explore the idea of augmenting the full instruct-tuning dataset with intent generation. We sample 20000 instructions from Alpaca (Taori et al., 2023) to initialize the main dataset and augment with 1000 harmful intent examples. Both of the harmful and benign intentions are generated following the template in Tab. 6 and 7 respectively.

As a baseline, we compare with conducting SFT on samples without the intention, similar to Safety-FT. We evaluate on PAIR attacks (harmfulness), XSTEST (over-refusal), ARC, MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2020) and GPQA for utility.

In Fig. 10, we observe similar findings as before, training with the INTENT-FT framework provides large upsides to the model's defense against adversarial instructions, while lower excessive refusal on XSTEST. Moreover, there is negligible performance difference between the two training styles on reasoning benchmarks. We believe that INTENT-FT is a promising framework to strengthen the defense of the foundation model against jailbreak attacks and leave exploration on more comprehensive training datasets for future work.




Figure 10: Harmfulness (PAIR), over-refusal and utility evaluation on **pre-trained** Llama trained with INTENT-FT. Intention fine-tuned models significantly reduces harmfulness and excessive refusal while not sacrificing utility.

E.2 INTENTIONS ARE UNIVERSALLY USEFUL

Instead of re-running PAIR from scratch, we reuse the successful attack instructions found on the vanilla models, i.e. each harmful instruction contains N^*_{PAIR} adversarial instructions, where N^*_{PAIR} varies per instruction depending on the number of attacks achieving ASR of 10. Following the original evaluation, an instruction is deemed to be successfully jailbroken if any of the N_{PAIR} attacks results in an ASR of 10. Evidently, both Fig. 6 and qualitative examples in Fig. 16 show that models trained with INTENT-FT can produce universally reliable intentions. Even when the model is not explicitly trained to condition the response on the intentions, it can still provide substantial defense against adversarial attacks. The utility of the intention scales beyond the type of prior training; useful on vanilla models and model architectures; intention from one model can transfer to the other.

E.3 MECHANISTIC ANALYSIS ON INTENT-FT

Logit Lens on Internal Representations. Besides observing a reduction in the norms of the refusal direction $V_R^{l^*}$, we perform another analysis: Logit Lens (Nostalgebraist, 2020). Logit Lens is a mechanistic interpretability tool that essentially performs early unembedding of any internal activations of a model. This is in contrast with traditional operations, where the unembedding layer W_U is only used on the output from the final layer. Logit Lens can thus be used on any layer to view the immediate output probabilities over V, here $|\cdot|_L$ refers to applying the final normalization layer:

$$p^l_\theta(x_{t+1}|z^l; x_1, \dots x_t) = W_U(|z^l|_L) \tag{5}$$




Figure 11: Refusal direction norms across each layer for both vanilla and INTENT-FT models. **[Left]** Llama, **[Right]** Qwen. Optimal layer for Llama = 11 and 14 for Qwen.

We perform Logit Lens on JAILBREAKBENCH as the harmful dataset and ALPACA as the harmless, and find the top 5 most common unembedded token in each layer.

Interestingly, in the vanilla setting, we observe a clear distinction between refusal and compliance behaviors when the model is prompted with harmful versus harmless instructions. As shown in Fig. 12, the token *"cannot"* appears in early layers and transitions to *"I"* in later layers, a pattern consistent with refusal phrases such as *"I cannot help you"* (Arditi et al., 2024; Yeo et al., 2025). In contrast, for harmless instructions, the most frequent token is *"Here"*, commonly initiating compliance phrases like *"Here are the steps"*. However, when applying the Logit Lens to models trained with INTENT-FT, these distinct patterns are no longer observed. Instead, frequent tokens such as *"first"*, *"the"*, and *"to"* emerge in both harmful and harmless settings, reflecting the template-like openings in intention reasoning seen in the training data (e.g., *"First, I need to"*, *"The instruction is"*, *"To deduce the intention"*).

In the vanilla setting, the representations z_h^l (harmful) and z_b^l (benign) are well separated, and their contrast defines a direction closely associated with harmfulness, favoring refusal over compliance. This separation explains why refusal directions extracted from INTENT-FT models are much weaker: the behavioral delta between harmful and harmless prompts is reduced, as evidenced by the diminished contrast under the Logit Lens. Nevertheless, as shown in Fig. 5, the **ActAdd** intervention can still reduce refusal rates, suggesting that z_h^l and z_b^l in INTENT-FT models continue to encode some notion of harm and harmlessness. However, these do not directly manifest as explicit refusal or compliance; rather, the model now signals the harmful or harmless nature of the instruction at a later stage in the response.

PCA Shows Retained Discriminability. To further examine the relationship between harmful and harmless representations after training, we perform PCA on activations from layers near l^*. As shown in Fig. 14, a clear separation between the two classes persists, despite the weakened refusal direction. This indicates that, while the explicit contrastive direction associated with immediate refusal is attenuated, the model still retains discriminative features that differentiate harmful from harmless inputs in the broader activation space. In other words, the reduction in the magnitude of the refusal direction does not imply that the overall representational distinction between harmful and harmless instructions is lost; instead, it suggests that this distinction is now distributed across multiple directions in activation space, rather than being concentrated along a single, highly-interpretable axis.




Figure 12: Applying Logit Lens on JAILBREAKBENCH with **Vanilla Llama**. Values represent probability of observing the target token. There is a clear distinction between the top internal representations between harmful and harmless instruction sets, with *"I"* being a common starting token for refusal phrases and *"Here"* for compliance.





Figure 13: Applying Logit Lens on JAILBREAKBENCH with **INTENT-FT Llama**. In contrast to Vanilla models, there is no clear indication if the input representation corresponds to harmful or harmless concepts.



(a) Vanilla (b) INTENT-FT

Figure 14: PCA on harmful and harmless representations from layer 9 to 14 on Llama. The optimal layer l^* is 11.

E.4 CLASSIFIER DEFENSES

Previously, we examined both prompt-based and fine-tuning approaches for defending against jailbreak attacks. Here, we investigate another alternative: using a classifier (Peng et al., 2024) to filter out harmful instructions, allowing only benign inputs to reach the language model. This approach can also be applied to model outputs, screening responses for harmful content before they are presented to users. Conceptually, this forms a two-stage defense: a classifier detects for harmful requests prior to model inference, while the safety-aligned model attempts to refuse the harmful request. An additional stage can be added by applying the classifier to the output response as well.

We employ OpenAI's Moderation API[4] and Llama-Guard-3 (LG)[5] as our classifiers. The OpenAI API supports independent evaluation of inputs and outputs, whereas LG requires both to be provided as input; thus, we apply the OpenAI classifier to both the input and output space for maximum defense. As shown in Fig. 15, while classifier-based filtering provides some improvement over relying solely on internal model safety alignment, both classifiers remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, with PAIR attacks still achieving over 50% success rates. Beyond the increased inference overhead, a key drawback is the binary nature of these classifiers, which can lead to false refusals of benign instructions, thereby degrading model usability. This effect is evident in the significant increase in refusal rates on XSTEST when using the OpenAI classifier.

Overall, while classifiers offer a lightweight alternative to model fine-tuning, their limitations as binary filters constrain their effectiveness. Rather, we believe that a more effective deployment is to use classifiers as a trigger for additional scrutiny, for instance, one can implement INTENT-FT training but with an additional trigger to control if the model should perform the intention generation. This hybrid strategy can reduce inference cost and mitigate performance degradation in high-stakes applications. We think that this is promising and leave it for future works.




Figure 15: Evaluation on classifier-based defenses on harmfulness (PAIR and DI) and over-refusal for **Llama**.

[4]https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/moderation
[5]https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/Llama-Guard-3-8B

F QUALITATIVE EXAMPLES




Figure 16: Qualitative example of **PAIR** on Llama. Both vanilla and IA defense is fooled by the attack and outputs harmful responses, while INTENT-FT correctly infers the harmful intention and refuses to comply. IA focuses on adhering to safety guidelines but does not recognize the harmful intention.




Figure 17: Qualitative example of **Harmful-FT** on Llama. While IA regards the intention of the instruction as harmful, it still leads to a harmful response, while INTENT-FT mitigates the effect of the harmful training and refuses to comply with the instruction.




Figure 18: Qualitative example of **Adaptive Attack (AA)** on GPT-4.1. AA instructs the target model to follow a set of pre-defined rules that restrict the model from beginning it's response with common refusal phrases. INTENT-FT correctly infers the hypothetical nature of the instruction and deduce the underlying harmful intention. Both Vanilla and IA appeared to adhere to the rules and comply with the harmful request.




Figure 19: Qualitative example of **PAIR** on Qwen. IA highlights the need to follow ethical and legal considerations but fails to understand that full compliance is not possible while ensuring safety. INTENT-FT correctly infers the underlying harm and offers an alternative which does not include details on hacking methods.